People of the Philippines vs Mirto, October 19, 2011, GR

193479 QUALIFIED THEFT

- the accused was branch manager of Union Cement Corporation (UCC) for
the Tuguegarao City area.
-misappropriated company funds; he used the credit line of accredited dealers in
favor of persons who either had no credit lines or had exhausted their credit lines. He
diverted cement bags from the companys Norzagaray Plant or La Union Plant to
truckers who would buy cement for profit; he did not remit the checks but these were
either encashed or deposited to his personal bank account (USED SCHEME TO
PERPETRATE THEFT)

RULING:

ART. 308. Who are liable for theft.Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain but without violence, against, or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver
the same to the local authorities or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property

of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage
caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where

trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent
of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals,
or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of the crime of Theft are: (1) there was a taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent
of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was
accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon
thing.
 Theft is qualified under Art. 310 of the RPC, when it is, among others,
committed with grave abuse of confidence, thus:

ART. 310. Qualified Theft.The crime of theft shall be punished by

the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)

The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence

are as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owners consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,

nor of force upon things;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

All of the foregoing elements for Qualified Theft are present in this case.

First. The presence of the first and second elements is abundantly clear. There
can be no quibble that the fund collections through checks payments all issued
payable to cash are personal properties belonging to UCC. These funds through
checks were paid by UCC clients for the deliveries of cement from UCC.
Second. The third element is likewise abundantly clear. The collected
amounts subject of the instant case belonged to UCC and not to accused-
appellant. When accused-appellant received them in the form of Pay to Cash checks
from UCC customers, he was obliged to turn them over to UCC for he had no right
to retain them. That he kept the checks and deposited them in his account and in the
accounts of Magno Lim knowing all the while that these checks and their proceeds
were not his only proves the presence of unlawful taking.

As the trial court aptly pointed out, accused-appellants theory that he only
kept the funds in trust for UCC with the elaborate explanation that once the checks
cleared in his account then he remits them to UCC is completely incredulous. For
one, accused-appellant has not adduced evidence that he indeed remitted the funds
once the corresponding checks were cleared. For another, accused-appellant could
not explain why he deposited some of the checks he collected in the accounts of
Magno Lim in MetroBank (MBTC Account No. 124-5) and Equitable PCIBank
(EPCIB Account No. 71820-8). Moreover, accused-appellants contention of such
alleged management practice[15] is unsupported by any evidence showing that prior
to the events in mid-2001 there was indeed such a practice of depositing check
collections and remitting the proceeds once the checks cleared.

Third. The element of intent to gain is amply established through the

affidavit[16] of Wilma Invierno of Rommeleens Enterprises, one of UCCs customers,
who confirmed that she had been sold cement bags instead of to dealers with credit
lines and she was required by accused-appellant to issue pay to cash checks as
payment. The affidavits of Arthur Alonzo[17] of Alonzo Trucking, Robert
Cokee[18] of Philippine Lumber, and Russel Morales[19] of Mapalo Trucking
similarly attested to the same type of sale and payment arrangement. In so doing,
accused-appellant facilitated the collection of pay to cash checks which he deposited
in his bank account and in the bank accounts of Magno Lim. Thus, the fourth element
of intent to gain is duly proved.

Fourth. Equally clear and undisputed is the presence of the fifth

element. Accused-appellant admitted having received these checks and depositing
them in his personal account and in the accounts of Magno Lim. Thus, the element
of taking was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things.

Fifth. That UCC never consented to accused-appellants depositing the checks

he collected in his or other accounts is demonstrated by the immediate action UCC
took upon being apprised of the misappropriation and accused-appellants confession
letter. UCC lost no time in forming a special audit group from the Group Internal
Audit of Phinma Group of Companies. The special audit group conducted an internal
audit from July 3 to 25, 2001 and submitted a Special Audit Report[20] dated August
8, 2001, showing that the total unremitted collections of accused-appellant from the
period covering May 25, 2001 through June 23, 2001 amounted to PhP 6,572,750.

AVP Santos and UCC SVP and Head of Marketing Group Dr. Felizardo met
with accused-appellant who admitted misappropriating company funds. AVP Santos
testified[21] in open court on what transpired in that meeting and accused-appellants
verbal admission/confession. And with the findings of the auditors that not only did
accused-appellant unlawfully take UCC funds but he also committed the offense of
violating company policies, rules, and regulations, UCC was compelled to file seven
criminal complaints against accused-appellant. This swift and prompt action
undertaken by UCC argues against the notion that it consented to accused-appellants
act of depositing of check proceeds from company sales of cement products in his
account or in the accounts of Magno Lim.

Sixth. That accused-appellant committed the crime with grave abuse of

confidence is clear. As gathered from the nature of his position, accused-appellant
was a credit and collection officer of UCC in the Cagayan-Isabela area. His position
entailed a high degree of confidence, having access to funds collected from UCC
clients. In People v. Sison,[22] involving a Branch Operation Officer of Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIB), the Court upheld the appellants conviction
of Qualified Theft, holding that the management of the PCIB reposed its trust and
confidence in the appellant as its Luneta Branch Operation Officer, and it was this
trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and
prejudice of PCIB x x x.[23] In People v. Mercado,[24] involving a manager of a
jewelry store, the Court likewise affirmed the appellants conviction of Qualified
Theft through grave abuse of confidence.
 In the instant case, it is clear how accused-appellant, as Branch Manager of
UCC who was authorized to receive payments from UCC customers, gravely abused
the trust and confidence reposed upon him by the management of UCC. Precisely,
by using that trust and confidence, accused-appellant was able to perpetrate the theft
of UCC funds to the grave prejudice of the latter. To repeat, the resulting report of
UCCs internal audit showed that accused-appellant unlawfully took PhP 6,572,750
of UCCs funds.

Moreover, accused-appellant issued a written certification[28] dated July 20,

2001, attesting to the fact of the ownership of the bank accounts where he deposited
the checks he collected from UCC clients, which reads:

07/20/01

To whom it may concern:

This is to certify that to my knowledge, the owner of the following bank

accounts are as follows:

Bank account Owner

SBC TUG 0301261982001 B. G. Mirto

MBTC TUG 124-5 Magno Lim
EPCI TUG 71320-8 Magno Lim

This certification is issued for whatever purpose it may serve.

(Sgd.) Bernard G. Mirto 7/20/01

Signature over printed name date

Further, as can be amply gleaned from accused-appellants handwritten

admission and duly borne out by the internal audit teams findings, he deliberately
used a scheme to perpetrate the theft. This was aptly pointed out by the CA, which
We reproduce for clarity:

UCC found that accused-appellant gravely abused the trust and

confidence reposed on him as Branch Manager and violated company
policies, rules and regulations. He did not remit collections from
 customers who paid Pay to Cash checks. He used the credit line of
accredited dealers in favor of persons who did not have credit lines or
other dealers who had exhausted their credit line. He diverted cement
bags from Norzagaray Plant or La Union Plant to truckers who would
buy cement for profit. In these transactions, he instructed dealers that
check be made in the form of pay to cash. He did not issue them
receipts. The checks were either encashed or deposited to accused-
appellants personal account No. 0301-261982-001 at Security Bank &
Trust Co. (SBTC) Tuguegarao Branch or deposited to the accounts of
a certain Mr. Magno Lim maintained at MetroBank and
EquitablePCIBank, both located at Tuguegarao City.[29] (Emphasis
supplied.)

It is, thus, clear that accused-appellant committed Qualified Theft. And as

duly pointed out above, even considering the absence of the handwritten
extrajudicial admission of accused-appellant, there is more than sufficient evidence
adduced by the prosecution to uphold his conviction. As aptly pointed out by the
trial court, the prosecution has established the following:

1. That checks of various customers of UCC were written out as bearer

instruments. Payments in cash were also made.

2. These were received by the accused Mirto who deposited them in his
personal account as well as in the account of Mr. Magno Lim.

3. The monies represented by the checks and the case payments were
consideration for bags of cement purchased from the UCC, the
complainant-corporation.

4. The accused Mirto was never authorized nor was it part of his duties
as branch manager to deposit these proceeds in his account or in the
account of Mr. Magno Lim.[30]

Defense of Agency Unavailing

As his main defense, accused-appellant cites the testimonies of prosecution

witnesses Restituto Renolo and Reynaldo Santos to impress upon the Court that he
is an agent of UCC. And as an agent, so he claims, an implied trust is constituted by
his juridical possession of UCC funds from the proceeds of cement sales:

ATTY. CARMELO Z. LASAM: Mr. Renolo, can you tell us the specific duties and
responsibilities of your area sales managers?

RESTITUTO RENOLO: The duties and responsibilities of an area sales officer, we are in
charge of the distribution of our products, cement and likewise its collection of
its sales.[31]

xxxx

ATTY. RAUL ORACION: Okay, now as Assistant Vice-President for Marketing and
supervisor of all area sales offices and branch managers, could you tell the duties
and responsibilities of the accused Bernard Mirto at that time?

REYNALDO SANTOS: x x x, also collect sales and for the cash for the collection of our
sales.[32]

To accused-appellant, he had authority to collect and accept payments from

customers, and was constituted an agent of UCC. As collection agent of UCC, he
asserts he can hold the collections in trust and in favor of UCC; and that he is a
trustee of UCC and, therefore, has juridical possession over the collected
funds. Consequently, accused-appellant maintains there was no unlawful taking, for
such taking was with the knowledge and consent of UCC, thereby negating the
elements of taking personal property and without the owners consent necessary in
the crime of Qualified Theft.
This contention fails.

The duty to collect payments is imposed on accused-appellant because of his

position as Branch Manager. Because of this employer-employee relationship, he
cannot be considered an agent of UCC and is not covered by the Civil Code
provisions on agency. Money received by an employee in behalf of his or her
employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee.[33]

The fact that accused-appellant had authority to accept payments from

customers does not give him the license to take the payments and deposit them to
his own account since juridical possession is not transferred to him. On the contrary,
the testimony he cites only bolsters the fact that accused-appellant is an official of
UCC and had the trust and the confidence of the latter and, therefore, could readily
receive payments from customers for and in behalf of said company.

G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015

CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.(ESTAFA through
MISAPPROPRIATION)
-accused Benabaye was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank Inc.,
Iligan City Branch (Siam Bank). As such, she was authorized to collect
and/or accept loan payments of Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional
receipts therefor,4 accomplish a cash transfer slip at the end of each banking
day detailing the amounts of money that she has received, and remit such
payments to Jenkin U. Tupag (Tupag), her supervisor.5
cralawred

-non-remittance of some loan payments received from its clients based on

the provisional receipts issued by its account officers, as well as the daily
collection reports corresponding to the said provisional receipts.
cralawred

RULING: It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an

employee on behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the
material possession of the employee.42 The material possession of an
employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the
juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession of
the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense
committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.43 Hence, conversion
of personal property in the case of an employee having
mere material possession of the said property constitutes theft,
whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical
possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same
property constitutes Estafa.44 cralawred

Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from
Siam Bank's clients. At the end of every banking day, she was required to
remit all cash payments received together with the corresponding cash
transfer slips to her supervisor, Tupag.46 As such, the money merely passes
into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for the duration of the
banking day. Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its
 temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller,47she had
no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical
or material possession.

In Chua-Burce v. CA,48 the Court acquitted therein petitioner Cristeta Chua-

Burce (Chua-Burce) of Estafa on the ground that the element of juridical
possession was absent. As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she
had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Relative thereto,
in Guzman v. CA,49 where a travelling sales agent was convicted of the crime
of Estafa for his failure to return to his principal the proceeds of the goods
he was commissioned to sell, the Court had occasion to explain the
distinction between the possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes
of determining criminal liability for Estafa, viz.:
chanRoblesvir tualLawlib ra ry

There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller of funds received
from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by
third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere
custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to
retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even
assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain the money
or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him
for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault. ary

Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent who
could have asserted a right against Siam Bank over the same, Benabaye had only acquired
material and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be convicted of
the crime of Estafa as charged. In fine, the dismissal of the Estafa charge against Benabaye
should come as a matter of course, without prejudice, however, to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charge against her as may be warranted under the circumstances of this case.

Matrido v People, july 13, 2009 (QUALIFIED

THEFT)

- a credit and collection assistant of private complainant Empire East Land Holdings,
Inc., petitioner was tasked to collect payments from buyers of real estate
properties such as Laguna Bel-Air developed by private complainant, issue receipts
therefor, and remit the payments to private complainant.
As alleged in the Information, petitioner took, intending to gain therefrom and
without the use of force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons,
a personal property consisting of money in the amount P18,000 belonging to
private complainant, without its knowledge and consent, thereby gravely abusing
the confidence reposed on her as credit and collection assistant who had access to
payments from private complainants clients, specifically from one Amante Dela
Torre.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.[19]

The taking was also clearly done with grave abuse of confidence. As a credit and
collection assistant of private complainant, petitioner made use of her position to
obtain the amount due to private complainant.As gathered from the nature of her
functions, her position entailed a high degree of confidence reposed by private
complainant as she had been granted access to funds collectible from clients. Such
relation of trust and confidence was amply established to have been gravely abused
when she failed to remit the entrusted amount of collection to private complainant.

The Court finds no rhyme or reason in petitioners contention that what the
prosecution tried to prove during trial was estafa through misappropriation under
Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC.

x x x The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the
thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and
converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if
the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with
the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa.[20] (Underscoring sup

That petitioner did not have juridical possession over the amount or, in other
words, she did not have a right over the thing which she may set up even against
private complainant is clear.[25] In fact, petitioner never asserted any such right,
hence, juridical possession was lodged with private complainant and, therefore,
estafa was not committed.
 The taking away of the thing physically from the offended party is not
elemental,[26] as qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is
in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged
felony.[27]

A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of an employer is considered to

be only in the material possession of the employee.[28] The material possession of
an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the
juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing
appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed
remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.[29]

x x x When the money, goods, or any other personal property is

received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on
commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both
material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the
transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even
against the owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was
primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash
belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere
bank employees.[30] (Italics in the original omitted; underscoring and
emphasis supplied)

That the transaction occurred outside the company premises of private

complainant is of no moment, given that not all business deals are transacted by
employees within the confines of an office, and that field operations do not define
an agency. What is of consequence is the nature of possession by petitioner over
the property subject of the unlawful taking.
On the penalty imposed by the trial court, which was affirmed by the appellate court
─ indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years, 5 months and 10 days:

The penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than the applicable
penalty for simple theft. The amount stolen in this case was P18,000.00. In cases of
theft, if the value of the personal property stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does
not exceed P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. Two degrees higher than this penalty is reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods or 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be prision

mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period or within
the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.[31] The mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender being present, the maximum penalty shall be
the minimum period of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or
within the range of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 16 years, 5 months and 20 days.

The Court thus affirms the minimum penalty, but modifies the maximum
penalty imposed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 31, 2007 and Resolution of August 1, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29593 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to
the imposed penalty, such that petitioner, Sheala P. Matrido, is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
G.R. No. 205144 November 26, 2014

MARGIE BALERTA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
REYES, J.:

The instant petition for review on certiorari1 assails the Decision2 rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) on October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00693 affirming, albeit with modification as to the penalty
imposed, the Decision3 dated November 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barotac Viejo,
Iloilo, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 99-1103, convicting Margie Balerta (petitioner) of Estafa.

Antecedents

The Information, dated October 27,1999, filed against the petitioner before the RTC partially reads as
follows:

That on or about May 31, 1999 until June 17, 1999, in the Municipality of Balasan, Province ofIloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
an employee/cashier of Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BABMPC)[,] was
in[-]charge of collecting and keeping the collections turned over to her by the collectors of the
cooperative [and of] account[ing] for and deposit[ing] the collected amount to the depository bank
which is the Balasan Rural Bank, Balasan, Iloilo, but said accused, far from complying with her
obligation, with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfullyand
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert toher personal use and benefit the total collection of
One Hundred Eighty[-]Five Thousand Five Hundred Eighty[-]Four Pesos and 06/100 (₱185,584.06)
Philippine Currency and despite repeated demands, the said accused failed and still fails, to liquidate
or render formal accounting of her collections or return the aforesaid amount to the Balasan Associated
Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative, to its damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount of
₱185,584.06.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During arraignment, the petitioner entered a "not guilty" plea.5 Pre-trial then ensued. The parties
stipulated on the following: (a) the identity and existence of Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (BABMPC); (b) the identity of the petitioner and her position as a cashier in
BABMPC; (c) the petitioner "cannot withdraw from the bank account of [BABMPC] alone;" and (d) the
criminal complaint against the petitioner was filed on the basis of the findings of an internal auditor
and not of an independent accountant.6

Version of the Prosecution

During the pre-trial, the prosecution manifested that BABMPC’s Manager, Napoleon Timonera
(Timonera), and Internal Auditor, Ruben Ambros (Ambros), would take the witness stand. Timonera
would testify on the function of BABMPC and the duties of the petitioner, while Ambros’ testimony
would revolve on the facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the complaint. The prosecution
intended to offer before the RTC no other documentary evidence except the affidavits of Timonera
and Ambros.7

In the course of the trial, only Timonera appeared to testify. When the proceedings before the RTC
was concluded, both the prosecution and the defense did not formally offer any documentary
evidence.8

In Timonera’s testimony, he stated that BABMPC is registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority and is engaged in micro-lending, trading and equipment rental.9 At the time he took the
witness stand, Timonera was BABMPC’s Manager, and he was authorized through a board resolution
to represent the cooperative in pursuing the criminal complaint against the petitioner.10
According to Timonera, the petitioner worked as one of the three cashiers in BABMPC.11 She used to
receive daily remittances, deposit to the bank, withdraw and issue loans12 specifically in connection
with Care Philippines’ account involving an amount of ₱1,250,000.00.13 Care Philippines entrusted the
sum to BABMPC, which in turn can release to borrowers loans ranging from ₱500.00 to ₱50,000.00.14

The petitioner neither resigned nor was terminated from employment, but she stopped reporting for
work from June 19, 1999 onwards after BABMPC discovered discrepancies and fraud in her
records.15 Bank records showed that there was a variance of ₱40.00 indicated in BABMPC’s passbook,
on one hand, and in the deposit slip, on the other.16 This prompted BABMPC’s bookkeeper, Rose De
Asis (De Asis) to request the Internal Auditor, Ambros, to verify with the bank, which in turn disowned
the entries and signatures in the passbook made and affixed between March 12, 1999 and June 15,
1999.17 BABMPC also found out from the bank teller that the petitioner declaredthe cooperative’s
passbook as missing since March 1999, hence, a new one was issued on May 6, 1999.18 The petitioner
used the new passbook in making actual transactions with the bank, but she kept the old passbook,
upon which she made falsified entries to prevent BABMPC from discovering the discrepancies.19 The
court asked Timonera how he knew that the signatures in the old passbook were affixed by the
petitioner herself. Timonera replied that it was the petitioner who kept the passbook, 20 and collected,
remitted and withdrew money from the bank.21 BABMPC’s bookkeeper, De Asis, on the other hand,
merely controlled the vouchers and the records of the transactions.22 The petitioner and De Asis were
the two authorized signatories of BABMPC as regards the passbook kept with the bank.23

Upon audit, BABMPC found that "there was a discrepancy of some ₱185,000.00," ₱90,000.00 of which
in the passbook, while the rest of the amount related to the records of the cooperative kept by the
petitioner. When asked by the petitioner’s counsel about where exactly was the discrepancy shown in
the copy of the bank’s ledger and pages of a passbook, which were part of BABMPC’s records,
Timonera answered that he is not an accountant and Ambros knew more about the matter.24

Timonera also stated that BABMPC had sent the petitioners three letters, dated June 22, 1999, June
24, 1999 and August 30, 1999. The first letter requested the petitioner to report to the office to explain
the discrepancies. The second letter requested the petitioner to pay BABMPC. The first two letters
were brought tothe petitioner’s house by BABMPC’s secretary, Marilyn Mombay (Mombay). Both
times, the petitioner was not at home, and it was Estela Balerta, the former’s sister-in-law, who
received the letters. The last letter was sentby mail, but the petitioner refused to receive it as well.25

Timonera also testified that without the petitioner’s presence and permission, the latter’s table and
drawers were opened through the use of duplicate keys kept by De Asis. The use of the duplicate keys
to open each other’s office drawers was howevera common practice between the petitioner and De
Asis.26

Version of the Defense

The defense, on its part, offered the testimony of the petitioner.

The petitioner testified that the lastday she reported for work as a cashier in BABMPC was on June
17, 1999. Timonera got angry that day when the petitioner reminded him of his cash advances, which
were already equivalent to his salaries for five months. The petitioner emphasized that Timonera had
exceeded the allowable cash advance amount of one month salary.27

On June 18, 1999, the petitioner suffered from migraine and was advised by her doctor to rest for two
weeks. The day after, Timonera visited the petitioner’s house, instructed her to rest, and informed her
that she will be notified in case a necessity for her toreport for work arises. On June 25, 1999, the
petitioner received a letter requiring her to go to BABMPC’s office. She complied with the directive on
the same day. Timonera then presented to the petitioner the result of Ambros’ audit showing that she
incurred a shortage of ₱80,000.00. She was not however furnished a copy thereof. The petitioner also
protested that the audit was conducted in her absence, but Timonera informed her that they would just
thresh the matter up in court.28

The petitioner likewise stated that she can no longer find the receipts, vouchers and books in her
drawers showing the cash advances of Timonera. Her plea for the conduct of an independent audit
also fell on deaf ears.29

On July 7, 1999, the petitioner proceeded to the Balasan Police Station to report about the forced
opening of her table and drawers which occurred on June 25, 1999. She also informed the police that
the amount of ₱5,000.00 kept in the drawers was missing. She confronted BABMPC about the missing
cash. Ambros admitted that he and De Asis opened the drawers, but made no mention of any cash
found thereon.30

The petitioner alleged that Timonera was ill motivated when he initiated the filing of the criminal
complaint against her. Timonera intended to evade his financial liabilities from BABMPC relative to his
cash advances and the money which he had diverted to other projects in violation of the rules of the
cooperative. The petitioner also suspected that Timonera must have speculated that the former had
money as she then had plans to go abroad.31

Prior to the petitioner’s reminder to Timonera about the latter’s cash advances, there was no untoward
incident whatsoever between them. She admitted though that she did not report Timonera’s cash
advances to BABMPC’s board.32

The petitioner testified that the only shortage she was aware of involved the amount of ₱1,896.00,
which was reflected in a past monthly audit. To date, the amount remains unsettled.33

Ruling of the RTC

On November 15, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,34 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the [petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa by misappropriation and hereby sentences [the petitioner to] five (5) years, five (5) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay [BABMPC] ₱185,584.06
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.35

The RTC’s reasonsare quoted below:

According to the [petitioner], the internal audit wherein she has a shortage of ₱185,584.06 was false.
However, she failed to prove and explain to the Court the exact figure or amount of money she is
accountable of. She failed to cause an audit of her own to show that no shortage was incurred by her.
Her testimony was not corroborated by any witness or other documentary evidence. What she did was
simply to deny her shortage and pointed to [Timonera] as one responsible for the filing of charges
against her. But the [petitioner] alone, being the one keeping the passbook of the cooperative, was
able to misrepresent with the Rural Bank of Balasan that the passbook was lost and thereafter, she
secured a new passbook. After she secured a new passbook, she used both the old passbook and
new passbook and falsified the entries in the old passbook making it appear that the old passbook
was presented and transactions were made using the old passbook with the bank. With this scheme,
it is clear that the accused has all the intention to defraud. For what is the purpose of using the old
passbook when it was already cancelled and of no legal use? Worst is that, by means of falsification,
she made false entries in the old passbook to mislead the officers of [BABMPC] to believe that the
money entrusted to her is safely kept, when in truth[,] there were already shortages.

The Court believes that the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming to point out the [petitioner’s]
criminal liability to the offense charged.36

Ruling of the CA

The petitioner challenged the above ruling before the CA raising the factual issues of whether or not,
as claimed by BABMPC, she had (a) falsified the entries in the passbook, (b) received collections for
remittance to the bank, (c) misappropriated BABMPC’s money, and (d) committed estafa.37

On October 31, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 99-1103 with modifications with respect
to the indeterminate penalties imposed. The [petitioner] is hereby sentenced to four (4) years and one
(1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporalas maximum and
to pay [BABMPC] the amount of Php185,584.06.

SO ORDERED.38

The CA based its disposition on the following:

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under subsection 1 (b) of Art. 315 of
the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

I. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return, the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;

II. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the person who received
it, or a denial on his part that he received it;

III. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

IV. That there be demand for the return of the property.

The essence of this kind of estafais the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words "convert" and "misappropriate"
connote the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to
a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. Tomisappropriate for one’s own use includes not
only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption
of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the
items to besold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.39
All the elements are present in the instant case. Firstly, it was sufficiently proven from the testimonies
of both the prosecution and defense witnesses that the [petitioner] was employed as one of the three
cashiers of the cooperative. From the testimonies, it was established that as a cashier, she was
responsible in handling the specific account of the money loaned by Care Philippines to the
cooperative. The money from Care Philippines was used by the cooperative for micro-lending, that is,
lending a small amount of money to small entrepreneurs from ₱500.00 to ₱50,000.00. Being such a
cashier, [thepetitioner’s] duties include receiving daily remittances, making deposits to and
withdrawals from the bank, as well as issuing loans. By receiving the money of the cooperative, [the
petitioner] also had the obligation to make delivery of or to return the same to the cooperative.

Secondly, on the matter of misappropriation, [the petitioner] deplored the conduct of an internal audit
in her absence but she merely denied the shortage of money as shown by the result of the internal
audit. [The petitioner] did not cause an audit of her own to rebut the evidence against her. She did not
show any documentary evidence nor present any witness to support her claims. It is axiomatic that
denial is the weakest form of defense. As held in People v. Magbanua, "[i]t is elementary that denial,
if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which
has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.

Through the use of the two (2) passbooks, [the petitioner] was able to dispose of the funds of the
cooperative to the latter’s disadvantage. Moreover, [the petitioner] did not refute the evidence of the
private offended party that she maintained two (2) passbooks. The certification issued by the Assistant
Manager of the rural bank showing that [the petitioner] had declared as lost the old passbook was not
contradicted by the defense at all. In like manner, there was no evidence presented by the defense to
controvert the claim that the [petitioner] falsified the initials of the bank employees every time she
records an entry in the old passbook, either withdrawal or deposit.

Thirdly, it is needless to say that the cooperative was greatly prejudiced by the misappropriation of its
funds and by the denial of [the petitioner] of the shortfall. Considering that the amount loaned by Care
Philippines to the cooperative for its micro-lending project was Php1,250,000.00 and considering
further that most of its clients only borrow from Php500.00 to Php50, 000.00, [the petitioner’s] shortage
of ₱185, 584.06 is already a substantial amount that could have been lent to a number of borrowers
of the cooperative.

As to the last element pertaining to the demand by the offended party, it has been held that, "[i]n a
prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidenceof misappropriation or
conversion. However, failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation". Moreover, a query as to the whereabouts of the money,
such as the one proven in the present case, is tantamount to a demand. The prosecution in the case
at bar, was able to show that the offended party inquired as to the whereabouts of the shortage
amounting to Php185, 584.06. The General Manager of the cooperative sent letters to the [petitioner]
asking her to report to the offices of the cooperative in order to explain a number of questionable
transactions that they have discovered.

In fine, the evidence of the prosecution was able to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that [the
petitioner] committed estafa by misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
With the evidence on record, We find no convincing reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court.40 (Some citations omitted, underscoring ours and italics in the original)

Issues
Undaunted, the petitioner assails the above ruling. Restated, the issues she presents for our resolution
are whether or not: (a) she is entitled to an acquittal considering that a cashier possesses no juridical
possession over the funds he or she holds; (b) demand, as an element of the crime of estafa, had
been proven in the instant case;and (c) her guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.41

The petitioner claims that in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled that a cashier cannot
be convicted of estafaif he or she has no juridical possession over the funds held.43 Further, the
element of demand was not established. There was no proof conclusively showing that the three letters
were sent to the petitioner by BABMPC. Assuming they were sent, no ample evidence exists to prove
that they were in fact received by the petitioner.44

More importantly, the prosecution had not discharged the burden of proof required to convict in criminal
cases. First. Timonera admitted that he did not have any personal knowledge about how the petitioner
committed the acts of misappropriation.45 Second. The statements of the Internal Auditor, Ambros,
were vital, but he never appeared in court to testify or to shed light on any documents purportedly
pointing to the petitioner’s liability.46 Third. No representatives of the bank testified on the alleged
inconsistencies found in the passbooks.47 Fourth. Even the amount of money claimed to have been
misappropriated was not determined with certainty.48 Fifth. In convicting the petitioner, the RTC and
the CA primarily relied on the falsified entries made on the passbooks, but they were not formally
offered as evidence, and the prosecution failed to establish that the petitioner was solely in control of
the said passbooks.49

In its Comment,50 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the petitioner had juridical
possession over the funds, which were lent by Care Philippines to BABMPC. The petitioner received
daily remittances, deposited to and withdrew money from the bank, and issued loans in connection
with the said account. Moreover, while denying having incurred the shortage, she offered no
explanation as to how much money she was accountable for. No other witness corroborated the
petitioner’s claims as well. The petitioner also failed to refute the existence of the two passbooks.
Anent the prejudice caused to BABMPC, the amount of ₱185,584.06 was substantial and could have
been loanedto a number of borrowers.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the instant petition.

The petitioner had no juridical possession over the allegedly misappropriated funds.

Chua-Burce is instructive anent what constitutes mere material possession, on one hand, and juridical
possession, on the other, for the purpose of determining whether the first element of estafais present
in a particular case, viz:

Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When the
money, goods, or any other personal property is received bythe offender from the offended party (1)
in trustor (2) on commissionor (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possessionof the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the
owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-
vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere
bank employees.
In People v. Locson, the receiving teller ofa bank misappropriated the money received by him for the
bank. He was found liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the
possession of the bank. We explained in Locson that –

"The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the possession
of the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence,
removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the
taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft."

In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals, a travelling sales agent misappropriated or
failed to return to his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to
sell. He was, however, found liable for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and
not qualified theft. In the Guzman case, we explained the distinction between possession of a bank
teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability – "The case cited by the Court of
Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support of its theory that appellant only had the material
possession of the merchandise he was selling for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in point. In
said case, the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated money received by him for the bank,
was held guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the
bank. There is an essential distinction between the possession by a receiving teller of funds received
from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise
delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller
is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has
no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. Anagent, on the other
hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain
money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him
for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault (Article 1915,
[N]ew Civil Code; Article 1730, old)."51 (Citations omitted, underscoring ours and italics in the original)

In the case at bench, there is no question that the petitioner was handling the funds lent by Care
Philippines to BABMPC. However, she held the funds in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds, she had
mere physical or material possession, but she held no independent right or title, which she can set up
against BABMPC. The petitioner was nothing more than a mere cash custodian. Hence, the Court
finds that juridical possession of the funds as an element of the crime of estafaby misappropriation is
absent in the instant case.

In the prosecution of the crime of estafa, demand need not be formal if there exists evidence of
misappropriation. However, in the instant case, conclusive proofs of both misappropriation and
demand are wanting.

"Fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense must
be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only
requisite to a finding of guilt."52

At the outset, it is significant to point out that neither the prosecution nor the defense had made any
formal offer of documentary evidence.53 The two passbooks, ledger, and three demand letters, while
mentioned by Timonera in his testimony, were notformally offered as evidence. The Court notes too
that the contending parties each had only one witness, namely, Timonera, for the prosecution, and the
petitioner, for the defense. Both of their testimonies were therefore without any corroboration.
Considering the absence of formal offers of documentary evidence, the judgments rendered by the
RTC and the CA solely hinged on who was more credible between the two witnesses.
While this Court does not find Timonera’s testimony as incredible, by itself alone, it is insufficient to
discharge the burden of proof required for conviction in criminal cases. The petitioner was indicted for
allegedly misappropriating the amount of 185,584.06. However, Timonera failed to state with certainty
where in the records held by the petitioner were the discrepancies shown. Timonera evaded answering
the question by emphasizing that he is not an accountant and that Ambros knew more about the
matter.54 Note too that Timonera admitted it was the petitioner and De Asis who were the two
authorized signatories relative to the funds lent to BABMPC by Care Philippines.55Hence, the petitioner
did not have sole access over the records and funds. Consequently, the authorship of the falsified
entries in the passbook cannot be attributed with certainty to the petitioner alone. It was thus fatal for
the prosecution’s cause that Ambros, De Asis, Mombay and the bank personnel did not take the
witness stand especially since documentary evidence were never formally offered as well.

The RTC and the CA faulted the petitioner for not offering countervailing evidence, including an audit
conducted in her own behalf. Still, it does not justify a conviction tobe handed on that ground because
the "[c]ourts cannot magnify the weakness of the defense and overlook the prosecution’s failure to
discharge the onus probandi."56

"Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This, however, cannot be used
to advance the cause of the prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover,
when the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which
is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption
of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit."57

"In a criminal case, the accused isentitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind."58

In the case at bar, however, the paltry evidence for the prosecution, consisting merely of Timonera’s
testimony, casts doubts anent the guilt of the petitioner, and does not amply rebut her right to be
presumed innocent of the crime charged.

The acquittal of the accused from the crime charged does not necessarily negate the existence of civil
liability. However, in the instant case, the prosecution had failed as well to present preponderant
1âwphi 1

evidence from which the Court can determinately conclude that the petitioner should pay BABMPC
the amount of ₱185,584.06.

Eusebio-Calderon v. People59 is instructive anent the effects of the two kinds of acquittal on the civil
liability of the accused, viz:

In the case of Manantan v. Court of Appeals, we elucidated on the two kinds of acquittal recognized
by our law as well as its different effects on the civil liability of the accused. Thus:

x x x. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of this instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to benot
the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which
may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance
of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, x x x.60 (Citation
omitted and underscoring ours)

In the case now under consideration, the Court acquits the petitioner notbecause she is found
absolutely innocent of the crime charged. The Court acquits merely because reasonable doubt exists
anent her guilt. Hence, the petitioner can still be held civilly liable to BABMPC if preponderant evidence
exist to prove the same.

Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court indicates how preponderance of evidence shall be
determined, viz:

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proofmust establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all
the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number. (Underscoring ours)

In the instant petition, the prosecution manifested during the pre-trial that Timonera's testimony would
touch on the functions of the BABMPC and the duties of the petitioner.61 During the trial, Timonera
made references to the alleged falsifications and misappropriations committed by the petitioner.
However, he denied specific knowledge of where exactly the falsifications and misappropriations were
shown and recorded.62 This, plus the fact that the prosecution made no formal offer of documentary
evidence, leaves the Court in the dark as to how the petitioner's civil liability, if any, shall be
determined.

In precis, the Court finds that Timonera's testimony does not quality as preponderant evidence from
which the Court can conclude that the petitioner is civilly liable to pay BABMPC the amount of
₱185,584.06.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00693 is REVERSED. The petitioner, MARGIE
BALERTA, is ACQUITTED of the crime of Esta/a under Article 315(l)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The directive of the Court of Appeals for Margie Balerta to PAY Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-
Purpose Cooperative the amount oL₱185,584.06 as CIVIL LIABILITY is likewise SET ASIDE for lack
of basis.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

ANDRE L. D AIGLE, G.R. No. 174181

 Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
-versus- Acting Chairperson,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. June 27, 2012
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.[1]

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking a reversal of the Decision[2] dated March 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 which affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated
January 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna in
Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL convicting petitioner Andre L. DAigle of the crime of
Estafa. Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution[4] dated August 17, 2006 denying the Motion
for Reconsideration[5] thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On June 5, 1997, petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC under the following
Information:

That in, about and sometime prior to December 1996, in

the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being then the Managing
Director of Samfit Phils. received from said Samfit, Phils. for management, care
and custody the following company properties:

a) Electric transformer worth P16,500.00

b) Two (2) units of electronic boxes and two (2) units of computer
boxes worth P490,000.00

c) Machine spare parts consisting of

- set of rack and pinion
- pair of bevel and gears MB-20-30
- pair of meter gears 42 teeth
- set of gears 32 teeth
- gear bith bearing inserted
- 3 SL 20 bearings V plate
- one-way clutch
 - one-way bearing CSK 20HC5
- 8 of LJ 34 bearings V type
- roller bearing 1 x 0
- 8 pieces of 6200 ZZE bearing with a total value of P12,765.35

d) [Equipment] and raw materials valued at P162,400.00

with a total value of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND, SIX

HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS & 35/100 (P681,665.35)

under the express obligation to use the same for a particular purpose[,] that is,
exclusively for the machinery of Samfit Phils. but accused far from complying
with his obligation with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his
employer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misapply,
misappropriate and convert the aforesaid corporate properties to his own
personal use and benefit and despite several demands made upon him,
accused refused and failed and still refuses and fails to return or account for
the same to the damage and prejudice of Samfit, Phils., represented by its
President, Mr. Arturo Parducho, in the aforesaid sum of P681,665.35.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for pre-trial and trial
on the merits.

During trial, the prosecution presented as its principal witness Arturo Parducho
(Parducho), Director and President of Samfit Philippines, Inc. (SPI), a corporation primarily
engaged in the manufacture of underwires for brassieres.According to him, petitioner
was the former managing director of SPI tasked with the management of the company
as well as the management, care and custody of SPIs personal properties. At the time that
he was holding said position, petitioner was likewise a majority stockholder of TAC
Manufacturing Corporation (TAC), an entity engaged in the fabrication of wire bending
machine similar to that being used by SPI.[7]

Sometime in November 1996, petitioner was divested of his duties and responsibilities as
SPIs managing director[8]due to alleged conflict of business interest. Because of this,
Parducho conducted an audit and inventory of SPIs properties and reviewed its financial
statements, vouchers, books of account and other pertinent records. He also interviewed
some of SPIs employees.[9] These revealed that several properties of SPI such as wire
materials, electronic transformer, electronic and computer boxes, machine spare parts,
while still under the management, care and custody of petitioner, went missing and were
left unaccounted for.[10] Further investigation revealed that some of SPIs wire bending
machines, computer and electronic boxes were inside the premises of TAC. This was
confirmed by Daniel Gutierrez, a former employee of TAC, who likewise admitted that
TAC copied the wire bending machines of SPI.[11]

In a letter dated January 14, 1997,[12] SPIs counsel formally demanded upon petitioner to
turn over to SPI all its equipment under his care and custody. Ignoring the demand,
petitioner was thus indicted with the present case. SPI also filed a replevin case against
him for the recovery of the electronic and computer boxes. Subsequently, and by virtue
of the Writ of Replevin,[13] an electronic box found inside TACs premises was recovered
from petitioner while a computer box was later on surrendered to the Sheriff.

In his defense, petitioner alleged that his engineering firm TAC fabricated spare parts for
SPI on a daily basis. Aside from this, it also did the repair and maintenance of SPIs
machines. He also claimed that he had an understanding with SPI that TAC would support
SPIs operation until its business standing improves. And since petitioner only had a 10%
share in SPI, TAC would fabricate for it two additional machines valued at $60,000.00 each
so that he could get additional 40% share therein. Under this set-up, Samfit UK would
provide the micro stepping motors and motor drives as well as the control
panels. However, petitioner was not able to finish fabricating the bending machines as he
was dismissed by SPI. As a consequence, he filed a labor case against it before the
Department of Labor and Employment.

Petitioner further claimed that SPI owes him about a million pesos for the repairs of its
machines. While he admitted that SPIs electronic transformer, computer boxes and
motor drives were recovered while in his possession thru a writ of replevin, he reasoned
out that he did not return them to SPI after his dismissal because he intended to exercise
his right of lien over them since he has properties which were still in the possession of SPI,
collectibles amounting to P900,000.00, and unpaid one-month salary
of P80,000.00. Finally, he denied having appropriated the computer boxes for his own
benefit.[14]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution had established the guilt of petitioner for
the crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315[15] of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). It ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of petitioner to account for and deliver to
SPI, upon demand, the properties entrusted to his care, custody and management is
sufficient evidence of actual conversion thereof to his personal use. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision[16] rendered on January 15, 2001 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences accused ANDRE D AIGLE to suffer an

indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty (20) days of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusio[n] temporal as maximum; to indemnify private complainant in the
amount of P191,665.35 and to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.[17]
Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed to the appellate court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision[18] dated March 31, 2006, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed with
modification the trial courts Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna (Branch 93), dated January 15, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL,
is MODIFIED to the effect that appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The decision is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[20] was likewise denied in a Resolution[21] dated

August 17, 2006.

Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER-ACCUSED[S]
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF VALID
REASONS/JUSTIFICATION.

II
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT, (RTC-BRANCH 93, SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA), AND AT THE SAME TIME
MODIFYING THE EXTENT OF THE PENALTY [IMPOSED] FOR THE CRIME
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED.[22]

Our Ruling

After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the

petitioner vis--vis that of the respondent People of the Philippines (respondent), and in
the light of the practically parallel finding of facts and conclusions of the courts below, this
Court finds the instant petition partly meritorious.

Concerning the first assigned error, the Court finds no cogent reason to sustain
petitioners claim that the appellate court erred in denying his Motion for Reconsideration
without valid reason or justification. The reason for the appellate courts denial of
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is clear and simple, that is, after it made a
thorough evaluation of the issues and arguments proffered in the said motion, the CA
found that same were already passed upon and duly considered in its assailed Decision.
This is very plain from the contents of the August 17, 2006 Resolution of the CA denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Undoubtedly, petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied due to a valid reason and justifiable cause.

Petitioner also bemoans the fact that the dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision
did not expressly mention that he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Suffice it to say, however, that a judgment is not rendered defective just
because of the absence of a declaration of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the
dispositive portion. The ratio decidendi of the RTC Decision extensively discussed the guilt
of the petitioner and no scintilla of doubt against the same was entertained by the courts
below. Indeed, petitioners guilt was duly proven by evidence of the prosecution. In any
event, a judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is
sufficient if it states: 1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; 2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice or accessory; 3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and 4) the
civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability
by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived. We find that all of these are
sufficiently stated in the trial courts Decision.

Anent the second assigned error, petitioner posits that the CA erred in affirming
the said RTC Decision and in modifying the penalty imposed upon him since the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of estafa. He
argues that Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC requires that the person charged was
given juridical possession of the thing misappropriated. Here, he did not acquire juridical
possession of the things allegedly misappropriated because his relation to SPIs properties
was only by virtue of his official functions as a corporate officer. It is actually SPI, on whose
behalf he has acted, that has the juridical possession of the said properties.

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand counters that
the prosecutions evidence has fully established all the elements of the crime
charged. Based on SPIs records, petitioner received from it various equipment of SPI on
several occasions for the sole purpose of manufacturing underwires for
brassieres.However after the conduct of an audit in December 1996, petitioner failed to
properly account therefor.

Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.

Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:
 1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return, the
same;

2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property

by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;

3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of

another; and

4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.[23]

All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.

Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a business

transaction with SPI wherein it would fabricate bending machines and spare parts for the
latter. Under their agreement, SPI would provide the necessary components to be used
in the fabrication as well as the electronic devices while work would be done at
petitioners premises. Pursuant to this, petitioner admitted to having received from SPI an
electronic transformer, electronic box and a computer box.[24] When petitioner, however,
was not able to finish the work allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI, the latter
demanded for the return of its properties. However, petitioner did not heed the demand
and simply kept the properties as lien for his claims against SPI.[25]

From petitioners own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of the
aforementioned elements is very clear.SPIs properties were received by the petitioner in
trust. He received them for a particular purpose, that is, for the fabrication of bending
machines and spare parts for SPI. And when SPI made a demand for their return after
petitioners alleged dismissal therefrom, petitioner deliberately ignored the same.

The Court cannot agree with petitioners postulation that he did not acquire
juridical possession of SPIs properties since his relation with the same was only by virtue
of his official function as SPIs corporate officer. As borne out by the records, the
equipment subject matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be
utilized in the fabrication of bending machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on
how to use them without any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired
not only physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the
Court held in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals:[26]

When the money, goods or any other personal property is received by the
offender from the offended party (1) intrust or (2) on commission or (3)
for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession
andjuridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a
possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owner. x x x

With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was able
to prove this through circumstantial evidence. Misappropriation or conversion may be
proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.[27] The failure
to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence
of misappropriation.[28] As mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the
properties of SPI which were received by him in trust. This already constitutes
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to
petitioners own personal use. Even if petitioner merely retained the properties for the
purpose of preserving his right of lien over them, same is immaterial because, to reiterate,
failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is
tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use. As correctly noted by
the CA:
 We are not impressed by appellants excuse. We note that SPIs demand
for the return of the properties subject of this case was made on January 14,
1997. At that time, appellant was no longer the managing director of SPI, he
having been terminated from his position on November 19, 1996. This
observation, coupled with SPIs demand for the return of its equipment and
materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the said properties
and the fact that he failed to return or at least account for them raises the
presumption of misappropriation and conversion. x x x[29]

Lastly, it is obvious that petitioners failure to return SPIs properties valued at P191,665.35
caused damage and prejudice to the latter.

In a last ditch effort to evade liability, petitioner claims that the controversy
between him and SPI is an intra-corporate controversy considering that he was a
stockholder of the latter. Such being the case, he avers that his conviction for estafa has
no basis.
Contrary, however to petitioners stance, by no stretch of imagination can the Court
consider the controversy between him and SPI as an intra-corporate controversy. As
correctly pointed out by the CA:

Finally, we find no cogent basis, in law and in fact, which would support
appellants allegation that the acts complained of in this case were corporate
acts. His allegation without more that he had an agreement with Mr. Bernie
Kelly of SPI to the effect that his (appellants) share in SPI would be increased
to 40% in exchange for two bending machines does not give his act of retaining
the properties a semblance of a corporate act. There is also no evidence that
he acted on behalf of TAC Manufacturing Corporation, much less of SPI.
Premises considered, we do not agree that appellants actuation should be
considered as a corporate act, for which he claims he could not be held
personally liable. x x x[30]
 Regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the RTC found said witnesses
to be credible and therefore their testimonies deserve full faith and credence. The CA for
its part, did not disturb the trial courts appreciation of the same. It is a well-entrenched
doctrine that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between
the parties.[31]Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of
them obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision. Thus, the
Court accords deference to the trial courts appreciation of said testimonies. Accordingly,
the RTCs finding of petitioners guilt, as affirmed by the CA, is sustained.

The proper imposable penalty

The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount
of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount involved
exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for
every P10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years
imprisonment.

In the present case, petitioner poses no serious challenge to the amount involved which
is P191,665.35. Since said amount is in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable
should be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor.[32] [A] period of one (1) year shall be added
to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in
no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed twenty (20) years.[33] Hence,
sixteen (16) years must be added to the maximum term of the penalty of prision
mayor. And since same exceeds twenty (20) years, the maximum term should be pegged
at twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Applying now the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law which is prision correccional in its
maximum to prision mayor in its minimum is prision correccional in its minimum to
medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months x x
x.[34]

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the CA correctly pegged
the penalty in its maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but erred in
imposing the minimum term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as same is
beyond the lawful range. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Accordingly,
petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 dated March 31, 2006 and August 17, 2006, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
DIONISIO AW a.k.a. TONY GO, G.R. No. 182276
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO,* J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
- versus - PEREZ, JJ.
 Promulgated:

March 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Dionisio Aw a.k.a. Tony Go, which seeks to set
aside the: (a) Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 27 November 2007, which
affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 76,
dated 7 April 2003 in Criminal Case No. Q-95-61234, finding petitioner guilty of the
crime of Estafadefined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(B) of the
Revised Penal Code,[3] and (b) the Resolution[4] of the appellate court dated 17
March 2008 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The generative facts are:

Petitioner was accused of six (6) counts of the crime of Estafa in separate
Informations filed before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 76. The six (6)
Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-95-60331, No. Q-95-61234,
No. Q-95-61235, No. Q-95-61236, No. Q-95-61237 and No. Q-95-61238. These
cases were consolidated and heard by Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City.[5]

A Judgment of Conviction was rendered against the petitioner in Criminal Case No.
Q-95-61234. He was acquitted in the other five (5) informations.

The Information against the petitioner in Criminal Case No Q-95-61234

reads:

That on or about the 1st day of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Toyota Quezon Avenue, Inc. to be represented by Vic
Abdon in the following manner to wit: the said accused being then a Sales Representative
of TOYOTA Quezon Avenue, Inc., got and received in trust from Tritan Trading Corporation
the amount of P480,000.00 Philippine Currency, representing payment of one unit of
Toyota Corolla, with the obligation involving the duty to remit said sum to the said
company but once in possession thereof and far from complying with his aforesaid
obligation despite repeated demands therefor, with intent to defraud, misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit to the damage
and prejudice of TOYOTA Quezon Avenue, Inc., in the amount of P480,000.00, Philippine
Currency.[6]

Petitioner posted a cash bond in the total amount of P50,000.00 for his temporary
liberty.[7]

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on all six (6) counts
of Estafa.[8] When the cases were called for joint pre-trial, petitioners counsel
manifested that his client is waiving his right to pre-trial, thus its termination.[9] Trial
ensued where the prosecution presented their witnesses, namely, Mr. Vic Abdon
(Abdon), the General Sales Manager of Toyota Quezon Avenue, Incorporated
(Toyota); Mr. Robert Gatchalian (Gatchalian), the Manager of the Credit and
Collection Department of Toyota; and Mr. Lucio Tiong (Tiong), General Manager of
Tritan Trading Corporation.

Witness Abdon narrated that petitioner was a former sales representative

of Toyota. As Sales Representative, petitioner performed two functions, namely: to
sell brand new Toyota vehicle units and to collect and receive payments from
customers.[10] Sales representatives who have rendered services to Toyota for a
long period of time like petitioner were allowed to collect and receive payments
from customers with the duty to remit the same to the cashier. As a matter of
procedure, sales representatives of Toyota were required to request copies of
provisional receipts from the cashiers which are then issued to the paying
customers. Customers usually pay in the form of checks payable to Toyota.[11] As
General Sales Manager, Abdon conducted meetings twice a week, particularly
during Mondays and Thursdays to stress to the sales representatives that they
should remit their collections to the cashier and to follow-up on their uncollected
accounts.[12]

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-61234, Abdon testified that sometime in July 1994,
Tiong, General Manager of Tritan Trading Corporation, purchased two units of
Toyota Corolla GLI valued at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
each.[13] Petitioner was the sales representative who attended to Tiong. It was also
petitioner who received the payments made by Tiong for the cars purchased
from Toyota.

Abdon recalled that for the first car, a Toyota Silver Mica, Tiong deposited Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with the petitioner who in turn issued to the former
Provisional Receipt No. 54583[14] dated 22 July 1994. As full payment, Tiong issued
Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-12122 in the amount of P480,000.00, a crossed check
payable to cash, covered by Provisional Receipt No. 56013 dated 1 August
1994. This is the subject of Criminal Case No. Q-95-61234.

As regards the second car, a grayish green Toyota, Tiong issued a check
worth P20,000.00 which petitioner acknowledged through Provisional Receipt No.
54582 dated 20 July 1994. Tiong then issued Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-13581
dated 25 July 1994, payable to cash in the amount of P480,000.00 as final
payment. It was petitioner who received the check payments of Tiong as shown by
the provisional receipts covering those checks. However, petitioner failed to remit
to Toyota the amounts covered by the checks.[15] Both checks amounting
to P480,000.00 each were made payable to cash because petitioner told Tiong
that Toyota needed the cash for the replacement of its stocks.[16] Abdon in his
testimony emphasized that he reminded petitioner of his uncollected
accounts. On 12 August 1994, Gatchalian, the manager of the Credit and Collection
Department of Toyota called Abdons attention to the fourteen (14) uncollected
accounts due from the petitioner including the two accounts due from Tritan
Trading Corporation.[17]

Upon being confronted by Gatchalian, petitioner undertook to settle the

accounts but failed to do so. After this incident where his attention was called
regarding his unsettled accounts, petitioner did not report to work anymore, thus,
Gatchalian and Abdon went through the files of petitioner. They forced open
petitioners drawer and found the files of several customers namely Lian Ho Trading,
Aity Merchandising, Raymundo Lim, Wilson del Rosario Go and Tritan Trading
Corporation. The documents showed that no payments were posted. The incident
was then brought to the attention of Mr. William Lee, Vice President and General
Manager of Toyota who instructed Abdon and Gatchalian to conduct an
investigation.[18] The matter was also brought to the attention of the lawyer
of Toyota who prepared and sent a demand letter to petitioner.[19]

Both Abdon and Gatchalian next went to the office of Tritan Trading Corporation
to inquire about the unsettled account of the corporation with Toyota. In their visit,
Tiong stated that Tritan Trading Corporation has fully paid to petitioner the two
cars it purchased from Toyota. Tiong showed them Provisional Receipt No. 56013
in the amount of P480,000.00 with the signature of petitioner paid through
Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-12122 for the Silver Mica Toyota, and Provisional
Receipt No. 54530 in the amount of P480,000.00 paid through Philtrust Bank Check
No. AO-013851 for the Grayish Green Toyota Corolla.[20]

Gatchalian described the procedure for the sale of Toyota vehicles. According to
him, after the customer agreed to the price and other terms of the sale for the
chosen vehicle, the sales representative shall prepare and fill up the vehicle sales
report. The sales representative will ask the customer to pay a certain amount to
serve as deposit and then he will turn over said payment together with the vehicle
sales proposal to the cashier for proper posting of such collection. The cashier will
issue either a provisional or official receipt. For sale on Cash on Delivery basis, the
sales representative will first request from the cashier a provisional receipt
reflecting the amount due. Upon delivery of the vehicle, the customer shall sign the
vehicle sales invoice, vehicle delivery notes and parts invoices. Thereafter, the sales
representative will collect from the customer the payment either in cash or
managers check and issue the corresponding provisional receipt. The sales
representative shall remit his collection to the cashier, who in turn will post the
same on the vehicle sales proposal. The folder file will have to be surrendered to
the Credit and Collection Department. This particular folder will be forwarded to
the Accounting Department for computation of the commission.[21]

Gatchalian testified that in the sales transactions concluded by petitioner, the latter
kept the folder files.Consequently the necessary documents never reached the
departments concerned despite the release of the vehicles to the customers. The
vehicle delivery note, which contained among others the signature of the officer
from the finance department, does not prove that payment was given by the
customer but simply serve as proof of delivery of the unit. Gatchalian admitted that
as a matter of policy, the company does not release the vehicle to the client without
full payment of the price thereof. However, with respect to the sales to the
customers involved in the instant cases, the vehicle units were release because of
the stiff competition in the market; and the trust and confidence accorded by the
top management on the petitioner. Gatchalian asserted that petitioner and Mr.
William Lee have known each other for several years.[22]
Called next to testify was witness Tiong. He essentially affirmed the testimony of
Abdon and Gatchalian. Tiong disclosed that sometime in July 1994, his company
Tritan Trading Corporation[23] authorized him to buy two units of vehicle
from Toyota.[24] He issued a check worth P20,000.00 as deposit or down payment
to petitioner, who then issued him a provisional receipt. Petitioner signed the
receipt in the presence of Tiong.[25] Petitioners signature appears on the lower right
hand portion of the receipt. Tiong next paid to the petitioner Philtrust Bank Check
No. AO-12122 in the amount of P480,000.00 as final payment. In turn, petitioner
issued to Tiong Provisional Receipt No. 56013.[26]

For the second car, a grayish green Toyota Corolla, Tiong again issued to petitioner
two (2) checks, first a check worth P20,000.00 as down payment and a second
check, Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-13851, likewise in the amount of P480,000.00
as full payment. Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-13851 was acknowledged by
petitionervia Provisional Receipt No. 54530.[27] For both cars, check payments were
crossed and issued payable to cash.[28]

Petitioner Dionisio Aw, a.k.a., Tony Go, was the lone witness in his defense.

Petitioner recalled that he was initially an employee of Cecilia Motors Corporation

from June 1981 to 13 October 1983. Mr. William Lee, one of the stockholders
therein was his boss. In January 1989, petitioner made a call to Toyota where Mr.
William Lee was then already working as Executive Vice-President. On 23 February
1989, petitioner was appointed Sales Representative. He pointed out that there is
nothing in his appointment which indicates that he is authorized to receive
payments from the customers. From January 1989 up to the time he resigned, he
sold more or less 600 to 700 units.[29]

He said that Tritan Trading Corporation purchased two units of Toyota

Corolla on cash basis and prepared the necessary vehicle sales proposal for these
transactions which documents are in the custody of Toyota. He accompanied the
driver of Tritan Trading Corporation, who brought the check payments for both
vehicles to the cashier in Toyota. After these payments, the vehicles were released
to the driver.
As stated at the outset, the RTC dismissed Criminal Cases No. Q-95-60331, No. Q-
95-61235, No. Q-95-61236, No. Q-95-61237 and No. Q-95-61238. The RTC
concluded that the petitioner misappropriated the amount ofP480,000.00 in
Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-12122 only, under the Information in Criminal Case
No. Q-95-61234. The RTC absolved petitioner for any liability on the value of
Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-13851 also forP480,000.00, which is the evidence
against the petitioner in Criminal Case No. Q-95-61236. According to the RTC, the
dorsal portion of Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-13851 which would disclose the
recipient of its proceeds was not among the exhibits annexed to the prosecutions
formal offer of evidence. Additionally, the RTC mentioned that the acquittal of the
petitioner in Criminal Case No. Q-95-1236 is justified in view of the failure of the
prosecution to formally offer the demand letter from Toyota pertaining to the
value of Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-13851 which Abdon claimed was sent to the
accused.[30]

The RTC held:

Considering that the criminal culpability of accused was clearly established in Criminal
Case No[s]. Q-95-61234, he shall be civilly liable to pay the sum of P480,00.00 for the
value of Philtrust Bank Check No. AO-12122 representing the amount of money which he
misappropriated.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Dionisio Aw alias Tony Go guilty of the crime
of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal for Criminal Case No. Q-95-61234.

Further, he is ordered to pay Toyota Quezon Avenue the sum of P480,000.00

representing the amount of money which he misappropriated.
 On reasonable doubt, the Court hereby acquits accused Dionisio Aw of the crime
of Estafa in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-60331, Q-95-61235, Q-95-61236, Q-95-61237 and Q-
95-61338.[31]

Petitioner appealed his judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals which was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 28147. The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC
and rendered a decision dated 27 November 2007, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the RTC of Quezon City Branch 76 in Criminal Case
No. Q-95-61234 is hereby AFFIRMED.[32]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was similarly denied for lack of merit by the
appellate court in a Resolution dated 17 March 2008,[33] hence, this petition based
on the following issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals in rendering the contested decision and resolution,
had decided a question of substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable
decisions of the Honorable Court, and has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise by this Honorable Court of its
power of supervision, considering that:

a) The Court of Appeals erred in finding the accused guilty of estafa despite failure on
the part of the prosecution to prove its elements beyond reasonable doubt.

b) The Court of Appeals erred in not applying the principle of Pro Reo considering that
the evidence relied upon were verily circumstantial.[34]

Striving to be acquitted of the crime charged, petitioner insists that the

prosecution: (1) failed to show that Toyota reposed trust and confidence upon him
as his appointment letter as Senior Sales Representative does not authorize him to
collect and/or receive payments from clients/customers; (2) the Vehicle Sales
Proposal states that all check payments shall be under the order of Toyota, while
all cash remittances were directly paid to the companys cashier, clearly showing
that he did not at any time received any amount from the customers who
transacted with him; (3) the checks issued by Tiong although payable in cash were
crossed checks, thus meant for deposit only.[35]

The petition lacks merit.

The elements of Estafa under Article 315, Paragraph 1(B) of the Revised Penal Code
are:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same.
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and

(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.

The first element of Estafa under Article 315, Paragraph 1(B) is the receipt
by the offender of the money, goods, or other personal property in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same.

Petitioner insists that the prosecution was not able to prove

that Toyota reposed upon him such degree of trust and confidence which he took
advantage of and that his appointment letter does not authorized him to collect
and/or receive payment from customers.[36]

Petitioners argument is a feeble attempt to escape liability and is belied by

the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Abdon, Gatchalian and Tiong. Based on