Ma. Angelica Dianne C.

Yco
JD-1D

SULPICIO INTOD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Facts:

Sometime in February 1949, Intod and his companions asked Mandaya to

accompany him in killing a certain Bernardina Palangpangan because of a land dispute
between them. Because of the threat in his life, he accompanied Intod’s group and pointed
to them the location of Palangpangan’s room. At that instant, the group fired several
gunshots to Palangpangan’s room. However, unknown to the accused, Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was
in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. The Regional
Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Petitioner seeks the modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent, on the other
hand, argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to
constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder.

Issue:

Whether or not accused is liable only for an impossible crime

Ruling:

Yes. The accused is liable only for an impossible crime. The provision on impossible
crimes under Art. 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides for two criminal
impossibilities: (1) Legal Impossibility and (2) Factual Impossibility. Legal impossibility
occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal
impossibility Such would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the
consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. On the other
hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar
belongs to the second category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end. The factual situation in this case presents a physical
impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder
because of the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the
actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally
liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of
the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies. Hence, accused
must only be liable for the commission of an impossible crime.
Ma. Angelica Dianne C. Yco
JD-1D

GEMMA T. JACINTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009

Facts:

Herein accused was a collector for a company called Mega Foam Int’l Inc. (Mega
Foam) and received a PhP10,000 check as payment from a Mega Foam customer. However,
instead of turning over the check to Mega Foam, the accused took the check and had it
deposited into her brother-in-law’s bank account. It turns out the check was not funded.
Both the regional trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the accused was guilty of
qualified theft.

Issue:

Whether or not accused is liable for the crime of qualified theft.

Ruling:

No. The accused is not liable for qualified theft and is liable only for an impossible
crime. In the crime of qualified theft, the personal property subject of the theft must have
some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further
bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the
accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. In this case, petitioner unlawfully
took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without
value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the crime of qualified theft is not actually
produced.

The court finds the case of Intod v. Court of Appeals highly instructive and
applicable to the present case. Stated in the aforementioned case is that Criminal
responsibility shall be incurred By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means The
Court also went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e.,
a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty. Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to
the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed
all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the
fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check
being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from
being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the
cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. Ergo, the petitioner is liable only of
impossible crime as provided in Art. 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ma. Angelica Dianne C. Yco
JD-1D

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket
within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard
who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. He saw
petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching
Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand.
Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting.
Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with
more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the
open parking space.

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and
directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the
cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were
eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When
Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by
fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the
incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen
merchandise recovered. Petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were charged
and convictedwith the crime of theft. Petitioner, on his appeal, argued that he should only
be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed
in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of merely frustrated theft

Ruling:

No. The accused is guilty of merely frustrated theft. The determination of whether a
crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of
execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether
the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of
whether the felony was "produced" after all the acts of execution had been performed
hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that
generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the
elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying
criminal intent.

It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property
stolen delves into the concept of "taking" itself, in that there could be no true taking until
the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct,
Ma. Angelica Dianne C. Yco
JD-1D

the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it
would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not
having been accomplished." Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future
discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and
such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will
not apply to the facts of this particular case. The court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he
acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of
time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load
these onto a taxicab. Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento,
is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he
has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Insofar as we consider the present question,
"unlawful taking" is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation
of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated
stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could
only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, we can only conclude that
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can
only be attempted or consummated.
Ma. Angelica Dianne C. Yco
JD-1D

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, HENRY

LAGARTO and ERNESTO CORDERO
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

Facts:
Respondent judge rendered a decision finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla
and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessories provided for by law.” Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of
Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be
"modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in
place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said
Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying
the same for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death after finding the accused guilty
of the crime of Rape with Homicide

Ruling:

Yes. Respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he failed and/or
refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death after finding the accused guilty of the crime
of Rape with Homicide. In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of
the prosecution and the defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape with Homicide. Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of
Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes
cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion —
depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed — to impose the
penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three instances. Rape with homicide is not one
of these three instances. The law plainly and unequivocally provides that "when by reason or
on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision
leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty
under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under
the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of
Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs. Finally,
the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the
proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." This is not a case of a
magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate
provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
Ma. Angelica Dianne C. Yco
JD-1D

discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion

Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN

G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
Facts:
Corazon, the mother of Chrystel, was busy preparing some drinks when she heard
one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting her to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she
saw accused inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or
"jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his
knees. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into her child's vagina. Horrified,
she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He
evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to
block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a
cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the accused. In his
defense, accused maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as a mere scheme of
Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an
errand for her. He asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of
penetration of Crysthel's private parts more than bolsters his innocence. Notwithstanding
the defense of the accused, he was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the
court a quo to the extreme penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of statutory rape

Ruling:

No. The accused is not guilty of statutory rape. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia
majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke
the surface of the female organ. Grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching
the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent
any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, (i.e., touching of either labia of
the pudendum by the penis,) there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the
Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of
rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape
— are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.