People v Janson Appellant RICKY PINANTAO also denied the accusation against

him, saying that he did not know Marites and Cesario

FACTS: Alcantara. He claimed that he was arrested in March 1987
because he was implicated by appellant Janson as one of the
That on or about the 24th day of March 1986, at about 10:00 perpetrators of the crime, per instruction of one Cristina
o’clock in the evening at Barangay Mateo, Municipality of Agio.17
Kidapawan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused RTC RULING:
JOEL JANSON, RICKY PINANTAO alias OGCO in company with
alias ABDUL, alias PUTO, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, who are WHEREFORE, prescinding from all of the foregoing
still at large and whose names are still unknown, constituting a considerations, the Court hereby pronounces the accused
band and armed with long and short firearms, conspiring, Ricky Pinantao alias Ogco and Joel Janson guilty of the crime of
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent Robbery with Rape beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly,
to gain, with force and intimidation, did then and there sentences Ricky Pinantao and Joel Janson each to undergo a
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away, at gun prison term of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Marites
point, cash money in the amount of P1,400.00, three (3) pieces Alcantara the sum of P30,000.00; to indemnify Cesario
of wrist watches, one (1) can coffee beans and one (1) chicken Alcantara the sum of P10,000,00. No award of other damages
and if converted into cash it amounted to P1,845.00 or a total in the absence of proof thereof.
amount of Three Thousand Two Hundred Fourty (sic) Five
Pesos (P3,245.00), Philippine Currency, owned by Mr. & Mrs. ISSUES:
CESARIO ALCANTARA; and on the same occasion, the above-
named accused, with the use of force, violence and (1)) Is the extrajudicial confession of Janson admissible as
intimidation and armed with firearms, did then and there evidence for the prosecution? NO
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take turns in having carnal
knowledge with one MARITESS ALCANTARA, a girl about 13
(2) May said confession be used against co-accused Pinantao?
years old, daughter of Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO ALCANTARA,
NO
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of
the aforesaid persons in the aforesaid amount.
RULING:
All contrary to law with the aggravating circumstances of
The investigating police officer, P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, admitted
dwelling, nighttime and the use of unlicensed firearms.
in open court that the sworn statement of appellant Joel
Janson was taken without the presence of counsel and that
On December 9, 1987, both accused pleaded not guilty. 3 Trial
this statement together with the waiver of his right to
then ensued.
counsel, was already prepared when it was presented to Atty.
Zerrudo for signing.
ATTY. JORGE ZERRUDO testified that he only assisted appellant
Janson in waiving his right to counsel, and that the sworn
Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel
statement was already prepared when he signed it.
Janson cannot be admitted in evidence. The manner by which
Nevertheless, he asked appellant Janson if the contents of the
it was obtained violated accused’s constitutional right to
statement were true, and whether he wished to be assisted by
counsel.
counsel.10
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounseled
ATTY. FRANCIS PALMONES, JR., testified that he notarized the
confession or admission and whatever information is derived
sworn statement14 of the appellant Janson on April 3, 1987,
therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence
marked as Exh. 4 and that Janson affirmed and understood the
against the confessant.38
contents of said affidavit because it was translated to him in
the Visayan vernacular.15
As provided for in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution,
Appellant JOEL JANSON, for his own defense, declared that he
was assisted by a lawyer when he was investigated and made
(1) Any person under investigation for the
to sign a sworn statement before the police on June 26, 1986.
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
But he denied the accusation against him and claimed that he
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation.
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
He claimed that he did not know how to read or write, and that
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
he was made to execute a sworn statement before a certain
policeman named Ulep. Only after the investigation did Atty. of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
Zerrudo sign the document. On cross-examination, he said that
presence of counsel.
he was put in jail for another crime, robbery.16
 xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
against him.
In People v. Javar,39 this Court was clear in pronouncing that
any statement obtained in violation of the Constitution,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a
grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel,
it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence
of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.40 In People
v. Gomez,41citing People v. Rodrigueza,42 this Court held that
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution requires the
assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he
waives the right to counsel.
Under the Constitution and existing law as well as
jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.43
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting
confession by coercion no matter how slight, as would lead
the accused to admit something false. What is sought to be
avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an
offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and
thereafter convict him. These constitutional guarantees have
been made available to protect him from the inherently
coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such
investigation.44
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to
counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent, made in the presence and with the assistance of
counsel,45 and it must be in writing. Indeed, any waiver of the
right to counsel without the assistance of counsel has no
evidentiary value.46
In this case, it cannot be said that the waiver of the right to
counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Appellant Joel
Janson was illiterate, and a minor of sixteen (16) years at the
time of the offense. As held in the case of People v.
Bonola,47 where the accused was unschooled and only
nineteen (19) years old when arrested, it is difficult to believe
that considering the circumstances, the accused made an
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In such instances, the
need for counsel is more pronounced.
It is also important to mention that the investigating officers
already had a prepared statement when they went to the
lawyer who is supposed to assist appellant Janson in waiving
his right to counsel.
This is not what is contemplated by law. In People v. Quidato,
Jr.,48 where the police officers already prepared the affidavits
of the accused when they were brought to the CLAO (now PAO)
lawyer, and the latter explained the contents of the affidavits
in Visayan to the accused who affirmed the veracity and
voluntary execution of the same, the court held that the
affidavits are inadmissible in evidence even if they were
voluntarily given. As also ruled in People v. Compil,49 the
belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day, even if
prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does
not cure the defect of lack of counsel for the investigators were
already able to extract incriminatory statements from the
accused therein. Thus, in People v. De Jesus,50 we said that
admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without
the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and
signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the
Constitution.
As pointed out in People v. Deniega,51 if the lawyer’s role is
reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a
priorly prepared document albeit indicating therein
compliance with the accused’s constitutional rights, the
constitutional standard is not met.
Finally, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson
cannot be used against Ricky Pinantao. An extrajudicial
confession by an accused implicating another may not be
utilized unless repeated in open court or when there is an
opportunity for the co-accused to cross-examine the
confessant on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered
hearsay as against said co-accused under the res inter alios
acta rule, which ordains that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. 52
For all the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court finding Janson and Pinantao guilty of the
crime of robbery with rape fails to persuade us that appellants
have been adequately identified as the perpetrators of the
heinous offense. In our view, to affirm that judgment of
conviction on the basis of contradictory testimony of
prosecution witnesses and the flawed extrajudicial confession
of appellant Joel Janson is to sanction a possible miscarriage of
justice.
AGUINALDO v VENTUS
FACTS:
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus
and Jojo B. Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit3 for estafa against
petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming to be business partners
in financing casino players, private respondents alleged that
sometime in March and April 2002, petitioners connived in
convincing them to part with their Two Hundred Sixty
Thousand (P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of
two motor vehicles which the latter had misrepresented to be
owned by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by one Levita
De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.
Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit,4 denying the accusation
against him, and claiming that his only participation in the
transaction between private respondents and Aguinaldo was
limited to having initially introduced them to each other.
Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution7 recommending
both petitioners to be indicted in court for estafa under Article
315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). He also
noted that Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any
controverting evidence despite the subpoena.
Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction
of Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent
granted in an Order of even date. Public respondent issued an
Order granting the motion for withdrawal of information, and
directing the recall of the arrest warrant only insofar as
Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her motion
for reconsideration with the OCP.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of
Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for
reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. Upon the
prosecution's motion, the public respondent ordered the
proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of petitioners'
motion for reconsideration. Public respondent ordered the
case archived pending resolution of petitioners' motion for
reconsideration with the OCP of Manila.15
The OCP of Manila filed a Motion to Set Case for
Trial,16considering that petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have
already been denied for lack of merit.
Public respondent issued an Order directing the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case
for arraignment.
Public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to cancel
arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for
reconsideration.21
Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and
Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest. De Castro alleged that she was the private
complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered archived.
Petitioners filed an Opposition alleging that De Castro is not a
party to the said case, which is in active file, awaiting the
resolution of their petition for review before the DOJ.
The public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to
Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and
to Issue Warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by
private prosecutor with conformity of the public prosecutor
Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit
ISSUES:
1. Whether the honorable court of appeals failed to appreciate
that the motion to reinstate the case and issue a warrant of
arrest was filed by one levita de castro who is not a party to
criminal case no. 03-21[6]182? YES
2. Whether a procedural techinicality that the suspension
allowed for arraignment is already beyond the 60- day period
may be relaxed in the interest of an orderly and speedy
administration of justice? NO
3. W/N the precipitate filing of the Information and the
issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of
incarceration without the preliminary investigation? NO
RULING:
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that
the Motion to Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of
Arrest31 was filed by one Levita De Castro who is not a party to
Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De Castro is
not even a private complainant, but a mere witness for being
the owner of the vehicles allegedly used by petitioners in
defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with
their P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have
granted petitioners' motion to expunge, and treated De
Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect,
as it was filed by one who is not a party to that case.
On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners'
contention that the provision of Section 11 (c),33 Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only
sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against
them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for
review with finality.
In Samson v. Judge Daway,34 the Court explained that while the
pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of
the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment
of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial
court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to
defer arraignment.35
In Diño v. Olivarez,36 the Court held that it did not sanction an
indefinite suspension of the proceedings in the trial court. Its
reliance on the reviewing authority, the Justice Secretary, to
decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was anchored
on the rule provided under Department Memorandum Order
No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that the period for
the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be
seventy- five (75) days.37
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court ruled that
in a long line of decisions, it has repeatedly held that while
rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as
they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants, and they are not to be trifled with
lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of invoking
"substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of procedural
rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is
warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of
justice requires it.39
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by
petitioners' argument that the precipitate filing of the
Information and the issuance of a warrant of arrest put
petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary
investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the
DOJ resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary
investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right,
petitioners are wrong in arguing that the Information filed,
without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally
premature. In support of their argument, petitioners cite Sales
v. Sandiganbayan41 wherein it was held that since filing of a
motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the
preliminary investigation proper, an Information filed without
first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to
a preliminary investigation
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having
been filed on July 16, 2003, the public respondent cannot be
faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the August 23,
2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest,
and setting their arraignment, pending the final resolution of
their petition for review by the DOJ. The Court believes that
the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from
the time petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ
on February 27, 2004 to September 14, 2005 46 when the trial
court finally set their arraignment, was more than ample time
to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of
their petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very
liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of arraignment
to a 60-day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with
more than eleven (11) years having elapsed from the filing of
the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be
arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial
on the merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period
counted from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ
had long lapsed.
On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a
complete preliminary investigation as part of their right to
due process, the Court rules in the affirmative. Having
submitted his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder- Affidavit to the
OCP of Manila before the filing of Information for estafa, Perez
cannot be heard to decry that his right to preliminary
investigation was not completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo
was not personally informed of any notice of preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of the Information, she was
nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such
investigation.
Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right
to a complete preliminary investigation as part of their right
to due process. After all, "[d]ue process simply demands an
opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where an
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process."
In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing
the May 16, 2005 Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case
and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, as it was filed by one who is not
a party to the case, and it was based on the DOJ's dismissal of
a petition for review in a different case. Nevertheless, the
Court upholds the CA ruling that the public respondent
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the
August 23, 2005 Order denying petitioners' motion to quash
warrant of arrest, and setting their arraignment, despite the
pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. For one,
the public respondent had been very liberal in applying Section
11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which allows suspension
of arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For another,
records show that petitioners were given opportunity to be
heard during the preliminary investigation of their estafa case.
ABS-CBN Corporation v Gozon
FACTS:
The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the
homecoming of Filipino overseas worker and hostage victim
Angelo dela Cruz on July 22, 2004. As summarized by the Court
of Appeals:
Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by
Iraqi militants and as a condition for his release, a demand was
made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After
negotiations, he was released by his captors and was
scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July
2004. Occasioned by said homecoming and the public interest
it generated, both . . . GMA Network, Inc. . . and [petitioner]
made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live
event.7
ABS-CBN "conducted live audio-video coverage of and
broadcasted the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and the subsequent press
conference."8 ABS-CBN allowed Reuters Television Service
(Reuters) to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special
embargo agreement.9
ABS-CBN alleged that under the special embargo agreement,
any of the footages it took would be for the "use of Reuter’s
international subscribers only, and shall be considered and
treated by Reuters under ‘embargo’ against use by other
subscribers in the Philippines. . . . [N]o other Philippine
subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to use ABS-CBN
footage without the latter’s consent."10
GMA-7, to which Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, Soho, Dela Peña-
Reyes, and Manalastas are connected, "assigned and stationed
news reporters and technical men at the NAIA for its live
broadcast and non-live news coverage of the arrival of dela
Cruz."11 GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News
Network (CNN). It received a live video feed of the coverage of
Angelo dela Cruz’s arrival from Reuters.12
GMA-7 immediately carried the live news feed in its program
"Flash Report," together with its live broadcast.13Allegedly,
GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that
Reuters was airing footages of ABS-CBN.14 GMA-7’s news
control room staff saw neither the "No Access Philippines"
notice nor a notice that the video feed was under embargo in
favor of ABS-CBN.15
On August 13, 2004, ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright
infringement under Sections 17716 and 21117 of the
Intellectual Property Code.18
On December 3, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo
Venturanza issued the Resolution19 finding probable cause to
indict Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas.20 Consequently, the
Information21 for violation of the Intellectual Property Code
was filed on December 17, 2004.
Agra Resolution: On June 29, 2010, Department of Justice
Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra (Secretary Agra) issued the
Resolution (Agra Resolution) that reversed the Gonzalez
Resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Peña-
Reyes and Manalastas for violation of the Intellectual
Property Code.29 Secretary Agra also found probable cause
to indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for the same
violation.30 He ruled that:
[w]hile good faith may be a defense in copyright
infringement, the same is a disputable presumption that must
be proven in a full-blown trial. Disputable presumptions may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Thus, a full-
blown trial is the proper venue where facts, issues and laws
are evaluated and considered. The very purpose of trial is to
allow a party to present evidence to overcome the disputable
presumptions involved
The trial court granted respondents’ Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and deferred respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas’ arraignment for 60 days in view of the Petition for
Review filed before the Department of Justice.
ISSUE
Whether Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction in the
Resolution dated June 29, 2010 and, therefore, whether a
petition for certiorari was the proper remedy in assailing that
Resolution? YES
RULING:
Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
allows the suspension of the accused’s arraignment in certain
circumstances only:
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.–Upon motion by the
proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the
following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an
unsound mental condition which effectively renders
him unable to fully understand the charge against him
and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that
the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60)
days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. (12a) (Emphasis supplied)
We clarify that the suspension of the arraignment should
always be within the limits allowed by law. In Crespo v. Judge
Mogul,41 this court outlined the effects of filing an information
before the trial court, which includes initiating a criminal action
and giving this court "authority to hear and determine the
case":42
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
the filing of the information in the proper court.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the
motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the
Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the
prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot
possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does
not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the
fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case
thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We
all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as
to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela
Peña-Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60-day
period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on
September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was
issued by the Court of Appeals. The trial court erred when it
did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It
had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul
reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to
proceed with the arraignment "disregards the requirements of
due process [and] erodes the Court’s independence and
integrity."46
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals found that
respondents committed a procedural error when they failed to
file a motion for reconsideration before filing the Petition for
Certiorari. However, the Court of Appeals held that a motion
for reconsideration was unnecessary since the Agra Resolution
was a patent nullity and it would have been useless under the
circumstances: Given that a reading of the assailed Resolution
and the instant records readily reveals errors of jurisdiction
on the part of respondent Secretary, direct judicial recourse
is warranted under the circumstances. Aside from the fact
that said Resolution is a patent nullity having been issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is
evidently useless on account of the fact that the issues and
arguments before this Court have already been duly raised and
accordingly delved into by respondent Secretary in his
disposition of the petition a quo.47 (Emphasis in the original)
A prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence
that will establish probable cause justifying the filing of a
criminal information against the respondent. By way of
exception, however, judicial review is allowed where
respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise stated, such
review is appropriate only when the prosecutor has exercised
his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and
gross enough to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.52 (Citations
omitted)
Grave abuse of discretion refers to: such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.53
Resorting to certiorari requires that there be there be "no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law[,]"54 such as a motion for
reconsideration. Generally, "a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie,
its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the [tribunal or
officer] to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case." 55 However,
exceptions to the rule exist:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the Court a
quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial Court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.56 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
As argued by respondents, "[a] second motion for
reconsideration would have been useless and futile since the
D[epartment] [of] J[ustice] had already passed upon the same
issues twice."57 Equally pressing under the circumstances was
the need to resolve the matter, as the Information’s filing
would lead to respondents’ imminent arrest. 58
Moreover, Department of Justice Department Circular No. 70
dated July 3, 2000, or the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal, provides
that no second motion for reconsideration of the Department
of Justice Secretary’s resolution shall be entertained:

SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party

may file a motion for reconsideration within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on
appeal, furnishing the adverse party and the Prosecution Office
concerned with copies thereof and submitting proof of such
service. No second or further motion for reconsideration shall
be entertained.

The Agra Resolution was the result of respondents’ Motion for

Reconsideration assailing the Gonzalez Resolution. To file a
motion for reconsideration of the Agra Resolution would be
superfluous. Respondents were, therefore, correct in filing the
Petition for Certiorari of the Agra Resolution before the Court
of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Secretary Agra committed

errors of jurisdiction, which then required the grant of the writ
of certiorari:

So viewed, by ordering the filing of information without proof

that probable cause exists to charge petitioners with a crime,
respondent Secretary clearly committed an error of
jurisdiction thus warranting the issuance of the writ of
certiorari. Surely, probable cause cannot be had when the very
provisions of the statute exculpates criminal liability in cases
classified as fair use of copyrighted materials. The fact that
they admittedly used the Reuters live video feed is not, as a
matter of course, tantamount to copyright infringement that
would justify the filing of an information against the
petitioners.59