YAPYUCO VS SANDIGANBAYAN 674 SCRA 420

FACTS:
The accused-petitioners Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno who were members of the Integrated National Police;
Reyes and Pamintuan who were barangay captains; Manguerra, Lacson, Pabalan who were either members of
the Civil Home Defense Force or civilian volunteers of Quiebawan and Del Carmen alleged that they all
received information concerning a reported presence of armed NPA in Quiebawan.
On that night of the incident, the victims had just attended a barrio fiesta celebration. On the way back,
suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly the victims
were all wounded and bleeding profusely, and thereafter pronounced dead. Thus, all the accused were charged
with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder.
On the other hand, the petitioner-accused contends that they flagged the jeepney that the victims boaded and
signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This
allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno, to fire warning shots but the jeepney
continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots
allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons house directly at the subject jeepney.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Yapyuco and his men and the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right.
Whether or not they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.

RULING: NO.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his
duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The
justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as
guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. Where invoked,
this ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has
committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury or
offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or
office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully
or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.

We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not obtain in
this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law enforcement operation.
No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them – who were either police and barangay
officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order – were bound to, as they did,
respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. While, it may certainly be argued that
rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused
were acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances.
Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as would threaten
the safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated
the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether or not they were at
the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the
prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations
of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that arise in the
legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly
knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire
his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not
vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful
apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains to other government officers or
agencies.

TY VS PEOPLE 439 SCRA 220

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila of seven (7) counts of violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22). The evidence for the prosecution showed that the petitioner issued seven
postdated checks payable to private complainant Manila Doctors Hospital in payment of her mother's hospital
bills. The checks were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. For her defense,
petitioner did not deny having issued the seven checks but contended that the issuance of the checks was under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She claimed
that she was compelled to issue the checks — a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her
mother could be discharged — for fear that her mother's health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane
treatment of the hospital, or worse, her mother might commit suicide. She further argued that there was absence
of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and that the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds in the account. The trial court, however, rejected the theory of the defense and gave full faith and
credence to the prosecution's evidence. It convicted the petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced her to a
prison term. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification setting
aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead ordered the petitioner to pay a fine.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liability

RULING: NO.
Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must
concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an
injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the
ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s
life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A
person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to
a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to
leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.

Speculative fear
The fear harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks,
a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged, for fear that her
mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother
might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

PEOPLE VS GENOSA 419 SCRA 537

FACTS:
Appellant (who was pregnant at that time), in her testimony, stated that she and her husband, Ben Genosa, had
a quarrel. When she was about to pack her clothes as the quarrel had escalated, her husband allegedly flew into
a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck. Ben got a blade,
as the drawer - that contained a gun, was locked. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing
him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to
pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom. Appellant, however, insisted that she
ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and
shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.

It should be noted that appellant was physically abused by her husband. The defense presented Dra. Natividad
Dayan, a decorated clinical psychologist. Dra. Dayan believed that appellant is a battered woman or is suffering
the Battered Woman Syndrome. Another decorated expert, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, Dr. Pajarillo said
that at the time she killed her husband appellant's mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma.

ISSUE:
Whether passion and obfuscation can be availed by the appellant.

RULING:
YES. The Court held that there present was the circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a
crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts
or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. For passion and obfuscation to be applied there
should be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and the act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might
recover her normal equanimity.

In this case, the battering incident preceded victim's death. He also threatened to kill her while dragging her by
the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. More importantly, appellant was eight months pregnant
at the time. His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both appellant and
her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was
able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her
blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die,
thus shooting her husband.

Upon this sequence, there was no lapse in time before the commission of the crime. Also, as appellant has an
anxiety brought about her Battered Woman Syndrome, those who suffer this syndrome relives the beating or
trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time.

PEOPLE VS TARAYA 344 SCRA 401

FACTS:
Prosec Version: Mariano Adillo a co-worker of the victim Salvador Reyes in a sash factory, testified that he had
known Salvador for two months. At about 10:00 p.m. of 24 September 1995, he, Salvador and three other
companions were in a beer house in Famy, Laguna. Salvador drank his beer outside the pub and was in a
conversation with a girl. Both were within the view of Mariano. Later, Salvador was approached and surrounded
by three men, one of them faced him while the two others positioned themselves behind him. Mariano hollered
at the men, who immediately left.
Half an hour later Mariano went out, but Salvador was nowhere in sight. At about 11:00 p.m., Mariano and a
boy searched for him up to a billiard hall which was about 200 meters away. They returned to the beer house
and he instructed the boy to hail a tricycle for his ride home. When no tricycle could be found he and a
companion walked home. The following day he learned of Salvador’s death.

Defense Version: Domingo Decena was at home and watching a television show on the night of 24 September
1995 and until 2:00 a.m. of the following day. Thereafter, he left the house to go to his brother’s place to sleep.
While he was walking along the street, he saw another person who was also walking and holding an iron pipe
about one and a half feet long. He later learned that the man was Salvador Reyes. He also saw AMPIE. When
AMPIE came face to face with Salvador, the latter tried to hit AMPIE once with the pipe, but AMPIE was able
to duck and avoid being hit by the pipe. AMPIE retaliated by hacking Salvador with a bolo. Salvador ran away,
followed behind by AMPIE. Frightened with what he saw, Domingo rushed back to his house. Twenty-five
minutes later he saw a commotion outside and learned that Salvador was found dead twenty meters away from
AMPIE’s house.13
SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez was among the policemen who arrived at the scene of the crime. The body of
Salvador Reyes was found some ten yards from the house of David Angeles, Jr. Accused-appellants were
implicated by an eyewitness to the death of Salvador. ARLY and JONAR were immediately incarcerated while
AMPIE, accompanied by his sister, surrendered at the police station on 9 October 1997. He recorded in the
police blotter the date and time of AMPIE’s surrender. AMPIE admitted that he killed Salvador, but alleged
that he did so in self-defense. Martinez then discontinued the investigation and advised AMPIE to avail of the
services of a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office.15
RTC: Guilty of Murder, qualified by treachery
The trial court ruled that AMPIE could not benefit from the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Salvador Reyes was killed on 24 September 1995. The complaint for murder was filed on the third
day of the following month, October, and a warrant of arrest was issued the day after. He admitted the killing
under claim of self-defense, it cannot be believed that he was unaware of the filing of the case. The trial court
concluded that the purpose of AMPIE’s visit to the police station on 9 October 1995, accompanied by his
sister, was not to surrender but to verify the charge filed against him

ISSUE:
Whether or not AMPIE is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

RULING:
No. The following are the requisites of voluntary surrender: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary;
and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed.34 For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be
spontaneous and must also show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities,
either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense incidental to his
search and capture.35
It cannot be denied that when AMPIE learned that the police authorities were looking for him in connection
with the death of Salvador Reyes, he immediately went to the police station on 9 October 1995. It was there
where he confessed to killing Salvador in self-defense. This is bolstered by the testimony of the investigating
officer SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez, who even entered in the police blotter that AMPIE voluntarily surrendered
to the police. However, the said surrender does not constitute one which would classify as a mitigating
circumstance. It must be emphasized that at the time of his surrender, AMPIE already had a pending warrant
of arrest which was issued on 4 October 1995, or five days before his surrender. His arrest by that time was
imminent. We cannot then appreciate in favor of AMPIE the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.