EN BANC

[G.R. No. 138200. February 27, 2002]

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
(DOTC), petitioner, vs. ROBERTO MABALOT, respondent.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
At the core of controversy in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the validity of
Memorandum Order No. 96-735, dated 19 February 1996, and Department Order No. 97-
1025, dated 29 January 1997, both issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
The facts are uncontested.
On , then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735
addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante
Lantin, viz:
In the interest of the service, you are hereby directed to effect the transfer of regional
functions of that office to the DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular
Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to Section 7 of Executive Order
No. 202.
Organic personnel of DOTC-CAR shall perform the LTFRB functions on a concurrent capacity
subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.
On 13 March 1996, herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order,[1] against petitioner
and LTFRB Chairman Lantin, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
81,[2] praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared illegal and
without effect.
On , the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from
implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. On , the lower court, upon filing of a bond by
respondent, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. On , then DOTC Secretary Amado
Lagdameo, Jr. filed his answer to the petition.
Thereafter, on , Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department Order No. 97-1025, to
wit:
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36, dated September 23, 1987, and for purposes of
economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR), the DOTC-CAR Regional Office, created by virtue of Executive
Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, is hereby established as the Regional Office of the LTFRB
and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct
supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.
The budgetary requirement for this purpose shall come from the Department until such time
that its appropriate budget is included in the General Appropriations Act.
After trial, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to reopen the hearing in the lower
court for the purpose of enabling petitioner to present Department Order No. 97-1025. In an
Order dated , the lower court granted the motion.
On , respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition assailing the validity of
Department Order No. 97-1025. On , the OSG presented Department Order No. 97-1025
after which petitioner filed a formal offer of exhibits.
In an Order dated , the lower court admitted petitioners documentary exhibits over the
objection of respondent. Likewise, the lower court admitted the supplemental petition filed by
respondent to which petitioner filed an answer thereto.
On , the lower court rendered a decision the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-733[3]
dated February 19, 1996 and 97-1025 dated January 27, 1997 of the respondent DOTC
Secretary null and void and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of
the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department and also
of the provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other office or employment in
the Government.
The preliminary injunction issued on is hereby made permanent.
No pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Hence, the instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the issue of
validity of the subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.
In his Memorandum[4], respondent Mabalot principally argues that a transfer of the powers
and functions of the LTFRB Regional Office to a DOTC Regional Office or the establishment
of the latter as an LTFRB Regional Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of
legislative power. To this end, respondent quoted heavily the lower courts rationale on this
matter, to wit:
With the restoration of Congress as the legislative body, the transfer of powers and functions,
specially those quasi-judicial (in) nature, could only be effected through legislative fiat. Not
even the President of the Philippines can do so. And much less by the DOTC Secretary
who is only a mere extension of the Presidency. Among the powers of the LTFRB are to
issue injunctions, whether prohibitory (or) mandatory, punish for contempt and to issue
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. These powers devolve by extension on the LTFRB
regional offices in the performance of their functions. They cannot be transferred to
another agency of government without congressional approval embodied in a duty
enacted law. (Emphasis ours)
We do not agree. Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory
infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders, this Court upholds Memorandum
Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 as legal and valid administrative
issuances by the DOTC Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, the President -
through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present
case - may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the
establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative
Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities
appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
At this point, it is apropos to reiterate the elementary rule in administrative law and the law on
public officers that a public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit,
either (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by
Congress), or (3) by authority of law.[5]
Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has been settled by
decisions of the Court upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the
President to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department.[6] Thus, at various
times, Congress has vested power in the President to reorganize executive agencies and
redistribute functions, and particular transfers under such statutes have been held to be within
the authority of the President.[7]
In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made
pursuant to the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance,
through an Executive Order (E.O.) issued by the President or an order of an administrative
agency such as the Civil Service Commission[8] pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292,
otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. In the case before us, the DOTC
Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Orders pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 36 of the President,[9] dated 23 September 1987, Section 1 of which
explicitly provides:
Section 1. Establishment of Regional Offices in the CAR- The various departments and
other agencies of the National Government that are currently authorized to maintain regional
offices are hereby directed to establish forthwith their respective regional offices In the
Cordillera Administrative Region with territorial coverage as defined under Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, with regional headquarters at Baguio City.
Emphatically the President, through Administrative Order No. 36, did not merely authorize but
directed, in no uncertain terms, the various departments and agencies of government to
immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in the CAR. To
us, Administrative Order No. 36 is a clear and unequivocal directive and mandate - no less
than from the Chief Executive - ordering the heads of government departments and bureaus
to effect the establishment of their respective regional offices in the CAR.
By the Chief Executives unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order No. 36 ordering his
alter ego - the DOTC Secretary in the present case - to effectuate the creation of Regional
Offices in the CAR, the President, in effect, deemed it fit and proper under the circumstances
to act and exercise his authority, albeit through the various Department Secretaries, so as to
put into place the organizational structure and set-up in the CAR and so as not to compromise
in any significant way the performance of public functions and delivery of basic government
services in the Cordillera Administrative Region.
Simply stated, it is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of
LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the
President, directly and merely sought to implement the Chief Executives Administrative
Order.
To this end, Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates:
The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.[10] It includes the authority to order the doing of an act
by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.[11]
From the purely legal standpoint, the members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the
disposition of the President since they are merely his alter ego.[12] As this Court enunciated
in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior,[13] without minimizing the importance of the heads of
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.
Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
Applying the foregoing, it is then clear that the lower courts pronouncement - that the transfer
of powers and functions and in effect, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office, may not be validly made by the Chief Executive, much less by his mere alter
ago and could only be properly effected through a law enacted by Congress -is to say the
least, erroneous.
In Larin vs. Executive Secretary,[14] this Court through the ponencia of Mr. Justice Justo
Torres, inked an extensive disquisition on the continuing authority of the President to
reorganize the National Government, which power includes the creation, alteration or abolition
of public offices. Thus in Larin, we held that Section 62 of Republic Act 7645 (General
Appropriations Act [G.A.A.] for FY 1993) evidently shows that the President is authorized
to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or
agency concerned:
Section 62. Unauthorized organizational changes.- Unless otherwise created by law or
directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions
in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures
and be funded from appropriations by this act.
Petitioners contention in Larin that Sections 48 and 62 of R.A. 7645 were riders, deserved
scant consideration from the Court, Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared
invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.[15]
Worthy to note is that R.A. 8174 (G.A.A for FY 1996) contains similar provisions as embodied
in Section 72 (General Provisions) of said law entitled Organizational Changes and Section
73 (General Provisions) thereof entitled Implementation of Reorganization. Likewise, R.A.
8250 (G.A.A. for FY 1997) has Section 76 (General Provisions) entitled Organizational
Changes and Section 77 (General Provisions) entitled Implementation of Reorganization.
In the same vein, Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides a strong legal basis for the Chief Executives authority
to reorganize the National Government, viz:
Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided
for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not
delegated by the President in accordance with law. (Emphasis ours)
This Court, in Larin, had occasion to rule that:
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law
then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of
the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which
includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries
and materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987
Constitution clearly provides that all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked.[16] So far, there is yet no law amending or
repealing said decrees.
The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1772, reads:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
National Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally
acceptable principles of good government and responsive national development, including but
not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and
development-oriented governmental framework:
xxx
b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be necessary, or create
those which are necessary, for the efficient conduct of government functions, services
and activities;
c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records and personnel from
one department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another;
d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions;
e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment;
f) Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies,
instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as well as expand, amend,
change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions, and authorities, including, with
respect to government-owned or controlled corporations, their corporate life,
capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters. (As added by P.D. 1772)
g) Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and
objectives of this decree. (As added by P.D. 1772) (Emphasis supplied.)
In fine, the designation[17] and subsequent establishment[18] of DOTC-CAR as the Regional
Office of LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative Region and the concomitant exercise and
performance of functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the
scope of the continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the Department of
Transportation and Communications.
Beyond this, it must be emphasized that the reorganization in the instant case was decreed in
the interest of the service[19] and for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of
the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region.[20] In this jurisdiction,
reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient.[21] To our mind, the reorganization pursued in the case at bar
bears the earmark of good faith. As petitioner points out,[22] tapping the DOTC-CAR pending
the eventual creation of the LTFRB Regional Office is economical in terms of manpower and
resource requirements, thus, reducing expenses from the limited resources of the
government.
Furthermore, under Section 18, Chapter 5, Title XV, Book IV of E.O. 292[23] and Section 4 of
E.O. 202,[24] the Secretary of Transportation and Communications, through his duly
designated Undersecretary, shall exercise administrative supervision and control[25] over
the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (Board).
Worthy of mention too is that by express provision of Department Order No. 97-1025, the
LTFRB-CAR Regional Office is subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central
Office. Under the law,[26] the decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Franchising and
Regulatory Offices shall be appealable to the Board within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
decision; the decision, order or resolution of the Board shall be appealable to the DOTC
Secretary. With this appellate set-up and mode of appeal clearly established and in place, no
conflict or absurd circumstance would arise in such manner that a decision of the LTFRB-
CAR Regional Office is subject to review by the DOTC-CAR Regional Office.
As to the issue regarding Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution, we hold that the
assailed Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not violate the aforementioned constitutional
provisions considering that in the case of Memorandum Order No. 96-735, the organic
personnel of the DOTC-CAR were, in effect, merely designated to perform the additional
duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the direct supervision and control
of LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB Regional Office.
As held in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees:[27]
To designate a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional duties
while he performs the functions of his permanent office. Or in some cases, a public officer
may be designated to a position in an acting capacity as when an undersecretary is
designated to discharge the functions of a Secretary pending the appointment of a permanent
Secretary.
Assuming arguendo that the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall be
holding more than one office or employment at the same time as a result of the establishment
of such agency as the LTFRB-CAR pursuant to Department Order No. 97-1025, this Court is
of the firm view that such fact still does not constitute a breach or violation of Section 7, Article
IX-B of the Constitution. On this matter, it must be stressed that under the aforementioned
constitutional provision, an office or employment held in the exercise of the primary functions
of ones principal office is an exception to, or not within the contemplation, of the prohibition
embodied in Section 7, Article IX-B.
Equally significant is that no evidence was adduced and presented to clearly establish that
the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall receive any additional, double or
indirect compensation, in violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. In the absence
of any clear and convincing evidence to show any breach or violation of said constitutional
prohibitions, this Court finds no cogent reason to declare the invalidity of the challenged
orders.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City-Branch 81 in
Special Civil Action Case No. Q-96-26868 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive Service Board is
challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute.
She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2,
1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service
Commission2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359
WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil Service shall be administered by the
Civil Service Commission, . . .;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that "The Civil
Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, is mandated to
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progresiveness and courtesy in the civil service, . . .";
WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 grants
the Commission the power, among others, to administer and enforce the constitutional and
statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 Provides,
among others, that The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit
and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based highly
technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
security of tenure;
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the administrative Code of 1987 provides
that "The third level shall cover Positions in the Career Executive Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to consolidate, integrate and unify
the administration of all levels of positions in the career service.
WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 confers on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization
as the need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that the Civil Service
Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and the necessary implications thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service Commission hereby
resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant
thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career
Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget,
properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the
Office for Career Executive Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio,
Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which
abolished the Career Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359,
including whether the Civil Service Commission has authority to abolish the Career Executive
Service Board. Because these issues remain unresolved, the Office of the President has
refrained from considering appointments of career service eligibles to career executive ranks.
xxx xxx xxx
You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to settle the legal issues arising
from issuance by the Civil Service Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, for guidance
of all concerned.
Thank You.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following
arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED THE
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE
CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE
TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO.
93-4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of petitioner.
Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It posited the following position:
ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC
I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT-CSC.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT TO A
CESO RANK OF PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVE
SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY
DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY
OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE
THE PRESIDENT HAS PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4) OFFICIALS
SIMILARLY SITUATED AS SAID PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO
CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO QUORUM, IS NOT THE FAULT OF
PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO
HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CESB.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW
(Sec. 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of the 1987). THIS
PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT
DISMISSED THE PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R. BELMONTE,
JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO. 114380. THE
AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED THE INTEGRATION OF THE
CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition.3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which adopted the Integrated Plan.
Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan provides:
Article IV — Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool of well-selected and
development oriented career administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service.
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the Board, is created to
serve as the governing body of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall consist of the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as presiding officer, the Executive Secretary and the
Commissioner of the Budget as ex-officio members and two other members from the private
sector and/or the academic community who are familiar with the principles and methods of
personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of members of the Career Executive Service. The
Board shall set up the organization and operation of the service. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished
by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public
Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is
primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted
by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices
are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary
to create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-
officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power
of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the
incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a
Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary
independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the
need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an Executive Director, with a Deputy
Executive Director shall implement policies, standards, rules and regulations promulgated by
the Commission; coordinate the programs of the offices of the Commission and render periodic
reports on their operations, and perform such other functions as may be assigned by the
Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members shall
have the following functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with legal advice and assistance;
render counselling services; undertake legal studies and researches; prepare opinions and
ruling in the interpretation and application of the Civil Service law, rules and regulations;
prosecute violations of such law, rules and regulations; and represent the Commission before
any court or tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate development plans, programs and
projects; undertake research and studies on the different aspects of public personnel
management; administer management improvement programs; and provide fiscal and
budgetary services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the Commission with personnel, financial,
logistics and other basic support services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate and implement policies, standards,
rules and regulations pertaining to personnel records maintenance, security, control and
disposal; provide storage and extension services; and provide and maintain library services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation shall formulate and implement
policies, standards, rules and regulations relative to the administration of position classification
and compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall provide leadership and
assistance in developing and implementing the overall Commission programs relating to
recruitment, execution and placement, and formulate policies, standards, rules and regulations
for the proper implementation of the Commission's examination and placement programs.
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in the
formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to performance
appraisal, merit promotion, and employee incentive benefit and awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide leadership and assistance in
the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service; formulate
standards for training and staff development; administer service-wide scholarship programs;
develop training literature and materials; coordinate and integrate all training activities and
evaluate training programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules and
regulations for the effective conduct or inspection and audit personnel and personnel
management programs and the exercise of delegated authority; provide technical and advisory
services to Civil Service Regional Offices and government agencies in the implementation of
their personnel programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the
development and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations in the
accreditation of employee associations or organizations and in the adjustment and settlement
of employee grievances and management of employee disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and implement policies, standards, rules
and regulations governing corporate officials and employees in the areas of recruitment,
examination, placement, career development, merit and awards systems, position classification
and compensation, performing appraisal, employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other
aspects of personnel management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be responsible for the enforcement of the
constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective
implementation of the retirement of government officials and employees.
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — The Commission shall have not less than thirteen (13)
Regional offices each to be headed by a Director, and such field offices as may be needed,
each to be headed by an official with at least the rank of an Assistant Director.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its
inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached
to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB
shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in
the government with a broad and positive outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of
the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment,
CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government
agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in
Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.
The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing
board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without
voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency.
Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service
Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of the CESB was
dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to state that the reliance is misplaced considering
that the cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause
of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent
Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and
JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine
Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of
1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino
domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA,
the task of processing and deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly
licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas
employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment
agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself,
through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment
agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through
the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the
processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines
to be issued for said purpose.
In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's
regional offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower
pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series
of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong
recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic
Helpers to Hong Kong.
Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the
temporary government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong
resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for
said skill and host market, the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the
implementation of said policy.
I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)
An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of
the POEA shall take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry
segment:
The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other
entities concerned:
1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies
2. Manpower Pooling
3. Worker Training and Briefing
4. Processing and Deployment
5. Welfare Programs
II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong
Recruitment Agencies or Principals
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may
negotiate with the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in
Hong Kong.
xxx xxx xxx
X. Interim Arrangement
All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA
until 31 July 1991 under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all
contracts shall be processed with the HWPU.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong
kong a list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of
acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for
processing. After the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be
the POEA manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series
of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for
Hong Kong
Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government
processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of
employment contracts which have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up
to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch
up to 15 August 1991 only.
Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines
shall recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor
Attache, Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991.
Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the
POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their
recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the
cut-off period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will
be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.)
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following
reasons:
1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-
making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative
Register were not complied with.
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and
regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title
[Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders
and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions
of this title. (Emphasis ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by
Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas
Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment
functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services
was the power and duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector
participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15,
Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:
3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a
government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . .
(Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies
in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of
employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. (Art. 20, Labor
Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not
unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing
complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More
and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified
activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts
of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful
reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the
"administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the
respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred
by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas
the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with
due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons"
(Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the
scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and
deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms"
that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other
than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may
still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other countries and all other
classes of Filipino workers for other countries.
Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule
against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other
charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers
to Hongkong. [They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the
Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is
affected with public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in
Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been
attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily
suspended effective July 1, 1991."
The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers
going to Hongkong only.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for
Hongkong resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely
to the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for
employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the
Philippines. (pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the
executive branch of Government.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication
and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies
charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall
become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of
general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center,
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of
filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases
of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures
to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied,
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and
implemented.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of
1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory
requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995
ANICETO G. MATEO, MAXIMO SAN DIEGO, QUIRINO MATEO, DANIEL FRANCISCO,
and LEONILA KUIZON, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, and EDGAR STA.
MARIA, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board
Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then
General Manager.1 On December 13, 1992, private respondent was placed under preventive
suspension and Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager.
He was later dismissed on January 7, 1993.
On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and
Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction2 before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78,
challenging his dismissal by petitioners. The petition embodied three (3) causes of action. It
reads:
xxx xxx xxx
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx xxx xxx
II-2 Petitioner is the General Manager of the MOWAD since August 1984 with concomitant
security of tenure in office and could not be removed either temporarily or permanently, except
for cause and only after compliance with the elementary rules of due process;
II-3 However, on December 14, 1992, contrary to the tenets of justice and fairness, as well as
for want of procedural due process, the respondents (petitioners) and members of the Board of
Directors of the MOWAD have arbitrarily, whimsically, and unilaterally stopped and prohibited
the petitioner from exercising his rights and performing his duties as General Manager of the
MOWAD and, in his place, have designated the respondent (petitioner) Maximo San Diego as
Acting General Manager . . .
II-4 On December 15, 1992, while petitioner was out of office on official travel, . . . thru stealth
and strategy, the respondents have conspired and helped one another in removing the
petitioner from the Office of the General Manager of the MOWAD by forcibly destroying its door
and locked it with a replaced door-knob and all attempts on his part to gain access and entry
proved futile; . . .
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx xxx xxx
III-2 On January 7, 1993, . . . in confabulation with his co-respondents and members of the
Board of Directors of the MOWAD, the respondent Aniceto G. Mateo slapped the petitioner with
an Order terminating his services as General Manger . . .
III-5 Petitioner has a clear right to the Office of General Manager of the MOWAD which is being
usurped or unlawfully held by respondent Maximo San Diego in conspiracy with his co-
respondents; . . .
 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx xxx xxx
IV-1-a Petitioner is entitled to the relief mandated, and the whole or part of such relief consists
in restraining the commission, or continuance of the acts complained of more particularly the
continuous acts of repondents in stopping and prohibiting him from exercising his rights and
performing his duties as General Manager of the MOWAD and from stopping and prohibiting
him to gain access and entry to office. 3
Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no
jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in
the Civil Service Commission; and (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy.4 Respondent
Judge Arturo Marave denied the Motion to Dismiss on April 26, 1993, and the Motion for
Reconsideration on June 9, 1993.5
Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
which was referred to respondent Court of Appeals for adjudication. In its Decision, dated
November 24, 1993, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and
in its Resolution, dated January 11, 1994, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.6
The main issue in this petition for review is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has
jurisdiction over Sp. Civil Case No. 014-M involving dismissal of an employee of quasi-public
corporation.
We hold that it has no jurisdiction.
There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended.7 In
Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commissions 8 the Court en banc ruled that
employees of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
As early as Baguio Water District v. Trajano et, al., We already ruled that a water district is a
corporation created pursuant to a special
law — P.D. No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and employees are covered by the
Civil Service Law.
In another case (Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC), We ruled once again that local water districts
are quasi-public corporations whose employees belong to the Civil Service. (emphasis omitted)
Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of goverment-own and
controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and
Regulations. 9
Presidential Decee No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, 10 and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum
Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of
private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved
by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent
could go on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved
by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission. So We held in Mancita v. Barcinas, 11 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Service Commission, * and that parties aggrieved
thereby may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution. We quote:
Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating
to the Civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's
certiorari judgment.
Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as
amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any
event, whether under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to
entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
dated November 24, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 1, 1994 in CA G.R. SP No. 31530
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 97203 May 26, 1993

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, substituted by HON. ARMANDO V. FABELLA, Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, and VENANCIO R. NAVA, Regional Director, DECS
Region IX, Davao City, petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Br. 134 and AMA
COMPUTER COLLEGE, INC., Davao City and AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE, respondents.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Mauricio C. Ulep for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated 15 November 1990 and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued pursuant to the said order, dated 16 November 1990, and to enjoin
the respondent Judge from implementing the order of 15 November 1990 and from further
conducting proceedings in Special Civil Case No. 90-2917 until further orders from this Court.
As prayed for, this Court issued on 28 February 1991 a temporary restraining order, viz.
"effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court You, RESPONDENT
JUDGE, your agents, representatives, or any person or persons acting in your place or stead
are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from implementing your Order dated November
15, 1990 and from conducting further proceedings in Special Civil Case No. 90-2917 entitled
"Ama Computer College, et al. vs. Hon. Isidro Carino, et al."1
The antecedents are as follows:
By virtue of a "Contract of Lease with Option to Buy" entered into with Light Bringer School
(LBS) on 14 May 1990, Ama Computer College (AMA) took possession of the premises of the
former located at Marfori Heights, Davao City. LBS is a duly recognized and licensed
elementary school which transferred its operation elsewhere in Davao City.
On 21 May 1990, Regional Director Venancio R. Nava, Region IX-DECS, received AMA's letter
of intent to operate as an educational institution in Davao City.2 Responding to the said letter,
Regional Director Venancio R. Nava reminded AMA "of the provisions of the Rules and
Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, specifically Article E, Section 7, Rule III that the filing
of the application shall be at least one (1) year before the opening of classes" and the
"provisions of the Private School Law reiterated in the Educational Act of 1992 which prohibits
the operation of unauthorized schools or courses."3
Nevertheless, AMA proceeded to announce its opening through news and print media, and
thereupon, started to enroll students in elementary, secondary and tertiary levels. Taking
remedial action, the DECS Regional Director directed AMA to stop enrollment and to desist
from operating without prior authorization.4
AMA, however, not only continued the enrollment but even started to hold regular classes, and
thereafter, on 15 June 1990, filed a formal application to operate. Acknowledging receipt of the
said operation, the Regional Director reiterated the earlier directive for AMA to stop operation
with a warning that further failure to comply "would constrain the Office to invoke the
Memorandum Agreement with the Defense Department to stop unlawful operation of the
school."5 Again, AMA ignored the directive and continued to operate illegally.
On 22 June 1990, a DECS inspection team was sent to the premises of AMA to look into the
case. In its report,6 the inspection team confirmed AMA's defiance of the DECS directive.
Hence, military assistance was requested by the Regional Director to effect closure of AMA
Computer College, Inc., Davao City. However, in a letter dated 25 June 1990, AMA's Officer-in-
Charge requested that the closure be held in abeyance for fifteen (15) days,7 which the
Regional Director denied on the same day.8
On even date, i.e. on 25 June 1990, the Regional Director received a letter from AMA asking
that the parties await the decision of the Secretary of DECS on its application for permit to
operate before the closure order is effected.9 On 27 June, 1990, the Secretary of DECS denied
AMA's
application.10
On 6 July 1990, AMA filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, a petition for prohibition, certiorari
and mandamus against the Hon. Isidro Carino, DEC's Secretary and Atty. Venancio R. Nava,
Regional Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region IX to annul and set
aside the closure order and to enjoin the respondents from closing or padlocking AMACC,
Davao City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53615.11 On 26 July 1990, the trial
court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Thereafter, AMA filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 22357 assailing the 26 July order of the court a quo,
but, again, the Court of Appeals peremptorily dismissed the petition12 and also denied its
motion for reconsideration.13
Under the cloak of an organization of parents of students styling themselves as AMACC-
PARENTS Organization, AMA filed another petition for prohibition and/or mandamus with
preliminary injunction with the RTC of Davao City, Branch 8, docketed therein as Civil Case No.
20-230-90, entitled "Freddie Retotal, Ricardo Fuentes, Calixta Holazo, Ursula Reyes, in their
own behalf and in behalf of the other members of AMACC Parents' Organization vs. Venancio
Nava, in his capacity as Regional Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports."14
On 7 August 1990, the court dismissed the petition.15
AMA, however, in order to thwart the closure or padlocking of its school in Davao City, filed with
the RTC of Makati, Branch 134, presided over by respondent Judge, another petition for
mandamus, with damages, preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against Hon. Isidro
Carino, Secretary and Director, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region IX to
compel the respondents to approve petitioners' application for permit to operate retroactive to
the commencement of school year 1990-1991, and to enjoin the closure and/or padlocking of
AMA-Davao school, docketed therein as SP Civil Case No. 90-2917.16
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss AMA's petition on the
ground that (1) AMA is not entitled to the writ of mandamus as petitioners' authority to grant or
deny the permit to operate is discretionary and not ministerial; (2) AMA failed to comply with the
provisions of the Education Act; (3) AMA is blatantly engaging in forum shopping; (4) AMA failed
to exhaust available administrative remedies before resorting to court; and (5) lack of territorial
jurisdiction over petitioner Regional Director and AMA-Davao.17
On 15 November 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order18 directing the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued,
upon filing of petitioners of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00, duly approved by this Court,
enjoining and restraining the respondent Hon. Isidro Carino, his agents, representatives and
any person acting for and his behalf, from implementing the closing and/or padlocking AMA
Computer College, Inc. - Davao City Branch, until further orders from this Court. 19
and on the following day, i.e., on 16 November 1990, issued the writ of preliminary injunction.20
Hence, the petitioners filed the present petition, claiming that respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order
dated 15 November 1990 and the writ of preliminary injunction dated 16 November 1990, and
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law except through the present petition. Acting upon the petition, the Court required the private
respondents to comment on the petition.21
Instead of filing their comment, the private respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion for the
Dismissal of the Petition on the following grounds: (1) A compromise agreement has already
been effected between AMA Computer College and the Department of Education completely
altering the factual situation in the case at bar; and (2) The grounds relied upon for this petition
for certiorari no longer exist.22
As required by the Court, the petitioners filed their comment23 on the aforesaid Manifestation
and Motion, while the private respondents filed by their reply24 thereto. As further required by
the Court, the petitioners filed a
rejoinder25 to the private respondents' reply, and the private respondents their sur-rejoinder26
to the petitioners' rejoinder
On 5 November 1991, the Court denied the private respondents' Manifestation and Motion for
the dismissal of the petition, and directed them to file their comment on the main petition as
required in the resolution of 14 February 1991.27
In their comment28 on the petition, the private respondents simply reiterated the allegations
contained in their Manifestation and Motion for the dismissal of the petition.
Thereafter, "the Court Resolved to (a) CONSIDER the comment as ANSWER to the petition;
(b) GIVE DUE COURSE to the petition; and (c) CALENDAR this case for deliberation."29
After careful deliberation, the Court holds that the petition is meritorious; hence, the same
should be granted.
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of his
jurisdiction in issuing the order of 15 November 1990 directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and in issuing the writ on 16 November 1990.
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as the "Education Act of 1982", the
establishment and operation of schools are subject to the prior authorization of the government
and shall be effected by recognition. And for the implementation of the law, the Ministry (now
Department) of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) is empowered to prescribe the rules and
regulations governing recognition.30
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 provide, among others,
as follows :
Section 1. Policy — Pursuant to the Constitution, all educational institutions shall be under the
supervision or, and subject to regulation by the State.
Consequently, no school or educational institution shall be established, nor operate any
educational program, whether formal or non-formal, except by law or pursuant to law and in
accordance with these Rules.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Establishment of School — The establishment of new schools shall be the subject to
the following :
xxx xxx xxx
d. The establishment of a new private school, including that of a branch school or extension
class, shall be subject to the prior approval of the Ministry pursuant to Act. No. 2706, as
amended, the Educational Act of 1982, and other education related and applicable laws . . . .
Sec. 5. Recognition of Schools — In view of the State Policy that education programs and/or
operations shall be of good quality, and therefore shall at least satisfy the minimum standards
with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and facilities, and of administrative and
management viability, no institution established as a school shall operate without prior
government authorization to conduct or undertake educational operations. . . .31
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, further provide :
Sec. 11. Effects of Non-Recognition. — Contrariwise, the effects of non-recognition of a school
or any of its programs or courses of studies, or specifically the non-issuance by the Ministry
(Department) of the permit or certificate of government recognition therefore as provided in
Sections 8 and 9 under this Rule, shall be any or all of the following :
a. At the option of the Ministry, either the total closure of the school or its program or courses
of studies for lack of authority to operate.
xxx xxx xxx
c. Disqualification of the school to confer any title or degree, or to award any certificate or
diploma to any pupil or student enrolled in the non-recognized program or course or studies.32
As a rule, a writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interest, and for no other purpose,
during the pendency of the principal action. Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be
issued, there must be a clear showing by the complainant that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the writ is directed are violative of said right.33
In the case at bar, the private respondents' application for a permit to operate AMACC-Davao
City as an educational institution was denied by the petitioners. Otherwise stated, the private
respondents do not have a permit to operate or a certificate of recognition from the government
to undertake educational or school operations. In fine, the private respondents do not have any
existing right that needed to be protected during the pendency of their principal action for
mandamus. Hence, the "closing" and/or "padlocking" of AMACC-Davao City would not and did
not violate any right of the private respondents.
Moreover, it is not the function of the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain a public officer
from performing a duty imposed by law or to permit the doing of that which is declared
unlawful.34 Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
establishment and operation of schools are subject to the prior authorization of the government.
And, as sanctions for operating without permit, the DECS is authorized either to impose the
total closure of school and/or to disqualify the school from conferring title or degree in the non-
recognized program or course of studies. In ordering the total closure of AMACC-Davao City,
the petitioners were only performing their duties as public officers; hence, the respondent Judge
should not have issued the writ of preliminary injunction. In issuing the writ, he allowed the
private respondents to continue the operation of AMACC-Davao City as an educational
institution without a permit or certificate of government recognition, thereby sanctioning the act
which is unlawful.
In directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent Judge reasoned
out that the private respondents "need full protection for by law against irreparable damage that
they may sustain by virtue of the closure order." In this connection, it would suffice to state that
the mere "possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of an actually existing right, is no
ground for an injunction, being a mere damnum absque injuria."35
Finally, the action filed by the private respondents in the court below is a petition for mandamus
to compel the petitioners to approve their application to operate AMACC-Davao City as an
educational institution. As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty but not a discretionary function.36 A ministerial duty is one which is so clear
and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other
hand, a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment. As
explained in the case of Symaco vs. Aquino,37 —
A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the
petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had to
be exercised in accordance with — and not in violation of — the law and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. Thus, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Motion to Dismiss the
petition —
Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits is
governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is vested
upon the judgment of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the
rules and regulations governing the recognition on private schools (Section 27, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 232).
Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed.
In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a permit in blatant violation of
law. Public respondent has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a school
in Davao City before petitioner has even filed an application or before his application has been
first processed in accordance with the rules and regulations on the matter. Certainly, public
respondent is not enjoined by any law to grant such permit or to allow such operation without a
permit, without first processing an application. To do so is violation of the Educational Act.38
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the order dated 15 November 1990 and the writ
of preliminary injunction dated 16 November 1990 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The petition for mandamus before the respondent court is DISMISSED.
The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court is hereby made
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992

CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
At the very outset, it should be well to set forth the constitutional provision that is at the core of
the controversy now confronting us, thus:
Article XVI, Section 6:
The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be national in scope and
civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The
authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. 1
With the aforequoted provision in mind, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN
ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" as the consolidated version of House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463.
Following the said Act's approval by President Corazon C. Aquino on December 13, 1990, it
was published on December 17, 1990. 2
Presently, however, petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar sworn to
defend the Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on December 20, 1990, seeking this Court's
declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for temporary restraining order.
But in an en banc resolution dated December 27, 1990, We simply required the public
respondents to file their Comment, without however giving due course to the petition and the
prayer therein. Hence, the Act took effect after fifteen days following its publication, or on
January 1, 1991. 3
Before we settle down on the merits of the petition, it would likewise be well to discuss albeit
briefly the history of our police force and the reasons for the ordination of Section 6, Article XVI
in our present Constitution.
During the Commonwealth period, we had the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus of the
Philippine Ground Force (PGF), now the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PC was
made part of the PGF but its administrative, supervisory and directional control was handled by
the then Department of the Interior. After the war, it remained as the "National Police" under the
Department of National Defense, as a major service component of the AFP. 4
Later, the Integration Act of 1975 5 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under the Office
of the President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the civilian
components. The PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief who, as concurrent Director-General of
the INP, exercised command functions over the INP. 6
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) 7 exercised administrative control and
supervision while the local executives exercised operational supervision and direction over the
INP units assigned within their respective localities. 8
The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military component, which
is the PC, severely eroded the INP's civilian character and the multiplicity in the governance of
the PC-INP resulted in inefficient police service. 9 Moreover, the integration of the national
police forces with the PC also resulted in inequities since the military component had superior
benefits and privileges. 10
The Constitutional Commission of 1986 was fully aware of the structural errors that beset the
system. Thus, Com. Teodulo C. Natividad explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NATIVIDAD. . . . The basic tenet of a modern police organization is to remove it from the
military. 11
xxx xxx xxx
Here in our draft Constitution, we have already made a constitutional postulate that the military
cannot occupy any civil service position [in Section 6 of the Article on the Civil Service 12]
Therefore, in keeping with this and because of the universal acceptance that a police force is a
civilian function, a public service, and should not be performed by military force, one of the
basic reforms we are presenting here is that it should be separated from the military force which
is the PC. 13
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the civilian police cannot blossom into full profession because most of the key positions are
being occupied by the military So, it is up to this Commission to remove the police from such a
situation so that it can develop into a truly professional civilian police. . . . 14
Hence, the "one police force, national in scope, and civilian in character" provision that is now
Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
And so we now come to the merits of the petition at hand.
In the main, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that RA 6975 emasculated the
National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine
National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom
both the National Police Commission and the PNP were placed. 15
We do not share this view.
To begin with, one need only refer to the fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law
that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices to lay at rest
petitioner's contention on the matter.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk 17 and has been held by us, in
the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 18 to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is said to be at the
very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive." 19
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine
of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
powers all at the same time and in person, 20 he will have to delegate some of them to his
Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, 21 "all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." 22 (emphasis ours)
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices
under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department." 23
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry,
local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies
created under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the
national government.
Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the
national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as
at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately provides for administration and control
at the commission level, as shown in the following provisions, to wit:
Sec. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical requirements,
communications, records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime
reporting;
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary
actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the
Philippine National Police by the Chief of the PNP;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through .the regional. appellate boards over administrative
cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 26. The Command and direction of the PNP shall be vested in the Chief of the PNP . . .
Such command and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to subordinate officials
with respect to the units under their respective commands, in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Commission. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 35. . . . To enhance police operational efficiency and effectiveness, the Chief of the PNP
may constitute such other support units as may be necessary subject to the approval of the
Commission. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 37. . . . There shall be established a performance evaluation system which shall be
administered in accordance with the rules, regulations and standards; and a code of conduct
promulgated by the Commission for members of the PNP. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM
over the PNP, RA 6975 vested the power to choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs
of Police in the Governors and Mayors, respectively; the power of "operational supervision and
control" over police units in city and municipal mayors; in the Civil Service Commission,
participation in appointments to the positions of Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-
General as well as the administration of qualifying entrance examinations; disciplinary powers
over PNP members in the "People's Law Enforcement Boards" and in city and municipal
mayors. 25
Once more, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions.
It is true that when the Constitutional Commissioners of 1986 provided that the authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law, they intended that
the day-to-day functions of police work like crime, investigation, crime prevention activities,
traffic control, etc., would be under the operational control of the local executives as it would
not be advisable to give full control of the police to the local executives. 26
They reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to warlordism, bossism, and sanctuaries for vices
and abuses. 27
It would appear then that by vesting in the local executives the power to choose the officers in
question, the Act went beyond the bounds of the Constitution's intent.
Not so. We find light in the principle of constitutional construction that every presumption should
be indulged in favor of constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in
question should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the
fundamental
law. 28
Under the questioned provisions, which read as follows:
D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PNP.
Sec. 51. Powers of Local Government Officials over the PNP Units or Forces.
Governors and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the Commission in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. As such, the local executives shall discharge the following
functions:
a.) Provincial Governor — (1) . . .
The provincial governor shall choose the provincial director from a list of three (3) eligibles
recommended by the PNP Regional Director.
4) . . . City and municipal mayors shall have the following authority over the PNP units in their
respective jurisdictions:
i.) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the
Provincial Police Director. . . . (Emphasis ours)
full control remains with the National Police Commission.
We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that "there is no usurpation of the
power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very same provision,
it is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. . . .
As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of
their functions under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts
are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM." 29 It is significant to note that the local
officials, as NAPOLCOM representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of
eligibles (those who meet the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) 30 to be
recommended by PNP officials.
The same holding is true with respect to the contention on the operational supervision and
control exercised by the local officials. Those officials would simply be acting as representatives
of the Commission.
As regards the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to say that the
questioned provisions, which read:
Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. — The Appointment of the officers and
members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner:
a.) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV. — Appointed by the PNP regional director for
regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for national headquarters personnel and attested
by the Civil Service Commission;
b.) Inspector to Superintendent. — Appointed by the Chief of the PNP, as recommended by
their immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil Service Commission;
c.) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General. — Appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Chief of the PNP, with proper endorsement by the Chairman of the Civil
Service
Commission . . .
Sec. 32. Examinations for Policemen. — The Civil Service Commission shall administer the
qualifying entrance examinations for policemen on the basis of the standards set by the
NAPOLCOM.
precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and will undoubtedly
professionalize the same.
The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law Enforcement Boards"
(or the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the commission's
power of control over the PNP.
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the regional appellate
boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is so under Section 20(c).
Furthermore, it is the Commission which shall issue the implementing guidelines and
procedures to be adopted by the PLEB for in the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign
NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs (Section 43-d4, d5).
As a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's complaints against erring
officers and members of the PNP, the establishment of PLEBs in every city, and municipality
would all the more help professionalize the police force.
Petitioner would likewise have this Court imagine that Section 12 of the questioned Act, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
Sec. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense. — During a
period of twenty- four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) shall continue its present role of preserving the internal and external security
of the State: Provided, that said period may be extended by the President, if he finds it
justifiable, for another period not exceeding twenty-four (24) months, after which, the
Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the primary role of preserving internal
security, leaving to the AFP its primary role of preserving external security.
xxx xxx xxx
constitutes an "encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of,
executive control and commander-in-chief powers."
That We are not disposed to do for such is not the case at all here. A rejection thus of petitioner's
submission anent Section 12 of the Act should be in order in the light of the following exchanges
during the CONCOM deliberations of Wednesday, October 1, 1986:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the Commander-in-
Chief of all the armed forces.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not
suppose they come under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President of the Philippines.
MR. NATIVIDAD. They do, Madam President. By law they are under the supervision and control
of the President of the Philippines.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national police.
MR. NATIVIDAD. He is the President.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision that the
President is Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.
MR. NATIVIDAD. No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.
MR. RODRIGO. There are two other powers of the President. The President has control over
departments, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local governments. Under which does
the police fall, under control or under supervision?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Both, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Control and Supervision.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the
President. (CONCOM RECORDS, Vol. 5, p. 296)
It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives muscle
to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not
being integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a
civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by
the President of the power of executive control.
Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It
simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would
gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under
this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to
here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the
Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him.
All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." 31 His position as a civilian Commander-in-
Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that "civilian authority
is, at all times, supreme over the military." (Article II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution)
Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight Committee" under Section
84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as members (namely: the
respective Chairmen of the Committee on Local Government and the Committee on National
Defense and Security in the Senate, and the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Public
Order and Security and the Committee on National Defense in the House of Representatives)
is an "unconstitutional encroachment upon and a diminution of, the President's power of control
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices."
But there is not the least interference with the President's power of control under Section 84.
The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tasked
solely with planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or absorption" into the
Department of the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved agencies." This it will
undertake in accordance with the phases of implementation already laid down in Section 85 of
the Act and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the committee itself would cease
altogether. 32 As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it exercises, decidedly do not
constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which properly belongs to
the President. What is more, no executive department, bureau or office is placed under the
control or authority, of the committee. 33
As a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the Constitution, there are the
so-called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections. (Article IX-A, Section 1)
As these Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be protected from
external influences and political pressures. Hence, they were made constitutional bodies,
independent of and not under any department of the government. 34 Certainly, they are not
under the control of the President.
The Constitution also created an independent office called the "Commission on Human Rights."
(Article XIII, Section 17[1]).However, this Commission is not on the same level as the
Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is independent like the latter
Commissions. 35 It still had to be constituted thru Executive Order No. 163 (dated May 5, 1987).
In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a national
police commission that will administer and control the national police force to be established
thereunder.
This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent
Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally created independent
Office, namely, the Commission on Human Rights.
By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit, Elections) and
the additional commission created by the Constitution (Human Rights) are all independent of
the Executive; but the National Police Commission is not. 36 In fact, it was stressed during the
CONCOM deliberations that this commission would be under the President, and hence may be
controlled by the President, thru his or her alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government.
WHEREFORE, having in view all of the foregoing holdings, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and
employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount
equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be less than
P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for
the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-
owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a
comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and
agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres.
Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992
in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268,
enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President.
Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of
productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause
the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of
the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the
amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential
control over the executive departments

Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive
departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any
action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.

When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of
government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing
the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power
of control over executive departments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to
prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by
committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards.
The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the
government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate
clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of
government resources.

The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of
executive departments.