Bill of Lading | RCM| PSULaw

1. Heacock H.E. Heacock Co. vs. Macondray

a. Three kinds of stipulations have often been made in a bill of lading. The first is one
exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage occasioned by its own
negligence. The second is one providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an
agreed valuation. And the third is one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed
valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight.
According to an almost uniform weight of authority, the first and second kinds of
stipulations are invalid as being contrary to public policy, but the third is valid and
enforceable.
b. If a common carrier gives to a shipper the choice of two rates and if the shipper makes
such a choice, understandingly and freely, and names his valuation, he cannot thereafter
recover more than the value which he thus places upon his property. A limitation of
liability based upon an agreed value does not conflict with any sound principle of public
policy; and it is not conformable to plain principles of justice that a shipper may
understate value in order to reduce the rate and then recover a larger value in case of
loss.
2. Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals
a. While it may be true that the passenger had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless
bound by the provisions thereof. "Such provisions have been held to be a part of the
contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's
lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". It is what is known as a contract of
"adhesion", in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one
party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case
at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in
reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent. A contract limiting
liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding
one from contracting against his own negligence.
3. Sea Land Services, Inc. vs. IAC
a. Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of or damage to goods transported by it
under a contract of carriage so governed by the laws of the country of destination and
the goods in question were shipped from the United States to the Philippines, the liability
of common carrier to the consignee is governed primarily by the Civil Code. Applying the
Civil Code provisions (Article 1749 and 1750) the stipulation in the bill of lading limiting
the liability of the common carrier for loss or damages to the shipment covered by said
rule unless the shipper declares the value of the shipment and pays additional charges is
valid and binding on the consignee.
4. Citadel Lines, Inc. vs. CA
a. Basic is the rule that a stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the
goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value,
is binding. Furthermore, a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or
shipper for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable
and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.
 b. In this case, the award based on the alleged market value of the goods is erroneous. It is
provided in a clause in the BOL that its liability is limited to US$2.00/kilo. The consignee
also admits in the memorandum that the value of the goods does not appear in the bill of
lading. Hence, the stipulation on the carrier’s limited liability applies.
5. Everett Seamship Corp. vs. CA
a. In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that all claims for which it may be liable shall
be adjusted and settled on the basis of the shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and
insurance premiums, if paid, and in no event shall the carrier be liable for any loss of
possible profits or any consequential loss. Its liability would only be up to One Hundred
Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper, had the option to declare a higher
valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier.
Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it had itself to blame for
not complying with the stipulations.
b. The commercial Invoice does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that the
common carrier has knowledge of the value of the cargo as contended by the shipper.
6. Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
a. Except as may be prohibited by law, there is nothing to prevent an inverse order of events,
that is, the execution of the bill of lading even prior to actual possession and control by
the carrier of the cargo to be transported. There is no law which requires that the delivery
of the goods for carriage and the issuance of the covering bill of lading must coincide in
point of time or, for that matter, that the former should precede the latter. While we
agree with petitioners' statement that "an airway bill estops the carrier from denying
receipt of goods of the quantity and quality described in the bill," a further reading and a
more faithful quotation of the authority cited would reveal that "(a) bill of lading may
contain constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more than a
contract between the shipper and the carrier. . . . (However), as between the shipper and
the carrier, when no goods have been delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can
estop the carrier from showing the true facts . . . Between the consignor of goods and
receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable
presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment. As between the consignor and
a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital."
b. There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a bill of lading without
dissent raises a presumption that all terms therein were brought to the knowledge of the
shipper and agreed to by him, and in the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped from
thereafter denying that he assented to such terms. This rule applies with particular force
where a shipper accepts a bill of lading with full knowledge of its contents, and acceptance
under such circumstances makes it a binding contract. In order that any presumption of
assent to a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting the liability of a carrier may arise, it must
appear that the clause containing this exemption from liability plainly formed a part of
the contract contained in the bill of lading. A stipulation printed on the back of a receipt
or bill of lading or on papers attached to such receipt will be quite as effective as if printed
on its face, if it is shown that the consignor knew of its terms. Thus, where a shipper
accepts a receipt which states that its conditions are to be found on the back, such receipt
 comes within the general rule, and the shipper is held to have accepted and to be bound
by the conditions there to be found.
c. Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility
of the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This
responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded
or stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu,
and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods
by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive them. And, there is delivery to
the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive
possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate
transportation and the carrier has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been
accepted by the carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences. Only when such
fact of delivery has been unequivocally established can the liability for loss, destruction
or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier, absent the excepting causes under
Article 1734, attach and the presumption of fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be
invoked.
7. Northwest Airlines
8. Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
a. The Warsaw Convention's provisions, do not regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier' or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for
some particular or exceptional type of damage, Otherwise, an air carrier would be exempt
from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply
with a contract of carriage, which is absurd. In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise
improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's
luggage was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is true, but without appreciable
damage.
b. There can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent profound distress and anxiety, which
gradually turned to panic and finally despair, from the time she learned that her suitcases
were missing up to the time when, having gone to Rome, she finally realized that she
would no longer be able to take part in the conference. Certainly, the compensation for
the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that
prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage.
c. She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. As
already mentioned, her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila, tardily, but
safely.
9. Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Rapadas
a. The Warsaw Convention governs the availment of the liability limitations where the
baggage check is combined with or incorporated in the passenger ticket. In the case at
bar, the baggage check is combined with the passenger ticket in one document of
carriage. The passenger ticket complies with Article 3, which provides:
b. (c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination
or stop in a country other than the country of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be
applicable and that the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers
for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage.
 c. The provisions in the plane ticket are sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of
the airline for loss of luggage. The passenger, upon contracting with the airline and
receiving the plane ticket, was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned.
If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations, he cannot avoid
the application of the liability limitations.
d. The facts show that the private respondent actually refused to register the attache case
and chose to take it with him despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check
it in. In attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the line, private
respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on allowable handcarried baggages.
Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be
removed from checked-in-luggage and placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried Manila-
paper or plastic envelope.
e. The alleged lack of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to
pay the corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with
the requirement that will exclude the application of limited liability.
10. China Airlines
11. Santos III
12. United Airlines