Limbona vs.

Mangelin
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation
and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as
his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly
held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its
resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the
extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of

administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables
it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On
the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps
the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that
"[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we
assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can
we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section
31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he
could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not
be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead,
they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find
equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

SEC28
CASE DIGEST : Legaspi Vs Civil Serv. Comm.
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil
action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent
had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.

ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the
Health Department employees

HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open
every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular
public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one
that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This
question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already
discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access,
the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is
of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise
will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to
marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the
constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and
in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the
legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who
are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim
to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the
respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies

The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter
of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers
and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National
Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints
for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority
to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and
seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and
seizures.
 xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as
a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort
and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable
limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

AQUINO vs MORATO
G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991 MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO (in
his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD,
respondents.

FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to
the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions.
It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was
eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over
a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are
purely and completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of
the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the
board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to
the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to
examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued
Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee
and the voting slips of the members.

ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid

HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest";
whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be
gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very
existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no
valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a
governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board
and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official
functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore,
public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al . v . THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al .

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue
negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the
crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.)
security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to
the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was
set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain
and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the
freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the
Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass
as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space
above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a
shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was
described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization
of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive
Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing
of the petition.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right to
information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:

The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to the
right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public
disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public
concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public
disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with
the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.
These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a
statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the
broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State
to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents
cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential
element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be
corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a
public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The
mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and
process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to
further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s
participation. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be
community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not
by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community. Included
as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which
includes ―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and
process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3
contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’
position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and
responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and
other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and
timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF
to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e
from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the
implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on
the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general, the objections
against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the
powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond
those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE,
however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of
the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this
concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in
paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last
mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between
the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative,
judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of
transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central
Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative relationship may have been intended to be defined more
precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association
in international law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an
international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the
term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international
legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations
with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and
events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government
over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of
border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to
or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the
Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions
of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or,
at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than
the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the
amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to
the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides
that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term ―autonomous
region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c)
on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai,
Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in
contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another
plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion
in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be
effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development. An associative arrangement does not uphold
national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal
framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,
itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to
the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through
an undue influence or interference with that process.

SEPARATION OF POWER

IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO (1988)

22 Oct 2017

[166 SCRA 246, October 05, 1988] Political Law| Courts| Judiciary| Administrative Functions

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE
ON JUSTICE.

FACTS:

Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, an Executive Judge in RTC in Bangui, Ilocos Norte was appointed as a member of Provincial
Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential EO 856. Petitioner requested the Court to allow him to accept
the appointment and to consider his membership in the committee as neither violative to his judicial function. He
also added that his membership in the said Committee is still part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.
Upon examination of EO 856 reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—

3.3 RECEIVE COMPLAINTS AGAINST ANY APPRE HENDING OFFICER, JAIL WARDEN,
FINAL OR JUDGE WHO MAY BE FOUND TO HAVE COMMITTED ABUSES IN THE
DISCHARGE OF HIS DUT IES AND REFER THE SAME TO PROPER AUTHORITY FOR
APPROPRIATE ACTION;

3.5 RECOMMEND REVISI ON OF ANY LAW OR REG ULATION WHICH IS BELIEVED

PREJUDICIAL TO THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

ISSUE:

Whether the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee discharges as administrative
functions and will be in violation of the Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Provincial Committee on Justice involves the exercise
of administrative functions, hence, it will be in violation of the Constitution.

Petition is denied.
 ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Posted by kaye lee on 3:28 PM
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for
garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed
Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion
to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied
Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further
cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said
Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine
the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It
is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA

on 6:00 AM in Case Digests, Political Law
0
166 SCRA 533 (1988)

o GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power

o EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation
o Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
 FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter
which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines
questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the
case.

ISSUE:

o W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no
authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say,
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in
the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature
has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out
the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is
one such administrative regulation.

Casibang v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
Makasiar, J.

Facts:

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably
filed a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1)
anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2)
terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other
violations of the 1971 Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or
specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to
supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the
Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence
and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that
the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which
— principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has
intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that “... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local
governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our
parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.” He further submitted
that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the
pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of
Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the
only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the
same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department;
and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government
structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and
expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue
assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or
policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the
government.

Issue:

whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit

Held:

No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending
election protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the
benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took
effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be
performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints
specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the
intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate
for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings
beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the
contested office.

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of
Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their
respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly
elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy
their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given
to them by said constitutional provision.

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to
continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court
decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law
or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973
Constitution.
 There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office. A‘term’ of office is the
period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its
privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers
and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the ‘term’ refers to the period, duration of length of time during
which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence,
although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not
foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to
continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the ‘term’
to the office, although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the
‘term’ thereof,” and that “it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the
term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new
term. They hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is
now indefinite.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide
election protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that ‘all existing laws not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. ‘And
there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the
herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected,” and “according to Section 8,
Article XVII of the New Constitution ‘all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue
and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases
pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.’ Consequently, the Courts of
First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and
decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.”

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city
officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests
concerning municipal elective positions.

General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of
Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional
provision.

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of
municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after
affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases,
simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or
constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public
servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.
 In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a
justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the
incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent
Judge decides the election protest. The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure”.

The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its
jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior
legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as
would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary
to pass upon.

PABLO C. SANIDAD AND PABLITO C. SANIDAD VS HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS & HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER
G.R. NO. L-44640
OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to
resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that are to be asked
during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to continue,
and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the power to
propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim
National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation of Presidential
Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the incumbent President
cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is
untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to
vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is political in nature –
and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of the transition period,
only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step
towards normalization.

ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and 1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was of political
nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is because the
1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal course has not been
followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the president undertook the
proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a contestable issue.

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DAZA VS SINGSON
Posted by kaye lee on 12:35 PM
G.R. No. 86344 December 21 1989

FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that
chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only
17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing
the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new set
of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP.

Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the Singson.
Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO that same day
to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.

Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that
the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.

RULING:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the
House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the
legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments.

The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima

undue delegation of power; separation of power

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO,
ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with
at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification
or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials
may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not,
however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the
President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable
target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional
oversight committee.

Discussions:

1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the guaranty
of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.

The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

1. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test
and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
2. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is
not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power
to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as
it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

Rulings:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of
the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the
BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the
State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

1. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the
Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.
2. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was
created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM,
NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

DELEGATION OF POWER
GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554
July 30, 2012
677 SCRA 750

FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of the 96th
Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct
Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary
had already been fully served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal
Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was
initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial
Detention Center.

Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial against him, Garcia
was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum security compound of the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is
separate and distinct from ordinary courts.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and (2) Whether or not the application
of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution

RULING: (1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period of
preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was under
preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the
conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal
court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the
Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept
in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his
sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”

(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification,” held the Court.
 People vs Vera

undue delagation of power; equal protection of the law

Caption: PEOPLE VS VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.

Facts:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for new
trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the
lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the
crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO
denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for
hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because
it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power
to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city
like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the
law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law
provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the
said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:

1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
 The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in
the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the
benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal protection,
to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class.

Rulings:

1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of
Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply
to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of
the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do
is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

1. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial
to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one
province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province
may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not
in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the
benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied
those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards
to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which
case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every
province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Published November 23, 2010

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14 0

G.R. No. 74457 – 148 SCRA 659 – Political Law – Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos
issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from one province to another but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then
charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred that EO 626-A was unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard
or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based
on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being
transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education
and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing a requirement the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking
the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied
said petition and the NMAT was conducted and administered as scheduled.
The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for
admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The
cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of
each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve
as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are
constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the
sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general
community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of
the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached
by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC.

v
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
608 SCRA 442
CARPIO, J.
18 December 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. On 5
September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent which showed
non-compliance. After a series of subsequent water sampling, PSL still failed to conform to the regulatory
standards. Another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002, in response to the 17 May 2002
request for re-sampling received by LLDA, finally showed compliance with the effluent standard in all
parameters. On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay indicating therein that the penalty should be
imposed from the date of initial sampling to the date there quest for re-sampling was received by the Authority.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the LLDA denied.
Issue:
WON the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of legislative
powers.
Ruling:
LLDA’s power to impose fines is not unrestricted
.It was only after the investigation finding the petitioner failing to meet the established water and effluent quality
standards that the LLDA imposed the penalty of P 1,000.00 per day. The P 1,000 penalty per day is in accordance
with the Amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984

LEGISLATIVE DEPT
Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary

Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary

December 8, 1994

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First, it
violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the
division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate
Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong
into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by
the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5.
Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population
requirement was attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first contention of one
subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct
subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of
the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision of the
section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore,
the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their
separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act
enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by
the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec [Oct. 6, 2000]

24SEP
FACTS:
There are 4 parameters to determine the winners in a party-list election under RA 7941:
1. 20% allocation 3. 3-seat limit
2. 2% threshold 4. Proportional representation

The Congress enacted RA 7941 on Mar. 3, 1995 which states that the State shall “promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. The State shall also develop the simplest
scheme possible to guarantee a full, free and open party system by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature.”

ISSUES:
1. Is the 20% allocation mandatory? Should the 20% allocation for party-list be filled up completely all the time?
 2. Are the 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit constitutional?
3. How should the additional seats be determined?

HELD/RULING:
(1) NO. Sec. 5(2) Art. 6 merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. The Congress has prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement, and the mechanics by which it is to be filled up.

(2) YES. The 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit are consistent with the very essence of “representation.” The 3-seat
limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislative. Thus, no single group would dominate.

(3) To determine the additional seats, 3 steps will be followed:

a. rank the highest to lowest. The highest is called the “first” party.

b. determine the seats the “first” party will have. For the “first” party, it will have a 6% benchmark. Every succeeding
additional 2% of votes from the first 2% requirement will constitute 1 additional seat. If the “first” party gets 2
additional seats, then the next in rank will get less.

c. to solve for the additional seats of other qualified parties, the formula provided below will be used:

additional seats no. of votes no. of

for the = of the party x additional
concerned no. of votes of seats of the
party the “first” party “first” party

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to
the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:
. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is
one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Tha facts attendant to the case rendered
it justiciable.

. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on
the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House
of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so
as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a
trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the Court
decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court
ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

BANAT VS COMELEC

Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the
total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total
votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats –
this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is
void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of
RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be
one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more
than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would
be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As
can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the
5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further,
the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in
the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat.
Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the
availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if
we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if
the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and
not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional
seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of
seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38
remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first,
the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at
least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3
seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it
has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the
votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied
seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be
prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN,
etc)from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from
RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not
qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political
parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained
that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country
shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.

Aquino v. COMELEC
AGAPITO AQUINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION (D)
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy(CoC) for the position of Representative for the new 2nd
Legislative District of Makati City providing the following information; Residence in Constituency: ___ years
& 10 months.
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the elections
Petitioner filed another CoC amending the certificate. Petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided
in the constituency for l year and 13 days.
Petitioner filed his Answer praying for the dismissal of the disqualification case. On the same day, a hearing was
conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner presented in evidence, his Affidavit, lease contract between petitioner
and Leonor Feliciano.
2nd Division of COMELEC promulgated a Resolution which DISMISS the: petition for Disqualification against
respondent Agapito Aquino and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the 2nd District of
Makati City.
Elections were held. In Makati City where 3 candidates vied for the congressional seat in the 2nd District, petitioner
38,547 votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained 35,910 votes.
Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's 2nd Division resolution dated May 6,
1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
COMELEC issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve
Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of
whether or not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sec 17, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution.
COMELEC issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the 2nd Division dated May 6, 1995. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of the 2nd Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito
A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the 2nd District
of Makati City in the elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner
is valid.

HELD:
Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid.
Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in
1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. His certificate indicated
that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace
of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile
of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its
terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for
only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City.
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that
petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims
to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati indicate that the sole purpose of transferring his physical residence
is not to acquire's new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of
Makati City.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a
newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It
is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati.

SEC6
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree,
education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte
Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when
he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of
the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the
same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation,
wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of
the First District of Leyte.

HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7
months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when
her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not
mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after
the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Co v. HRET: Can the spring soar higher than its source?

In the case of Co vs. Electoral Tribunal[1] the major issue was whether Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino

citizen in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.

Records show that Ong Te, the grandfather of Jose Ong, Jr., arrived in the Philippines in 1895. He established
his residence in Laoang, Samar. As such, he was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the Spanish colonial

administration.
 Jose Ong Chuan, Jose Ong Jr.’s father, was born in China in 1905. In 1915, he was brought by Ong Te

to Samar where he grew up. He was baptized into Christianity. He married a natural-born Filipina, Agripina Lao. He

also established his residence in Laoang, Samar. In 15 February 1954, he filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar

an application for naturalization. He was declared a Filipino citizen on 28 April 1955; the declaration was made final

and executory on 15 May 1957. He took his Oath of Allegiance and was issued a corresponding certificate of

Naturalization.

Jose Ong, Jr. was then a minor, nine years of age, and still finishing his elementary education in Samar when his

father took his oath. After completing his elementary education, he went to Manila to complete his higher education

and eventually found employment there. He, however, frequently went home to Samar where he grew up.

In 1971, his elder brother was elected a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Emil’s status as a

natural-born citizen was challenged. The Convention, however, declared Emil as a natural-born Filipino.

In 1984 and 1986, Jose Jr. registered and voted in Samar. He ran and won in the 1987 elections for

representative in the second district of Northern Samar. His opponents protested his election to the post on the

grounds that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The Court affirmed the decision of the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal declaring Jose Ong, Jr. a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Article IV Section 2 of 1987 constitution defines natural-born citizens as “those who are citizens of

the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship,”[2] as

well as “those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the

age of majority.”[3]

Section 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution was interpreted by the Court as applying to those who elected Filipino
citizenship not only after 2 February 1987 but also to those who elected citizenship before that date. It was intended

to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted

the status of natural-born citizen while one born of Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect

Philippine citizenship, whereby under earlier laws, he was not a natural-born citizen.[4]

The Court’s based its resolution of the issue by tracing Jose Ong, Jr. citizenship to his mother who was a

natural-born Filipina. What is material to the case is whether he elected Filipino citizenship when he reached the age

of majority as provided for by Section 1 (4) Article IV of the 1935 Constitution which was the operative law when he

was born. Under the 1987 Constitution, natural-born status can only be accorded to individuals who elected
citizenship upon reaching majority. In the opinion of the Court it is not necessary for Ong, Jr. to formally or in writing

elect citizenship when he came of age as he was already a citizen since he was nine by virtue of his mother being a

natural-born citizen and his father a naturalized Filipino.[5]

 Furthermore, election can be both formal and informal. In In Re Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) it was held that

the exercise of the right of suffrage when one comes of age constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine

citizenship. The rule in the Mallare case was applied whereby Jose Ong’s exercise of the right of suffrage and the

participation in election exercises were considered positive acts of electing Philippine citizenship. Entering a profession

open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election, running for

public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice. These,

according to the court, cannot be less binding than the filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration. [6]

SEC7

Dimaporo v. Mitra

Dimaporo v. Mitra
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur
during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately
following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of
the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his
intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did
not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the
present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives,
as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the
Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives
and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7,
Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts
that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these
constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not
provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another
office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another
office or employment.

ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE
THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM
EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of
abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have
this …chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI
(1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the
people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby
cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their
former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with
utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another
office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to
have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing
of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted
official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of
shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of
Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the
Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing
other grounds
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify
the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their
duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg.
881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of
candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on
the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to
obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and
benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose
and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner
seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be
extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office
(tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the
term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno
vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

People v. Jalosjos [Feb. 3, 2000]

24SEP
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended
by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of
the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to
attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ v. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, (A)
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

FACTS:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958,
when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is
not absolutely privileged.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding
order of dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.
HELD:
No, the publication in question is not a privileged communication.
The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of
the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either
in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of
the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an
open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in
session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to
the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International PipeIndustries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the
respondent Acerogroup, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao
Fernandez, then a member of the InterimBatasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for
respondentAcero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could
“appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez
did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the
notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of
10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter inlitigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of
Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without
violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of
the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case.
He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares.
He acquired them “after the fact” that is, after thecontested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had
been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more,
before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which
was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on
the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as
counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to
appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

SEC16
SANTIAGO v GINGONA
FACTS:

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member
of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator
Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
"minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the
debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third
session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof,
the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging
in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader?

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE

The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a
political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however,
the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2)
because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a
quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President (read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's
power of judicial review).

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not
a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but
was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine
the issue.

SECOND ISSUE

There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution mandates
that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
"minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing
a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in
both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.

THIRD ISSUE

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title
or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the
solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercise by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to
the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of
the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his
specific acts as minority leader.

FOURTH ISSUE

Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in
the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority
leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only
after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.

Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or
even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

Date: July 13, 2018Author: jaicdn0 Comments
Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House making serious
imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing
the creation of special House Committee to
investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and
in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it infringes his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special
Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter
guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15
months.

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.
 Issue:
Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for speeches

Ruling: NO.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a
copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been
understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the
members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they

shall not be questioned in any other place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior,
not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

on 7:00 AM in Case Digests, Criminal Law, Political Law
0
G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

o Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own
members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that
petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the
 application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her
suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:
o Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of
the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the
court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.”
Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to
discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension ord