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Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE .............................................................................................................................. 3

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 3

CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................................. 5

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................ 5

REALISM THEORY ........................................................................................................................................ 5
NEO-REALISM THEORY ................................................................................................................................. 6
NEW IMPERIALISM THEORY ........................................................................................................................... 6
LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................................................................... 9
THEME ONE: WAR ON TERROR...................................................................................................................... 9
THEME TWO: THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA, AND AFRICA’S RESPONSE TO THE US AND FRANCE’S GLOBAL WAR ON
TERROR ................................................................................................................................................... 13
THEME THREE: US AND FRENCH HISTORICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITH AFRICA ......... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT
DEFINED.

CHAPTER THREE ......................................................................................................................... 15

METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................. 15
SOURCES...................................................................................................................................... 16

CHAPTER FOUR .......................................................................................................................... 17

THE WAR ON TERROR AND NEOLIBERAL ADJUSTMENTS IN AFRICA ............................................................. 17

AFRICA’S HISTORICAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ............................................................................ 17
US WAR ON TERROR IN AFRICA ................................................................................................................... 21
AFRICA’S HISTORICAL RELATIONS WITH FRANCE ............................................................................................. 27
FRANCE’S WAR ON TERROR IN AFRICA .......................................................................................................... 31

CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................................................ 33

THE US AND NIGERIA...................................................................................................................... 33

NEOLIBERAL ADJUSTMENT .......................................................................................................................... 33
WAR ON TERROR STRATEGIES .............................................................................................................. 37
AFRICOM ........................................................................................................................................... 37
AFRICA CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE (ACOTA) ........................................................ 38
COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAMS................................................................................................................. 39
OIL.......................................................................................................................................................... 41
NATURAL RESOURCES ................................................................................................................................ 42
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX ........................................................................................................ 42

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CHAPTER SIX......................................................................................................................... 45

FRANCE AND MALI .................................................................................................................... 45

NEOLIBERAL ADJUSTMENT HISTORY.............................................................................................................. 45
WAR ON TERROR STRATEGIES ........................................................................................................... 49
OPERATION SERVAL ................................................................................................................................... 50
OPERATION BARKHANE .............................................................................................................................. 50
COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAMS................................................................................................................. 52
ECONOMIC INTERESTS ..................................................................................................................... 53
NATURAL RESOURCES ................................................................................................................................ 53
FRENCH COMPANIES IN MALI ...................................................................................................................... 53
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX ........................................................................................................ 53

CHAPTER SEVEN ......................................................................................................................... 55

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................. 55

BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................... 55

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Chapter One
Introduction

There has been an excessive focus on counter-terrorism ever since September 9/11, globally.
While the September 11 was known as the defining moment for the US, France has had a
long history of international terrorism attacks seen in the 1980s and 1990s, all through post
9/11, with various attacks occurring in 2002, 2007, and 2012. However, France’s defining
moment in the war on terror was a result of the 2004 attacks in Madrid and 2005 bombings in
London, which made France able to actively participate in becoming more active in the
global war on terror by joining the EU counter-terrorism coordination in 2004. After Which
French president, Sarkozy, advanced national counter-terrorism measures by introducing the
bill known as the ‘Law on the fight against terrorism’ (Act 2006-64), which was one of the
first bills actively reinforcing counter-terrorism laws. Since then, the US and France have
used this in order to gain their own military and geopolitical benefits. One of the classical
examples is that the US and France, as western powers, have had the biggest military
footprint in Africa, because of counterterrorism initiatives. It can especially be seen in
countries such as Nigeria and Mali. As a social scientist, and a scholar of International
Relations, I would like to understand how these western powers, the US and France, have
furthered their national economic and geopolitical interests and, hence, their power in Nigeria
and Mali in the name of war on terrorism. By employing the theory of new imperialism and
geopolitics, an analysis would be made on how these counter-terrorism strategies have
impacted security in Nigeria and Mali.

The reason behind the selection of these two countries is because they played their
immensely significant role in counter-terrorism initiatives in West Africa. Secondly, I looked
at countries in West Africa that showed significant intervention (through aid and/or military)
by the USA and France within these countries, as a response to terrorism, as well as
considering their geostrategic and economic interest for the U.S. and France. In addition, I
looked at countries that have had significant terrorist acts in West Africa, and therefore, the
countries of Nigeria and Mali have been selected.

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Firstly, my aim is to contribute to current discourse in this field, an alternative discourse

around counter-terrorism in West Africa by taking into consideration the African security
literature, secondly, on imperialism in the 21st century, and thirdly, the link between
imperialism and the war on terror. While analyzing the above mentioned conditions,, I would
like to show how counter-terrorism initiatives have been used to further the agendas of
countries such as the US and France, and thereby, providing an alternative perspective on
current counter-terrorism debates. Lastly, I would like to show how these discourses speak to
the overall theory of ‘new imperialism’. It is noted that plethora of literature have been
produced over this topic but there are still some gaps in alternative perspectives on the
purpose of the war on terror. It is worth noting that this is a ‘silent’ war, hardly ever covered
by mainstream media outside of the radicalized and imperialistic lens which t has always
been cast on Africa, and without sensitivity of the cultural and religious dynamics and
context. The war on terror has resulted into widespread religious conflict, in Nigeria and
Mali, where once Christians, Muslims and other religious groups have lived relatively
peacefully side by side. Therefore, interrogating the imperialistic aims of Western powers at
this time is essential. Furthermore, there are very limited studies which deal with the
imperialistic aims and goals of these two major powers, US and France in this specific
context. In addition, this research is relevant to the field of International Relations since it
seeks to employ the theory of new imperialism, in the framework of war on terror to analyze
the geopolitics of the 21st century. Therefore, it is relevant as it provides an analysis of the
reimagining of what it really constitutes being a powerful state in today’s era and, hence,
speaks to the larger patterns of power found within International Relations. The focus of this
research will be imperialism, both in its economic and geopolitical dimensions, as well as the
impact of these dimensions on security in Africa. I hypothesize the following: The US and
France have used the war on terror as a means of western imperialism, particularly in Nigeria
and Mali. My research question is as follows: How does the War on Terror, advanced by the
US and France, constitute part of the new imperialism in the context of Africa?

Sub Questions:
What are US and France’s economic and geo-political interests in West Africa?
What are the US and France’s counter-terrorism strategies in the region?
Can these strategies be considered part of the new imperialism in the context of Nigeria and
Mali?
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Have these counter-terrorism initiatives enhanced security in Nigeria and Mali, or have they
been damaging instead?

Chapter Two
Theoretical Framework
Realism Theory

The reason behind I will not be using the realist theory of International Relations is due to
the scholars such as Rosenberg, who theorize that the realist theory is limited to the balance
of power. Since World War II, realism has become a very specific type of approach in order
to understanding the discipline of international relations, which has mostly been defined in
such way: “the realm of interaction between sovereign authorities - a realm which is separate
from that of domestic politics, which is characterized by the condition of Hobbesian anarchy
- meaning that a competitive pursuit of determinate 'national interests' takes place in the
absence of regulation by a super ordinate authority, and therefore results in a set of
compulsions generic to relations between states which works, through the fulcrum institution
of the 'balance of power, to determine how states behave internationally” (Rosenberg, 1990).
Rosenberg further expands on the limitations of realism by discussing Carr’s (1946)
interpretation of economic and political power. This interpretation puts forward the idea that
economic and political power is so symbiotic that one should not define economics
separately, but to discuss it in terms of ‘political economy’. Hence, the limitation of realism is
that it can make differentiation that the modern state seeks to ‘mobilize’ the economy, but
does not distinguish the economy as a portion of a ‘transnational’ whole, which creates
significant political effects, autonomously of the ‘agency of the state’ (Rosenberg, 1990).
Thus, this theory is unable to sufficiently distinguish the above in the current research is
unable to sufficiently distinguish the above, which my research seeks to outline, precisely.

In addition, realism has significant limitations for my research project as it is limited in its
description of the dynamics of the global system. If one was to look at Morgenthau (1985)
understanding of realism, the central principle of his theory is that states are by nature,
‘power maximizers”. These states occur in a disconnected world of ‘the political’ with ‘the
political’ demarcated by its concern with power. Hence, power denotes ‘anything that
establishes and maintains the control of man over man’. By this shifting equilibrium of
multiple alliances, the independence of the units is preserved against the excessive

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accumulation of power at any one pole of the system (Rosenberg, 1990). In order to meet the
objective of this research, realism does not critique its three key categories - sovereignty,
anarchy and the balance of power. Therefore, it limits my research my research paradigm for
comprehend on terror constitutes part of new imperialism in Africa.

Neo-Realism Theory

Moving on to Neorealism, this theory holds at its basis that external tensions will outweigh
internal ones since country leaders rationally choose a foreign policy, which will reduce
security risks in an anarchical international system In other words, according to the neorealist
approach, whose foremost advocate is Kenneth Waltz, elites will be free of any domestic
restrictions that might influence their strategy for global interactions (Harvard International
Review, 2004). Consequently, Neorealism focuses primarily on the nature of interactions
between sovereign states. However, the theory is unable to address contemporary
developments in world affairs such as the rise of non-state actors (Sellers, 2016).
Neorealism’s focus on competition is likely to lead to security dilemmas due to increased
anxieties within and between states. According to this theory, as states are constantly anxious,
they continuously seek to attain capabilities. In order to attain security from a potential attack,
states are driven to acquire more and more capabilities to escape the impact of the capabilities
of others. It limits my research since competition between states does happen; there are many
more cases in contemporary world where states seek to cooperate with each other (Sellers,
2016). Furthermore, my research seeks to look at the national agenda of US and France in
terms of the war on terror in Africa, whereas neo-realism is unable to provide the necessary
framework to this research. While neorealism is clearly a vital component of a theoretical
model of international relations, it has its limitations. Therefore, its limitations show that it is
unable to provide the necessary understanding of the nuances found in today’s global system.
There is no getting away from the hard fact that it has been unable in explaining economic
and geopolitical interests in its understanding of the ‘security dilemma’, and that’s why I will
be using the new imperialism theory which I will expand on below.

New Imperialism Theory

David Harvey’s ‘New Imperialism’ as my theoretical framework will be used in this research.
Harvey (2003) is worth situating in the contemporary debate on imperialism. A major debate

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in Marxist political economy situates itself around whether capitalism in the 21st century
operates mostly through ‘transnational networks of power’, which theorists such as Hardt and
Negri (2000) support. Critiques of this view also are unable to ignore that ‘global capitalism’
is not predisposed to the classical explanations of ‘inter-imperialists rivalries’ of theorists
such as Lenin and Bukharin, in today’s context. In the Highest Stage of Capitalism
Imperialism (Lenin, 1917) Imperialism “describes the function of financial capital in
generating profits from imperialist colonialism as the final stage of capitalist development to
ensure greater profits.”

(Harvey, 2003) refers to the new imperialism as ‘capitalist imperialism’, which is “a

formulation that encompasses the (contradictory) dialectic between territorially based forms
of power, and the “molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time”. With
reference to territorially based forms of power, imperialism can be defined as a “distinctively
political project on the part of actors whose power is based in command of a territory and a
capacity to mobilize its human and natural resources towards political, economic, and
military ends” (Harvey, 2003). If one looks at the capital accumulation in space and time, it
necessitates “a diffuse political-economic process in space and time in which command over
and use of capital takes primacy” (Harvey, 2003). Therefore, there are two main tenets of
New Imperialism, i.e. the territorial and geopolitical logic, which is used to control space in
ways that enhance capital’s profitability, the economic as well as political logic that is used
to accumulate capital (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006).. These tenets of New Imperialism will
be expanded in this literature review.

According to Harvey (2003), “Imperialistic practices, from the perspective of capitalistic

logic, are typically about exploiting the uneven geographical conditions under which capital
accumulation occurs and also taking advantage of what I call the ‘asymmetries’ that
inevitably arise out of spatial exchange relation.” Harvey distinguishes between these two
main tenets of new imperialism by analyzing the various state actors’ profit motives of the
capitalist logic and the longer-term state expenditures, which according to his theory need not
be themselves directly profitable if they enhance capitalist accumulation. Thus, he uses these
logics to provide patterns of new imperialism by using the case of Iraq as an explanation of
the United States’ ‘non-territorial imperialism’. While doing so, he provided a basis for the
tenets of new imperialism through tracing the United States’ progression of controlling oil in
the Middle East preceding the Iraqi occupation in 2003. As US controlled oil in the Middle
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East through Iraqi occupation in 2003, it significantly contributed to the US economy by

means of multifaceted geopolitical actions, and its increased ‘regional’ military development
as well. These patterns help us to understand the context of the US and France’s new
imperialism in Africa.

In essence, Harvey’s new imperialism shows us that, “controlling access controls the current
and future pace and shape of global economic growth, one that the U.S. can control militarily
especially as it has undergone drastic de-industrialization itself. The Middle East is likely to
be the key provider of oil, as stocks worldwide deplete, over the next 50 years. Oil is
becoming scarcer, the Middle East will remain a key source, and control over access is both a
security issue for the U.S. as it is for the global economy as a whole” (Harvey, 2003). Harvey
(2003) highlights the US military power by the manner in which ‘power’ in the global system
entails the construction of ‘consent’. Thus, he defines hegemony as follows: “the exercise of
power through consent and leadership, to describe this potentially more cooperative
component of capitalist imperialism but notes that the reconciliation depends crucially on
recognizing the fundamental political role of accumulation by dispossession as a fulcrum of
what class struggle is and should be construed to be about” (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006).
What can be considered the most distinguishing of Harvey’s theory is his emphasis on
accumulation by dispossession being the central feature of new imperialism. His theory
recaps that capitalism originated in dispossessing peasants of their land (which forced them
onto the labor market) and the similar processes occurs today. For this research, I will thus be
looking at the western powers of the US and France’s imperialist agendas, while also looking
at the role and response of African countries such as Nigeria and Mali in relation to the US
and France’s global war on terror within their countries.
According to Harvey (2003), capitalist imperialism allows “the Marxist theory of imperialism
to analyze the forms in which geopolitical and economic competition have become
interwoven in modern capitalism” (Harvey’s particular conceptualization of imperialism is
valuable both in itself and as a means of developing a Marxist theory of the state. As Harvey
(2007) stated in relation to unpacking new imperialism, “follow the capital surpluses and look
for the geographical and territorially-based practices that attach to their absorption or
devaluation.” Harvey helps us go beyond realist and neo-realist explanations about global-
political phenomena and international relations, and provides a much wider framework.
Therefore, I will use it as my theoretical framework.

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The Marxist method’s unique aspect of examining imperialism comprises of trying to

incorporate two completely distinct aspects of the global arena. “One consists of the
hierarchies, conflicts and alliances – political, military and economic – between countries; the
other concerns the working of the productive system and the hierarchy of classes which it
generates. The first is about dominance and exploitation of some countries by others; the
second is about the stability of the productive system and the dominance and exploitation of
some classes over others” (Sutcliffe, 2007). This is imperative since it speaks to the research
question posed in this research, which is trying to connect the economic and geo-political
factors to the military factors of the ‘war on terror’, which enables the dominance and
exploitation of countries such as the US and France over countries such as Nigeria and Mali.
Thus, “the argument is that economic multi-polarity, as much as military unipolarity, may be
the real key to the future of the capitalist international system” (Bromley 2003).

Literature Review
Theme One: War on Terror

The literature review has been divided by keeping in view various themes. The first theme
will cover current debates on the War on Terror that drives it in the US and France, and trace
the rise of the War on Terror in Africa. It will also analyze the various strategies of the US
and France in their war on terror in Nigeria and Mali, along with impact these strategies have
strategies as an avenue for western imperialism in Africa. When it comes to relevant
literature on the war on terror, the renowned scholars have been written much around this
topic (Schmidt, 2013), which has focused on the rise of global military presence in Africa as
a result of the war on terror, it ultimately gives a detailed account of the similarities between
the Cold War and the War on Terror because of the external interests secured during that time
Keena (2003)has also written a lot on this topic, he provides a detailed analysis of how the
US established military bases in Africa as a means of pursuing imperial objectives in the
name of security. Kieh and Kalu (2013) look at how West Africa fits into America’s War on
Terror, and expands on their various counter-terrorism strategies in the region. Kaplan (2005)
has also written a lot on the topic of American security and imperialism, and his works
provide substantial analysis on this. Mills (2005) is an expert on African security, whose
works have delved into the War on Terror in Africa. (Clarke (2004) provides an account of
his experiences during the early formation of the war on terror, post 9/11. (Parmar, Miller and
Ledwidge, 2009) helps us understand US foreign policy on the war on terror and its

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implications for US imperialism. Jones, Forman and Gowan (2010) have analyzed the Bush
administration’s formation of the war on terror framework.

According to various research scholars of this field, , there is universal definition of

terrorism. According to the U.S. Department of Defence, terrorism is: “calculated use of
unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies
in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (Department of
Defence, 2001). The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism puts further
significance on terrorism being a ‘non-state’ act of violence, and defines it as “premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national
groups or clandestine agents” (The White House, 2003). These definitions have placed a
great emphasis on the significance of the concept of terrorism being only considered if done
by a non-state actor. These definitions do not allow for state terrorism and, therefore, enables
an environment wherein counter terrorism operations are undertaken by all ‘means necessary’
(Chomsky and Achcar, 2007). What is significant is how the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
has operated. No price is considered too small to fight the Great War. The GWOT allows for
global expansion of military might without needing to justify the need for intervention in
depth. The GWOT is considered sufficient justification, and allows for an imperial reach,
which the fight against communism had previously enabled.

Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. made a grand proclamation of the global war on
terrorism (GWOT). A complete understanding and the ‘parameters’ of the GWOT entails has
purposefully remained muddled from 2001. At the beginning, the Bush administration, along
with its neo-conservative politicians, claimed a wide range of ‘enemies’, which comprised of
“including rogue states; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators; terrorist
organizations of global, regional, and national scope; and terrorism itself, and conflated them
into monolithic threat” (Clarke, 2004) .This has allowed for the U.S. and its allies to have a
continuous war with countries and ‘non-state’ actors that pose a threat to them. This research
will seek to build on this and provide an analysis that underpins the U.S. and France’s new
imperialism strategies, which these literatures were constrained by time.
This research will analyze the US in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategies. In this research,
an attempt will be made in order to will provide a brief overview of some of their strategies.
The United States war on terror in Nigeria has included initiatives such as AFRICOM, the
Tran-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-
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Sahara (OEF-TS), Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), and Counter Violence Extremism (CVE).
The TSCTP was established in 2005 in order to build the capacity of African partners in
counterterrorism,= which was originally intended for the Sahel region(Mali, Mauritania,
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger) under the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), later it included Nigeria,
Senegal, and Cameroon. The purpose of the TSCTP is to develop partner states’ ability to
counter violent extremism, improve border and customs operations, and bolster financial
intelligence. TSCTP is a multi-agency program performed by the DOS, USAID, and the
DOD. Nigeria has participated in TSCTP regional programs on medical, logistics,
communications, and intelligence training against terrorism, and at the country level, TSCTP
has conducted civil-military relations training, counter-improvised explosive devices (IED)
training, and border security and crisis management training in Nigeria. In addition to this,
the US uses the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) which is U.S. military equipment or material
in excess of the approved force requirement or retention as enshrined in the U.S. foreign
assistance Act of 1961, and which have been used to provide Nigeria with assistance for
counter terrorism purposes (Mustapha, 2014). Hence, the present research will seek to
analyse these strategies through the new imperialist lens of the US geo-political/territorial and
economic interests, which current literature does not address sufficiently.

The basis for US military, AFRICOM in the region, can be taken directly from primary
documents of AFRICOM, which would greatly help meet the goals of this research
(Rodriguez, 2013). A proposal for a more active US involvement in Nigeria was produced for
the Joint Military Operations Department, of the US Naval War College (Robertson, 2012).
This paper discusses how important Nigeria is to US interests, especially for oil and
hydrocarbons, and also discusses the links between Boko Haram and AQIM. The present
research, therefore, will further expand on the primary documents from AFRICOM and US
Department of Defense in order to analyse the correlation between their economic and
geopolitical interests and their operations in Nigeria.

In terms of French initiatives, It is worth noting that they consist of a more multilateral and
include African states such as the G5 Sahel initiative which will also be looking at in this
research. While this is significantly different to the United States’ counter-terrorism approach
in Africa, which is mostly a unilateral approach such as with AFRICOM, therefore, the
research seeks to analyze both the US and France’s approaches not in relation to each other,
but in order to be able to provide better generalizations of their different approaches to the
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global war on terror from a new imperialist perspective. An attempt will be made in order to
investigate the economic and geopolitical dimensions of US and French policy, and of their
counter-insurgency operations.

Melly and Darracq (2013) have analyzed the France’s counter-terrorism strategies in Africa,
while Lacher and Tull (2013) look specifically at military intervention in Mali due to terrorist
activities. Furthermore, Arieff (2013) analyses the French intervention in Mali and the crisis
of terrorism in the country. Charbonneau (2017) provides an analysis of the international
‘division of labour’ between UN peacekeeping and counterterrorism, which defines the
possibilities of peace in Mali with regard to the perceived necessities of the ‘global war on
terror’. These sources were found very useful in this research for doing analysis of French
counter-terrorism in Mali, while Wing (2016) looks at the interests of the various factors
involved in Mali, and France situating its interventions within the war on terror. The present
research will be analyzing Some of France’s counter-terrorism strategies have included
Operation Serval, where French military conducted major combat operations and military
force. “Key militant logistical and operational bases were destroyed in ground and air
operations, while drug-trafficking networks, considered a significant revenue-generating
industry for Sahel- and Maghreb-based terrorist groups, were similarly dismantled” (Stigall
2015). France also specifically targeted terrorist leaders of organizations such as Al-
Murabitoun.

In 2014, France ‘concluded’ Operation Serval and converted to a new counter-terrorism

operation called Operation Barkhane, and which now covered the wider Sahel region.
Operation Barkhane’s mission, which continued till today, is to implement French military in
support of the military forces of France’s partners in the Sahel in order to neutralize “armed
terrorist groups”, and to block the rebuilding of terrorist sanctuaries in the region. It consists
of 3,000 French soldiers who are spread across two permanent bases situated in Gao (Mali)
and N’Djamena (Chad). Operations are normally done in partnership with Malian military
forces (Stigall, 2015).

International terrorism has also emerged as a primary defense concern. France’s main
counter-terrorism strategy is one of ‘prevention and projection’, which highlights using the
smallest force possible, enhancing the usage of military technology, highlighting intelligence
in the region, and pre-positioning forces in a region to respond quickly to crises—all of which
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are reflected in current African deployments, and which were seen with Operation Boali in
the Central African Republic (Hansen, 2007).. In this review literature, many instances of
French operations have been seen in Mali being based on Mali’s geo-strategic significance
for France due to the mineral reserves in Mali and more importantly in Mali’s neighbouring
countries such as Niger. Mineral reserves such as Uranium, which holds economic
significance as an energy source for France, and for which Mali is in a unique position
territorially in West Africa. According to France’s Defense and Security website, there are
“sixteen French companies present in Mali, including subsidiaries of BNP Paribas, Total and
Laborex. In addition, France provides Mali with military cooperation officers. It supports the
Peacekeeping School (École de maintien de la paix, EMP) in Bamako and the Military
Administration School (École militaire d’administration, EMA) in Koulikoro. France
supports the strengthening of Mali’s armed forces in the framework of making the G5 Sahel
Joint Force operational” (France Diplomatie, 2018). Therefore, the present research will
further expand on these primary documents from the French Department of Defense and
Security in order to analyze the correlation between their economic and geopolitical interests
along and their operations in Mali.

A lot of literature around the war on terror focuses on the USA, while France has also been a
key force in shaping counter-terrorism initiatives in Africa. Furthermore, the above-
mentioned literature does not provide a fully comprehensive analysis on the War on Terror as
a means of new imperialism in Africa, which is what the present study seeks to do.
Furthermore, the current literature does not provide many analyses which look at both France
and the USA together, in advancing their material interests through the War on Terror
framework.

Theme Two: The New Scramble for Africa, and Africa’s response to the US and France’s
Global War on Terror

The new scramble for Africa has various opposing viewpoints. If one was to understand it
from a new imperialist perspective, all the viewpoints would play a part in France’s
involvement in Mali. The new scramble for Africa has been mainly discussed in relation to
energy resources such as oil in Nigeria and Uranium in Mali (among other resources), and the
global war on terror. Significantly, in Mali, the Presidential Council for Investment (CPI),
founded in 2003, is made up of representatives of numerous multinationals—Anglo gold,

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Barclays, Coca-Cola, etc.—and the FMI and the World Bank also attend its meetings.
Beyond all this, the Malian Agency for Promotion of Investments (API), created in 2005,
notes that the influx of foreign capital is encouraged without restrictions (and permits the
repatriation of dividends and of proceeds from sales or liquidations). In the area of mining,
subterranean Mali contains many more resources than have yet been exploited, such as the
future extraction of petroleum in the north of the country, in particular in the Taoudeni basin,
but the drilling, mining, and transportation of hydrocarbons still pose technical, logistical, and
financial complex problems, not to mention security issues. Therefore, there has been
opposing debates on whether France’s global war on terror in Mali is actually influenced by
scrambling for Mali’s resources (Batou. 2013).

If French energy interests are to be linked to its military intervention in Mali, they are those
of the Areva nuclear energy company that monopolizes the exploitation of the uranium
deposits at Arlit in Niger (the world’s fourth largest producer), located 300 kilometers east of
the border of the Malian region of Kidal. Significantly, a third of the fuel consumed by the
French nuclear plants comes from Niger. Moreover, an agreement was signed in 2013 by
Areva for the exploitation of the Imouraren basin (the second largest reserve in the world), 80
kilometers to the south of Arlit, 60 percent of the capital of which is the property of this
company, with an investment of 1.2 billion Euros has been already programmed. Batou
(2013), Claudot-Hawad (2013) and Diarra (2013) argue this very point of the scramble for
Mali’s natural resources, while others such as Bergamaschi and Diawara (2014) and Chivvis
(2016) are not completely convinced of this fact, and still others such as Powell (2016) argues
for other economic motives as motivating French intervention. Taking these factors into
consideration, it is impossible to completely ignore the implications of France’s economic
interests in Mali, which is what my thesis seeks to expand on, as well as to fill the gap of the
various new imperialist logics of France, and not just one sided, such as the above-mentioned
literature.

Hence, if one is to unpack the new scramble for Africa from a new imperialist perspective, it
is imperative to look at France’s involvement in Mali from a territorial and geopolitical logic.
Mali is strategically located between North Africa and a route across the continent that
reaches the ocean as well. “This gives us an important strategic position: whoever controls
Mali, controls West Africa – if not the whole of Africa. That is why this region became so
coveted” (Bridges from Bamako, 2017). In addition to this, the geopolitical logic of France’s
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involvement also provides us a better understanding of its war on terror in Mali. Scholars
such as Lacoste (2011) advocates that this region is an area wherein there are real and
anticipated threats to a number of western powers since the advent of 9/11. Thereby, these
debates unpack one part of a new imperialist perspective, whereby the present study seeks to
unpack the logics of both economic and territorial/geopolitical.
According to Turse (2015), Obama’s scramble for Africa increased significantly from Bush’s
limited incursions. His book provides detailed account of routes of American military and the
US war on terror, showing the significance of these for US economic interests, and thereby
will help the present research situate these in the larger new imperial context.

Chapter Three
Methodology

The main purpose of this research is to find out whether the theory of new imperialism better
helps to explain the motivations and actions of counter-terrorism strategies of France in Mali
and the US in Nigeria. The research design will take a deductive approach, as I will be
applying theory to my empirical observations of counter terrorism, and thus use my
observations to expand on the current theory of New Imperialism. Therefore, I will use case
studies to make generalizations about my analyses. Using Reflexive science, means that I will
start out from virtual dialogue, meaning the research that I will observe (gather) from my
various sources and which I will expand on later in this paper, will be entrenched within a
second dialogue between local processes and extra-local forces, which for the purpose of my
research would be the dialogue between the West’s war on terror and Nigeria and Mali, and
these can only be comprehended through a third, expanding dialogue of theory with itself, i.e.
the dialogue between my analysis of new imperialism found within my cases, and the
existing theory of David Harvey’s New Imperialism, which I will seek to build upon. As such
I will use Michael Burawoy’s extended case method in order to show how the general goes
the unique, how the micro speaks to macro, and to connect the present to the past in
anticipation of the future, all by building on pre-existing theory. Burawoy’s method is based
firstly on Gluckman (1961) who argued that “the most fruitful use of cases consists in taking
a series of specific incidents affecting the same persons or groups, through a long period of
time, and showing the change of social relations among these persons and groups, within the
framework of their social system and culture”. Secondly, according to van Velsen (1967), this

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method entails analyzing the interrelation of structural (‘universal’) regularities, on the one
hand, and the actual (‘unique’) behavior of individuals, on the other”. He argues that what
ultimately recommends the method is its ability to illuminate the complex relationship
between a social world of “norms in conflict”, and the strategies and choices of individuals.
Like Gluckman and van Velsen, Burawoy (1991) emphasizes on the importance of variations
in the case through time and space, as these often help to delineate the forces shaping a
particular society. It means there will be variations in this current study since an attempt will
be made to begin by historically placing US and France’s relations with Africa and
contextualize it to today’s relations. Forces will be defined that shape these relations.
Burawoy (1991) also proposes that researchers use their observations of specific cases to
challenge and reconstruct existing theory. On this line of thinking, cases are selected
specifically for their theoretical relevance, and by using a case to challenge existing theory,
generalization from a single case study becomes possible. This is accomplished through
identification and analysis of anomalous cases (i.e., cases not accounted for by the existing
theory). According to Burawoy (1991), careful attention to such anomalies “leads directly to
an analysis of domination and resistance”. Hence, the extended case method will help look at
the US and France in Africa, and how their interactions in the region with regard to the war
on terror speak to the larger theory of new imperialism. Michael Burawoy’s extended case
method does not limit the analysis in this research the cases under investigation do not need
to have strict parallels in order to make observations. Therefore, I am not comparing the two,
but observing the cases on their own in relation to the global war on terror in Africa and new
imperialism, Furthermore, by analyzing the US and France in Nigeria and Mali over time,
means that I will not be limited by their strategies of AFRICOM and the G5 Sahel not
operating at the same time nor that their strategies are completely different, as I will analyse
them as their own entities.

Sources

The sources that will be utilized in the research would be primary policy documents, such as:
country-level documents of Nigeria and Mali, US and French military documents,
congressional hearings, committee reports, Congressional Research Service reports,
Government Accountability Office reports, and official declassified U.S. and French
documents, AFRICOM documents, G5 Sahel documents. One of my challenges that occurred
during this research was that I had difficulty in acquiring primary documents. With regard to

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primary U.S. documents, when it comes to most of the military reports of the U.S. is not
particularly transparent, which means that I had to resort to more secondary documents for
information. Primary documents for Nigeria were also difficult to locate, so most of my
primary information was taken from government websites as Nigerian government reports
were not easily accessible. In terms of France, my challenge with primary documents was the
language barrier. Where I could have documents translated I did, but more often than not I
had to resort to secondary documents as well. With regards to Mali as well, I was hindered by
the language, I was able to find a number of translated primary documents in French
language, but I was unable to do translate them. Therefore, I was limited in my research
capacity to further uncover associations. I will also use data sites such as the World Bank, the
IMF, ACLED, Uppsala Conflict Data Program and IRIN to help understand my other sources
better. In addition, I will use secondary sources such as: news articles, academic journals,
books, and NGO reports to answer my question of how the War on Terror has been used by
the US and France to advance their interests in Nigeria and Mali. Hence, I will use case
studies in order to speak to the larger patterns of power that are emerging.

Chapter Four
The War on Terror and Neoliberal Adjustments in Africa
Africa’s Historical Relations with the United States

In order to understand the rise of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), it is imperative to trace
Africa’s historical relations with the U.S. and France. This chapter seeks to discuss the U.S.
and Africa’s relations first and secondly, Africa’s relations with France. For the purpose of
this research, slavery, the U.S. – Liberia relationship, the consequences of the Structural
Adjustment Programmes and the Cold War will be briefly discussed in order to help provide
context for the United States’ current day involvement in Africa, and what it means for the
GWOT. At the termination of the Cold War during at the early 1990s, Africa as a continent
was in chaos. Africa’s place in the international political economy played a critical role in its
destabilization, even though it was not the only challenge that African states faced at the
time. During the post-independence era in Africa, African states were affected deeply by the
1970s and 1980s economic shocks. The economic shocks from1973-1974 to 1979-1980 was
due to African states not having oil extraction capabilities of their own, which meant they
were required to import oil from out of Africa. Thus, during this period, oil prices escalated

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significantly, leading to African states draining their ‘foreign exchange reserves’.

Consequently, their debt levels became excessive (Schmidt, 2013).
The first most notable relationship that the U.S. historically had with Africa was during the
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. This link was deepened with the establishment of Liberia, and
therefore in order to understand the United States’ links with Africa, its relations with Liberia
cannot be ignored. At the beginning of the 1800s, the U.S. sought to find a way to ‘manage’
born free and liberated Black Americans, whereby they conceptualized the colony of Liberia,
which was managed by the American Colonization Society (ACS). In 1822, the first African-
American settlers arrived in what they named Monrovia, and subsequently became Liberia.
Over the period of forty years, 19000 Black Americans, African slaves that were taken from
slave ships and a limited amount of West Indians settled in the colony of Liberia. Initially,
White Americans of the ACS administered Liberia, while Black Americans sought to shape
Liberia in the image of the United States. In 1847, Liberia declared its independence, and
molded its constitution and flag after the United States’, although the U.S. only formally
recognized Liberia in 1862 (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Thus, the U.S. went from
outright control to providing aid to Liberia. However Liberia still looked towards the U.S. in
their views and ‘values’ (Duva, 2002). Subsequently, it led to a long history of relations
between the U.S. and Liberia. Characteristically speaking, the state of Liberia was considered
to be a colony of the United States, which was. Significant as Liberia was a key associate in
America’s Cold War.
Liberia was backed by the U.S. through its provision of various resources, including military
and financial resources, and in return Liberia monitored (policed) the continent for the U.S. It
should be noted that there is a long history of the U.S using Liberia for its own agenda,
which could not have been more apparent during Liberian President William Tubman’s
tenure (1944 – 1971), and which (Schmidt (2013) mentions, “the United States built or
enhanced a number of important facilities in Liberia: a Voice of America relay station, which
broadcast American propaganda throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; the
Omega navigation station, which facilitated shipping along the West African coast; a critical
CIA listening post; and Roberts Field, where American military planes landed and refueled
on twenty-four hours’ notice.” Such allowances of American agendas portray the extent of
the American ‘colonization’ of Liberia, as well as its historical link with Africa. The U.S.
furthered its relationship with Liberia during William Tolbert’s administration, with Liberia
continuing to be the United States’ key ally in Africa. This was apparent during U.S.
President Reagan’s tenure, whereby Liberia functioned as an operating base for the CIA
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conducting operations against Libya and its president, Muammer Qaddafi, whom America
declared as a “state sponsor of terrorism” (Schmidt, 2013). In keeping with the United States’
various strategies of using certain African countries as an operating base, and in line with the
theory of new imperialism, and its tenet of territorial and geopolitical logic, the U.S.
enhanced Roberts Field, and operated from the Kamina and Kinshasha air bases in Zaire, as a
means of attacking UNITA, which was an Angolan rebel group. As a result of such
cooperation, Liberia received considerable economic resources from the U.S. in the year
1980 – 1982 along with approximately $500 million in aid. This shows precedence for
America’s current day GWOT, and the way in which they operate within Africa. America’s
involvement in Africa reached new heights during the Cold War, and its effects are still found
today.

During the Cold War period, the U.S. concern for Africa consisted of three arcs. Firstly, and
its main concern revolved around the suppression of USSR power and influence, especially
within the newly independent countries in Africa. . Secondly, Africa as a provider of natural
resources such as uranium and it was of high importance to the U.S. in its weapon
manufacturing. Lastly, the establishment of military bases in Africa by convincing various
African countries to be in collaboration Furthermore, U.S. Africa policy usually consisted of
countering policies and treaties which dealt with ‘social and economic development’, the
consequences of colonialism, as well as the funding of infrastructure (Magu, 2019).

African states also did not break the colonial cycle of exporting their natural resources at
cheap rates, and importing over-priced industrial-made products from western countries,
which meant that when the second economic shock between 1980 to 1989 occurred, their
trade of various commodities, such as, cotton, cocoa, copper and coffee plunged drastically,
and therefore, could not trade well enough to sustain their economies. This challenge made
various African states indebted to international banks and states, which in turn led to these
African states seeking assistance from international monetary institutions. During this time,
the rise of capitalism and neo-liberal ideologies allowed institutions such as the World Bank
and the IMF to enforce rigid stipulations on their financial assistance. These stipulations
include currency devaluation in order to stimulate their free market ideology, instructs the
decrease in government expenditure, as well as stipulating that a country’s economic
processes are altered to allow for non-government interference within these processes
(Schmidt, 2013).
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This led to the political and economic crisis at the end of the 1980s and 1990s, which
eventually laid the groundwork for the conflict and turmoil in African states to the present
day. With the cutbacks of government funding in agriculture, health and education, and the
profit derived from exports being paid towards the international monetary institutions, many
African people became disenfranchised. African military staff were also affected as they no
longer were able to benefit from government resources, and thus looked for alternative forms
of income which led to a rise in drugs, money laundering, arms and the smuggling of natural
resources. Some of these marginalized soldiers eventually became ‘warlords’ who controlled
civilians that were producers of the resources. Significantly, the situation that African states
found themselves in during the 1990s was a result of the western policies that were imposed
during the Cold War. This was due to the fact that if a country was deemed necessary for
Western powers during the Cold War, all else was disregarded. Corruption and bad
governance, repression by African governments were all ignored, which allowed for chaos
once the Cold War ended since states such as the U.S. removed itself from Africa, and
caused these African states to fall into disarray without military and financial assistance from
their western backers. This situation created ‘popular movements’ which fought to release
their states from corrupt leaders, but which eventually was used as a way of securing wealthy
natural resources. These were seen in countries such as Liberia, Zaire, Somalia and Sudan,
among others (Schmidt, 2013).

Due to the insecurity that came with independence, the U.S. and the USSR took the
opportunity to ‘battle out’ the Cold War in Africa.. The defining features of American foreign
policy during the period of World War II, until the decline of communism in the start of the
1990s, was the endorsement of the ‘free-market capitalist’ system along and the war against
communism Subsequently, US president Eisenhower, who came into power at the same time
as African independence movements started to increase, considered ‘nationalism’ in a
negative light, and equating it to global communist ‘subversion’. Presidents Kennedy,
Johnson and Carter had a more nuanced views towards anti-colonial movements in Africa,
but ultimately were not in favour if these political forces could not be ‘controlled’. Following
these presidents, the Nixon, Ford and Reagan presidencies had a more hard-line policy in
dealing with African nationalism.

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US War on Terror in Africa

While a defining moment of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) occurred on September 11,
2001, the War on Terror in Africa began in Sudan in the 1990s. During this time period,
Osama bin Laden was conducting operations in the region, with an attack coordinated against
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, and in 1998 Al- Qaeda bombed the American embassies
in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The US dealt with these attacks aggressively by striking al
Qaeda in Afghanistan, while simultaneously striking a chemical plant in Sudanion the basis
of the plant allegedly supplying components for chemical weapons for al-Qaeda.. Those who
had carried out these attacks were believed to be in Somalia by the U.S, and this later
influenced the U.S. policy in Somalia and Africa. This new policy was unleashed upon
countries in Africa, which were plagued with poor governance since these countries were
considered to be ripe ground for terrorists. In the post – Cold War era, terrorism became the
Cold War era’s communism. The U.S. became more involved in Africa post-9/11 through
financial aid and military training, forging military cooperation with various African states, as
well as opening military bases in a number of African states.). This new U.S. policy in Africa
was further ‘militarized’ by the U.S. Department of Defense, which took over various
humanitarian and developmental assistance programmes that had been under the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID). As turmoil in the Middle East expanded, the U.S.
started looking towards Africa for easier access to oil and renewable resources. The rise in
the global war on terror affected much of the U.S. policy in Africa, such as the lifting of the
prohibition of international ‘political assassinations’ that had been in place since 1975. This
allowed for the CIA and the DOD to deploy Special Operations troops in order to obtain
intelligence, apprehend or kill al Qaeda members across the globe by all means possible. This
practice continued under President Barack Obama (Schmidt 2013, 213 – 215). According to
(Krauthammer 1990), significantly, during the 1990s ‘neo-conservative’ politicians sought to
create strategies in which an expanded defense budget could be substantiated, while
concurrently enabling an American expansion in various areas of ‘influence’, whereby the
U.S. was the dominant power. After 9/11, the GWOT enabled a new American foreign policy
that allowed its new imperialism to take its root. America’s new war was justified by
claiming the protection of U.S. security domestically, as well as internationally. Notably,
“such counter-productive measures of security did not start on Bush’s watch, nor would they
end there” (Jacob, 2018).

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In the post 9/11, East Africa and the Horn of Africa became America’s first American
undertaking of the GWOT in Africa, with the creation of a U.S. military base at Camp
Lemonnier in Djibouti. This included the formation of the Combined Joint Task Force– Horn
of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which was the first substantial amount of soldiers in Africa since the
Cold War, numbered at 1800 soldiers and civilians. The base was located between the Red
Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which is opposite Yemen and flanks Somalia. The CJTF-HOA
helped train soldiers in Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia (Lyman 2008), (Schmidt 2013). In
2002, the second undertaking in America’s GWOT was the western Sahel, in which the U.S.
formed the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and it included Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. The
PSI’s mandate was meant to deal with weapons, drug smuggling and managing the increase
in border regulations in order to restrict terrorist movement. For instance, many special forces
teams were sent to Mali in 2004 as the part of this initiative” (Turse 2015).

In 2003, then U.S. president, George W. Bush, backed a $100 million counter terrorism
program for the Horn of Africa and East Africa, and called it the East Africa Counter
terrorism Initiative (EACTI), which was used to among other things, combat terrorist
financing and money laundering, while simultaneously the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) directed a number of military drills as well as ‘support operations’ in the Maghreb
(Schmidt 2013). These were initially targeted at the GLPF in Algeria. In 2005, the PSI
became the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which was an ‘interagency’
program whose mandate was to restrict the propagation of extremist beliefs, as well as
providing financial assistance to the disenfranchised in order to combat vulnerability toward
extremist beliefs. This next stage in the GWOT was “to train local armies at battling
insurgencies and rebellions and to prevent bin Laden and his allies from expanding into the
region” (Turse, 2015). One of TSCTI’s main military operations was called Operation
Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara, which included the provision of admin support,
equipment and military training of African partners in border regulation as well as offensive
operations against terror suspects. A number of U.S. state departments were involved in the
TSCTI such as USAID, Treasury Department, State Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) (Schmidt, 2013).

The GWOT in Africa continued after Ethiopia, with the support of U.S., attacked Somalia, as
a result of the rise of the Islamic Court Movement in Mogadishu, Somalia in 2006. The most
significant aspect of U.S. policy in Africa was the formation of U.S. Africa Command
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(AFRICOM) in 2008, which brought together its various projects in Africa under one
command, and allowed for greater U.S. involvement in Africa (Lyman, 2008). TSCTI
eventually became the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which by 2010
included a number of North and West African states, such as Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco,
Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Chad, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Significantly,
some of these states were involved in the U.S. in military operations such as Flintlock 2005
that was the biggest military operation since World War II between Africa and the U.S. The
military involvement of America in Africa eventually led to the creation of the U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM). Where previously U.S. military action in Africa had been supervised
by EUCOM, CENTCOM and USPACOM during the Cold War era and post-Cold War era,
with the newly created AFRICOM, U.S. Africa policy migrated from the ‘periphery’ to the
‘core’ of U.S. security policies (Schmidt. 2013). This will be discussed in depth in the
following chapter.

Once President Barack Obama came into office, his administration no longer viewed al-
Qaeda as Africa’s main threat, but al-Qaeda’s ‘affiliates’, namely, AQIM, Boko Haram and
Al-Shabab. U.S. President Obama, therefore, backed an initiative called the Counter-
Terrorism Partnerships Fund, whose mandate was aimed at training and arming African states
in counter terrorism programmes. The U.S. went on to create the Regional East Africa
Counterterrorism initiative (PREACT), while countries such as Kenya followed its lead and
established the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), a Joint Terrorism Task Force, a National
Counterterrorism Centre and a National Security Advisory Committee, joined the U.S. Anti-
Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) as well. This is significant as it shows how African
countries like Kenya have become so embroiled in GWOT, consequently, allowing for
America’s imperial practices to expand its reach.

In 2011, AFRICOM’s first major war occurred, during the rise of the Arab Spring, wherein
they took down Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi with France and Britain. As AFRICOM
Commander General, Carter Ham, stated the logic behind US operations on the continent:
“The absolute imperative for the United States military [is] to protect America, Americans,
and American interests; in our case, in my case, [to] protect us from threats that may emerge
from the African continent” (Turse, 2015). This is significant when considering AFRICOM’s
missions across Africa. The collapse of the Gaddafi administration created a domino effect,
which immensely affected African states beyond Libya’s border. Gaddafi’s arms went
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missing and fell into the hands of various groups such as the Libyan rebels and the Tuareg
soldiers who had been Gaddafi’s allies. These Tuareg soldiers formed a new group called the
MNLA, and launched an attack on northern Mali. In this manner, the Islamic State was
formed in Northern Mali. However, the French intervened and assisted the Malian army in
recapturing the north of Mali (Al Jazeera, 2017).
In contemporary Africa, the U.S. has been directly and indirectly involved and active through
reconnaissance and military missions in Africa’s GWOT. According to Turse (2015), Their
war is conducted against “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa; the Islamist
movement Boko Haram in Nigeria; al-Qaeda-linked militants in post-Qaddafi Libya; Kony’s
murderous Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the Central African Republic, Congo, and
South Sudan; Mali’s Islamist Rebels of the Ansar al-Dine, al-Shabaab in Somalia; and
guerrillas from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen.” The
U.S. has drones in Entebbe, Uganda in its fight against Kony’s Lord’s Resistence Army, and
have between one hundred to two hundred soldiers based at Kenya’s military base in Manda
Bay. The U.S. also have active drones dispatched from Ethiopia and the Seychelles Islands,
while the CIA is active in Somalia and Yemen, which are all a part of America’s GWOT in
Africa. U.S. reconnaissance air carriers are used over the Sahara Desert, Mali, Burkina Faso
and Mauritania. The U.S. military footprint in Africa has grown over the last decade, with
U.S. Special Operations soldiers based in Djema in the Central African Republic, in Nzara in
South Sudan, Dungu in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as in Mali (Turse, 2015).
Kenya, as a major ally in America’s counterterrorism programmes, is allocated
approximately $1 billion each year, and certain units within their military are trained by U.S.
Special Operations Forces (Turse, 2015).

America’s War on Terror was also seen in 2012 when their ‘marines’ from the Special
Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 12 (SPMAGTF-12) provided training support to
Uganda’s People’s Defense Force which is mandated to conduct operations in Central
African Republic as well as in Somalia in America’s fight against al-Shabaab. Uganda’s
People’s Defence Force also provides a significant number of soldiers to the African Union
Mission (AMISOM), which is backed by the U.S. Besides Uganda, the SPMAGTF-12 also
provided training support to the Burundi National Defense Force (BNDF) in 2012, which was
the second biggest squadron in Somalia. Besides these, the U.S. provided counterterrorism
support and armed soldiers in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and Tunisia.

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Significantly, “on an average basis, there are approximately 5,000 US Military and DoD
personnel working across the continent at any one time” (Turse 2015).

President Trump’s Africa policy has been erratic to say the least. The US has repeatedly
stated that it has a ‘light [military] footprint’ in Africa, and multiple reports advocating for
the decrease of US special operations and shutting down of military ‘outposts’ in Africa, but
due to the fact that there has been little confirmation on the actual number of operations and
outposts, the actual extent of America’s military footprint has been difficult to analyse. The
reason for America’s apparent downsizing is being referenced by a 2017 attack on a few of
its soldiers in Niger, as well as the reprioritizing of policy against Russia and China.
However, the ambush in Niger only brought America’s presence in Africa into the spotlight,
forcing the military to find a solution to the new interest in its activities in Africa. In 2018,
AFRICOM’s adviser Peter E. Teil stated that there were 34 American bases all over Africa,
with an increased focus on the Horn of Africa, North Africa and West Africa (Turse 2018).
For instance, there have been a number of drone and military operations over the years in
Libya, with three ‘outposts’ situated in Libya which were not officially disclosed, while in
2017 President Trump stated that American defence forces were not operating in Libya
(Turse 2018) (Thrush 2017). This contradiction is significant due to the fact that the US has
long had a history of stating the opposite to its actions in Africa, from its role in the
assassinations of certain African leaders, to the current day level of US intervention in the
continent, and its true purpose behind the grand war on terror.

Furthermore, according to AFRICOM commander Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, AFRICOM’s

mission is that with “partners, strengthens security forces, counters transnational threats, and
conducts crisis response in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional
security, stability, and prosperity”, while at the same time taking great pains to mention that
its initiatives are ‘African-led’ as well as that AFRICOM, is not ‘militarzing’ the continent.
Notably, Waldhauser did not state the total number of US ‘bases’. In line with the theory of
new imperialism, The political logic, i.e. “political power is always constituted out of some
unstable mix of coercions, emulations, and the exercise of leadership through the
development of consent” (Harvey 2003, 42). Throughout this report the manifestation of this
logic will be seen, including the strategy of France.

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The current US military presence in Africa includes, in Djibouti, what could be considered
the biggest ‘drone complex’ in the globe, namely, Chabelley. The US is also creating a drone
complex in Niger, that is much bigger than the one in Djibouti, which gives rise to the
question, if the US does not have much interests in Africa, and is also seeking to downsize its
presence in the continent, why would such large-scale bases be needed? The map below,
which is most probably not a complete representation of the American presence and interests
in Africa, it does provide an approximation, and allows for the most complete data to date.
The division of military bases implies that they mainly revolve around three ‘counter-
terrorism theaters’ in the continent, namely, West Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel
(Turse 2018).

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According to (Turse 2018),

“16.5 percent of commandos overseas are deployed in Africa. This is

about the same percentage of special operators sent to the continent in
2017 and represents a major increase over deployments during the
first decade of the post-9/11 war on terror. In 2006, for example, just
1 percent of all U.S. commandos deployed overseas were in Africa.
Today, more U.S. commandos are deployed to Africa than to any
other region of the world except the Middle East. Back in 2006, there
were only 70 special operators deployed across Africa.”

He further states that in 2006 there were only seventy special military soldiers in the
continent, while in 2014, there were around seven hundred soldiers, while currently,
according to approximations, there are about 1 370 special operations troops in the
continent (Turse 2018). Therefore, while the US claims to be downsizing, it is clear that
there has not been a significant change since 2017, meaning that the US still is very much
active in Africa. As (Waldhauser 2018) states, “

Africa’s Historical Relations with France

In order to contextualize the true purpose of the Global War on Terror, this paper will now
seek to trace France’s historical relations with Africa. France’s relations with Africa stretches
as far back as the 17th century, but the spread of its colonial empire occurred more
significantly in the 19th century, notably taking charge of current day Senegal and Mauritania
in 1815, with the subjugation of Ottoman Algiers during the year of 1830, including the
invasion and the advent of colonial rule of West Africa and Central Africa, as a result of the
‘scramble for Africa’, as well as the founding of the colony of Tunisia in 1881. In the 1890s,
France invaded Mali (named as French Sudan at the time), French Guinea, and the Ivory
Coast. France’s colonial further expanded to include Niger in 1903 and Morocco in 1912
(LeVine 2013) (Ginio and Sessions 2016). After World War I, the League of Nations
allocated Cameroon and Togo to France. Eventually, France’s colonial empire in Africa
stretched from West Africa and Central Africa to the western Sahel, Djibouti in the Horn of
Africa, Réunion, Madagascar, as well as the Comoros. These colonies were mainly used for
the extraction of their natural resources, while in North Africa became a base for French
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settlers. France’s alleged guiding policy for Africa was situated around the ethos of a
civilising mission, which was a direct paradox, when taking its brutal occupation and
exploitation of these countries into account. The end of World War I brought about an
intensified fight for independence by African states, which was only realized after World War
II. France’s colonial rule was officially ‘concluded’ by 1962, after an extensive fight for
independence by African countries, including a vicious conflict between France and Algeria.
As such (Ginio and Sessions 2016) states that, “the ties it [France] forged continue to shape
relations between France and its former colonial territories throughout the continent.”

These ties were seen through various avenues, one of them being The CFA franc, which was
initially called the Colonies Françaises d’Afrique’, and which was formulated by a law of
General de Gaulle’s on December 26, 1945, after World War II. It was used as a means for
France to enable economic assimilation between its various colonies, and therefore to have
command over these African states’ resources, economic systems and political structures
(Sylla 2017). Originally, the CFA franc was distributed by Caisse Centrale de la France
d’Outre Mer, which was France’s main bank for its colonies. Once France’s colonies gained
independence at the beginning of the 1960s, the distribution and managing of the Franc zone
was taken over by the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest” (BCEAO) and the
Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale” (BEAC). The CFA franc zone currently consists of
eight West African countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, and Togo, and who are all members of the West African Economic and Monetary
Union (WAEMU), as well as consisting of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, whom are members of the Central Africa
Economic Monetary Cooperation (CAEMC). Even though control went to these regional
banks after independence, it is significant to note that France is still active within these banks.

As (Tchatchouang 2014, 4) states, “France is represented in the executive boards of the two
regional central banks and has traditionally been the main trading partner and provider of
extensive technical and financial assistance to all member countries of the CFA franc zone.”
The CFA franc is defined by a number of components. Firstly, a fixed exchange rate with the
euro. The second component is that of an unconstrained ability to exchange CFA francs into
euros. Thirdly, the assurance of conversion by France, by means of an ‘operating account’
transacted with the French Treasury, by BCEAO and BEAC. Fourthly, the principle of free
movement of capital between the CFA franc zone and France, and fifthly, the amalgamation
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of ‘foreign exchange reserves’ of both CFA franc blocs. The Banque de France does not have
an official capacity on this, but the Ministry of Finance in France manages the CFA franc
exchange rate, and governed by the French Treasury. As a means of further imposing its
imperial tactics, there are further conditionalities on the two regional banks, namely, there
should be a minimum of fifty percent of foreign reserves in the French operating account
(and which after the advent of independence, this amount was 100%, while between the
period of 1973 and 2005, stood at 65%), there should be a ‘foreign exchange cover’
amounting to twenty percent that accounts for ‘sight liabilities’, and lastly, loans to member
states are restricted to twenty percent of the state’s income for the year prior. In 1994, France
devalued by fifty percent the CFA franc, which led to the economic crisis within the
francophone region with the increase in prices, with the increase in import charges, and the
decrease in export income. These vital decisions were made without consideration from the
African governments. While many argue the benefits of the CFA franc, the fact is that after
its devaluation in the 1990s, its “inflation only normalised in 2015/16 due to the compression
of domestic demand, while the inflationary shock had major consequences from a social
perspective” (Alby 2018, 7). These consequences are seen today in the fragile environment
found within various African states, and which has allowed for the spread of terror acts, and
subsequently the rise in the GWOT.

An argument can thus be made that the CFA franc does not allow for these African countries
to obtain complete financial sovereignty. Significantly, France has veto power on the boards
of the both the banks of the CFA franc region. The restructuring of the BCEAO in 2010, saw
the creation of ‘monetary policy committee’ which manages its currency policy. France has
voting powers within this committee, and with regards to the president of the UEMOA
Commissions has only an consultative position (Sylla 2017). The CFA franc has further
destabilized the economy and development of these countries, as it prevents these states from
transforming from agricultural based economy to a manufacturing based economy, and does
not allow for ‘trade integration’ between its countries, while also allowing excessive capital
drainage. Therefore, it is evident that

“membership of the franc zone is synonymous with poverty and under-

employment, as evidenced by the fact that 11 of its 15 adherents are classed
as Least Developed Countries (LDCs), while the remainder (Côte d’Ivoire,
Cameroon, Congo, Gabon) have all experienced real-term economic decline
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(the credit-to-GDP ratio stands around 25% for the WAEMU zone, and 13%
for the CAEMC zone, but averages 60%+ for sub-Saharan Africa, and
100%+ for South Africa etc)” (Sylla 2017).

Furthermore, France has intervened in these African states’ affairs, to the point where if a
president no longer sought to be a part of the franc zone, France has ‘removed’ or
assassinated them, and instead installed leaders who would seek power, such as in the case of
the CAEMC countries and Togo. In such an environment where corruption is rife, economic
development and stable political structures becomes rare. Furthermore, during the post-
independence era France formulated accords with African states not only economically but
also militarily. Their military accords enabled a constant presence of French military in the
continent, while also formalizing the sales of French arms and French military consultants to
various African states (Schmidt 2013, 178). This allowed France to be named the gendarme
of Africa (Charbonneau 2008, 282).

France also provided its military services to deal with domestic and regional/international
conflict of certain African states, in lieu of the right to mine ‘strategic’ natural resources.
What is significant in understanding the rise of the War on Terror in contemporary Africa is
that from the beginning of the 1960s right until 1992, France provided military training for
approximately 40 000 African soldiers. In certain African countries, France’s military
presence continued well after its colonial era, while certain African military personnel were
sent to France to be trained.. This allowed for France’s presence in Africa to be solidified
until this day. France’s military agreements with certain African countries in the post-colonial
era assisted in France maintaining their military bases and soldiers to stay in Africa. With the
end of the Cold War France’s Africa policy once again had to be amended (Schmidt 2013,
188-189). During the Cold War, France emphasised its policy of ‘protecting’ Africa from
Communism, which allowed France to maintain its interest of retaining its influence in
Africa. This was done through sustaining “permanent military bases originally found in
Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Cameroon and the Central African Republic”
(Benneyworth 2011)

Then French President Mitterrand announced in 1990, that France would not provide
development assistance to African states without their transformation to democratic states,
and that French assistance would be tied to human rights processes. Simultaneously, in the
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same announcement, France stated that although it would not get involved in domestic
conflicts, it would still assist with the fight against external perils. This is synonymous with
France’s historical relations with Africa, while also mirroring America’s relationship
stipulations with Africa. The continuity of France’s colonial nature was however seen in its
dealings with Rwanda, in which it ’trained’ the Forces Armées Rwandaises from 1990-1993,
while also supplying huge amounts of weapons. This eventually enabled the genocide in
Rwanda, and saw calls from French civil society for France to reanalyse its military policy in
Africa (McNulty 2000, pp. 109–110) (Benneyworth 2011). Consequently, even though
France reduced is military numbers in Africa, and shut down multiple bases, it still manned
44 500 soldiers, called La Force d’action rapide in 1993 (Martin 1995, 13). Significantly,
“Between 1997 and 2002 France launched thirty-three operations in Africa, though ten of
those had mandates or fell under United Nations command, suggesting that broader
humanitarian concerns have become increasingly important to France, with acceptance of
multilateral involvement and moves towards using interventionism to promote security and
development rather than prioritising often morally dubious order and stability” (Charbonneau
2008, 283).

France’s War on Terror in Africa

This was in line with France’s new policy towards Africa, as during the 2000s France went
from single operations to intervening in Africa through more multilateral operations.
However, due to France’s entry into the European Economic and Monetary Union as well as
due to critics within France’s government, France decreased its trade with Africa to below
five percent by the end of the 1990s, it reduced its military presence as well as its financial
assistance in Africa, and devalued the CFA franc excessively. By that point, African states
received below twenty percent of ‘direct foreign investment’ from France. Militarily, by 2008
France had only about 6 000 soldiers in Africa, with bases only in Djibouti, Senegal and
Gabon. Instead of being based permanently in African countries as was done historically,
French soldiers moved around according to temporary missions in the twenty first century
(Schmidt 2013, 188-189). According to (Obi 2009, 6) “The concern with combating terror
and the quest for oil underpin the west’s increasing securitization of Africa. This has led to
the securitization of specific regions of Africa: West Africa: oil, illegal migrants and criminal
networks, Horn of Africa and East Africa: terrorist threats, failed states and criminal
networks, North Africa: terrorist threats, oil and illegal migrants.” This quote assists in

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contextualizing western states economic, financial assistance, counterterrorism initiatives and

development agreements in Africa.

In 2010, the continuation of France having a military presence in Africa while portraying an
appearance of not being significantly invested was seen with the removal of French 1 200
soldiers, and the handover of its military base to Sengal (Bamford 2010). This would appear
that France was attempting to withdraw from Africa, however, “it still retained the will and
capacity to intervene, as demonstrated in Ivory Coast when French forces, long in-theatre
under Force Licorne, assisted in overthrowing Laurent Gbagbo, albeit with UN endorsement
(Howden 2011) (Benneyworth 2011). More recently, France’s military intervention in Mali
in 2012, led to militants moving into other African countries. For instance, militants went
back to Libya, Nigerian militants went back to Nigeria, and the Islamist militants of Boko
Haram and Ansaru escalated their levels of attack in Nigeria. Following this period, in 2014,
then French President François Hollande, backed a new operation named Operation
Barkhane, whose mandate was situated around a permanent counterterrorism operation which
comprised of 3 500 French soldiers to be based in Burkina Faso, with functioning bases in
Chad, Niger and Mali, Mauritania. Consequently, “President Obama approved millions in
emergency military aid for French operations in Mali, Niger, and Chad, while the United
Kingdom, another former colonial power in the region, dispatched combat aircraft to the
French base in N’Djamena to contribute to the battle against Boko Haram” in Nigeria (Turse
2015, 227).

In essence, France’s reasoning behind their military interventions, and ultimately their policy
on Africa, was dictated in France’s 2013 Defence White Paper, and this understanding of the
African environment was further reinforced by head of the then-Strategic Affairs Office in
the French Defence Ministry, Philippe Errera in 2014. This conceptualization entailed the
common western view of African states as a ‘fragile’ and ‘failed-state, wherein these insecure
environments allow for the growth of crime, various trafficking, as well as terrorism. In line
with France’s narrow approach to understanding the GWOT, this approach does not consider
the conditions that led to the terror threats, but it places great importance on making the
heartland, i.e. France safe. Thus, as Errera stated, “there is a real risk for French and
European interests, that this situation could result in the creation of a ‘terrorist state’ at the
gates of Europe” (Powell 2017). Such statements provided the rationalization for France’s
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Mali intervention, including the various military operations that have been ongoing in West
Africa since 2013. Thus, it is to be considered that there is something about the GWOT that
gives the pretext for intervening, in order to control. This may not be full blown colonial rule,
but it does give territorial reach, which is what Harvey’s new imperialism allows one to
understand. “Ultimately France has successfully used its security presence since
decolonisation to exert influence in countries where it has interests, maintaining both regional
hegemony and its vision of order and stability. While that strength is still potent, strategic
rationales for maintaining substantial presences are weakening” (Benneyworth 2011).

Chapter Five
The US and Nigeria
Neoliberal Adjustment History

This chapter will seek to analyse the economic and political and territorial and geopolitical
logics of new imperialism have manifested in Nigeria. The guiding of thesis ‘logics’ can be
seen by AFRICOM General Waldhauser, who states,

“African nations—their people, their increasing appetite for democratic

principles, their growing economic impact and potential in global
markets—remain an enduring interest for the United States. U.S.
Africa Command supports our African partners in building the
capability and the capacity to develop local solutions to radicalization,
destabilization, and persistent conflict. By making targeted investments
and maintaining strong partnerships, we can set the basic security
conditions needed for good governance and development to take root.
Africa, our allies, the U.S., and the world stand to benefit from a
secure, stable, and prosperous Africa” (Waldhuaser 2018, 2)

This chapter will seek to analyse these interventions in Nigeria, from the economic through to
the military operations. What has been apparent over the last few decades is that the US-led
bloc has shaped the what being a state entails in Africa. The US and its allies have remade
the state to be good-governed, disciplined states, and in the process African states have been
externalized. This means that African states do not work on the national/territorial

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sovereignty, but rather work on the sovereignty of globalized capital. This reinforces the
state-centred logic of new imperialism. The notion of good governance as a necessary
measure of a fragile or failed state has been a key element of global ‘policy’ dialogue on the
Third World, more specifically, Africa. In the post-Cold War era, the endorsement of good
governance has been strategically placed as the basis of World Bank, IMF and Western allies
global policies. The notion of a failed/fragile state was further enhanced upon in the
aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent GWOT. Good governance and fragile
states have been thoroughly situated in ‘international development’ and ‘security policy’
dialogue, as well as in international law doctrines, and has been advocated by the US-led
bloc, which includes France. These conceptions have helped to provide justification for
intervention in Africa, which have included everything from ‘military intervention’ to
governance and economic reform, which will be discussed throughout this paper (Jones 2015,
63). Significantly (Jones 2015, 72) further states, “this discourse served to legitimise the
practices of western governments and international organisations in providing ‘policy advice’
and ‘technical assistance’ in a range of matters of political, economic and social concern to
newly independent countries, the new vocabulary helping to disguise essential continuities
with colonial relationships”.

For the purpose of this report, “in very broad terms, good governance involves the creation of
a government that is, among other things, democratic, open, accountable, and transparent and
that respects and fosters human rights” (Anghie 2006, 114). This includes a broad outline for
the Bretton Woods Institutions’ definitions. While this may appear to be to the advantage of
the Third World state, through the imposition of conditionalities such as good governance,
international financial institutions (IFI’s) and various western states remake the state.
Therefore, there is a rhetoric of good governance, but it is very loaded, as the various
requirements of the concept show. The IMF and the World Bank, are therefore in an
influential ‘position’ to orchestrate the conditionalities being applied, as there is a numerous
amount of the Global South which require finance from these IFIs (Anghie 2006, 114).
Through this one can see the state-centric logic of new imperialism at work. In order to
understand America’s new imperialism in Nigeria, one cannot ignore its history with the
state, as this provides context for the rise of the GWOT in contemporary Nigeria. This is
significant due to the fact that these neoliberal structural adjustment programmes contributed
significantly to Nigeria’s current day instability, which the west in their grand war on terror

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narrative fail to address, and as such has provided for the justification of U.S. intervention in
Nigeria.

During the 1980s, it was argued that due to the Nigerian state’s disproportionate intervention
in the market, the hard-hitting recession of the mid 1980s, as well as the decline in
international oil cost, Nigeria did not have the financial means nor the capability to produce
sufficient foreign exchange revenue, in order to deliver civic amenities to the Nigerian
people. Due to this set of circumstances, Nigeria undertook a more formal structured form of
foreign loans as a means of providing its civic amenities. The neo-liberal Structural
Adjustment Programme was introduced in Nigeria in July 1986, under the Ibrahim B.
Babangida Administration, and which became a stimulus for many of Nigeria’s current-day
troubles. The key policies for completing the aims of SAP revolved around a ‘market-
oriented’ development policy, and which required a) the devaluation of the Naira, b) the
decrease in government influence and restraints on the economy (economic liberalization), c)
the dissolution of agricultural goods marketing bodies, d) the restriction in budget
expenditure for state services as well as Nigeria’s tax rates, e) decrease of government
subsidies, and f) the ‘privatization’ of state-owned organizations (Danladi, Naankiel and
Naankiel 2016). These conditionalities also favoured external debt service, and import
liberalization. This means that if countries such as Nigeria do not fulfil the IMF’s, World
Bank and ‘creditor clubs’ conditionalities of implementing financial and budget-related
strategies, they would not assist these states.

In Nigeria’s case, a majority of its people were not in favour of the SAP, but its then
president, President Babangida, pushed it through. The SAP in Nigeria had a number of
negative consequences, which has had an impact on the circumstances of current day Nigeria.
For the purpose of this paper, only certain consequences of the SAP will be discussed, such
as the devaluation of the Naira. The devaluation caused the Nigerian standard of living to be
reduced significantly, with the level of unemployment increasing drastically. This led to
people struggling to afford their basic needs, and which eventually allowed for significant
strain on the ‘social fabric’ of Nigeria. Due to the average Nigerian no longer having
consumer purchasing power, they did not have access to food, health and public services.
This allowed for a precarious environment, where the state used violence to enable the
conditionalities of the IMF and World Bank to be achieved. This called Nigeria’s state
sovereignty into question. At the time, Nigeria’s state sovereignty was under threat due to

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firstly, its government allowing the Bretton Woods Institutions to determine Nigeria’s aims
and policies. Secondly, the IMF and World Bank directly policed the implementation of the
policy strategies of the Babangida administration. Nigeria’s state sovereignty was also
infringed upon through the payment of Nigeria’s debt taking precedence over the state’s
provision of public services, which was seen as the SAP was meant to be completed over two
years (1986-1988), and which eventually was redesigned to take place over seven years
(1986-1993). However, by September 1993, Nigeria’s SAP-related debt totaled N51, 616.9
million (49.31%) of its total expenditure (Obansa 2005). Lastly, even though there was huge
outcry against the implementation of the SAP, the interest of the Nigerian people was not
taken into account.

It should be noted that there were certain positive instances of SAP working in Nigeria, such
as in the case of the boom of the agricultural sector (Abbah 2012, 5). However, there were
more negative outcomes of SAP than positive. Scholars such as (Ojo 2001) and (Sabo &
Igwo 2007), have provided evidence for the failings of the SAP, which have ultimately led to
the increased instability of Nigeria’s economy, and therefore providing a foundation for its
current state, wherein non-state terror actors can thrive. According to (Okome 2005), “Social
cohesiveness was eroded because several social problems intensified and proliferated in the
era of SAP, such as the declining standards of living and increased polarization of society
into the few wealthy, the shrinking numbers of the middle classes and rapidly increasing
ranks of the impoverished.” Consequently, the influence of SAP still impacts contemporary
Nigeria.

Furthermore, due to the unstable environment that Nigeria found itself in, its social fabric
became severely damaged. The SAP allowed for religious and cultural violence to escalate
due to the lack of resources, and the consequences of which is still found in contemporary
Nigeria. (Egwu 2005) further emphasises this, stating, “The imposition of neo-liberal
macroeconomic reform policies which began with the Structural Adjustment Programme in
the mid-1980s further reduced the capacity of the African state to deal with the challenges of
development and welfare. The consequences were the mounting unemployment problem,
inflation, and widespread poverty on the continent. The social dimensions of Adjustment are
well known and harmful especially in engineering social and political unrests.” In 1985 (prior
to the commencement of the SAP), Nigeria’s external debt amounted to $19.5 billion, which
escalated to $27 billion in 1987, (which was the year before the SAP was meant to end), and
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by 1991, the amount had increased to $34.4 billion (Anyanwu, Oyefusi, Oaikhenan, Dimowo
1997). As a result of SAP, Nigeria’s external debt profile rose to an all-time high.

War on Terror Strategies

This paper will discuss U.S. security initiatives in Nigeria, and how these contribute to their
new imperialism in Africa. U.S. foreign policy is three-tiered in its framework. This
framework is made up of national foreign policy, regional, and international foreign policy.
Each of these policies are overseen by the State Department and USAID. The Department of
Defence oversees its own programs, but is involved in certain State Department and USAID
programs as well. The Bureau of African Affairs oversees U.S. policy in Africa. The U.S. has
a specific policy and strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, which was announced in June 2012
(Mustapha 2014, 43). This chapter will show how the U.S. security strategies in Nigeria
speak to its broad strategy in counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The U.S. has multiple security strategies when dealing with counterterrorism in Nigeria.
These are AFRICOM’s operations, Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
(ACOTA), the Excess Defence Articles (EDA) program, marine security programs and
various counterterrorism operations.

AFRICOM

US Africa Command was formed under the European Command (EUCOM) on October 1,
2007. It became autonomous on October 1, 2008, with its headquarters based in Stuttgart
Germany. The reason for the headquarters not being based in Africa was mainly due to the
opposition from African leaders, as well as due to the high expense of the command when it
was first created (Mustapha 2014, 43). The basis for US military, and therefore AFRICOM in
the region can be taken directly from primary documents of AFRICOM, which accordingly
stated,

“U.S. Africa Command protects and advances vital U.S. national security
interests in Africa, including protecting the security of the global
economic system, preventing catastrophic attacks on the homeland,
developing secure and reliable partners, protecting American citizens
abroad, and protecting and advancing universal values, and therefore the

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Department of Defense, while prioritizing addressing emerging security

challenges through both direct and indirect responses, U.S. Africa
Command views these challenges also as opportunities to deepen enduring
relationships, strengthen partner capabilities, and foster regional
cooperation” (Rodriguez 2013, 7).

AFRICOM is made up of the U.S. Army Africa, U.S. Air Forces Africa, U.S. Marine Corps
Forces Africa, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa and
CJTF-HOA. AFRICOM uses a combination of security collaboration, military exercises and
military operations to further U.S. Africa Policy (Mustapha 2014, 43).

Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP) are made up of ACOTA programs, the
TSCTP and the African Partnership Station (APS). APS is a marine security programme
under the command of US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF). It was formed in 2008, and its
mandate is to construct naval safety and security by increasing the abilities of allies, through
expanding navel knowledge, ‘response capabilities’ and constructing ‘infrastructure’ in
various African countries. These missions are done through bilateral and multilateral
agreements with African states such as Nigeria. The Nigerian Navy are based in Lake Chad
as well as in the Gulf of Guinea where they assist U.S. Navy with operations. Marine officers
from African states train with the APS for three to six months. For instance, among various
operations dealing with different matters, Operation Flintlock trains TSCTP countries in
‘special forces operations’ in defending civilians and preventing ‘terrorists’ from entering,

The other marine program is the Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP),
which is an operational program of APS. Both the APS and AMLEP are used by AFRICOM
in conjunction with various African states in dealing with ‘regional security threats’.
According to AFRICOM: “the common objective of APS and AMLEP is to improve the
ability of partner nations to extend the rule of law within their territorial waters and exclusive
economic zones and to better combat illegal fishing, human smuggling, drug trafficking, oil
theft, and piracy” (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 2018, 4-5).

Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)

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ACOTA was formed in 2002, and is overseen by the Bureau of African Affairs, but which
AFRICOM also allocates consultants and advisors. One of its main instruments is the Global
Peace Operation Initiative (GPOI), which was established in 2004.

Counterterrorism Programs

Due to the expanding nature of the GWOT, the U.S. has a various number of initiatives and
operations that deal with the GWOT specifically. These include the TSCTP, Operation
Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), and Counter
Violence Extremism (CVE). The TSCTP’s mandate is to expand African partner states’
“capacity to counter violent extremism, improve border and customs operations, and bolster
financial intelligence” (Mustapha 2014, 50). TSCTP is an initiative of the DOD, USAID and
the State Department. Funding for the TSCTP is derived from the economic support fund, the
non-proliferation fund, anti-terrorism, peacekeeping operation funds, demining, as well as
other program funds. Nigeria, even though a part of the Sahel, only became a recipient of the
TSCTP in 2007.

Domestically, TSCTP has trained Nigeria in ‘civil-military relations training’, ‘counter-

improvised explosive devices (IED) training, border security, and crisis management.
Regionally, Nigeria has been a part of a number of TSCTP initiatives with various African
states, on ‘intelligence training’, ‘medical’, ‘logistics’ and ‘communications’ against
terrorism. Secondly, the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) in Nigeria is mandated to assist in
developing the ability of security departments in averting, identifying and probing terrorist
threats. Thirdly, in relation to the CVE initiative, it is meant to deal with the root causes of
‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’. “Its main focus is to degrade the capacity and ability of terrorist
organizations to elicit sympathy and boost recruitment” (Mustapha 2014, 53). The U.S. also
conducts education and training initiatives, such as the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
(CTFP) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET), which were formed to
teach and train ‘mid-level’ and ‘senior’ soldiers of African ally countries. These initiatives
are receive funding from the State Department, but are controlled by the DOD, through its
Defence and Security Cooperation Agency. These initiatives main purpose is to create an
international system of terrorism specialists at a functioning and tactical levels, as well as to
build a database of knowledge. This is used as a means to assimilate African partners into the
U.S. system of things.

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While Nigeria has been a contested space in the past, its significance to the U.S. is noted.
Robert P. Jackson, who is the principal deputy assistant secretary, of the Africa Bureau of
Affairs, stated:
“A peaceful and stable Nigeria is crucially important to the future of
Africa, and we cannot stay on the sidelines if it stumbles. Nigeria has
the continent’s largest population and biggest economy. We look to
Nigeria as a partner in our quest to help Africans lead lives free of
violence and filled with possibility. As an engine of growth, a
fountainhead of art and industry, and a political giant, Nigeria is vital to
the success of President Obama’s 2012 Strategy toward Sub-Saharan
Africa. As we implement that strategy, we are focusing on building a
democratic, prosperous, and secure Nigeria” (Mustapha 2014, 73).

The U.S also sent an Interdisciplinary Assistance Team composed of personnel from DOD,
USAID, the State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in April 2014,
to help with Nigeria’s search and rescue mission of the 275 girls that were kidnapped by
Boko Haram in Chibok. Furthermore, in 2014, Nigeria participated in in the U.S. President’s
Security Governance Initiative (SGI) which was declared at the U.S.-Africa Leaders’
Summit. This initiative’s objective was on management, supervision and liability of the
security departments at the ‘institutional level’ (U.S. State Department 2014). Thus, while
Nigeria’s relationship with the U.S. was at times considered to be tempestuous, Nigeria
received considerable assistance from the U.S. over the years – which is significant in itself.

The U.S. has dedicated a substantial amount of assistance to Nigeria, for security purposes.
Nigeria is a recipient of counterterrorism through the State Department’s West Africa
Regional Security Initiative (WARSI). In 2016, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger received
counterterrorism and border security aid from the three year Global Security Contingency
Fund (GSCF) initiative, which is worth $40 million. This initiative revolves around
neutralizing Boko Haram (Congressional Research Service 2016, 22). While such initiatives
appear to be only focused on counterterrorism, statements made by the U.S. should not be
ignored, as they help contextualize the GWOT within Nigeria’s - and Africa’s – geostrategic
and economic importance to the U.S. This is seen in the U.S. National Security Strategy,
which declares, “the U.S. seeks sovereign African states…integrated into the world economy,
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able to provide for their citizens’ needs, and capable of managing threats to peace and
security, which the current conditions in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region do not satisfy
U.S. strategic goals as outlined in the National Security Strategy” (Duncan 2018). The U.S.
National Defense Strategy goes on further to state that the U.S. troops will assist in
countering terrorists, and that AFRICOM is best suited to fulfilling the National Security
Strategy mandate. This is significant as the strategy not only mentions security but also
economics, which means that the U.S. considers AFRICOM (and its military) as best suited
to dealing with all of the above. It is not so farfetched then to consider that the U.S. GWOT is
not only about counterterrorism but also about its economic interests.

Oil

In 2015, Nigeria was considered to be the biggest oil manufacturer as well as having the most
natural gas reserves in Africa, while also being the fourth-highest exporter of liquefied
natural gas (LNG). Nigeria’ oil and natural gas sectors contribute to the most to its economy.
Due to Nigeria’s dependency on its oil income, its economy is often affected by crude oil
prices. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) has joint ventures production-
sharing contracts (PSCs) with Total, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Eni and Shell, Addax Petroleum
and Statoil are also involved in Nigeria’s oil sector. However, International Oil Companies
have been negatively affected by the volatility in the Niger Delta where they conduct onshore
and shallow water oil programs. A common occurrence has been for these companies to
move their interests and investments to deep-water programs and onshore natural gas
programs. Nigeria had approximately 37 billion barrels of oil reserves at the close of 2015,
which was the second-highest reserves in the continent – after Libya. Most of these reserves
are found in the Niger River Delta, in the Bight of Benin, the Bight of Bonny and the Gulf of
Guinea (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2016, 1- 4).

The United States was historically the largest importer of Nigeria’s oil but due to their
production of sweet crude oil in Bakken and Eagle Ford, their imports decreased drastically.
In 2012, the U.S. was the biggest importer of Nigeria’s oil and dropped to their tenth biggest
importer in 2015. In 2015, the U.S. imported approximately 57 000 b/d of crude oil, which
decreased by ninety percent from 2010. Hence, Nigeria dropped to the eleventh biggest
international oil supplier to the U.S. which made up less the one percent of U.S. crude
imports (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2016, 8).

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Natural Resources

Nigeria has the biggest amount of natural gas reserves in Africa, and is ninth in the globe. By
the close of 2015, Nigeria had approximately 180 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas
reserves. However, most of the natural gas reserves are found in the Niger Delta, which is
affected by the instability around the area. It should be noted that the U.S. does not import
natural gas from Nigeria any longer. Thus, in expanding Harvey’s New Imperialism, the
resources are not necessarily natural resources, it has evolved into the extensive amount of
capital that the GWOT has procured, which will be discussed below.

Military Industrial Complex

The Military Industrial Complex was first termed by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in
his Farewell Address on January 17, 1961. He stated that the U.S. should protect itself from
the procurement of unjustified ‘influence’ from members of Congress which relied on
military activities, the Department of Defence and its army, as well as private military
contractors, such as, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman. Hence, the military
industrial complex essentially lobbies for ‘political support’ from the country’s government,
in order for military expenditure to expand and grow. Therefore, the military industrial
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complex is seen as “Military forces that have been funded overwhelmingly by national
governments, which historically have been the target of lobbying efforts by bureaucrats in
military-related ministries, by legislators from districts containing military bases or major
military manufacturing plants, and by representatives of private firms involved in the
production of weapons and munitions” (Weber 2019).

This understanding helps to situate Brown University’s ‘Cost of War’ Project. It should first
be noted that it is extremely difficult to work out the U.S. government’s complete military
budget as their departments are not transparent with all their expenditure. However, they have
come to the closest approximation. For all Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) or
Emergency Spending, between financial year 2001 and 2019, Cumulative Appropriations for
Department Of Defence and State Department/USAID, in Billions of Current Dollars,
Rounded to the Nearest Billion. The budget for OCO’s which includes Africa, and the
Bipartisan Budget Act totaled 137 billion dollars. The U.S. has budgetted 5.9 trillion dollars,
in order to fight the GWOT covering the financial year 2019, which includes ‘direct war’ as
well as expenses associated to war. The Cost of War’s estimations varies significantly from
the Department of Defence due to the fact that it includes costs that are afflicted by the
GWOT across various government departments, and not only the DOD. This includes the
Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security. The extent of military
spending due to the war on terror is seen in that “The Pentagon currently projects $80 billion
in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) spending through FY2023. Even if the wars are
ended by 2023, the US would still be on track to spend an additional $808 billion (see Table
2) to total at least $6.7 trillion” (Crawford 2018, 1).

While the graph below does not have extensive coverage, it helps to trace how much the U.S.
defence budget has increased since 2001. This is noteworthy as new imperialism dictates that
the territorial and geopolitical logic is used to control space in ways that enhance capital’s
profitability, as well as the economic and political logic, which is used to accumulate capital.
Thus through the military industrial complex, this can be seen. With the rise in the war on
terror, so has the military budget increased exponentially. Which gives rise to the questions,
what is the true purpose of the war on terror? The GWOT has not only provided an avenue
for military expansion across the globe, but also helped provide a basis for capital
accumulation.

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On April 5, 2011, the House Budget Committee ‘Path to Prosperity’ planned for the DOD’s
budget to increase from 583 billion dollars in 2012 (excluding an additional 127 billion
dollars), to 703 billion dollars in 2021, not taking inflation into account, totaling in 6 461
trillion dollars between 2012 and 2021. Furthermore, the GWOT operations are outlined to
receiving an approximate of 50 billion dollars, and amounting to 577 billion dollars between
2012 and 2021. In the context of the DOD requiring more funds, the Congressional Budget
Office plans for an additional 1 044 billion dollars over this time period. The U.S. defence
budget takes precedence in its foreign policy, and this was seen with both Republican and
Democrat administrations, as seen below.

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In 2012, even though then President Obama revealed that there would be a decrease in
defence expenditure, as dictated by the Budget Control Act of 2011. However, the limit for
the defence budget was 100 billion dollars higher than the whole budget for 2013, in addition
there was a clause that stated that the limit could be surpassed if Congress and the President
agreed on an emergency protocol. According to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) in 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump sought to raise defence expenditure by 54
billion dollars, while decreasing ‘non-defence’ expenditure. With President Trump’s
administration, there has been a considerable increase in military expenditure on the GWOT
(Global Security 2019).

Since President Trump has come into power, there has been a further increase in America’s
already ‘militarized’ foreign policy. The Trump administration have also appointed a number
of generals in policy positions, which has allowed for military policy to deal with economic,
political and cultural issues. These generals are namely, Gen. Mattis as defense secretary,
Gen. John Kelly as head of Homeland Security, and Lt. General H.R. McMaster as National
Security Advisor. The Trump administration has favoured ‘arms company executives’ as well
as ‘lobbyists’ for high positions. This “revolving door between weapons contractors and the
U.S. government include, Mattis, who served on the board of General Dynamics before
entering the Trump administration; Secretary of the Air Force nominee and former New
Mexico congresswoman, Heather Wilson, who lobbied for Lockheed Martin’s nuclear
weapons unit after leaving Congress; and National Security chief of staff Lt. General Keith
Kellogg, who has worked for a series of defense contractors including Cubic and CACI”
(Hartung 2017, 4).

Chapter Six
France and Mali
Neoliberal Adjustment History

Mali became its own independent state on September 22, 1960, and elected its first president,
i.e. Modibo Keïta. Once Keïta came into power, he formed a ‘one-party state’ and departed
from the French Community in 1962 (Library of Congress 2005, 3). Even though Keïta
wanted to break all ties with France, in June 1963, the Mali government was forced to request
help from France due to economic challenges. This led to the creation of an ‘advance

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account’ in the French treasury. Following independence from France until the beginning of
the 1980s, Mali’s economic and development policies were characterised by socialism
policies, such as the state influence within various public sectors. This included the
‘nationalisation’ of banks, the formulation of parastatals, extensive state control on prices,
state control over international trade, among various others. France’s influence in Mali’s
monetary matters increased significantly in 1967 (just before the coup d’état of Keïta), when
Mali re-entered the Franc Zone, and with the devaluation of the Malian Franc, France took
charge of Mali’s Treasury (Bergamaschi and Diawara 2014) (Bourdet 2002, 26).
Furthermore, “Mali had to sign monetary cooperation agreements in 1967 [with France] and
accept conditionalities related to the implementation of structural reforms such as the
suppression of the collective land system in exchange for increased aid” (Bergamaschi and
Diawara 2014). The Soviet influenced economic and development policy was overturn in
1968 after the overthrow of then president Modibo Keïta, and was changed to a ‘market-
oriented model’ (Bourdet 2002, 26). In 1982, Mali’s economy was restructured further by the
IMF and World Bank. Mali was further locked-in in 1984 by its return to the West African
Monetary Union (WAMU). Towards the end of the 1980s, during the military dictatorship of
Moussa Traoré, the most stringent IMF and World Bank economic lock-ins took place
through ‘stand-by agreements’ and SAP, and which meant a complete neoliberal market-
oriented model. Among these conditionalities was during the period between 1982 and 1992,
Mali received six IMF loans, four ‘standby-agreements’ as well as two ‘adjustment facilities’,
namely the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and an Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF). These IMF adjustment loans over the period of 1982 and 1996 amounted to
352.6 million dollars. Towards the end of the 1980s, the IMF was among the main drivers of
the reformation of international trade, and which advocated for the removal of ‘export tax’. In
addition, the IMF arranged with Mali the Povety Reduction and Growth facility (PRGF) in
August 1999, in which the facility was valued to be 58.8 million dollars, and which by 2003
was granted an additional 5.9 millions dollars (Bourdet 2002, 30). France continued assisting
Mali, including militarily through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities
(Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix or ReCAMP, as well as
providing assistance to the government in terms of ‘decentralisation’. This was imperative for
Mali’s neoliberal economic model, and which France and the Bretton Woods Institutions
used to keep Mali disciplined , as a ‘good governed state’ (Bergamaschi and Diawara 2014).

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Mali’s economic system reforms were extensive throughout the 1990s. System reforms can
be defined as, “measures that are aimed at reforming or transforming the economic system
and are concerned with the role and functioning of markets and competition, the structure of
ownership and incentives and the network of institutions that governs the behaviour of
economic agents” (Bourdet 2002, 33). These reforms included, the privatisation of
agricultural markets, the elimination of ‘price controls’, precedence given to ‘foreign direct
investment’ (FDI), the privatisation or shut down of parastatals, including the privatisation of
banks. It is significant to note that the IMF and World Bank (as well as certain bilateral
donors), were chief among the key forces backing Mali’s economic reform policy, and their
influence in the country has grown significantly since (Bourdet 2002, 37).

Some of the main conditionalities in the 1980s and 1990s was the limitation on state
expenses, which evolved into the civil service wage bill, the limitation of grants to
parastatals, as well as tax reforms. French influence and control was further seen on Mali’s
economic strategies, through Mali’s return to WAEMU , and which noticeably WAEMU has
been observing Mali’s economic policies since 1996. In the period following the CFA franc
devaluation, a method of shared economic supervision was formed by WAEMU. This
method was created as a means of supporting the franc by merging the economic policies of
member states. At first the merging of these policies were based on four ‘criteria’. These
included, the amount of the civil service wage bill could not go beyond fifty percent of tax
income, but which was decreased to fourty percent in January 1998. Secondly, local
resources which funded state investment needed to amount to approximately fifteen percent
of tax income. Thirdly, approximately fifteen percent of tax income on ‘primary fiscal
surplus’, which is the overall costs deducted from the overall income, not including interest
payable on local and international debts. Lastly, local and foreign debt was required to be
lowered or stagnant. However, a more stringent set of conditionalities from WAEMU further
locked Mali in, with a new method of economic observation, under the ‘Convergence,
Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact’, which was approved towards the end of 1999. The
new ‘criteria’ were as follows,

“There are four primary criteria of which one, basic fiscal balance (0
percent of GDP), is considered a key criterion. The three other primary
criteria are inflation (no more than 3 percent a year), domestic and foreign
debt (no more than 70 percent of GDP), and internal and external arrears
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(unchanged or decreasing). The secondary criteria concern the civil service

wage bill (no more than 35 percent of tax revenue), domestically financed
public investment (at least 20 percent of tax revenue), the external deficit
excluding grants (at most 5 percent of GDP) and tax revenue (at least 17
percent of GDP)” (Bourdet 2002, 32).

This ‘pact’ further allows for member states economic programmes to be observed, and if not
observed as stated, a system for sanctions is set in place.

It is significant to note that, when arguing state sovereignty, how does a state claim complete
sovereignty when its monetary policy are influenced by external forces. This is the case for
Mali, who is a part of the CFA and UEMOA, and therefore all its key decisions are made by
the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). The BCEAO has been responsible for
controlling ‘price stability’, as well “setting the policy rate or injecting liquidity in the zone”
(Bastagli and Toulmin 2014, 11).

Stated in its Articles of Agreement, the IMF claims its purpose “is to provide member-states
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international prosperity”. However, if that were the case,
all its conditionalities that it imposes on countries such as Mali would decrease the country’s
debt, but since SAP were implemented, Mali’s external debt has increased drastically. In
2011, the Mali’s external debt amounted to 25.4 percent of its GDP. According to the IMF,
“Mali’s growing public debt to GDP ratio remains well below the UEMOA convergence
criteria of 70 per cent and these trends are in line with expectations as public debt ratios tend
to increase in the wake of debt relief” (IMF 2013). The most recent findings on Mali’s total
IMF debt was done in May 2018, and since its latest loan, which amounted to 9.7 million US
dollars, bringing Mali’s total debt to 219.7 million US dollars. Significantly, “in the past two
decades, French authorities have increasingly complied with the World Bank’s and the
International Monetary Fund’s neoliberal recommendations” (Bergamaschi and Diawara
2014). This has ultimately enabled an environment in which instability could thrive. While
these economic reforms may not have been the only cause of Mali’s fragile environment, it
has had a long history in Mali and therefore has still played a significant part in the context
that Mali finds itself in today.

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In line with Harvey’s theory of New Imperialism, one principle is geopolitical logic, which
when considering this helps provide partial context for France’s involvement in Mali. This is
can be seen in a paragraph of an European Parliament paper, where it mentions Mali’s
provision of 100 000 hectares of land to Libya, in order for Libya to formulate infrastructure
to farm rice and cattle, as well as the assembling of ‘irrigation canals’ in Mali which was
granted to a Chinese company. This paper is not arguing for or against the merits of this, but
the fact is that France has had a long history of seeking to keeps its influence and control in
West Africa, including post-independence. So such instances of deviation from Western
interests should not be taken lightly. According to (Bastagli and Toulmin 2014, 16) “In recent
years, Mali has been intensifying cooperation with China and India as well as with Libya.
Relations with China have especially deepened over the last decade.”

War on Terror Strategies

As this paper has discussed in the previous chapter, the U.S. war on terror strategies involve
more training and support through AFRICOM. This chapter will seek to analyse France’s
strategies in Mali, and how these speak to its larger new imperialist practices. This chapter’s
timeline begins on January 2013, when the France accepted Mali’s appeal for military
intervention. The appeal was made by Interim President Dioncounda Traoré. The Islamist
militants had captured the space between northern and southern Mali and were close to
capturing the vital airbase in Sevaré and the town of Mopti. Arguments were being made that
should the militants take charge of the airfield, the capital of Mali, Bamako would eventually
fall to the militants , and a ‘terrorist state’ would be created. French intelligence pushed the
rhetoric that the militants had gained access to Bamako already. The fear that the militants
had ties to international terrorist groups, and this very war on terror language allowed for the
French military to intervene, with overwhelming consensus from the local, regional and
global parties. Furthermore, there was a lot of controversy at the time around the manner in
which France dealt with the MNLA. Locals were angered that France allowed for ransom to
be paid for hostages, while also allowing MNLA combatants to roam freely in Kidal, which
they argued France gave freely to the MNLA. There were also allegations that France was
providing equipment to the MNLA. However, this did not matter to the French, as they
concluded Operation Serval, they distanced themselves from the on goings in Mali.

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Operation Serval

Operation Serval (the Mali intervention), was the start of a larger French presence in the
Sahel since the beginning of the twenty first century. Operation Serval, which was made up
of 5 000 French troops, eventually led to the creation of Operation Barkhane, which was
established on August 1, 2014, and which helped extend French troops throughout the area.
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
has since been tasked with securing Mali according to the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2100, and France has gone on to extend its mandate to counter terrorism in the
Sahel. While France did halt the disintegration of Mali, it should not be confused with the
bigger war on terror language. This is further explained in that

“militarization of the fight against radicalism may further obscure for France and the United
States alike the non-military aspects of the problem, everything that encourages radicalism
and keeps the state of the Sahel fragile. Serval demonstrates the problem amply: The French
military has been focusing in on the specific terrorist threats and other security assistance
efforts while refusing to involve itself in Mali’s other problems. Barkhane promises more of
the same” (Wing 2016, 61).

The situation in Mali led to a number of interventions, which were headed by the French, the
African Union, ECOWAS, and MINUSMA. The reasoning behind the French involvement
was disputed by some that, then President François Hollande merely followed public
engagement on the matter in order to increase ‘support’ in France. However, if this were the
case, France would not have expanded its military presence in the region, but would have
closed the case, as a successful endeavor and would have returned home, and Operation
Barkhane would not have been established (Wing 2016, 65).

Operation Barkhane

Operation Barkhane has allowed for the creation of a French base in Gao, with 1 000 French
soldiers still on the ground in Mali. Its headquarters are in Ndjamena, Chad with 1 200
soldiers active on the base. Intelligence missions are made up of 300 staff which are based in
Niger, with Special Forces established in Burkina Faso. This is clearly the opposite of
France’s initial position on the intervention in Mali, and as (Wing 2016, 69 – 70) stated, “it

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would appear that France has taken the position that complete exit is not viable, and some
argue that a 70 S. D. Wing permanent military presence in the Sahara is the realization of a
dream for the French.” Furthermore, the Mali intervention occurred while France’s White
Paper on Defence and Security was still being discussed by the French National Assembly,
and when it was finally approved on April 29, 2013 its military expenses were not decreased
significantly. This was a result of France’s argument that it had to be able to operate freely so
that it can defend French national security at times when partners were unable or unwilling to
do so.

This can be considered an expansion of France’s new imperialism, as according to the new
imperialism theory, at its foundation, it is made up of economic and geostrategic interests.
We see this in (Wing 2016, 70), where it is stated that, “the rapid deterioration of conditions
in Mali does not constitute a discrete phenomenon, which can be wholly divorced from the
political and social context of that or any other country.” Meaning also that what occurs in
Mali is not necessarily only confined to Mali itself, but flows into its neighbouring countries
as well. France’s partners in West Africa have embraced their presence, and the ‘economic’
and ‘political’ assistance (privileges) that comes with it. Significantly, while previous French
interventions in Africa were viewed as neo-colonial, while the portrayal of Operation Serval
and Operation Barkhane as the GWOT allowed for African states to be more open to
intervention and the increased presence of French troop in the region. In (Wing 2016, 72), it
is stated that “the use of terms such as Islamist, jihadist, salafist and terrorist to express
security considerations legitimizes international military violence and it legitimizes the
ontological priority given to the Malian state.” A significant difference in the framing of their
presence in Africa, the U.S. mentions consistently that they are present in the continent to
protect their country’s national interests and security, while France, made sure to stress
MINUSMA’s role and the fact that they were invited to intervene in Mali, as opposed to
framing it according to France’s national security and interest.

Furthering France’s new imperialist practices, in its white paper on defence and security, it
states:

“The risks associated with weakness are more insidious than threats related to
power, since they are not as tangible as traditional power struggles and their
impact is felt much later, when the international community is confronted with a
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breakdown in order which it needs urgently to resolve. It is then faced with a

dilemma: either to let chaos set in or, on the contrary, to intervene and risk
becoming the focus of hostility, without being able to rely on any solid national
partners. In the new strategic landscape, it is therefore particularly important to
identify any risks of weakness as early as possible, in order to counter them before
they can wreak [the] most havoc” (Powell 2017).

This statement emphasises Mali geostrategic location, which should not be ignored lightly.
While authors such as (Powell 2017) argue that this is due to French ideology on Africa, I
argue that France has economic interests in neighbouring countries which influence its
actions in Mali. So, while Mali may not have much of an economic interest to France, it is
located strategically in West Africa.

Counterterrorism Programs

France’s counterterrorism strategy includes, a joint-military staff with Mali, it backs the
Peacekeeping School (École de maintien de la paix, EMP) which is based in Bamako, as well
as the Military Administration School (École militaire d’administration, EMA) in Koulikoro.
France’s official mandate is to provide ‘support’ to Mali’s soldiers, which also consists of
making the G5 Sahel Joint Force a functioning structure (France Diplomatie 2018). This also
included a training operation of the Malian Army, which they tasked the EU with conducting.
The European Union Training Mission (EUTM-Mali) was meant to take place over fifteen
months but was prolonged and was supplemented by a civilian operation in order to develop
national security in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali). There were 3 400 ‘trainers’ in Mali in 2015,
with Mali’s Army increasing to approximately 8 200 troops (Griffin 2016, 905).

With regards to the G5 Sahel Cross Border Joint Force, it was officially made operational on
July 2, 2017 in Bamako, Mali. This Force is funded by the French, and has the support of the
African Union, as well as endorsed by the UN Security Council through resolution 2359. It
also receives global funding from the European Union (fifty million Euros), the U.S. has
declared for $60 million, Saudi Arabia has declared 100 million Euros and the UAE has
declared for thirty million Euros. Each of the five states of the Force are also providing ten
million Euros each. Its objective is to counter terrorism, international ‘organized crime’, as
well as ‘human trafficking’ in the G5 Sahel region. It’s first mission was conducted by Mali,

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Niger and Burkina Faso troops in November 2017, and consists of 5000 soldiers. There is
also a plan for a ‘Sahelian counter-terrorism’ unit to be sent to northern Mali.

Economic Interests
Natural Resources

In the countries surrounding Mali, there are resources that are of great importance to France.
These include, but not limited to, “the gas and mineral resources located close to the Algerian
oil fields which are much coveted by the French and within walking distance of locations that
have displayed positive exploration indicators in Mauritania, uranium found in excess in
Niger, which share’s a boarder with north-eastern Mali, and which are owned by France’s
massive nuclear power company Areva” (Onuoha and Thurston 2013).

French Companies in Mali

There are French companies involved in various sectors in Mali, such as, Bouygues – which
manages ‘construction’, Bolloré Africa Logistics – which is a transportation company,
Orange – focused on information technology, as well as BNP-Paribas – which is in the
monetary sector. The prospect of oil in the surrounding areas, and in Mali, where in August
2013 ‘exploration permits’ were awarded to various transnational companies in the basin of
Taoudeni, is noteworthy. However,

As dicussed earlier in the paper, France’s reasoning for its interventions in Africa has always
been motivated by its worldview.

Military Industrial Complex

Between the period of 1992 to 2000, France’s military budget decreased by 3.7% each year.
However, at the beginning of the new millennium, France’s military expenditure totaled 33.6
billion dollars. In December 2001, 3.1 billion dollars was further assigned for military
expenditure, with approximately 398 million dollars allocated for the sole purpose of
expenditure dealing with the GWOT. Furthermore, between the period of 2001 to 2008,
military expenditure increased by 23.5, which included funding for international military
operations. The Military Planning Act for 2003-2008 formulated an objective of budgeting

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for 14.84 billion dollars in order to manage and expand ‘capabilities’ of new ‘equipment’. In
comparison to the Military Planning Act for 1997-2002, there was a growth of 6.8% in
consistent euros. The expansion in the defence budget of 2003-2008, which was justified by
the war against terror, was in fact dedicated to reinforcing the ‘gendarmerie’. The militant
gendarmerie is the establishment that deals with homeland security in France. Significantly,
as discussed in the previous chapter, during the start of the GWOT, the U.S. called for its
global allies to join in the fight against terrorism. France had initially been reluctant to
support this call but, its military budget at the time says otherwise. Currently, France supports
the U.S. request for Europe to increase their defence expenditure, in order to “allow for
credible self-defense, the development of effective crisis reaction capabilities, and greater
participation in international responses to global challenges” (Global Security 2019).

In line with the theory of new imperialism, in 2010 France’s ministry of defence was
scheduled to reduce its budget between two billion and 4.8 billion dollars, over the period of
the next three years. During France’s intervention in Mali, their military expenses amounted
to approximately 2.7 million euros a day, which was double when compared to the
multilateral intervention in Libya, whereby France spent approximately 1.6 million euros a
day. French Defence Minister at the time, Jean-Yves Le Drian stated to its parliament that the
transportation of troops and ‘military hardware’ had amounted to fifty million euros, and
totaled seventy million euros only fifteen days into the intervention.

After the Paris terror attacks, President François Hollande announced on the 29 of April 2015
that the defence expenditure would escalate by almost four billion euros over the period of
four years. Furthermore, in 2018, France’s defence budget for the period between 2019 and
2025 will grow to total two percent of the GDP by 2025. “The military budget will increase
€1.7 billion per year until 2022 and €3 billion per year starting in 2023. Total military
expenditure over the period will be €300 billion. For 2018, it is €34.2 billion (1.82 percent of
GDP), compared to €32.7 billion (1.77 percent of GDP) in 2017”

What the analysis of this chapter thus far has shown is that new imperialism goes far beyond
the accumulation of resources. While resources has played a significant part in
contextualizing new imperialism, what can be seen instead is the dramatic increase in military
spending which is justified by the war on terror. Therefore, the tenets of new imperialism are
seen to be substantiated.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion

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