Conan Fischer

Class Enemies or Class Brothers?

Communist-Nazi Relations in Germany
1929-33

The demise of the Weimar Republic was both sudden and spectacular.
In 1928 the German electorate largely ignored the radical prophets of
doom and enabled an SPD-led coalition to take office. Conservative and
middle-class opinion still tended to regard the Republic with reserve,
but generally the domestic and international situation appeared much
improved. This recovery was brief. In 1929, as the fragile world
economic order collapsed, Germany slid rapidly into an unprecedentedly
severe economic crisis. This catalysed a political crisis which brought
the NSDAP, previously a fringe party, to power in January 1933. Of
course most Germans did not vote Nazi. The two large Catholic parties
saw their vote falter only in March 1933 - after Hitler had become
Chancellor - while the republican SPD’s vote declined rather than
collapsed. Other voters turned to the Communist Party, the KPD, which
almost doubled its national vote and had almost overhauled the SPD
electorally by November 1932.
Seymour Martin Lipset ranks among the more influential analyists of
this crisis. In his study of modem political systems, Political Man, which
first appeared in 1960, Lipset argues that economic insecurity causes
political radicalization which polarizes politics on class lines. When
examining Weimar Germany, Lipset argues that the middle classes,
habitual supporters of bourgeois liberalism (sic), deserted the moderate
centre for the NSDAP, while the working classes tended to switch from
the SPD to the KPD as they were radicalized by the economic
catastrophe.3
The elegant simplicity of this argument has, doubtless, contributed to
its popularity. Historical analysis of the collapse of Weimar has become

A debate on matters raised in this article, consisting of a critique by R. J. Geary and

a reply by the author, will appear in the next issue of European History Quarterly.

259
Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,
2016
260

increasingly refined and complex, but the notion of political polarization

on class lines remains firmly established. 4 None the less, some writings
have suggested a weakening of class politics during the depression.
Barrington Moore Jr. is prominent among those who remain unconvinced
by the lower-middle-class theory of Nazism, although he would not deny
that very many protestant lower-middle-class Germans supported the
NSDAP. I ,

This paper will argue that while conventional class and interest group
politics survived within a narrowing social base of those least affected
by the economic crisis, (class being taken to describe people’s material
position in society, their relationship to the means of production), new
forms of political action, not necessarily founded on class, developed
among the economic and psychological victims of the depression. This
hypothesis will be examined through consideration of relations between
the two main radical parties, the NSDAP and KPD, as seen from the
KPD’s viewpoint.
The KPD’s origins pre-date and are quite distinct from those of German
fascism. Before the First World War, the revisionist and orthodox wings
of the SPD had shared a commitment to democratic socialism, but
disagreements over the war itself and the revolution in Russia sundered
the party. In Weimar the choice seemed to be between democracy or
socialism. The SPD’s leaders regarded the establishment of a parliamen-
tary democracy as their first priority, although even their record in this
respect has attracted considerable criticism.’ The KPD was founded in
January 1919, largely from members of the Spartakus League, a pacifist,
revolutionary group which included many left wingers from the pre-war
SPD. Its leaders, notably Rosa Luxemburg, although confronted by a
powerful syndicalist presence in the party, advocated the establishment
of socialism through spontaneous popular revolution, but following her
violent death in the January 1919 rising, the KPD’s new leaders began
to move towards an explicitly Marxist-Leninist line. In effect, by the
mid-1920s they would sacrifice democracy to achieve socialism. The
resulting struggle between the two socialist parties has dominated histories
of the Weimar KPD. 8 It is agreed that the KPD tried in vain to destroy
the SPD’s powerful base among the industrial workers and trade unions
in an attempt to dominate the socialist section of the proletariat. From
this base the KPD had planned to control the masses and, consequently,
society as a whole. The intensity of this struggle during the depression
years, it is argued, greatly assisted Hitler’s cause by default. Socialism
was divided while the fascist and traditional Right co-operated to destroy
the Republic.&dquo;9

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 261

This line of argument implies, again, that relations between the KPD
and NSDAP were essentially negative. Standing on opposite sides of the
class divide, there was little on which they could co-operate. However,
this interpretation owes much to the heavy use by standard histories of
the KPD of the published works of former KPD and Communist Inter-
national leaders, and of publications and protocols issued by the KPD
and the Communist International.’° These organizations were absorbed
in their struggle with the SPD throughout the Weimar period and their
publications reflect this. They were caught virtually unawares by the
rise of Nazism and were forced to improvise hurriedly and unsuccessfully
to meet this new threat. This failure to combat Nazism effectively and
the continuing struggle with the SPD probably contributed to the
Communists’ relative silence on some aspects of Communist-Nazi
relations.
Recent archival research on the KPD has begun to produce new results
which acknowledge that the NSDAP did make inroads into the working
class and that this impinged on Nazi-Communist relations. However,
much of this work argues that the NSDAP only penetrated the fringes
of the working class. There may have been a brisk border war between
the basically middle-class NSDAP and working-class KPD, and at times
some superficial, tactical co-operation, but, essentially, the parties stood
&dquo;
on opposite sides of the class divide. Whilst, in her study of KPD-
Nazi political violence in Berlin, Rosenhaft concludes that the SA was
strongly working-class, she also finds that in the streets there was little
save violent hostility between the two camps. 11 Thus Flechtheim’s
assertion that the NSDAP’s membership was ’thoroughly immune’ to
blandishments from nationalist-minded Communists such as Neumann’3
would appear to require qualification, but not rejection.
While the Lipset approach would thus far appear vindicated, the
standard histories of the KPD contain snippets of information which do
not conform to the general pattern. For instance, during the 1923 crisis,
Reventlow, a leading Nazi, wrote in the KPD’s main newspaper, Rote
Fahne,14 while Ruth Fischer, a prominent Central Committee member,
urged Nazi students to join the KPD, since their anti-Semitism already
made them class warriors. 11 Bahne notes that the KPD’s formulation of
a programme of national and social liberation in August 1930 was designed
to woo Nazi supporters, 16 and also remarks on the transfer of members
between the SA and KPD during 1931 and 1932. &dquo; Flechtheim records
the condemnation by the KPD leader, Thdlmann, of the Neumann Group
for advocating a full-blown physical offensive against fascism long after
the NSDAP had, Thdimann believed, become a mass movement, thereby

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
262

making physical confrontation pointless. 18 More intriguing, perhaps, was

Thdlmann’s assessment of co-operation between Nazi and Communist
workers during the Berlin transport strike’è:Œ thj greatest ’-’sitive achieve-
ment of the KPD and RGO - the KPD’s factory cell orgarrr~,:~~::.;1: w &dquo;’
Of course, after Hitler’s takeover, desertions from the KPD to the
NSDAP and especially the SA became a chronic problem, mirrore~b
Bahne notes, by heavy losses from the RGO to its Nazi equivalent, the
NSBO, in the factory council elections of spring 1933. 20 In the same
elections the firmness of the SPD vote embarrassed the authorities
sufficiently for the elections to be suspended in mid-course. 21
It is crucial to establish whether such incidents were anomalies, or
whether they indicate a strand in KPD politics which has hitherto been
neglected. The seemingly distinctive social character of the two radical
movements might suggest that any contact between them was anomalous.
In 1927 and 1928 - the last years for which detailed figures were
available - some 80 per cent of KPD members were skilled or unskilled
workers, 22 while the NSDAP was about 30 per cent working-class during
the early 1930s. ~~ Many historians have used these relative figures to
adjudge the Nazis’ attempt to gain working-class support a failure and
of little significance, but others have interpreted the same figures
differently. Barrington Moore considers the NSDAP’s recruitment of
industrial workers ’an effective and sinister performance’. &dquo; Hamilton’s
analysis of urban election results in Weimar conckides that ’almost half
of Berlin’s NSDAP vote came from the nine working-class districts of
the city5 although the study reveals a relative level of support for the
Nazis in the urban working-class areas of Berlin and other cities of nearer
25 per cent in 1932. 26 This distinction between absolute and relative levels
of support is crucial. Relative working-class representation within the
Nazi movement has usually been cited when Nazism’s appeal to the
working class is dismissed as insignificant, for the figure 0’ 25 per cent
cited above is well below the general level of electoral support for the
NSDAP, while absolute figures have often been used to support the
opposite view.
The respective sizes of the two parties are important here. The KPD’s
membership rose from 120,000 in September 1930 to about 300,000
during 1 932 . ~? Most of these members were working-class, but few were
factory workers in employment. Even in 1927, when the KPD enjoyed
relatively strong links with the industrial working class, Arthur Rosenberg
warned: ’We are extremely weak in the large factories and, therefore,
in trade union activities. The largest part of our membershil is
unemployed or in small workshops. Thus we are in the periphery, not

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 263

in the heart of the working class. ’ 28 By 1931 about a fifth of Communists

worked in factories or workshops of any kind and during 1932 the figure
was nearer a te.~. 29 Therefore while the KPD contained perhaps 100,000
.. - - ,z members.in September 1930 and a good 250,000 or more
workers during 1932, this involves a broad definition of the term worker.
although the KPD had pockets of industrial support which reflected its
ability to take over some of the pre-war SPD’s local organizations -
as in some Ruhr towns 31 things were different nationally.
-

Seen in this light, the NSDAP’s performance among the working class
was less dismal, for while most Nazis were middle-class, it was a much

larger party. The NSDAP still only contained 129,563 members - among
them 33,944 workers - in September 1930, but by mid-January 1933
there were 267,423 workers within the 849,000-strong NSDAP and these
figures, derived from the official NSDAP Parteistatistik, may
underestimate the size of the pre-1935 NSDAP. 3’ Therefore the Nazis
had outpaced the KPD in terms of working-class recruitment during the
early 1930s and by early 1933 possibly contained more workers than
the KPD. Socially, these Nazi workers often resembled their Communist
counterparts, usually being young, jobless, or, in if work, employed
outside large-scale industry. 32 Both movements possessed auxiliary
organizations whose members often failed to join the parent party, but
the particularly high proportion of workers in Nazi organizations such
3’
as the Hitler. Youth (HJ) and SA reinforces rather than weakens the
central argument.
Turning to the electoral question, Mason’s estimate of perhaps
3,500,000 workers voting Nazi in July 193234 is reinforced by Hamilton’s
recent work. 35 By comparison, the KPD polled 5,370,000 votes in July
and 5,980,000 in November 1932, 36 but these were not exclusively
working-class. Thus the KPD probably had a small advantage over the
NSDAP in attracting working-class electoral support in July 1932 and
only achieved something approaching a decisive lead in November.
The KPD and NSDAP therefore differed socially not in their absolute
levels of working-class membership, but in the Nazis’ success in mobiliz-
ing in addition huge numbers of the disaffected protestant petite
bourgeoisie. The KPD remained largely proletarian with limited support
while the NSDAP’s success right across society created a mass movement
which the KPD’s leaders came to fear.
As intimated, KPD party publications and individual reminiscences
give a different impression. The problem of Nazism is played down,
or d1e physical struggle between the KPD and NSDAP which raged

throughout the early 1930s is emphasized. The latter is understandable,

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
264

for in an age of political violence, the KPD suffered frequent attacks

by the SA in particular and replied in kind. The Communist press
portrayed this violence as part of a class war between the embattled pro-
letariat and bourgeois reaction,&dquo; partly to rally the KPD’s unstable
membership and partly to present the KPD as defenders of working-class
communities. Nazi violence was also used to develop ties with ordinary
Social Democrats. The KPD denounced SPD leaders as part and parcel
of the capitalist system - as ’social fascists’, but every attempt was made
to approach directly the ordinary SPD members and trade unionists. This

strategy, labelled the ’United Front from Below’, was lent credibility
by Nazi violence against both Communists and Socialists. The KPD
argued that such violence constituted an offensive against the organized
working class and that it behoved ordinary Social Democrats to join the
KPD in defence of the working-class community. j8
However, internal KPD correspondence and police reports on the
Communist movement reveal a more positive side to Nazi-Communist
relations. While the NSDAP’s derisory electoral performance in 1928
understandably gave the KPD few sleepless nights - the SPD was a
far greater problem - matters changed even before the Nazis’ electoral
breakthrough in September 1930. By 1929 the NSDAP was expanding,
becoming more active, and making electoral gains at state level. It was
considered a capitalist, and therefore fascist, party which sought to
consolidate bourgeois rule, but the KPD noted that this was not preventing
misled workers from supporting it as so many had always supported
-

the ’social fascist’ SPD. Thus a KPD official reported in December 1929
that Nazi recruitment was largely from the working classes in one or
two Thuringian towns, 39 while another report from Hof in North Bavaria
noted that most of the Nazis attending a Communist meeting in the same
month were proletarians&dquo; These scattered warnings were outweighed
during early 1930 by observations from many KPD branches on the
NSDAP’s strong attraction for the lower middle classes; 41 none the less
in June the Magdeburg-Anhalt KPD announced a vigorous ideological
offensive to counter Nazi inroads into the working class and reclaim Nazi
workers for ’the revolutionary class front’. 42 The Berlin-Brandenburg
KPD spoke in similar terms&dquo; and by summer 1930 Nazi penetration
of the working classes was worrying the Central Committee. It observed
that the NSDAP, like the SPD, had used pseudo-radical tactics to ’lead
astray the working class and working people’ and outlined a two-pronged
strategy for ’winning over these proletarian elements from the NSDAP’.
This allowed Communist organizations to reply to physical violence in
kind, but whenever possible Communists would wage an ideological

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 265

struggle to win the hearts and minds of Nazi workers. 44 The consequent
abandonment of the previous tactic of ’Beating down the Fascists
wherever you meet them!’ was unpopular with some party branches -
as in Berlin&dquo; - but the potential Nazi threat had been recognized at
the highest level.
The KPD’s fears were largely confirmed by the September 1930
election result. The Nazis’ 6,400,000 votes and 107 seats overshadowed
the Communists 4,600,000 votes and 77 seats&dquo; and while much of the
NSDAP’s support was from the middle class, electoral surveys by the
KPD’s district organizations showed that in some areas workers, too,
were voting Nazi. 47 Six districts - Franconia, North West, Wasserkante,

Baden, Berlin-Brandenburg and Middle Rhine - made no comment on

the social basis of the Nazi vote. Four others - Warttemberg, South
Bavaria, and two important industrial districts, the Ruhr and Lower Rhine
-

detected no significant working-class support for the NSDAP.

However in Mecklenburg and Magdeburg-Anhalt, the Nazis had made
limited inroads into the working-class vote. Elsewhere the picture was
blacker. Upper Silesia and Pomerania had witnessed a substantial swing
to the Nazis by rural workers, often influenced by estate managers. Other
districts reported a more general Nazi advance into the working class,
and often the SPD vote: as in Halle-Merseburg, North Bavaria, East
Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia, Silesia, the Palatinate, Lower Saxony,
Hessen-Waldeck and Hessen-Frankfurt.
Although working-class support for the Nazis had been uneven, and
had been weak in the KPD’s industrial strongholds of Upper Silesia and
the Ruhr, the Central Committee interpreted the overall result gloomily.
It believed that the Nazis had gained over half the SPD’s lost votes, and
because SPD losses were partly offset by gains from the DDP (German
Democratic Party), it seemed that many former Socialists had voted
Nazi.4&dquo; In social terms, Nazi successes in the countryside were noted,
but more ominous were the NSDAP’s gains ’in areas with a severely
deprived working-class (home, small-scale and medium-scale industry)
which still maintain very strong, old SPD traditions, or in areas, such
as Chemnitz, which have suffered from sizeable sectarian struggles in

the past’ . 49 The Communists believed that their own performance in these
areas had been weak, and concluded, miserably, that they had not

prevented the bourgeois parties’ working-class supporters from switching

to the Nazis, 11 that many more young voters had supported the NSDAP
than the KPD and that the Communist Party had failed badly to pick
11
up the SPD’s losses. In October 1930 the Central Committee launched
a familiar diatribe against the SPD, but, given the election result, warned

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
266

its factory, street and district cells to heed the NSDAP. 52

The Reich Interior Ministry observed this changed mood in November
1930, noting that the emphasis of the Communist campaign against
fascism ’today no longer lies in the physical struggle against the fascists,
but in political mass agitation to detach the working-class elements from
the fascist and social fascist organizations.’ 53 True, the Kampfbund gegen
den Faschismus was to continue the physical struggle, but partly in
defence against Nazi terror.54 The political struggle, consciously or
unconsciously, acquired two distinct strands. The KPD tried simply to
eradicate Nazi working-class support, but simultaneously seemed to
recognize that this would not be possible. Thus they would have to accept
and work with the Nazis at grass-roots level in the short term so as to
befriend working-class Nazis and then detach them from their bourgeois
leaders. This approach resembled the ’United Front from Below’ strategy
which was designed to win over Socialists, and indeed by late 1931 the
KPD employed the United Front tactic to attract ’misled SA workers’
to the Communist movement. 55
Until mid-1931, however, the KPD concentrated on simply eliminating
Nazi influence. In late 1930 the Berlin-Brandenburg KPD had instructed
members to locate Nazi factory cells and unemployed groups and take
political countermeasures. 56 In March 1931 the Oberhausen KPD planned
to prevent Nazi penetration of the working classes and to eliminate
Nazism among salaried staff. 5’ On 20 July 1931 Die Rote Front wrote
of surrounding politically the ’SA nests’ and of winning over the Nazi
proletarians. 11 When writing days earlier in Die Rote Fahne, Thdlmann
had optimistically claimed that by preventing a Nazi breakthrough into
the working classes the KPD had precipitated a crisis within the NSDAP’s
leadership. 59 Privately, though, the KPD was less optimistic. In March
1931 an instruction letter entitled ’Fascism and Social Fascism’ discussed
at length Nazism’s social basis and the tactics this necessitated. The
NSDAP’s mass membership, directed by the bourgeoisie and led by
dgclasses bourgeois elements, was considered socially diverse. The
ruined petite bourgeoisie, peasants, ’despairing, misled proletarians’ and
salaried staff comprised different proportions of the Nazi movement in
different places. The Nazi following was characterized as largely petit
bourgeois in South Germany and Thuringia, but in industrial regions
such as the Wasserkante, Saxony and the Rhineland, it was considered
strongly proletarian. The KPD was to heed these variations which could
be very localized, but in general;

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 267

As long as the national fascist movement was not a mass movement and had not won
proletarian elements in large numbers, it was correct [to beat down the fascists wherever
you meet them], and a broad ideological and political struggle was unnecessary.
However, things are different now. The Nazis have set out particularly to win over
the working-class masses and do have very many workers indeed as members (especially
in the SA) and considerable proletarian electoral support (for instance in Saxony). Today
a struggle with fists alone would be just as pointless and wrong as it would be, for

instance, against the SPD and the other bourgeois parties. 60

This letter did not signify momentary panic, for during 1931 there were
similar messages 6’ and in December the Central Committee warned its
factory cells of the growing Nazi threat. 62
Indeed, the Nazis’ combination of terror with political acumen was
pressing the KPD hard, necessitating not only mass defence, but equally
the improvement and greatest possible intensification of the ideological mass struggle
against this rapidly growing popular movement. Any weakening in the face of Nazi
terror, the murderers of workers, would be fatal, but the neglect of ideological mass
work among Nazi supporters is already costing us dearly. To tolerate further neglect
of this mass work would result in our political work losing considerable impetus,
particularly in the factory council elections and the Prussian state elections.63

Therefore it seems that the KPD accepted tacitly during 1931 that it
would not easily eradicate working-class backing for the NSDAP and
that the ’United Front from Below’ tactic would indeed have to extend
to Nazi supporters. Frequent, largely unsuccessful, appeals to Nazis
actually to join the KPD, on the grounds that the NSDAP did not represent
their interests,64 were only complementary to the United Front tactic.
The latter formed part of the KPD’s strategy for seizing power. Even
the NSDAP hoped to use an absolute majority in parliament to over-
throw the Republic, but parliament was only of peripheral importance
for the Communists. The KPD could mobilize additional support during
election campaigns, and use parliament for disseminating propaganda,
but the revolution would be made in the factories. Here the KPD would
establish cells to assume the leadership of the working class’s economic
struggle. Economic mass strikes would foster a revolutionary class
consciousness and the launching of political mass strikes in turn. The
general strike and revolution would follow.
This strategy, perhaps more reminiscent of anarcho-syndicalism than
anything else, made it impossible to ignore Nazism once it had working-
class support. Thus the United Front tactic, initially aimed at SPD
members, was then extended to Catholic workers and now, logically,
in 1931, to the NSDAP. In June 1931 a briefing for strike leaders stressed

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
268

that if strikes were to succeed, all workers, including Nazis, needed to

be involved. 65 Similarly in its Action Plan for November and December,
the Ruhr KPD perceived the United Front as a weapon for destroying
both the Socialists’ and Nazis’ mass bases.66
During the first half of 1932 a multitude of KPD reports suggested
that the Nazi advance into the working class was continuing and even
accelerating. The Nazis were probably least successful among factory
workers, but so was the KPD - despite its revolutionary strategy -
and Communist officials complained of indifference to Nazi advances,
or impotence in the face of Nazi success in individual factories. 67 Reports

from individual towns could be equally depressing. Notable were those

from Brunswick, where the Nazi HIB-Aktion had been particularly
successful; 68 Stettin, where Nazi strength was ten times greater than the
KPD’s in working-class districts; 69 and Hamburg. Even in this great
industrial port city, the Nazis dominated the working-class St Georg
district’° and Hamilton’s figures indicate a respectable Nazi electoral
performance in the working-class parts of the city.&dquo;
Regional reports from widely varying areas could be no less dispiriting.
Lower Saxony acknowledged in March that to win the majority of the
proletariat, Nazi workers and former Socialists who had turned Nazi
would have to be won over. 72 In April the Brunswick state KPD reported
to the Central Committee that its activities were paralysed by a Nazi
terror only equalled in Schleswig-Holstein.’3 In Wfrttemberg and Silesia
Nazi progress within the jobless working class was all too apparent. 74
In May the Halle-Merseburg KPD stressed to the Central Committee
the need to counter the NSBO and, especially, the Nazi breakthrough
into the working-class unemployed . ?5 However, the situation was worst
in rural north Germany. In Oldenburg the NSDAP had reportedly
mobilized the masses and had the poor in its grip. 76 An official reported
to the Central Committee from Mecklenburg:

I would just like to present the following incident as characteristic.

Hitler was expected in Ltibz on his way to Waren. There were thousands of people,
including a large number of proletarian women with their children who held flowers
in their hands. This fact, without exaggeration, shows how deeply the Nazis have
penetrated the ranks of the working class in the countryside.&dquo;

The problems such Nazi successes created for the KPD soon became
apparent the
to authorities. On 20 April 1932 a police report published
in Munich and circulated to other police forces observed that Thalmann’s
poor showing in the Reich Presidential Election had depressed Communist

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 269

morale nationally. 78 Still more depressing was ’the unexpectedly large

growth of the National Socialists, who were able to prevail in working-
class and Communist districts despite Communist terror at their
meetings’ 79 After noting Communist support for Hitler in the second
round of the Presidential Election and powerful backing for Hitler from
the unemployed, the report continued:

Because of transfers from the Communists to the National Socialists, personal contacts
have long existed between the two camps. Recently in particular, people have switched
from the Communist paramilitary organizations to the SA because the Central Com-
mittee’s instructions against ’individual terror’ had impinged on their activist leanings. 80

In other words, because the Central Committee had instructed Commu-

nists not to beat up their class brothers in the SA, some, bored and
frustrated, had joined the SA - no doubt to beat up their class brothers
in the Red Front. 81
However, the KPD’s leaders were not panicked by the seriousness
of the overall situation and persevered with their existing strategy during
1932. The struggle against Social Democracy was maintained, that against
Nazism intensified. Direct appeals to the SA rank and file emphasized
the contradiction between their, proletarian, class interests and those of
their bourgeois leaders. 8Z The struggle to involve working-class Nazis
in the United Front was stepped up, although SA attacks on the KPD
necessitated a continued physical struggle against Nazi terror.83
Despite the growth in Nazi support there were encouraging straws in
the wind. While the KPD’s own membership was unstable and sometimes
susceptible to Nazi blandishments, the opposite could also apply. Thus
Nazi workers in the Hamburg area assured the KPD that should Hitler
betray them, they would kill him themselves. 8a Similarly, Nazis in the
Silesian town of Liegnitz promised to switch to the KPD if Hitler reneged
85
on his promises. In Thuringia discussions between Communists and
the SA and HJ precipitated substantial HJ desertions to the KPD. 86 In
Chemnitz storm-troopers complained that Hitler had betrayed twenty-
three of the twenty-five points and declared that they would join the KPD
if he betrayed the last two. 87 The Hannover KPD developed close ties
with Nazi workers in one factory who promised to join the KPD if the
NSDAP let them down. 88 Clearly relations between working-class Nazi
supporters and Communists could sometimes be less negative than the
standard histories allow.
More important still was the practical co-operation demanded by the
United Front from Below strategy. Nazi workers in Oldenburg were

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
270

solidly behind a Communist-organized strike during the Anti-Fascist

Factory Week, 89 while many KPD-organized Committees for the
Unemployed, which lobbied the authorities for better welfare provision,
included Nazi workers.9° Nazis were also involved in the Anti-Fascist
Action, or Antifa, and sat on United Front Committees. This might seem
incongruous, but for the KPD all opposing parties were bourgeois and
therefore fascist. Antifa was directed specifically against these parties’
leaders and organizations, with ordinary members, especially workers,
to be won for Communism. Thus in areas as diverse as Baden, the middle
Rhine valley, the Palatinate, Thuringia and Upper Silesia, Nazis sat on
Antifa Committees and participated in Antifa-led strikes and welfare
campaigns. 91 The attitude of ordinary Communist workers to this policy
is summed up by a report from a Berlin Transport Authority depot in
July as a strike was brewing.

The comrades ... regard the United Front movement as a purely political measure against
the Nazis. There is a great deal of discussion with the Nazis and it has become evident
that they are ready to strike against wage cuts and other attacks on conditions. Q2

Berlin, it is worth remembering, witnessed severe street violence between

the SA and Red Front at this particular time, although as Rosenhaft
shows, even the Berlin street-fighters occasionally changed sides. 93
The July 1932 elections marked a turning point in both Communist
and Nazi fortunes. The NSDAP’s gains eclipsed those of the KPD, but
since elections were only of peripheral importance to the Communists,
this did not cause undue concern. The NSDAP’s legality policy, however,
made electoral success crucial and, despite high hopes whipped up within
the movement, it polled 37 per cent - not the 50 per cent required to
take absolute power ’legally’. So it was the Nazis who suffered a crisis
of confidence after the election, whilst the Communists prepared to
counter-attack.
Given the NSDAP’s objective performance in July, this was particularly
ironic. The KPD’s electoral surveys revealed Nazi gains in SPD-oriented
working-class districts of the Rhine and Ruhr and elsewhere, 94 again
notably in Chemnitz.95 The NSDAP had advanced generally into the
working class in other cities, especially Zwickau, Merseburg and
Frankfurt-am-Main, 96 but Berlin provided the most disastrous result.
The Communist vote stagnated at 27.3 per cent while the Nazi vote
doubled from 14.6 per cent in September 1930 to 28.6 per cent in July
1932.&dquo; This was below the national average, but the NSDAP was
the largest single party in Berlin and its votes had doubled in the

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 271

working-class districts as elsewhere. The KPD ascribed this setback to

its ineffective struggle against the Nazis which particularly affected
working-class opinion. 98 Hamilton’s researches suggest that something
similar occurred in Hamburg.’9
But the Nazi tide had peaked. The impatience previously displayed
by working-class Nazis turned to despair. The SA in particular became
demoralized and felt that their long-standing doubts about the electoral
road to power had been vindicated. ~°° In Saxony, Antifa acquired a new
role: that of protecting SA deserters from reprisals by their former
comrades, so as to hasten the collapse of the SA. 101
On 16 September a KPD conference recognized that the whole Nazi
movement, not just the SA, faced difficulties and therefore recommended
replacing the term Anti-Fascist Action with United Action. ’We should
no longer say Anti-Fascist Action so bluntly, because the conception

behind this watchword very much excludes the National Socialist workers
from the struggle against Papen.’ 102 Before long, United Action posters
appeared, showing Communist, Nazi and Socialist workers standing
shoulder to shoulder in class solidarity against the bourgeoisie. 103 These
tactics were relatively effective. The KPD’s Factory Press Service com-
mented in October on the growing tendency of Nazi workers to join
Communist-led strikes 104 and similar reports mounted up as the autumn
went by. 105 Nazi proletarians were urged repeatedly to achieve their
economic and social goals by joining the United Front. 106 Thus by
November the notorious Berlin transport strike was simply one example
of relatively widespread Nazi involvement in KPD-organized strikes.
The November 1932 election confirmed that on the whole the Nazi
tide was ebbing. The NSDAP polled 33 per cent of the votes, remaining
the largest party, but it had lost more than 2,000,000 votes. Therefore
the KPD was reasonably content to see its vote rise by 700,000, from
14.3 to 16.9 per cent of the poly, 107 although many working-class Nazis
had apparently abstained rather than vote KPD. ’°8 The W6rttemberg
and Berlin KPD were among those who probably contributed to this
reticence by maintaining a higher level of violence against the Nazis than
the Central Committee had wished.’°9 Of course much of the violence
had been provoked by the SA and even while the KPD produced ever
more leaflets appealing to Nazis for co-operation on the basis of common
class interests, other leaflets which were bitterly hostile to the NSDAP
also appeared. 110
At least the KPD’s ambivalence was eclipsed by the crisis within the
NSDAP. Official sources regarded the proletarian SA’s collapse as
imminent, &dquo;’ while the KPD became sufficiently confident to talk of

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
272

influencing the NSBO as an organization, not just individual members. 112

The appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in January 1933 overcame,
temporarily, the crisis within the NSDAP, which now attracted floods
of new recruits. The KPD still appealed to the ’SA proletarians’ to
recognize the hollowness of Hitler’s social programme and to refrain
from beating up their class brothers, &dquo;’ but in vain. The Communists
tried to infiltrate the SA and NSBO, arousing some official concern, &dquo;4
but they were powerless to stem the Nazi tide. The KPD faced persecu-
tion, mass arrests, murder, and the desertion of many members and voters
to the Nazis. It recognized that the voters it had weaned from Nazism
between July and November 1932 had simply returned to their original
home. &dquo;5 They were accompanied by others. In late March the
Westphalian authorities commented on the sheer volume of deserters from
the KPD to the SA, &dquo;6 a process which was repeated elsewhere. &dquo;’
What had gone wrong? The KPD itself had always recognized that
in taking an extra-parliamentary road to power, it would need the active
support of most factory workers. However, it is widely accepted that
the KPD failed to penetrate the organized, employed working class
significantly in most parts of Germany and that here Social Democracy
held firm. The Communists therefore found a constituency among the
very young, the unemployed and the unorganized who, alone, would
never form a revolutionary vanguard. Rosenhaft finds that many

Communist street-fighters were semi-politicized at best and from petty

criminal backgrounds at worst, &dquo;8 and as Geary comments: ’It is clearly
the case that the quality if not the quantity of the Communist Party’s
&dquo;9
support was always problematic.’ Thus the ’United Front from Below’
tactic had provided the KPD with a rag-bag of support which certainly
included many victims of the economic crisis, but these supporters lacked
the patience and long-term perspectives so deeply rooted within German
Social Democracy.
These serious deficiencies were compounded by the Nazi movement’s
success within the very social groups which turned in part to the KPD.

People whose lives were ravaged by the depression evidently preferred

radical millenarianism to the staid, interest-group politics of the Weimar
Republic, but it appears that few became either convinced Nazis or
Communists. The question of how far unemployment radicalizes people,
rather than stunning them into a life of monotonous passivity, remains
controversial, but recent studies suggest that the young in particular will
feel anger and frustration rather than resignation. &dquo;’ It certainly seems
that this was the case in Weimar Germany, and that young Germans were
driven by opportunism, desperation and, not least, moral outrage into

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 273

whichever radical movement appeared most likely to redress their

grievances and fulfil whatever aspirations they still had.’2’
The KPD accepted in private that many young, jobless workers were
turning to Nazism, but the use of the United Front strategy to counter
this became a two-edged sword. The fighting between Communists and
Nazis, ritualized by the wearing of tattered, makeshift uniforms and
insignia, probably helped to maintain a degree of distinction between
the bedraggled followers of the swastika and the followers of the hammer
and sickle. However, the KPD’s United Front tactic in particular had
enabled extensive grass-roots links to develop between these two
apparently hostile camps. Ordinary Nazis were assured that the KPD
had no quarrel with them, ordinary Communists were told to recognize
working-class Nazis as their misled class brothers. The KPD even argued
that because of the economic crisis, petit bourgeois Nazis were objectively
122
part of the proletarian movement.
This tactic prospered in autumn 1932, but also paved the way to disaster
in the specific circumstances of 1933. The NSDAP’s success within parts
of the working class had, it may be argued, forced the KPD to adopt
such a line, but the United Front tactic helped to make Nazism -
particularly the SA and NSBO with their vaguely formulated radicalism
-

an apparent alternative for many ordinary Communists.

Certainly the struggle between the KPD and Nazis was not a struggle
at first hand between radicalized and estranged classes. Both parties
sought support from the casualties of the economic crisis. The KPD was,
by definition, a proletarian party and therefore, understandably, failed
to recruit particularly many middle-class victims of the crisis - economic
or psychological. It left that field largely clear to the Nazis, who promised
to protect the middle classes from socialism, whether revisionist or
revolutionary. However, the KPD failed even to convince many
unemployed workers - the ultimate casualties of the slump - of the
credibility of the Communist message and eventually watched helplessly
as they streamed into the Nazi movement.

Notes

I am very grateful to the Wolfson Foundation for its support which made possible the research
for this article.

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
274

1. S. M. Lipset, Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore 1981), 106.
Lipset implicitly defines class according to income levels, while this article (see p. 3) favours
the classical Marxist definition because of its lack of ambiguity.
2. Lipset, op. cit., 138.
3. Lipset, op. cit., 116 n. 63, 248.
4. For instance: D. Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic. Political Economy
and Crisis (Princeton 1981), 265-66. K. D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship. The Origins,
Structure and Consequences of National Socialism (London 1973), 195, 199, 201.
M. Broszat, ’National Socialism, its Social Basis and Psychological Impact’, in E. J.
Feuchtwanger, ed., Upheaval and Continuity. A Century of German History, (London 1973),
145, where Broszat refers to Lipset.
Injustice. The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (London 1978),
5. B. Moore, Jr.,
chapter 12.
6. O. K. Flechtheim, Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt-am-Main 1969),
chapter 1, esp. 117.
7. For instance: Flechtheim op. cit., 116-17. S. Haffner, 1918/19 Eine deutsche
Revolution (Hamburg 1981).
8. For instance: S. Bahne, Die KPD und das Ende von Weimar. Das Scheitern einer
Politik 1932-1935 (Frankfurt-am-Main 1976). Flechtheim, op. cit.
9. Bahne, op. cit., 71. Flechtheim, op. cit., 250. J. Wickham, The Working Class
Movement in Frankfurt am Main during the Weimar Republic (D. Phil. Dissertation, Univer-
sity of Sussex, 1979) 237-50. Wickham, however, freely acknowledges that the Nazi
movement attracted some working class support in Frankfurt.
10. Bahne, op. cit., 101-34. Flechtheim, op. cit., 5-13.
11. R. Geary, ’The Failure of German Labor in the Weimar Republic’ in M. Dobkowski
& I. Wallimann, eds., Towards the Holocaust (Westport, Ct. 1983), 178-81.
12. E. Rosenhaft, Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence
1929-1933 (Cambridge 1983), chapters 4-6.
13. Flechtheim, op. cit., 275.
14. Flechtheim, op. cit., 178.
15. Ibid.
16. Bahne, op. cit., 14. The KPD took a similar view during the 1923 crisis when it
recognized the need to play the nationalist card to deprive the fascists of this weapon.
Flechtheim, op. cit., 177.
17. Bahne, op. cit., 16.
18. Flechtheim, op. cit., 283.
19. Bahne, op. cit., 32.
20. Bahne, op. cit., 53, 54. See also I. Buchloh, Die nationalsozialistische
Machtergreifung in Duisburg. Eine Fallstudie (Duisburg 1980) 144-53.
21. M. Broszat, The Hitler State. The Foundation and Development of the Internal
Structure of the Third Reich translated by J. Hiden (London 1981), 139.
22. Bahne, op. cit., 15. Flechtheim, op. cit., 240-41.
23. Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP, ed., Partei-Statistik. Stand I. Januar 1935
(Munich 1935), 70.
24. Moore, op. cit., 407.
25. R. F. Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler? (Princeton 1982), 91.
26. Hamilton, op. cit., 78, 111, 136-7, 211, 217-18.
27. Flechtheim, op. cit., 347. Bahne, op. cit., 16.
28. Flechtheim, op. cit., 241.

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 275

29. Bahne, op. cit., 16, 35. Flechtheim, op. cit., 348.
30. R. Geary, European Labour Protest 1848-1939 (London 1981), 149-50, 151.
31. While the Partei-Statistik figures have been treated cautiously, they have been widely
used by historians. However, it seems possible to interpret the tables, such as that on
page 70, as providing a breakdown of the 1935 membership alone. Thus the figures for
earlier years would indicate when the 1935 membership joined, and the varying social
composition of these joiners at different times, but they could not provide a full analysis
of the NSDAP’s membership in earlier years. This might not have affected the relative
representation of different social groups in the party too greatly, assuming that member-
ship fluctuation affected most social groups more or less equally, but the absolute figures
might be considerable underestimates.
32. Geary, ’German Labor’, 179. Bracher, op. cit., 200-201. S. Neumann, Die Parteien
der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart 1977), 82, 134 n. 9.
33. For HJ; P. D. Stachura, Nazi Youth in the Weimar Republic (Santa Barbara & Oxford
1975), 58-62. For SA; C. J. Fischer, Stormtroopers: A Social, Economic and Ideological
Analysis 1929-35 (London 1983), chapters 2 and 3.
34. T. W. Mason, Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich, (Opladen 1977), 62-78 does, however,
conclude that all in all, Nazism’s appeal to the working class before Hitler’s takeover was
limited.
35. Hamilton, op. cit., especially chapters 4-8.
36. Flechtheim, op. cit., 347.
37. See numerous articles and reports in Die Rote Fahne, the KPD’s main newspaper,
pertaining to this period. Many relevant cuttings and extracts are available in the Bundes-
archiv Koblenz, NSDAP Hauptarchiv (NS 26), Folder 1169. Bestand 4, 65 in the
Staatsarchiv Bremen is another rich source.
38. Staatsarchiv Bremen (hereafter SB), 4,65/257/48. Nachrichtenkonferenz in Berlin
am 14.12.1931. Ministerialrat Dr Guyet. Thuringisches Ministerium des Innern. Die
Kommunistischen Bestrebungen auf Bildung von Einheitsorganisationen mit
Sozialdemokraten. See also: SB 4,65/254/47. ’Aus den Rundschreiben des ZK über, Unsere
Taktik in Braunschweig’, Die Rote Fahne, Nr. 72 (26.3.1931). Bundesarchiv Koblenz
(hereafter BA) R45IV/5. An Z.K. KPD Sekretariat. Bericht über Wahlversammlungen
in Mecklenburg. Mannheim, 7.6.1932.
39. BA, R45IV/9. Bericht über Wahlversammlungen im Bezirk Thüringen vom 3. bis
7.12.29.
40. BA, R45IV/9. Bericht über Versammlungstour in Nordbayern (vom 9. November
bis 8. Dezember 1929). Berlin 9.12.1929 gez. Ewert.
41. For instance: BA, R45IV/16. Bericht zum. I. Bezirksparteitag der KPD, Bezirk
Sachsen - am 3. und 4. Mai in Dresden im Gasthof Doberitz. 8.
42. BA, R45IV/16. Juni Rundschreiben der KPD. Bezirk Magdeburg-Anhalt. B.L. der
KPD Magdeburg - Anhalt. 1) Kampf gegen den Faschismus. Juni 1930.
43. SB 4,65/251/46. Aus den ’Mitteilungen’ des Landeskriminalpolizeiamts IA Berlin
Nr. 11vom I. Juni 1930. III. Die Linksradikale Bewegung 1. Der Bezirks-Parteitag der
KPD Berlin-Brandenburg-Lausitz-Grenzmark.
44. SB 4,65/251/46. Abschrift IAN 2160/1.8. Zentralkomitee der KPD. Sekretariat.
Berlin, den 17. Juli 1930. Rundschreiben Nr. 10, 3.
45. Rosenhaft, op. cit., 83-7.
46. Frequencies: A. Milatz, Wähler und Wahlen in der Weimarer Republik (Bonn 1968),
151. Percentages: Hamilton, op. cit., 476.
47. SB 4,65/253/47. Aus Mitteilungen Nr. 21 des Pol. Präs., Berlin vom 1 November

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
276

1930. II. Linksradikale Bewegung. 1) Die Auffassung des Z.K. vom Ergebnis der
Reichstagswahlen.
48. Ibid. , 22-3.
49. Ibid., 27-8.
50. Ibid., 50. cf. Hamilton, op. cit., 171, 264, 387-9.
51. As note 47, 59-60.
52. SB 4,65/252/46. Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands.
Sekretariat. Brief des Zentralkomitees an alle Betriebszellen, Straßenzellen und Ortsgruppen.
Berlin, Anfang Oktober 1930. cf. Flechtheim, op. cit., 264, where he observes that at
the highest level the KPD appeared publicly unconcerned about the Nazi electoral
breakthrough, maintaining that the KPD were the sole victors.
53. SB 4,65/253/47. Der Reichsminister des Innern. IAN 2160d/31.10. Betreff: KPD
-

Kampf gegen Faschismus. Berlin, den 7. November 1930.

54. Ibid.
55. SB 4,65/257/48. Abschrift. Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. ’Schafft Einheitsfrontorgane.’
Essen, den 26.11.1931.
56. SB 4,65/253/47. Der Reichsminister des Innern. IAN 2160/26.11. Betrifft:
Kommunistische Bewegung. Berlin, den 26. November 1930, 2.
57. SB 4,65/254/47. Abschrift. Der Polizei-Präsident in Bochum. Nachrichten-
sammelstelle. Betrifft: Rundschreiben der KPD, Unterbezirksleitung Oberhausen. Bochum,
den 23. März 1931.
58. SB 4,65/256/48. Auszug aus dem 8. Lagebericht des Freistaates Sachsen vom
28.8.31. II Linksbewegung: KPD, 5-6.
59. SB 4,65/255/47. ’Die Lage in Deutschland und die Aufgaben der KPD’, Die Rote
Fahne, Nr. 142, 4.7.31.
60. SB 4,65/255/47. Abschrift zu IAN 2160/7.4. Lehrbrief Nr. 2. Faschismus und
Sozialfaschismus. II. Die nationalfaschistische Bewegung, 24.
61. For instance: SB 4,65/255/47. Abschrift. Resolution des Zentral-Komitees der KPD
über die Beschlüsse des XI Plenums des Ekki, 7.SB 4,65/256/48. Abschrift IAN 2160/27.10.
Zentralkomitee der KPD. Sekretariat. Sonderanweisungen! Berlin, den 7. Oktober 1931,
5. SB 4,65/257/48. Abschrift. Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. Sekretariat. An alle Betriebs-
u. Straßenzellen! Essen, den 24.10.1931, 2-3.

62. SB 4,65/257/48. Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands.

Rundschreiben an alle Leitungen der Betriebszellen, Straßenzellen, Ortsgruppen,
Unterbezirke ... Berlin, den 8. Dezember 1931, 11, 14.
63. Ibid. 11.
64. For instance: SB 4,65/253/47. ’Von der SA zur KPD. Noch eine Mahnung an alle
proletarischen Elemente in der NSDAP’, Arbeiter-Zeitung, Nr. 5 (7.1.31). BA, Sammlung
Schumacher (hereafter Sch.) 330. ’Stennes oder Hitler?’ (Flysheet published by Scheringer
in April 1931 which appeals to Nazis to join the KPD).
65. SB 4,65/273/53. Abschrift. Streikführer-Kursus-Material Nr. 2. Der Polizei-Präsident
in Bochum. Nachrichtensammelstelle. Bochum, den 11. Juni 1931, 6.
66. SB 4,65/257/48. Abschrift. Arbeitsplan des Bezirks Ruhrgebiet für November-
Dezember 1931.
67. BA, R45IV/11. Stand der Arbeit in den Betrieben und unter den Erwerbslosen und
die wichtigsten Aufgaben der RGO im Bezirk Halle-Merseburg. BA, R45IV/26. Bericht
über die Ermittlung der Arbeit in dem Betrieb Wasag (Piesteritz), 5 ’Unterschätzung der
Nazi’ BA, R45IV/8. Abschrift. ZK der KPD. Berlin, den 1. März 1932, 2 ’Welches sind
die Hauptschwächen und Unterlassungen ... ?’

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 277

68. BA R45IV/21. Zusammenfassender Bericht über die Kontrolle in Braunschweig

(Jan./Feb. 1932). See also BA, R45IV/21. ’Die NSDAP in Braunschweig’.
69. BA, R45IV/30. Bericht über Mecklenburg-Schwerin. 17.6.32, Stettin. The report
noted a similar situation in the small towns around Stettin.
70. BA, R45IV/21. Bericht über die Versammlungstournee des Genossen Weiss... in
den Bezirken Niedersachsen, Wasserkante und Nordwest. Berlin, 27.4.32, Montag den
18.4 Erwerbslosenversammlung in St. Georg (Hamburg).
71. Hamilton, op. cit., 111.
72. BA, R45IV/6. Reorganisationsplan zur Schaffung von 13 Unterbezirken im Bezirk
Niedersachsen. Bezirksleitung Niedersachsen, 17.3.32, 4.
73. BA, R45IV/25. An das ZK Pol. Sekr. Braunschweig, 29.4.32, gez. Adolf Benscheid.
74. BA, R45IV/21. Abschrift. Bericht für die BL Schlesien über den Unterbezirk Langen-
bielau, April 1932, gez. Z.K. Instrukteur Richard Schulz. BA R45IV/21. Bericht Nr. 2
(Württemberg), 16 April 1932.
75. BA, R45IV/11. KPD Bezirk Halle-Merseburg. An das Zentralkomitee der KPD,
Sekretariat Halle den 19.5.32.
76. BA, R45IV/5. An ZK, KPD Sekretariat. Bericht über Versammlungen in Oldenburg.
Mannheim, 30.5.32, gez. Paul Schreck.
77. BA, R45IV/5. Abschrift. Bericht Mecklenburg. Öffentliche Versammlung Lübz.
78. SB 4,65/259/49. Die Lage in der KPD. Mü. 20.4.32.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. cf. Fischer, op. cit., 216-17, where a similar Württemberg police report is discussed.
82. For instance: BA, NS26/1169. ’Warum kämpft die SA?’, Die Rote Fahne (1.3.1932).
BA, Sch. 330. ’Achtung! Proleten der SA u. SS mal herhören!’ (Leaflet distributed in
Hamburg, mid-1932).
83. In February the Ruhr KPD, for instance, sought to do both. SB 4,65/258/48. Der
Polizei-Präsident in Bochum. Politische Nachrichtenstelle für die Provinz Westfalen. Betrifft:
Rundschreiben der Bezirksleitung der KPD. Ruhrgebiet. Bochum, den 6. Februar 1932.
84. BA, R45IV/21. Bericht über die Agitationstour-Wasserkante. Berlin, den 28.4.32.
gez. Grethe Hahne. The report also remarks: ’The Nazi lads are very interested in Russia.
They do not believe everything in their newspapers.’
85. BA, R45IV/21. Bericht 17.4.-24.4.32. Schlesien. gez. Ziegler.
86. BA R45IV/25. Bezirk 1/2 (in Thüringen). 3.5.32. The HJ attitude to the Soviet
Union must have been equally encouraging: ’Our comrades [in the KPD] were told that
they have absolutely nothing against the Soviet Union. [The HJ] would find comrades more
easily in Russia than us, because National Socialism is now being built up in Russia.’
87. BA, R45IV/28. Diskussion bezw. Berichterstattung der UB-Sekretäre am 9.6 zur
Antifaschistischen Aktion. Unterbezirk Chemnitz.
88. BA, R45IV/21. Besprechung mit den Polleitern der Betriebszellen und Stadtteilen
in Hannover. April/Mai 1932. Appel; Nahrungsmittel.
89. BA, R45IV/26. Auszug aus den Berichten der BL über die Durchführung der
Antifaschistischen Betriebswoche. Bezirk Nordwest.
90. BA, R45IV/28. Arbeitsplan der Ortsgruppe Grossenhain für Monat Juni. Erwerbs-
losenbewegung. BA, R45IV/28. KPD Unterbezirk Bautzen. An die Bez. Leitung Sachsen.
Betr.: Bericht über die Schaffung von Einheitsausschüssen. BA, R45IV/8. Die BL Nieder-
Sachsen. Die UBL Peine. An das ZK, 2 Nazi.
91. BA, R45IV/23. Bezirk Baden-Pfalz. An das ZK der KPD, Sekretariat, Berlin. Bericht
über die Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Antifaschistischen Aktion. Mannheim,

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
278

11.6.32. BA, R45IV/23. Abschrift. Berzirksleitung Mittelrhein. An das ZK/Sekretariat.

Bericht über den Stand der Antifaschistischen Aktion im Bezirk Mittelrhein. Köln, 14.6.32.
BA, R45IV/23. Abschrift. Bezirksleitung der KPD. Groß-Thüringen. An das Sekretariat
des ZK. Bericht des Bezirks Thüringen über die Antifaschistische Aktion. Erfurt, 10.6.32.
BA, R45IV/23. Bezirksleitung Oberschlesien der KPD. An das Zentralkomitee Abt.
Sekretariat, Berlin. Betr.: Bericht über die Einleitung zur Antifaschistischen Aktion.
Hindenburg, den 10. Juni 1932.
92. BA, R45IV/16. Berichte der Arbeiterkorrespondenten über die Lage in den
Großbetrieben unter der Militärdiktatur und dem Ausnahmezustand. Vom 20-26 Juli, 15
BVG-Weissensee-Omnibus.
93. Rosenhaft, op. cit., 164-66.
94. Survey, district by district, filed in BA, R45IV/21.
95. BA, R45IV/28. Bericht des UB Chemnitz zur Durchführung der Reichstagswahl
am 31.7.1932.
96. SB 4,65/260/49. Rundschreiben Nr. 13. Anweisungen des Sekretariats. An alle
Bezirksleitungen u. Redaktionen. Berlin, den 8. August 1932. I. Unser Wahlsieg. The
tone of this report is highly optimistic and the cities named are considered exceptions.
However, separate reports from the Rhine, Ruhr and Berlin show that there, too, the KPD
had done badly in some cities or districts.
97. Hamilton, op. cit., 74.
98. ’In Berlin the situation is such that we have lost votes in working-class areas and
gained considerably in areas where the working class is not dominant.’ SB 4,65/260/49.
Abschrift aus der Zeitschrift Der Pionier des Bolschewismus. Herausgegeben v. der
Bezirksleitung der KPD/Ruhrgebiet. August 1932, 6. cf. Bahne, op. cit., 29.
99. KPD vote in September 1930, 18.7 per cent; July 1932, 18.4 per cent. Hamilton,
op. cit., 108. cf. Bahne, op. cit., 29.
100. Fischer, op. cit., 158, 162-4, 209-11.
101. BA, R45IV/28. An das Sekr. der KPD u. BL Sachsen. Betr. Beantwortung des
Fragebogens des ZK an die Instr. u. Wahlhelfe. Thalheim, 6.8.32, 4.
102. SB 4,65/260/49. Zu IAN 2162/11.10. Bericht von der Agitprop-Konferenz am
16. September 1932. Anlage 1.
103. SB 4,65/2038/362. ’Hinein in den Kommunistischen Jugendverband!’
104. SB 4,65/2038/362. ’Gegen die Nazi’, Betriebs Presse Dienst, Oktober 1932, 9.
105. For instance: SB 4,65/2038/362. ’Reformisten und NSBO gegen streikende Kraft-
fahrer’ Betriebs Presse Dienst, Anfang November 1932, 3. SB 4,65/2038/362. ’Neue
Streiks’ Betriebs Presse Dienst, Anfang November 1932, SB 4,65/261/49. Bericht der
Bezirksleitung des Bezirks Mecklenburg der KPD über die Arbeit der Partei 1931/32, 15.
106. For instance: BA, Sch. 330. ’SA-Opposition. Die Führerin aller revolutionären SA-
Kameraden.’ (28.10.32). BA, Sch. 330. ’SA u. SS Zersetzung in Euern Reihen! ...’ Rote
Jungfront. BA, Sch. 330. R. F. B. Eppendorf-Hoheluft. Ortsgruppe-Hoheluft. Appeal to Nazi
proletarians. BA, Sch. 330. ’Proleten der SA- und SS-Stürme. Die Kommune spricht zu Euch!’
107. See note 46.
108. BA, R45IV/44. Resolution des Bezirksparteitages über das XII Plenum des EKKI
und die Aufgaben der Parteiorganisation in Nordwest, 14.
109. SB 4,65/260/49. Aus L.B. Stuttgart, W.11 vom 23.12.32. Bezirksparteitag der
KPD. Bezirk Württemberg, 13. Rosenhaft, op. cit., 138-63.
110. A large number of these are found in BA, Sch. 331.
111. Fischer, op. cit. 158.
112. SB 4,65/261/49. Abschrift. Material zur Vertiefung unseres politischen Einflusses

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016
 279

u. Verstärkung der Organisationbasis der Partei, 11.

113. BA, Sch. 331, ’Pflichtarbeiter!! Erwerbslose!! S.A. Proleten!!’. BA, Sch. 331.
’SA Proleten sei gesagt’, Die Rote Front. Organ des Rotfrontkämpfer BundeslNeustadtl
Hamburg (März 1933). SB 4,65/2044/364. ’SA-Kameraden!’, Der SA-Prolet, Nr. 3. SB
4,65/2044/364. ’SA Kameraden! Augen auf!, Kleine Arbeiterzeitung (März 1933), 4-6.
114. BA, SA Archiv (NS 23)/401. Abschrift. Die Oberste SA-Führung. Betr. Kommu-
nistische Bewegung. München, 24.4.33. SB 4,65/262/50. Abschrift. Der Polizeiprasident
in Recklinghausen. Politische Nachrichtensammelstelle für die Provinz Westfalen. Betrifft:
KPD. Recklinghausen, den 22. März 1933.
115. SB 4,65/262/50. ’Zum Wahlergebnis und unseren nächsten Aufgaben’, 2. In: Der
Polizeipräsident in Recklinghausen. Politische Nachrichtensammelstelle für die Provinz
Westfalen. Betrifft: KPD. Recklinghausen, den 16. März 1933.
116. SB 4,65/262/50. Der Polizeiprasident in Recklinghausen. Politische Nachrichten-
sammelstelle für die Provinz Westfalen - Betrifft: KPD. Recklinghausen, den 22. März
1933, 5.
117. Fischer, op. cit., 211-12.
118. Rosenhaft, op. cit., 202-07.
119. R. Geary, Unemployment and Working-Class Solidarity in Germany, 1929-1933
(Unpublished paper), 12. cf. A. Rosenberg, Geschichte der Weimar Republik (Frankfurt
am Main, 1961), 199-200.

120. A. Sinfield, What Unemployment Means (Oxford 1981), 35-41. J. Seabrook,

Unemployment (London 1982).
121. Fischer, op. cit., 155-69, 206-18.
122. SB 4,65/273/53. ’4 Mill. Angestellte, 4 Mill. Ausgebeutete, 4 Mill. Proletarier...’
RGO Ruhrgebiet Angestelltenkommission. Essen, den 23. März 1931.

Conan Fischer

is Lecturer in History at Heriot-Watt University,

Edinburgh. He is the author of Stormtroopers. A
Social, Economic and Ideological Analysis,
1929-35 (London 1983), and various articles on the
SA of the NSDAP. He is currently preparing a book
on Communist-Nazi relations during the Weimar
era.

Downloaded from ehq.sagepub.com at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on June 4,

2016