Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
RULE 16
BATCH 6
ATTY. FAMADOR
1. RAMOS vs PERALTA: Nam Tayaban
M5
FACTS:
Petitioner Benedicto Ramos started occupying the Salgado fishpond
TABLE OF CONTENTS
from January 1, 1964 by virtue of a lease contract executed in his
RULE 16 - MOTION TO DISMISS favor by private respondent spouses Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez.
1. RAMOS VS PERALTA: NAM TAYABAN √ The original lease term of 5 years was renewed several times, the last
being until December 31, 1977.
2. TING VS ALIGAEN: ANGELITO ORTIZ
Ramos was unaware that title 1 of the property was in the name of
3. PNB VS HIPOLITO: DIANNE POGOSA √
Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded,
4. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP VS CA: JEPROKS GERODIAZ √ organized, and 99.5%-owned by the Salgado spouses, which was later
renamed Mindanao Insurance Co., In., and was placed under
receivership and liquidation.
RULE 17 - DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Thereafter, respondent P.R. Roman, Inc. purchased the Salgado
5. GO VS CRUZ: SITTI WARNA √
fishpond for P950,000.00 from Mindanao Insurance. As a result the
6. JALOVER VS YTORIAGA: KRISTINE MARIE SUPERABLE CAMINERO √ spouses Ortanez refused to accept from petitioners the advance
7. MINA VS PACSON: MARY MAE ABALLE LANTICSE √ rentals on the fishpond in the amount of P30,000.
8. CASINAS VS VDA DE ROSALES: FLORENCE TAN Later on, petitioner received a letter from Don Pablo R. Roman
informing him of the latter’s acquisition of the fishpond and intention
9. REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK VS MOLINA: JOHARA VILLANUEVA √
to take possession thereof. Ramos reminded Mr. Roman of his lease
contract over the fishpond and refused to consent to the intended
Special thanks to all volunteers! take over. Notwithstanding petitioner's objection, P. R. Roman, Inc.
took over possession of the fishpond.
Petitioner filed before the CFI Manila an action for consignation of the
sum of P70,000 representing advance rentals for the 101-hectare
Salgado fishpond located in Bo. Balut, Pilar, Bataan. The sums being
previously tendered to, but refused by spouses Ortanez and Pablo
Roman.
P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that venue admission of the identity of parties in Civil Case No. 4102 and Civil
was improperly laid, the complaint states no cause of action and the Case No. 103647, particularly as he filed a third party complaint in
court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit. In its Civil Case No. 4102 against the spouses Ortanez and Mindanao
motion to dismiss, P. R. Roman, Inc. cited the pendency before the insurance.
then CFI of Bataan of Civil Case No. 4102 instituted by P.R. Roman,
Inc. against petitioner Benedicto Ramos on August 13, 1976 to quiet
2. TING vs ALIGAEN: Angelito Ortiz
its title over the Salgado fishpond.
CFI Manila: Dismissed the petition, petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was unsuccessful. LOWER COURT: Petitioner is the defendant and appellant; Respondent is
plaintiff and appellee
ISSUE: FACTS:
WON the CFI Manila erred in dismissing the case. 1. ANTECEDENTS: In a prior case (1956), petitioners contended that the
sale to Liong (an alien), predecessor in interest of respondents, of a
HELD: parcel of land was void. But the purchaser was not aware of the
constitutional prohibition (sale of land to alien) while the petitioners
No. Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be
were. However, pursuant to the principle of in pari delicto, the
invoked as a ground for the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of
petitioner is barred from recovering the title.
the following requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at least 2. COMPLAINT: Twelve (12) years later, on the basis of the decision of
such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) Identity of the SC in PBC v. Lui She1 (1967), respondents filed a complaint for the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the recovery of the same parcel. Respondents reiterated their
same facts; and (c) The identity in the two cases should be such that contention.
the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which 3. MOTION TO DISMISS: On the ground of res judicata.
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. 4. OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION: In support of the change in
jurisprudence asserted, upon the contention that said decision
These requisites are present in the case at bar. It is worthwhile warrants a reopening of the case and the return of the parcel of land
mentioning that in his basic petition for review, one of the assigned involved to the petitioners.
errors of petitioner is that the respondent court erred in not holding 5. REPLY TO THE OPPOSITION: PBC v. Lui She cannot affect the
that the parties in Civil Case No. 4102 are not the same as the parties outcome of the instant case. Said 1967 decision cannot be applied to
in Civil Case No. 103647. However, in his brief, no further mention of the instant case where there had been already a final and conclusive
this assigned error was made; a clear indication of petitioner's determination.
1 Ratio – It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because only cogent but also important, article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an
the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are, without relief. For exception to the rule on pari delicto, that "When the agreement is not illegal
one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the
charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators to protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover
whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt. For another thing, and this is not what he has paid or delivered."
6. ORDER: Before the filing of the petitioners’ Reply, the Motion was due to the transfer of defendant Hipolito as supervising teacher to some
denied. other province, his proposed plan of payment did not materialize; that said
ISSUE: offer of plan of payment was an acknowledgment of defendants' just and
valid obligation.
Whether the questions decided in the previous case could still be
brought again in the present case in view of the change in 4. The prayer was for the court to order defendants to pay to plaintiff the
jurisprudence, and consequently, the motion to dismiss on the said amount of P11,999.73.
ground of res judicata should be denied (NO) 5. Defendants move for a bill of particulars, but the motion was denied.
HELD: They then moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action, if
1. Requisites for application of res judicata are present – any, had already prescribed. To the motion they attached a joint affidavit of
a. It is undisputed that the first case was tried and decided by a merit, wherein they averred that they never made any acknowledgment of
court of competent jurisdiction, whose decision was affirmed indebtedness nor offered a plan of payment, but on the contrary had always
maintained that plaintiff's action had prescribed.
on appeal by the SC
b. The parties to the two cases are substantially the same. 6. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that the prescriptive period
c. The subject matter of the two actions are the same. had been suspended by "Executive Order No. 32, otherwise known as the
d. The causes of action and the reliefs prayed for are identical Moratorium Law," and interrupted, pursuant to Article 1973 of the old Civil
— the annulment of the sale and the recovery of the subject Code, by plaintiff's written extra-judicial demands as well as by defendants'
parcel of land. acknowledgment of the indebtedness.
2. PBC case is not applicable to the case at bar, considering the rule that 7. Defendants replied to plaintiff's opposition, stating among other things
posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court cannot retroactively that Executive Order No. 32, if at all, suspended the prescriptive period "only
be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where for two (2) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days; that the alleged
the prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or written extrajudicial demands constitute self-serving evidence; and that
criminal in nature. defendant Hipolito's letter of February 16, 1959 can not be considered as an
acknowledgment of indebtedness.
CFI’S DECISION: Dismissed the complaint. It ruled that since the seven
3. PNB vs HIPOLITO: Dianne Pogosa promissory notes constituted one single obligation, arising as it did from
plaintiff's financiation of defendants' sugar crop for 1941-42, the date of the
FACTS:
last promissory note, June 23, 1941, should be considered as the true date of
1. The case was an appeal from the order of dismissal by the Court of First the written contract, from which the ten year prescriptive period started. that
Instance of Negros Occidental. the alleged letters of demand cannot be considered as extrajudicial demands
"under Art. 1155 of the Civil Code" because there is no proof that defendants
2. The complaint, filed on June 18, 1959, allege that defendants obtained
received them; that plaintiff's letter of demand of February 4, 1959, which
various sugar crop loans from plaintiff through its Victorias Branch, evidenced
was admittedly received by defendant Hipolito, did not work to interrupt the
by promissory notes that despite repeated demands, defendants failed and
prescriptive period which had already previously elapsed; and that defendant
refused to pay said amount;
Hipolito's answering letter of February 16, 1959 does not contain any express
3. That in view of such demands defendants went to Attorney Medel of or tacit acknowledgment of the obligation nor promise to pay the same and
the legal department of plaintiff's Victorias branch and offered a plan of hence did not renew the obligation.
payment of the account, but for reasons unknown to plaintiff and probably
SUMMARY: Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for recovery of taxes
against the petitioner in RTC Malolos, Bulacan and before the expiration of
ISSUE: WON defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations of
the 15-day reglementary period to answer; the petitioner filed two successive
fact contained in the complaint in a motion to dismiss. (YES)
motions for extension of time to file responsive pleadings, which were both
granted. 3 days before the expiration of the second extension, petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of plantiff’s (Norzagaray)
RULING: lack of capacity to sue and lack of cause of action but the motion was denied
The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal of the complaint is for both for lack of capacity to sue and lack of cause of action. Plaintiff
erroneous. In a motion to dismiss defendant hypothetically admits the truth (Norzagaray) then moved to declare the petitioner in default for having filed
of the allegations of fact contained in the complaint. only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive pleading during the extension
granted. RTC received ex parte the evidence for the plaintiff and thereafter
An examination of the complaint herein does not indicate clearly that ruled in favor of the plaintiff declaring the petitioner in default; CA affirmed.
prescription has set in. On the contrary, it is belied by the allegation
concerning defendant's offer of payment made on May 7, 1957. Such offer ISSUE: Whether the order of default was valid. (NO). and whether the motion
hypothetically admitted in the motion, worked as a renewal of the obligation. to dismiss was seasonably filed within the period of the second extension
granted by the trial court. (YES)
It is true that defendants attached to the motion a joint affidavit of
merit wherein they deny having made an offer of a plan of payment. Such RULING: The default order was clearly erroneous and should not have been
denial, however, being a contrary averment of fact, would be proper in the sustained on appeal. There is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed
answer to the complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for the seasonably, within the period of the second extension granted by the trial
contradictory allegations would require presentation of evidence. The same court. Moreover, in, Sec. 4. Rule 16 provides: Time to plead. — If the motion
is true of the other allegations in the complaint concerning, the demands for to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall
payment sent by plaintiff upon defendants and the partial payments made by file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the
them, all or some of which may have a material bearing on the question of time he received notice of denial or deferment, unless the court provides a
prescription. In other words, the ground for dismissal not being indubitable, different period. The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days
the lower court should have deferred determination of the issue until after before the expiration of the second extension. Notice of its denial was served
trial of the case on the merits. on the petitioner on July 29, 1985. From that date (July 29, when the
petitioner received the notice of denial of his motion), the petitioner had 15
The order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the days within which to file its answer, or until August 13, 1985. It was unable to
lower court for further proceedings, with costs against appellees. do so, however, because of the default order issued by the trial court on
August 2, 1985. On that date, the petitioner still had eleven days before the
expiration of the 15-day reglementary period during which the petitioner was
supposed to file his answer. The SC held that in issuing the order of default
4. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP vs CA: Jeproks Gerodiaz before the expiration of the period for the filing of its answer, the trial court
deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to be heard in its defense. The
PETITIONER: CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION judgment by default thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the evidence
of the plaintiff, was therefore also invalid. At any rate, the default order was
RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and MUNICIPALITY OF NORZAGARAY
a total nullity and produced no legal effect whatsoever because it was issued
even before the petitioner could file its answer. This was clearly a violation of
due process.
It is clearly provided in Section 4 of the same Rule that: Sec. 4. Time to plead.
— If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred,
FACTS:
the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11,
1. On February 1, 1985, the Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for computed from the time he received notice of denial or deferment, unless
recovery of taxes against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, the court provides a different period.
Bulacan.
The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days before the
2. Before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period to answer, the expiration of the second extension. Notice of its denial was served on the
petitioner filed two successive motions for extension of time to file petitioner on July 29, 1985. From that date (July 29, when the petitioner
responsive pleadings, which were both granted. received the notice of denial of his motion), the petitioner had 15 days within
which to file its answer, or until August 13, 1985. It was unable to do so,
3. The last day of the second extension was May 28, 1985. On May 25, 1985, however, because of the default order issued by the trial court on August 2,
the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the 1985. On that date, the petitioner still had eleven days before the expiration
plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause of action. of the 15-day reglementary period during which the petitioner was supposed
4. The motion was denied on July 16, 1985, "both for lack of merit and for to file his answer.
having been improperly filed." We hold that in issuing the order of default before the expiration of the
5. On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to declare the petitioner in default period for the filing of its answer, the trial court deprived the petitioner of
for having filed only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive pleading the opportunity to be heard in its defense. The judgment by default
during the extension granted. thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the evidence of the plaintiff, was
therefore also invalid. We do not agree with the respondent court that the
6. This declaration was made on August 2, 1985, and evidence for the petitioner should have first filed a motion to set aside the default order
plaintiff was thereafter received ex parte, resulting in a judgment in its favor before challenging the judgment by default on appeal. The evidence that the
on February 4, 1986. The judgment was affirmed by the respondent court in default order was not served on the petitioner has not been refuted. It is not
its decision dated April 7, 1989, 1 which is the subject of the present petition. explained why the default judgment was served on the correct counsel of the
ISSUE: Whether the order of default was valid. (NO) and whether the motion petitioner but the default order was not. At any rate, the default order was a
to dismiss was seasonably filed within the period of the second extension total nullity and produced no legal effect whatsoever because it was issued
granted by the trial court. (YES) even before the petitioner could file its answer. This was clearly a violation of
due process.
RULING:
The record shows that the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered on
The default order was clearly erroneous and should not have been sustained April 7, 1989, and notice thereof was served on the petitioner on April 17,
on appeal. There is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed 1989. On April 28, 1989, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
seasonably, within the period of the second extension granted by the trial which was denied on June 1, 1989. Notice of the denial was served on June 8,
court. It is true that such a motion could not be considered a responsive 1989, and on June 21, 1989, the petitioner asked this Court for a 30-day
pleading as we have held in many cases. extension within which to file the present petition. The extension was granted
Nevertheless, it is also true that in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, up to July 23, 1989. The private respondent contends that the petition was
it is provided that "within the time for pleading, a motion to dismiss the action filed late because the 15-day reglementary period should be counted from
may be made" on the grounds therein enumerated, including the grounds April 17, 1989, when the decision of the respondent court was served on the
invoked by the petitioner. petitioner. Its reason is that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma
and did not suspend the running of the said period, which thus expired on judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
May 3, 1989. without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication
While mindful of the decision cited by the private respondent, we call upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a
attention to our later pronouncement on this matter, in the case of Siy v. competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A
Court of Appeals: In the first place, the very purpose of a motion for class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of
reconsideration is to point out the findings and conclusions of the decision
the court."
which in the movant's view, are not supported by law or the evidence. The
movant, therefore, is very often confined to the amplification on further
discussion of the same issues already passed upon by the court. Otherwise,
his remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or Facts:
some other remedy. Conformably, we must hold that the motion for
reconsideration was not pro forma. Hence, it did have the effect of California Manufacturing Co., Inc. sued Dante Go in CFI Manila for
suspending the reglementary period of appeal until the denial of the motion unfair competition. The gravamen of California's complaint was that
was notified to the petitioner. Dante Go, doing business under the name and style of "Sugarland
International Products," and engaged like California in the
manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta, was selling his
products in the open market under the brand name, "Great Italian,"
RULE 17 in packages which were in colorable and deceitful imitation of
California's containers bearing its own brand, "Royal." Its complaint
contained an application for preliminary injunction commanding
5. GO vs CRUZ: Sitti Warna
Dante Go to immediately cease and desist from the further
DOCTRINE manufacture, sale and distribution of said products, and to retrieve
those already being offered for sale. About two weeks later, however,
The dismissal of civil actions is always addressed to the sound
California filed a notice of dismissal with the Court without prejudice
judgment and discretion of the court, whether dismissal is sought
conformably with Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
after a trial has been completed or otherwise, or whether it is prayed
for by a defending party, or by a plaintiff or claimant. There is one
instance however where the dismissal of an action rests exclusively
Four days afterwards, California received by registered mail a copy of
on the will of a plaintiff or claimant, to prevent which the defending
Dante Go's answer with counterclaim which has been filed in court. A
party and even the court itself is powerless, requiring in fact no action
fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying among others the
whatever on the part of the court except the acceptance and
sala of Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including
recording of the causative document. This is dealt with in Section 1,
that filed by California against Dante Go. California filed another
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which reads as follows: "SECTION 1.
complaint asserting the same cause of action against Dante Go, this
Dismissal by the plaintiff . — An action may be dismissed by the
time with the CFI Caloocan City. This second suit was assigned to the
plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any
branch presided over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz.
time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary
Issue:
Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order directing defendant to Whether or not the plaintiff has the right to cause the dismissal by
immediately cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale, mere notice before an answer is served on him.
promotion and distribution of spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta
products contained in packaging boxes and labels under the name
`GREAT ITALIAN,' which are similar to or copies of those of the Ruling:
plaintiff, and recall and all his spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta
Yes. A plaintiff has the right to cause dismissal of his action by mere
products using the brand, ‘GREAT ITALIAN.’”
notice before an answer is served on him, even if an answer had
already been filed in court.
On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go
filed a petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its
de Leon: Note that service of a motion for summary judgment also
nullification and perpetual inhibition. The Court issued a writ of
precludes right to dismiss by notice.
preliminary injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz and the City
Sheriff from enforcing or implementing the restraining order and
from continuing with the hearing on the application for preliminary
What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the
injunction. The scope of the injunction was subsequently enlarged to
action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's answer with
include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained from
the Court (either personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff
proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by
of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment. This is the plain
California against Dante Go. Dante Go's thesis is that the case filed
and explicit message of the Rules. Service signifies delivery of the
against him by California in the Manila Court remained pending
pleading or other paper to the parties affected thereby through their
despite California's notice of dismissal. According to him, since he had
counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is ordered by
already filed his answer to the complaint before California sought
the court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal
dismissal of the action three (3) days afterwards, such dismissal was
service, 15 service by mail, 16 or substituted service.
no longer a matter of right and could no longer be effected by mere
notice in accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, but
only on plaintiff's motion, and by order of the Court; hence, the
California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court
Caloocan Court acted without jurisdiction over the second action
after the filing of Dante Go's answer but before service thereof. Thus
based on the same cause. He also accused California of forum
having acted well within the letter and contemplation of the afore-
shopping, of selecting a sympathetic court for a relief which it had
quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto
failed to obtain from another.
brought about the dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila
Court, without need of any order or other action by the Presiding
Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever reasons
or motives California might have had for bringing it about, and was, as of around 900 square meters; that since before the war, the plaintiffs have
the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, "without prejudice," the been in continuous possession of the increased portion of the land, which,
under the principle of alluvion, automatically belongs to them; that sometime
contrary not being otherwise "stated in the notice" and it being the
in January, 1958, the defendants had the land increase surveyed, placed
first time the action was being so dismissed. concrete monuments thereon and took possession , without the knowledge
and consent of the plaintiff and that the defendants, who destroyed plants
standing on the land in question which belong to the plaintiffs, have remained
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second in ion of the in spite of repeated demands made by the latter for them to
action in the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same return the said possession. The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the
owners of the increased portion of the land, and that the defendants be
claim. The filing of the complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the
ordered to vacate the premises and restore their possession to the plaintiffs,
subject matter or nature of the action. In truth, and contrary to what to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P147.00 as actual damages, the sum of
petitioner Dante Go obviously believes, even if the first action were P300.00 as attorney's fees, and the sum of P200.00 annually from the time
still pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance would not affect the plaintiffs were deprived of ion up to the time the said ion shall have been
the jurisdiction of the Caloocan Court over the second suit. The costs restored, and to pay the of suit.
pendency of the first action would merely give the defendant the In his answer dated April 21, 1960, petitioner Fermin Jalover, as a defendant,
right to move to dismiss the second action on the ground of auter alleged, inter alia, that his mother and co-defendant, Ana Hedriana, died on
action pendant, or litis pendentia. July 21, 1959; that the land in question was formerly a river bed, which, less
than 10 years before, was abandoned the natural change in the course of the
waters; that the said land rightfully belongs to the defendant as sole heir of
his mother, who owned the land pursuant to Article 461 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines; that it is not true that the plaintiffs were ever in possession
6. JALOVER vs YTORIAGA: Kristine Marie Superable Caminero of the land, or that they had made demands upon the defendant to vacate
the land; that the plaintiffs had filed an ejectment suit against the defendant
with the Municipal Court of Iloilo City on March 12, 1958, and the same was
Doctrine: decided against the plaintiffs: and that by virtue of the malicious firing of the
complaint, the defendant suffered damages and had to hire the services of
After the prosecution had rested its case, the case may not be dismissed for counsel. The defendant prayed the court to dismiss the complaint with costs
failure to prosecute. against the plaintiffs and to order the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the sum
Facts: of P1,000.00 as damages and the sum of P1,000,00 by way of attorney's fees.
Two complaints filed by Republic Planters Bank-Civil case no. 116028 (branch
36) and Civil Case No. 129829 (branch 20) for the, for the collection of sum of For the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must
money based on the promissory note. acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. If it did not
Judge Alfredo C. Florendo dismissed Civil Case No. 116028 for failure of the acquire jurisdiction over the private respondents as parties to Civil Case No.
petitioner "to prosecute its case within a reasonable length of time." 116028, it cannot render any binding decision, favorable or adverse to them,
or dismiss the case with prejudice which, in effect, is an adjudication on the
merits. The controverted orders in Civil Case No. 116028 disregarded the
fundamental principles of remedial law and the meaning and the effect of
jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered res judicata, must be binding, and
must be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
judgment is a nullity. The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028 does not
have the effect of an adjudication on the merits of the case because the court
that rendered the same did not have the requisite jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants therein. This being so, it cannot be the basis of res
judicata and it cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all, such a dismissal may
be considered as one without prejudice.