FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 174144, April 17, 2007 ]
BELLA A. GUERRERO, PETITIONER, VS. RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Scriptures tell the story of the brothers Jacob and Esau[1], siblings who fought bitterly over
the inheritance of their father Isaac's estate. Jurisprudence is also replete with cases involving
acrimonious conflicts between brothers and sisters over successional rights. This case is no
exception.
On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero
and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan Hospital in Tondo, Manila.
On May 24, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the
decedent in Branch 95[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where the case was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-20661.
The petition alleged the following: petitioner was named as executrix in the decedent's will and
she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a citizen of the Philippines at the time
of her death; at the time of the execution of the will, the testatrix was 79 years old, of sound and
disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence and was capacitated to
dispose of her estate by will.
Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not
executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not
comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and
petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence.
In an order dated November 9, 1994, the trial court appointed petitioner as special administratrix
of the decedent's estate. Respondent opposed petitioner's appointment but subsequently
withdrew her opposition. Petitioner took her oath as temporary special administratrix and letters
of special administration were issued to her.
On January 17, 2000, after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed a demurrer
thereto alleging that petitioner's evidence failed to establish that the decedent's will complied
with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil Code.
In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article
806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the
testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's, residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City
before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
The dispositive portion of the resolution read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds, and so declares that it cannot admit the
last will and testament of the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura to probate for the reasons
hereinabove discussed and also in accordance with Article 839 [of the Civil Code] which
provides that if the formalities required by law have not been complied with, the will shall be
disallowed. In view thereof, the Court shall henceforth proceed with intestate succession in
regard to the estate of the deceased Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura in accordance with Article
960 of the [Civil Code], to wit: "Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person
dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity, xxx."
[3]
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the resolution of the trial court.[4]
Thus, this petition.[5]
Petitioner admits that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the
testatrix's residence in Quezon City before Atty. Directo and that, at that time, Atty. Directo was
a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. She, however, asserts that the fact that
the notary public was acting outside his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the validity of the
notarial will.
Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary
public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the
Civil Code? It did not.
Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court.
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.[6] This formal
requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. [7] In other words, a
notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental
witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer and declaring it to be his act or deed.[8] In the case of a notarial will, that competent officer
is the notary public.
The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they executed and subscribed to the
will as their own free act or deed.[9] Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury,
thus paving the way for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of
spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. [10] It also provides a
further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in the will. [11]
Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyer duly
commissioned as a notary public.
In this connection, the relevant provisions of the Notarial Law provide:
SECTION 237. Form of commission for notary public. -The appointment of a notary public shall
be in writing, signed by the judge, and substantially in the following form:
GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCE OF ___________
This is to certify that ____________, of the municipality of ________ in said province, was on
the ___ day of __________, anno Domini nineteen hundred and _______, appointed by me a
notary public, within and for the said province, for the term ending on the first day of January,
anno Domini nineteen hundred and _____.
_________________
Judge of the Court of
irst Instance[12] of said
Province
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be
co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be
co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the
limits of his jurisdiction. (emphases supplied)
A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts. [13] It is
issued "within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public's authority is co-
extensive with it. In other words, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including
the taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his
commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any
notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. As this Court
categorically pronounced in Tecson v. Tecson:[14]

An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the officer's jurisdiction is void as if the
person taking it ware wholly without official character. (emphasis supplied)
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the
authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses. In the
same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will before
him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last will and testament was, in effect, not
acknowledged as required by law.

Moreover, Article 5 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and void unless the
law itself declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and prohibitory statutes were
transgressed in the execution of the alleged "acknowledgment." The compulsory language of
Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the
Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo
were all completely void.

The Court cannot turn a blind eye to Atty. Directo's participation in the preparation, execution
and unlawful "acknowledgment" of Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's will. Had he exercised his
notarial commission properly, the intent of the law to effectuate the decedent's final
statements[15] as expressed in her will would not have come to naught.[16] Hence, Atty. Directo
should show cause why he should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the bar
and as an officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation on the possible misconduct of
Atty. Macario O. Directo.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006,[8] we required Atty. Quintana to comment on the letter
of Judge Laquindanum.

JUDGE LILY LYDIA A.C. No. 7036 In his Response,[9] Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial commission before
A. LAQUINDANUM, Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon
Complainant, Present: by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks. He alleged that the reason for Judge Laquindanums
inaction was that she questioned his affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
PUNO, C.J., Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to
QUISUMBING, obtain a Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted to withdraw
YNARES-SANTIAGO, his petition. After he withdrew his petition, he claimed that Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from
CARPIO, her office to ask him to return his petition, but he did not oblige because at that time he already
CORONA, had a Commission for Notary Public[10] issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the
CARPIO MORALES,* Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR., Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge Laquindanum, because the latter
NACHURA, immediately issued notarial commissions to other lawyers without asking for so many
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, requirements. However, when it came to him, Judge Laquindanum even tracked down all his
BRION, pleadings; communicated with his clients; and disseminated information through letters,
PERALTA, and pronouncements, and directives to court clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him and be
BERSAMIN, JJ. ostracized by fellow lawyers.
Promulgated:
ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA, Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at Midsayap, Cotabato; and
Respondent. June 29, 2009 Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. He contended that he did not violate any provision
x------------------------------------------------x of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because he was equipped with a notarial
DECISION commission. He maintained that he did not act outside the province of Cotabato since Midsayap,
Cotabato, where he practices his legal profession and subscribes documents, is part of
PUNO, C.J.: the province of Cotabato. He claimed that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice
his legal profession in the entire Philippines.

This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana) stemmed from a
letter[1] addressed to the Court filed by Executive Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge
Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato requesting that proper
disciplinary action be imposed on him for performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato,
which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial
commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.
In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive
judges are required to closely monitor the activities of notaries public within the territorial bounds
of their jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries public shall not extend notarial functions beyond
the limits of their authority. Hence, she wrote a letter[2] to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop
notarizing documents within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap,
Cotabato (which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his
notarial commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao) since certain
documents[3] notarized by him had been reaching her office.
However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in
Midsayap, Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card[4]executed by
Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License[5] executed by Elenita D.
Ballentes.
Under Sec. 11, Rule III[6] of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana could not extend
his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanaobecause Midsayap,
Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of
the Province of Cotabato. The City within the province of Cotabatois Kidapawan City, and
not Cotabato City.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it was discovered
that it was Atty. Quintanas wife who performed notarial acts whenever he was out of the office
as attested to by the Joint Affidavit[7] executed by Kristine C. Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes.
Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive,
because only Executive Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the
Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in the Province of Cotabato.
In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,[11] we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In the February 28, 2007 Hearing[12] before the OBC presided by Atty. Ma. Crisitina B. Layusa
(Hearing Officer), Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation, [13]which was notarized by
Atty. Quintana in 2004.[14] Honorata Rosil appears as one of the signatories of the document as
the donors wife. However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate
of Death[15] issued by the Civil Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.
Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents in the years
2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his commission as notary public for and in
the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had already expired on December 31, 2005,
and he had not renewed the same.[16] To support her claim, Judge Laquindanum presented the
following: (1) Affidavit of Loss [of] Title[17] executed by Betty G. Granada with subscription dated
April 8, 2006 at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy[18] of Mr. Elias Diosanta Arabis with
subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss [of] Drivers License[19] executed by Anecito
C. Bernabe with subscription dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit
of Loss[20] executed by Santos V. Magbanua with subscription dated February 22, 2007 at
Midsayap, Cotabato.
For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in the documents marked
as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum were his except for the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM
Card[21] executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License[22] executed by
Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3) Affidavit of Loss[23] executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He explained
that those documents were signed by his wife and were the result of an entrapment operation of
Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them notarized by his wife, when they
knew that his wife is not a lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his wife to notarize
documents.According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to stop doing it as it would ruin his
profession.
Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition, because he did
not comply with her requirements for him to transfer his membership to the Kidapawan Chapter,
wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP President.
On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only performing her responsibility
and had nothing against Atty. Quintana. The reason why she did not act on his petition was that
he had not paid his IBP dues,[24] which is a requirement before a notarial commission may be
granted. She told his wife to secure a certification of payment from the IBP, but she did not
return.
This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his Response the
certification of good standing and payments of his IBP dues. However, when the same was
examined, there were no documents attached thereto. Due to oversight, Atty. Quintana prayed
that he be given time to send them later which was granted by the Hearing Officer.
Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and promised not to repeat
the same. He also asked that he be given another chance and not be divested of his privilege to
notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of his family.
On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the documents [25] issued by the IBP
Cotabato City Chapter to prove that he had paid his IBP dues.
In a Manifestation[26] dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum
submitted a Certification[27] and its entries show that Atty. Quintana paid his IBP dues for the
year 2005 only on January 9, 2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381.Likewise, the arrears
of his IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1998 to 2003 were also paid only on
January 9, 2006 per O.R. No. 610387. Hence, when he filed his petition for notarial commission
in 2004, he had not yet completely paid his IBP dues.
In its Report and Recommendation,[28] the OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be
disqualified from being appointed as a notary public for two (2) years; and that if his notarial
commission still exists, the same should be revoked for two (2) years. The OBC found the
defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be without merit, viz:
Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan, Cotabato,
which is already outside his territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary Public.
Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:
Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial
acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period
of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning court is made, unless earlier revoked [or] the notary public has resigned
under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City and the [P]rovince of
Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his commission as notary public in Midsayap
or Kabacan and in any place of the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to
do such act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of
Maguindanao but part of the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of respondent that he
can exercise his notarial commission in Midsayap, Cotabato because Cotabato City is part of
the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of merit.
xxxx
Further, evidence on record also shows that there are several documents which the respondents
wife has herself notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot be blamed for the act of his wife
as he did not authorize the latter to notarize documents in his absence. According to him[,] he
even scolded and told his wife not to do it anymore as it would affect his profession.
In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the Court held,
thus:
A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register; He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to their (sic) secretaries
A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his
notarial register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wifes act and that he did
not authorize his wife to notarize documents. He is personally accountable for the activities in his
office as well as the acts of his personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.
Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent notarized in 2004 a Deed of Donation (Rollo, p.
79) wherein, (sic) Honorata Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants therein, was already dead
at the time of notarization as shown in a Certificate of Death (Rollo, p.80) issued by the Civil
Registrar General of Libungan, Cotabato.
Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document (1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even determining the presence or qualifications
of affiants therein, respondent only shows his gross negligence and ignorance of the provisions
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
xxxx
Furthermore, respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the right to
practice his profession including notarial acts in the entire Philippines. This statement is barren
of merit.
While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law in
the Philippines.(sic) However, not every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial
functions without having been commissioned as notary public as specifically provided for under
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He must have submitted himself to the commissioning court
by filing his petition for issuance of his notarial (sic) Notarial Practice. The commissioning court
may or may not grant the said petition if in his sound discretion the petitioner does not meet the
required qualifications for [a] Notary Public. Since respondent herein did not submit himself to
the procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no reason at all to claim
that he can perform notarial act[s] in the entire country for lack of authority to do so.
Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent, complainant being the commissioning court in
Midsayap, Cotabato has the authority under Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to
monitor the duties and responsibilities including liabilities, if any, of a notary public
commissioned or those performing notarial acts without authority in her territorial jurisdiction. [29]
xxxx
We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six (6) months and revocation and suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial commission
for two (2) years more appropriate considering the gravity and number of his offenses.

After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
committed the following acts: (1) he notarized documents outside the area of his commission as
a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife
notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the
signatories therein was already dead at that time.

The act of notarizing documents outside ones area of commission is not to be taken
lightly. Aside from being a violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also
partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.[30] Notarizing documents with an expired
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly
commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath
proscribes.[31] Notarizing documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a
violation of Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, [32] Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and the lawyers oath which unconditionally requires lawyers not
to do or declare any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the
documents that he admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by
passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.

All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income for his family
will not serve to lessen the penalty that should be imposed on him. On the contrary, we feel that
he should be reminded that a notarial commission should not be treated as a money-making
venture. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with
public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity
thereof.[33]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a
period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with
even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable
this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the
Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice
endorsed to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action. The first letter-
complaint,1 dated March 2, 2009, was filed by the commissioned notaries public within and for
the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie
Pasiliao, Atty. Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-Lingayen) against
Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a commission.
In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial office along
Alvear Street East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing notarial acts and practices in
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite notarial commission. They asserted
that Atty. Siapno was never commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform
notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan
from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial commission, however, was never
renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence supporting their allegations such as
the pictures of Atty. Siapno’s law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to prove that
Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1)
Addendum to Loan and Mortgage Agreement2 showing that the Promissory Note was notarized
before Atty. Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, 3 dated January
24, 2008, notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons
Re: Given Name and Date of Birth,4 dated January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4)
Acknowledgement of Debt,5dated January 24, 2008, notarized in Dagupan City.
Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority to his
secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas (Arenas), who wrote legal
instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.
On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed the same to the OBC.
The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty. Pedro L.
Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his driver’s license and he executed
an affidavit of loss which was notarized by Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied
for authentication when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos
was not commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.
The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain Atty. Evelyn
who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
had been notarizing and signing documents for and on behalf of several lawyers.
In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-
Lingayen to conduct a formal investigation on the complaint against Atty. Siapno and Executive
Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to conduct a formal investigation on the
alleged violation of the Notarial Law by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty.
Evelyn, and thereafter, to submit a report and recommendation thereon.
Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno
With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge conducted a hearing
wherein the complainants affirmed the allegations in their letter-complaint. For his part, Atty.
Siapno denied the accusations and averred that the law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not
his and that Bautista and Arenas were not his secretaries. 10
In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was issued a
notarial commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to
December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His commission, however, was
cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive
Judge found Atty. Siapno to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he
performed notarial functions without commission and recommended that he be fined in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the recommended penalty.
A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed
maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law office of one of the
complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several
instruments with an expired notarial commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in
any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless
earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno
could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of
Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.12 It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno
violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also
Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.13
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing
documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired commission. In the case
of Nunga v. Viray,14 a lawyer was suspended by the Court for three (3) years for notarizing an
instrument without a commission. In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,15 the respondent was likewise
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years and was permanently barred
from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing several documents after the
expiration of his commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v. Quintana,16 the Court
suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was disqualified from being commissioned as notary
public for a period of two (2) years because he notarized documents outside the area of his
commission, and with an expired commission.
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in Ligayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan without the requisite commission, the
Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient. Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred from
being commissioned as notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.

Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn

In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could not have complied
with the June 9, 2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the Court because he was no longer the
Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at that time. To date, no formal investigation has been
conducted on the alleged violation of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a certain
Atty. Evelyn.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court
is ordered to RE-DOCKET the same as separate administrative cases.

The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting capacity, is
ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and
Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of this decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary
Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court
Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be
recorded in the personal files of the respondent.

With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the
Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate administrative cases. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the
matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of a
copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with
the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were LinaM. Garan and the
other above-named complainants. They filed with this Court a Motion to Join the Complaint and
Father RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, A.C. No. 5095 Reply to Respondents Comment. They maintain that Atty. Pascuas omission was not due to
ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG, inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.[1] On November 16, 1999, we granted their
DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. motion.[2]
QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. Present: Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ recommendation.
*
and DENU A. AGATEP, PUNO, C.J. On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly
*
Complainants, QUISUMBING, reproduced as follows:
**
YNARES-SANTIAGO, A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic
CARPIO, requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the
- versus - CORONA, nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person
CARPIO MORALES, executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each
AZCUNA, instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one
TINGA, in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which
CHICO-NAZARIO, the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries (Sec. 246, Article V, Title
VELASCO, JR., IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).
NACHURA, and Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching
Atty. EDWIN PASCUA, REYES, JJ. his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his
Respondent. commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
Promulgated: In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by
Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register.
November 28, 2007 Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his
staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x his notarialregister the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part
as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
DECISION The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints
allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively,
under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore,
For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned
Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a
above-named complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan. member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot
committed as follows: be considered a disinterested witness or party.
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of one Joseph Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was
B. Acorda entering the same as Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, submitted only when Domingos affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative
dated December 10, 1998. case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of one Remigio B. credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another
Domingo entering the same as Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as
dated December 10, 1998. Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that both documents are
dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).
executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the
Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998. sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.
In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or
notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found
his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties.
affidavit was attached to his comment. In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his
Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document without affiants
appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the
signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding
his duties as a notary public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of
Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more
severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the
respondents first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice of
law, after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered
the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended for six
months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months may be considered enough penalty for him as a lawyer.Considering
that his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be
imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial commission of
Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.[3]

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and
conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascuaguilty of misconduct in
the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-
complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[4] The term, however, does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.[5]
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,[6] wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed
of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such
wrongful act constitutes misconduct and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de
Rosales v. Ramos,[7] we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and
suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial Law in not
registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he
notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,[8] however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the
practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubiafor making a false declaration in the
document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense, we believe that the
imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise,
since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be
imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if
still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005]
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, complainants, vs. ATTY.
EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,[1] spouses Benjamin Santuyo
and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and
dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land
covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer and
was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of
1991. Complainant spouses averred that about six years after the date of notarization, they had
a dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land. The case was estafa through
falsification of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by
respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The spouses allegedly
forged his notarial signature on said deed.[2]
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale
contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an impression of
respondents notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the technicalities
surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have forged the signature of
herein respondent. They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register,
and could not have made any imprint of respondents seal or signature on the subject deed of
sale or elsewhere.[3]
In his answer[4] to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied
having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed property. According to respondent, he
once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he was asked to
apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several documents in that
office, these, however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of
office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was only when they
gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions, the
secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on
documents relating to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent added that he normally
required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and made them personally
acknowledge the documents before him as notary public. He would have remembered
complainants had they actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing complainant
Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latters husband and co-complainant only on November 5,
1997, or about six years from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover,
respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed
that it was forged; the strokes were smooth and mild. He suspected that a lady was responsible
for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the
subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He
surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the secretaries,
with the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a
victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In a report[5] it submitted to the Court, the IBP noted that the alleged
forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was different from his signatures in other
documents he submitted during the investigation of the present case. [6] However, it ruled that
respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial
functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register. [7]It thus
recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondents
commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he
should not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof.[8]
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically
state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their
appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the
document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants
themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of
was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to
who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention that he only met
complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the deed of sale.
Respondents assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on
November 17, 2001[9] wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite
respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be
introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent
was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale
concerning another property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should
have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not
have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been
commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for
notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondents signature which
is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had
been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in
having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which
was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody
else.[10]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence
in the performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his
commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he
is disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a period of two years from finality of
this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9385 November 11, 2013
MARIANO AGADAN, EDEN MOLLEJON, ARSENIO IGME, JOSE NUMBAR, CECILIA
LANGAWAN, PABLO PALMA, JOSELITO CLAVERIA, MIGUEL FLORES, and ALBERT
GAYDOWEN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RICHARD BALTAZAR KILAAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On September 12, 2005, complainants Mariano Agadan, Eden Mollejon, Arsenio Igme, Jose
Numbar, Cecilia Langawan, Pablo Palma, Joselito Claveria, Miguel Flores and Albert Gaydowen
filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Baguio Benguet Chapter (IBP-Baguio-
Benguet Chapter) a Complaint1 against respondent Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan (Atty. Kilaan)
for falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. They alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated
certain entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to
operate public utility jeepney filed before the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board – Cordillera Administrative Region (LTFRB-CAR) and docketed as Case No. 2003-CAR-
688 by substituting the name of the applicant from Gary Adasing (Adasing)2 to that of Joseph
Batingwed (Batingwed);3 that Atty. Kilaan submitted false and/or insufficient documentary
requirements in support of Batingwed s application for CPC; that Atty. Kilaan prepared a
Decision based on the Resolution of the LTFRB Central Office which dismissed the Opposition
filed by the complainants; and that the said Decision granted the application of Batingwed which
was adopted by the LTFRB-CAR.
On February 27, 2006, the IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter formally endorsed the Complaint to the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) for appropriate action. 4 Acting on the Complaint, the
IBP-CBD directed Atty. Kilaan to submit his Answer.5
In his Answer6 dated April 8, 2006, Atty. Kilaan denied violating the Lawyer s Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He disclaimed any pat1icipation in the preparation of the Decision
with respect to the application of Batingwed for CPC. He explained that it is the Regional
Director of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)-CAR who approves
the application and who drafts the Decision after the LTFRB-CAR signifies its favorable
recommendation. He denied exercising any influence over the DOTC-CAR or the LTFRB. He
claimed that Batingwed had decided to abandon his application hence he no longer submitted
the necessary requirements therefor. He also disavowed any knowledge that Batingwed s
application had been forwarded to the LTFRB Central Office for approval. Atty. Kilaan claimed
that he knew about the favorable Decision only when Batingwed showed him the same. He
narratted that considering the incomplete documents, the LTFRB mistakenly approved
Batingwed s application. Thus, when it discovered its error, the LTFRB immediately revoked the
grant of CPC to Batingwed.
He denied intercalating the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed. He averred that once
an application has been filed, the application and all accompanying records remain with the
LTFRB and could no longer be retrieved by the applicant or his counsel; as such, it is highly
improbable for him to intercalate the entries therein. Atty. Kilaan further explained that it was
Adasing who paid the filing fee in behalf of Batingwed but the cashier erroneously indicated
Adasing instead of Batingwed as payor. Atty. Kilaan lamented that Adasing who is not in the
Philippines could not corroborate his explanation. Finaliy, Atty. Kilaan noted that complainants
filed the instant suit in retaliation for the dismissal of their Opposition to the application for CPCs
which he filed on behalf of his other clients.
The case was set for mandatory conference7 after which the parties submitted their respective
Position Papers.8 In their Position Paper, complainants further alleged that the Verification in
Batingwed's application for CPC was notarized by Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51,
Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaan's Notarial Registry
submitted to the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court in Baguio City, the said notarial entry
actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of Batingwed's application. Also,
complainants belied Atty. Kilaan's allegation that Adasing is 'presently abroad by presenting the
Affidavit of Adasing claiming that he never left the country.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner9 found complainants to
have miserably failed to prove that Atty. Kilaan intercalated the entries in the application for CPC
of Batingwed. Their allegation was based on mere suspicion devoid of any credible proof, viz:
At the onset, it is very difficult to prove that it was respondent himself who was responsible for
any intercalation, particularly the substitution of Joseph Batingwed's application folder in lieu of
Gary Odasing's. Indeed, that is a grave charge, and based on the evidence presented by
complainants, all that they can muster is a suspicion that cannot be confirmed. Of course, this
has to be pointed out - anyone who had access to the case folder could have possibly been
responsible for whatever intercalation that may have occurred. That being said, this Office is not
prepared to make that leap into conjecture and conclude that it was respondent's doing.
Besides, the Certification of the Receiving Clerk of the DOTC CAR dated 18 October 2006 -
which notably was submitted by complainants -stated that the application of Gary Odasing was
continued by Joseph Batingwed. Complainants have not alleged that the same constitutes a
violation of the rules and procedures of LTFRB. Thus, it may be presumed to have been done in
the regular course of business.10
However, the Investigating Commissioner did not totally absolve Atty. Kilaan as he found him
liable for violating the Notarial Law considering that the Verification of Batingwed's application
which he notarized and denominated as Doc. No. 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of
2003 was actually recorded as a Deed of Sale in his Notarial Register. In addition, the
Investigating Commissioner noted that Atty. Kilaan lied under oath when he alleged that Adasing
was abroad as this was squarely belied by Adasing in his Affidavit. The Investigating
Commissioner held thus:
Respondent must be punished for making it appear that he notarized a document the
Verification-when in truth and in fact, the entry in his Notatial Registry shows a different
document. Thus, it is but proper to suspend respondent s privilege of being commissioned as a
Notary Public.
Not only that. Despite knowing that the Verification was not properly notarized, respondent, as
counsel for the applicant, proceeded to file the defectively verified Petition with the LTFRB-
Baguio City. Clearly, there was falsehood committed by him, as there can be no other
conclusion except that respondent antedated the Verification.
xxxx
Lastly, this cannot end without this being said. Respondent made matters worse by alleging in
his Answer to the instant administrative complaint that Gary Odasing was abroad -which
seemingly was drawn up more out of convenience than for truth. Now, that allegation had been
completely rebuffed and found to be untrue by the execution of an Affidavit by Gary Odasing
himself. x x x It is therefore an affront to this Office that respondent would attempt to defend
himself by pleading allegations, which were seemingly made deliberately, and which were later
found to be untrue. Clearly, respondent tried, albeit vainly, to deceive even this Office. 11
The Investigating Commissioner recommended, viz:
contract, he shall keep a connect copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in
said records a brief description of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a
consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to
the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on
which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

WHEREFORE, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that respondent s notarial

xxx xxx xxx
commission, if still existing, be REVOKED immediately and that he be further PROHIBITED from
being commissioned as a notary public for TWO (2) YEARS.
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
Moreover, it is likewise recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of TWO (2) MONTHS.12 SEC. 249. Grounds fix revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on the part
of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground
for the revocation of his commission:
In its September 19, 2007 Resolution No. XVIII-2007-82, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification that Atty. Kilaan’s Notarial Commission be revoked and that he be disqualified from xxx xxx xxx
being appointed as Notary Public for two years, thereby deleting the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the IBP Board of
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching
Governors in its Resolution No. XX-2012-41 dated January 15, 2012.
his notatial acts in the manner required by law.

After a careful review of the records, we find that Atty. Kilaan committed the following infractions:
xxx xxx xxx
1) violation of the Notarial Law; 2) violation of the Lawyer s Oath; and 3) violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally
accountable for all entries in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of
In his Motion for Reconsideration tiled before the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Kilaan passed
responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to their secretaries, a
on the blame to his secretary for the inaccuracies in the entries in his Notarial Register. He
reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open condemnation. Respondents.
asserted that being a private practitioner, he is burdened with cases thus he delegated to his
especially Calubaquib. a self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner should have known better
secretary the job of recording the documents which he notarized in his Notarial Register. He
than to give us such a simple-minded excuse.
argued that the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification for two years is too
harsh. a penalty considering that he is a first-time offender; he prayed for leniency considering
that his family depended on his income for their collective needs. We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act
but one invested with substantive public interest such that only those who are qualified or
authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily
It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting
entries in his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondent s explanation that he
themselves upon the public the courts and the administrative offices in general.
is burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in
his Notarial Register to his secretary. In tact, this argument has already been rebuffed by this
Court in Lingan v. Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga,13 viz: Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must therefore
observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties.
Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:

In Gemina v. Atty. Madamba,14 we have also ruled that –

SEC. 245. Notarial Register.--Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the
notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall
supply a ce1tified copy of such record, or any part thereof: to any person applying for it and x x x The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entitles and his failure to enter the documents that
paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied) he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot escape
liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not merely his secretary,
should be held accountable for these misdeeds.
xxx xxx xxx

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in
the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on
him, the person executing, swearing to or acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any to
documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after
the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees
which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due
collected by him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a
execution.1âwphi1 Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or
routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for caretl1lness and faithfulness. Notaries
must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take pmt or
allow themselves to be pmt of illegal transactions.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly
commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain
from committing any dereliction or any act which may serve as cause for the revocation of his
commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent s failure to make the proper entry or
entries in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a
principal at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the basis of
personal knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyer s
commission as a notary public.

Indeed, Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to
keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His failure to
make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts is a ground
for revocation of his notarial commission.15 As mentioned, respondent failed to make the proper
entries in his Notarial Register; as such, his notarial commission may be properly revoked.

Aside from violating the Notarial Law, respondent also violated his Lawyer’s Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility by committing falsehood in the pleadings he submitted before the
IBP. His claim that Adasing was abroad hence could not corroborate the explanation made by
Batingwed was proved to be untruthful when complainants submitted the Affidavit of Adasing
insisting that he never left the country. Canon 10,

Rule 10.0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides that a lawyer shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice. In the same vein, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 mandates that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent failed to
observe these Rules and hence must be sanctioned.

Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Kilaan s suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months and the revocation and disqualification of his notarial commission for a period of one (1)
year appropriate.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, if still existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a
period of one (1) year. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with
more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of
the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 4545, February 05, 2014
CARLITO ANG, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 139–B, Section 12(c) of the Rules of Court assailing
Resolution Nos. XVII–2005–1411 and XVIII–2008–6982 of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board of Governors found respondent Atty.
James Joseph Gupana administratively liable and imposed on him the penalty of suspension for
one year from the practice of law and the revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification from reappointment as notary public for two years.
The case stemmed from an affidavit–complaint3 filed by complainant Carlito Ang against
respondent. Ang alleged that on May 31, 1991, he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria
Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo, executed an Extra–judicial
Declaration of Heirs and Partition4 involving Lot No. 2066–B–2–B which had an area of 6,258
square meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT ) No. (T–22409)–6433. He
was given his share of 2,003 square meters designated as Lot No. 2066–B–2–B–4, together
with all the improvements thereon.5 However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he
found out that said TCT No. (T–22409)–6433 had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof,
new TCTs6 had been issued in the names of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia
Diamante, Lolita D. Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct participation
in the commission of forgeries and falsifications because he was the one who prepared and
notarized the Affidavit of Loss7 and Deed of Absolute Sale8 that led to the transfer and issuance
of the new TCTs. Ang pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed
by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria Magpayo’s signature
was forged as clearly shown by the Certification9 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu. Further, the certified true copy of page 37, Book No. XII,
Series of 1989 of respondent’s Notarial Report indubitably showed that Doc. No. 181 did not
refer to the Deed of Absolute Sale, but to an affidavit.10 As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was
allegedly executed by the late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have been
executed by her as she died11 three years prior to the execution of the said affidavit of loss.
Ang further alleged that on September 22, 1995, respondent made himself the attorney–in–fact
of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita Canque, Gregorio Diamante,
Jr. and Fe D. Montero, and pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney in his favor, executed a
Deed of Sale12 selling Lot No. 2066–B–2–B–4 to Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. on October 10,
1995. Ang complained that the sale was made even though a civil case involving the said parcel
of land was pending before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.13
In his Comment,14 respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is merely using the
present administrative complaint as a tool to force the defendants in a pending civil case and
their counsel, herein respondent, to accede to his wishes. Respondent averred that Ang had
filed Civil Case No. Man–2202 before Branch 55 of the Mandaue City RTC. He anchored his
claim on the Extra–judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition and sought to annul the deed of
sale and prayed for reconveyance of the subject parcel of land. During the pre–trial conference
in Civil Case No. Man–2202, Ang admitted that he is not an heir of the late Candelaria Magpayo
but insisted on his claim for a share of the lot because he is allegedly the son of the late Isaias
Ang, the common–law husband of Candelaria Magpayo. Because of his admission, the notice
of lis pendens annotated in the four certificates of title of the land in question were ordered
cancelled and the land effectively became available for disposition. Ang sought reconsideration
of the order, but a compromise was reached that only one TCT (TCT No. 34266) will be
annotated with a notice of lis pendens. Respondent surmised that these developments in Civil
Case No. Man–2202 meant that Ang would lose his case so Ang resorted to the filing of the
present administrative complaint. Thus, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case for
being devoid of any factual or legal basis, or in the alternative, holding resolution of the instant
case in abeyance pending resolution of Civil Case No. Man–2202 allegedly because the issues
in the present administrative case are similar to the issues or subject matters involved in said
civil case.
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, to whom
the case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation, submitted her Report and
Recommendation15finding respondent administratively liable. She recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that respondent
committed an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an instrument in the disposal of the
subject property through a deed of sale executed between him as attorney–in–fact of his client
and Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a
pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. The Investigating Commissioner
additionally found that respondent “delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of their
office before being brought to him for his signature.” This, according to the commissioner, “must
have been the reason for the forged signatures of the parties in the questioned document…as
well as the erroneous entry in his notarial register….”16 Nonetheless, the Investigating
Commissioner merely reminded respondent to be more cautious in the performance of his duties
as regards his infraction of his notarial duties. She held,
Respondent should have been more cautious in his duty as notary public which requires that the
party subscribing to the authenticity of the document should personally appear and sign the
same before respondent’s actual presence. As such notary public respondent should not
delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the bar in accordance with Rule 9.0117 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On November 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVII–2005–
141,19adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modifying the recommended
penalty. Instead of suspension for three months, the Board recommended the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one year and revocation of respondent’s notarial
commission and disqualification from reappointment as notary public for two years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,20 arguing that it was neither illegal nor unethical
for a lawyer to accept appointment as attorney–in–fact of a client to sell a property involved in a
pending litigation and to act as such. He further contended that granting that his act was
unethical, the modified penalty was evidently too harsh and extremely excessive considering
that the act complained of was not unlawful and done without malice.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVIII–2008–
69821 denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII–2005–
141. Hence, this petition for review.
Respondent reiterates that being commissioned by his own clients to sell a portion of a parcel of
land, part of which is involved in litigation, is not per se illegal or unethical. According to him, his
clients got his help to sell part of the land and because they were residing in different provinces,
they executed a Special Power of Attorney in his favor.22
We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent administratively
liable.
After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that respondent did not act unethically
when he sold the property in dispute as the sellers’ attorney–in–fact because there was no more
notice of lis pendens annotated on the particular lot sold. Likewise, the Court finds no sufficient
evidence to show that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17,
1989 was antedated.
However, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties
when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the
Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29, 1994. Section 1 of Public Act
No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 1. x x x
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the
act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not,
his certificate shall so state.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public
or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. 23 In the
case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit
before respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead
since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law.
Indeed, respondent averred in his position paper before the IBP that he did not in fact know
Candelaria personally before, during and after the notarization24 thus admitting that Candelaria
was not present when he notarized the documents.
Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or
routine.25 Thus, in Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos,26 the Court emphasized the significance of the act of
notarization, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act
and deed.
A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers
and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. 27 It devolves
upon respondent to act with due care and diligence in stamping fiat on the questioned
documents. Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted in undermining
the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Hence, he should be
liable for his infraction, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred
duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with
public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or juratis sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion.28 As the Court has held in Flores v. Chua,29
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder
by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession…. (Emphasis supplied.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.” Respondent averred in his position paper that it had been his consistent practice to
course through clerical staff documents to be notarized. Upon referral, said clerical staff
investigates whether the documents are complete as to the fundamental requirements and
inquires as to the identity of the individual signatories thereto. If everything is in order, they ask
the parties to sign the documents and forward them to him and he again inquires about the
identities of the parties before affixing his notarial signature. 30 It is also his clerical staff who
records entries in his notarial report. As aforesaid, respondent is mandated to observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties as a notary and to ascertain
that the persons who signed the documents are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. In
merely relying on his clerical staff to determine the completeness of documents brought to him
for notarization, limiting his participation in the notarization process to simply inquiring about the
identities of the persons appearing before him, and in notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead
person, respondent is liable for misconduct. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in
order.31
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana is found administratively liable for
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. Further, his notarial
commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for
a period of two years, with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be
attached to the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION 8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and Carmelita
Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;
A.C. No. 8103 December 3, 2014
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona Limcumpao,
notarized on March 27, 2008;
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL,
BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,
vs. 10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and Libertad
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent. Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;

DECISION 11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco and
Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized March 18, 2008;
MENDOZA, J.:
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar and Mila
Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution1 or the IBP Board of Governors
which reads:
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and Sps.
Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March 18, 2008;
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner xxx and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws 14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago, notarized on
and rules and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial April 1, 2008;
duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED. Further,
he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development
Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated June 11, 2008,
submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano, Luzviminda
Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional
Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;
Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of
18 documents at the time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The
notarized documents were as follows: 17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married to
Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C.
Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008; 18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan and
Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March 14, 2008.
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy Margaret
L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008; These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who
had information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the
Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married to
caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see
Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;
respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the
documents cameout of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17, 2008; Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on
March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the letter.3
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa
Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter endorsed the
same to the IBP National Office for appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the wife and
on Bar Discipline (CBD).
sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;

When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia Francisco
the complaint, the latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11,
and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;
2008 Letter was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather "a report on, and endorsement
of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the country," 4 and that any advice on
how to consider or treat the documents concerned would be welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for appropriate action.5
This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of Atty.
Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008, and require respondent to comment on the said letter.
In his comment,7 dated 27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he was not aware that those
were documents notarized using his name while he was out of the country. Upon his own
inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his
knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the
import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred
that he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. When
the case was called for mandatory conference on September 16, 2009, only respondent
appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a manifestation reiterating his original position and requesting that
his attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. Only respondent submitted a position paper,9 to
which he added that for 21 years that he had been practicing law, he acted as a notary public
without any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and notarial
practice.
The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III)as
Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was
not verified, that most of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the
comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that
respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in
most of the attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office
secretary.He admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was
abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of
the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing an
office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially pertaining
to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the standard
required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his
office secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of respondent’s
commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of
two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its
Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of the IBP. He contended
that by admitting and owning up to what had happened, but without any wrongful intention, he
should be merited with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed simple negligence
which did not warrant such harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of
respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason
to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a
mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby
affirmed.13
On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by the secretary
of respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were
notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This
clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his
secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers
to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s
secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public.
Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not
authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his office
open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register
within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to notarize
documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this
Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that
respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him
could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned
as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register.14 He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21 years
that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish and this was his
first and only infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on guard and could
have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents
were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act
towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of notarial
commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is
appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary
public not only damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined
the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be
held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. 15Where the
notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his
solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his
secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice
law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in
charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his
office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted
therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead,
they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any
force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.

Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant

responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued
with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.17

It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, notaries pub! ic must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of pub! ic
instruments would be undermined.18

Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not take
lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the balance.

WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with
MODIFICATION.1âwphi1Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary
public, the Court REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the
repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10783, October 14, 2015
ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A.
BASILIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stems from a complaint1 filed by complainant Atty. Benigno T.
Bartolome (Bartolome) on May 19, 2009 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio (Basilio) for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice2 (Notarial Rules).chanrobleslaw
The Facts
In the complaint, Bartolome alleged that Basilio, a notary public in Tarlac City, notarized a
document entitled "Joint Affidavit of Non-Tenancy and Aggregate Landholdings"3 (Joint Affidavit)
purportedly subscribed and sworn to before him by Loreto M. Tañedo (Tanedo) and Ramon T.
Lim on January 15, 2006, and supposedly recorded as Doc. No. 375, Page No. 75, Book No. X,
Series of 2007 in his notarial register,4 despite the fact that Tañedo had already passed away as
early as December 1, 2003.5
In his Answer/Comment6 dated June 24, 2009, Basilio admitted having notarized the Joint
Affidavit but claimed that, prior to the notarization, he verified the identities of the persons who
appeared before him through their respective Social Security System (SSS) identification cards
and driver's licenses. He further denied any knowledge that the one who appeared before him
misrepresented himself as Tañedo and that the latter was already dead as of December 1,
2003.7
During the clarificatory hearing, Basilio, who undisputedly notarized the Joint Affidavit, admitted
his failure to: (a) record the subject document in his notarial book; (b) submit a copy of the same
to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City (RTC); and (c) have the notarization revoked or
recalled.8
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated June 10, 2010 submitted by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Randall C. Tabayoyong (Investigating Commissioner), Basilio was found to have
manifested gross negligence and a complete disregard of the Notarial Rules. The Investigating
Commissioner pointed out that contrary to Section 8, in relation to Section 6, Rule II of the
Notarial Rules, Basilio failed to indicate in the Joint Affidavit the details of the SSS identification
card and driver's license which were allegedly shown as competent evidence of identity of the
persons who appeared before him. Thus, his claim that he verified the identities of the persons
who subscribed the Joint Affidavit could not be given credence. Basilio also failed to record in his
notarial register his notarial act on the Joint Affidavit in violation of Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the
Notarial Rules. Lastly, the Investigating Commissioner found that Basilio failed to submit a copy
of the Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC, contrary to Section 2 (h), Rule VI of the
Notarial Rules.10 Accordingly, he recommended that Basilio's notarial commission, if still existing,
be revoked; he be disqualified from obtaining a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year
and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. 11
In a Resolution12 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation. Dissatisfied, Basilio filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution13 dated September 27,
2014.chanrobleslaw
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly found Basilio liable
for violation of the Notarial Rules.chanrobleslaw
The Court's Ruling
The act of notarization is impressed with public interest.14 As such, a notary public must observe
the highest degree of care in complying with the basic requirements in the performance of his
duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system. 15
In the present case, Basilio, as duly found by the IBP, failed to faithfully comply with his duties as
a notary public.
Section 5 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules clearly states that:
SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. — A notary public shall not:
xxxx
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete. (Emphases
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A notarial certificate, as defined in Section 8, Rule II of the Notarial Rules, requires a statement
of the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular notarization, viz.:
SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. — "Notarial Certificate" refers to the part of, or attachment to, a
notarized instrument or document that is completed by the notary public, bears the notary's
signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular
notarization as provided for by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, a jurat is, among others, an attestation that the person who presented the instrument
or document to be notarized is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by the Notarial Rules:16
SEC. 6. Jurat. — "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;cralawlawlibrary
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;cralawlawlibrary
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
(Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the records bear out, Basilio affixed his official signature and seal on the notarial certificate of
the Joint Affidavit without properly identifying the person/s who signed the same. His claim that
he verified the identities of the affiants through their respective SSS identification cards and
driver's licenses cannot be given any credence considering the ostensible lack of their details on
the face of the certificate. Neither was he able to provide the fact of identification in any way. On
the other hand, it has been established that one of the named signatories to the Joint Affidavit
was already dead when he notarized the aforesaid document. Hence, it is sufficiently clear that
Basilio had indeed affixed his official signature and seal on an incomplete, if not false, notarial
certificate.
Moreover, by the same account, Basilio violated Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules
which prohibits the notarization of a document if the person involved is not personally known to
the notary public or has not identified himself through competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - x x x
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis
supplied)
To add, Basilio himself admitted that he failed to record his notarial act on the Joint Affidavit in
his notarial register, contrary to Section 2 (a), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, which states:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. — (a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record
in the notarial register at the time of notarization the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) the entry number and page number;cralawlawlibrary
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;cralawlawlibrary
(3) the type of notarial act;cralawlawlibrary
(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;cralawlawlibrary
(5) the name and address of each principal;cralawlawlibrary
(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the signatory is not
personally known to the notary;
(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's
identity;cralawlawlibrary
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;cralawlawlibrary
(9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of work
or business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or
relevance.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x x (Emphases supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Since the notarial register is a record of the notary public's official acts, he is charged with
recording therein the necessary information regarding the document or instrument notarized. If
the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records, doubt as to its nature arises
so that the alleged notarized document cannot be considered a public document. 17 Considering
the evidentiary value given to the notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record
the document in his notarial register is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document
was notarized when, in fact, it was not,18 as in this case.
It should be clarified, however, that while Basilio had also failed to submit a copy of the Joint
Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC, and to retain a copy thereof for his own records, the
requirement therefor, as stated under Section 2 (h),19 Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, applies only
to instruments acknowledged before the notary public. Documents like the Joint Affidavit which
contain a jurat and not an acknowledgment are not required to be forwarded to the Clerk of
Court. Hence, there should be no administrative infraction on this score. Nevertheless, Basilio's
afore-discussed violations of the Notarial Rules are grave enough to warrant sanctions from the
Court.
A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. 20 Notaries must inform
themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow
themselves to be part of illegal transactions.21 In line with this mandate, a notary public should
not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very person who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are
stated therein.22 By failing in this regard, the notary public permits a falsehood which does not
only transgress the Notarial Rules but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct."23 Verily, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face; and it is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the
integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
As herein discussed, Basilio's failure to properly perform his duty as a notary public resulted not
only in damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also in undermining the
integrity of the office of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. In fine, he
should be meted out with the modified penalty of disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public for a period of two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year. Although there is no showing that Basilio prepared the document in question, his utter
disregard of the Notarial Rules as exhibited during the proceedings before the IBP, together with
his admitted failure to revoke or recall his notarization despite his knowledge of its irregularity,
warrants the same treatment as the errant lawyer in Agbulos v. Viray:24
[T]he Court finds the need to increase that recommended by the IBP which is one month
suspension as a lawyer and six months suspension as notary public, considering that
respondent himself prepared the document, and he performed the notarial act without the
personal appearance of the affiant and without identifying her with competent evidence of her
identity. With his indiscretion, he allowed the use of a CTC by someone who did not own it.
Worse, he allowed himself to be an instrument of fraud. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a
lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is meted the
penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned
as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for
one year.25 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY of violating the
2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one
(1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him
from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 FIRST DIVISION
February 6, 2017
A.C. No. 11165
ORLANDO S. CASTELO, ELENA C. CAMA, OSWALDO CASTELO, JOCELYN LLANILLO,
AND BENJAMIN CASTELO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD SEGUNDINO C. CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
A notarized document is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Thus, a notary public should
observe utmost care in performing his duties to preserve public confidence in the integrity of
notarized documents.1
The salient facts, as borne by the records, are:
Sometime in late 2013, Complainants Orlando S. Castelo, Elena C. Cama, Oswaldo Castelo,
Jocelyn Llanillo, and Benjamin Castelo (Castelo heirs) received summons from the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 22, Manila (MeTC) for an ejectment case2 filed against them by Leonida
Delen and Spouses Nestor Delen and Julibel Delen (the Delens), who alleged that they were the
owners of the house and lot located at 2511 A. Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila (subject property).
The subject property was then the residence of the Castelo heirs, 3 and was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 291223 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Manila (RD) in the
name of the Delens.4
Upon verifying the authenticity of TCT No. 291223 with the RD, the Castelo heirs discovered that
the previous title covering the subject property, TCT No. 240995, which was in the name of the
Castelo heirs' parents, Spouses Benjamin Castelo and Perzidia5 S. Castelo (Spouses Castelo),
had been cancelled6 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24, 2010 (Deed).7 The
Deed was purportedly executed by the Spouses Castelo and the Delens, and was notarized by
Respondent Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching (Atty. Ching), despite the fact that Perzidia S.
Castelo died on May 4, 2009,8 as shown in her Death Certificate.9 The Castelo heirs also
learned that the acknowledgment page of the Deed showed that only community tax certificates
had been presented to Atty. Ching, and not valid government-issued identification cards as
required by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. 10
With this discovery, the Castelo heirs filed on June 2, 2014 with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) this administrative case against Atty. Ching based on the latter's gross
negligence in notarizing the Deed. 11
Atty. Ching, for his part, denied having notarized the Deed. He countered that he did not know
the Spouses Castelo and the Delens, and that the Deed presented by the Castelo heirs had
been falsified. Atty. Ching continued that his purported signature in the Deed was forged. 12 To
prove the alleged forgery, Atty. Ching presented specimens of his signatures that he used in
signing pleadings and notarizing documents. 13
At the scheduled mandatory conference on September 1, 2014, 14 the Castelo heirs and Atty.
Ching were present. 15The Castelo heirs moved for the issuance of an Ex-Parte Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum 16 to Atty. Jennifer H. Dela Cruz-
Buendia, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, or
any of her duly authorized records officers, to appear at the next scheduled mandatory
conference with Books No. 16 and 17, Series of 2010 of the Notarial Register (Atty. Ching's
notarial books), which allegedly contained the original copy of the Deed. The IBP issued the
subpoena, 17 and the mandatory conference was reset to November 13, 2014. 18
In the November 13, 2014 resetting of the mandatory conference which was the last, 19 Atty.
Ching's notarial books were presented.20 However, Atty. Ching failed to attend the said
conference and refute the authenticity of the Deed.Upon verification, the IBP concluded that the
copy of the Deed presented by the Castelo heirs in their Complaint was indeed a faithful
machine copy of the original contained in Atty. Ching's notarial books. 21 Thereafter, the Castelo
heirs submitted their position paper.22 Atty. Ching, however, failed to submit his.
After due proceedings, Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles (Commissioner Robles) rendered a
Report and Recommendation23 on December 3, 2014, finding that Atty. Ching was grossly
negligent in notarizing the Deed.24The dispositive portion reads:
UPON THE FOREGOING, considering the seriousness of the consequences of respondent's
gross negligence, it is recommended that respondent's notarial commission be cancelled
25
immediately, and that he be disqualified from ever being commissioned again as notary public.
In its Resolution26 dated February 21, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve with modification the said Report and Recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", for gross negligence in
Respondent's notarial service. Hence, Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching's notarial commission if
presently commissioned is immediately REVOKED. Further, he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as Notary Public and SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months.27
After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the Court has no
compelling reason to diverge from the factual findings of Commissioner Robles and the
recommended penalty of the IBP Board of Governors.
Gross negligence on the part of a notary public encompasses the failure to observe any of the
requirements of a notarial act under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which would result in
putting the rights of a person to his liberty or property in jeopardy. This includes, among others,
failing to require the presence of the signatories to a notarial instrument and ascertaining their
identities through competent evidence thereof, 28 and allowing, knowingly or unknowingly,
people, other than the notary public himself, to sign notarial documents, affix the notarial seal
therein, and make entries in the notarial register.29
In Spouses Santuyo v. Hidalgo, 30the Court ruled that Atty. Hidalgo was grossly negligent not
only in the supposed notarization of a deed of sale of a parcel of land purchased by the Spouses
Santuyo, but also in allowing his office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial
registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone. This resulted in an ownership
dispute between the Spouses Santuyo and a certain Danilo German which led to the filing of a
case of estafa through falsification of a public document against the Spouses Santuyo, thus:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically state
that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale notarized.1avvphi1 Their
appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the
document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants
themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of
was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to
who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent's contention that he only met complainant
Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the deed of sale. Respondent's
assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on November 17,
2001 wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house
on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other.
The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the
latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another
property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxxx
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should
have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not
have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been
commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for
notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondent's signature
which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter
as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in
having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which
was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody
else.31
In this case, Commissioner Robles observed that while Atty. Ching denied having notarized the
Deed32 by showing the discrepancy between his purported signature therein33 and the specimen
signatures34 he submitted in his Answer, he miserably failed to explain how the Deed ended up
in his notarial books. Commissioner Robles concluded that while it would not be fair to conclude
that Atty. Ching actually signed the Deed, he was nonetheless grossly negligent for failing to
give a satisfactory reason why a supposedly forged Deed was duly recorded in his notarial
books. 35
The Court completely agrees with Commissioner Robles' observation. While there may be
reasons to give Atty. Ching the benefit of the doubt as to who signed the Deed, the Court does
not and cannot lose sight of the fact that Atty. Ching still failed in ensuring that only documents
which he had personally signed and sealed with his notarial seal, after satisfying himself with the
completeness of the same and the identities of the parties who affixed their signatures therein,
would be included in his notarial register. This also means that Atty. Ching failed to properly
store and secure his notarial equipment in order to prevent other people from notarizing
documents by forging his signature and affixing his notarial seal, and recording such documents
in his notarial books, without his knowledge and consent. This is gross negligence.
Such gross negligence on the part of Atty. Ching in letting another person notarize the Deed had
also unduly put the Castelo heirs in jeopardy of losing their property. To make matters worse,
the real property subject of the Deed was the residence, nay, the family home of the Castelo
heirs, a property that their parents had worked hard for in order to provide them and their
children a decent shelter and the primary place where they could bond together as a family - a
property which had already acquired sentimental value on the part of the Castelo heirs, which no
amount of money could ever match. One can just imagine the pain and anguish of losing a home
to unscrupulous people who were able to transfer title to such property and file a case in court in
order to eject them - all because of the negligence of a notary public in keeping his notarial
books and instruments from falling into the wrong hands.
This is not to say, however, that the Court has ruled on whether or not the Deed in this case was
indeed forged.1âwphi1Such issue is civil, and perhaps criminal, in nature which should be
passed upon in a proper case, and not in an administrative or disciplinary proceeding such as
this case. 36
As for the penalty to be imposed, and taking into account the possible undue deprivation of
property on the part of the Castelo heirs as a result of Atty. Ching's gross negligence, the Court
agrees with, and hereby adopts, the recommended penalty of the IBP.
As a final note, this case should serve as a reminder for notaries public, as well as for lawyers
who are applying for a commission, that the duty to public service and to the administration of
public justice is the primary consideration in the practice of law.37 This duty to public service is
made more important when a lawyer is commissioned as a notary public. Like the duty to defend
a client's cause within the bounds of law, a notary public has the additional duty to preserve
public trust and confidence in his office38 by observing extra care and diligence in ensuring the
integrity of every document that comes under his notarial seal, and seeing to it that only
documents that he personally inspected and whose signatories he personally identified are
recorded in his notarial books. In addition, notaries public should properly secure the equipment
they use in performing notarial acts, in order for them not to fall into the wrong hands, and be
used in acts that would undermine the public's trust and confidence in the office of the notary
public.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching is found GUILTY of gross negligence in the
performance of his duties as notary public. His existing notarial commission, if any, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is also PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned
as a notary public. Moreover, he is hereby SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR
SIX (6) MONTHS. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
Atty. Ching is also DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision to
determine the reckoning point of the effectivity of his suspension.
Let a copy of this Decision be made part of Atty. Ching's records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and copies be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 11346, March 08, 2017
DR. BASILIO MALVAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. CORA JANE P. BALEROS, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment1 filed on June 30, 2014 by Dr. Basilio Malvar
(complainant) against Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros (respondent) for acts amounting to grave
misconduct consisting of falsification of public document, violation of Administrative Matter No.
02-8-13-SC or the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules) and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Antecedent Facts
The complainant is the owner of a parcel of land located,in Barangay Pagudpud, San Fernando
City, La Union.2 On January 7, 2011, the complainant executed a Deed of Absolute Sale3 in
favor of Leah Mallari (Mallari) over the said lot for the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00). This transaction was acknowledged by the children of the complainant through a
document denominated as Confirmation of Sale.4
The process of conveying the title of the lot in the name of Mallari spawned the legal tussle
between the parties. According to the complainant, an agreement was made between him and
Mallari wherein he undertook to facilitate the steps in order to have the title of the lot transferred
under Mallari's name.5However, without his knowledge and consent, Mallari who was not able to
withstand the delay in the delivery of the title of the land sold to her allegedly filed an Application
for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land6 as a preliminary step for the segregation and
titling of the same before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), San Fernando City, La Union using
the complainant's name and signing the said application.7 A civil case for collection of sum of
money was instituted by Mallari before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Aringay, La Union
seeking reimbursement tor the expenses she incurred by reason of the transfer and titling of the
property she purchased.8 A compromise agreement9 was forged between the parties which
failed because two out of the four checks issued by the complainant were unfunded. 10 This
prompted Mallari to file a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise
known as The Bouncing Checks Law, against the complainant before the MTC of Aringay, La
Union.11
Ultimately, a criminal case for falsification of public document against Mallari was filed before the
Office of the Prosecutor and now pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 1.12 The complainant alleged that it was through the
conspiracy of Mallari and the respondent that the crime charged was consummated. 13
Notwithstanding the Office of the Prosecutor's determination that the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish conspiracy between Mallari and the respondent, thereby dropping the
latter's name from the indictment, the complainant remained unfazed and thus, initiated the
present petition for disbarment seeking the imposition of disciplinary sanction against the
respondent.14 The complainant claimed that the respondent, by notarizing the assailed
Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land, made it appear that he executed
the same when the truth of the matter was he never went to the office of the respondent for he
was in Manila at the time of the alleged notarization and was busy performing his duties as a
doctor.15
On August 19, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference16 requiring both parties to appear
before it on November 18, 2014. However, the scheduled mandatory conference was reset to
December 2, 201417 here the complainant personally appeared while the respondent was
represented by her attorney-in-fact and counsel.18
The complainant buttressed in his position paper that the respondent consummated the crime of
falsification of public document as delineated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and
thus, the presumption of regularity in the notarization of the contested document has been
overthrown and cannot work in her favor.19 He recapped that he never appeared before the
respondent to have the subject document notarized.20 The complainant stressed that the
respondent made a mockery of the Notarial Rules by notarizing the Application for Certification
of Alienable and Disposable Land in his absence.
In her Position Paper,21 the respondent refuted the allegations against her by narrating that
Benny Telles, the complainant and his sons came to her office to have the subject document
notarized and that she is certain as to the identity of the complainant. 22 Moreover, she argued
that the charges filed against her were all part of the complainant's scheme to avoid his
obligations to Mallari as the buyer of his lot.23
Ruling of the IBP
On June 15, 2015, Commissioner Maria Angela Esquivel (Commissioner Esquivel) found that
the respondent was negligent in the performance of her duties as a notary public and violated
the Notarial Rules, thereby recommending disciplinary imposition against her. The pertinent
portion of the Report and Recommendation24 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's
commission as a notary public be revoked; that she be disqualified for being a notary public for
two (2) years with a stem warning that a repetition of similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.25
In a Resolution26 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
Commissioner Esquivel's report and recommendation with modification, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", for failure of Respondent to
observe due diligence in the performance of her duties and obligations as a Notary Public
specifically Rule VI, Section 2 of the Notarial Law. Thus, [the respondent's] notarial commission,
if presently commissioned, is immediately REVOKED. Furthermore, [she] is DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as a Notary Public for two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months.27 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
The Issues
Whether administrative liability should attach to the respondent by reason of the following acts
alleged to have been committed by her:
1. Falsification of the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land;
2. Notarization of the aforesaid document in the absence of the complainant; and
3. Double Entries in the Notarial Registry.
Ruling of the Court
After a close scrutiny of the facts of the case, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate
from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
With regard to the imputation of falsification of public document, the Court shall not inquire into
the merits of the said criminal case pending adjudication before the MTCC and make a ruling on
the matter. Commissioner Esquivel correctly declined to resolve the falsification case pending
resolution before the regular court to which jurisdiction properly pertains. Though disbarment
proceedings are sui generis as they belong to a class of their own and are distinct from that of
civil or criminal actions, it is judicious for an administrative body like IBP-CBD not to pre-empt
the course of action of the regular courts in order to avert contradictory findings. 28
The Court concurs with the conclusion of Commissioner Esquivel that the respondent violated
several provisions of the Notarial Rules. The complainant insists that the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land was notarized sans his presence. An affidavit
requiring a jurat which the respondent admittedly signed and notarized on August 18, 2010
forms part of the subject document. The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary
certifies that the instrument is sworn to before her, thus, making the notarial certification
essential.29 The unsubstantiated claim of the respondent that the complainant appeared before
her and signed the contested document in her presence cannot prevail over the evidence
supplied by the complainant pointing that it was highly improbable if not impossible for him to
appear before the respondent on the date so alleged that the subject document was notarized.
The complainant furnished in his Sworn Judicial Affidavit submitted before the court patients'
record cards showing that he attended to a number of them on August 18, 2010 in De Los
Santos Medical Center, E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.30
A jurat as sketched in jurisprudence lays emphasis on the paramount requirements of the
physical presence of the affiant as well as his act of signing the document before the notary
public.31 The respondent indeed transgressed Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Notarial Rules by
affixing her official signature and seal on the notarial certificate of the affidavit contained in the
Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land in the absence of the complainant
and for failing to ascertain the identity of the affiant. The thrust of the said provision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Prohibitions.
xxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
or document -
(1)
is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2)
is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The physical presence of the affiant ensures the proper execution of the duty of the notary public
under the law to determine whether the former's signature was voluntarily affixed. 32 Aside from
forbidding notarization without the personal presence of the affiant, the Notarial Rules demands
the submission of competent evidence of identity such as an identification card with photograph
and signature which requirement can be dispensed with provided that the notary public
personally knows the affiant. Competent evidence of identity under Section 12 of Rule II of the
Notarial Rules is defined as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to
the identification of an individual based on:
a)
at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph
and signature of the individual; or
b)
the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.
Granting that the complainant was present before the notary public at the time of the notarization
of the contested document on August 18, 2010, the respondent remained unjustified in not
requiring him to show a competent proof of his identification. She could have escaped
administrative liability on this score if she was able to demonstrate that she personally knows the
complainant. On the basis of the very definition of a jurat under Section 6 of Rule II of the
Notarial Rules, case law echoes that the non-presentation of the affiant's competent proof of
identification is permitted if the notary public personally knows the former.33 A 'jurat' refers to an
act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public
and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before
the notary public as to such instrument or document. 34
Further, the respondent displayed lack of diligence by the non observance of the obligations
imposed upon her under Section 2 of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register.
(a) For every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of
notarization the following:
(1)
the entry number and page number;
(2)
the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3)
the type of notarial act;
(4)
the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;
(5)
the name and address of each principal;
(6)
the competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules if the signatory is not personally
known to the notary;
(7)
the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8)
the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9)
the address where the notarization was performed if not in the notary's regular place of
business; and
(10)
any other circumstance the notary public may deem of significance or relevance.
xxx
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall
also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
x x x (Emphasis ours)
The same notarial details were assigned by the respondent to two distinct documents. In an
order of the MTCC where the criminal case for falsification of document was pending, Clerk of
Court Atty. Raquel Estigoy-Andres (Atty. Estigoy-Andres) was directed to transmit the original
document of the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land which was
notarized by the respondent.35 A similar order was issued by the MTCC requiring the DENR for
the production of the impugned document.36 The DENR issued a certification that despite
diligent efforts they could not locate the said document but which they were certain was received
by their office.37 Meanwhile, upon Atty. Estigoy-Andres' certification,38 it was discovered that as
per the respondent's notarial register submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Document No.
288, Page No. 59, Book No. LXXIII, Series of 2010 does not pertain to the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but to a notarized document denominated as
Joint Affidavit of Adjoining Owners39 executed by Ricardo Sibayan and Cecilia Flores.
Undoubtedly, the document entitled Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable
Land nowhere appears in the respondent's notarial register. The respondent further exposed
herself to administrative culpability when she regretfully offered plain oversight as an excuse for
the non-inclusion of the challenged document in her notarial register and by stating that it is her
office staff who usually fills it up.
To reiterate, the respondent admitted having signed and notarized the Application for
Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but based from the foregoing, she indubitably
failed to record the assailed document in her notarial book. It is axiomatic that notarization is not
an empty, meaningless or routinary act. It is through the act of notarization that a private
document is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of
preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution.40 "If the document or instrument does not
appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the
document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot
bolster any claim made based on this document."41 The respondent's delegation of her notarial
function of recording entries in her notarial register to her staff is a clear contravention of the
explicit provision of the Notarial Rules dictating that such duty be fulfilled by her and not
somebody else. This likewise violates Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the CPR which provides
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
In addition to the above charges, Commissioner Esquivel noted that the respondent failed to
retain an original copy in her records and to submit the duplicate copy of the document to the
Clerk of Court. However, in a previous case, the Court ruled that the requirement stated under
Section 2(h) of Rule VI of the Notarial Rules applies only to an instrument acknowledged before
the notary public and not to the present document which contains a jurat.42 "A jurat is a distinct
creature from an acknowledgment."43 It is that part of an affidavit in which the notary certifies that
before him or her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor; while an
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.44 Hence, no liability can be ascribed to the
respondent relative to such ground.
In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers who were remiss in their duties as
notaries public to disciplinary sanction. Failure to enter the notarial acts in one's notarial register,
notarizing a document without the personal presence of the affiants and the failure to properly
identify the person who signed the questioned document constitute dereliction of a notary
public's duties which warrants the revocation of a lawyer's commission as a notary
public.47 Upholding the role of notaries public in deterring illegal or immoral arrangements, the
Court in the case of Dizon v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.48 prohibited the respondent for a period of two
(2) years from being commissioned as a notary public for notanzmg a compromise agreement
without the presence of all the parties. In the case of Atty. Benigno T. Bartolome v. Atty.
Christopher A. Basilio,49 which factual milieu is similar to the present case, the Court meted out
against therein respondent the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification
for two (2) years from being appointed as a notary public and suspension for six (6) months from
the practice of law due to various infringement of the Notarial Rules such as failure to record a
notarized document in his notarial register and notarizing a document without the physical
presence of the affiant.
Following jurisprudential precedents and as a reminder to notaries public that their solemn duties
which are imbued with public interest are not to be taken lightly, the Court deems it proper to
revoke the notarial register of the respondent if still existing and to disqualify her from
appointment as a notary public for two (2) years. She is also suspended from the practice of law
for six (6) months. Contrary to the complainant's proposition to have the respondent disbarred,
the Court is of the belief that her acts do not merit such a grave penalty and the sanctions so
imposed suffice. The Court held in an array of cases that "removal from the Bar should not really
be decreed when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would
accomplish the end desired."50
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cora Jane P. Baleros is GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath. Her notarial
commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and she is hereby DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years. She is likewise SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately. Further, she is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

The Court finds unacceptable the respondent's defiance of the Notarial Rules. Under the
circumstances, the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary public who failed to
discharge her duties as such but also as a lawyer who exhibited utter disregard to the integrity
and dignity owing to the legal profession. The acts committed by the respondent go beyond
being mere lapses in the fulfilment of her duties under the Notarial Rules, they comprehend a
parallel breach of the CPR particularly Canon 9, Rule 9.01, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which provides
that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" and the
Lawyer's Oath which amplifies the undertaking to do no falsehood and adhere to laws and the
legal system being one of their primordial tasks as officers of the court. Given the evidentiary
value accorded to notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in
her notarial register corresponds to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized
when, in fact, it was not.45 It cannot be overemphasized that notaries public are urged to observe
with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of their duties;
otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined. 46
 THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3441. August 11, 2005]
JUDGE GERVACIO A. LOPENA, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO P. CABATOS, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos (respondent) was administratively charged [1] by Judge Gervacio
A. Lopena (complainant) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tagbilaran-Clarin, Bohol
of SERIOUS BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS and GRAVE MISCONDUCT allegedly
committed as follows:
1) Respondent knowingly falsified a Deed of Donation[2] purportedly executed by one
Crispina Panis by notarizing the same on June 24, 1981 when the donor had died on January
15, 1981, and
2) Respondent showed a grave disrespect to the courts and the administration of justice
by holding, together with his followers, a parade/rally on September 21, 1984 around the
principal streets of Tagbilaran City, directed against complainant who had convicted respondents
close relatives in three criminal cases and denied the applications for probation of two of the
convicts.
Acting on this Courts Resolution of February 14, 1990,[3] respondent submitted his
COMMENT, by letter of April 19, 1990,[4] claiming that he had been away from his place of birth,
Panaytayon, Tubigon, Bohol since 1958, hence, when he notarized the questioned deed of
donation, he really did not recognize the person of Cristina Panis, but he was led by one
Gregorio Ricafort to believe that the old woman before him at the time was the said Crispina
Panis.
Respondent informed that his notarization of the questioned document in fact resulted to
his indictment in court for reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of public document, which
case was pending trial.
As for the charge of having conducted a rally/parade, respondent claimed that the same
was staged by PDP Laban and BAYAN of Bohol as a protest against complainant who showed
bias in presiding over the trial of the criminal cases against members of the Cabatos family and
disregarding the evidence in convicting them.
By Comment/Reply[5] to respondents COMMENT, complainant countered that one of the
witnesses to the questioned document was respondents father, Geronimo Cabatos, [6] a
permanent resident of Panaytayon who knew as he was related by blood to Crispina
Panis,[7] hence, it is incredible for respondent not to know of Panis death on January 15, 1981 or
that he did not know the person of . . . Panis [even if] he ha[d] been away from his place of birth
since 1958.
This Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by Resolution of
June 4, 1990.[8]
The rollo shows that complainant had been manifesting his zeal in pursuing the case, but
until March 19, 2002 when a Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued a
Notice of Hearing[9] directing the parties to appear at the IBP Building on April 19, 2002, the case
appears to have in the interim remained dormant.
Due to the unavailability of complainant and the IBP Investigating Commissioner on the
scheduled hearings on April 19, 2002[10] and June 7, 2002, respectively, they were reset to June
28, 2002.[11]
Before the June 28, 2002 scheduled hearing, complainant filed before the IBP a
MANIFESTATION COUPLED WITH MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADING[12] wherein he expressed wonder . . . why it took the Committee on Bar Discipline of
the IBP over ten (10) long years to set th[e] case for hearing.
In the same Manifestation cum Motion, complainant informed that his two witnesses,
Aniceta P. Tarle, a daughter of the deceased Crispina Panis, and Ricafort (who, as reflected
above, respondent claimed to have led him to believe that the old woman presented before him
was Panis) had died.
Complainant further informed that he and respondent were principal sponsors at a
wedding, hence, he had not pressed for the early investigation of the case.
Nonetheless, complainant prayed that the case be decided on the basis of the pleadings.
Respondent, whose comment on complainants above-said Manifestation cum Motion was
sought by the IBP by Order of June 28, 2002,[13] filed a Motion to Dismiss[14] manifesting that he
was joining complainants motion to have the case resolved on the basis of the pleadings, and
informing that the criminal complaint lodged against him in connection with his notarization of the
questioned document was dismissed, he having proved
i) that when he notarized the subject Deed of Donation one among six similar documents
executed in favor of Barangay Panaytayon, Tubigon, Bohol, for purposes of a
school site someone represented to respondent as Crispina Panis;
ii) that she turned [out] to be the daughter of Crispina Panis, and that she ha[d] been
instructed by Gregorio Ricafor[t] who prepared the document to affix the same
Crispina Panis in the document;
iii) that the donation turned out to be the will and resolve of the heirs of Crispina Panis[.]
Respondent accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the case.
IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline Victoria O. de los Reyes, to whom the case was
reassigned, issued a Notice of Hearing[15] setting the case for hearing on October 10, 2002 but
not one of the parties showed up. While the IBP received on October 4, 2002 complainants
Reiterative Manifestation dated September 30, 2002, [16] it resolved to deny the Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, by Order of October 10, 2002[17] upon its finding of a need for
complainant to substitute his charges.
The IBP later received on October 6, 2002 a REITERATIVE MANIFESTATION (RE:
COMPLAINANTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS)[18] alleging, among other
things,
b) that respondent never personally knew the late Crispina Panis nor his relationship to
her, considering that from 1958 (when respondent set foot on secondary
education) respondent left his native place and resided in a convent with a parish
priest (now Msgr. Saturnino Felicitas) as an altar boy and convent helper, until
respondent graduated from two (2) college courses;
 c) that, in fact, the fact of death of said Crispina Panis was known to respondent only
when he became one of the accused in a complaint for falsification of public
document filed with the MCTC of Tubigon-Clarin, Bohol[.]
The case was set anew for complainant to present evidence on November 11, 2002
during which, again, none of the parties appeared, drawing the Commission to consider the case
submitted for resolution by Order of even date.[19]
Commissioner de los Reyes submitted her REPORT and RECOMMENDATION[20] the
pertinent portion of which read:
xxx
In view of the failure of the complainant to substantiate his serious charges against the
respondent, it is respectfully recommended that this charge for disbarment be dismissed. There
is no question that the complainant waived his right to present his evidence despite the
opportunity given him by this Commission and in effect deprived the respondent the right to
confront him and his witnesses.
However, this Commission would like to point out that there is no issue that respondent Atty.
Cabatos did not exercise that degree of diligence required of him as a Notary Public.
It has been held in the case entitled Flores v. Chua, 306 SCRA 465, that where the notary
public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn
oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. And in the
case Nunga v. Viray, 306 SCRA 487, the Honorable Court ruled that notaries public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
In the case before us, the respondent himself admitted that he did not exert any effort to find out
if the person who acknowledged to have executed the Deed of Donation was really Crispina
Panis. He merely relied on the assurance of Mr. Gregorio Ricafort that the person who appeared
before him as Notary Public was the real Crispina Panis. Considering that Tubigon, Bohol is a
small town, it would have been easy to determine the real identity of the person claiming to have
executed the document.
Moreover, it was easy for the respondent to require the person who claimed to have executed
the questioned Deed of Donation to produce his Community Tax Certificate (formerly Residence
Certificate) and any other documents to identify him or her. This he did not do.
It can therefore be validly concluded that respondent Atty. Cabatos failed to exercise with utmost
care and diligence his duties as Notary Public.
For these reasons, it is recommended that respondent Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos be
reprimanded, with a warning that a graver penalty will be recommended to be imposed on him in
the event he again fails to exercise that high degree of diligence required of a Notary Public in
the performance of his duties as such. (Emphasis and italization in the original)
By NOTICE OF RESOLUTION,[21] the IBP National Secretary quoted the IBP Resolution
No. XVI-2003-89 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner,[22] which notice of Resolution, along with the records of the case, was transmitted
by letter of September 29, 2002 of the IBP Director for Bar Discipline and received on October 9,
2003 by the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court.[23]
When will the incidence of violations, by lawyers commissioned as notaries public, of their
oath of office decline if not abate?
Why do notaries public seem to be impervious to the call by this Court to faithfully
discharge their sacred duties which are dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest?
Why did respondent rely on Ricaforts alleged leading him to believe that the old woman
before him was the Crsipina Panis who purportedly executed the document for notarization,
when one of the witnesses[24] to the execution of the document was his (respondents) father,
Geronimo Cabatos, from whom he could have verified the identity of Crispina Panis, if indeed he
did not know her?
That respondent was, if true, exonerated from the criminal case filed against him in
connection with his notarization of the questioned document does not exonerate him from the
present administrative case.
Nor does, if respondents information in his Motion to Dismiss[25] is true, that the person
who had been instructed by Ricafort to affix the signature of Crispina Panis was the latters
daughter exonerate him. By such information, he in fact impliedly admits that the document had
already been signed when it was brought to him for notarization.
That a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are
the same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents of
the truth of what are stated therein bears reiterating. On pain of sounding like a broken record,
this Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of the injunction is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party in this case Crispina Panis
and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act of deed.[26]
Respondent having thus failed to faithfully discharge his sacred duties as a notary public,
under the facts and circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for a period of One (1) Year is in
order.
As for the charge against respondent of showing grave disrespect to the courts and the
administration of justice by holding a parade/rally, along with his followers, during which he
imputed bias to complainant whom he branded as worse than President Marcos, it has not been
sufficiently substantiated.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent, Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos, if still
existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is hereby DISQUALIFIED to be commissioned as a notary
public for a period of One (1) Year, and WARNED that a similar violation by him shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the country, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let this Resolution be also made of record in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 5426 April 3, 2007
CHITA PANTOJA-MUMAR, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JANUARIO C. FLORES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by Chita Pantoja-Mumar
charging respondent Atty. Januario C. Flores with fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, falsification
of document, breach of duty and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Complainant is one of the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. It appears that
respondent had prepared an Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale1 for her and 11 other co-
heirs covering a three-hectare property in Pangdan, Cambanay, Danao City. The deed was
executed in favor of the spouses Filomena and Edilberto Perez, who were later able to secure a
torrens title2 over the property under their names.
In the verified Complaint3 dated March 17, 2001, complainant alleged that respondent had
prepared the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1987, but averred
that the transaction did not push through, and the deed was not notarized. She further narrated,
thus:
8. [Respondent], knowing fully well that there actually was no transaction between the
Pantojas and the Perezes, notarized the same document apparently in violation of his
oath as a lawyer and a breach of his duty as a notary public. Worst was the fact that
[the] spouses Perez and the respondent had the document thumbmarked by [a person
other than] Maximina Pantoja as appearing above in the same typewritten name.
Attached is an enlarged Machine Copy of Maximina Pantoja’s true and genuine
thumbmark as Annex "C" while an enlarged machine copy of the thumbmark
appearing above her typewritten name in the said document is attached as Annex "D"
for comparison;
9. Moreover, the respondent x x x made it appear in the falsified/fabricated and forged
document that the same was acknowledged before him on December 29, 1987, when
in truth and in fact, he and [the] spouses Perez prepared, falsified, fabricated and
forged the said document after June 13, 1988, when they were able to fraudulently
secure the first page thereof from Lucresia P. Awe, not to mention the fact that neither
of the parties to the said document appeared before him as required under the notarial
law. This is supported by the written declaration of [the] spouses Perez dated June 25,
1988 that they bought the property on June 13, 1988 for ₱40,000.00, a photocopy of
which is attached as Annex "E" hereof.
10. On the basis of such falsified, fabricated and forged document denominated as
Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale, [the] spouses Perez with the help of
respondent attorney, were able to effect the issuance of a title over the above-
described property in their names to the damage and prejudice of complainant and the
compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. Attached as Annex "F" is a photocopy of
the title;4
Respondent denies the charges against him. His version of what transpired during the
signing and notarization of the document is as follows:
9. x x x [D]uring the signing of the document at the ancestral home of the Pantojas on
December 29, 1987, by surviving spouse Celedonia Lumen Pantoja and all the
children (except Mrs. Mumar), the respondent called the attention of Mrs. Pantoja to
the fact that Mrs. Mumar was not a signatory to the document because she was
absent. Mrs. Pantoja pleaded with the respondent to proceed with the notarization of
the document because she badly needed the money. She promised to have the
document signed by Mrs. Mumar as soon as she would come to Danao City;
10. But Mrs. Pantoja did not make good her promise. So, on February 24, 1989,
Edilberto Perez (vendee) sent a registered letter to Mrs. Chita P. Mumar at her
address at Talibon, Bohol, informing her of the sale of their 3.3526 hectare property
located in Pandan, Cambanay, Danao City, covered by Tax Dec. 008-0895, a copy of
the letter is hereto attached as Annex "F." The letter was received by her son Odelio
Mumar on March 2, 1989, per postal registry return card hereto attached as Annex
"G";
11. Obviously, as early as March 2, 1989, complainant Mumar already knew of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale. Therefore, her right of action, whether civil,
criminal or administrative, is barred by prescription. She is also guilty of laches in
failing to assert her right for an unreasonable length of time;
12. Lastly, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale was published in the Sun Star
Daily, a newspaper of general circulation in the cities and province of Cebu in its
issues of March 18, 23 and 31, 1989, as shown by an Affidavit of Publication by its
Editor-in-Chief Pacheco Seares, a copy of said affidavit is hereto attached as Annex
"H."5
He alleged that no criminal charges for falsification were filed against him, and it was only on
January 11, 2000 that seven of the ten heirs of Jose Pantoja, Sr. filed a civil case for Recovery
of Ownership, Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, Accounting and
Damages.6
The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 26,
2001. The case was assigned to Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa. A mandatory conference
was held on October 15, 2003, where only the complainant appeared and manifested that she
was willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings submitted. She
requested for additional time to file a verified position paper.
For his part, respondent filed a Manifestation that he received the notice of mandatory
conference, but requested to be excused therefrom. He stated that he was also willing to submit
the case on the basis of the pleadings.
In her Position Paper, complainant reiterated the allegations in her complaint. She insisted that
respondent forged her signature, which originally did not appear on the first page of the
document before it was borrowed. She added that respondent had also falsified a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) to make it appear that one of her co-heirs had authorized another to sign the
deed for her. According to the complainant, respondent dated the questioned document
"December 29, 1987," when in fact the first page containing all the signatures of the heirs was
borrowed only on June 13, 1988. Even the spouses Perez declared in writing that they had
bought the subject property on June 13, 1988. The complainant stressed that the spouses Perez
were able to secure a certificate of title to the subject property because of the forged document.
In his Comment on the Position Paper, respondent alleged that the allegations in the complaint
are self-serving and not supported by evidence. To prove his point, respondent enclosed the
original duplicate of the SPA which was notarized on November 4, 1987, and the transcript of
stenographic notes in Civil Case No. DNA-574, particularly the testimony of Clarita Manulat, who
testified on the circumstances surrounding the execution of the SPA and handcarried it to Pasig
on June 20, 1987.
Regarding Maximina’s thumbmark, respondent recalled that on December 29, 1987, he, Clarita
Manulat, and vendee Filomena Perez went to the residence of Celedonia Pantoja as previously
agreed upon. Only the complainant was not present. After the other heirs finished signing the
document, Mrs. Pantoja asked permission from respondent if she could bring the document
inside the bedroom because she would be coaxing her daughter to affix her thumbmark. Mrs.
Pantoja told them that Maximina was "reclusive and suffering from mental imbalance."
According to respondent, the so-called thumbmark of Maximina which appears on the cedula is
the fake one. He surmised that this thumbmark was probably affixed on the cedula by one of her
sisters, since Maximina would not come out of her room and had to be coaxed by her mother to
affix her thumbmark on the document. Respondent also enclosed a copy of the transcript of his
testimony in Civil Case No. DNA-574.
In reply, complainant pointed out that respondent had admitted that he did not see Maximina
affix her thumbmark on the assailed Deed, yet he notarized it; respondent had also admitted that
he had committed a breach of his office as a notary public on cross-examination in Civil Case No
DNA-574. Respondent’s belief that Maximina Pantoja was suffering from some mental ailment
and yet still notarized it only proves his misconduct.
In her Report dated January 16, 2006, the Investigating Commissioner found that while the
validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale is yet to be resolved in the civil case,
the acts and omissions of respondent as notary public have been duly established. According to
the Investigating Commissioner:
1. The document, although already signed by some of the co-heirs/co-owners on or
before December 29, 1987, was not finalized because the transaction was not
pursued; however, the date of notarization was indicated therein to be December 29,
1987;
2. Respondent notarized the document on or after June 13, 1988, without the authority
and/or in the absence of some of the supposed signatories;
In a Resolution dated May 26, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline approved Resolution No. XVII-2006-281, worded as follows:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A;" and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
that respondent was remiss in his duties as notaries public, Atty. Januario C. Flores is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and Respondent’s notarial commission
is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment for two (2) years.
It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a private
document is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of
preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution.10 Indeed, a notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe
utmost care in complying with the elementary formalities in the performance of their
duties.11 Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would
be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.12 A notary public is duty-bound to
require the person executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he
is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same. 13
As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent admitted he did not actually
see one of the signatories to the subject deed sign, and that he notarized the deed despite the
absence of the complainant’s signature:
Q. In other words, you were not present when Maximina Pantoja affixed her
thumbmark on Exhibit "2"?
A. I was present, but I did not see Maximina Pantoja affixed (sic) her thumbmark on
Exhibit "2." I just presumed that it was her thumbmark because I relied on the
statement and representation of Mrs. Celedonia Pantoja that she was going to coax
her daughter, Maximina Pantoja, to affix her thumbmark. Right after, when she came
out from her bedroom, the document had already a thumbmark of Maximina Pantoja
(TSN, August 16, 2004, Civil Case No. DNA-570, pp. 20-21).

xxxx
3. Respondent did not see one of the co-heirs, Maximina Pantoja, actually affix her
thumbmark to the document; and
Q. Even without the signature of Chita Mumar [complainant], you notarized the
document?
4. Respondent notarized the document even if Complainant, also a co-heir, did not
sign it.7
A. There is nothing wrong. What would have been a gross mistake on my part if
somebody [else affixed] the signature of Chita Mumar when I notarized it.
The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that these acts and omissions were established
through respondent’s own admission that he notarized the document even if Maximina Pantoja
did not affix her thumbmark in his presence, and that complainant did not appear before him to Q. But you correctly notarized the document even without the signature of Chita
sign the deed. The Investigating Commissioner also considered respondent’s testimony in Civil Mumar, is that correct?
Case No. DNA-574.8 Citing Gonzales v. Ramos,9 Commissioner Herbosa recommended that the
notarial commission of respondent be revoked; and that he be disqualified from reappointment
A. That is correct.
as notary public for a period of two years and suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
 Q. And do you think that is proper, legal and ethical on the part of the Notary Public?

A. No. (TSN, August 16, 2004, Civil Case No. DNA-574, pp. 28-29).14

Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that all the vendors-
signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein, respondent undermined the
confidence of the public on notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which
proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as
such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most
imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should
not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine –
would accomplish the end desired.15 Considering that this is the respondent’s first administrative
offense, the Court modifies the IBP’s recommendation of a two-year suspension from the
practice of law to one year.16

The Court also finds it unnecessary to discuss the other matters raised by the parties, since they
involve the merits of Civil Case No. DNA-574, best left for the trial court to decide.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Januario C. Flores is GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and
the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby
REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two
(2) years. He is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective
immediately. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 5864. April 15, 2005]
ARTURO L. SICAT, complainant, vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,[1] complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the
Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According to
complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January 4,
2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a
contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the
construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs amounted
to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For the services of
the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount
of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar
Goco. The check was received and encashed by the latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA
notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons participated in
an act or proceeding when in fact they did not.
In his Comment,[2] respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had
already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001
that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was
not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime
before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled
the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public document that existed.
Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since
similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings
that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD
1594,[3] PD 1445,[4] RA 7160[5] and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He
stressed that no criminal and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,[6] the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26, 2003,
the IBP submitted its investigation report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001
purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident
that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already
dead at the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and Awards Committee
of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before
the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4
January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money
which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special Power of Attorney
helped said parties succeed in their plans.[7]
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondents notarial commission be revoked and
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. [8]
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainants
accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He
likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was
a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it
was his duty to serve the ends of justice,[9] not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act
at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself
and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession. [10]
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,[11] where the respondent
notarized certain documents and made it appear that the deceased father of complainant
executed them, the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[12] The Court was emphatic that lawyers
commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who
signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally appeared before
them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries
public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties,
otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be
undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However,
respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001
or more than two months after the latters death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent
declared that Benitez appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his free
and voluntary act. Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act.[13] It converts a private document
into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary
proof of its authenticity and due execution.[14]
Neither will respondents defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and
unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of falsehood
in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and
potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator
of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but
as a public officer as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused
disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive them and the
Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project
could not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the
public a spurious contract ― all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was
the Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation to
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the Municipality of
Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services in the
conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed
Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the contract amount
of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious
document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating
signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit
perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in
the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required outputs. x x x[15]
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty
recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought
to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants, by:
G.R. No. 150866 March 6, 2006
a) Declaring the plaintiff as the rightful awardee of Stall No. 8, Building A, Cabanatuan
Public Market and ordering the defendants, or any person acting in their behalf, to
MANUEL MALLARI and MILLIE MALLARI, Petitioners,
vacate said Stall No. 8 and relinquish the possession thereof to the plaintiff;
vs.
REBECCA ALSOL, Respondent.
b) Condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P18,000.00,
representing the value of the merchandize [sic] and items taken by the defendants
DECISION
from said Stall No. 8;

CARPIO, J.:
c) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the following amounts:

The Case
(1) P10,000.00 - as attorney’s fees; and

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 9 August 2001 Decision2 and 12
(2) P20,000.00 - as exemplary and punitive damages; and
November 2001 Resolution3of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52681. The Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the 8 November 1995 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 27 ("trial court") in Civil Case No. 870-AF. d) Awarding costs in favor of the plaintiff.

The Antecedent Facts SO ORDERED.6

Stalls No. 7 and 8 of the Supermarket Section of the Cabanatuan City Public Market were Petitioners appealed the trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals.
awarded to and occupied by Abelardo Mallari ("Abelardo"), father of Manuel Mallari ("Manuel")
and Rebecca Alsol ("respondent"). Before Abelardo’s death on 16 July 1986, he gave the stalls
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
to Manuel and respondent. Manuel and his wife Millie Mallari ("petitioners") occupied Stall No. 7
while respondent and her husband Zacarias Alsol occupied Stall No. 8.
In its 9 August 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal and affirmed the
trial court’s Decision with modification. The Court of Appeals sustained respondent’s right to
In July 1988, respondent’s daughter became sick and the Alsol family had to stay in Manila for
occupy Stall No. 8 by virtue of the Lease Contract she entered with the City Government.
two months for the medical treatment. They returned to Cabanatuan City in September 1988
However, the Court of Appeals deleted the award of actual damages amounting to P18,000 in
only to find out that petitioners were already occupying Stall No. 8. The partition between Stalls
favor of respondent on the ground that there was no sufficient proof of the loss. The Court of
No. 7 and 8 had been removed and respondent’s merchandise and things were already gone.
Appeals also deleted the award of exemplary damages to respondent amounting to P20,000.
Petitioners refused respondent’s demand to vacate Stall No. 8.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’s Decision. In its 12 November
Respondent sought the help of the City Market Committee ("Committee"). On 5 May 1989, the
2001 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Committee passed Kapasiyahan Blg. 1, s-1989 granting Stall No. 7 to Manuel and Stall No. 8 to
respondent. On 4 June 1990, respondent and the City Government of Cabanatuan ("City
Government"), represented by City Mayor Honorato C. Perez ("Mayor Perez"), executed a Hence, the petition before this Court.
Contract of Lease ("Lease Contract"). The Lease Contract granted respondent the right to
occupy Stall No. 8 for a monthly rental of P316 subject to increase or decrease in accordance
with the rules and ordinances of the City Government. The Issues

However, petitioners still refused to vacate Stall No. 8. Instead, they filed an action for Petitioners raise the following issues:
annulment of the Lease Contract before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 29
("Branch 29"). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 789-AF. In its Order of 25 May 1990, 1. Whether respondent is the proper awardee of Stall No. 8.
Branch 29 dismissed the case for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and on the
additional ground that the Committee is not the proper party to the case. 5
2. Whether the Lease Contract executed between respondent and the City
Government is valid.
On 17 October 1990, respondent filed an action for recovery and possession before the trial
court. On 8 November 1995, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads: 3. Whether respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees.

The Ruling of This Court

The petition has no merit.
Ruling on Whether Respondent is the Proper Awardee of
Stall No. 8 is Premature
The Court of Appeals pointed out that when the Committee awarded Stall No. 8 to respondent,
petitioners filed an appeal before the Secretary of Finance questioning the award. In their
appeal, petitioners alleged that respondent failed to comply with the conditions set by the
Committee. The appeal was still pending when the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed
Decision. Petitioners admitted in their Memorandum the pendency of the appeal.7 Hence, the
Court may not at this time rule on whether respondent is the proper awardee of Stall No. 8. Any
resolution on this question will preempt whatever ruling the Secretary of Finance may issue on
the pending appeal.
Validity of the Lease Contract
Respondent and the City Government executed the Lease Contract on 4 June 1990 prior to
petitioners’ filing of appeal before the Secretary of Finance. The pendency of the appeal does
not affect the validity of the lease. As the Court of Appeals ruled, the Lease Contract remains
valid until revoked by the City Government or annulled by the proper court in a proper action.
Petitioners insist that the Lease Contract is not valid because the City Treasurer should have
signed the Lease Contract and not Mayor Perez. Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying Republic Act No. 71608("RA 7160"), otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992 or long after the execution of the Lease
Contract on 4 June 1990. Petitioners further allege that granting Mayor Perez has the authority
to sign the Lease Contract, Mayor Perez did not appear before the notary public who notarized
the Lease Contract. Hence, the Lease Contract did not produce any right in favor of respondent.
The Court agrees with petitioners that RA 7160 is not the applicable law. Instead, the Court of
Appeals should have applied Batas Pambansa Blg. 3379 ("BP 337") or the old Local
Government Code. Still, even under BP 337, city mayors have the authority to sign contracts on
behalf of city governments.
Under Section 171(2), Article One, Chapter 3 of BP 337, the powers and duties of the city mayor
are as follows:
Sec. 171. Chief Executive; Compensation, Powers and Duties.
xxxx
(2) The city mayor shall:
(a) Take care that the laws of the Philippines and the ordinances and resolutions of
the city are duly observed and enforced;
(b) Maintain peace and order in the city, and in pursuance thereof, he shall be entitled
to possess and carry the necessary firearms within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to
existing rules and regulations on the possession and carrying of firearms;
(c) Prepare and submit to the sangguniang panlungsod the annual budget of the city
for the ensuing calendar year on the date and in the manner provided and prescribed
by law;
(d) See to it that executive officers and employees of the city faithfully discharge their
respective duties, and for the purpose, cause, if necessary, the institution and filing of
appropriate criminal or administrative action;
(e) Furnish the sangguniang panlungsod from time to time, such information and
recommend such measures as he shall deem appropriate or necessary;
(f) Examine the books, records, and papers of all offices, officers, agents or
employees of the city;
(g) Represent the city in its business transactions, and sign all warrants drawn on the
city treasury and all bonds, contracts and obligations of the city;
(h) Appoint, in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulations, all officers and
employees of the city, whose appointments are not otherwise provided in this Code;
(i) Cause to be instituted judicial proceedings to recover property and funds of the city
wherever found, and cause to be defended all suits against the city, or otherwise
protect its interests;
(j) As soon as possible but not later than March 31 of each year, prepare and submit
to the Ministry of Local Government an annual report covering the operation of the city
government during the preceding calendar year;
(k) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the city are collected, and the city
funds applied in accordance with law or ordinance to the payment and settlement of
the city expenses and obligations;
(l) Exempt, upon the recommendation of the superintendent of city schools, deserving
but financially disadvantaged students from the payment of tuition and other school
fees or any part thereof;
(m) Take such emergency measures as may be necessary to protect the public from
fires, prevent and mitigate the effects of floods, storms, earthquakes and other public
calamities;
(n) Grant or refuse to grant, pursuant to law, city licenses or permits, and revoke the
same for violation of law or ordinance or the conditions upon which they are granted;
(o) Require owners of houses, buildings or other structures constructed without the
necessary permit or in violation of existing law or ordinance, to remove or demolish
such houses, buildings or structures within thirty days, or cause its removal or
demolition at the expense of the owner;
(p) Grant permits to hold benefits, excepting prohibited games of chance, for public
and charitable purposes without requiring approval of the Ministry of Social Services
and Development;
 (q) Act on the commutation of vacation, sick and maternity leaves and of trips outside
the city of chiefs of offices appointed by him;
(r) Initiate appropriate action or proceedings against any national government official
or employee rendering service within the city to draw the attention of the
corresponding superior officer to the dereliction of the official or employee involved;
(s) Authorize payment of medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence,
and hospital fees of officials and employees of the city who suffer any injury arising out
of or in the course of their employment. Absence in such cases shall not be charged
against any leave credit;
(t) Approve the commutation of such transportation allowances as may be authorized
by law for chiefs of offices;
(u) Direct the preparation and formulation of the development plan and program of the
city, and upon approval of the sangguniang panlungsod, direct and supervise the
implementation and execution of the same;
(v) Call a meeting of any or all of the officers and employees of the city; and
(w) Perform such other duties and exercise such other powers as may be prescribed
by law or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the powers and duties of the city treasurer are enumerated under Section
181(4), Article Five, Chapter 3 of BP 337, thus:
Sec. 181. Appointment, Qualifications, Compensation, Powers and Duties. x x x x
(4) The city treasurer shall:
(a) Advise the city mayor, the sangguniang panlungsod, other city officials, and the
national officers concerned with the disposition of property of the city government;
(b) Collect taxes throughout the city, including national, provincial and municipal taxes
and other revenues authorized by law;
(c) Take custody of and exercise supervision over all city funds and property, including
city buildings and grounds and, subject to the approval of the city mayor, assign rooms
to city officers and other public officials who by law are entitled to office space in the
city buildings;
(d) Make annual reports to the mayor of all income disbursements, and acquisition
and disposition of all assets of the city during the period, and furnish copies thereof to
the sangguniang panlungsod and to all department heads of the city government;
(e) Take charge of the disbursement of all city and other funds the custody of which
may be entrusted to him by law or other competent authority;
(f) Upon designation by the Minister of Finance, act as treasury fiscal examiner in the
city under the administrative authority of the Treasurer of the Philippines in
accordance with pertinent rules and regulations;
(g) Inspect, under the authority of the sangguniang panlungsod, the operation of public
utilities belonging to, leased or operated by, the city government, such as telegraph
and telephone, land and water transportation, waterworks, electric-light plants,
irrigation systems, bonded warehouses, ferries, slaughterhouses, and other
commercial and industrial enterprises of the city and all private commercial and
industrial establishments within the city in relation to city tax ordinances; and
(h) Perform such other duties as may be required by law or ordinance.
Applying BP 337, there is nothing in the powers and functions of the city treasurer that gives the
city treasurer authority to sign contracts for the city government. Instead, Paragraph (g), Section
171(2), Article One, Chapter 3 of BP 337 clearly provides that the city mayor shall represent the
city in its business transactions and sign contracts of the city. Hence, Mayor Perez has the
authority to sign the Lease Contract on behalf of the City Government. Even under the Revenue
Code of Cabanatuan City of 1974, the authority of the city treasurer is limited to direct and
immediate supervision, administration and control over the Cabanatuan public markets and its
personnel.10 The city treasurer has the authority to designate spaces and stalls to vendors, 11 but
the authority does not include signing of contracts on behalf of the City Government.
Petitioners also allege that the Lease Contract is not valid because Mayor Perez did not appear
before the notary public who notarized the document.
We cannot sustain this argument.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document. 12 However, the non-
appearance of the parties before the notary public who notarized the document does not
necessarily nullify nor render the parties’ transaction void ab initio. 13 Thus:
x x x Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the necessity of a public document is only for
convenience, not for validity or enforceability. Failure to follow the proper form does not
invalidate a contract. Where a contract is not in the form prescribed by law, the parties can
merely compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This is
consistent with the basic principle that contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have
been entered into, provided all essential requisites are present.14
Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor Perez’s failure to appear before the notary
public.
Award of Attorney’s Fees
Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
 (2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability
laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the award of attorney’s fees is justified. Petitioners
refused to vacate and turn over Stall No. 8 to respondent despite respondent’s repeated
demands and the existence of the Lease Contract between respondent and the City
Government. Respondent was left with no recourse but to litigate to protect her interest. Hence,
we sustain the award of attorney’s fees amounting to P10,000 to respondent.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 9 August 2001 Decision and 12
November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52681.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 158144 : July 31, 2008]
ST. MARY'S FARM, INC., Petitioner, v. PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES, INC., RODOLFO A.
AGANA, JR., and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, METRO
MANILA, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming in toto the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 254, Las Piñas City, which dismissed for
lack of merit the complaint for annulment of sale.
The factual antecedents of the case, as narrated by the RTC, are as follows:
[I]t appears that herein plaintiff was the registered owner of an originally twenty-five thousand
five hundred ninety-eight (25,598) square meters of land situated at Bo. Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas
City under Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Las
Piñas City.
In compliance with a final court decision in Civil Case No. 87-42915 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XL of Manila, plaintiff passed and approved on 27 June 1988 a board resolution
authorizing defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision four thousand (4,000)
square meters of the land covered by the aforecited Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648
(11521-A). Allegedly, after the consummation of this transaction, defendant Rodolfo A. Agana
did not return to plaintiff the borrowed aforementioned title and[,] instead, allegedly forged a
board resolution of the plaintiff corporation supposedly to the effect that plaintiff had authorized
him to sell the remaining twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-eight (21,598) square meters
of the subject property. A series of transactions thereafter took place between defendant Rodolfo
A. Agana and defendant Prima Real Properties, Inc. (Prima) which transactions culminated to
the signing on 5 September 1988 of an absolute deed of sale transferring the ownership of the
subject land from herein plaintiff to herein defendant Prima. After the consummation of the sale,
defendant Prima effected the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) in
the name of plaintiff and in lieu thereof another Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 in the
name of defendant Prima was issued by defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva in his capacity as
Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
Subsequent developments had it that on 6 October 1988, defendant Prima duly purchased from
T.S. Cruz Subdivision the aforementioned four thousand (4,000) square meters portion of the
subject property which development thereafter led to the cancellation of the aforementioned
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 and the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas
City of two separate titles both in the name of defendant Prima, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
7863 covering the aforementioned four thousand square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-7864 covering the herein twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-eighty (21,598) square
meter subject property.
In its complaint which was amended twice, the second amendment even needed the intervention
of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorariand mandamus after the same was denied
admission by Hon. N.C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the then Assisting Court of Makati,
[Muntinlupa], Metro Manila, herein plaintiff alleged inter alia that the authorization certified to by
Antonio V. Agcaoili, Corporate Secretary of the plaintiff and used by defendant Rodolfo A. Agana
in selling the subject property to defendant Prima was a forgery as the board of directors of the
plaintiff never enacted a resolution authorizing herein defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to sell herein
subject property to defendant Prima or to anyone else for that matter. Plaintiff further claimed
that defendant Prima in collusion with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana acted maliciously and in bad
faith in relying on the forged authority without taking any step to verify the same with the plaintiff
as owner of the subject property. According to plaintiff, the deed of absolute sale entered into
between defendants Prima and Rodolfo A. Agana being the result of fraudulent transaction was
void thereby, among others, causing damage to the plaintiff. For canceling Transfer Certificate of
Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) knowing fully well that the authorization to sell [to] defendant Rodolfo
A. Agana was a forgery, defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva was likewise made liable for
damages.
On the other hand, defendant Prima separately with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in their
respective answers, sought and insisted constantly on the dismissal of the complaint based
solidly on the ground that Venice B. Agana and Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta who filed in behalf of
the plaintiff the original complaint and the amended and the second amended complaints as
well, respectively, lacked legal capacity to sue because they were not authorized therefor by the
board of directors of the plaintiff. Furthermore, defendant Prima argued that it acted in good faith
when it relied solely on the face of the purported authorization of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana
and entered into the deed of absolute sale and paid in full the purchase price of
PhP2,567,760.00 of the subject property. This fact, according to defendant Prima, made it a
buyer in good faith and for value. To cap its argument, defendant Prima in adopting the defense
of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana asserted that even assuming that the authorization of defendant
Rodolfo A. Agana was forged when plaintiff, through its President, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr.
(brother of Rodolfo) accepted/received part of the aforestated purchase price knowing fully well
the same to be the proceeds of the sale of the subject property, plaintiff has been precluded as it
is now estopped from asking for rescission of the deed of absolute sale and reconveyance of the
subject property.3
After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on April 7, 2000, dismissing the complaint
for annulment of sale with damages filed by the petitioner.4
The trial court found that the respondent was a buyer in good faith and for value, relying on the
authority of Rodolfo A. Agana to sell the property in behalf of the petitioner company, as
evidenced by a notarized board resolution. As such, the trial court ruled that the petitioner was
bound by the acts of its agent and must necessarily bear whatever damage may have been
caused by this alleged breach of trust.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following errors:
I
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Respondent Agana was duly authorized by
Petitioner under the Certification dated June 30, 1988 (Exhibits "D" and "3") to enter into the sale
of the subject property with Respondent Prima Real.
(A) There is no proof of the Certification's authenticity and due execution;
(B) There is clear and convincing evidence that the Certification was forged.
(C) Even assuming that the Certification was authentic and duly executed, it was not sufficient in
form and by its terms to authorize Respondent Agana to sell the subject property or receive
payment on behalf of Petitioner.
II
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Respondent Prima Real was the author of
its own damage by not making reasonable and prudent inquiries into the fact, nature and extent
of Respondent Agana's authority, and by causing the issuance of checks in the name of
Respondent Agana.
The petition must fail.
A cursory reading of the issues reveals that these are factual matters which are not within the
province of the Court to look into, save only in exceptional circumstances which are not present
in the case at bar. Well settled is the rule that in Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
only questions of law must be raised.5 As a matter of procedure, the Court defers and accords
finality to the factual findings of trial courts, especially when, as in the case at bar, such findings
are affirmed by the appellate court. This factual determination, as a matter of long and sound
appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal. It is not the
function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of
the factual holding of the lower courts.6
Petitioner insists that "the sale of the realty entered into between respondent Agana, purportedly
on behalf of the petitioner, and respondent Prima is null and void for lack of authority on the part
of respondent Agana to sell the property."7 The board resolution allegedly granting Rodolfo
Agana the authority to sell in behalf of the company, as certified by Corporate Secretary Atty.
Antonio V. Agcaoili, is alleged to be a forgery. Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta, who served as
assistant to Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., the President of St. Mary's Farm, Inc., in 1988 testified that
the board of directors did not hold any meeting on June 27, 1988; that, in fact, the signature of
Atty. Antonio Agcaoili was not genuine; and that said document was merely presented to the
notary public for notarization without Atty. Agcaoili appearing before him.
Despite this insistence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of
the respondent court affirming those of the trial court on this matter. Anent the forged signature
of Atty. Agcaoili, the CA did not err in not giving evidentiary weight to the findings of the
Document Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the ground that the findings
were not really conclusive. In the first place, the procedure for the investigation of questionable
handwriting was not properly followed. There is nothing on record that will conclusively show that
the alleged standard sample signatures of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili, which were submitted to the
NBI and made the basis of comparison, were the genuine signatures of the same Atty. Antonio
Agcaoili. Moreover, the examiner testified that it was possible to have variations in the standard
signatures of Atty. Agcaoili, caused by certain factors such as passage of time, pressure and
physical condition of the writer which may have decisive influences on his handwriting's
characteristics.8 Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a particular
signature appearing in those documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification and a
more accurate comparison of signatures. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the
burden of proof lies in the party making the allegation.9 Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the
petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the Secretary's
Certification, petitioner wants us to consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty.
Agcaoili did not appear before a notary public for notarization. We do not agree, because in the
past, we have already held that the non-appearance of the party before the notary public who
notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the parties' transaction void ab
initio.10 However, the non-appearance of the party exposes the notary public to administrative
liability which warrants sanction by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, we agree with the
respondent court that it is not enough to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the
statements contained in the board resolution. To overcome the presumption, there must be
sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the
falsity of the certificate.11 In the absence of such proof, the document must be upheld.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.12 chanrobles virtual law library
On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo
Agana's authority to sell the subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an innocent
purchaser for value in good faith. Our pronouncement in Bautista v. Silva13 is instructive:
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays full and fair price for the same,
at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property. He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from
whom he receives the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the
face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not
obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith,
however, is sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered
owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale,
the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any
defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property. 14
All the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned case are present in the case at bar, enough
for us to consider Prima as a buyer in good faith. Prima Real Properties, Inc. is a company
engaged in the buying and selling of real properties. As borne out by the records, respondent
exerted efforts to verify the true background of the subject property. Rodolfo Agana presented to
respondent the (1) notarized board resolution which stated that at a special meeting held on
June 27, 1988, the board of directors authorized Mr. Rodolfo A. Agana, Treasurer, to sell the
subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-1648;15 (2) a separate
Certification by the petitioner's president, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., authorizing its Treasurer,
Rodolfo Agana, to sell said property;16 and, (3) TCT No. T-1648 of the subject property.
Convinced that Rodolfo Agana had the authority to sell on behalf of the company after being
presented all these documents, the sale between the parties was thereby consummated. A deed
of sale was executed on September 5, 198817 and the full consideration of P2,567,760.00 for the
subject property was paid.18
It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to Rodolfo Agana and not to the company
which, according to the petitioner, should have alerted the respondent to inquire further into the
extent of Agana's authority to transfer the subject property. This was no longer necessary
considering that respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana's authority to sell,
evidenced by the notarized Certification. As explained in the Bautista case:
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we know
it to be a public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact
of its due execution. A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice between
knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with a presumption
sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that he
executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is deprived of such
choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial
system, he has been given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly
notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that fiction of regularity
which holds together commercial transactions across borders and time.
In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has [in his] possession title to
the property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves
that he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter's capacity to sell; and that in
his inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special
power of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial
acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution
and authenticity.19
Aside from the pertinent documents presented, respondent also relied on the confirmation and
certification of the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City and Mr. Timoteo S. Cruz, owner of the
land likewise sold by Rodolfo Agana for the petitioner, with similar authorization by the petitioner
and signed by the corporate secretary Atty. Agcaoili. Agana acted as petitioner's authorized
agent and had full authority to bind the company in that transaction with Cruz.
Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner that respondent Agana's authority was only limited to
negotiate and not to sell the subject property, suffice it to state that the board resolution further
averred that he was "authorized and empowered to sign any and all documents, instruments,
papers or writings which may be required and necessary for this purpose to bind the Corporation
in this undertaking."20 The certification of the President, Marcelino Agana, Jr. also attests to this
fact. With this notarized board resolution, respondent Agana, undeniably, had the authority to
cede the subject property, carrying with it all the concomitant powers necessary to implement
said transaction. On the strength of the deed of absolute sale executed pursuant to such
authority, title over the land in petitioner's name was cancelled and a new certificate of title - TCT
No. T-617521 - was already issued in the name of Prima Real Properties, Inc.
Thus, it is too late in the day to have the sale voided, notwithstanding the retraction made by
Rodolfo Agana in his Comment22 on the Petition filed with this Court. Therein, he admits that he
acted solely and without proper authority of the corporation. Agana states that he wishes to end
once and for all the rift that had occurred in the corporation; and in order to buy peace for all the
parties and for himself, he is willing to return the money paid by Prima so that ownership of the
property can be returned to the petitioner. In light of this admission that Agana had no authority,
petitioner posits that there is justifiable reason for the Court to re-visit or evaluate the facts of the
case anew.
Unfortunately, the Court cannot give weight to this magnanimous gesture of Agana; neither will
the Court lend credence to Agana's assertion that he acted solely and without proper authority
from the corporation, inasmuch as it was raised for the very first time in this Court and only after
8 years from the inception of the case. In all the pleadings filed by respondent Agana in court, he
was steadfast in his position that he had authority to sell the subject property. A judicial
admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position
contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof
and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.23 In the instant case, there is no proof of these
exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the retraction was merely an afterthought on the part of
respondent Agana with the intention to end the rift in the family corporation.
Considering all the foregoing, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent Prima is an innocent
purchaser in good faith and for value.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 176984 - August 29, 2012]
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SERVANDO ARGUELLES
(Deceased) & CLAUDIO ARGUELLES and MARILOU TRINIDAD, for herself and as
guardian ad litem of her minor children namely, LLOYD, MARK, ADRIAN, and GEORGIA,
all surnamed TRINIDAD, TRISTAN TRINIDAD and EDGARDO TRINIDAD, JR., Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 179131]
MARILOU TRINIDAD, for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor children LLOYD,
MARK, ADRIAN & GEORGIA, all surnamed TRINIDAD, EDGARDO TRINIDAD, JR. and
TRISTAN TRINIDAD, Petitioners, v. SERVANDO ARGUELLES (Deceased) and CLAUDIO
ARGUELLES, and METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These cases involve an action for the annulment of a transfer certificate of title (TCT) over a
parcel of land on the basis of an allegedly falsified deed of sale transferring title over the
property.
The Facts and the Case
Respondent brothers, Servando and Claudio Arguelles (the Arguelleses ), were registered
owners of a parcel of land in Imus, Cavite, under TCT T-115897. On November 23, 1983 the
Arguelleses entered into a conditional sale of the land to Edgardo Trinidad and his wife Marilou
(the Trinidads). In accordance with the terms of the sale, the Trinidads gave the
Arguelleses P 50,000.00 as down payment. The balance ofl!396,720.00 was to be paid in
monthly installments.
The Trinidads occupied and began developing the property in 1986. They paid the real estate
taxes due on it from 1987 to 1997. With a deed of sale in their favor, the Trinidads eventually
had the land titled in their names on August 15, 1991 under TCT T-316427. In that same year,
they applied with Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank) for a loan, offering the land
as collateral. Satisfied that the Trinidads owned the property, Metrobank accepted it as collateral
and lent them money. Subsequently, Metrobank granted the couple several more loans, totaling
more than P 11 million, all secured by the land.
On January 7, 1997 the Arguelleses filed a complaint against the Trinidads with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite1 for the cancellation of TCT T-316427 in the latter s names.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Metrobank and sought the cancellation of
the real estate mortgages over the property in its favor.
The Arguelleses denied having executed a deed of sale in favor of the Trinidads. They alleged
that they entrusted their owner s duplicate copy of title to Atty. Alejandro Saulog, Sr., who
assisted the parties in executing a conditional sale covering the land. The Trinidads used a
fictitious deed of sale, notarized by a certain Atty. Saulog, Jr. to effect the transfer of title in their
names.
In answer, the Trinidads claimed that they paid for the land by installments, completing the
payment on June 24, 1986 with the result that the Arguelleses executed the deed of sale in their
favor. For its part, Metrobank filed a cross-claim against the Trinidads for litigation expenses,
alleging that the Trinidads were answerable for such expenses under the mortgage contracts.
In its decision of December 27, 2005 the RTC ruled in favor of the Arguelleses and cancelled
both the title in the name of the Trinidads and the mortgages in Metrobank s favor. The
primordial issue, said the RTC, was whether or not the Trinidads paid the balance of the agreed
purchase price by installments. It found that they did not since they could not present proof of
the payments they supposedly made. When asked on cross-examination, Marilou Trinidad could
not even remember when they made those installment payments.
Two handwriting experts testified during the trial on the authenticity of the Arguelleses signatures
appearing on the deed of sale: 1) Atty. Desiderio Pagui whom the Arguelleses hired and 2)
Rogelio Azores of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Their opinions differed. Atty. Pagui
concluded that the signatures were forged, while Azores maintained that the signatures were
authentic. The RTC adopted the conclusion of Atty. Pagui, finding that he presented a more
thorough and detailed analysis. He compared both similarities and differences between the
questioned signatures and specimen signatures; whereas, Azores gave emphasis to the
similarities.
In addition to annulling the Trinidads title, the RTC awarded the Arguelleses moral damages
of P1,000,000.00 and attorney s fees of P 200,000.00. It denied Metrobank s cross-claim against
the Trinidads, holding that Metrobank was a mortgagee in bad faith, having had prior notice of
the irregularity in the Trinidads title. The defendants appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA).2ςrνll
In its decision of March 6, 2007,3 the CA affirmed that of the RTC but reduced the award of
moral damages to P 50,000.00 each in favor of Servando and Claudio Arguelles. As for
Metrobank, the CA held that it was not a mortgagee in good faith as it appears that Metrobank
compelled the Trinidads to acquire title over the property before the initial loan could be
approved.
The Trinidads filed their motion for reconsideration while Metrobank appealed the CA Decision
to this Court. Upon the denial of their motion, the Trinidads filed their own petition with this Court
as well. Both cases were then consolidated on November 21, 2007. During the pendency of
these cases, Servando Arguelles passed away and was substituted by his heirs.
The Issues Presentedςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The issues in these cases are:
chanrobles virtual law library
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the deed of sale, which the Arguelleses
supposedly executed and that the Trinidads used for the transfer of the property in their names,
was a falsified document; andcralawlibrary
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the real estate mortgages that the Trinidads
executed in favor of Metrobank are not binding on the Arguelleses.
The Court s Rulings
The key question in these cases is the authenticity of the deed of sale that the Arguelleses
supposedly executed in favor of the Trinidads and that the latter used in transferring the property
title in their names. Both the RTC and the CA held that the deed was not authentic. Ordinarily,
being a question of fact, the RTC s finding, affirmed by the CA, carries great weight. But, here,
since such finding appears to be based on a flawed drawing of conclusions from the facts, the
Court is justified in taking a second look.4ςrνll
The courts below concluded that the subject deed of sale is not authentic based on the
following:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1. The notary public who notarized the document could not recall if the Arguelleses personally
appeared and signed the deed of sale before him;
2. Two copies of the deed of sale, one dated 1986 and the other 1991, were presented;
3. The Trinidads failed to prove that they paid the Arguelleses the full purchase price mentioned
in the conditional sale; andcralawlibrary
4. The testimony of the expert witness for the Arguelleses sufficiently proved that the two
brothers signatures were forged.
chanrobles virtual law library
First. Both the RTC and the CA held that the presumption of regularity of a public document 5 did
not attach to the subject deed of sale, given that the notary public, Atty. Saulog, Jr. failed to
establish the authenticity of the signatures on it. He could not remember if the Arguelleses,
present in court as he testified, were the same persons who appeared and acknowledged the
document before him.
But it is too much to expect a notary public who had but a brief time with the Arguelleses during
the notarial ceremony to remember their faces 12 years later. What matters is Atty. Saulog, Jr. s
testimony respecting the ritual of notarization that he invariably followed. He gave unbending
assurance that he ascertained the identities of the parties to documents who appeared before
him, including the Arguelleses, by requiring them to show documentary proofs of the same6 and
to sign the documents in his presence.7ςrνll
Besides, the theory of the Arguelleses is that it was Atty. Saulog, Jr. who facilitated the
preparation of the falsified deed of sale for the benefit of the Trinidads. But, if this were so, it
would have made more sense for Atty. Saulog, Jr. to testify in defense of the genuineness of the
transaction by claiming that he recalled the faces of those who appeared before him 12 years
ago and that they were no other than the Arguelleses.
Second. The Arguelleses point out that the residence certificates on the acknowledgment
portion of the deed of sale did not belong to them since these did not tally with their 1991
residence certificates. Further, they presented evidence that Atty. Saulog, Jr. did not have a
notarial commission in 1991.
But two copies of the deed of sale were presented in this case, identical in every way except that
the first, the Trinidad s original copy of the deed of sale, Exhibit "4," carried the date June 24,
1986 while the second, a certified copy of the deed of sale from the Register of Deeds, Exhibit
"D" of the Arguelleses, bore the date June 24, 1991. Evidently, it is the first document, original,
unblemished, and bearing the year 1986 that is the correctly dated copy. On the other hand, the
year typewritten on the second document, the certified copy, had been crudely altered by
erasure with the digits "91" superimposed to make the year read "1991." In other words, the
deed of sale was executed in 1986, not 1991.
The Arguelleses merely claim that their residence certificate numbers on the copies of the deed
of sale did not reflect their 1991 residence certificates. They do not state, however, that those
numbers do not represent their 1986 residence certificates, the correct year when the deed of
sale was executed. Further, they do not also claim that Atty. Saulog, Jr. did not have a notarial
commission in 1986 the year that the clean deed of sale was actually notarized.
Third. Both the RTC and the CA held that what is crucial in determining the authenticity of the
deed of sale is the question of whether or not the Trinidads paid the balance of the purchase
price after November 23, 1983. The two courts point out that the Trinidads not only failed to
present proof of payment, but Marilou Trinidad was also unable to say specifically when they
paid their installments to the Arguelleses.
But, firstly, the fact that Marilou Trinidad did not have any receipt evidencing payment of the
balance of the price cannot give rise to the assumption that they had not paid the same. Marilou
testified that she in fact asked the Arguelleses to issue receipts for the payments made but the
latter declined, saying that they would be executing a deed of sale upon full payment and that
this would be better proof of payment than ordinary receipts.8 That the Trinidads trusted the
Arguelleses sufficiently to waive the receipts is evidenced by Claudio Arguelles own admission
that they also did not issue any receipt for the P50,000.00 down payment that the Trinidads
made.9ςrνll
Secondly, while the conditional sale contained an undertaking by the Trinidads to pay the
balance of the purchase price in installments, such payment may be assumed to have been
made from the fact that the Trinidads were subsequently found in possession of a deed of sale
that the Arguelleses executed in their favor. Not only this, unquestionably, the Arguelleses gave
up possession of their owner s duplicate copy of the title and this subsequently found its way into
the hands of the Trinidads. There can be no better proof than these that the Trinidads had
already paid their obligation to the Arguelleses. Indeed, in 1991 the Trinidads succeeded in
registering the title to the land in their names.
Actually, as plaintiffs, the Arguelleses carried the burden of proving the affirmative of their claims
(1) that the Trinidads had not fully paid for the land and (2) that they caused the falsification of a
deed of sale supposedly executed by the Arguelleses in their favor and used it to transfer the
title to the property in their names. Further, by the nature of their action, the Arguelleses must
rely on the strength of their evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defendants.10ςrνll
The Court finds it difficult to believe the Arguelleses version that the Trinidads did not pay even
one centavo of the P 396,720.00 balance of the purchase price that they undertook to pay by
installments. Consider the following:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
A. If the Arguelleses were to be believed, they endured the fact that the Trinidads did not bother
to pay them even one installment after the down payment made in November 1983. 11 The
Arguelleses supposedly contented themselves with just waiting for when the payment would
come.12 And they did not bother to make any demand from 1983 to 1996 on the Trinidads for
what was due them.13 Indeed, it was only after some 13 years that Claudio Arguelles went to the
Registry of Deeds to check on the standing of their title.14Incredible!
b. According to the Arguelleses, they turned over their owner s duplicate copy of the title to Atty.
Saulog, Sr. who assisted them in 1983 in preparing the conditional sale they entered into with
the Trinidads. But it makes no sense for the Arguelleses to entrust their original title to Atty.
Saulog, Sr. who was practically a stranger to them. And, although the Trinidads supposedly
failed for 13 years to pay the monthly installment due, they made no effort to demand from the
lawyer the return of their duplicate owner s copy of the title.
c. The Arguelleses had all along been aware that the Trinidads took possession of the land as
early as 1983 after supposedly making a mere down payment. Claudio Arguelles who lived
about half a kilometer from the property, passed by it almost every day, and observed the
presence of the Trinidads on it15 and the fact they had built improvements.16Yet, Claudio never
bothered to drop in and demand payments of what was due him and his brother or ask the
Trinidads to leave the property. Claudio s mere excuse was that he was very busy.17ςrνll
d. Further, the Arguelleses ceased paying real estate taxes on the property after 1986. The
Trinidads were the ones who paid those taxes from 1987 to 1996. Only in 1997 when the
Arguelleses filed their action to recover the property did they begin to pay the taxes. 18ςrνll
chanrobles virtual law library
Fourth. Of two handwriting experts who examined the questioned signatures, Atty. Desiderio
Pagui and Rogelio Azores, both the RTC and the CA gave more credence to the opinion of the
first because he identified both the similarities and the differences and gave more details. Pagui
was a private handwriting expert that the Arguelleses presented. Azores was an expert from the
NBI.
In essence, Atty. Pagui gave the opinion that, whereas the specimen signatures were clumsily
written, the questioned signatures were done with greater dexterity. He imputed the similarities
between the two sets of signatures to simulation through practice. 19ςrνll
Azores found, on the other hand, significant similarities between the questioned signatures and
the specimen: the structural pattern of elements, the directions of strokes, and the manner of
execution. He also observed allowable natural variations between the sets of signatures. Finally,
he held the view that there were no indications or symptoms of forgery, such as hesitations and
tremors in writing, and that the questioned signatures were written with free and spontaneous
strokes, made unconsciously without attention given to the act of writing.20ςrνll
The RTC gave greater weight to the report of Atty. Pagui because it gave more details and
extensively discussed both differences and similarities between the questioned signatures and
specimen; whereas Azores focused mainly on the similarities.
But, while the trial court generally has discretion to determine the weight to be given to an expert
testimony, it erroneously disregarded Azores findings. Azores, as government handwriting
expert, was a neutral source of opinion. The Chief of the Questioned Documents Division of the
NBI concurred in his findings. Azores findings should be treated as an official act performed with
accepted competence and cloaked with the mantle of impartiality and neutrality. 21 Atty. Pagui, on
the other hand, was a private practitioner paid for by the Arguelleses. It was but natural for him
to support the position of his client, bringing up tiny details to make up for lack of substance.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Arguelleses have failed to overcome the
presumed validity of the Trinidads title over the property in dispute.

Fifth. With the Court s above conclusion, there is no further need to determine whether or not
the real estate mortgages that the Trinidads executed in favor of Metrobank are binding on the
Arguelleses. They are, based on such conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 2007 and resolution dated August 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV
86714 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite in Civil Case 1465-97
dated December 27, 2005, and DENIES the action for the annulment of Transfer Certificate of
Title T-316427 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite and of the real estate
mortgages entered into by the Trinidad spouses and Metrobank and the cross-claim of
Metrobank.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
The respondent lawyers failed to file their comment.
MARY JANE D. VELASCO, A. C. No. 5033
Complainant,
Present: On June 20, 2001, the Court ordered respondent lawyers and their counsel to show

PUNO, C.J., cause why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, comply with the resolution requiring the comment. Copies of the resolution dated June 20,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, 2001 were returned unserved from Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno with notations party
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, out/unknown at/party moved out and moved out. Atty. Doroin received the said resolution
- versus - AZCUNA,*
TINGA,* on July 27, 2001.[5]
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, On April 17, 2002, complainant was required to submit the correct addresses of Atty.
REYES,
DE CASTRO, and Alcid and Atty. Centeno, while Atty. Charlie Doroin was fined Php 500.00 for failure to comply
BRION, JJ.
ATTY. CHARLIE DOROIN and Promulgated: with the show cause resolution dated June 20, 2001 and was ordered to submit his comment.[6]
ATTY. HECTOR CENTENO,
Respondents. July 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Complainant failed to comply with the directive of the Court.

On July 23, 2003, the Court required the complainant to show cause why she should
DECISION not be disciplinarily dealt with for her non-compliance with the said directive and to submit her

compliance within ten (10) days from notice. In the same resolution, the fine imposed on Atty.
PER CURIAM:
Charlie Doroin was increased from Php 500.00 to Php 1,000.00 for his failure to file his comment
This case refers to a disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane D. Velasco on March
on the complaint as required by the Court, or to suffer imprisonment of five (5) days in case he
31, 1999, against respondent lawyers for forgery and
fails to pay and to submit his comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.[7]
falsification constitutive of malpractice.[1]

In a report dated August 2, 2004, the Clerk of Court informed the Court that
On June 21, 1999, the Courts Second Division required the respondent lawyers to
respondent Atty. Doroin paid the fine of Php 1,000.00. However, Atty. Doroin still failed to submit
comment on the complaint within (10) days from notice.[2]
the comment on the administrative complaint required of him and has not complied with the

On August 24, 1999, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, counsel for respondents, filed a Motion for show cause resolution dated April 17, 2002 by submitting the correct addresses of Atty. Quintin

Extension to File Comment praying that an extension of sixty (60) days from August 16, 1999 be P. Alcid and respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.[8]

given to them to file their comment.[3]

In a Manifestation submitted June 23, 2005, the complainant submitted the addresses

On October 4, 1999, the Court granted the Motion for Extension with a warning that of Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno as well as a copy of a Special Power of

the same shall be the last and no further extension will be given. [4] Attorney authorizing Mr. Juanito C. Perez to prosecute the instant case. [9]

On July 27, 2005, the Court issued a resolution noting the compliance of the
complainant as well as the latters manifestation and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt
of the record.[10]
On October 3, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines through Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva Maala issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing to the parties to
the case scheduled on October 26, 2005 with a strict note that [n]on-appearance by any of the
parties shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in further proceedings. [11]
On October 26, 2005, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complainant,
together with his counsel Atty. Andres Villaruel, Jr. appeared. As respondents Atty. Charlie
Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno had not filed their comment, they were directed to submit it
within (10) days from receipt of notice. The hearing of the case was reset on November 30,
2005.[12]
On November 30, 2005, again, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the
complaint, together with his counsel, Atty. Villaruel, appeared. The notices sent to respondents
were returned to the Commission on Bar Discipline with a notation RTS-Moved. As respondents
had not filed their comment on the complaint, they were declared in default. In an Order
dated November 30, 2005, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala submitted her report and
recommendation, viz.[13]
The Commission on Bar Discipline reported that:
xxxxxxxxx
In her Affidavit-Complaint, complaint alleged that she was
appointed as Administratrix in Special Proceedings Case No. Q-96-27628
pending consideration before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
87, entitled In the matter of the Settlement of the Estate of the Late Eduardo
Doroin, Monina E. Doroin, petitioner. The deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died
on 21 January 1996, in Papua New Guinea. In this Special Proceedings
case, respondents were collaborating counsels for Oppositor, Josephine
Abarquez.
On 21 March 1996, Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful
means into making her sign an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of
Partition, allotting complainant the sum of P1,216,078.00 giving the
paramour of complainants father, Josephine Abarquez, the share
of P7,296,468.00 and also allotting complainants two (2) alleged illegitimate
brothers and an alleged illegitimate sister, a similar sum of P1,216,075.00
each alleging that such sharing is in accordance with law. But no share was
assigned to complainants mother, who was the legal wife of Dr. Eduardo
Doroin.
To partially satisfy complainants share of Php 1,216,078.00, Atty.
Doroin required complainant to sign a paper which was an alleged
Confirmation of Authority to Sell the property of complainants father located
at Kingspoint subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by
TCT No. 34885, Complainant told Atty. Doroin that she will first consult a
lawyer regarding the legality of the said Confirmation of Authority to Sell
before she signs the same. Eventually, she was not able to sign the said
Confirmation because complainants lawyer, Atty. Marapao, failed to confer
and negotiate with Atty. Doroin regarding the same.
When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint
Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there was no house constructed
thereon, but when she visited it again on January 1999, there was already a
four-door townhouse constructed. Complainant was informed by the
caretaker at the site that the owner is one Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura.
Complainant also learned later on that the property, which was one of the
properties submitted to the Court handling the Special Proceedings case in
the Inventory of Property dated 3 April 1996, was sold by Atty. Doroin to
Evangeline Reyes-Yonemura [sic], by forging the signature of complainants
late father. Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon City,
knowing that complainants father was already dead as of 21 January 1996,
made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute Sale, that complainants father
appeared before him in Quezon City on 17 January 1997.
Records show that a case for Falsification of Public Document
was filed against respondent Atty. Hector Centeno before the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 39, docketed as Criminal Case No.
104869. Atty. Centeno was arraigned on 12 September 2001 and pleaded
not guilty. After the arraignment, Atty. Centeno did not anymore appeared
[sic] in court and jumped bail.[14]
The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when they caused extreme and great damage to the
complainant.[15] The Commissioner also noted that the failure of the respondents to answer the
complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several occasions and to appear on the
scheduled hearing set showed flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates
despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.[16] The
Commissioner recommended that the respondent lawyers be disbarred.

On November 18, 2006, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on
Bar Discipline with the modification that respondent lawyers be suspended indefinitely instead of
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any
constitutional privilege or right, and attorneys right to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. [21]

being disbarred.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof generally rests upon the complainant,
The Notice of Resolution and the Report and Recommendation by the Integrated Bar
and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
of the Philippines, were submitted to the Court, through the Director for Bar Discipline, in a
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[22]
transmittal letter dated January 22, 2007.

In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers forged the deed of sale
The issue before us is whether Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno are guilty of
and forced her to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement by explaining to her that it was in
violating their lawyers oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
accordance with law.
which would merit their disbarment.

The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute a blatant violation of

We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP, but modify the penalty to be
the lawyers oath to uphold the law and the basic tenets of the Code of Professional
imposed on respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.
Responsibility that no lawyer shall engage in dishonest conduct. Elementary it is in succession
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
law that compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse shall have a share in the estate by way of
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.[17] legitimes[23] and no extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse of said right except if she

gives it up for lawful consideration, but never when the spouse is not a party to the said

settlement.[24] And the Civil Code reminds us, that we must give every man his due.[25]
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are

dealing with their clients or the public at large,[18] and a violation of the high moral standards of
The guilt of the respondent lawyers is beyond dispute. They failed to answer the
the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
complaint filed against them. Despite due notice, they failed to attend the disciplinary hearings
disbarment.[19] In Marcelo v. Javier,[20] we reminded the members of the legal profession that:
set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainant remain uncontroverted.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients In Ngayan v. Tugade,[26] we ruled that [a lawyers] failure to answer the complaint against him
require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his
clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing.
Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3,
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal Rule 138, Rules of Court. [27]
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
The Court is mindful that disbarment is a grave penalty. Considering that the license to
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law, though it is not a property right, sustains a lawyers primary means of livelihood and
practice law during good behaviour and can only be deprived of it for
to strip someone of such license amounts to stripping one of a career and a means to keep
himself alive, we agree with the modification submitted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

that an indefinite suspension would be the more appropriate penalty on Atty. Charlie Doroin.

However, we cannot be as lenient with Atty. Hector Centeno who, aside from committing a

dishonest act by depriving a person of her rightful inheritance, also committed a criminal offense

when he falsificated a public document and thereafter absconded from the criminal proceeding

against him after having posted bail.

We also take this opportunity to remind the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and their

regional and city chapters to maintain an updated record of the office and residence addresses

of their members to help facilitate looking for lawyers. As officers of the court, lawyers should be

readily available upon the Courts beckoning.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Charlie Doroin is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY, and Atty.

Hector Centeno is hereby DISBARRED.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines and also be placed on the personal records of the respondents.

SO ORDERED.
 the part of his staff but his claim that Roldan personally appeared before him to attest to the
truthfulness of the verification and certification was true.

EN BANC The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) set the case for mandatory conference but before its
conclusion, on September 7, 2012, complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance 6 manifesting
that she was no longer interested in continuing with the complaint and that she was withdrawing
January 24, 2017
it.

A.C. No. 11545 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3439]

For said reason, the CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, 7 recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against Atty. Baylosis.
SUSAN LOBERES-PINTAL, Complainant,
vs.
In its Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-610,8 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP-Board of
ATTY. RAMONCITO B. BAYLOSIS, Respondent.
Governors reversed and set aside the report and recommendation of the CBD. In its Extended
Resolution,9 the IBP-Board of Governors found Atty. Baylosis guilty of violating the 2004 Rules
DECISION on Notarial Practice when he made it appear that Roldan was present during the notarization of
the petition on May 13, 2011 and recommended the immediate revocation of his notarial
commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for two (2) years.
Per Curiam:

The Court's Ruling

This case stemmed from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Susan
Loberes-Pintal (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against
respondent Atty. Ramoncito B. Baylosis (Atty. Baylosis) for gross violation of the 2004 Rules on The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP except as to its recommended penalty.
Notarial Practice.
Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice specifically provides:
The Antecedents:
Section 2. Prohibitions. - (a) x x x
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Baylosis for committing perjury,
falsification of public documents and the use of falsified documents. She alleged that Roldan C.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
Pintal (Roldan) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
or document -
entitled Roldan C. Pintal v. Susan Loberes-Pintal, docketed as Civil Case No. C-22815 (2011)
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC); that Atty. Baylosis conspired with
Roldan by making it appear in the petition that he was a resident of Caloocan City when, in truth (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
and in fact, he was a resident of Quezon City; and that Atty. Baylosis notarized the verification
and certification against non-forum shopping of the petition on May 13, 2011, but, at that time,
Roldan was out of the country. Complainant submitted a Certification2from the Barangay (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.1âwphi1
Chairman of Barangay 12, Zone 1, District II of Caloocan City, attesting that Roldan was not a
resident thereof and a Certification3 from the Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of
the country from April 10, 2011 to September 8, 2011. Without a quibble, Atty. Baylosis was negligent in the performance of his duty as a notary public
when he notarized the petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage without the presence of
In his Answer,4 Atty. Baylosis denied the accusation and insisted that when Roldan went to his Roldan. This was evidenced by the Certification) issued by the Bureau of Immigration that
Roldan was not in the Philippines on May 13, 2011 as he had left the Philippines on April 10,
office in January 2011, he personally interviewed him and asked him to submit documents such
as his marriage certificate, birth certificate and a personal write-up narrating his personal history, 2011 and came back only on September 8, 2011. Atty. Baylosis' contention that he personally
courtship history and marital history; that Roldan provided him a Certification 5 from the interviewed Roldan when the latter went into his office and personally read and signed the
petition cannot be accorded a shred of credence.
Chairman of Barangay 12, Zone 1, District II of Caloocan City, attesting that he was a resident
thereof for six (6) years; that after the interview, he referred Roldan to a clinical psychologist for
evaluation and testing; that due to financial difficulties, it was only in March 2011 that Roldan In notarizing a document in the absence of a party, Atty. Baylosis violated not only the rule on
was able to pay his acceptance fee; that it was also around that time that Roldan read and notarial practice but also the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
reviewed the allegations in the petition and affixed his signature in the Verification and engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. 10 By affixing his signature
Certification portion thereof; that Roldan personally appeared before him, swore in accordance and notarial seal on the document, he attested that Roldan personally appeared before him on
with law and verified his petition in accordance with the Rules of Court; that due to typographical the day it was notarized and verified the contents thereof. His conduct is fraught with dangerous
errors in the psychological report, Atty. Baylosis returned the report for correction; that it was possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts
only on May 13, 2011, that the corrected report was returned to his office; and that he and the public accord to notarized documents. 11
immediately gave the final draft of the petition together with the report and other documents to
his secretary for filing. Atty. Baylosis further averred that the date of recording on May 13, 2011
of the Verification and Certification of the petition was an honest mistake and excusable error on
It must be emphasized that a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, is mandated to discharge
with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest. 12 It is for this reason that a notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the
public's confidence in the integrity of the document would be undermined. 13 In Gonzales v. Atty.
Ramos, 14 it was written:

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is,
by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the public's confidence
in the integrity of the document would be undermined.15

Following the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice, 16 Atty. Baylosis
should be permanently barred from being commissioned a notary public.

The Court would like to stress the prevailing ruling that desistance of the complainant or
withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of an administrative
proceeding. In Bautista v. Bernabe, 17 the Court wrote:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 18

WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Ramoncito B. Baylosis GUILTY of violating the Rule on Notarial
Practice and Rule 1.01 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby imposes the penalty of being PERMANENTLY BARRED from being commissioned as a
Notary Public with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

This order is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to the
personal record of Atty. Ramoncito B. Baylosis; the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all lower courts; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for proper guidance
and information.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION the supposed affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the complainants wife came
back to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a person whom she introduced to him as Charles
Baylon. He further contended that he believed in good faith that the person introduced to him was the
complainant because said person presented to him a Community Tax Certificate bearing the name
CHARLES B. BAYLON, A.C. No. 6962 Charles Baylon. To corroborate his claims, the respondent attached the affidavit of his secretary,
Leonilita de Silva.
The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to commit fraud, deceit or falsehood.[5]
Complainant,
After due proceedings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended to the IBP-Board of
Governors that the respondent be strongly admonished for notarizing the SPA; that
Present: his notarial commission be revoked; and that the respondent be barred from being granted a notarial
commission for one year.[6]
In justifying its recommended sanctions, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline stated that
In this instance, reasonable diligence should have compelled herein respondent to ascertain the true
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the nature of the document, i.e., giving a
third party authority to mortgage a real property owned by another. The only saving grace on the part of
- versus - PUNO, C.J., respondent is that he relied on the fact that the person being authorized under the SPA to act as agent
and who accompanied the impostor, is the wife of the principal mentioned therein.[7]
On October 22, 2005, the IBP-Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-109 which reads:
REYES,
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents failure to properly ascertain the
BRION, JJ. true identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the nature of the document, Atty. Jose
A. Almo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified (sic) from reappointment as Notary Public
for two (2) years.[8]
ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO, Promulgated: In our Resolution[9] dated February 1, 2006, we noted the said IBP Resolution.
We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been negligent in the performance
Respondent. of his duties as a notary public in this case.
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. In Santiago v.
Rafanan,[10] we explained,
June 25, 2008
. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
DECISION upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
QUISUMBING, J.: acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
This case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by the complainant at the Integrated Bar of For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their
the Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with fraud and deceit for notarizing a Special Power of office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They
Attorney (SPA) bearing the forged signature of the complainant as the supposed principal thereof. are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are dictated by public policy
Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife, Rosemarie Baylon, conspired and are impressed with public interest.[11]
in preparing an SPA[1] authorizing his wife to mortgage his real property located in Signal Village, Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of the SPA which in this case
Taguig. He said that he was out of the country when the SPA was executed on June 17, 1996, and also authorized the complainants wife to mortgage the subject real property, the respondent should have
when it was notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To support his contention that he was exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person who represented himself and
overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a certification[2] from the Government of Singapore showing was represented to be the complainant.[12] He should not have relied on the Community Tax Certificate
that he was vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a certification[3] from the Philippine presented by the said impostor in view of the ease with which community tax certificates are obtained
Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the country from March 21, 1995 to January 28, these days.[13]As a matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of a community tax certificate
1997. To prove that his signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant presented a report[4] from the in proving the identity of a person who wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in
National Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned signature on the SPA was not the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of
written by him. persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized.[14]
The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property was mortgaged to Lorna Moreover, considering that respondent admitted[15] in the IBP hearing on February 21, 2005 that he had
Express Credit Corporation and that it was subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his wife to settle already previously notarized some documents[16] for the complainant, he should have compared the
her mortgage obligations. complainants signatures in those documents with the impostors signature before he notarized the
In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that he initially refused to questioned SPA.
notarize it when the complainants wife first came to his office on June 17, 1996, due to the absence of
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of respondent Atty. Jose A. Almo is
hereby REVOKED. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED to be reappointed as Notary Public for a period of two
years.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the respondent is DIRECTED to report
the date of his receipt of this Decision to this Court.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to
the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
January 26, 2016
A.C. No. 10859
[Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2514]
MARIA FATIMA JAPITANA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SYLVESTER C. PARADO, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
This refers to the September 27, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board
of Governors (IBP-BOG), which adopted and approved with modification, the Report and
Recommendation2 of the Investigating Commissioner.
In her verified complaint,3 dated April 6, 2009, which was indorsed by the Court to the IBP,
complainant Maria Fatima Japitana (Fatima) accused respondent Atty. Sylvester C.
Parado (Atty. Parado) of performing notarial acts without authority to do so, knowingly notarizing
forged documents, and notarizing documents without requiring sufficient identification from the
signatories.
The Complaint
On June 22, 2006, Atty. Parado notarized the Real Estate Mortgage4 between RC Lending
Investors, Inc. (RC Lending), as mortgagee, and Maria Theresa G. Japitana (Theresa) and Ma.
Nette Japitana (Nette), as mortgagors. It was supposedly witnessed by Maria Sallie
Japitana (Sallie) and Maria Lourdes Japitana-Sibi (Lourdes) and her husband Dante
Sibi (Dante), Fatima's sisters and brother-in-law, respectively. The mortgage covered a parcel of
land on which the family home of the Japitanas was constituted. On the same date, Atty. Parado
notarized the Affidavit5 allegedly executed by Theresa, Nette, Lourdes, Dante, and Sallie to
show their conformity to the Real Estate Mortgage over the land where their family home was
situated.
On October 23, 2006, RC Lending, through Cristeta G. Cuenco (Cuenco), filed its Petition for
ExtraJudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.6 Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) was issued under the name of RC Lending. On February 3, 2009, it filed an ex-
parte motion7 for the issuance of a break-open order, for RC Lending to effectively take the
possession of the subject property as it was gated and nobody would answer in spite of the
sheriffs repeated knocking.
Fatima, however, assailed that the signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage as well as in the
Affidavit, both notarized on June 22, 2006, were forgeries. She asserted that Atty. Parado did
not require the persons who appeared before him to present any valid identification. Fatima
alleged that Atty. Parado manually forged the signatures of Sallie, Lourdes and Dante, as
witnesses to the Real Estate Mortgage. She added that her sister, Theresa, was a schizophrenic
since 1975. More importantly, Fatima averred that Atty. Parado had no notarial authority, as
certified8by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (RTC).
Proceedings before the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CED) issued the order,9 dated September 17, 2009,
directing Atty. Parado to submit his answer to the verified complaint within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the said order. On February 17, 2001, the IBP CBD issued the Notice of Mandatory
Conference,10 requiring both parties to attend the mandatory conference set on March 16, 2011.
On the said date, The IBP CBD issued another order,11 resetting the mandatory conference to
April 6, 2011 because Atty. Parado failed to appear before the commission.
On April 6, 2011, Atty. Parado again failed to appear. The IBP CBD then issued the
order12 terminating the mandatory conference and directing both parties to submit their
respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of the order.
In her position paper,13 Fatima reiterated that Atty. Parado was guilty of unethical conduct for
performing notarial acts without the necessary authority, and that he knowingly notarized forged
documents. Atty. Parado, on the other hand, failed to submit his position paper.
Report and Recommendation
In his October 31, 2011 Report and Recommendation,14 Investigating Commissioner Oliver A.
Cachapero (Commissioner Cachapero) noted that Atty. Parado had previously testified in court
that the mortgagors and the witnesses personally appeared before him and that it was he who
required them to affix their thumb marks and their signatures - which the parties and the
witnesses in the Real Estate Mortgage did. Commissioner Cachapero opined that there was no
evidence to support that Atty. Parado lied as the court had not set aside his testimonies.
Consequently, he concluded that it was not proven that Atty. Parado forged the assailed
documents and notarized the same.
Commissioner Cachapero, however, found that Atty. Parado was dishonest when he testified
that he was issued a notarial commission effective until 2008. His claim was belied by the
certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that Atty. Parado had not been
issued a notarial commission for 2006. As such, he recommended that Atty. Parado be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On September 27, 2014, the IBP-BOG resolved to revoke Atty. Parado's notarial commission, if
presently commissioned, for testifying that he had a notarial commission valid until 2008,
contrary to the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC and for ignoring the notices
sent by the Commission on Bar Discipline. Likewise, the Board of Governors disqualified Atty.
Parado from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years and suspended him from
the practice of law for six (6) months. Specifically, Resolution No. XXI-2014-616, reads:
xxx for testifying in Court that Respondent himself was issued notarial commission up to the year
2008 which was belied by the Certificate of the Clerk of Court VII of Cebu City pointing out that
Respondent was not issued a Notarial Commission for the year 2006, and for ignoring the
notices of the Commission, Atty. Sylvester C. Parado's notarial commission if presently
commissioned is immediately REVOKED.
FURTHER, he is DISQUALIFIED from being Commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) 1ears
and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. 15
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP BOG but modifies the penalty imposed. Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the presentation of a
competent evidence of identity, if the person appearing before the notary public is not personally
known by him. Section 12, Rule II of the same Rules defines competent evidence of identity as:
A close perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Parado had no existing notarial commission
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
when he notarized the documents in question in 2006. This is supported by the certification
photograph and signature of the individual; or (b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness
issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that based on the Notarial Records, Atty. Parado
not privy to the instrument, document or transaction, who is personally known to the notary
had not been issued a notarial commission for the year 2006. He failed to refute the same as he
public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
neither appeared during the mandatory conference nor filed his position paper.
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and
shows to the notary public a documentary identification.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,16 a person commissioned as a notary public may
perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for
Atty. Parado did not claim to personally know the persons who executed the said documents.
a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
Hence, the presentation of their CTCs was insufficient because those cannot be considered as
commissioning is made. Commission either means the grant of authority to perform notarial or
competent evidence of identity, as defined in the Rules. Reliance on the CTCs alone is a
the written evidence of authority.17
punishable indiscretion by the notary public.19

Without a commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts. A lawyer
Doubtless, Atty. Parado should be held accountable for failing to perform his duties and
who acts as a notary public without the necessary notarial commission is remiss in his
responsibilities expected of him. The penalty recommended, however, should be increased to
professional duties and responsibilities. In Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice,18 the
put premium on the importance of the duties and responsibilities of a notary public. Pursuant to
Court emphasized that notaries public must uphold the requirements in acting as such, to wit:
the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice,20Atty. Parado should be
suspended for two (2) years from the practice of law and forever barred from becoming a notary
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform public.
notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission.
Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sylvester C. Parado is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform
for two (2) years and PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as Notary
such act.
Public.

Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
This order is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document Let copies of this decision be furnished all courts in the country and the Integrated Bar of the
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity.1âwphi1 A notarial document is by Philippines for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this decision be also appended to
law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must the personal record of Atty. Sylvester C. Parado as a member of the Bar.
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
SO ORDERED.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty.
Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial
Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and
directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.

In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing
documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired commission. xxxx [Emphases
Supplied]

Atty. Parado knowingly performed notarial acts in 2006 in spite of the absence of a notarial
commission for the said period. Further, he was dishonest when he testified in court that he had
a notarial commission effective until 2008, when, in truth, he had none. Atty. Parado's misdeeds
run afoul of his duties and responsibilities, both as a lawyer and a notary public.

Moreover, even if Atty. Parado had a valid notarial commission, he still failed to faithfully observe
the Rules on Notarial Practice when he notarized the Real Estate Mortgage and the Affidavit of
Conformity with the persons who executed the said documents merely presenting their
Residence Certificate or Community Tax Certificate (CTC) before him.
 FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9676, April 02, 2018
IN RE: DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 2012 IN OMB-M-A-10-023-A, ETC.
AGAINST ATTY. ROBELITO* B. DIUYAN
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) furnished the Court a copy of its
September 26, 2012 Decision1 in Case No. OMB-M-A-10-023-A (Andrea M. Camilo
v. Raul C. Brion, Agrarian Reform Program Technologist (SG-10), Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office, Mati, Davao Oriental). In the said Decision, the Office of the
Ombudsman noted, viz.:
On a final note, this Office finds it unsettling that the Deed of Partition submitted
before the DAR was notarized by Atty. Robellito B. Diuyan on 23 July 2003, when
one of the signatories therein, Alejandro F. Camilo, had earlier died on 23 August
2001. On this matter, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Supreme Court of
the Philippines for its information and appropriate action.
In a Resolution2 dated July 24, 2013, this Court treated the September 26, 2012
Decision in OMB-M-A-10-023-A and the Deed of Partition as an administrative
complaint against respondent Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan and required the latter to file
a comment thereon.3
In a letter dated October 30, 2013, and by way of comment, respondent admitted
4
notarizing the Deed of Partition in his capacity as District Public Attorney of the
Public Attorney's Office in Mati City and all of Davao Oriental. He claimed that:
[The] signature as Notary Public in that [July 23, 2003] Deed of Partition subject
matter of the complaint was indeed mine. I was still connected with the Public
Attorney's Office as District Public Attorney at that time. I retired on April 20, 2008.
My function [included] the execution and/or notarization of a document x x x.
1n the case at bar, eight (8) persons appeared before me with the document deed
of partition prepared by them subject matter of the complaint. I asked them one by
one if the document is true and correct [and] with their Community Tax Certificates,
they answered me in the affirmative and after being satisfied with their answer I
notarized the document for free as they are considered as indigents. Of course, they
signed it one by one in front of me.5
In a Resolution6 dated February 3, 2014, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
A mandatory conference was set on May 29, 2014 in Pasig City; however,
7
respondent was unable to attend the same since he had not fully recovered from a
debilitating stroke that he suffered in 2012; he cannot stand or walk unassisted;
has difficulty speaking; and only relies on his meager monthly pension of
P12,000.00. Thus, in an Order8 dated May 29, 2014, the mandatory conference was
terminated and respondent was required to submit his Position Paper.
By way of explanation, respondent narrated in his Position Paper9 that:
x x x I have nothing to do with present [charge]. [A]s public officer[,] I [enjoy] the
presumption of good faith and regularity in [the discharge] of my function as Chief
Public Attorney in Mati and all in Davao Oriental x x x; there is no showing that I
have committed any wrong since x x x becoming a lawyer and member of x x x the
[I]ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as [during my] 22 years of x x x service
in [the Public Attorney's Office] and in my private life x x x.
With regard to the deed of partition x x x there is no showing that it was done with
irregularity x x x.
On July 23, 2003 the parties in the document appeared and requested to have their
document notarized for free[. A]s Public Attorney I am bound to do so [since the
affiants were indigents] I x x x then read the said document and asked them if this
is true and [they] answered in the positive. Then having been satisfied of their
answer I let them [sign] one by one in front of me after which I notarized the same
for free. [The] parties [were] personally present and acknowledged that they [were
the] same parties to the document and [they showed] to me their respective CTC.10
In a Report and Recommendation11 dated September 24, 2014, the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. While it found no deceit or malice on the part of the respondent,
and even considered the fact that respondent was a former public official with no
previous record of misconduct, as well as the fact that the affiants in the subject
Deed of Partition were farmers who did not have any IDs and only had Community
Tax Certificates (CTCs) to present and prove their identities, the IBP-CBD
nonetheless found him grossly negligent in the performance of his functions.
The IBP-CBD thus recommended as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned finds respondent guilty of
breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and accordingly, recommends
revocation of his notarial commission, if any, for one (1) year, effective
immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.12
In a Resolution13 dated December 14, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors (BOG)
adopted the IBP-CBD's Report and Recommendation but increased the
recommended penalty, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding Respondent [guilty] for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty.
Robellito R. Diuyan's notarial commission if presently commissioned is immediately
REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned for two (2) years
and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.14
The case is now before us for final disposition.
Issue
Whether respondent should he held administratively liable for notarizing a Deed of
Partition on the basis of the affiants' CTCs.
Our Ruling
This Court finds nothing. irregular with respondent's act of notarizing the Deed of
Partition on July 23, 2003 on the basis of the affiants' CTCs. The law applicable at
the time of the notarization only required the presentation of the CTCs.
In Mabini v. Atty. Kintanar,15 this Court dismissed the administrative complaint filed
against the lawyer therein because the lawyer complied with the notarial law extant WHEREFORE, the Complaint against Diuyan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
at the time of notarizing the contested document, to wit:
It is a truism that the duties performed by a Notary Public are not just plain SO ORDERED.
ministerial acts. They are so impressed with public interest and dictated by public
policy. Such is the case since notarization makes a private document into a public
one; and as a public document, it enjoys full credit on its face. However, a lawyer
cannot be held liable for a violation his duties as Notary-Public when the law in
effect at the time of his complained act does not provide any prohibition to the
same, as in the case at bench. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)
Similarly, respondent notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003, or prior to
the effectivity of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,16 of which he is being held
accountable by the IBP. However, when the Deed was notarized on July 23, 2003,
the applicable law was the notarial law under Title IV, Chapter 11, Article VII of the
Revised Administrative Code,17 Section 251 of which states:
SECTION 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of (cedula) residence tax. -
Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall
have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper (cedula)
residence certificates or are exempt from the (cedula) residence tax, and there shall
be entered by the notary public as a part of such certification the number, place of
issue, and date of each (cedula) residence certificate as aforesaid.
In addition, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 46518 also reiterated the need to present a
residence certificate when acknowledging documents before a notary public, viz.:
Section 6. Presentation of residence certificate upon certain occasions. - When a
person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document before
a notary public, x x x it shall be the duty of such person or officer of such
corporation with whom such transaction is had or business done or from whom any
salary or wage is received to require the exhibition of the residence certificates
showing the payment of the residence,taxes by such person: Provided, however,
That the presentation of the residence certificate shall not be required in connection
with the registration of a voter.

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, it was incorrect for the IBP to have applied the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice in holding respondent liable for notarizing the Deed of Partition. To
reiterate, the Deed was notarized on July 23, 2003. The 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice were not yet in effect at that time.

Here, respondent was then the District Public Attorney in Mati, Davao Oriental when
affiants, who were indigent farmers and who did not have any personal
identification card or any other form of competent evidence save for their
CTCs,19 requested the notarization of the Deed of Partition. These eight individuals
who approached him presented themselves to be the affiants of the said Deed and
signed the same in respondent's presence. There was nothing irregular on the face
of the Deed that would have alerted respondent to ask probing questions or inquire
about the circumstances behind the execution of the said instrument. On the
contrary, the Deed was a valid exercise of the farmers' right to divide the title in
their favor as beneficiaries. The Ombudsman affirmed this when it dismissed the
administrative case filed against an agrarian reform officer concerning the Deed. In
fact, the Ombudsman rule,d that "[t]he eventual breaking of TCT20 CLOA21 No. 454
into individual titles in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries named in said collective
CLOA is not irregular as it is, in fact, provided by DAR22 rules and regulations."23

In fine, respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when he
notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003.
 THIRD DIVISION in possession of the property to avoid the ire of his father from whom he had acquired property
inter vivos, subject to his obligation to vacate the premises anytime upon demand; that on
February 13, 1991, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
G.R. No. 203786 October 23, 2013
T-80054 covering the subject property in its name; that Aquiles necessarily undertook the cost of
repairs and did not pay rent for using the premises; that Aquiles transacted with it, through Sia
AQUILES RIOSA, Petitioner, Ko Pio, now deceased, who was then its Chief Executive Officer; that his opinion that only the
vs. land was sold was absurd because the sale of the principal included its accessories, not to
TABACO LA SUERTE CORPORATION, Respondent. mention that he did not make any reservation at the time the deed was executed; that it
repeatedly asked Aquiles to vacate the premises but to no avail; that, instead, he tried to
renovate the building in 2001 which prompted it to lodge a complaint with the Office of the Mayor
DECISION
on the ground that the renovation work was without a building permit; and that Aquiles’ complaint
was barred by prescription, laches, estoppel and indefeasibility of La Suerte’s title.5
MENDOZA, J.:
During the trial, Aquiles and his daughter, Anita Riosa Cabanele, testified to prove his causes of
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure action. To defend its rightful claim, La Suerte presented the testimony of Juan Pielago Sia
assailing the May 30 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals CA), and its September 20 2012 (Juan), the son of Sia Ko Pio and a member of the board. Aquiles also presented his wife,
Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96459 reversing the September 30 2010 Decision3 of the Erlinda, as rebuttal witness.
Regional Trial Court Branch 15 Tabaco City Albay RTC), which granted the complaint for
annulment/declaration of nullity of the deed of absolute sale and transfer certificate of title On September 30, 2010, the RTC ruled in favor of Aquiles, disposing as follows:
reconveyance and damages.

Wherefore, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
The Facts and against the defendant.

On February 26, 2002, petitioner Aquiles Riosa (Aquiles) filed his Complaint for 1. Ordering the annulment of sale of the subject lot purportedly executed by plaintiff
Annulment/Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title, Aquiles Riosa in favor of defendant corporation;
Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tabaco La Suerte Corporation (La Suerte)
before the RTC.
2. Annulling the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80054 in the name of defendant
corporation;
In his complaint, Aquiles alleged that he was the owner and in actual possession of a 52-square
meter commercial lot situated in Barangay Quinale, Tabaco City, Albay; that he acquired the
said property through a deed of cession and quitclaim executed by his parents, Pablo Riosa, Sr. 3. Ordering defendant corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of Twenty Thousand
and Sabiniana Biron; that he declared the property in his name and had been religiously paying Pesos (₱20,000.00) as Attorney’s fees;
the realty tax on the said property; that thereafter, his daughter, Annie Lyn Riosa Zampelis,
renovated the commercial building on the lot and introduced improvements costing no less than
4. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00) as
₱300,000.00; that subsequently, on three (3) occasions, he obtained loans from Sia Ko Pio in
exemplary damages; and
the total amount of ₱50,000.00; that as a security for the payment of loans, Sia Ko Pio requested
from him a photocopy of the deed of cession and quitclaim; that Sia Ko Pio presented to him a
document purportedly a receipt for the ₱50,000.00 loan with an undertaking to pay the total 5. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
amount of ₱52,000.00 including the ₱2,000.00 attorney’s fees; that without reading the (₱20,000.00) as Attorney’s fees.
document, he affixed his signature thereon; and that in September 2001, to his surprise, he
received a letter from La Suerte informing him that the subject lot was already registered in its
SO ORDERED.6
name.

The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Aquiles that he was made to sign an instrument of
Aquiles claimed that by means of fraud, misrepresentation and deceit employed by Sia Ko Pio,
sale without his knowledge because he trusted Sia Ko Pio and he was of the belief that what he
he was made to sign the document which he thought was a receipt and undertaking to pay the
had signed was merely an instrument of indebtedness. It cited, as legal basis, Article 1330 of the
loan, only to find out later that it was a document of sale. Aquiles averred that he did not appear
Civil Code which provides that a contract where the consent is given thru violence, intimidation,
before the notary public to acknowledge the sale, and that the notary public, a municipal judge,
undue influence or fraud is voidable. Inasmuch as the property was acquired thru fraud, the
was not authorized to notarize a deed of conveyance. He further claimed that he could not have
person who obtained it by force of law was considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
sold the commercial building on the lot as he had no transmissible right over it, as it was not
of the person from whom the property came. Thus, according to the RTC, La Suerte was bound
included in the deed of cession and quitclaim. He, thus, prayed for the nullification of the deed of
to reconvey to Aquiles the subject property.
sale and certificate of title in the name of La Suerte and the reconveyance of the subject
property to him.4
With its motion for reconsideration denied, La Suerte appealed to the CA. In its May 30, 2012
Decision, the CA reversed the RTC decision and upheld the validity of the subject deed of sale
In its Answer, La Suerte averred that it was the actual and lawful owner of the commercial
in favor of La Suerte. It declared La Suerte as the lawful owner of the subject lot and
property, after purchasing it from Aquiles on December 7, 1990; that it allowed Aquiles to remain
improvements thereon, subject to the right of reimbursement for the renovation expenses. The
CA held that tax declarations or realty tax payments by Aquiles were not conclusive evidence of
ownership, citing Spouses Camara v. Spouses Malabao,7 where it was ruled that a party’s
declaration of real property and his payment of realty taxes could not defeat a certificate of title
which was an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the
person whose name appeared thereon. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The September 30, 2010
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 15, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is rendered:
1. DISMISSING the complaint for annulment of deed of sale and transfer certificate of
title, without prejudice to the right of plaintiff-appellee’s daughter to a reimbursement
for the renovation works she made on the structure/building on the lot; and
2. GRANTING defendant-appellant’s counterclaim although in the reduced amount of
₱100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.8
Aquiles filed his Motion for Reconsideration9 of the CA decision, but the same was denied by the
CA in its September 20, 2012 Resolution. Hence, Aquiles filed the present petition before this
Court raising the following
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error in reversing
the decision of the Trial Court disregarding the conclusion and findings of the Trial
court;
2. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error of law in holding
that the personal loan of petitioner obtained and granted by Sia Ko Pio is a
consideration of sale of the property in favor of the respondent corporation La Suerte
Corporation;
3. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was a valid and
perfected contract of sale of real property between petitioner and respondent
corporation La Suerte Corporation;
4. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and
applicable jurisprudence in resolving petitioner’s actual physical possession of the
property in question; and 5. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed
serious error of law by awarding damages to the respondent.10
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether there was a perfected and valid contract of sale
for the subject property between Aquiles and La Suerte, through its Chief Executive Officer, Sia
Ko Pio.
Aquiles argues that there was no perfected contract to sell because (1) there was no transaction
between La Suerte and Aquiles for the sale of the property in question; (2) there was no board
resolution authorizing Sia Ko Pio to purchase the property; (3) there was no evidence that the
money received by Aquiles from Sia Ko Pio came from La Suerte; and (4) he did not appear
before the notary public for notarization of the instrument of sale. Moreover, there was a
discrepancy in the date appearing in the deed of sale and the date in the acknowledgment and
the notarial reference.
La Suerte, in its Comment,11 argued that Aquiles’ petition should be dismissed because it raised
only questions of fact as only pure question of law is allowed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 45. It counters that the notarized deed of sale was the very evidence of the agreement
between them. According to it, said deed of sale was binding and enforceable between them,
albeit there was a discrepancy in the dates, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal
contract of sale of real estate produces legal effect between the parties. La Suerte adds that the
absence of a board resolution for the purchase of the property has no controlling consequence
as La Suerte had ratified the act of Sia Ko Pio.
The Court’s Ruling
Notably, the issues raised in the petition are factual in nature. Essentially, Aquiles asks the Court
to review the factual determination of the CA. As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts and is not to review or
calibrate the evidence on record.12 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact
by the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless
the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions.13 An acceptable exception is where there
is a conflict between the factual determination of the trial court and that of the appellate court. In
such a case, it becomes imperative to digress from this general rule and revisit the factual
circumstances surrounding the controversy.14
In this case, although the RTC and the CA were one in ruling that the prescriptive period of
reconveyance did not run against Aquiles because he remained in possession of the subject
property, they differred in their findings of fact and conclusions on the question of whether there
was a perfected and valid contract of sale.
The RTC annulled the sale of the subject properties on the ground of fraud as Aquiles was made
to sign an instrument which he believed to be a receipt of indebtedness. On the contrary, the CA
ruled that the contract of sale was valid. The CA wrote:
Nevertheless, We rule that the subject deed of sale is valid. We are not convinced of Aquiles’
bare assertion that the said document was executed through fraud, misrepresentation or deceit,
and that his wife’s signature thereon was forged. The rule is that for an action for reconveyance
based on fraud to prosper, the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. It must be stressed that mere allegations
of fraud are not enough. Intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some
manner, injure him, must be specifically alleged and proved.15
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court holds otherwise.
The Court agrees with the finding of the RTC that there was no perfected contract of sale. It is a
hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal
and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a
better position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.16
The elements of a contract of sale are: a] consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to
transfer ownership in exchange for the price; b] determinate subject matter; and c] price certain
in money or its equivalent.17
In this case, there was no clear and convincing evidence that Aquiles definitely sold the subject
property to La Suerte, nor was there evidence that La Suerte authorized its chief executive
officer, Sia Ko Pio, to negotiate and conclude a purchase of the property. Aquiles’ narration in
open court is clear that he did not intend to transfer ownership of his property. The pertinent
parts of his testimony read:
Q – How much is your debt to the father of Jhony known as Pia Wo?
ATTY. GONZAGA: The question refers to Sia Ko Pio?
ATTY. BROTAMONTE: Pia Wa.
A – At first I borrowed ₱3,000.00.
Q – Thereafter is there any additional amount?
A – Then, he give me ₱10,000.00.
Q – Thereafter, is there any additional amount?
A – After the money was exhausted, I borrowed ₱10,000.00.
Q – After that ₱10,000.00, did you borrow another loan? A – The next amount I borrowed from
him is ₱20,000.00.
Q – Now did you sign any document showing receipt of that amount you received from Pia Wa?
A – The last time that I borrowed from him he wants to buy the property but I told him that I will
not sell it.
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
Q – What happened when you did not like to sell the property?
A – He did not say anything but he made me sign a paper evidencing my debt from him.
Q – Were you able to read the papers you signed if there is wording or statement?
A – I did not read it anymore because I trust him.
Q – What happened thereafter?
A – After several years we come to know that our property is already in their name. 18 [Emphases
supplied]
The foregoing testimony negates any intention on the part of Aquiles to sell the property in
exchange for the amounts borrowed. Evidently, it was a series of transactions between Aquiles
and Sia Po Ko, but not between the parties. The transactions were between Aquiles, as
borrower, and Sia Ko Pio, as lender. It was not a sale between Aquiles, as vendor, and La
Suerte, as vendee. There was no agreement between the parties. As the first element was
wanting, Aquiles correctly argued that there was no contract of sale. Under Article 1475 of the
Civil Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds on the
thing which is the object of the contract and on the price.
Aquiles acknowledged that he signed the receipt for the total loan amount of ₱50,000.00 plus
₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees. There is, however, no proof that it came from La Suerte as the
consideration of the sale. Accordingly, there is no basis for a holding that the personal loan of
Aquiles from Sia Ko Pio was the consideration for the sale of his property in favor of La Suerte.
As to La Suerte’s contention that a deed of absolute sale was purportedly executed by Aquiles in
its favor, it failed to adduce convincing evidence to effectively rebut his consistent claim that he
was not aware that what he had signed was already an instrument of sale, considering his trust
and confidence on Sia Ko Pio who was his long-time friend and former employer.
The fact that the alleged deed of sale indubitably bore Aquiles’ signature deserves no
evidentiary value there being no consent from him to part with his property. Had he known that
the document presented to him was an instrument of sale, he would not have affixed his
signature on the document. It has been held that the existence of a signed document purporting
to be a contract of sale does not preclude a finding that the contract is invalid when the evidence
shows that there was no meeting of the minds between the seller and buyer.19
Indeed, if Aquiles sold the property in favor of La Suerte, he would not have religiously and
continuously paid the real property taxes. Also of note is the fact that his daughter spent ₱
300,000.00 for the renovation of improvements. More important, La Suerte did not earlier ask
him to transfer the possession thereof to the company. These uncontroverted attendant
circumstances bolster Aquiles’ positive testimony that he did not sell the property.
And for said reasons, the CA should not have favorably considered the validity of the deed of
absolute sale absent any written authority from La Suerte’s board of directors for Sia Ko Pio to
negotiate and purchase Aquiles property on its behalf and to use its money to pay the purchase
price. The Court notes that when Sia Ko Pio’s son, Juan was presented as an officer of La
Suerte, he admitted that he could not find in the records of the corporation any board resolution
authorizing his father to purchase disputed property.20 In Spouses Firme v. Bukal Enterprises
and Development Corporation,21 it was written:
It is the board of directors or trustees which exercises almost all the corporate powers in a
corporation. Thus, the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 23. The board of directors or trustees. — Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the
corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business
conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or
trustees to be elected from among the holders of stock, or where there is no stock, from among
the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year and until their successors
are elected and qualified. x x x
SEC. 36. Corporate powers and capacity. — Every corporation incorporated under this Code
has the power and capacity:
xxxx
7. To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease, pledge, mortgage and otherwise
deal with such real and personal property, including securities and bonds of other corporations,
as the transaction of a lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and necessarily
require, subject to the limitations prescribed by the law and the Constitution.
 xxxx
Under these provisions, the power to purchase real property is vested in the board of directors or
trustees. While a corporation may appoint agents to negotiate for the purchase of real property
needed by the corporation, the final say will have to be with the board, whose approval will
finalize the transaction. A corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business
through its board of directors and through its officers and agents when authorized by a board
resolution or its by-laws. As held in AF Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dieselman Freight
Services, Co.:
Section 23 of the Corporation Code expressly provides that the corporate powers of all
corporations shall be exercised by the board of directors. Just as a natural person may authorize
another to do certain acts in his behalf, so may the board of directors of a corporation validly
delegate some of its functions to individual officers or agents appointed by it. Thus, contracts or
acts of a corporation must be made either by the board of directors or by a corporate agent duly
authorized by the board. Absent such valid delegation/authorization, the rule is that the
declarations of an individual director relating to the affairs of the corporation, but not in the
course of, or connected with, the performance of authorized duties of such director, are held not
binding on the corporation.22 [Emphases supplied]
In the case at bench, Sia Ko Pio, although an officer of La Suerte, had no authority from its
Board of Directors to enter into a contract of sale of Aquiles’ property. It is, thus, clear that the
loan obtained by Aquiles from Sia Ko Pio was a personal loan from the latter, not a transaction
between Aquiles and La Suerte. There was no evidence to show that Sia Ko Pio was clothed
with authority to use his personal fund for the benefit of La Suerte. Evidently, La Suerte was
never in the picture.
The CA also failed to consider the glaring material discrepancies on the dates appearing in the
purported deed of absolute sale notarized by Judge Arsenio Base, Municipal Court Presiding
Judge of Tabaco City (Judge Base).
An examination of the alleged contract of sale shows three (3) dates:
1. In witness whereof, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 8th day of December
1999 in Tabaco, Albay, Philippines;
2. Before me, this 7th day of December, 1990 in Tabaco, Albay; and
3. Doc. No. 587;
Page No. 12;
Book No. 4;
Series of 1990.
The document was dated 1999, but the date in the acknowledgment and notarial reference was
an earlier date, 1990. The ex-oficio notary public, Judge Base, was not presented to explain the
apparent material discrepancy of the dates appearing on the questioned document. This only
confirms the claim of Aquiles that he signed the receipt representing his loan at the bodega of
Sia Ko Pio sometime in 1990, and not at the office of Judge Base in 1999.
La Suerte insists that the discrepancy on the dates was a mere clerical error that did not
invalidate the deed of sale. It is worthy to stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts
in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. While it is true that an error in the notarial inscription does not generally invalidate a
sale, if indeed it took place, the same error can only mean that the document cannot be treated
as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document
would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due execution
need not be proved.23
An even more substantial irregularity raised by Aquiles pertains to the capacity of the notary
public, Judge Base, to notarize the deed of sale. Judge Base, who acted as ex-oficio notary
public, is not allowed under the law to notarize documents not connected with the exercise of his
official duties. The case of Tigno v. Aquino24 is enlightening:
There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court
Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a
regular notary public provided that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to
the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there
are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies. The facts of this case do not warrant
a relaxed attitude towards Judge Cariño's improper notarial activity. There was no such
certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to accept the
veracity of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city, was even then not
an isolated backwater town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers. 25
In this case, no such certification was attached to the alleged notarized document.1âwphi1 Also,
the Court takes note of Aquiles’ averment that there were several lawyers commissioned as
notary public in Tabaco City. With Judge Base not being authorized to notarize a deed of
conveyance, the notarized document cannot be considered a valid registrable document in favor
of La Suerte.
Moreover, Aquiles wife, Erlinda, who appeared to have affixed her signature as a witness to the
purported document of sale, categorically stated that she never signed such an instrument and
never appeared before a notary public.
Although it is true that the absence of notarization of the deed of sale would not invalidate the
transaction evidenced therein,26 yet an irregular notarization reduces the evidentiary value of a
document to that of a private : document, which requires proof of its due execution and
authenticity to be admissible as evidence.27
It should be noted that the deed of sale was offered in evidence as authentic by La Suerte,
hence, the burden was upon it to prove its authenticity and due execution. La Suerte
unfortunately failed to discharge this burden. Accordingly, the preponderance of evidence is in
favor of Aquiles.
In fine, considering the irregularities or defects in the execution and notarization of the deed of
sale, the Court finds Itself unable to stamp its seal of approval on it. The R TC was correct in
ordering its annulment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 30, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 96459 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The September 30, 2010 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 Tabaco City, Albay, is REINSTATED.
This disposition is without prejudice to any valid claim of the heirs of Sia Ko Pio against Aquiles.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod
City, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage
they will solemnize.
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio
V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law.1
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license.
He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation2 and issued them to the contracting parties.3 He
notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage.4 These "package marriages" are
allegedly common in Bacolod City.5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo.
All affidavits were notarized on the day of the contracting parties’ marriages. 6 The affidavits
contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.
(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge7
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo
allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-90 allows
municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if
connected with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are
not connected with a judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. 9 Thus, Judge
Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he
solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits.
He also did not require the parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as
required by law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x
simple and elementary to ignore."10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is
the father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making
false statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to
delay Frialyn’s case.12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge.13 The
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary14 does not prohibit
judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will
solemnize.15 Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a
judge, not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he
notarized.16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their
competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of
their affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the
affidavit.17 The parties’ identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they solemnized.19 He pleaded "not to make him
[complainant Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and chopping block"20 since other judges also
notarized affidavits of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo
be fined ₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt with more
severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
connected with municipal trial court judges’ official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on
the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,21 a judge’s duty is to personally
examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage
ceremony.22 Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the
Court Administrator recommended a fine of ₱1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized. 23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of
gross ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However,
they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and
other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90
dated February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath
perform the function of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to
amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised the marriage.
Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of
this power:
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary
also provides:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal
notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,
ratification of cohabitation. — In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation,
contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their
the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to determine their
functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also
fact of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of
prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing
compliance with (a) and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in marriage.
their courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public
when notarizing documents ex officio:
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage.
neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities
or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio,
As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of
(Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2)
cohabitation.
certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit.24
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function
and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the
duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the
exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of
affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements
cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial
before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in
jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the
marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting
parties and examine the requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they
the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage
will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function
license.26
and duty to solemnize marriages.

A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he
and none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage.27 Before performing the marriage
solemnized their marriages]."33 He notarized documents not connected with his official function
ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented. 28
and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. 29 Instead,
Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he
the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by
cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
law to administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the
affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other. 31 The judge must also To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the solemnizing officer’s duties to examine the
execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and affidavit of cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been
found no legal impediment to the marriage.32 Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines complied with redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a document he
provides: himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by law to
administer oaths" who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
performs the marriage ceremony are two different persons.
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from
notarizing "private documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges."34 Since a marriage license is a public document, its "counterpart," the
affidavit of cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of
cohabitation, he notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity."35 The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public
purpose," remains a private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private
documents. As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official duty
to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges
and private lawyers in transacting legal conveyancing business."36 He cited Borre v. Judge
Moya37 where this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90 for
notarizing a deed of sale. Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of
cohabitation, he did "not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting
legal conveyancing business."38 Thus, he did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that
"[judges] should not compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business."39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal
conveyancing business." So long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official
functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a
certificate of candidacy. In Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this court fined Judge Galapon for
notarizing the verification page of an answer filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board. The documents involved in these cases were not used to transact "legal
conveyancing business." Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty
of violating Circular No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official
function and duty to solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries
public are lacking in Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in
the municipality or circuit of the judge’s court constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.42
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they
solemnized does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to
the contrary.43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b)
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the
signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory
to present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public
is the signatory to the instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not
personally know the signatory, he must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of
identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties
subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties
were personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of evidence
of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They
personally appeared before him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also
interviewed them on their qualifications to contract marriage. Thus, the parties to the affidavit of
cohabitation need not present their competent pieces of evidence of identity.44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the
parties personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to
their affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with
them.45 Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the
notary public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos
v. Judge How46where this court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations x x x"47were defenses against gross ignorance of the law charges. His
good faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres]
only within the parameters of tolerable judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does not apply where the
issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond
possible margins of error."49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts’ territorial jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
requires notaries public to personally know the signatory to the document they will notarize or
require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal
principles and procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements
nine times is not good faith.

Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity,50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer."51 If the law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes "lack of integrity."52 Violating basic
legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.

This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it
being a serious charge:53

a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations;54

b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months;55 or

c. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. 56

This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for
gross ignorance of the law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges’
practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court
finds suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months sufficient
sanction.

Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law.1âwphi1 They
should act with caution with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical
requirements as in this case will be dealt with strictly.

WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and
other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of
this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196651, February 03, 2016
UWE MATHAEUS, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ERIC AND GENEVIEVE
MEDEQUISO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 14, 2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 04236 dismissing
petitioner Uwe Mathaeus' Petition for Review, as well as the CA's April 6, 2011
Resolution3 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Factual Antecedents
In Civil Case No. 5579, the Tagbilaran Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
1 issued a January 12, 2007 Decision5 ordering petitioner to pay respondents
spouses Eric and Genevieve Medequiso, the amount of P30,000.00 with legal
interest, attorney's fees, and costs.
Petitioner interposed an appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 7269, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 48. On September 30, 2008, the RTC
issued a Decision6 affirming the MTCC judgment.
Petitioner moved to reconsider,7 but the RTC - in an April 13, 2009 Order8 - upheld
its judgment.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review9 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R CEB SP No.
04236. However, in its assailed September 14, 2009 Resolution, the CA dismissed
the Petition, decreeing thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Perusal of the instant petition filed by the petitioner within the period prayed for
discloses that the required Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping
was sworn to not before a notary public but before a clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court in Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
Although Section 242 of Article III of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes
clerks of court to act as notaries public ex-officio, the Supreme Court lias
consistently ruled that clerks of court may notarize or administer oaths only when
tiie matter is related to the exercise of their official functions.10 A Verification in an
appeal via a Petition for Review is not within the scope of the matters wherein clerks
of court are at liberty to notarize or administer oath. Hence, the same is considered
improperly verified and treated as unsigned and dismissible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,12 but in its assailed Resolution, the CA stood
its ground.
Hence, the instant Petition.
In a December 4, 2013 Resolution,13 this Court resolved to give due course to the
Petition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A PROPER VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42 THAT WARRANTS A DISMISSAL OF
THE PETITION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II
WHETHER OR NOT A STRICT ADHERENCE TO SECTION 6 OF THE REVISED RULE ON
SUMMARY PROCEDURE IS TO BE RESORTED [TO] TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION
THAT THE ANSWER OF THE PETITIONER WAS NOT EXPUNGED FROM THE RECORDS
OF THE MTCC CASE.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PECULIARITY OF THE MTCC CASE AND THE ADVENT OF
A.M. 08-9-7-SC (RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES) ENTITLES A
LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES TO GIVE THE PETITIONER HIS DAY IN
COURT AND ALLOW HIM TO PRESENT HIS EVIDENCE DURING A FULL BLOWN
TRIAL.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner's Arguments
In his Petition and Reply15 seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and the
RTC's September 30, 2008 Decision, as well as the remand of the case to the MTCC
for further proceedings, petitioner argues that - contrary to the CA's pronouncement
that a clerk of court's administration of an oath in a verification contained in a
petition for review is not within the scope of his official functions - Atty. Romulo T.
Puagang (Clerk of Court of the Bohol RTC) may validly notarize the verification in
the CA petition, as it is merely a continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
5579; that the Astorga16 case refers to documents that are alien to a clerk of court's
functions - the CA petition cannot be said to be alien to the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 5579; that his filing of an unverified Answer in Civil Case No. 5579 - which
led the MTCC to discard the same and render judgment against him - should not be
taken against him, because as a non-lawyer and foreigner who prepared and filed
the same without furnishing copies to the opposing party, he did not know the
judicial rules of procedure; that therefore, his Answer in Civil Case No. 5579 should
be admitted; that with the admission of his Answer, proceedings in the MTCC should
be reopened and continued; that liberality in the application of the rules on
summary procedure is underscored by the subsequent issuance of the rules of
procedure on small claims cases, which prohibit the appearance of attorneys; and
that the case should be reopened in order that the parties may present their
respective evidence,
Respondent's Arguments
In their Comment17 seeking denial of the Petition, respondents plainly point out that
the Petition is frivolous and dilatory; that in deciding the case, the MTCC, RTC and
CA unanimously rendered judgment against petitioner; and that petitioner's
arguments deserve no merit.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Our Ruling
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial
compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or compelling reasons.'"19 Taking
the foregoing circumstances and considerations to mind, the Court is not inclined to
relax the rules for the petitioner's benefit; it perceives no compelling reasons or
circumstances to rule in his favor. Quite the contrary, the CA pronouncement
ordering the dismissal of his Petition for Review is just, and thus should stand.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2009 and April 6, 2011
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 04236 are AFFIRMED.

The Court denies the Petition. SO ORDERED.cr

We have held that "Clerks of Court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus
notarize documents or administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the
exercise of their official functions. x x x [C]lerks of court should not, in their ex-
officio capacity, take part in the execution of private documents bearing no relation
at all to their official functions."18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Even if it is to be conceded that the CA Petition for Review in CA-G.R. CEB SP No.
04236 is merely a continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 5579, this Court
cannot agree with petitioner's argument that the notarization of verifications and
certifications on non-forum shopping constitutes part of a clerk of
court's daily official functions. We are not prepared to rule in petitioner's favor on
this score; as it is, the workload of a clerk of court is already heavy enough. We
cannot add to this the function of notarizing complaints, answers, petitions, or any
other pleadings on a daily or regular basis; such a responsibility can very well be
relegated to commissioned notaries public. Besides, if the practice - specifically title
notarization by clerks of court of pleadings filed in cases pending before their own
salas or courts - is allowed, unpleasant consequences might ensue; it could be
subject to abuse, and it distracts the clerks of court's attention from the true and
essential work they perform.

Petitioner's procedural misstep forms part of a series of lapses committed in the

prosecution of his case. In the MTCC level, he failed to file a verified Answer to
respondents' Complaint. Secondly, he did not furnish a copy thereof to respondents.
As a result, the MTCC expunged his responsive pleading and rendered judgment
against him. This time, at the level of the CA, he committed another mistake; that
is, he caused his Petition for Review to be notarized by the RTC Clerk of Court
where his case is pending. At this point, petitioner and his counsel are expected to
be more circumspect in their actions, avoiding the commission of questionable acts
that jeopardize their case.

Under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the CA, submitting
together with the petition a certification on non-forum shopping. Under Section 3 of
the same Rule, "[t]he failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the
deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof."

Specifically with respect to certifications against forum-shopping, we have

repeatedly held that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016
ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA
PEÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed
(complainant) against Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty
and grave misconduct. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
The Facts
In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with
dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the
Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the
complaint filed by respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the
complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect,
there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil
action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato
Jadulco.
Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a
copy of the free patent covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730,
but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. Complainant claimed
that she could not properly defend herself without a copy of the title. She
further claimed that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To
support such claim, complainant presented Certifications from the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in
Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT
No. 1730.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when
he represented the occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family, who
previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed
of donation respondent notarized.
Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch 16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former
client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor. Complainant
narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed in the
[Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the
accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate
Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) - University of
Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and
received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal
which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government
office.
In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the
charges against him. Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action]
he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon
Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001."3 chanrob lesvi rtual lawlib rary
Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of
the records in Civil Case No. B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to
complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not furnished,
respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon filing of the instant
complaint.
Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to
the case filed against the occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed
that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should be
addressed to Judge Asis himself.
As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of
dismissal from the service, respondent admitted that he accepted the positions
of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines
College of Law, which is a government institution. However, respondent
countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and
thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent further claimed that his
designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had not received
any salary except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation
as Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he proceeded to
perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit
from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the administrative case against him, who
interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed before this
Court.
Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a
Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20 February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to
the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All these submissions basically
reiterated the respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's
allegations.
chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
The Ruling of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent in
his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described complainant's
counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married
man x x x before the wife of that married man died." According to the IBP
Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of
respondent's gross misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character
as an officer of the court."
With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP
Commissioner found that respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the
numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she has
submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct
(1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint filed by
complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is
respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of
the free patent covered by OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the Comment
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and (3) for accepting the positions
of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines
College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory
penalty of prohibition on reemployment in any government office as a result of
his dismissal as a judge.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.8 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibrary
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting
the IBP Commissioner's recommendation. The Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.9
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct. chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
The Ruling of the Court
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
Using foul language in pleadings
In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature
and complexion"10 and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man
x x x before the wife of that married man died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent
maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed
to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative
case."12
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry
We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is
irrelevant to the resolution of this case. While respondent is entitled and very
much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using
improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states: ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action
The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-
conciliation between the parties in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the
filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no such
certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco,
et al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in
the complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against
Fortunato Jadulco.15chanroblesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118
for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x was the certification x x x issued on May 9,
2001, x x x."
Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-
1118 was filed with the RTC on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of
Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he
used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of
the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of
Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118
was filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that the
subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was issued prior to the filing
of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate
to file action when there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01,
and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title
With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel
with a copy of the free patent title, we find that it does not constitute
dishonesty.
Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which
means that a copy of the title exists. There is no showing that respondent
deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The
remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a
motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and her
counsel could examine the same.
Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a
question of fact demanding an examination of the parties' respective evidence.
Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this administrative case,
absent any clear and convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated
such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove
that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm
that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their official records. chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
Conflict of interest
Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly
notarized a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by complainant's
family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly
sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are occupants in the
lot owned by complainant's family.
Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary
public simply performs the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial
Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature
witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand,
refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving
with Judge Asis and conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to
respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any proof. Complainant
simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860
and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the
RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any concrete evidence proving
her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis.
Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge
should be filed against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored
by the judge.chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office
In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge
of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for partiality, with prejudice to
reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his
dismissal as a judge, one of which is the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified,
respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-
College of Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor.
Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed
salary was attached to his designation except for honorarium." Respondent
also claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE
office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the Supreme
Court." He further avers that complainant in the administrative case against
him (as a judge) posed no objection to his petition for clemency.
Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment
does not distinguish between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence,
that his designation was only temporary does not absolve him from liability.
Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does
not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in
a government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous
administrative case did not object to his petition for clemency.
In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office,
respondent should have declined from accepting the designation and desisted
from performing the functions of such positions.17Clearly, respondent
knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed
upon him by the Court.
In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this
Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension
order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes
gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's
suspension or even disbarment. chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
Gross Misconduct
In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that
he submitted a certificate to file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa
when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the civil action of his
client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper
language in his pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on
reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal
as a judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a
mere error in judgment."19 chan roble svirtu allawlib rary
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground
for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's
recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of

gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for
two (2) years with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar act
or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and all courts in the Philippines for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

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