Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Safety Research

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jsr

Association between safety leading indicators and safety climate levels

Saeed Givehchi, ⁎ Ehsan Hemmativaghef, Hassan Hoveidi
Faculty of Environment, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Objectives: The aim of this study was to evaluate the association of leading indicators for occupational health and
Received 27 July 2016 safety, particularly safety inspections and non-compliances, with safety climate levels. Methods: Nordic Occupa-
Received in revised form 29 November 2016 tional Safety Climate Assessment Questionnaire was employed to evaluate safety climate in cross-sectional de-
Accepted 4 May 2017 sign. The geographically diverse population of the inspection body made it possible to conduct the survey
Available online 18 May 2017
across 10 provinces in Iran. 89 completed questionnaires were obtained with a response rate of 47%. Except
for management safety justice, the internal consistency of other six dimensions was found to be acceptable (α
Keywords:
Active failures
≥ 0.7). Results: Mean scores of dimensions ranged from 3.50 in trust in the efficacy of safety systems (SD =
Just culture 0.38) to 2.98 in workers' safety priority and risk non-acceptance (SD = 0.47). Tukey HSD tests indicated a statis-
Latent failures tically significant difference of mean scores among groups undergoing different number of safety inspections and
Non-compliance those receiving different number of non-compliances (p b 0.05), with no significant differences based on safety
Safety inspection training man-hours and sessions (p N 0.05). Spearman's rank-order correlation showed no relationship between
work experience and number of non-compliances (correlation coefficient = − 0.04, p N 0.05) and between safety
training man-hours and number of non-compliances (correlation coefficient = − 0.15, p N 0.05). Conclusions:
Our results indicate that safety climate levels are influenced by number of safety inspections and the resultant
non-compliances. Practical applications: Findings suggest that safety non-compliances detected as a result of
conducting safety inspections could be used to monitor the safety climate state. Establishing plans to conduct
scheduled safety inspections and recording findings in the form of safety non-compliance and monitoring their
trend could be used to monitor levels of safety climate.
© 2017 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction elements of latent failures including organizational climate, inadequate

The significant role of human factors in workplace accidents has
not changed much in decades. The old Heinrich theory holding unsafe
acts responsible for 88% of all workplace accidents (Heinrich, 1941 ),
and the more recent investigations attributing 76% of all accidents
to behavior and 20% to both behavior and conditions (McSween &
Mathews, 1997); demonstrate the limitations of relying on technolog-
ical and systematic solutions for prevention of accidents. In contrast,
James Reason model of accident causation identi fied latent failures
comprising organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and precon-
ditions for unsafe acts as contributing factors in accidents. It explained
how accidents could be seen not simply as a consequence of human
error, but as the result of the interaction between unsafe acts (active
failures) and latent failures (Reason, 2000a, 2000b).
This model and a comprehensive human error framework, the
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) developed
later (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, 2001 ), further introduced the
⁎ Corresponding author at: Faculty of Environment, University of Tehran, No. 25, Qods
St, Tehran, Iran.
E-mail address: givehchi@ut.ac.ir (S. Givehchi).
supervision and condition of operators; indicating that there might be a
flaw in Heinrich's and other researchers' theory in identifying merely
unsafe behaviors as the main cause for occurrence of accidents, and
that consideration should be given to the drivers of latent failure.
Nevertheless, human factors proved to be detrimental in the
Chernobyl accident and many of the tragic disasters in the following
years including Piper Alpha, BP Texas re finery, and Challenger and
Columbia space shuttles explosions (INSAG-7, 1992; NASA Safety Center,
2013; Outer Space Universe, 2011; Smith, 2003; CSB, 2005) which all en-
couraged safety culture research particularly in high reliability organiza-
tions (Antonsen, 2009).
The prevailing health and safety culture of organizations is recog-
nized as a major influence on workers' safety related behavior (HSE,
1999). The crucial role of behavioral factors in reducing injuries has
been indicated in organizational and safety culture research (Brown,
Willis, & Prussia, 2000; Carder & Ragan, 2003; DePasquale & Geller,
1999; Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Gershon et al., 2000;
Griffin & Neal, 2000). While safety climate levels have been demon-
strated with the ability to predict workplace injuries (Felknor, Aday,
Burau, Delclos, & Kapadia, 2000; Gershon, Pearse, Grimes, Flanagan, &
Vlahov, 1999), other studies have associated a higher injury rate among
groups with the poorest safety climate levels (Smith & DeJoy, 2014).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2017.05.003
0022-4375/© 2017 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
24 S. Givehchi et al. / Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32
Research had also conveyed a significant positive relationship
between safety climate and safety performance (Guldenmund, 2000;
Wiegmann, Zhang, Von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002; Zohar,
1980), which is fundamentally composed of leading and lagging indi-
cators (HSE, 2006). Lagging indicators are characterized by reporting
accidents and learning from feedback (Delatour, Laclemence, Calcei,
& Mazri, 2014) and leading safety indicators represent the current
state and/or potential development of key organizational functions
or processes as well as the technical infrastructure of the system
(Dyreborg, 2009).
The nature of leading indicators has been described as predictive,
proactive, and preventative (Grabowski, Ayyalasomayajula, Merrick,
Harrald, & Roberts, 2007; Hinze, Thurman, & Wehle, 2013; Hudson,
2009; Toellner, 2001; Wurzelbacher & Jin, 2011). There is also extensive
research on whether a correlation or link, if not causal relationship,
exists between leading and lagging indicators of safety performance
(Diaz & Cabrera, 1997; Iyer, Haight, Castillo, Tink, & Hawkins, 2004;
Nielsen, Rasmussen, Glasscock, & Spangenberg, 2008). It is also impor-
tant for leading indicators to actively monitor the state of safety perfor-
mance (Hopkins, 2009). These findings, and in particular the predictive
and preventive role of leading indicators, may be suggestive of their
potential to act as a monitoring tool for detection and identification of
latent failures.
A limitation of previous research is that most studies have evaluated
trends of accident records as a lagging indicator of safety performance
in relation to improvements in safety climate. In other few researches,
the role of safety training in improving safety climate has been studied
(Bahari, 2011). To address the limitations of previous studies, we
examined the association between various safety performance leading
indicators and safety climate dimensions. Moreover, we also included
occupation category, work experience, age, and gender to study any
associations between these factors and dimensions of safety climate.
2. Methods
2.1. Study population
In this study, Nordic Occupational Safety Climate Questionnaire
(NOSACQ-50) was employed to obtain employees perceptions towards
safety climate in cross-sectional design. The safety culture of an organi-
zation is defined as the product of individual and group values,
attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's
health and safety programs (ACSNI, 1993). With a view to the cultural
layers of basic assumption, espoused values and artifacts discovered
by Schein (2004) the measurement of all three layers would be very
time consuming (Brooks, 2008), therefore, safety climate, as a quicker
approach, is assessed to form a snapshot (Canso, 2013) of safety culture.
The study evaluated safety climate among workers of an inspection
body during September 2015. Inspectors of traded goods and products
at 14 geographically diverse ports and cities across Iran were chosen
for the study. Each location constituted of at least one middle manager
or supervisor who engaged in routine inspections like other personnel.
Operations included verification of the quantity, weight, and quality of
traded goods, testing of product quality and ensuring that products
meet the requirements of standards set by governments, standardiza-
tion bodies, or customers. Inspected items included packed and bulk
oil, gas, chemical, mineral, agricultural, consumer, and retail products.
NOSACQ-50 questionnaire was sent via the organization's QHSE
department e-mail to location managers or safety officers. While partic-
ipation of all workers in the survey was encouraged, emphasis was
made on (a) objective of the survey for assessing the level of safety
climate and its improvement, (b) protecting the confidentiality of
individual respondents, (c) voluntary participation, and (d) returning
of questionnaires either electronically or by post. Respondents gave
their written informed consent to participate in the study.
NOSACQ-50 questionnaire designed by a Nordic network of occupa-
tional safety researcher headed by the National Research Centre for the
Working Environment, Denmark, consists of 50 items across seven safe-
ty climate dimensions. Each dimension is composed of 6–9 items as per
the following: (a) management safety priority, commitment, and com-
petence, (b) management safety empowerment, (c) management safe-
ty justice, (d) workers' safety commitment, (e) workers' safety priority
and risk non-acceptance, (f) safety communication, learning, and trust
in co-workers' safety competence, and (g) trust in the efficacy of safety
systems. The questionnaire items are formulated in two groups of
positive and reverse formats using a four point Likert scale ranging
from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” The design of positive and
reversed items is considered for control of acquiescence bias, which
has the potential to introduce serious confounds that may threaten the
validity of cross-cultural comparisons (Cheung & Rensvold, 2000).
The initial interpretation of results is based on scores obtained
in each dimension. Scores higher than 3.30 indicate a good level
allowing for maintaining developments, while scores between 3.00
and 3.30 are considered fairly good with a slight need for improve-
ment. A score of 2.70 to 2.99 shows a fairly low level with a need of im-
provement and a score below 2.70 indicates a low level with a great
need of improvement.
Inclusion criteria for this study were: (a) employee shall be engaged
in operational activities, (b) either 5 personnel shall work at each loca-
tion as minimum or (c) a minimum of 70% response rate is obtained in
each location. In consultation with the questionnaire designer, the min-
imum number of respondents in each location was reduced from the
recommended 10 to five; as among 14 locations, 10 had b 10 personnel,
but we also considered a response rate factor in the survey. Administra-
tive and office personnel and high level management were excluded on
the basis of not being exposed to operational risks. Accordingly, of the
total inspector personnel (N = 202, 14 locations), 93% of individuals
were selected to participate in the survey (N = 188, 10 locations).
Altogether 89 inspectors (78 workers and 11 middle managers) filled
out the questionnaire, corresponding to a response rate of approxi-
mately 47%.
The internal consistency of the seven dimensions of NOSACQ-50
questionnaire was tested by calculating Cronbach's alpha coefficient,
which showed acceptable internal consistency of all dimensions, except
for dimension three. Management safety priority and ability was
measured with nine items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.77), management
safety empowerment was measured with seven items (Cronbach's
alpha = 0.85), management safety justice was measured with six
items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.62), worker safety commitment was mea-
sured with six items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.71), workers' safety priority
and risk non-acceptance were measured with seven items (Cronbach's
alpha = 0.71), peer safety communication, learning, and trust in safety
ability were measured with eight items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.70), and
workers' trust in the efficacy of safety systems was measured with
seven items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79).
2.2. Statistical methods
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare mean
scores of the seven dimensions to determine significant differences
Table 1
Formulas for calculation of ANOVA.
Source of variation Sums of squares Degrees of Mean squares F
freedom
Between groups SSB = ∑ni ð xi−x Þ
2 k − 1 and SSB MSB
MSB = F=
k−1 MSE
Within groups SSW = ∑∑ðx−xiÞ
2 N−k SSW
MSW =
N−k
N−1
Total SST = ∑∑ðx− xÞ2
 S. Givehchi et al. / Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32 25

based on each variable. Null hypothesis assumed equal means. Where
ANOVA results indicated significant differences between means,
Tukey's HSD tests were performed to make comparisons between
pairs of means in each variable subgroup and clarify what stratified sub-
group mean differed. Before the comparison of means, Leven's test
was conducted to assess the homogeneity of variances with the null
hypothesis of equal variances. If homogeneity of variances was hold,
then mean differences were attributable to differences between sub-
groups of a variable. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient was used
to assess non-linear relationships between non-parametric variables
and their direction. A significance level of 0.05 was chosen to reject
the null hypothesis for all above tests (p ≤ 0.05). The statistical analyses
were carried out with IBM SPSS Statistics version 23. Formulas for calcu-
lation of the above statistical methods are described in the following.
Calculation of ANOVA requires that sums of squares between groups
(SSB), within groups (SSW), and the total sums of squares (SST) as well
as mean squares between groups (MSB) and within groups (MSW) are
computed to obtain the F score. The formula for calculation of ANOVA
is shown in Table 1, where x represents the mean score of each respon-
dent to each individual question, xi represents mean score of each di-
mension, x represents the overall mean score, k is the number of
strati fied subgroups of each independent variable, and N represents
the total number of respondents.
The formula for Levene's test is defined as:
k 2
N−k ∑i¼1 Ni Zi−Z::
W¼ 2:
k−1 ∑k ∑Ni Zij−Zi
i¼1 j¼1
In this case, if V represents each study variable with size N, divided into
k subgroups, and Ni is the size of the ith subgroup and Zij = jVij−Vij,
then Vi can be either the mean, median or trimmed mean of the i-th
subgroup. Also, Zi are the group means of the Zij while Z:: represents
the overall mean of Zij.
Tukey HSD test formula for each mean comparison is per following:
M1−M 2
q¼
1
s ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
MSw
n 3. Results
Respondents' ratings of safety climate were entered into the analysis
as dependent variables. Leading indicators such as safety inspections
and non-compliances and demographic factors were entered as inde-
pendent variables. Raw data from the items were used to calculate
mean scores for each dimension and individual. Only answered items
were used in the calculations. All answers for a dimension were ex-
cluded from the calculation if less than 50% of the items in that dimen-
sion were answered since a mean score based on less than 50% of the
items cannot be considered reliable.
2.3. Study variables
Nine study variables were selected to study and determine their ef-
fects on safety climate. These variables could be divided into 2 different
groups as leading indicators and demographic information.
2.3.1. Demographic info
Demographic variables included (a) gender, (b) occupation category
(defined as worker or branch manager/supervisor), (c), (d) years of
work experience (defined as ≤ 5, 6–10 or ≥ 11 years), (e) age at time of
participating in survey (defined using 10-year groupings of 21–30,
31–40, 41–50, 51–60 years), and (f) location.
2.3.2. Leading indicators
The leading indicators of safety performance considered included
(a) number of safety inspections conducted (stratified subgroups of 0,
1–3, 4–5 and 6–7 inspections), (b) number of non-compliances and
hazards observed (groupings of ≤ 5, 6–15, 16–20 and ≥ 21 cases),
(c) health and safety training (de fined as 0.1–3, 3.1– 7, 7.1 –11 man-
hours), and (d) number of training sessions (stratified subgroups of
b10, 11–20, 21–30 sessions) per location. Data on safety performance
during the year prior to conducting the survey (from September 2014
to September 2015) were obtained from the organization's online data-
base as well as QHSE division records. Number of training man-hours
was calculated by dividing total training hours per location by number
of personnel.

While M represents the mean of each subgroup being compared, n is
the number of cases per subgroup and MSw is the mean square within
groups. Once q is calculated, it must be compared with the degree of
freedom within (dfW) and the number of subgroups to determine
whether any of the mean comparisons is statistically significant.
The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (rs), is calculated using
the following formula:
Covðrgx; rgyÞ
rs ¼ ρrgx; rgy ¼
σrgxσrgy
Where ρ represents Pearson correlation coefficient while applied to
rank variables, Cov(rgx, rgy) is the covariance of rank variables and
σrgxσrgy are the standard deviations of rank variables.
Of the total operational personnel (N = 202, 14 locations), 94% were
considered eligible to participate in the survey (N = 188, 10 locations).
Altogether 89 employees filled out the questionnaire, corresponding to
a response rate of approximately 47%.
Out of all respondents to the survey, 47.2% were between 21
and 30 years old, 81% were men, 87.6% were workers, 84.3% had less
than 5 years of work experience and 47.2% were between 21 and
30 years old. Out of the 10 locations studied, 6 locations (N = 44)
underwent 1–3 inspections, 3 locations (N = 18) had less than five
non-compliances, 4 locations (N = 34) held 11–20 safety training
sessions and 3 locations (N = 43) recorded 3.1–7 man-hours of safety
training, all during the one year period before conducting the survey.
Detailed characteristics of the study population and mean scores of
dimensions of safety climate among subgroups are presented in Table 5.

Table 2
Descriptives of the study population (N = 89).

Safety climate dimensions Number of items Mean Median Range Minimum Standard error Standard Variance
of mean deviation

Management safety priority and ability 9 3.30 3.22 1.38 2.63 0.041 0.38 0.15
Management safety empowerment 7 3.23 3.14 1.71 2.29 0.048 0.45 0.20
Management safety justice 6 3.17 3.16 2.33 1.67 0.046 0.44 0.19
Workers' safety commitment 6 3.37 3.50 1.50 2.50 0.044 0.41 0.17
Workers' safety priority and risk non-acceptance 7 2.98 2.85 2.17 1.83 0.050 0.47 0.22
Peer safety communication learning, and trust in safety ability 8 3.17 3.12 1.63 2.38 0.037 0.35 0.12
Workers' trust in efficacy of safety systems 7 3.50 3.57 1.29 2.71 0.041 0.38 0.15
26 S. Givehchi et al. / Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32

Table 3
Descriptive statistics of all questionnaire items.

Mean SD

Dimension 1 — Management safety priority and ability

1.Management encourages employees here to work in accordance with safety rules - even when the work schedule is tight 3.38 0.574
2.Management ensures that everyone receives the necessary information on safety 3.36 0.549
3.Management looks the other way when someone is careless with safety 3.42 0.540
4.Management places safety before production 3.08 0.795
5.Management accepts employees here taking risks when the work schedule is tight 3.17 0.776
6.We who work here have confidence in the management's ability to deal with safety 3.35 0.480
7.Management ensures that safety problems discovered during safety rounds/evaluations are corrected immediately 3.32 0.656
8.When a risk is detected, management ignores it without action 3.44 0.543
9.Management lacks the ability to deal with safety properly 3.26 0.735
Dimension 2 — Management safety empowerment
10.Management strives to design safety routines that are meaningful and actually work 3.20 0.568
11.Management makes sure that everyone can influence safety in their work environment 3.18 0.561
12.Management encourages employees here to participate in decisions which affect their safety 3.20 0.664
13.Management never considers employees' suggestions regarding safety 3.34 0.722
14.Management strives for everybody at the worksite to have high competence concerning safety and risks 3.25 0.589
15.Management never asks employees for their opinions before making decisions regarding safety 3.27 0.635
16.Management involves employees in decisions regarding safety 3.19 0.604
Dimension 3 — Management safety justice
17.Management collects accurate information in accident investigations 3.37 0.649
18.Fear of sanctions (negative consequences) from management discourages employees here from reporting near-miss accidents 3.38 0.796
19.Management listens carefully to all who have been involved in an accident 3.20 0.760
20.Management looks for causes, not guilty persons, when an accident occurs 3.06 0.671
21.Management always blames employees for accidents 2.97 0.789
22.Management treats employees involved in an accident fairly 3.16 0.648
Dimension 4 — Workers' safety commitment
23.We who work here try hard together to achieve a high level of safety 3.29 0.643
24.We who work here take joint responsibility to ensure that the workplace is always kept tidy 3.37 0.591
25.We who work here do not care about each other's safety 3.32 0.736
26.We who work here avoid tackling risks that are discovered 3.17 0.715
27.We who work here help each other to work safely 3.56 0.563
28.We who work here take no responsibility for each other's safety 3.55 0.605
Dimension 5 — Workers safety priority and risk non-acceptance
29.We who work here regard risks as unavoidable 2.40 0.829
30.We who work here consider minor accidents to be a normal part of our daily work 2.95 0.718
31.We who work here accept dangerous behavior as long as there are no accidents 3.31 0.684
32.We who work here break safety rules in order to complete work on time 3.49 0.588
33.We who work here never accept risk-taking even if the work schedule is tight 2.92 0.838
34.We who work here consider that our work is unsuitable for cowards 2.74 0.882
35.We who work here accept risk-taking at work 3.03 0.809
Dimension 6 — Safety communication, learning and trust in co-workers safety competence
36.We who work here try to find a solution if someone points out a safety problem 3.40 0.538
37.We who work here feel safe when working together 3.35 0.548
38.We who work here have great trust in each other's ability to ensure safety 3.15 0.617
39.We who work here learn from our experiences to prevent accidents 2.59 0.721
40.We who work here take each other's opinions and suggestions concerning safety seriously 3.37 0.530
41.We who work here seldom talk about safety 3.06 0.789
42.We who work here always discuss safety issues when such issues come up 3.20 0.643
43.We who work here can talk freely and openly about safety 3.30 0.531
Dimension 7 — Workers' trust in efficacy of safety systems
44.We who work here consider that a good safety representative plays an important role in preventing accidents 3.53 0.502
45.We who work here consider that safety rounds/evaluations have no effect on safety 3.36 0.746
46.We who work here consider that safety training to be good for preventing accidents 3.60 0.492
47.We who work here consider early planning for safety as meaningless 3.47 0.624
48.We who work here consider that safety rounds/evaluations help find serious hazards 3.51 0.546
49.We who work here consider safety training to be meaningless 3.65 0.548
50.We who work here consider it important to have clear-cut goals for safety 3.40 0.598

Table 2 shows safety climate mean scores which ranged from highest
in workers' trust in efficacy of safety systems (M = 3.50, SD = 0.38), to
lowest in workers' safety priority and risk non-acceptance, (M = 2.98,
SD = 0.47). Mean scores of (a) management safety empowerment,
(b) management safety justice, and (c) peer safety communication
learning, and trust in safety ability, with scores ranging from 3.00 to
3.30, indicated a fairly good level with a slight need of improvement.
Worker safety priority and risk non-acceptance pointed to a fairly low
level with a need of improvement (M = 2.98, SD = 0.47).
Each item of the questionnaire and the relevant descriptive statistics
are shown in Table 3.
Benchmarking of present study results with overall outcomes of re-
searches and surveys conducted by employing NOSACQ-50 since its
introduction was made possible by Pete Kines, the main developer of
the questionnaire. Statistically significant differences on
(a) management safety priority, commitment, and competence,
(b) management safety empowerment, (c) management safety justice,
(d) workers' safety commitment, and (e) trust in the efficacy of safety
systems were detected (p b 0.001); although internal consistency of di-
mension 3 was questionable. There were no statistically significant dif-
ferences in workers' safety priority and risk non-acceptance, and safety
communication, learning, and trust in co-workers' safety competence
among the two groups. The “worker” occupation group was considered
for the comparison, which is shown in Table 4.
Table 5 shows results of one-way between subjects ANOVA which
indicated a significant difference in worker safety commitment based
 S. Givehchi et al. / Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32 27

Table 4
Benchmarking perceptions of importance of health and safety between overall NOSACQ-50 database and workers of present study.
Table data provided by Pete Kines, November 2015.

Safety climate dimensions Number of Mean Standard Standard error P value

workers score deviation of mean

Management safety priority and ability Present study 78 3.28 0.38 0.04 0.001
NOSACQ-50 24,900 2.96 0.49 0.00
Management safety empowerment Present study 78 3.22 0.45 0.05 0.001
NOSACQ-50 24,184 2.89 0.47 0.00
Management safety justice Present study 78 3.15 0.44 0.05 0.001
NOSACQ-50 23,787 2.96 0.49 0.00
Workers' safety commitment Present study 78 3.37 0.41 0.05 0.001
NOSACQ-50 24,723 3.15 0.46 0.00
Workers' safety priority and risk non-acceptance Present study 77 2.96 0.48 0.04 N 0.05
NOSACQ-50 24,018 2.92 0.05 0.00
Safety communication, learning and trust in co-workers safety competence Present study 78 3.17 0.36 0.04 N 0.05
NOSACQ-50 24,099 3.10 0.04 0.00
Workers' trust in efficacy of safety systems Present study 78 3.51 0.39 0.04 0.001
NOSACQ-50 23,664 3.17 0.44 0.00

on the number of safety inspections; additionally, (a) management
safety priority and ability, (b) worker safety commitment, and
(c) peer safety communication, learning, and trust in safety showed
a significant difference based on the number of non-compliances
(p b 0.05). No significant difference was observed between means
based on number of safety training sessions, man-hours of safety
training, gender, occupation group, work experience and age (p N 0.05).
Results of Levene's test of assumptions of homogeneity of variances
and Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test are also detailed
in Table 5 (Further Tukey HSD tests for comparisons between pairs of
means of locations were not performed due to insignificance of related
results in this paper).
Table 6 details the Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between
six pairs of ranked variables. No correlations were observed between
work experience and number of non-compliances received and
between safety training man-hours and number of non-compliances
(p N 0.05).
4. Discussion
In previous research, safety auditing has been regarded as a key
requirement in any effective safety management system (Griffiths,
1985). Mearns, Whitaker, and Flin (2003) have also recommended
setting of auditing goals and their achievement as a first line defense
in preventing injury. But to the knowledge of writers, no studies have
investigated the association between safety inspections and safety
climate.
While results indicated that workers' safety commitment was influ-
enced by the number of safety inspections, a higher number of inspec-
tions was not associated with higher perceptions of safety climate.
Groups undergoing 1–3 inspections demonstrated a higher perception
of worker safety commitment (M = 3.43, N = 44) in comparison
with groups inspected 4– 5 times (M = 3.31, N = 15). Reference to
organization objectives showed that a target has been set to randomly
conduct a minimum number of inspections per year, irrespective of
variety of locations. Accordingly, a more specific and detailed schedule
with defined timelines covering all locations would be expected to
have a more positive effect. Special emphasis shall be made on the out-
come of safety inspections which is the prevention of potential failures
by detection of non-compliances.
Although in certain cases, such as ISM code's guidelines, reference
is made on the importance of reporting of non-compliances by de-
veloping a just culture (Oltedal, 2011), studies have not evaluated
the impact of safety non-com pliances a s a potential confounde r on
safety climate. Our findings indicated that perception of employees of
management safety priority and ability was higher among groups with
6–15 non-compliances in comparison with groups with less than 5 non-
compliances. In contrast, perceptions of employees of workers' safety
commitment as well as peer safety communication, learning, and trust
in safety ability were higher in groups with less than 5 non-compliances
in comparison with groups receiving more than 20 non- compliances.
Various factors might have influenced the inconsistency of results.
While the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient showed a strong posi-
tive correlation between number of non-compliances and number of
safety inspections (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.72, p b 0.01),
the differing number of non-compliances received might have been in-
fluenced by diversities in (a) level of risks in each location (b) size of
each location and number of employees, (c) type of operations, and
(d) random sampling nature of inspections. However, variations in
non-compliances in an organization as a whole or in one of its particular
sections constitute a reliable measure of its safety state and perfor-
mance which in turn is influenced by its safety climate.
The significant differences of mean scores among various locations
demonstrate the possibility for existence of safety subcultures. These
differences indicate that a large group in an organization does not
have the same perception of safety climate. This is in line with findings
of Luria and Yagil (2010), who challenged safety climate as a uniform
concept for all employees and prescribed boundary conditions for safety
climate. It is also consistent with the findings of Zohar (2000, 2010) who
suggested safety climate should be evaluated in group and not in an
organization level.
Contrary to strong evidence in relation to the role of safety training
in promoting and developing a positive safety climate (Cooper, 1998;
Wilson-Donnelly, Piet, Salas, & Burke, 2005; Cohen & Colligan, 1998),
neither number of safety training sessions nor training man-hours
were associated with any differences in safety climate levels. Also safety
training was ineffective in reducing number of non-compliances with
no correlations observed between neither safety training man-hours
nor number of training sessions with number of non-compliances. Fur-
ther investigations showed that self-studies of safety training materials
are accounted in safety training man-hours. Without any mechanisms
in place for appropriate testing of learning outcomes and knowledge
gained after a self-reported training course, there might be potential
for insubstantial and erroneous reporting. Studies have shown that
“classroom training with instructor” along with certain interactive prin-
ciples encompassing (a) asking questions, (b) synergy/learning with
others, and (c) interaction with a human instructor as the most effective
method for learning (Gerzon, Heuer, Kibbee, Nielsen, & Veal, 2006).
There were no differences in safety climate perceptions among men
and women which is contrary to the findings of Fang, Chen, and Wong
(2006). In contrast with the findings of Khandan, Maghsoudipour, and
Vosoughi (2011) who showed a significant association between age
and safety climate, no significant differences in safety climate percep-
tions were observed among different age groups. In addition, work
28 S. Givehchi et al. / Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32

Table 5
Demographic and leading indicators characteristics and differences between mean scores of safety climate levels among study populations.

N % N of locations Statistical analysis/Descriptives Dima 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4 Dim 5 Dim 6 Dim 7

Age
21–30 (1) 42 47.2 9 Mean 3.29 3.26 3.16 3.35 2.99 3.16 3.47
31–40 (2) 30 33.7 10 Mean 3.36 3.29 3.22 3.46 2.97 3.18 3.53
41–50 (3) 12 13.5 5 Mean 3.21 3.23 3.18 3.28 2.93 3.22 3.51
51–60 (4) 3 3.4 3 Mean 3.09 2.63 2.72 3.31 2.8 3.13 3.24
ANOVA 0.6 0.12 0.34 0.61 0.93 0.82 0.56
Gender
Male (1) 72 80.9 10 Mean 3.33 3.28 3.2 3.41 3 3.2 3.51
Female (2) 17 19.1 5 Mean 3.2 3.04 3.07 3.23 2.92 3.09 3.46
ANOVA 0.21 0.05 0.3 0.1 0.57 0.25 0.65
Occupation category
Worker (1) 78 87.6 10 Mean 3.28 3.22 3.15 3.37 2.96 3.17 3.51
Manager/Supervisor (2) 11 12.4 10 Mean 3.51 3.29 3.35 3.39 3.16 3.23 3.45
ANOVA 0.66 0.67 0.16 0.85 0.19 0.62 0.68
Work experience (years)
b5 (1) 75 84.3 10 Mean 3.32 3.24 3.19 3.41 2.99 3.17 3.5
6–10 (2) 7 7.9 5 Mean 3.26 3.17 3.05 3.32 2.94 3.25 3.55
≥10 (3) 6 4.7 3 Mean 3.24 3.24 3.14 3.11 2.93 3.15 3.38
ANOVA 0.85 0.92 0.72 0.22 0.92 0.83 0.72
Number of safety inspections
0 (1) 7 7.9 1 Mean 3.19 3.08 3 3.29 2.92 3.21 3.53
1–3 (2) 44 49.4 6 Mean 3.34 3.26 3.25 3.43 2.96 3.18 3.5
4–5 (3) 15 16.9 2 Mean 3.12 3.13 3 3.31 2.91 3.18 3.43
6–7 (4) 23 25.8 1 Mean 3.39 3.29 3.19 3.33 3.11 3.16 3.55
ANOVA 0.1 0.08 0.23 0.04 0.55 0.19 0.12
P value 1–2 0.62 0.46 0.41 0.45 1 0.97 0.98
P value 1–3 1 1 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.78 0.7
P value 1–4 0.62 0.69 0.74 0.99 0.79 0.98 1
P value 2–3 0.15 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.99 0.14 0.1
Leven's t-test 0.75
P value 2–4 1 0.95 0.86 0.25 0.53 0.64 0.98
P value 3–4 0.18 0.34 0.81 0.88 0.71 0.82 0.3
Number of non-compliances
≤5 (1) 18 20.2 3 Mean 3.19 3.08 3.00 3.29 2.92 3.21 3.53
6–15 (2) 15 16.9 2 Mean 3.34 3.26 3.25 3.43 2.96 3.18 3.50
16–20 (3) 11 12.4 2 Mean 3.12 3.13 3.00 3.31 2.91 3.18 3.43
≥21 (4) 38 42.7 2 Mean 3.39 3.29 3.19 3.33 3.11 3.16 3.55
ANOVA 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.14
P value 1–2 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.96 0.27 0.28
Leven's t-test 0.09
P value 1–3 0.25 0.31 0.85 0.18 0.65 0.06 0.28
P value 1–4 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.12
Leven's t-test 0.22 0.32
P value 2–3 0.90 0.99 0.54 0.99 0.90 0.83 0.87
P value 2–4 0.29 0.92 0.55 0.99 0.64 0.83 1
P value 3–4 0.85 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.80
Training (man-hours)
0.1– 3 (1) 25 28.1 4 Mean 3.30 3.25 3.19 3.45 2.98 3.19 3.53
3.1–7 (2) 43 48.3 3 Mean 3.33 3.21 3.17 3.30 2.98 3.11 3.46
7–11 (3) 21 23.6 3 Mean 3.25 3.26 3.17 3.42 2.98 3.30 3.56
ANOVA 0.75 0.90 0.98 0.28 0.99 0.11 0.56
Number of training sessions
b10 (1) 30 33.7 5 Mean 3.31 3.23 3.18 3.44 2.86 3.20 3.55
11–20 (2) 36 40.4 4 Mean 3.25 3.19 3.16 3.34 3.01 3.17 3.42
21–30 (3) 23 25.8 1 Mean 3.39 3.29 3.19 3.33 3.11 3.16 3.55
ANOVA 0.38 0.71 0.96 0.51 0.17 0.93 0.32
Locations
Angooran 7 7.9 1 Mean 3.52 3.55 3.31 3.79 2.96 3.36 3.50
Khaf 7 7.9 1 Mean 3.14 3.22 3.26 3.45 3.06 3.04 3.62
Tabriz 10 11.2 1 Mean 3.07 3.02 2.83 3.16 2.73 3.00 3.46
Sari 6 6.7 1 Mean 3.59 3.60 3.61 3.72 3.14 3.60 3.88
Mahshahr 23 25.8 1 Mean 3.39 3.29 3.19 3.33 3.11 3.16 3.55
Karaj 4 4.5 1 Mean 3.36 3.04 3.17 3.17 3.01 3.13 3.43
Bandarabbas 15 16.9 1 Mean 3.23 3.10 3.14 3.22 3.05 2.99 3.24
Isfahan 7 7.9 1 Mean 3.19 3.08 3.00 3.29 2.92 3.21 3.53
Asaluyeh 5 5.6 1 Mean 3.36 3.17 3.13 3.40 2.26 3.23 3.69
Kharg 5 5.6 1 Mean 3.22 3.34 3.33 3.60 3.26 3.55 3.37
ANOVA 0.15 0.14 0.84 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06

Significant differences are bolded.

a
Dimension.

experience was observed to have no influence over safety climate levels, safety perception. Safety climate perceptions seemed not to be influ-
which is contrary to previous findings (Gyekye & Salminen, 2010 ) enced by occupation category either (worker vs. manager), which is in
which demonstrated a positive relationship between experience and congruence with the findings of Neal and Griffin (2006). The reasons
 S. Givehchi et al. / Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32 29

Table 6
Correlations between non-parametric variables of the study.

Age Work experience Number of safety inspections Number of non-compliances Training (man-hours) Number of training sessions

Age
Spearman's rho 1 0.49 0.01 − 0.17 0.12 0.05
2-tailed – 0.00 0.90 0.11 0.24 0.62
N 86 86 86 79 86 86
Work experience (years)
Spearman's rho 0.49 1 − 0.05 − 0.04 0.15 0.01
2-tailed 0.00 – 0.64 0.69 0.14 0.91
N 86 88 88 81 88 88
Number of safety inspections
Spearman's rho 0.01 − 0.05 1 0.72 0.43 0.92
2-tailed 0.90 0.64 – 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 86 88 89 82 89 89
Number of non-compliances
Spearman's rho − 0.17 − 0.04 0.72 1 − 0.17 0.67
2-tailed 0.11 0.69 0.00 – 0.11 0.00
N 79 81 82 82 79 82
Training (man-hours)
Spearman's rho 0.12 0.15 0.43 − 0.15 1 0.54
2-tailed 0.24 0.14 0.00 0.17 – 0.00
N 86 88 89 82 89 89
Number of training sessions
Spearman's rho 0.05 0.01 0.92 0.67 0.54 1
2-tailed 0.62 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
N 86 88 89 82 89 89

Correlations are bolded.

for these indifferences could be explained by the fact that all managers
responding to the survey engaged in routine operations and therefore
were directly exposed to the same risk level in the workplace regardless
of age or experience level, a condition not normally observed in other
workplaces (Neal & Grif fin, 2006 ), and, identical to workers, formed
perceptions on safety climate levels based on interactions with higher
level management.
The inter-correlations among test items in dimension three which ad-
dressed workers' perceptions of how management treats workers involved
in accidents fairly; indicated questionable internal consistency of this dimen-
sion (α b 0.7). A just culture which comprises an atmosphere of trust, where
there is a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior, is deemed
necessary in preparing workers to report errors (Reason, 1997). In contrast, in
organizations where accountability and blame are predominant features of
the work situation, there might be a tendency to manage safety issues
through mer ely fo rmal procedu res at the expe nse of problem-
solving and ingenuity (Je ffcott, Pidgeon, Weyman, & Walls, 2006).
A preliminary approach to promote a just culture would be to compel
management of the main intention of accident reporting and investi-
gation which is prevention of future recurrence.
To our knowledge, the present study is the first study that distinc-
tively investigated the role of leading indicators of safety performance
in relation to safety climate. Strengths of this study include a geograph-
ically diverse population, access of investigators to performance
indicators data contained in company maintained databases rather
than relying on worker self-report in each location, and familiarity of
the research team with company's overall circumstances. A review of
the characteristics of previous research is detailed in Appendix 0.
There are some potential limitations to our study. First, a longitu-
dinal panel design would have enabled the inve stigation of in flu-
ence of variables on safety climate variations over time which was
not possible in the current study on the basis of using cross-
sectional data. Secondly, bias due to non-response could not be
ruled out. There was particularl y a low r esponse rate (15.3%) in
one of the locations with the greatest population (N = 98) indicat-
ing a problem area which needs to be further investigated f or
underlying causes, including potential for a lack of general coopera-
tion in tasks beyond routine duties or a negative view on safety is-
sues driven by pee r group pressure f rom high status membe rs
among workers. There might also be a potential concern over
receiving criticism or having to deal wi th “undue consequences”
as a result of safety climate outcomes. Thirdly, in addition to factors
influencing number of n on-complianc es as mentioned a bove, obser-
vations are affected by the perceptions of inspector, including their
knowledge, training, education, attit ude and experience in re lati on
to job tasks, proce sses and conditions whic h could not be explo red
in this study.
In conclusion, perceptions on the importance of health and safety are in-
fluenced by variations in leading indicators. As a factor effective on workers'
safety commitment, safety inspections need to be scheduled and conducted
of all divisions and areas within an organization. Additionally, as number of
non-compliances was shown to indicate the perception of workers on man-
agement safety priority and ability, workers' safety commitment and safety
communication, learning, and trust in co-workers' safety competence,
therefore, variations in this leading indicator could be used as a measure
of the status of safety climate. A rise of non-compliances in a specific divi-
sion or area of the organization, compared with its previous records,
could be indicative of degrading safety climate levels. However, compari-
sons shall be restricted to the specific section under evaluation and
benchmarking departments or organizations shall not be exercised. In mea-
surement of safety climate levels and planning for its improvements, atten-
tion needs to be paid to different subcultures that exist within any
organization. On another note, counting the number of man-hours of safety
training or number of safety training sessions is not an indicator of effective
safety training. The principles of interactive learning need to be employed
for conducting safety training in an effective manner. In situations where
personal factors such as work experience, age or occupation category
do not have any association with safety climate, as shown in this
study, an organization would bene fit by promotion of a just culture
through encouragement of reporting of hazards while dynamically
balancing out acceptable and unacceptable behaviors.
Acknowledgment
The outcome of research had no implications including financial
benefits for any of the researchers. The “assessment of safety
climate” was established as one of the KPIs of the organization during
the year 2015. The results obtained will be provided to the company's
global QHSE management team for further application in its other
affiliates.
30 S. Givehchi et al. / Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32

Appendix 1

A review of the characteristics of previous literature

No. Author(s) Study population Research methods Statistical methods Sample of results

1. Diaz and Cabrera n = 166, 3 airport Research design: Factor analysis, ANOVA, Pearson correlation indicated a signi ficant positive
(1997) companies cross-sectional Regression analysis, correlation between both variables (R = 0.26; ρ = 0.001).
Research tool: scale of safety Pearson correlation, An analysis of regression was carried out given the above
attitudes, safety climate MANOVA relationship and the results showed that the climate
questionnaire, safety level scale predicted 7% (F = 11.74; ρ = 0.0008) and age predicted
3.7% (F = 9.33; ρ = 0.0001) of the attitude-variance.
2. DePasquale and n = 701, 20 different Research design: Stepwise regression Employees in a mandatory BBS process demonstrated
Geller (1999) industrial sites, cross-sectional significantly greater levels of trust in management (both
31 focus groups Research tool: perception abilities and intentions), trust in coworkers (both abilities
survey questionnaire and and intentions), and overall satisfaction with the BBS
focus group discussions training received.
3. Brown et al. n total = 800, 593 Research design: Covariance structure Of the structural models evaluated, the indirect model
(2000) respondents, 551 cross-sectional analysis system–person sequence represented the best fitting
included in data Research tool: survey parsimonious model. Results from this model show that
analysis, Steel industry questionnaire developed for the presence of safety hazards can degrade perceived
this purpose safety climate (− 0.32) and increase operators' feelings of
pressure to value expediency over safety (0.29). However,
the perception of a strong safety climate can diminish
feelings of pressure (− 0.30). Thus, safety hazards influence
perceived pressure directly and indirectly through climate.
4. Felknor et al. n = 1000, hospital Research design: Not available The two most significant predictors of safety climate were
(2000) based health care cross-sectional training and administrative support for safety. Safety
workers Research tool: climate was a statistically significant predictor of
survey questionnaire workplace injuries and safety practices, respectively, and
developed for this purpose there was an underreporting rate of 71% of workplace injuries.
5. Gershon et al. n = 789, hospital Research design: Factor analysis Senior management support for safety programs, absence
(2000) based health care cross-sectional of workplace barriers to safe work practices, and
workers Research tool: cleanliness/orderliness of the work site were significantly
survey questionnaire related to compliance (P b .05). In addition, both senior
developed for this purpose management support for safety programs and frequent
safety-related feedback/training were significantly
related to workplace exposure incidents (P b .05).
6. Griffin and Neal n total = 1403, Research design: Confirmatory factor Perceptions of knowledge about safety and motivation to
(2000) 1264 included in cross-sectional analysis, structural perform safely influenced individual reports of safety
data analysis Research tool: survey equation modeling performance and also mediated the link between safety
questionnaire developed climate and safety performance. Specific dimensions of
for this purpose safety climate were identified and constituted a higher
order safety climate factor. The results support
conceptualizing safety climate as an antecedent to safety
performance inorganizations.
7. Zohar (2000) n = 534 in 53 work Research design: Exploratory factor Climate perceptions signi ficantly predicted microaccident
groups, metal cross-sectional analysis (PCA), records during the 5-month recording period that
processing plant Research tool: survey correlations, within-group followed climate measurement, when the effects of group
questionnaire based on homogeneity, ANOVA, and individual level risk factors were controlled.
critical incident technique ordinary least squares
and the use of task Load Index regression, hierarchical
(Hart & Staveland, 1988), linear modeling
supervisor and expert
ratings of risk
8. Carder and Ragan n total = 6000, estimated Research design: Pearson correlation, Sites with higher (better) survey scores tend to have lower
(2003) response rate: 80%–90%, cross-sectional chi-squared test accident rates. Reflecting the inverse nature of this
50 plants, Chemical relationship, the Pearson coefficient in this case is −.87
industry Research tool: survey and is significant beyond the .0005 level.
questionnaire evolved for
this purpose
9. Mearns et al. n = 682 in year 1, Research design: longitudinal ANOVA, Tukey HSD, Negative and significant coefficients between health and
(2003) n = 806 in year 2. Research tools: Spearman correlation safety auditing with rate of dangerous occurrence in the
Offshore Oil & Gas Offshore Safety first [rho9 = − 0.71; P b 0.05] and between health and
Questionnaire safety auditing and rate of lost time injuries
(OSQ); Safety [rho8 = − 0.85; P b 0.01] in the second year.
Management
Questionnaire
(SMQ)
10. Iyer et al. (2004) 30 weeks of observations Research design: longitudinal Regression analysis, An increase of the intervention level by 47%, following as
made on hours spent Research tool: mathematical Response surface analysis, closely as possible, the directions (recipe) suggested, a
on implementation of programming model designed Mathematical decrease of 7.1% in the incident rate was observed. These
interventions vs. weekly for an effective safety and programming confirmed the strength of the relationship between the
incident rates health program incident rates and intervention application levels that was
suggested by the model.
11. Fang et al. (2006) n = 4719, 54 sites, Research design: Factor analysis, Logistic Statistically significant relationships were found between
Construction company cross-sectional regression safety climate and personal characteristics, including
and its subcontractors Research tool: safety climate gender, marital status, education level, number of family
questionnaire survey members to support, safety knowledge, drinking habits,
direct employer, and individual safety behavior.
 S. Givehchi et al. / Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32 31

Appendix
(continued)
1 (continued)

No. Author(s) Study population Research methods Statistical methods Sample of results

12. Neal and Griffin n total = 700, Research design: longitudinal Confirmatory factor Group safety climate in year 2 was positively associated
(2006) n = 430 (61%) in year 1, Research tools: survey analysis, ANOVA, Poisson with subsequent levels of safety motivation after we
n = 490 (52%) in year 2, questionnaire regression analysis controlled for all individual measures. This result provides
n = 301 (46%) in year 3. strong evidence for a lagged effect of group safety climate
Hospital staff on subsequent individual safety motivation. The inclusion
of safety motivation in year 2 as a predictor of safety
motivation in year 4 means that we found the lagged
effect of group safety climate after controlling for prior
levels of safety motivation.
13. Brooks (2008) n = 20, Wood products Research design: longitudinal Not available Dominant assumptions are naturally selected.
manufacturer Research tool: ethnographic The results are discussed with reference to safety systems,
research methods negative cultural elements called Cultural Safety Viruses,
and how our understanding of this particular
organizational culture might be used to build resistance
to these viruses.
14. Nielsen et al. Plant A - T0: n = 388, Research design: longitudinal Poisson regression, At follow-up accident rates were reduced at both plants
(2008) T1: n = 443 Research tool: Multi-multiple and the only significant between-plant difference was
Plant B – T0: 364, T1: 293 Danish safety culture confirmatory factor commitment to the workplace. The study demonstrates a
questionnaire (DSCQ) analysis relationship between changes in both questionnaire- and
audit-based measures of safety climate and rates of
self-reported injuries and LTIs.
15. Gyekye and n = 320, industrial Research design: Chi-squared test, ANOVA, The interaction model (age x experience x job role) was
Salminen (2010) workers including cross-sectional MANOVA, posterior t test found to be highly significant for work safety (F(26, 258) =
32% miners and 68% from Research tool: survey 18.89, p b .001). The main effects of experience
textiles, timber and questionnaire (F(4, 258) = 30.68, p b .001), job role (F(1, 258) = 75.98,
saw-mill plants, p b .001), and age (F(3, 258) = 85.87, p b .001), and the
breweries, and interaction effects of job role and experience were all
food-processing plants significant (F(3, 258) = 4.47, p b .010).
16. Luria and Yagil n = 90 in 11 Research design: ANOVA, Content analysis Two themes of general differences in safety among
(2010) manufacturing cross-sectional employee sub-groups with a frequency of 72% and
organizations, including Research tool: favorability of 3.8 and safety perceptions of employee
metal & aviation semi-structured sub-groups with a frequency of 34% and favorability
industries (5), food interview of 3.4
industries (4), chemical
industry (1) and plastic
industry (1)
17. Bahari (2011) T1: n = 330, T2: n = 402, Research design: longitudinal Exploratory factor In Time 2, levels of Knowledge and Skill Transfer
manufacturing plant Research tool: analysis, Principal (M = 54.18, SD = 5.60), Safe Work Practices (M = 21.57,
safety climate scale and safety component analysis, SD = 2.71) and the Safety and Risk Understanding
climate questionnaire Confirmatory factor (M = 19.80, SD = .687) mean score were reported to be
developed for this purpose analysis, MANOVA, slightly higher compared to Time 1.
Pearson product
moment, ANOVA
18. Khandan et al. n total = 151, 134 Research design: ANOVA, ELECTRE The results notified a significant relationship between age
(2011) respondents cross-sectional and safety climate (p b 0.05)
(89% response rate), Research tool: survey
Petrochemical industry questionnaire
19. Wurzelbacher n = 33 companies, Research design: Dichotomization of data, Higher levels of several self-reported OSH program
and Jin (2011) covered by the same cross-sectional mean and standard elements (tracking progress in controlling workplace
worker compensation Research tool: surveys deviation comparisons, safety hazards, identifying ergonomic hazards, using
insurer developed for this purpose F-test health promotion programs) were associated with lower
rates of WC lost time cases in 2003. Higher reported
exposures to noise and projectiles were also associated
with higher rates of WC cases and costs in 2003.
20. Smith and DeJoy n = 398, Fire fighters Research design: Structural equation
(2014) cross-sectional modeling, Poisson
Research tool: data collection regression analysis
by questionnaire

References
Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) (1993). ACSNI
study group on human factors. Organising for safety. Third report (pp. 100). HSE
Books.
Antonsen, S. (2009). Safety culture: Theory, method and improvement. UK: Ashgate Pub Co.
Bahari, S. F. (2011). An investigation of safety training, safety climate and safety outcomes:
A longitudinal study in a Malaysian manufacturing plant. [dissertation] Manchester
Business School.
Brooks, B. (2008). The natural selection of organisational and safety culture within a small
and medium sized enterprise (SME). Journal of Safety Research, 39, 73–85.
Brown, K. A., Willis, P. G., & Prussia, G. E. (2000). Predicting safe employee behavior in the
steel industry: Development and test of a sociotechnical model. Journal of Metals,
18(4), 445–465.
Carder, B., & Ragan, P. (2003). A survey-based system for safety measurement and
improvement. Journal of Safety Research, 34(2), 157–165.
Cheung, G. W., & Rensvold, R. B. (2000). Assessing extreme and acquiescence response
sets in cross-cultural research using structural equations modeling. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 31, 187–212.
Civil air navigation services organization (Canso) (2013, Apr.). Safety culture definition &
enhancement process model. Available from: https://www.canso.org/sites/default/
files/Safety%20Culture%20Definition%20and%20Enhancement%20Process.pdf.
Cohen, A., & Colligan, M. J. (1998, Jun.). Assessing occupational safety and health training: A lit-
erature review. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/98-145/pdfs/98-145.pdf.
Cooper, M. (1998). Health and safety training (4th ed.). London: Financial Times Manage-
ment Briefing.
CSB (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board) (2005). Investigation Report on
BP Texas Explosion and Fire. Report No. 2005-04-I-TX. Available from Available from:
http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf.
Delatour, G., Laclemence, P., Calcei, D., & Mazri, C. (2014). Safety performance indicators:
A questioning diversity. Chemical Engineering Transactions, 36, 55–60. http://dx.doi.
org/10.3303/CET1436010.
32 S. Givehchi et al. / Journal of Safety Research 62 (2017) 23–32
DePasquale, J., & Geller, E. S. (1999). Critical success factors for behavior-based safety: A
study of twenty industry-wide applications. Journal of Safety Research, 30(4), 237–249.
Diaz, R. I., & Cabrera, D. D. (1997). Safety climate and attitude as evaluation measures of
organizational safety. Accident; Analysis and Prevention, 29(5), 643–650.
Dyreborg, J. (2009). The causal relation between lead and lag indicators. Safety Science, 47,
474–475.
Fang, D., Chen, Y., & Wong, L. (2006). Safety climate in construction industry: A case study
in Hong Kong. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 132(6), 573–584.
Felknor, S. A., Aday, L. A., Burau, K. D., Delclos, G. L., & Kapadia, A. S. (2000). Safety climate
and its association with injuries and safety practices in public hospitals in Costa Rica.
International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health, 6, 18–25.
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O'Connor, P., & Bryden, R. (2000). Measuring safety climate: Identifying
the common features. Safety Science, 34(1–3), 177–192.
Gershon, R. R., Karkashian, C. D., Grosch, J. W., Murphy, L. R., Escamilla-Cejudo, A., Flanagan,
P. A., et al. (2000). Hospital safety climate and its relationship with safe work practices
and workplace exposure incidents. American Journal of Infection Control, 28, 211–221.
Gershon, R. R., Pearse, L., Grimes, M., Flanagan, P. A., & Vlahov, D. (1999). The impact
of multifocused interventions on sharps injury rates at an acute-care hospital.
Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, 20, 806–811.
Gerzon, J., Heuer, B., Kibbee, K., Nielsen, E., & Veal, L. (2006, Dec.). MIT training delivery
methods survey. Sponsored by the training alignment team. Available from:
http://web.mit.edu/training/trainers/tdmreport.pdf.
Grabowski, M., Ayyalasomayajula, P., Merrick, J., Harrald, J. R., & Roberts, K. (2007).
Leading indicators of safety in virtual organizations. Safety Science, 45(10), 1013–1043.
Griffin, M. A., & Neal, A. (2000). Perceptions of safety at work: A framework for
linking safety climate to safety performance, knowledge and motivation. Journal of
Occupational Health Psychology, 5(3), 347–358.
Griffi ths, D. K. (1985). Safety attitudes of management. Ergonomics, 28, 61–67.
Guldenmund, F. W. (2000). The nature of safety culture: A review of theory and research.
Safety Science, 34, 215–257.
Gyekye, S. A., & Salminen, S. (2010). Organizational safety climate and work experience.
JOSE, 16(4), 431–443.
Hart, S. G., & Staveland, L. E. (1988). Development of NASA-TLX (Task Load Index): Results
of Empirical and Theoretical Research. International Journal of Advances in Psychology,
52, 139–183.
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (1999). Summary guide to safety climate. Offshore
technology report 1999/063. Available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/
otopdf/1999/oto99063.pdf.
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (2006). Developing process safety indicators:
A step-by-step guide for chemical and major hazard industries. Available from:
http://antarisconsulting.com/docs/guides/unit_a/A3_HSG254_Developing_Process_
Safety_Indicators.pdf.
Heinrich, H. W. (1941). Industrial accident prevention, a scientific approach (2d ed.).
New York: McGraw-Hill, 19.
Hinze, J., Thurman, S., & Wehle, A. (2013). Leading indicators of construction safety
performance. Safety Science, 51(1), 23–28.
Hopkins, A. (2009). Thinking about process safety indicators. Safety Science, 47(4), 460–465.
Hudson, P. (2009). Process indicators: Managing safety by the numbers. Safety Science,
47(4), 483–485.
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (1992). INSAG-7 the Chernobyl accident:
Updating of INSAG-1. SAFETY SERIES no. 75 (Vienna).
Iyer, P., Haight, J., Castillo, E., Tink, B., & Hawkins, P. (2004, Mar/Apr). Intervention effec-
tiveness research: Understanding and optimizing industrial safety programs using
leading indicators. Chemical Health and Safety, 9–19.
Jeffcott, S., Pidgeon, N., Weyman, A., & Walls, J. (2006). Risk, trust, and safety culture in UK
train operating companies. Risk Analysis, 26(5), 1105–1121.
Khandan, M., Maghsoudipour, M., & Vosoughi, S. (2011). Ranking of working shift groups in
an Iranian petrochemical company using ELECTRE method based on safety climate as-
sessment results. Journal of the Chinese Institute of Industrial Engineers, 28(7), 537–542.
Luria, G., & Yagil, D. (2010). Safety perception referents of permanent and temporary
employees: Safety climate boundaries in the industrial workplace. Accident; Analysis
and Prevention, 42, 1423–1430.
McSween, T. E., & Mathews, G. A. (1997). The values-based safety process: An overview.
Quality Safety Edge, 3.
Mearns, K., Whitaker, S. M., & Flin, R. (2003). Safety climate, safety management practice
and safety performance in offshore environments. Safety Science, 41, 641–680.
NASA Safety Center. The case for safety, the North Sea Piper Alpha disaster. 2013, May;
7(4).
Neal, A., & Griffin, M. A. (2006). A study of the lagged relationships among safety climate,
safety motivation, safety behavior, and accidents at the individual and group levels.
The Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(4), 946–953.
Nielsen, K. J., Rasmussen, K., Glasscock, D., & Spangenberg, S. (2008). Changes in safety climate
and accidents at two identical manufacturing plants. Safety Science, 46(3), 440–449.
Oltedal, H. A. (2011). Safety culture and safety management within the Norwegian-
controlled shipping industry: State of art, interrelationships, and influencing factors.
(dissertation) University of Stavenger, Faculty of Social Sciences.
Outer Space Universe (2011, Jan.). Remembering the challenger shuttle explosion: A disas-
ter 25 years ago. Available from: http://www.outerspaceuniverse.org/remembering-
challenger-shuttle-explosion-25-years.html.
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing Limited.
Reason, J. (2000a). Human error. The Western Journal of Medicine, 172(6), 393–396.
Reason, J. (2000b). Human error: models and management. BMJ, 320, 768–770.
Schein, E. (2004). Organisational culture and leadership, 3rd ed. John Wiley and Sons.
Shappell, S., & Wiegmann, D. (2000, Feb.). The Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS). Report no. DOT/FAA/AM-00/7. US Department of Transportation:
Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Aviation Medicine.
Shappell, S., & Wiegmann, D. (2001). Applying reason: The Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS). Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, 1, 59–86.
Smith, M. S. (2003, Sep.). CRS report for congress, NASA's space shuttle Columbia: Synopsis
of the report of the Columbia accident investigation board. Order code RS21606.
Available from: http://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/
Documents/Congress/CRS%20Summary%20of%20CAIB%20Report.pdf.
Smith, T. D., & DeJoy, D. M. (2014). Safety climate, safety behaviors, and line-of-duty inju-
ries in the fire service. IJES, 3, 49–64.
Toellner, J. (2001). Improving safety and health performance: Identifying and measuring
leading indicators. Professional Safety, 46(9), 42–47.
Wiegmann, D., Zhang, H., Von Thaden, T., Sharma, G., & Mitchell, A. (2002, Jun.). A synthe-
sis of safety culture and safety climate research. Technical report ARL-02-3/FAA-02-2.
Contract DTFA 01-G-015. Federal Aviation Administration Atlantic City International
Airport, NJ, Aviation Research Lab Institute of Aviation.
Wilson-Donnelly, K. A., Piet, H. A., Salas, E., & Burke, C. S. (2005). The impact of organiza-
tional practices on safety in manufacturing: A review and appraisal. Human Factors
and Ergonomics in Manufacturing, 15, 135–176.
Wurzelbacher, S., & Jin, Y. (2011). A framework for evaluating OSH program effectiveness
using leading and trailing metrics. Journal of Safety Research, 42 (3), 199–207.
Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied impli-
cations. The Journal of Applied Psychology, 65, 96–102.
Zohar, D. (2000). A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of group
climate on microaccidents in manufacturing jobs. The Journal of Applied Psychology,
85(4), 587–596.
Zohar, D. (2010). Thirty years of safety climate research: Reflections and future directions.
Accident; Analysis and Prevention, 42, 1517–1522.
Saeed Givehchi Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Environment, University of
Tehran, Iran, in Health, Safety and Environment and Disaster and Emergency Management
since 2010. Saeed received his Ph.D. in Geography and Urban Planning in 2009 from Uni-
versity of Tehran. He graduated from University of Tehran, Iran with a MSCE in Natural Di-
saster Management in 2006. Saeed is an expert in health, safety and disaster management
and process safety.
Ehsan Hemmativaghef MSCE graduated in 2016 from University of Tehran, Iran in Health,
Safety and Environment. The aim of his thesis was to study the factors influencing safety
climate levels. Ehsan is an expert in occupational health and safety, HSE auditing and in-
spections.
Hassan Hoveidi Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Environment, University of
Tehran, Iran, in Health, Safety and Environment and Environmental Management and
Planning since 2010. Hassan received his Ph.D. in Environmental Planning in 2010 from
University of Tehran. He graduated from University of Tehran, Iran with a MSCE in Envi-
ronment Planning, Management and Training in 2006. Hassan is an expert in Environmen-
tal Health, HSE Management and Waste Management.