A Report on and Response to C. S.

Peirce’s How to Make Our Ideas Clear

Anthony
Machum
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Dr. C. Hundleby
34-573-01
16 September 2009

Peirce begins How to Make Our Ideas Clear with a critique of the concepts clear

and distinct. These concepts, for the two centuries before him, were “reckoned by

logicians as among the gems of their doctrine.” (Peirce, 37) For Peirce they are no longer

sufficient. Though they were “precisely on the level of Descartes Philosophy”, one of the

“philosophies which [(for Peirce)] have long been extinct”, they are not ‘on the level’ of

“the enginery of modern thought.” (Peirce, 38) Clearness is “familiarity through use” and

distinctness “precise definition… in abstract terms.” (Peirce, 37) This, however, does not

deal with how to distinguish between what seems clear and what is actually clear.

For Peirce familiarity and definition are important steps toward having a

genuinely clear idea, but he calls for a “third grade” of clearness. (Peirce, 44) En route to

articulating his ‘third grade’ Peirce first defines thought and its function. Thought being:

a “system of relations” whose “sole motive, idea and function is to produce belief…”

(Peirce, 41) Belief being: “First, it is something we are aware of; second, it appeases the

irritation of doubt [(the motive for thinking)]; and third, it involves the establishment…

of a rule of action, or… habit.” (Peirce, 41) Succinctly, the “function of thought is to

produce habits of action…” (Peirce, 43) This leads him to

“the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension,

[which] is as follows: Consider what effects, which might conceivably
have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to
have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our
conception of the object.” (Peirce, 44)

So, in having a genuinely clear idea we attain familiarity through use, distinctness

through definition and clearness by considering what effects the object has, and,
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importantly, by not going beyond the conception of the object that the conception of the

effects provides. For example, someone may have a familiar and defined idea about

people of a certain skin color or gender being inferior, but if the practical effects of this

skin color or gender are sufficiently considered their idea is shown to not correlate with

the effects. How then do we distinguish real effects of real things?

“The only effect which real things have is to cause belief… The question

therefore is, how is true belief (or belief in the real) distinguished from false belief (or

belief in fiction).” (Peirce, 45) Peirce’s answer is the scientific method, where by “The

opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean

by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.” (Peirce, 47) The key is

“investigation carried sufficiently far.” (Peirce, 47) Which leaves two questions: (i)

When is investigation carried sufficiently far? (ii) Is it possible to investigate sufficiently

far? On (i): Is it when everyone agrees? Could we not all be mistaken? Simply, yes, but

for Peirce there remains an ultimate reality with ultimate and eternal solutions/truths

whether humans can reach them by carrying investigation sufficiently far or not. He

accounts for the fluidity of human perception and conception but not for the fluidity of

aspects of reality. On (ii): Humans and the world (reality) are constantly changing

(flowing); this demands not only new investigations but constant reinvestigation of the

supposedly established. Does this not preclude any kind of ultimate?

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Works Cited

Peirce, Charles S. “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” In Pragmatism: A Contemporary

Reader, ed. Russell B. Goodman. New York: Routledge, 1995. 34-49.