Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v.

Military Shrine Services –

Philippines Veterans Affairs Office, Department of National Defense
G. R. No. 187587
June 5, 2013

Facts:
President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation no. 423, reserving parcels of land in Pasig,
Taguig, Parañaque, Rizal, and Pasay City for a military reservation in 1957. However, in 1967,
Proclamation No. 423 was amended by President Ferdinand Marcos, reserving portions of Fort
Bonifacio for a National Shrine, presently called as the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Such
proclamation was further amended in 1986 when President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
2476, excluding some barangays in Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan, and Signal Village from the
military reservation. President Marcos included Western Bicutan in the excluded areas through a
handwritten addendum at the bottom of the Proclamation. Proclamation No. 2476 was published
in the Official Gazette on that same year but without the addendum. In 1999, Nagkakaisang
Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. members, pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, filed a petition to
convert the areas they were occupying from public land to residential lands. The Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems granted their request despite the non-publication of the addendum
but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

Issue:
Does the hand written addendum have any legal force and effect despite its nonpublication?

Ruling:

No. The written addendum does not have any legal force and effect. The Supreme Court
sustained the CA decision, stating that the addendum in Proclamation No. 2476 was not only
“irrelevant” but “speculative.” Courts cannot honor a handwritten note that wasn’t published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Citing Tañada vs. Hon.
Tuvera, the Supreme Court also said that requirement of publication as required by Article 2 of
the Civil Code is indispensable in order to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has
otherwise provided. The phrase “unless otherwise provided” in the Article 2 of the Civil Code
refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the
law’s publication in the Official Gazette. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the requirement
of publication may be dispensed with.
 People vs. Veneracion
G.R. Nos. 119987-88
October 12, 1995
Facts:
According to the sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the
necropsy report of the victim, Abundio Lagunday and Henry Lagarto y Petilla were charged with
the crime of Rape with Homicide in an information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional
Trial Court docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071. After trial and presentation of the
evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court found the defendants Henry Lagarto y
Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide and sentenced both accused with the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessories provided for by law." Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of
Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be
"modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in
place of the original penalty. Refusing to act on the merits of the said motion for reconsideration,
respondent Judge, issued an order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or
Death?

Ruling:
No, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the
proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." This is not
a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the
appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law
clearly imposes the penalty of Death. The instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private
respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the
instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by
this Court of the decision imposing the death penalty.
 Wassmer v. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089
December 26, 1964
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, promised to marry each other on Sept. 4, 195.
However, on Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note to Beatriz stating that he wants to postpone the
marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. The following day, he sent her a another
letter and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning and apologizes. On the day of
wedding Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages.
Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.

Issue:
Is there a breach of promise to marry?

Ruling:
Yes. There is breach of promise to marry .As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong but to formally set a wedding day and go through all the preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, can be subjected
to claims to damages. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which
provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
 MERCED vs. DIEZ
G.R. No. L-15315
August 26, 1960

Facts:
Merced, petitioner, filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar
alleging that he married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by
Elizabeth’s relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that
petitioner has been previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the
suspension of the criminal case on grounds of prejudicial question.

Issue:
Is the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question?

Ruling:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage must
have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent of the contracting
parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and
void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for bigamy,
cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless
all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be secured.
 Abbas vs. Abbas
G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013
Facts:
Syed and Gloria, a Filipino citizen, were married in1992 in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines
in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, he arrived in Manila. He was told that he has going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines. During the
ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to
apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. The Municipal Civil
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan.

The RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus their marriage was void ab initio. She appeals
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals which granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.

Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of
the RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?

Ruling:
No. The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for
Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document. As to the motive of Syed in seeking to
annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to
evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was
Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. The petition
is therefore granted.
 Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.111717
October 24,1994
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila in 1942. In 1962, Aurelio P. Camacho
subsequently married respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living
since 1953 and their a child, Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito). The marriage was
solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958. In 1967
Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido. He lived with her from June 1968 until Aurelio’s
death. Petitioner’s daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio’s son, Chito, who lived
with them for about a year in 1976. On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on
Delgado Street in which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette
Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer.Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single. On November 26,
1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in
consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
326681 was issued in petitioner’s name on January 11, 1985. Luisita and her son Chito brought
this case in the Regional Trial Court, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to
petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a
forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.In
answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in
question using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for fourteen
years, that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisita’s
consent and that she was a purchaser in good faith.

Issues:
1. Is the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita valid?
2.Is the deed of sale between Aurelio and Nenita is valid?

Ruling:
1. The burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage falls
under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to dischargethisburden.
Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent
marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period
of seven years had lapsed. 6 This exception cannot be invoked I this case in order to sustain the
validity of Aurelio’s marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first
wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living
together as husband and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child, in 1961, even before
their marriage in 1962.

2. There is no basis for holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal
partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first
place. The sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner’s ownership is evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name. Indeed, the property in question was
acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty
years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelio’s son way back in
1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary,
Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have
been Aurelio’s child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of
Appeals’ ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to
have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.
 Republic v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 159594
November 12, 2012
Facts:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March
16, 1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen Pangasinan. They had no
children due to Catalina‘s hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. Eduardo filed a petition for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage, alleging Catalina’s psychological incapacity to
comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that Catalina‘s psychological
incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his consent, engaged in petty
arguments with him, constantly refused to do household chores or take are of their adopted
daughter, gossiping with the neighbors, gambling, and abandoning their conjugal home to live
with Bobbie Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes revealed that
Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and is incurable. These manifested
through her immaturity that makes her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital
obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her
share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. The Regional
Trial Court ruled in favor of Eduardo, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.

Issues:
Did the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity rendering the marriage null and
void?

Ruling:
No. First, Catalina‘s supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and, therefore, was not
established. Eduardo‘s testimony was self-serving. Second, Dr. Reyes‘neuro-psychiatric
evaluation was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr.
Reyes merely established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her immaturity and
childishness could no longer be treated due to Catalina‘s reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly,
Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity
which would have been achieved if her report corroborated not only with Eduardo‘s statements
but also with interviews by other persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or
supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her
basic marital functions. In this case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or
standards to dispute psychological incapacity.
 Yu v. Reyes-Carpio
G.R. No. 189207
June, 15, 2011

Facts:
On September 12, 2006, private respondent moved to submit the incident on the
declaration of nullity of marriage for resolution of the court, considering that the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of
the parties marriage. On September 28, 2006, petitioner opposed private respondents Motion,
claiming that the incident on the declaration of nullity of marriage cannot be resolved without the
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. Petitioner,
therefore, averred that the incident on nullity of marriage, on the one hand, and the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations, on the other, should both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved.

Issue: tDid he CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the assailed

orders issued by the trial court and dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.

Ruling:
Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the acts being alleged to have been exercised
with grave abuse of discretion(1) the Orders of the RTC deferring the presentation of evidence
on
custody, support, and property relations; and (2) the appellate courts Decision of upholding the
Orderswere patent and gross that would warrant striking down through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
At the very least, petitioner should prove and demonstrate that the RTC Orders and the
CA Decision were done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. This, however, has
not been shown in the petition. It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are
alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders.
 Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company
G.R. No. 12707
August 10, 1918

Facts:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a gift
from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the Philippines.
The car’s value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the
Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering
some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value
disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an
estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co). In March
1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but Commercial
Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the cost of the car
were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union also stated that the car
does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the Civil
Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.
Ruling:
Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding
to his wife. The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The
evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of
the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then
thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr.
Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected. Commercial
Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of the automobile by
its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of
fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large extent matters
of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies must depend
upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.
 Gonzales v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 159521
December 16, 2005
Facts:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979. Four children
were born from this union. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties,and
Erlinda managed their pizza business. In 1992, She prays for the declaration of the nullity of
their marriage based on Mario's alleged psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties. She
managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. Mario denied she was the
one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties
"existing during their marriage." In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision, rendered its
judgment and ordered the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal
properties between Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were
divided, Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.

Ruling:
SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in question. The
marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by the trial court which was later
affirmed by the CA. Consequently, their properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article
147 of the Family Code. These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property
relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a
man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void
marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during
their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through
the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares. Article 147 creates a
presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired
through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It
further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
 Fortaleza v. Lapitan
G.R. No. 178288
August 15, 2012
Facts:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and AmparoLapitan
in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum. As security, spouses Fortaleza
executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and
lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baños, Laguna. When spouses Fortaleza failed
to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. Dr. Raul
Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5 million.
The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage.
On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession with Branch 35 of the RTC of Calamba City. On September 16, 2005, the RTC
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty of the court.
Spouses Fortaleza elevated the case to the CA, however, the appellate court dismissed the
appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners were bared on their right of redemption over the foreclosed
property by demanding redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount
of the foreclosed property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is a family home.

Held:
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However,
Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts
secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no
doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the subject property. Assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale,
spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before
it was sold at the public auction. Failure to do so would stop the party from later claiming the
exemption.
 Marquino v Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72078
June 27, 1994
Facts:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition,
Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of
Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew
her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise
received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of
an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The
Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she
died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still
alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners, legitimate
children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana,
allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel
recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be
continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

Issue:
Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs

Ruling:
The Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be
transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an
exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in
an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since
the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
 Lam v. Chua
G.R. No. 131286
March 18, 2004
Facts:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and
Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua
Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home,
indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to
agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of
present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated
in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null
and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.

Issue:
Should Jose give the corresponding support?

Ruling:
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it.
The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly
expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child.
 DACASIN VS. DACASIN
GR. NO. 168785 FEBRUARY 05, 2010

Facts:
Herald, an American, and Sharon, a Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They were
blessed with one daughter, Stephanie who was born on September 21, 1995. In June 1999,
Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake
County, Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of
petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent the sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. On January 28, 2002, both executed in
Manila a contract for joint custody over Stephanie. In 2004,Herald filed a case against Sharon
alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over Stephanie contrary to their agreement. The
trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the
Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding
sole custody of Stephanie the respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner
following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction and dismissed the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit
And enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.

Ruling:
The trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do
so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This
conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was jurisdiction for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of its Judgment for Dissolution. Petitioner’s suit
seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so
called “retained jurisdiction.
 BEUMER v. AMORES
G.R. No. 195670
December 3, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, are married. The RTC declared the
nullity of their marriage on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership. In defense, respondent averred that, with the
exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not
acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own
personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A
and 2055-I by way of inheritance. She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner
attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own
money. Petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch
government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for
their acquisition.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the land as partitioned

RULING:
The Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning
Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing
on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to
partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.