Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We have repeatedly held, however, that the
the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in existence of a contract between the parties does not
fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by bar the commission of a tort by the one against the
a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise other and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor.
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise presence of contractual relations. The liabilities of a
was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be
inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other
sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.Quasi-delict, as defined in Article
to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of
2176 of the Civil Code, is homologous but not identical
marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, to tort under the common law, which includes not only
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as
followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs, or public policy. NAVIDA V. DIZON ET. AL G.R. NO. 125078, MAY 30,
2011
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. VS. CA, GR
FACTS:
NO. 110295, OCT. 18, 1993
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were
FACTS:
filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve
Geronimo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint foreign countries, including the Philippines. The
for damages against petitioner. She alleges in her thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they
complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten allegedly sustained from their exposure to
Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill
of soft drinks and other goods to the students of nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23
Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public. Some foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred
parents of the students complained to her that the Coke to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the
and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases
matter and other foreign substances or particles. She therein that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were
brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.,"
the DOH for examination; subsequently, the DOH which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and
informed her that the samples she submitted "are "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which
adulterated”. Due to this, her sales of soft drinks was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The
severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the
as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses; not dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum
long after that, she had to lose shop and became jobless non conveniens.
and destitute. In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the
Federal District Court conditionally granted the
ISSUE: defendants' motion to dismiss.
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in
W/N the subsequent action for damages against the soft view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive
drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach systems which they allegedly suffered because of their
of implied warranty against hidden defects or exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that
merchantability pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil they were exposed to this chemical during the early
Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public 1970's up to the early 1980's when they used the same
respondent, which can be filed within four years in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or
pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code. when they resided within the agricultural area where
such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that
W/N DOLE Inc., should be held liable for damages due W/N CLC is guilty under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
to exposure of the nematocides.
HELD:
HELD:
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint- Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., evidence:
attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides
containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
al., and ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said other person for whose act he must respond
chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses,
specifically to their reproductive system. (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
cause of action of plaintiff claimants — a quasi-delict,
which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or Difference between fault and negligence:
omission which causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the o FAULT
Civil Code provides:
Article 2176.Whoever by act or voluntary act or omission which causes damage
omission causes damage to another, to the right of another giving rise to an obligation
there being fault or negligence, is on the part of the actor to repair such damage.
obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no requires the execution of a positive act which
pre-existing contractual relation causes damage to another
between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the o NEGLIGENCE
provisions of this Chapter.
failure to observe for the protection of the
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et interest of another person that degree of care,
al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from precaution and vigilance which the
their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the circumstances justly demand.
banana plantations located in the Philippines or while
Consists of the omission to do acts which result
they were residing within the agricultural areas also
in damage to another.
located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the
Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of The fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows
action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. that the door could not be opened from the inside. That
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao sufficiently points that something was wrong with the
City obviously have reasonable basis to assume door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
jurisdiction over the cases. loquitor. There is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of
liability on petitioners' part. Our pronouncement that
a.2 Requisites Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not
get out using the door, negates petitioners' other
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
contention that the proximate cause of the accident was
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
Timothy's own negligence. The injuries he sustained
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
from the fall were the product of a natural and
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
cause that originated from CLC's own negligence.
provisions of this Chapter.
b. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM:
FACTS: Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail
himself of any other remedy because he may
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic not recover damages twice for the same negligent act
corporation engaged in the business of transporting or omission of the accused (Article 2177 of the Civil
beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC). Code). In other words, "the same act or omission can
Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender,
trailer driven by Romeo Dunca. At around 4:00 o’clock that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi
in the morning while the truck was descending at a delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the
slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
the road which was uneven because there were damages under both types of liability."
potholes about five to six inches deep. The left lane
parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. Before In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file
approaching the potholes, Dunca and his truck helper a separate civil action for damages against Reyes
saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the Trucking as employer of Dunca, based on quasi delict,
opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
road by taking the left lane but at that particular
moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to Under the law, the vicarious liability of the employer is
run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. founded on at least two specific provisions of law:
Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved
to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. The Nissan Art. 2176 in relation to Article 103 of the
was severely damaged, and its two passengers, Art. 2180 of the Civil Revised Penal Code
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. Code
Reyes Trucking settled the claim of the heirs of Balcita.
The heirs of Dy opted to pursue the criminal action but Preponderance of Proof Beyond
did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they Evidence Reasonable
filed against Reyes Trucking. They also withdrew their Doubt
reservation to file a separate civil action against Liability of employer
Dunca and manifested that they would prosecute the is Direct and Liability of
civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. TC Primary subject to employer is
consolidated both criminal and civil cases and the defense of due subsidiary to the
conducted a joint trial of the same. TC held diligence in the liability of the
Dunca guilty of the crime of Double Homicide through selection and employee.
Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor supervision of the
Vehicle Law and liable to indemnify the heirs of Dy for employee.
damages and the dismissal of the complaint in the
Employer and Liability attaches
separate civil case. TC rendered a supplemental
employee are when the
decision ordering Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable for
solidarily liable, employee is
all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy,
thus, it does not found to be
Jr., in the event of insolvency of the Dunca.
require the insolvent.
ISSUES: employer to be
insolvent.
May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily liable for the
damages awarded to the heirs of Dy in the criminal
action against Dunca, despite the filing of a separate
civil action against Reyes Trucking? SPS. SANTOS, EL. AL. V. PIZARDO, ET. AL., GR
NO.151452, JUL. 29, 2005
HELD:
FACTS:
No.
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with
Reyes Trucking, as employer of the accused who has Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide
been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a
imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus
of the filing of the separate civil action based on q u a s i driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which
d e l i c t against it. However, Reyes Trucking, as claimed the lives of the van's driver and three of its
defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed passengers, including a two-month old baby, and
against it, based on q u a s i d e l i c t , may be held liable caused physical injuries to five of the van's passengers.
thereon. Sibayan was convicted and sentenced due to the said
crime. There was a reservation to file a separate civil
action.
ISSUE: ISSUE:
W/N Atlantic Company is liable for damages. Whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
HELD: HELD:
Whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit
solely liable for the damages sustained by respondents. (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract NEGLIGENCE – conduct that creates undue risk of
whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W. harm to another. It is the failure to observe that degree
Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P4,000. They of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances
agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.
Endencia’s title to the land was perfected in the Court of (Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja,
Land Registration and a Torrens title issued in her name. G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002)
When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out
that the property measured 1,248 hectares instead of - want of care required by the circumstances. It
452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its
she became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to application depends upon the situation of the parties,
Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so and the degree of care and vigilance which the
large an amount and that she had been misinformed as circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is
to its area. Daywalt filed an action for specific great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure
performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
entire tract to Daywalt. Meanwhile, the La Corporacion circumstances. (US v. Juanillo, G.R. No. 7255, Oct. 3,
de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a 1912)
religious corporation, which owned an estate
Elements:
immediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to
Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the Reasonable foresight of harm
representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence
and ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of Failure to take necessary precaution
little force and easily subject to the influence of other
people. Father Sanz knew of the existence of the PICART V. SMITH, 69 SCRA 809
contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from
conveying the entire tract. Daywalt filed an action for FACTS:
damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it
unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the
performance of her contract for the sale of the land in Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union when the
question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant
Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was The question as to what would constitute the
Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. He conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
went to Manila International Airport to meet his future of course be always determined in the light of
son-in-law. As the plane was landing, he and his human experience and in view of the facts involved
companions went to the viewing deck to watch the in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot
arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke slipped on an be here of much value but this much can be
elevation 4 inches high and fell on his back, breaking his profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
thigh bone in the process. He underwent a 3- conduct by the circumstances which are before them
hour operation and after recovery he filed a claim for or known to them. They are not, and are not
damages against the Civil Aeronautics Administration supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they
(CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the can be expected to take care only when there is
airport. something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
ISSUE: consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to
W/N CAA was negligent take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
HELD:
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a always necessary before negligence can be held to
legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was exist....
never intended to trip down people and injure them. It
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case
was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the
before the lower court, could not have reasonably
True, he may not have known and probably did not 1. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of
know the precise nature of the explosion which might the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between
be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, the vehicles. Petitioner has the burden of showing a
and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries causal connection between the injury received and the
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, must show that the violation of the statute was the
and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
the explosion. It would be going far to say that substantially contributed thereto. Petitioner says that
"according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning
such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be headlight during night time certainly increases the risk of
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else accident," that because the Cimarron had only one
should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the
by him under such circumstances. fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuver ability." We are
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be convinced that no maneuvering which the Cimarron
said to have the necessary capacity to understand and driver could have done would have avoided a collision
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own with the panel truck, given the suddenness of the events.
acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat was
exercise due care and precaution in the commission of immaterial.
such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the
things the question of negligence necessarily depends accident was the negligence of petitioners driver. As the
on the ability of the minor to understand the character trial court noted, the swerving of petitioners panel truck
of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioners
which a minor can be said to have such ability will driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed but
necessarily depends of his own acts and their that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it
consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be as well.
said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
accordance with the varying nature of the infinite 2. With respect to the requirement of passing
variety of acts which may be done by him. psychological and physical tests prior to his employment,
although no law requires it, such circumstance would
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY V. CA, 300 SCRA 20 certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due
diligence. As the trial court said:
FACTS:
. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and
This case involves a collision between a truck owned by emotional, were conducted on their would-be
petitioner and a cimarron which caused the death of employees. No on-the-job training and seminars
three persons and injuries to several others. Petitioner’s reminding employees, especially drivers, of road
truck crashed the cimarron when the driver stepped on courtesies and road rules and regulations were
the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and this caused done. There were no instructions given to
his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a defendants drivers as to how to react in cases of
portion of the opposite lane. RTC found Petitioner’s emergency nor what to do after an emergency
driver to be responsible for the accident and awarded occurs. All these could only mean failure on the part
damages in favor of Private respondents. Petitioner of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it
contends that the driver of the cimarron was guilty of of a good father of a family in the selection and
contributory negligence since it was guilty of violation of supervision of its employees. Indeed, driving exacts
traffic rules and regulations (overloading, had only one a more than usual toll on the sense. Accordingly, it
headlight on) at the time of mishap. He also argued that behooves employers to exert extra care in the
sudden swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver selection and supervision of their employees. They
stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. He must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by
further argued that the driver should be exonerated law. But petitioner did not show in what manner
based on the doctrine of last clear chance, which states drivers were supervised to ensure that they drove
that the person who has the last clear chance of their vehicles in a safe way.
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts
of his opponent, is solely responsible for the MERCURY DRUG V. BAKING, GR NO. 156037, MAY
consequences of the accident. He petitioner claimed that 25, 2007
the cimarron had the last opportunity of avoiding an
accident. FACTS:
The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera has reached the Application of Article 2180:
intersection where there is a traffic sign 'yield,' it stopped
and cautiously treated the intersection as a "Thru Stop' The patent and gross negligence on the part of the
street, which it is not. The KBL bus was on its way from petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its regular driver Virgilio presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of
Llamoso, on its way towards Manila. The regular negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of
itinerary of the KBL bus is through the town proper of its bus driver. Where the employer is held liable for
Pila, Laguna, but at times it avoids this if a bus is already damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its
fully loaded with passengers and can no longer own negligent employee. The liability of the employer
accommodate additional passengers. As the KBL bus under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on The fact that Crame did not see Coombs until the car
the part of petitioneror its employees was not merely was very close to him is strong evidence of inattention
presumed.Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its to duty, especially since the street was wide and
shop and the residenceof the Mables as required by a unobstructed, with no buildings on either side from
city ordinance: which a person can dart out so suddenly. Moreover, the
street was also well-lighted, so there is no reason why
- that the fire could have been caused by a Crame did not see Coombs long before he had reached
heated motor or a litcigarette the position in the street where he was struck down.
- that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored The presence of the carromata was not corroborated
in the shop; and by any of the witnesses. Moreover, it would have
obscured his vision only for a moment. Besides, it is the
- that workers sometimes smoked inside the duty of automobile drivers in meeting a moving vehicle
shop on public streets and highways to use due care and
diligence to see to it that persons who may be crossing
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, behind the moving vehicle are not run down by them.
Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with
city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of It is clearly established that Crame was driving along
negligence.Even then the fire possibly would not have the right-hand side of the streetwhen the accident
spread to the neighboring houses were it not for happened. According to the law of the road and the
another negligent omission on the part of defendants, custom ofthe country, he should have been on the left-
namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high hand side of the street. According towitnesses there
enough to prevent the flames from leaping over was abundant room for him to drive on such side.
it. Defendant's negligence,therefore, was not only with
respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect There is no evidence which shows negligence on the
tothe spread thereof to the neighboring houses. part of Coombs. At the time he was struck, he had a
right to be where the law fully protected him from
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner vehicles traveling in the direction in which the accused
be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to was driving at the time of injury. There is no evidence
construct a firewall between its property and private to show that the soldier was drunk at the time of the
respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with accident. And even if he were, mere intoxication is not
the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with negligence, nor does it establish a want of ordinary
an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the
ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v. other evidence tending to prove negligence. If one’s
Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care
181.] and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or
sober.
US V. CRAME, 30 PHIL 2
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; PRESUMPTIONS AND
FACTS: BURDEN OF PROOF.
Mariano Crame, chauffeur of a motor vehicle, while Where, in a criminal prosecution against the driver of an
driving along Calle Herran in the city of Manila, automobile for running down and injuring a pedestrian
knocked down, dragged, and ran over the body of crossing a street, it appeared that at the time the injury
George E. Coombs, a private in the US army, who was was produced, the injured person was where he had a
then crossing the road, causing him injuries, wounds, right to be, that the automobile was being driven on the
and bruises. Moreover, such injuries damaged his wrong side of the street, and no warning was given of its
mental faculties and incapacitated him from further approach, it was properly held that there was a
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, Whether the IAC acted correctly in applying the doctrine
the doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r should apply as to or res ipsa loquitur with proper jurisprudential basis and
presume negligence on the part of the appellees. if not, who is negligent?
HELD: HELD:
DOCTRINE OF R E S I P S A L O Q U I T U R APPLIES. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or
CALTEX IS LIABLE. on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would
be of no moment taking into account the warning device
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or
thing which caused the injurycomplained of is shown to four meters from the back of the truck. But despite this
be under the management of defendant or his servants warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private
things does not happen if those who have its respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo
management or control use proper care, it affords truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the
reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and left
defendant, that the incident happened because of want foot.
of care.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
and employees, was under the control of appellees. A established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows
fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by
neighboring houses. The person who knew or could respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to
have known how the fire started were the appellees escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the
and their employees, but they gave no explanation respondent court committed reversible error.
thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care. DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR:
The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank under the management of the defendant, and the
wagon who was transferring the contents thereof into accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
the underground storage when the fire broke out, not happen if those who have the management use
strengthen the presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians absence of any explanation by the defendant, that the
often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the accident arose from want of care.
area is used as a car barn for around 10taxicabs
owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out AS DEFINED UNDER BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY:
and possibly smoke cigarettes is located one meter
from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable
concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only presumption or inference that defendant was negligent,
2½ meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing
from leaping over it in case of fire. injury was in defendant’s exclusive control, and that the
b.) YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person in charge and
In the selection of prospective employees, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualifications, 3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any
experience and service records. While the petitioner- voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
corporation does not appear to have erred in injured
considering Pascual for his position, its lack of
supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable
The above requisites are all present in this case. First,
for the fire.In the supervision of employees, the
no person just walking along the road would suddenly be
employer must formulate standard operating
sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent.
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend
Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the
off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar
proof, including documentary evidence that they
Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
power to instruct him with regard to the specific
CARMEN, JR. V. BACOY G.R. NO. 173870 APRIL 25, restrictions of the jeep's use, including who or who may
2012 not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without
the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it
FACTS: safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to
observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no
showing that the death of the victims was due to any
At dawn on New Year's Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy
voluntary action or contribution on their part.
Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo
The Board of Medicine of the PRC rendered a Decision Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought
exonerating petitioner from the charges filed against her. as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. The defenses in an action for damages,
provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are:
Respondents went to the PRC on appeal. The PRC
rendered a Decision reversing the findings of the Board
and revoking petitioner’s authority or license to practice Art. 2179.When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
her profession as a physician. the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate
Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
also dubbed her petition as one for certiorari under Rule
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
65 of the Rules of Court. The petition was dismissed by
the CA citing that neither Rule 43 nor Rule 65 was a
proper remedy. Hence, this petition. In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the
Board of Medicine that petitioner advised her to return
on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days after the D&C.
ISSUE:
However, complainant failed to do so. This being the
case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the
W/N petitioner was guilty of negligence and malpractice. doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was
interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent could
HELD: have examined her thoroughly.
Worthy to mention that the fact that the PRC was not Editha omitted the diligence required by the
among those enumerated in the list of quasi-judicial circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The
agencies in Rule 43 does not by its fact alone, imply its omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation
exclusion from the coverage of the said Rule. The Rule played a substantial part in bringing about Editha’s own
expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals injury.
from awards, judgments final orders or resolutions of
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi- Based on the evidence presented in the present case
judicial functions. under review, in which no negligence can be attributed
to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident
resulting in Editha’s injury was her own omission when
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if deceased against INELCO. INELCO contends that the
such animal should escape from him or stray away. deceased could have died simply either by drowning or
by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to
herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should
out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge,
arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person
caused the installation of a burglar deterrent. Petitioner
who may have suffered it.
conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent must
have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's
ISSUE: electrocution when she tried to open her gate that fateful
day. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of
W/N owner of the animal is liable for the injuries caused petitioner and dismissed the complaint. An appeal was
to the caretaker. filed with the CA which reversed the trial court’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
HELD:
ISSUE:
NO. For the statute names the possessor or user of the
animal as the person liable for "any damages it may W/N the CA erred in not applying the legal principle of
cause," and this for the obvious reason that the "assumption of risk" in the present case to bar private
possessor or user has the custody and control of the respondents from collecting damages.
animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it
from causing damage. HELD:
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes
Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the to leave the party but not under the ignominious
truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was circumstance painted by the latter and claimed that she
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of asked the latter to leave in the most discreet manner.
res judicata does not apply.
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, the Civil giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim . The
Code requires extraordinary diligence from common trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to Plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty
the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated,
the risk of being asked to leave as he was a "gate- the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
crasher." problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. Under these
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person circumstances the law is that the person who has the
assents is not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self- last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to
inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, ALLIED BANK V. BPI G.R. NO. 188363 FEBRUARY
however, this doctrine does not find application to the 27, 2013
case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed
the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners,
FACTS:
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still
under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose
him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of
P1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group
International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more
accepted at petitioner's Kawit Branch. The check, post-
credible the lower court’s findings of fact.
dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn against the account of
Mr. Silva with respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. (BPI) Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the
Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule check for clearing to respondent through the Philippine
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).
him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite
and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner
credited the account of MMGI with P1,000,000. On
Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire
October 22, 2002, MMGI's account was closed and all
belief and is indeed incredible.
the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva
discovered the debit of P1,000,000 from his account. In
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are response to Silva's complaint, respondent credited his
concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have account with the aforesaid sum. On March 21, 2003,
suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right respondent returned a photocopy of the check to
done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must petitioner for the reason: "Postdated." Petitioner,
be his to bear alone. however, refused to accept and sent back to respondent
a photocopy of the check. Thereafter, the check, or more
a.3. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Doctrine of accurately, the Charge Slip, was tossed several times
Supervening Negligence; Doctrine of Discovered from petitioner to respondent, and back to petitioner,
Peril; or the “Humanitarian” Doctrine until on May 6, 2003, respondent requested the PCHC to
take custody of the check. Acting on the request, PCHC
PICART vs. SMITH, supra. directed the respondent to deliver the original check and
informed it of PCHC's authority under Clearing House
ISSUE: Operating Memo (CHOM) No. 279 dated 06 September
1996 to split 50/50 the amount of the check subject of a
"Ping-Pong" controversy which shall be implemented
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence to be liable for
thru the issuance of Debit Adjustment Tickets against
damages.
the outward demands of the banks involved. PCHC
likewise encouraged respondent to submit the
HELD: controversy for resolution thru the PCHC Arbitration
Mechanism.
Defendant is liable.
However, it was petitioner who filed a complaint before
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the the Arbitration Committee, asserting that respondent
right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass should solely bear the entire face value of the check due
over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the to its negligence in failing to return the check to
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary period as
this would not be done; and he must in a moment have provided in Section 20.1 of the Clearing House Rules
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with and Regulations. Petitioner prayed that respondent be
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 40
ordered to reimburse the sum of P500,000 with 12% the payee's account. Thus, notwithstanding the
interest per annum, and to pay attorney's fees and other antecedent negligence of the petitioner in accepting the
arbitration expenses. post-dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement
from respondent the amount credited to the payee's
In its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent charged account covering the check.
petitioner with gross negligence for accepting the post-
dated check in the first place. It contended that PANTRANCO v. BAESA, GR No. 79050, Nov. 14, 1989
petitioner's admitted negligence was the sole and
proximate cause of the loss. FACTS:
On December 8, 2004, the Arbitration Committee In the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar
rendered its Decision 10 in favor of petitioner and and Marilyn Baesa and their children, together with 10
against the respondent. First, it ruled that the situation of other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on
the parties does not involve a "Ping-Pong" controversy their way to a picnic to celebrate the fifth wedding
since the subject check was neither returned within the anniversary of the spouses. Upon reaching the highway,
reglementary time or through the PCHC return window, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam
nor coursed through the clearing facilities of the PCHC. River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were
proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding
As to respondent's direct presentation of a photocopy of PANTRANCO bus from Aparri encroached on the
the subject check, it was declared to be without legal jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve, and collided
basis because Section 21.1 11 of the CHRR 2000 does with it. As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses
not apply to post-dated checks. The Arbitration Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim
Committee further noted that respondent not only failed and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the
to return the check within the 24-hour reglementary passengers suffered injuries.
period, it also failed to institute any formal complaint
within the contemplation of Section 20.3 12 and it Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioner
appears that respondent was already contented with the appealed but CA dismissed the case. Petitioner faults
50-50 split initially implemented by the PCHC. Finding the Court of Appeals for not applying the doctrine of the
both parties negligent in the performance of their duties, "last clear chance" against the jeepney driver. Petitioner
the Committee applied the doctrine of "Last Clear claims that under the circumstances of the case, it was
Chance" and ruled that the loss should be shouldered by the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last
respondent alone. clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore
negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
ISSUE: competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the
harm.
Last clear chance.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Will the doctrine of last clear chance apply in this case?
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that
the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a HELD:
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious of merit.
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the The doctrine of the last clear chance
plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes simply, means that the negligence of a
negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory claimant does not preclude a recovery
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply for the negligence of defendant where
except upon that assumption. Stated differently, the it appears that the latter, by exercising
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude reasonable care and prudence, might
him from recovering damages caused by the have avoided injurious consequences
supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the to claimant notwithstanding his
last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the negligence.
exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations where Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of
the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant's failure "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For
to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that
chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to
cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury. In this avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril
case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of
cause of the unwarranted encashment of the subject it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury
check was the negligence of respondent who cleared a if he does not know or could not have known the
post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to
facility without observing its own verification procedure. show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the
if only respondent exercised ordinary care in the clearing approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did
process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder
upon seeing the date written on the face of the check on his right since he must have assumed that the bus
"Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could have then promptly driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the
returned the check and with the check thus dishonored, jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. As
petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof to held by this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v.
W/N petitioners are free of liability since respondents From the above findings, the negligence of respondent
had the last clear chance of avoiding the incident. Antonio Esteban was not only contributory but rather the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident and thereby
HELD: precludes their right to recover damages. The only
purpose of warning signs was to inform and warn the
public of the presence of excavations on the site. The
The petition is denied. private respondents already knew of the presence of
said excavations. It is basic that private respondents
This Court finds that the CA committed no grave abuse cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own
of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the
petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, cause thereof. Furthermore, respondent Antonio
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson
necessary repairs.” Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and
had knowledge of the presence and location of the
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed
private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid him and his wife to danger; hence he is solely
the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior
negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of ONG vs. MCWD, 104 Phil 397
"last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular
accidents, is inapplicable to this case. FACTS:
PLDT vs. CA, GR No. 57079, Sept. 29, 1989 Defendant owns and operates three recreational
swimming pools at its Balara filters in Diliman, Quezon
FACTS: City to which people are invited and nominal fees are
charged.
Private respondents spouses Esteban instituted a case
against petitioner company for the injuries they In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, a 14-
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep year old boy, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio,
ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, arrived at the defendant's swimming pools. This has
th th
an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT. The been the 5 or 6 time that the three brothers had gone
complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban to said natatorium. After paying the requisite admission
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools
because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any where the water was shallow. Later on, Dominador Ong
warning light or signs. told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in
an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon
The trial court issued a decision in favor of the private hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool
respondents. The CA reversed the decision of the trial leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not
court. However, after granting a second motion for see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of
reconsideration, the CA set aside its original decision coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on
and affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. duty in the pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and
Hence, this petition. Mario Villanueva.
ISSUE: Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the
pool area informed one Andres Hagad, Jr., that
W/N petitioner company is liable to private respondents somebody was swimming under water for quite a long
for the injuries sustained by the latter. time. Another boy informed lifeguard Abaño of the same
happening and Abaño immediately jumped into the big
swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body
HELD:
of Dominador Ong from the bottom. Manual artificial
respiration was applied. Despite medical attention by the
The petition is meritorious. nurse and Dr. Ayuyao of UP, the boy died.
As evidenced by the factual findings of respondent court, Plaintiffs instituted a case to recover damages from
private respondents’ jeep were running along the inside defendant for the death of their son in the said swimming
lane of Lacson street when it suddenly swerved (as pool operated by defendant. After trial, the lower court
shown through the tiremarks) from the left and thereafter dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition.
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS V. VIZCARA G.R.
running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the NO. 190022 FEBRUARY 15, 2012
opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made
aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep a.4. Emergency Rule
on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road VALENZUELA vs. CA, 253 SCRA 303
or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder
of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before
proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred. FACTS:
The CA correctly held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of
inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff
precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi
ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which lancer from her restaurant to her home. Before reaching
proximately caused injury to another. A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her
tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos people, to solicit help if needed since rear right tire was
guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's
defective jeep on the highway. condition, she parked along the sidewalk, put on her
emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the
rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who
Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continued will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped
to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite
by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant
knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not
Richard Li. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown
immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon
against the windshield of the car of the defendant and
seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. However, when then fell to the ground. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up
the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the to the middle of her thigh and was eventually fitted with
passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at hand and
an artificial leg.
steered the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder
of the road to avoid a collision. It was at this point that it
was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control of Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent and
his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who had the last alleged that when he was driving along the inner portion
opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. he was suddenly
passenger jeep towards the right shoulder of the road. confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, with a car
coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph,
with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he
The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation
instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with
where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which
negligence, but the defendant − who had the last fair he did not see because it was midnight blue in color,
chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so
with no parking lights or early warning device, and the
− is made liable for all the consequences of the accident,
area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
the plaintiff's car was improperly parked.
However, the doctrine does not apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at Both the trial court and the CA found for petitioner.
hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. However, the latter modified the former’s decision in
reducing the amount of damages. Hence, this petition.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to
this case, because even if it can be said that it was ISSUE:
Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap
when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western W/N petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of contributory
lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the negligence to preclude her from claiming damages.
opportunity to avoid the collision.
HELD:
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the not guilty of contributory negligence.
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
only contributory, the immediate and proximate injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the he is required to conform for his own protection. Based
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which,
according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
In this case, both Ramos and Valdez failed to exercise conformed for her own protection was not to park at all
reasonable care and caution. Since the gross negligence at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We
of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of cannot agree.
Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly The appearance and intervention of Prosecutor Atty.
finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to Navarro for presentation of evidence for damages was
act without much time to consider the best means that disallowed. No appeal was taken from the order.
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what Judgment on the criminal case was rendered on April
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a 15, 1959, acquitting the accused Elordi. Prior thereto, or
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by on September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants
his own negligence. commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi
Company and Elordi. Appellee moved to dismiss the
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire said action relying on the ground of prescription among
on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point others. The motion was dismissed by the Court a quo.
which is both convenient for her to do so and which is Hence, this appeal.
not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to
run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or ISSUE:
turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find
no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to
W/N the action for damages has prescribed.
stop and assess the emergency because the hobbling
vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other
motorists. HELD:
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did The action has prescribed.
exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the
emergency and could not be considered to have The present action is one for recovery of damages
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code).
extremities. The emergency which led her to park her Appellants' intervention in the original action was
car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's
own making, and it was evident that she had taken all order. And when they commenced the present civil
reasonable precautions. action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still
pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence the remedy afforded by the Civil Code
ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident. The circumstances established by the In filing the civil action, appellants considered it as
evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to
that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.
Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast
speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had In other words, the civil action for damages could have
settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There been commenced by appellants immediately upon the
is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he death of their decedent, Capuno and the same would not
was under the influence of liquor. Under these have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for
conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with homicide through reckless imprudence. But the
changing conditions on the road were significantly complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or
lessened. after the lapse of more than five years.
ORIX METRO LEASING V. MANGALINAO G.R. NO. The contention that the four-year period of prescription in
174089 JANUARY 25, 2012 this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal
action against Jon Elordi is incorrect notwithstanding that
a.5. Prescription appellants had neither waived the civil action nor
reserved the right to institute it separately. Such
Art. 1150. “The time for prescription for all kinds of reservation was not necessary; as without having made
actions, when there is no special provision which ordains it they could still file — as in fact they did — a separate
otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be civil action even during the pendency of the criminal
brought.” case; and consequently, the institution of a criminal
action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.
CAPUNO vs. PEPSI, GR No. L-19331, Apr. 30, 1965
b. Incomplete/Partial Defense
FACTS:
b.1. Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
A vehicular collision occurred on January 3, 1953 in
Apalit, Pampanga which involved a Pepsi-Cola delivery
truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and recover damages. But if his negligence was only
Rizalina Paras. contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
The appellate court found that the train boarded by the HELD:
deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that
he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit We are shown no good reason for the departing from the
on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. conclusion of the trial judge to the effect that the sudden
It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even stop, death of the child Purification Bernal was due principally
despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a
to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced
person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.
by the extensive burns from the hot water.
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
passengers to their destinations and to observe
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when
extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury
suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the the religious procession was held. There was nothing
presumption that it was negligent in the performance of abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces
its obligation under the contract of carriage. in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with
diligence as required by law, it appears that the hot water. The contributory negligence of the child and
deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to
Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the
recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in
coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and
tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of reduction of the damages.
said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train.
Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the JARCO MARKETING CORP. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 377
PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of
the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same FACTS:
token, the award of exemplary damages must be set
aside.
On 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH AGUILAR
were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store owned
RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF, supra.(See under ACT
OR OMISSION) by herein petitioner. CRISELDA was signing her credit
card slip at the payment and verification counter when
TAYLOR vs. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud.
CO..supra.(See under DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE She looked behind her and saw her daughter’s body on
NUISANCE) the floor pinned by the store's gift-wrapping counter.
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical
BANAL & ENVERSO vs. TACLOBAN ELECTRIC & Center but died a few days later. The cause of her death
HOUSE PLANT, 54 Phil 327 was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
Private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any
entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
nine years is incapable of contributory negligence. And CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA
even if ZHIENETH, at six years old, was already capable momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch
of contributory negligence, still it was physically when she signed her credit card slip. It was reasonable
impossible for her to have propped herself on the and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child.
counter. Also, the testimony of one of the store's former
employees, Gerardo Gonzales, who accompanied NAPOCOR vs. CASIONAN, GR No. 165969, Nov. 27,
ZHIENETH when she was brought to the emergency 2008
room of the Makati Medical Center belied petitioners'
FACTS:
theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales
claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by the doctor Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19
what she did, ZHIENETH replied, "Nothing, I did not years old at the time of the incident that claimed his life.
come near the counter and the counter just fell on me." He worked as a pocket miner.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of herein petitioners finding A trail existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used
that the proximate cause of ZHIENETH’s injuries was by members of the community. Sometime in the 1970’s,
the negligence of the latter and that of her mother. Upon petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical
appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some
Hence, this petition. of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing
their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten
ISSUE:
feet.
W/N petitioners should be absolved from liability
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner,
because of private respondent’s negligence.
Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo
HELD: poles for their pocket mining. Noble carried the shorter
pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked
We deny the petition.Under the circumstances, it is ahead as both passed through the trail underneath the
unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their
and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she work place.
trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to
Gonzales' testimony on the matter. As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole he
was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension
Gonzales' earlier testimony on petitioners' insistence to wires. Thereafter, Melchor saw Noble fall to the ground.
keep and maintain the structurally unstable gift-wrapping He rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was
counter proved their negligence. Petitioner was informed already dead.
of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, it
neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of respondents.
situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees
ISSUE:
and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have done. W/N Noble Casionan is guilty of contributory negligence
so as to mitigate NAPOCOR’s liability.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply
the conclusive presumption that favors children below HELD:
nine years old in that they are incapable of contributory
negligence. The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting
to happen. As established during trial, the lines were
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required
conclusively presumed to have acted without distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole
criminal liability. Since negligence may be a felony and a carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He
quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of would not have been electrocuted.
liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of
age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Noble’s
incapable of negligence. part.
ISSUE: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13,
were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary
W/N Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly School. On July 9, 1962 they were assigned to weed the
interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners grass in the school premises. While thus engaged
liable for vicarious liability. Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said
aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to
HELD: frighten Cuadra, tossed the object at her. At that precise
moment the latter turned around, and the object hit her
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-
right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article
part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the
2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In
eye became swollen and had to undergo surgical
fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides
operation twice. Despite the medical efforts, however,
for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons
Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her
responsible for the act or omission, in this case the
right eye.
minor and the father and, in case of his death of
incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, The parents instituted a suit in behalf of their minor
such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa
hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that Monfort's father. The RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff to
"(t) he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease which the defendant appealed to SC on pure questions
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they of law.
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages." ISSUE:
Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article W/N Alfonso Monfort can be held liable for the acts of his
2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor causing child which caused damage to the Cuadra daughter.
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall
be answerable with his own property in an action against HELD:
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article
civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision
2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or
is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the
the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to
Revised Penal Code.
cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that
of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by
then becomes himself liable under Article 2180 under
their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the principle of vicarious liability. The presumption of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the liability is merely prima facie and may therefore be
aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number rebutted by proving that they observed all the diligence
of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs. of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
Capuno, et al., Araneta vs. Arreglado, Salen, et al. vs.
Balce, Paleyan, etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et al., and In the present case there is nothing from which it may be
Elcano, et al, vs. Hill, et al. Parenthetically, the aforesaid inferred that the defendant could have prevented the
cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of
damage by the observance of due care, or that he was
parents for crimes committed by their minor children
over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
discernment, and also of minors 15 years of age or over, authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act
since these situations are not covered by Article 101, which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school,
Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held where it was his duty to send her and where she was
that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as
in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it
Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and
was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to
hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply play and which no parent, however careful, would have
only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would any special reason to anticipate much less guard
result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or
negligence the parents would be liable but not where the indeed any trait in the child's character which would
damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the
however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a blame could be attributed to her parents.
regrettable inconsistency in the Court's determination of
whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving TAMARGO vs. CA, GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling ART. 217 (FC) - In case of foundlings, abandoned
that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed neglected or abused children and other children similarly
were not indispensable parties to the action. The CA situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in
dismissed the appeal having been filed out of time. summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's
Hence, this petition. homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly
accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)
ISSUE:
b.3. By Owners and Managers of Establishments
Whether the natural parents of Adelberto are liable for
the damages sustained by Jennifer Tamargo. SPS. VILORIA V. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES G.R. NO.
188288 JANUARY 16, 2012
HELD:
FACTS:
This principle of parental liability is a specie of vicarious
liability or the doctrine of imputed negligence where a On or about July 21, 1997 and while in the United
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, States, Fernando purchased for himself and his wife,
but also for torts committed by others with whom he has Lourdes, two (2) round trip airline tickets from San
a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Diego, California to Newark, New Jersey on board
Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical Continental Airlines. Fernando purchased the tickets at
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents US$400.00 each from a travel agency called "Holiday
— their parental authority — which includes the Travel" and was attended to by a certain Margaret
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. Mager (Mager). According to Spouses Viloria, Fernando
agreed to buy the said tickets after Mager informed them
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child
that there were no available seats at Amtrak, an intercity
living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the
passenger train service provider in the United States.
parents were negligent in the performance of their legal
Per the tickets, Spouses Viloria were scheduled to leave
and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
for Newark on August 13, 1997 and return to San Diego
their custody and control. The parental dereliction is, of
on August 21, 1997.
course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule
that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good their flight to Newark to an earlier date or August 6,
father of a family to prevent the damage. 1997. Mager informed him that flights to Newark via
Continental Airlines were already fully booked and
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto
offered the alternative of a round trip flight via Frontier
with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still
Air. Since flying with Frontier Air called for a higher fare
lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural
of US$526.00 per passenger and would mean traveling
parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that
by night, Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager,
It may seem unjust at first glance that CAI would "It is an old and well-settled
consider Spouses Viloria bound by the terms and rule of the courts that the
conditions of the subject contracts, which Mager entered burden of proving the action is
into with them on CAI's behalf, in order to deny Spouses upon the plaintiff, and that if
Viloria's request for a refund or Fernando's use of he fails satisfactorily to show
Lourdes' ticket for the re-issuance of a new one, and the facts upon which he bases
simultaneously claim that they are not bound by Mager's his claim, the defendant is
supposed misrepresentation for purposes of avoiding under no obligation to prove
Spouses Viloria's claim for damages and maintaining the his exceptions. This [rule] is in
validity of the subject contracts. It may likewise be harmony with the provisions
argued that CAI cannot deny liability as it benefited from of Section 297 of the Code of
Mager's acts, which were performed in compliance with Civil Procedure holding that
Holiday Travel's obligations as CAI's agent. each party must prove his
own affirmative allegations,
However, a person's vicarious liability is anchored on his etc." (citations omitted)
possession of control, whether absolute or limited, on
the tortfeasor. Without such control, there is nothing Therefore, without a modicum of evidence that CAI
which could justify extending the liability to a person exercised control over Holiday Travel's employees or
other than the one who committed the tort. As this Court that CAI was equally at fault, no liability can be imposed
explained in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.: on CAI for Mager's supposed misrepresentation.
Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical On October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the
attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident. northbound Franco Bus he was driving to the left to
avoid hitting a truck parked along the cemented
Petitioners spouses Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga,
complaint for damages against respondents.
Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming
Isuzu Mini Bus driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the CA
absolved Miguel from liability upon appeal, citing that the making a collision between the two vehicles an
latter was not the employer of Lozano. Hence, this unavoidable and disastrous eventuality.
petition.
The collision resulted in the deaths of the two drivers
ISSUE: and two passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and
Fernando Chuay.
May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the
negligent acts of the driver assigned to him, which Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of
resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian? the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim
Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife of
HELD: driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for
damages.
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds
no application in the present case. The trial court in its decision said that the act of the
Franco Bus driver was a negligent act punishable by law
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their resulting in a civil obligation arising from Article 103 of
employees, the following requisites must be established: the Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer Civil Code. Said decision was affirmed by the IAC.
personally or through another; (2) That the service to be
rendered in accordance with orders which the employer ISSUE:
has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the
illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by
reason of the functions entrusted to him.
herein private respondents was predicated upon crime
or quasi-delict.
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot
be assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove
the relationship by preponderant evidence HELD:
In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be
find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of made between the subsidiary liability of the employer
Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the under the RPC and the employer's primary liability under
latter. To determine the existence of an employment the NCC which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.
relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: The first type of liability is governed by Article 103 of the
(1) the employer's power of selection; (2) payment of
Revised Penal Code which provide as follows:
wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to
control the method of doing the work; and (4) the
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The
employer's right of suspension or dismissal.
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
Applying the foregoing test, it was the Municipality of article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons,
Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano felonies committed by the servants, pupils, workmen,
was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the duties;
time of the accident is of no moment.
While the second kind is governed by Articles 2176,
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had 2177 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he
still can not be held liable. Mere giving of directions to Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability
the driver does not establish that the passenger has originates from a delict committed by the employee who
control over the vehicle.
is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary
liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 60
Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be crime. It is now settled that for an employer to be
proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be
criminal action whereby the employee's criminal present:
negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor
are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the
employer's liability would not be predicated under Article discharge of his duties;
103.
(2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied
In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted. his civil liability;
Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand
(3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
on considering that their liability is merely secondary to
industry.
their employee's primary liability. Logically therefore,
recourse under this remedy is not possible. Without the conviction of the employee, the employer
cannot be subsidiarily liable.
To hold the employer liable under Article 103 of the RPC
sans prior conviction is erroneous. It is erroneous In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has
because the conviction of the employee primarily liable the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised
liability and, at the same time, absurd because we will be Penal Code and an action for quasi- delict under Article
faced with a situation where the employer is held 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the
subsidiarily liable even without a primary liability being latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the
previously established. negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's
defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of
Thus the present case must be decided on the basis of
the family.
civil liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act
of its employee and not subsidiary liability under Art. 103 In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an
of the RPC. action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file
BERMUDEZ vs. HON. MELENCIO-HERRERA, G.R.
an independent civil action did not preclude them from
No. L-32055 February 26, 1988
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
FACTS:
ALVAREZ vs. CA, G.R. No. L-59621 February 23,
A cargo truck, driven by Pontino and owned by Cordova 1988
Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-
FACTS:
year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy
sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, a Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide in
criminal case filed against Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants the CFI of Quezon Province. After trial, the court
filed in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File rendered judgment against the accused.
Separate Civil Action."
The accused appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial
On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil court's decision but deleted that part thereof making
case for damages. Finding that the plaintiffs instituted herein petitioner, as employer of Renato Ramos,
the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's subsidiarily liable for payment of the adjudged
negligence constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court indemnities to the offended parties, ruling that --
stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the
accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case Maximiliano Alvarez is not a party in this action. It is
their right to file a separate civil action. That being so, true that the judgment of conviction in the criminal
the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the case binds the person subsidiarily liable with the
complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and accused, and it is therefore the duty of the employer
to suspend the hearing of the case against Pontino until to participate in the defense. The law, however,
after the criminal case is finally terminated. Hence, this does not authorize that the subsidiary liability of the
appeal. employer be adjudged in the criminal action. This is
because, in the criminal proceeding, the employer,
ISSUE: not being a party, is denied the opportunity to
present his defense against such subsidiary liability.
Whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants
Due regard to due process and observance of
is founded on crime or on quasi-delict.
procedural requirements demand that a separate
HELD: action should be filed against the supposed
employer to enforce the subsidiary liability under
We find the appeal meritorious. Article 103 of the RPC.
To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi- The CA’s decision was not appealed. Meanwhile, on 14
contract, crime and quasi-delict. According to appellant, December 1978, Pajarito v. Seneris was decided by this
her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from Court, holding inter alia that--
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 61
Considering that the judgment of conviction, The trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The trial court
sentencing a defendant employee to pay an made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because
indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised there was no service of summons on him. The trial court
Penal Code, is conclusive upon the employer not held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained
only with regard to the latter's civil liability but also by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s
with regard to its amount, . . . in the action to enforce employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
the employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no
other function than to render decision based upon Mrs. Cerezo resorted to petition for relief from judgment,
the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has petition for certiorari and annulment of judgment. Mrs.
no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion Cerezo insisted that trial court never acquired jurisdiction
an error has been committed in the decision. over the case considering there was no service of
summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses
In view of the foregoing principles, it would serve no claimed was an indispensable party. All of the actions
important purpose to require petitioner to file a were denied for lack of merit.
separate and independent action against the
employer for the enforcement of the latter's ISSUE:
subsidiary civil liability. At any rate, the proceeding
W/N Foronda was an indispensable party to the action
for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability
so as to enforce Mrs. Cerezo’s liability.
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. HELD:
After finality of the CA judgment, the case was The petition has no merit.
remanded to the RTC for execution on the strength of
the Pajarito decision. Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds from the point of
view of criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis
ISSUE: of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the
Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
W/N a separate civil action is necessary to enforce the
employer’s subsidiary liability. The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising
from a delict under Article 103 of the RPC, or may give
HELD:
rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of
The petition is not impressed with merit. the NCC. An aggrieved party may choose between the
two remedies.
The subsidiary liability of an employer automatically
arises upon his employee's conviction, and subsequent Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a
proof of inability to pay. In this light, the application of quasi-delict. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion,
Pajarito is merely the enforcement of a procedural Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case.
remedy designed to ease the burden of litigation for
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict
recovery of indemnity by the victims of a judicially-
is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based
declared criminally negligent act.
on a delict is merely subsidiary. Although liability under
A separate civil action may be warranted where Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the
additional facts have to be established or more evidence employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
must be adduced or where the criminal case has been directly. When an employee causes damage, the law
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just presumes that the employer has himself committed an
as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was damage.
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce
case. These do not exist in this case. Considering
the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal
moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial,
negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of
appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the
the RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary
complainants in this case to require at this time a
capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate
separate civil action to be filed.
a criminal action where the employee’s delict and
CEREZO vs. TUAZON, G.R. No. 141538 March corresponding primary liability are established. If the
23, 2004 present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial
court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However,
FACTS: the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs.
Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
On 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger
collided with a tricycle. On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver L.G. FOODS CORPORATION vs. HON. PAGAPONG-
Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. AGRAVIADOR, G.R. No. 158995 September
Cerezo, as owner of the bus line and bus driver 26, 2006
Foronda.
FACTS:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 62
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
son of the spouses Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. (n)
employee, Yeneza. Charles died as a result of the
accident.
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with
A criminal case was filed against the driver. the proper government office a bond executed by a
government-controlled corporation or office, to answer
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the for damages to third persons. The amount of the bond
accused driver committed suicide. On account thereof, and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public
the MTCC dismissed the criminal case. official. (n)
Thereafter, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for DUAVIT vs. CA, G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989
damages against the petitioners as employers of the
deceased driver, basically alleging that as such FACTS:
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. On July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Sarmiento and Catuar were
aboard a jeep. Catuar was driving the said jeep and
The defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,
while approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Catuar slowed
principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim
down. Suddenly, another jeep driven by defendant
for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the
Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff's jeep. Catuar was
provision of Article 103 of the RPC.
thrown to the middle of the road; his wrist was broken
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of and he sustained contusions on the head; that likewise
merit. The CA denied the petition for certiorari and plaintiff Sarmiento was trapped inside the fallen jeep,
upheld the trial court. and one of his legs was fractured.
ISSUE: The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Sabiniano
as driver, and against Duavit as owner of the jeep.
Whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is
founded on Article 103 of the RPC or derived from Defendant Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other
Article 2180 of the NCC. jeep, denied that the other defendant (Sabiniano) was
his employee.
HELD:
Defendant Sabiniano categorically admitted that he took
The complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff the jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the
Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for consent or authority of the latter
damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however,
from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict The trial court found Sabiniano negligent but absolved
was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To Duavit from liability. Upon appeal, the CA rendered the
stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint decision holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable
gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and with Sabiniano.
the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise
ISSUE:
due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have W/N the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an
prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the accident can be held liable under Article 2180 of the
death of their 7-year old son. NCC when the said vehicle was neither driven by an
employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the
latter.
employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and HELD:
a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.
As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a
b.5 Owner of Vehicle vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving
In the vehicle the said vehicle if the same was driven without his
Not in the vehicle
consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by
him.
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in
Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle
the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that involved in tire mishap but completely denies having
a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or employed the driver Sabiniano or even having
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was
twice within the next preceding two months. virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold,
therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver
of Article 2180 are applicable. (n) nor employee would be absurd as it would be like
The CFI rendered a decision against Jose and Arroyo. We find no reversible error committed by respondent
The lower court based her liability on the provision of court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint.
Article 144 of the Civil Code which reads:
To sustain a claim based on Art. 2176, the following
When a man and woman living together as husband and requisites must concur:
wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
both of them through their work or industry or their
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damage
ISSUE:
incurred by the plaintiff.
W/N Arroyo who is not a registered owner of the jeepney
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to
can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with
prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or
the registered owner of the same.
negligence of FILCAR, because only the fault or
HELD: negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established.
It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to
The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the
NCC requires that the man and the woman living other vehicle his personal liability. FILCAR did not have
together must not in any way be incapacitated to any participation therein.
contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to
Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to Art. 2180 is not applicable in this case. FILCAR being
contract marriage with Arroyo. Under the aforecited engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of
provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no
of the jeepney. There is therefore no basis for the liability vinculum juris between them as employer and employee.
of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible
physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
jeepney. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the being an employer of the latter.
registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from CADIENTE vs. MACAS, supra.
consequences incident to its operation, or maybe
caused to any of the passengers therein. b.6. By State
ANONUEVO vs. CA, supra. REPUBLIC vs. HON. PALACIO, G.R. No. L-20322
May 29, 1968
FGU INSURANCE CORP. vs. CA, G.R. No. 118889
March 23, 1998 FACTS:
MERITT vs. GOV’T OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS, G.R. No. It is, therefore, evidence that the is only liable for the
L-11154 March 21, 1916 acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act
as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
FACTS: article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an
Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle along Taft Avenue when
agent.
the General Hospital ambulance turned suddenly and
unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the b.7.. By Teachers
street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn and in violation of the Motor EXCONDE vs. CAPUNO, G.R. No. L-10134 June
Vehicle Act, by which movement it struck the plaintiff. 29, 1957
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the
for the damages in question because at the time the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial
Dante committed the negligent act which resulted in the court, however, absolved from liability the three other
death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute,
with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not ruling that teachers or heads of establishments of arts
disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. and trades shall be only liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students and apprentices where the
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law
latter are under their custody.
above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or ISSUE:
apprentices while they are under their custody", but this
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades W/N defendants-school officials are liable as tortfeasors
and not to any academic educational institution. Here with defendant Daffon for damages resulting from
Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Palisoc’s death.
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular
activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose HELD:
Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. In
The Court holds that under the Art. 2180 of the NCC,
the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that
defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical
school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held
Institute are liable jointly and severally for damages to
liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not
plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son
then a student of an institute of arts and trades as
at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's
provided by law.
laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of
is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly
parental authority they exercise over them which liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party
imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, defendant.
keeping them in their company, educating them and
The rationale of such liability of school heads and
instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students,
the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and
so long as they remain in their custody, is that they
punish them in moderation". The only way by which they
stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students,
can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." In
family to prevent the damage. This, defendants failed to
the law of torts, the governing principle is that the
prove.
protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
SPS.PALISOC vs. BRILLANTES, G.R. No. L-29025 mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
October 4, 1971 hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the
school itself to provide proper supervision of the
FACTS: students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was damages, impleading Abon, Ungos (ROTC
the teacher-in-charge. Each of them was exercising only Commandant), school officials and the BCF as party
a general authority over the student body and not the defendants. The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor
direct control and influence exerted by the teacher of Castro. On appeal by petitioners, the respondent
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial
thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence Court.
of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that ISSUE:
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
W/N petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Abon
connection with his physics report did not necessarily
for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon,
the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer. HELD:
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at
there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat.
enforcing discipline upon Damon or that he had waived A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of
condoned their non-observance. His absence when the temporary adjournment of school activities where the
tragedy happened cannot be considered against him student still remains within call of his mentor and is not
because he was not supposed or required to report to permitted to leave the school premises, or the area
school on that day. And while it is true that the offending within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by
student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere
even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a
committed, it has not been established that it was school without more does not constitute "attending
caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
student. On the contrary, the private respondents have custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
proved that they had exercised due diligence, through
the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Abon
that discipline. cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the
school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot
Finally, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot
held directly liable under the article because only the under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is with Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
made responsible for the damage caused by the student
or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the Besides, the record shows that before the shooting
tort committed by any of the other private respondents incident, Ungos, ROTC Unit Commandant, had
for none of them has been found to have been charged instructed Abon "not to leave the office and to keep the
with the custody of the offending student or has been armory well guarded." Apart from negating a finding that
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school
such custody. when he committed the act for which the petitioners are
sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows that
SALVOSA vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988 Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with
definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
FACTS:
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic
ART. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers,
institution. However, it is also an institution of arts and
or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are
trade.
shall have special parental authority and responsibility
The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly over the minor child while under their supervision,
appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon instruction or custody.
received his appointment from the AFP and received his
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges
school, entity or institution. (349a)
Foundation ROTC Unit. Abon was also a commerce
student of the BCF. ART. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility
under the preceding Article shall be principally and
On 3 March 1977, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 68
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, Evidence shows, and this the respondents did not
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute dispute, that the immediate cause of the accident was
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of
liable. James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the
they exercised the proper diligence required under the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment
particular circumstances. of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned
on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause
articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil of the accident.
Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS, G.R. No. owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. The
143363. February 6, 2002 registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the
FACTS:
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. As a streets.” Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel
part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the spouses that the accident occurred because of the
fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
Elementary School. The jeep was driven by James of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same
b.8. Defense: Diligence of a Good Father of
school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
Family
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin
Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained c. Provinces, Cities and Municipalities
from the accident.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
Thereafter, his parents filed a case for damages against liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
James Daniel II and his parents, Villanueva and St. by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
Mary’s Academy. The RTC found the St. Mary’s roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
Academy liable while Daniel’s parents were subsidiarily works under their control or supervision. (n)
liable. Villanueva was absolved from liability. Said
decision was affirmed by the CA. JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 71049 May
29, 1987
ISSUE:
FACTS:
W/N petitioner is liable for the death of Carpitanos.
Petitioner alleged that on August 15, 1974 he, together
HELD: with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy
"bagoong" at the time when the public market was
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall
flooded with ankle deep rainwater. On his way home, he
have special parental authority over a minor child while
stepped on an uncovered opening obscured by the dirty
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail, stuck
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the
inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
petitioner. After administering first aid treatment at a
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble
under custody is a minor, those exercising special home. Petitioner became ill and his leg swelled with
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for great pain and was thereafter hospitalized. After
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the discharge, he had to walk around in crutches. His injury
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, prevented him from attending to the school buses he is
instruction, or custody. operating.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose
was the proximate cause of the injury caused because administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had been
the negligence must have a causal connection to the placed. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon
accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show appeal, the IAC held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation
that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate liable for damages but absolved respondent City of
cause of the death of the victim. Manila.
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be Genaro Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted
held liable for the injuries sustained by the petitioner manhole on P. Burgos Avenue as he stepped down from
because under the Management and Operating the curb of the street to board a jeepney. Teotico
Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all suffered serious injuries due to the fall.
responsibility for damages which may be suffered by
third persons for any cause attributable to it. As a consequence thereof, Teotico filed a complaint for
damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city
It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
held liable under the Revised Charter of Manila which police. The complaint was dismissed by the CFI. The
provides: decision was affirmed by the CA except insofar as the
City of Manila was concerned which was ordered to
The City shall not be liable or held for damages or
indemnify Teotico. Hence, this appeal.
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of
the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other City ISSUE:
Officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any
other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said W/N the City of Manila is liable for the damages incurred
Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers while by Teotico.
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
HELD:
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines provides that: The CA applied the Civil Code instead of Act. No. 409
(Charter of Manila), and, we think, correctly. It is true
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned,
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code
person by reason of defective conditions of roads, a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter
streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic
under their control or supervision. Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability
of the City of Manila. Upon the other hand, Article 2189
Thus, it is clear that the Revised Charter of Manila refers constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces,
to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the
of the object, thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" —
governs liability due to "defective streets, public specifically — "of the defective condition of roads,
buildings and other public works" in particular and is streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works
therefore decisive on this specific case. under their control or supervision.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary
for the liability therein established to attach, that the for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective public works belong to the province, city or defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality has either "control or supervision" over the municipality have either "control or supervision" over
public building in question. said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana
not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision"
Public Market, despite the Management and Operating
by the City of Manila.
Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation remained under the control of the former. GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN, G.R. No. 61516
March 21, 1989
There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of
Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the public FACTS:
market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place
for their marketing needs. Guilatco was about to board a motorized tricycle at a
sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under
Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) when
openings in the middle of the passageways and if any, she accidentally fell into a manhole. As a result thereof,
that they were adequately covered. Had the opening she had to be hospitalized and operated on. From the
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404) Page 70
time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, necessary repairs. (1907)
as she has difficulty of locomotion.
xxx
xxx