Morphogenesis Versus Structuration On Combining Structure and Action Archer1982

Morphogenesis versus Structuration: On Combining Structure and Action
Author(s): Margaret S. Archer

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1982), pp. 455-483
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MargaretS. Archer
Morphogenesisversusstructuration:
on combiningstructureand actionl
The fundamental problem of linking human agency and social
structurestalks throughthe history of sociologicaltheory. Basically
it concernshow to develop an adequatetheoreticalaccount which
deals simultaneouslywith men constitutingsociety and the social
formationof humanagents. For any theorist,except the holist, social
structureis ultimatelya humanproduct,but for any theorist,except
advocatesof psychologism,this product in turn shapes individuals
and influences their interaction. However successive theoretical
developmentshave tilted either towardsstructureor towardsaction,
a slippagewhichhas gatheredin momentumover time.
Initially this meant that one element became dominant and the
other subordinate:human agency had become pale and ghostly in
mid-centuryfunctionalism,whilst structure betook an evanescent
fragility in the re-floweringof phenomenology.Eventuallycertain
schools of thought repressedthe second elementalmostcompletely.
On the one hand structuralistMarxismand normativefunctionalism
virtuallysnuffed-outagency-the acting subjectbecameincreasingly
lifeless whilst the structuralor culturalcomponentsenjoyeda life of
their own, self-propellingor self-maintaining.On the other hand
interpretativesociologybusily banishedthe structuralto the realmof
objectificationand facticity-human agencybecamesovereignwhilst
social structure was reduced to supine plasticity because of its
constructednature.
Although proponents of these divergentviews were extremely
vociferous,they were also extensivelycriticizedandpreciselyon the
groundsthat both structureand action were indispensablein socio-
logical explanation.2 Moreover serious efforts to re-addressthe
problem and to re-unitestructureand actionhad alreadybegunfrom
inside 'the two Sociologies',3when they were characterizedin this
manicheanway. These attemptsemergedafter the earlysixties from
'general' functionalists,4'humanistic' marxists5 and from inter-
actionistsconfrontingthe existence of stronglypatternedconduct.6
Furthermorethey werejoined in the samedecadeby a bold attempt
The British Journal of Sociology Volume 33 Number 4 December 1982
OR.K.P. 1982 0007 1315/823304-0455 $1.50
455

456 MargaretS. Archer
to undercut the problem by disclosing 'hidden structures'which

simultaneouslygovernedovertstructuralorganizationand observable
actionpatterns.7
Buildingon these basesin a very eclectic manner,two newperspec-
tiveshavesince begunto maturewhichdirectlytacklethe relationship
between structure and action and seek to unite them. One is the
'morphogeneticapproach',8advancedwithin generalsystemstheory,
whose best knownexponentis WalterBuckley.9Its sociologicalroots
go back to the three kinds of theoreticalrevisionismmentionedin
the last paragraph,but the other part of its pedigreeis cybernetics.
The second perspective is 'structuration',recently spelt-out by
Anthony Giddens. Whilst integratingsome of the same revisionist
material, this approach leans much more heavily on the newer
linguisticstructuralism,semioticstudiesandhermeneutics.
Both the 'morphogenetic'and 'structuration'approachesconcur
that 'action' and 'structure'presuppose one another: structural
patterningis inextricablygroundedin practicalinteraction.Simul-
taneouslyboth acknowledgethat socialpracticeis ineluctablyshaped
by the unacknowledgedconditionsof actionandgeneratesunintended
consequenceswhich form the context of subsequentinteraction.The
two perspectivesthus endorse the credo that the 'escapeof human
history from humanintentions,and the returnof the consequences
of that escape as causalinfluencesupon humanaction, is a chronic
featureof social life'.10Wherethey differ profoundlyis in how they
conceptualize it, and how, on that basis, they theorize about the
structuring(andre-structuring) of socialsystems.
STRUCTURATION AND MORPHOGENESIS
Structuration In dealingwith 'structuration'this paperconcentrates

exclusivelyupon AnthonyGiddens'sbook CentralProblemsin Social
Theory: Action, Structureand Contradictionin Social Analysis,1l
since its density and rangerequireclose textual attention.Giddens's
whole approachhinges on overcomingthree dichotomies and it is
these dualismswhich he stripsaway from a variety of sources,then
recombiningtheirresidues:
(a) First he insists on an account of humanagencywhich is intrinsi-
cally relatedto the subjectactingin society, thusseekingto transcend
the dualism between voluntarismand determinism.Hence both
deterministicattempts to get behind the 'backs of actors' (as in
organic functionalism and orthodox Marxism) and the excessive
voluntarismwhichneglectsthe structuralcontext (asin contemporary
action theories)areequallycondemned.
(b) Second he seeks to mediate the dichotomy between subject
and object by assigninga prime role to the knowledgeabilityof

Morphogenesisversusstructuration 457
actors in producingand reproducingtheir society, whilst acknowl-

edgingthat they necessarilyemploy societalpropertiesin the process.
Thus structuralismand functionalismarecriticizedfor subordinating
the individualto society and Giddensaims to transcendthe subject/
object dualismby elaboratingon common elementsin the work of
Marx and the later Wittgensteinwhich construe the generationof
society as the outcome of praxis.
(c) Finallyhe rejectsany theory which repressestime by separating
statics from dynamics and analysingthe two separately. For to
Giddens, any theory embodying the interdependenceof structure
and action is predicatedupon graspingthe temporal and spatial
locations which are inherent in the constitution of all social inter-
action.Thus the divisionbetweensynchronyand diachronymustalso
be transcendedin orderto capturethe temporalreleaseof unintended
consequencesand their subsequentinfluenceon lateraction.
Becauseof this rejectionof the three dichotomies,'structuration'
is quintessentiallyconcernedwith duality not dualism,with amalga-
mating the two sides of each divide.This is to be achievedthrough
the central notion of the 'duality of structure'which refersto 'the
essentialrecursivenessof sociallife, as constitutedin socialpractices:
structure is both medium and outcome of the reproductionof
practices.Structureenterssimultaneouslyinto the constitutionof the
agent and social practices,and "exists"in the generatingmomentsof
this constitution'.l2This involvesan imageof society as a continuous
flow of conduct (not a series of acts) which changesor maintainsa
potentially malleable social world. In turn it obviously proscribes
any discontinuousconceptualizationof structure and action-the
intimacy of their mutual constitution defies it. 'Structuration'is
predicatedupon the 'duality of structure':analyticallyit disengages
continuitiesor transformationsin the reproductionof socialsystems.
Because of the dynamic interplayof the two constituentelements,
'structuration'does not denote fixity, durability,or even a point
reached in development.'Structuration'itself is ever a processand
nevera product.
In elaboratinghis theory of 'structuration',however, Giddens
completely ignores existing efforts to perform the same task of
re-unitingstructureand action from within generalsystems theory.
MorphogenesisThis perspectivehas an even better claim than the
former to call itself a 'non-functionalistmanifesto';13since a major
part of its backgroundwas the growingdisenchantmenton the part
of neo-functionalistswith every remnant of the OrganicAnalogy-
with the over-integrated viewof socialstructureandthe over-socialized
view of man;with the assumptionof immanentequilibrationunrelated
to human decision-making;with its failure to incorporatetime-a
double failure involving the absence of an analytical history of

systemic emergence(groundedin humaninteraction,takingplace in

prior social contexts) and a failureto appreciatethat the structural
elaborationthus producedcarriesover to future time, providingnew
contexts for subsequentinteraction.
'Morphogenesis'is also a process,referringto the complex inter-
changes that produce change in a system'sgiven form, structureor
state (morphostasisbeing the reverse),but it has an end-product,
structuralelaboration,which is quite differentfrom Giddens'ssocial
system as merely a 'visiblepattern'.This to him can best be analysed
as recurrentsocialpractices,whereasto generalsystemstheorists,the
elaborated structure has properties which cannot be reduced to
practicesalone, althoughthese are what generatedboth it and them.
Theemergentpropertiesl4whichcharacterizesocio-culturalsystems
imply discontinuitybetween initial interactionsand their product,
the complex system. In turn this invites analyticaldualismwhen
dealing with structureand action. Action of courseis ceaselessand
essential both to the continuation and furtherelaborationof the
system, but subsequentinteraction will be different from earlier
action because conditioned by the structuralconsequencesof that
prior action. Hence the morphogeneticperspective is not only
dualistic but sequential, dealing in endless cycles of -structural
conditioning/socialinteraction/structural elaboration-thus unravel-
ling the dialecticalinterplaybetweenstructureand action. 'Structur-
ation', by contrast,treatsthe ligaturesbindingstructure,practiceand
system as indissoluble,hence the necessityof dualityand the need to
gaina moreindirectanalyticalpurchaseon the elementsinvolved.
Hence Giddens'swhole approachturns on overcomingthe dichot-
omies which the morphogeneticperspectiveretains and utilizes-
between voluntarism and determinism, between synchrony and
diachrony,and between individualand society. In 'place of each of
these dualisms,asa singleconceptualmove,the theoryof structuration
substitutesthe centralnotion of the dualityof structure'.15The body
of this paperwill:
(a) question the capacity of this concept to transcend such
dichotomiesin a way which is sociologicallyuseful;
(b) defend the greater theoretical utility of analytical dualism,
whichunderpinsgeneralsystemstheory; and,
(c) seek to establishthe greatertheoreticalutility of the morpho-
geneticperspectiveover the structurationapproach.
I THE 'DUALITY OF STRUCTURE' AND VOLUNTARISM/DETERMINISM
Basicallywhat Giddensis seeking to enfold here are two views of

social institutions-institutions as causesof action (whichhas certain
deterministicovertones) and institutions as embodimentsof action

(which has more voluntaristicconnotations).Condensedin the brief

statementthat 'structureis both medium and outcome of the repro-
duction of practices'l6is his method of bridgingthis dichotomy.The
central notion of the 'duality of structure'makesup the bridgeby
droppingtwo planksfrom oppositebanksso that they liejuxtaposed.
Firsthe advancesthe essentialcontributionmade by knowledgeable
actorsin generating/transforming recurrentsocialpractices-which in
turn createsthe 'visiblepattern'that constitutesthe socialsystem for
Giddens.Simultaneously,he lays down the fundamentalproposition
that when actorsproducesocialpracticesthey necessarilydrawupon
basic 'structuralproperties'-these essentialfactorsbeingviewedas a
matrixof rulesand resources.
Ideally what he wants to integrateis the way in which the active
creation of social conditions is itself unavoidablyconditioned by
needing to drawupon structuralfactorsin the process.Perhapsthis
is clarifiedby consultingthe kind of practicalimagesGiddenshas in
mind. The referencesto agentsproducingrecurrentsocial practices
summon-up a picture of the 'ruttedness' of routine action-in
bureaucracy,for instance,wherelife is constantlybreathedinto inert
rules which then deadentheiranimatorsthroughroutinization.l7But
this is not the only picture he invokes.Thereis also metamorphosis,
the generationof radicallynew practiceswhen agency rides on the
coat-tails of structuralfacilitation to produce social changeof real
magnitude.Although the 'duality of structure'spansboth images,it
providesno analyticalgrip on which is likely to prevailunder what
conditions or circumstances.The theory of 'structuration'remains
fundamentallynon-propositional.
In other words the 'centralnotion' of the 'structuration'approach
fails to specify when therewill be 'morevoluntarism'or 'moredeter-
minism'. In fact, on the contrary, the 'duality of structure'itself
oscillatesbetween the two divergentimagesit bestrides-between (a)
the hyperactivityof agency,whose corollaryis the innatevolatilityof
society, and (b) the rigidcoherenceof structuralpropertiesassociated,
on the contrary,with the essentialrecursivenessof sociallife.
(a) Hyperactivityis an ineluctableconsequenceof all rules and
resourcesbeing defined as transformative,in contradistinctionto the
rigid transformationalgrammarof linguistics.Resourcesare readily
convertible, rules endlessly interpretable;the former providing
material levers for transformingthe empirical domain, the latter
transfiguringcodes and norms. Consequentlythe spatio-temporal
constitution of society is orderedin terms of the mediationsand
transformationsmade possible by these two structuralproperties,
as manipulated by agents. However it follows that if structural
propertiesareinherentlytransformativethen actorsgenericallyenjoy
very high degreesof freedom-at any time they could have acted
otherwise, interveningfor change or for maintenance.Hence the

counterfactualimage of hyperactivityin which actors explore and

exploit these generousdegreesof freedom.Hence too the outcomes
must be correspondinglyvariegated;society is not just 'potentially
malleable',18 it becomeshighly volatile if 'the possibilityof changeis
recognizedas inherentin everycircumstanceof socialreproduction'.19
(b) The other side of the 'duality of structure'is intended to
rectify the image andintro(lucea morerecognizablepictureof social
life. Instead I believe over-correctiontakes place, generatinga
counter-imageof 'chronic recursiveness'in society. Basically this
arisesbecause actorshave to drawupon rulesandresourcesin social
interchangeand these structuralproperties are thus reconstituted
through such interaction.HoweverGiddensgoes further than this,
now endorsingthe kind of linguisticanalogydisavowedin (a). Thus
when actorsdo drawupon rulesandresourcesthey necessarilyinvoke
the whole matrix of differenceswhich constitute structures,'in the
sense in which the utteranceof a grammaticalsentencepresupposes
the absent corpusof syntacticalrules that constitutethe languageas
a totality'.20
In this way Giddenscommitshimselfto an enormouscoherenceof
the structuralproperties,such that actors'inescapableuse of them
embroilseveryonein the stable reproductionof social systems.The
pendulumswingsso far the otherway that we arenow presentedwith
another over-integratedview of man, for the 'duality of structure'
relates the smallestitem of day-to-daybehaviourto attributesof far
more inclusive social systems: 'when I utter a grammaticalEnglish
sentence in a casualconversation,I contributeto the reproductionof
the Englishlanguageas a whole. This is an unintendedconsequence
of my speakingthe sentence,but one that is boundin directlyto the
recursivenessof the dualityof structure'.21
This rigidity of the recursiveimage is open to criticism on two
counts. On the one hand, rules and resourcesare not so coherently
organizedas grammar,often lackingthe mutuallyinvocatingcharacter
of syntax (to have a council house does not necessarilymean no
telephone,low income,job insecurityetc.). Onthe otherhand,action
is not really so tightly integratedby these structuralproperties:not
only may some of the smallest items of behaviourbe irrelevantto
the social system, certain largerones may also be trivial,mutually
cancellingor self-containedin their effects, whilst still other actions
can produce far reachingaggregateand emergentconsequen.ces-yet
these differentpossibilitiesremainundifferentiatedby Giddens.What
is wrong with this image,as with the previousone, is that it does not
allow for some behaviourengenderingreplicationwhilst other action
initiates transformation.Rather than transcendingthe voluntarism/
deterrninismdichotomy, the two sides of the 'duality of structure'
embody them respectively:they are simply clamped together in a
conceptualvice.

versusstructuration
Morphogenes?s 461
This oscillationbetweencontradictoryimagesderivesfrom Giddens

not answering'when'questions-when can actors be transformative
(which involves specificationof degreesof freedom) and when are
they trapped into replication (which involves specificationof the
stringency of constraints)?These answers in turn requireanalysis
of the potential for change, which is rooted in systemic stability/
instability,and the conditionsunderwhichactorsdo/do not capitalize
on it. AlthoughGiddensadmitsthat structuresare both facilitating
and constraining,indeed it is one of the majortheoreticaltasks to
discoverwhataspectsof socialorganizationgovernthe interconnection
between the two,22 this is precisely, with one exception, what he
does not do. His theory consistentlyavoidsconcretepropositionsof
this type.
Stringencyof ConstraintsThereasonfor thisomissionis his principled

but misguideddistaste for the constraintconcept (contaminatedby
functionism):23the exception, his analysis of contradiction,is of
course on the contraryan example of systemic facilitation.Specifi-
cation of the stringencyof constraintsis sedulously avoided at all
three levels of analysis-structuralproperties,social institutionsand
social systems. StructuralPropertiesareintegralto socialconstitution
and reconstitution,but when do they throwtheirweightbehindthe
one or the other? Generallyin sociologythishasbeen tackledthrough
an appreciationthat some propertiesare more resilientor engender
more resistance to change than others, at any given time. This
specification of the strength of constraintsis both impossible in
Giddens's conceptualization and unacceptable to him. First his
properties (defined reductively as rules and resources)are outside
time and space,havinga 'virtualexistence'only when instantiatedby
actors. Second, since what is instantiateddependson the power of
agencyand not the natureof the property,thenpropertiesthemselves
are not differentiallymutable.Excessivevoluntarismenters through
these two doorswhich areconceptuallyproppedopen.
However,why shouldone accept thispeculiarontologicalstatusfor
structuralpropertiesin the firstplace?Whereresourcesareconcerned
senseis only a 'material
he arguesthat what exists in a spatio-temporal
existent' which, to become operativeas a resourcehas to be instan-
tiated throughpowerrelationsin conjunctionwith codesandnorms.24
This is an argumentof necessaryaccompanimentand it is not a very
convincingone, for the so-called'materialexistents' often constrain
in their own right. Examplesincludevariouskindsof scarcitywhich
can arisewithout power or normativeregulationand involvenothing
other than physiologicalsignification,like famine, over-population,
shortage of skills or land. In what possible sense do these require
instantiation?They are there and the problemis how to get rid of
them or deal with them.

Lessobviously,why shouldWorld
on only in libraries,be regarded Threeknowledge,even if it
as outsidetime and space;it is lives
continuouslyand thus awaitsnot there
when it is activatedit contains its instantiationbut activation.25Yet
own
independentof the constructionsand potentials and limitations
The fact that resourcesand their regulationsimposedupon it.
of significationand legitimationuses are usuallyentangledwith rules
and
should not be confounded with that these do makea difference
Indeed the rulesthemselvesareusually them making all the difference.
becausethe distributionor use of real contestedand areso precisely
in turn can also affect resourcesis at stake.The
significationand regulation,instead oflatterthe
relationshipbeingexclusivelythe other way
Furthermorethe qualityof the structural round.
contributionto differentialmalleability, propertiesrnakesits own
of power actors bring to bear. independentof the amount
Some properties can be changed
relativelyquickly(tax rules),sometake
orknowledgedistributions),some longerto change(demographic
prove highly
(bureaucracy, genderdistinctions,ethnicity),and resistantto change
able(exhaustednaturalresourcesor some areunchange-
importantly, environmental ruin).Evenmore
centralconfigurations
theConstitution,or capitalism) of rules and resources(the Law,
among display this differentialmutability
theirinternalcomponents.
The key point here is that
during the time
something, then that thing continues to exert it takes to change
cannotbe assumed to be a constraintwhich
whilst insignificant
it lasts. Nations can fall, polities in its social consequences,
be deposed and economies
bankrupted, while efforts are being made to
responsible. As a general theoretical change the factors
however proposition
short the time intervalinvolved. this holds good
spirits
awayby makingstructuralproperties Yet this is what Giddens
themonly a pale 'virtualexistence'. atemporal and according
Social Institutions are
enduring conceptualizedas standardizedpractices,
and widespreadin society.26In
ratherthan with institutional operations, dealingwith socialpractices
exercise(in which structuralproperties the earlier conceptual
power) is directly paralleled.It has were transmutedinto agents'
voluntarism identical effects; it amplifies
andmininaizesconstraint.The
institutional knowledgeabilityandcombinedaccentuationof
actors'
institutionswork 'behind our backs' (or beforeunderemphasisof how
matter)
producesa complementaryneglectof our faces for that
istics
in their own right.Whatthis institutional character-
people omits arecharacteristicsof which
may well be aware(such as
orinflation),
but which constrainthemcentralization,electoralsystems
none
constrainwithout much 'discursive the less (aswell as others
which
international penetration'of them, like
monetarypolicy or high science).
Hereexplanatoryreductionism
attendstreatingthe effects of, say,

centralizationas reducibleto the exercise of power by determinate

actors.27The voluntaristicbiasmeansthatinstitutionsarewhatpeople
produce,not what they confront-and have to grapplewith in ways
whicharethemselvesconditionedby the structuralfeaturesinvolved.28
For Giddens institutionalrecursivenessnever reflects the durability
of constraint:it alwaysrepresentsthe continuityof reproduction.
Social System Only at this level does Giddens concede that
'unintended consequencesof action stretch beyond the recursive
effects of the duality of structure',29producingwhat others would
term 'emergentproperties',but whichhe calls 'self-regulating proper-
ties'. Immediatelyandcategoricallyhe assertsthatit is theirfacilitating
effects upon which theory shouldcentre-'the self-regulating proper-
ties of social systems must be graspedvia a theory of system contra-
diction.30 The reason for this one-sidednessis that to Giddens
contradictionsrepresentcracksthroughwhich radicalchangecan be
forced by social conflict-'ceterzsparibus,conflict and contradiction
have a tendency to coincide'.3lBut is he warrantedin concentrating
on systemic contradictionalone and in ignoringsystemic compati-
bilities altogether?
From the morphogeneticperspectivecontradictions,though very
important, are only one of many deviation-amplifying mechanisms.
To Maruyamathe latter
are ubiquitous: accumulationof capitalin industry,evolution of
living organisms,the rise of culturesof varioustypes, interpersonal
processes which produce mental illness, internationalconflicts,
and the processes that are loosely termedas 'viciouscircles'and
'compound interests': in short, all processes of mutual causal
relationshipsthat amplify an insignificantor accidental initial
kick, build up deviationand divergefrom the initial condition.32
Obviouslyscme of the aboveexamplesinvolveconflict,but 'felicitous
circles' and 'compound interests' do not, yet they contribute to
structure-building. The close relationshipbetweenconflictandchange
belongs more to the history of sociology than to theories of self-
regulationin complex systems.
Giddens'sstudiousneglect of compatibilities-those relationsand
exchanges among components which tend to preserveor maintain
a system's given form, organizationor state-derives partly from
his valid rejectionof functionalequilibrationbut perhapsowes more
to the fact that such morphostaticprocessesareexperiencedas con-
straintsby othersin sociallife. Neverthelessin complexsocio-cultural
systems, the positiveandnegativefeedbackloops producingmorpho-
genesis and morphostasisrespectively,also circulatesimultaneously.
This means that Giddensprovidesan inherentlypartialaccountof
the systemic conditions of change and stability. His attemptto bow
out of this by contestingthat there is 'little point in looking for an

overall theory of stability and change in social systems, since the
conditions of social reproductionvary so widely between different
types of society'33fails on three counts. First it implies a descent
into specificity (not necessarilyhistoricaluniqueness)whichGiddens
himselftends to eschewthroughoutthe book. Second,in pin-pointing
'contradiction'as the focus of theoreticalanalysishe is specifying
a general condition of change and to do so must have eliminated
other contenders.Third,he does indeedprovidean overalltheory of
stability,if rudimentaryin form,to whichwe will now turn.
Degrees of Freedom As we have seen, the systematicunderplaying
of constraintsartificiallyinflates the degreesof freedomfor action.
To correct this Giddenscounterposestwo factorswhich limit them,
thus temperinghyperactivityand volatility, i.e. his 'attemptto show
the essentialimportanceof traditionandroutinizationin sociallife'.34
Howeverwhile a full specificationof constraintsdetailswho is limited,
when and how, distinguishingthese people from others with vested
interestsin stability,Giddensonly stressesthat society formsactors
in general terms by inducing habitual action. Yet 'habit' lumps
together a varietyof conditionspromotingstabilityin a way whichis
not only methodologicallyunhelpfulbut is also positivelymisleading
in its implication that all that is requiredfor destabilizationis a
changeof habit.
Thus instead of a specificationof degreesof freedomrelatedto
systemic features and the action contexts they create, Giddens
provides a general account of 'deroutinization'detached from
variationsin structuralconfigurations.Primarilyit is treated as a
passive process in which external events (war, cultural contact,
industrialization)disruptingrainedhabits. In practicethis repudiates
Weber'stenet, embodied in the studies of world religions,that it is
only throughacknowledgingboth the restrictionsthat socialorganiz-
ation imposes on people, and the opportunitiesfor action that are
rooted in the internalinstabilityof socialstructures,that we arriveat
detailedtheoriesof deroutinization,rationalizationandchange.
At most Giddensallowsthat thereare'criticalsituations'or 'critical
phases'wherethe drasticdisruptionof routinecorrodesthe customary
behaviourof actors andheightenssusceptibilityto alternatives.Then
'there is establisheda kind of "spot welding"of institutions that
formsmodes of integrationwhichmay subsequentlybecomeresistant
to furtherchange'.35Not only is the concept of a 'criticalsituation'
dubiousbecauseof its post hoc designation,but also this formulation
begs more questionsthan it answers.Whatmakes a phase'critical'-
arestructuralfactorsnot alwaysgermane?Whatproducesaparticular
crisis-do specific systemic featuresnot generatedistinctivecrises?36
What produces subsequent resistance? Logically this cannot be
attributedto the long termsedimentationof habits.

Does Giddens'sformulationfare any better if we look at it the

other way round,i.e. not focusingon whatcurtailsfreedom(tradition
and routinization),but on the conditionsunderwhichhigherdegrees
of freedom prevail?Unfortunatelythis is not the case, the reason
being that the 'transformativecapacity' of actors is immediately
conflated with the concept of power. On the contrary I would
maintain that degreesof freedom are logically independentof the
power of agents,the relationshipbetweenthem beingone of contin-
gency. Systemic patterningdeterminesa given potential for trans-
formation,but:
(a) this may not be capitalizedupon by those with the power to
do so;
(b) its exploitationdoes not necessarilyinvolvepower;
(c) considerablepower can be deployed in this context without
producingany transformation.
The example of our decentralizededucationalsystem should clarify
points (a) and (b), for this providesconsiderablestructuraldegrees
of freedom for innovation and change. Sometimes these remain
unexploited, not because teacherslack the power to innovate but
because they do not want transformation:sometimesthey are used
for the internal initiation of change without any application of
power. Always to Giddens 'transformativecapacity is harnessedto
actors' attemptsto get othersto complywiththeirwants'.37Thiswas
not the case with the foundationof experimentalschools nor with
the move to progressiveschooling, which involved a cumulative
change in educationalphilosophy38which could only be termed
complianceby renderingthat termvacuous(i.e. to acceptanythingis
to comply with it). To clinch point (c), degreesof freedommay be
large,but powerfulcontestantscan lock in immobilism,as in casesof
political 'centrism',like Fourth Republic France. In other words
there are even some circumstancesunderwhich the use of power and
the achievementof transformationareantithetic.39
Once again the contrast between the structurationapproach
and the morphogeneticperspectivebecomes pointed. In the latter
structuralelaboration can arise from three sources of interaction
(besides their unintendedconsequences):the confluence of desires,
power induced complianceor reciprocalexchange.Thereforein any
givencase the relationshipbetweenpowerandmorphogenesisremains
to be determined.Structuration,on the other hand, makes trans-
formationlogicallydependenton power relationsalone.40
Whilst structurationattemptsto transcend the voluntarism/deter-
minismdivide by a singleconceptualleap (the 'dualityof structure'),
morphogenesistackles the respectiveweightingsof the two aspects
by analysingthe stringencyof constraintsand degreesof freedomin
different structuralcontexts and for different social groups. The
hare and the tortoise analogyis equally pertinentto the way these
perspectivesapproachthe next 'dualism'.

S. Archer
Margaret
466
II'STRUCTURATION' AND SYNCHRONY/DIACHRONY
Giddens maintainsthat 'the conception of structurationintroduces

temporalityas integralto social theory; and that such a conception
involvesbreakingwith the synchrony/diachronyor static/dynamic
Whileagreeingwholeheartedlythat the incorporationof
divisions'*4l
timeis a condition of theoreticaladequacy,one may doubt whether
'structuration'does integratethe temporaldimensionadequately.Just
asthe attempt to transcendthe voluntarism/determinism dichotomy
and routinization which were
producedtwo imagesof hyperactivity
attempt to overcome the static/
notsuccessfullyunited, so in this
dynamicdivision, two equivalentimages emerge-those of chronic
recursiveness andtotal transformation-butarenot successfullyrecon-
ciled.The reasonfor this is identicalin both cases,his unwillingnessthe
to examine the interplay between structureand action because
twopresu.pposeone anotherso closely.42
Immediatelyfollowing his discussionof the system and its self- the
regulatingpropertieshe proposes 'two principalways in which an
study of system propertiesmay be approached'.43 This involves
exerciseof 'methodologicalbracketing'.Institutionalanalysisbrackets
repro-
strategicaction and treats structuralpropertiesas 'chronicallyfigures
ducedfeaturesof social systems'.44 This image of recursiveness
prominently,but many would deny that these featuresnecessarily
are'chronic':though they ma^ be long lastingthey arenevertheless
temporary(e.g. feudalism)or may changefrequently(e.g. resource
distributions).Instead, through this kind of institutionalanalysis,
they acquirea spuriousmethodologicalpermanence.
On the other hand, to examine the constitutionof socialsystems and
as strategic conduct, Giddens brackets institutional analysis
studies actors'mobilizationof resources and rulesin social relaticns.
This leads immediatelyto the reverseimage-'Change, or its poten-
tiality, is thus inherent in all moments of social reproduction'.45
('Moments' have now replaced 'circumstances'in the quotation
reproducedon page 460.) Here an equally spuriouschangeability
appears as a product of this methodological device-systemic
malleability is not only high but is constant over time.temporalOn the
contrarymany would argue that it is variableand that its
variations are partially independent of strategic action, however
This
intensely it is mobilized or knowledgeablyit is conducted.swing
methodologicalbracketing has again produced the pendular
total
between contradictoryimages-of chronic recursivenessand
traWnsformation.
Giddensmightreplyin defencethatsinceboth occursimultaneously is
in reality, then no contradictionis involved as th;esocial system
i.e. that
inherentlyJanus faced. But hardly anyone would deny this,
there are long tracts of steady institutionalreplication(sometimes

eroded by cumulativeaction) or that collective action can reshape

social structure(without necessarilyerasingevery familiarregularity
or routine).Whatmost of us seek insteadof these truismsare theor-
etical propositionsabout when (more) recursivenessor (more)trans-
formation will prevail-a specification which would necessitate
unravellingthe relationsbetween structureand action.This Giddens
refuses to give on principlebecauseto specify theirinter-relationship
would involve dualistic theorizing. Yet, ironically, what does his
bracketingdevice do other than traducethis very principle,since it
merelytransposesdualismfrom the theoreticalto the methodological
level-thus concedingits analyticalindispensability.
Moreimportantlythis bracketingapproachhasseriousimplications
concerning time which seem to contradict the aim of making
temporalityintegral to explainingthe system and its properties.To
Giddens what is bracketed are the two aspects of the 'duality of
structure',institutionalanalysisand strategicconduct beingseparated
out by placing a methodologicalepoche upon each in turn. But
because they are the two sides of the same thing, the pocketed
elements must thus be co-terminousin time (the symmetryof the
epoc/zes confines analysisto the same epoque); and it follows from
this that temporal relations between institutional structure and
strategicaction logicallycannot be examined.
The attempt to reunite the two elements under the rubric of
'structuration'consists in the introduction of three 'modalities',
drawnupon by actors strategicallybut at the sametime constituting
the institutional features of the system-'interpretative scheme',
'facility'and 'norm'.46To Giddensthe 'levelof modalitythusprovides
the coupling elements whereby the bracketingof strategicor insti-
tutional analysis is dissolvedin favour of an acknowledgementof
But the interrelationshipis not really at issue
their interrelation'.47
(or morepreciselyit is only anissueforhard-lineethnomethodologists
and extreme structuraldeterminists).The real theoreticalissueis not
whether to acknowledgeit but how to analyseit, andhow to explain
the systemic propertiesit generatesand elaborates.Yet little of this
can be tackled from an approachwhich precludestheorizingabout
the temporalrelationsbetween structureand action.
The basic notion of the 'duality of structure'militatesagainstthe
latter because it resistsuntying structureand action, except by the
bracketingexercise.In turn this meansGiddenscannot acknowledge
that structureand action work on different time intervals(however
small the gap between them). This,ironically,leadshim to underplay
the full importance of time in sociology. Whathe stressesis that
theorizingmust have a temporaldimension:whathe missesis time as
an actual variablein theory. In consequenceGiddens asserts that
'social systems only exist throughtheir continuousstructurationin
the courseof time,48 but is unableto provideanytheoreticalpurchase

on the structuring over time.

The morphogeneticargumentthat structureand action operate
over differenttime periodsis basedon two simplepropositions:
-that structurelogicallypredatesthe action(s) which transformit,
-that structuralelaborationlogicallypostdatesthose actions,which
can be representedas shownin FigureI.
' Structure
T1
' Action
T2 T3
StructuralElaboration '
T4
FIGURE I
Althoughall threelines arein fact continuous,the analyticalelement

only consists in breakingup the flows into intervalsdeterminedby
the problemin hand: given any problemand accompanyingperiod-
ization, the projection of the three lines backwardsand forwards
would connect up with the anteriorand posterior morphogenetic
cycles. This representsthe bedrockof an understandingof systemic
properties,of structurtng over time, which enablesexplanationsof
specific forms of structuralelaborationto be advanced.(Since time
is equallyintegralto morphostasisthereis no questionof the temporal
being equated with change in general systems theory.) 'Castro's
example' will be used to demonstratehow time is incorporated
as a theoreticalvariablesince it lends itself to simple quantitative
illustration.
After the revolutionCastroconfrontedan extremelyhigh rate of
illiteracywhich he soughtto eliminateby the expedientof 'eachone
teach one'. Now let us make a numberof arbitraryand hypothetical
assumptionsabout a situation like the Cubanone, namely that the
proportionof the total populationliterateat the startwas 5 per cent
(15 per cent or 25 per cent), that to becomeliteratetook preciselya
year, and that the policy was 95 per cent successful(no society ever
achieving 100 per cent literacy). From these the diagramshown in
Figure II can be produced. For all its oversimplificationthe curves
demonstratesome vital points about the relationshipsbetween time
and the morphogeneticsequence.
(a) Structure The initial structuraldistributionof a property (i.e.
the aggregateconsequenceof prior interaction)influencesthe time
taken to eradicateit (5 years versus2 years for the outer and inner
curves),throughits effect on the populationcapableof transforming
it. Certainly only some kinds of properties would approximate
to this exponential pattern of change (skills, knowledge, capital

1oo 15%
in tos
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
INITIAL Sm 20
1 2 3 4
YEARS
FIGURE II TOTALPOPULATION
accumulation,demographicdistribution),but this does not affect

the basic point that all structuresmanifesttemporalresistanceand
do so genericallythrough conditioningthe context of action. Most
often perhaps their conditional influence consists in dividing the
population (not necessarilyexhaustively)into social groupsworking
for the maintenanceversusthe changeof a given property,because
the property itself distributesdifferentobjectivevested intereststo
them at T2 (ratherthan abilitiesas in the exampleused). Thiswould
be the case where propertieslike citizenship,political centralization
or wagedifferentialswere concerned.
Furthermore,what the diagramservesto highlightis thatthe initial
structuralinfluence does not peter out immediately,even given a
collective determination to transform it (indeed here the major
burdenof illiteracyis only dispersedtowardsthe end, in the last or
penultimatetime interval).In other words it takes time to change
any structuralpropertyand that period representsone of constraint
for some groups at least. No matter how short, it prevents the
achievement of certain goals (those which motivate attempts to
changeit). Structuralinfluencesextend beyond T2 and it is essential
to know whether this is becausethey (temporallyand temporarily)
resist collective pressuresto change, remainbecausethey represent
the vested interests of the powerful, or are in fact 'psychologically
supported'by the population.To regardeveryinstitutionalregularity
as the result of 'deep sedimentation'is to assimilatethem all to the
latter category.Yet without these distinctionsit remainsinexplicable
when (or whether)the propertywill be transformed.

(b) Action On the one hand, action initiatedat T2 takes place in

a context not of its own making.In our example, those who were
literateinitiallywerenot responsiblefor theirdistributionin the popu-
lation; this grouppropertyresultedfrom the restrictiveeducational
policies of others, probablylong dead.49Here it appearsimpossible
to follow the methodologicalindividualistandassertthatanystructural
property influential after T2 is attributableto contemporaryactors
(not wantingor not knowinghow to changeit), becauseknowledge
about it, attitudes towards it, vested interests in retainingit and
objectivecapacitiesfor changingit have alreadybeen distributedand
determinedby T2. Yet without analysingthese we cannot account
for when the 'longueduree' is broken, who is primarilyresponsible
for it, or how it is accomplished(by collectivepolicy, socialconflict,
incrementalchangeetc.).5°
On the other hand,betweenT2 and T3 agencyexerts two indepen-
dent influences,one temporal,the other directional.It can speed-up,
delay or preventthe eliminationof priorstructuralinfluences.In our
example, (i) popular commitment to self instructioncould reduce
the time taken to eliminate illiteracy, thus improvingon all three
curves(thoughnot obliteratingthem entirelybecauseof the need for
personnelto prepare,disseminateand guide in the use of materials);
(ii) lack of enthusiasmor ability to teach amongstliteratesandlack
of willingnessto participateand learn amongstilliteratescan delay
the process5Iand damagethe project.(Determinismis not built-into
the morphogeneticperspective.) Simultaneouslyagents, although
partly conditioned by their acquirements(whose contents they did
not themselvesdefine) can exercise a directionalinfluenceupon the
future cultural definition of 'literacy' thus affecting the substance
of elaboration at T4. (Voluntarism has an important place in
morphogenesisbut is ever trammelledby past structuraland cultural
constraintsandby the currentpolitics of the possible.)
(c) StructuralElaborationIf action is effective then the transform-
ation producedat T4 is not merelythe eradicationof a priorstructural
property (illiteracy)and its replacementby a new one (literacy),it is
the structuralelaborationof a host of new socialpossibilitiessome of
which will have gradually come into play between T2 and T4.
Morphogeneticanalysisthus explainsthe timingof the new facilitating
factors and can account for the inception, in this instance,of say a
national postal service, mail-orderbusinesses,bureaucratizationand
less obvious but more significant developmentslike international
communication with its ramifications for religion, technology,
political ideology etc. From the 'structuration'perspective,these
remainthe capriciousexploits of indeterminate'moments'.
Simultaneously,however, structuralelaboration re-startsa new
morphogeneticcycle, for it introducesa new set of conditionalinflu-
ences upon interactionwhich are constrainingas well as facilitating.

T4 is thus the new T1, and the next cycle must be approachedafresh
analytically, conceptually and theoretically.Giddens is completely
correctthat laws in the socialsciencesarehistoricalin character(i.e.
mutable over time), but whereashis endorsementof this view rests
principally on the reflexive knowledge and behaviourof actors,52
mine resideson changesin the socialstructureitself which requireus
to theorize about it in different ways since our subjectmatterhas
altered. A new explanandumcalls for a new explanans,though this
does not rule out the possibility that the latter can be subsumed
undera more generallaw.
Paradoxicallyfor all Giddens'sstressupon the importanceof time,
it is the past in the presentand the futurein the presentwhichmatter
for him; the presentbeinga successionof 'passingmoments'in which,
quotingWilliamJames approvingly,'the dying rearwardof time and
its dawningfuture forever mix their lights'.53This continuousflow
defies periodization.Consequentlyhe has to stressthe quintessential
polyvalence of each 'moment',both replicatoryand transformatory
(reproductionalways carriesits two connotations).Yet he is never-
thelessdrivento recognizethe existenceof 'criticalphases'in the long
term and to accord (excessive) theoretical significanceto them (as
times of institutionalspot-welding).Whatis lackingin Giddens'swork
is the length of time between the 'moment'and the 'criticalphase'
-in which the slow work of structuralelaborationis accomplished
and needs theorizingabout.
III SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE INDIVIDUAL/SOCIETY DICHOTOMY
Giddens'sbasic aim here is to bringtogetherthe developmentof the

individualas a socialproductand the generationof society by human
agency, within a single theoreticalframework.Essentiallythis means
givinga 'parts-whole'account which explainsthe articulationof the
two components.Giddens's accountacceptsthe 'problemof scope':54
he rightly rejectshomology as a solution, denyingthat the systemis
small scale interactionwrit large,or that the small is a miniaturized
version of the large. His distinction between social and systems
integrationwidens this rejectionto includeany view whichpresumes
that what integratesthe individualinto societyautomaticallyexplains
what integrates society itself-thus illegitimately conflating social
integration with systemic integration. Such views foreclose the
possibility of society consisting of groupsin tension, yet he argues
that those who have accepted such tension as their premise (like
Merton) have then wrongly relinquishedan understandingof the
totality as in some way implicatedin the parts.SsIt is this implicative
'parts-whole' relationshipthat he seeks to develop. Already two
controversialpoints shouldbe noted.

On the one hand he implies that all currenttheories endorsing
intergrouptension at the level of social integrationalso share the
defects of Mertonianfunctionalismat the systemic level, i.e. they
cannot handle the mutualimplicationof partsand whole. Thismight
be challengedfrom a numberof differentperspectives,but what is of
particularrelevancehere is that it would be rejectedby those who
expressly broke with functionalismto achieve an implicativebut
non-homological'parts-whole'account-like Gouldner,Blau,Etzioni
orBuckley-namelyjust those theoristswho beganto exploremorpho-
genesis in the context of general systems theory. (Interestingly,
given the sweep and erudition of Giddens'swork, these are the
sociologistswho neverreceivesustainedattention.)
On the other hand, althoughGiddensacceptsa 'problemof scope'
he does not see this as intimatelyalliedto transcendingmicro-macro
dualismin sociologicaltheory.Onthe contrary,insteadof conceptual-
izing scope as the problemof chartinga methodologicalpath leading
from the smallest scale interactionto large-scalecomplex systems,
Giddens transmutes the notion of successive concrete levels of
increasingsize into one of abstract'dimensions',whichaffect all sizes
of group and operatesimultaneously.Thusthe 'crunching-up', which
has already been discussed, of transformationand recursiveness
(equallysalient and etemally operative)and of momentand totality
(no sequence only simultaneity),is now joined in his 'dimensional
approach'by a compactingof the micro- and the macro-,whichare
not teased out in scale or time. Can this yield an adequate,let alone
a superioraccountof the 'parts-whole'relationship?
Giddens's articulationbetween the two is achievedthroughhis
conceptsof 'modalities'and'structuralprinciples'whichareintimately
related to one another. We have seen that the three modalities-
'interpretativescheme', 'norm' and 'facility'-serve to articulate
interaction and structure.Throughbeing drawnupon by actors in
the production of interactionwhilst also constitutingthe structural
media of systems, 'the "modalities"of structurationrepresentthe
centraldimensionsof the dualityof structure'.S6 All three dimensions
arecombinedin differentwaysto producethe rangeof socialpractices
generated within the intersectingsets of rules and resourcesthat
ultimatelyexpressfeaturesof the totality. How then arewe to grasp
the observableregularities(the 'visiblepattern') produced through
this dimensionalinterplay?(Giddensof course rejectsthe procedure
of separatingout 'upward'and'downward'influencesor disentangling
interconnectionsbetween 'context' and 'environment'.)
His answeris given at length because of the need to dwell on his
precise formulation.'Each of the three sets mentioned above thus
has to be interpolatedas elements of cycles of social reproduction
producing systemness in social relations. In the context of such
interpolation,we can identifystructuralelementsthataremost deeply

embeddedin the time-spacedimensionsof social systems. . . I shall

refer to such structuralelements as structuralprinciples.Structural
principles govern the basic institutionalalignmentsin a society'.S7
They may operate at all of the three levels of system integration:
Difficulties in
homeostasis, feed-back or reflexive self-regulation.58
this 'parts-whole'account surroundboth the identificationof the
two key conceptsand theirinterrelationship.
The 'structuralprinciples'areabstractions,manifestingthemselves
as institutionalized connections governing the reproductionof a
particularsocial system or type of society. How then can they be
graspedunequivocally?In practice Giddens advancestwo different
procedures,thoughthey arenot clearlydistinguishedas such:
(a) The first method turns on his distinction between 'primary
principles'and 'secondary'or derivativeones. 'Primaryprinciples',he
argues, can be identified as being fundamentallyand inextricably
involved in systemic reproductionbecause they enter into the very
structuringof what that systemis. In otherwordsthey canbe detected
directlyby virtueof theircentrality.Howeverwhenpracticalexamples
are adduced, the procedureappearsto lead to considerableequivo-
cation. For instancehe claimsthat in Marx'scharacterizationof early
capitalismthe 'forces/relationsof productionschememay be readas
assertingthe universalprimacyof allocationoverauthorization',but
in what Giddenscalls 'class-dividedsocieties'(whereaccumulationis
not dominatedby privatecapital),the principleis reversed,authoriz-
ation havingprimacy over allocation, as in the early civilizations.S9
Not only are such 'principles'far from self-evident,they areincapable
of commandingpublic assent. Indeed the whole 'industrialsociety'
debate is preciselyabout what its centralprinciplesare, the various
terms used providinga good indication of divergenceover what is
consideredto be central-'technological society', 'affluent society',
'consumer society', 'welfare society', 'managerialsociety' or 'new
industrialstate'.
The distinction between 'primary'and 'secondary'principlesis
open to the sameobjection(andhas fuelled the abovedebate,a major
aspectof which is whetherwe shouldtalk about industrialeconomies
or arejustifiedin speakingmoreextensivelyaboutindustrialsocieties).
In other words all such 'structuralprinciples'are in fact contested.
Theirultimate status is that of hypothesesadvancedby investigators
and not that of structuralelementsintegralto societies.
(b) HoweverGiddens'swork does contain an alternativemethod for
the identification of 'structuralprinciples',namely by interpolation
of the 'modalities'which will reveal the most deeply embedded
structuralelements,as the earlierquotationstated.Herethe 'structural
principles'are not identified (at the macro-level)by inspectingthe
system itself, as in (a), but ratherindirectidentificationtakes place

instead,by examiningthe mechanismstat the micro-level)producing

systemness,which the principlesgovern.In other wordsgovernance
is detected throughits effects. Yet this method of identificationdoes
not seem any more satisfactoryfor it has exactly the sameweakness
as the first, namelythat indirectinterpolationhas the samecontested
nature and hypothetical status as does the direct induction of
principles. Since there are no grounds of validationwhich would
command public agreement, each and every interpolation must
* t
remaln equlvoca ..
Moreover,not only does the lattermethod fail to solvetheproblem
of identifying'structuralprinciples'it also revealsa majordifficulty
surrounding the relationship between the 'principles' and the
'modalities'.This is crucial because it is their articulationwhich
constitutes the mainstay of Giddens's'parts-whole'account. In (b)
the combination(s) of the 'modalities'is held to be governedby
principles operative at higher levels (homeostasis, feed-back or
reflexive self-regulation),otherwise the 'principles'are not identifi-
able throughthe 'modalities'.Here social interchangeat lowerlevels
is being presentedas the product of the system (incidentallya much
strongerinfluence than the structuralconditioning of the micro-
by the macro endorsedin generalsystems theory). But this is not
consistent with Giddens'sown conceptualizationof the 'modalities'
and specificallythe generativepowerswith whichhe endowsthem-
put anotherway, it conflicts with the micro-levelactingback on the
macro-level.
To him, for all that the three 'modalities'are media (structural
components) of the system, they nevertheless have significant
autonomy as drawnupon creativelyby actors. If each 'mode' pre-
supposes unprogrammedtransformations,then their combinatory
possibilitiesareopen not closed,problematicnot given.ThisGiddens
considers as quintessentialto the duality of structure.Yet if this
autonomyis granted,then the combinationsof thesethreedimensions
actuallymanifestedin interactionarenot necessarilygovernedby the
'structuralprinciples'.In other words any regularitiesdetected via
interpolation of the 'modalities' need not be the effects of the
'principles'but may reflect the regularexploitationof autonomyby
agency.Giddenswishes to say that they areboth, but if he wants to
have it both ways then he is left with no method for detectinghis
'principles'.
Once again the duality notion has produced two unreconciled
images:the one presentsthe 'principles'as governingthe 'modalities'
(the macro-dominatingthe micro-),the otherportraysthe 'modalities'
as cyclically transformingthe 'principles'(the micro- directingthe
macro-).The attemptto interrelatethem fails on logicalgrounds,the
attempt to identify the principalcomponentsalso fails on practical
grounds. The unsuccessful articulation of the two key concepts

which these failuresimply undercutsthe claim to have advanceda

superior'parts-whole'account.
The 'parts-whole' account proffered from the morphogenetic
perspectivelinks structure and interactionin an entirely different
way-the structuredwhole being understoodin terms of the social
processeswhich articulaterelationsbetween individualsand groups.
In contrast to the structurationapproachthere is investigationof
processes instead of imputation of 'princzples',and identification
of mechanismsin place of the interpolation of 'modalities'.This
account of the whole as a negotiatedorderis based four-squareon
the following assumptionswhich Giddensbarely acknowledgesand
grosslyunderplays:
-interaction generatesemergentpropertieswhich must figurein
explanatorystatements;
-scope is a crucial variablewhich precludesan undifferentiated
theory coveringthe micro-and macroscopic;
-the dynamicsproducingthe elaboratingthe complexwhole can
be modelled.
By workingthroughthese sequentiallyI will seek to show not only
that a better 'parts-whole'account resultsbut also one which fulfils
Giddens's desiderata of treating society as consisting of parts in
tension and of understandingthe totality as implicatedin its parts.60
Emergenceis embeddedin interaction:in the latter 'we are dealing
with a system of interlinkedcomponentsthat can only be definedin
terms of the interrelationsof each of them in an ongoingdevelop-
mental process that generatesemergentphenomena-includingthose
we refer to as institutional structure'.6lEmergentproperties are
therefore relational:they are not contained in the elements them-
selves,but could not exist apartfrom them. As Blauputsit, 'although
complex social systems have their foundationin simplerones, they
have their own dynamicswith emergentproperties'.62 The lattercan
arise at all levels from small scale interactionupwards,althoughas
scope grows they are increasinglydistancedfrom everydaypsycho-
logical dispositionsbut never ultimatelydetached from interaction.
The highest ordersof emergencearenothingmore than the relations
between the resultsof interaction.Neverthelessthese 'feed back' to
conditionsubsequentinteractionat lower levels.
It follows that the problemof scope cannot be side-steppedif an
adequate'parts-whole'account is to be given.In this perspectivethe
task 'is to specify and conceptualizethe processesand mechanisms
by which the more complex and indirect sociative structuresor
communication matrices are generated out of less complex, less
indirect and patternedsociativeprocesses-on how the formerfeed
back to help structurethe latter;and on how each may continually
interact to help maintainor to change the other'.63Thus the first

implication of a full acceptance of emergenceis the need to dis-

entangle the micro-macroconnectionswhich lead to the genesisof
social structures.Although the problem of scope has not yet been
fully transcended,Blau's analytical history of emergenceis what
latermorphogeneticaccountsmust improveon.
Blau provides a starter motor at the micro-levelin exchange
relations,derivesintegration(reciprocalexchange)anddifferentiation
(power stemming from lack of reciprocity) directly from these
elementarytransactions,and shows how macro-levelpolitical organ-
ization with its inherenttensionbetweenlegitimationand opposition
are indirect consequencesof them. This painstakingderivationof
large scale structuresfrom small scale interactiongivesmuch more
analytical purchase on the social system and its parts than does
Giddens's procedure of positing 'modalities' and conceptualizing
their interplayas dimensionalpermutations.In the latterthe middle
groundof transactions,accommodations,aggregationsandemergence
is dealt with by conceptual manipulationrather than processual
exploration. In the formerinstitutionalstructureis understoodas
generatedby determinatesocialprocessestakingplaceunderspecified
conditions.
The second implicationof emergenceis the need to grapplewith
the ongoing interplaybetween micro- and macro-levels,where the
broadercontext conditionsthe environmentof actorswhoseresponses
then transformthe environmentwith which the context subsequently
has to deal, the two jointly generatingfurtherelaboration64as well as
changesin one another.Analyticalcomplexityis enormousprecisely
because morphogenesisis a multi-level affair and no level can be
dropped or conflated without making the unwarrantedassumption
that some level has ultimateprimacy.The multiplefeedbackmodels
of generalsystemstheory arebasictools for teasingout the dynamics
of structuralelaboration:thoughcomplexto operationalize,they are
not defied by complexity. This kind of modellingcan yield-up the
practical mechanisms of morphogenesis which provide a better
explanatory grip on complex social systems than do hypothetical
'structuralprinciples'.
It should be clear from the foregoingthat Giddens'stwo criteria
for a satisfactory'parts-whole'account are met. From the morpho-
genetic perspectivethe whole is implicatedin the partsin two senses
it emergesfrom them and it acts backupon them-though the full
implicativeforce can only be graspedover time since feedbacktakes
time. Part of this force is thereforelost by truncatingmutualimpli-
cation into the moment/totality relationship. Equally the parts
themselvesare in tension and the natureof the tensionproducesthe
state of the whole. Inevitably social processes generatedto meet
certain requirementsrepresentimpedimentsto other groups. Inte-
grativeanddifferentiatingprocessescomeinto conflictasdo legitimate

organizationsand the opposition provokedby the constraintsthey

exert.65As Blau argues from this, the 'perennialadjustmentsand
counter-adjustments find expressionin a dialecticalpatternof social
change',66
muchof whichwouldbe lost by undulyrestrictinganalytical
focus to certain tensions, hypothetized but not substantiated,as
'primary'.67
CONCLUSION
The differencesexploredbetween the morphogeneticperspectiveand

the structurationapproachstem from an initial partingof the ways
over the endorsementof 'analyticaldualism'or the adoption of the
'dualityof structure'.The followingpointssummarizehow 'analytical
dualism'tacklesthe dichotomieswhich the 'dualityof structure'fails
to transcend.
-the specification of degrees of freedom and stringency of
constraintsmakes it possible to theorizeabout variationsin
voluntarismand determinism(and theirconsequences),whereas
conceptual insistence on the simultaneity of transformative
capacityandchronicrecursiveness inhibitsany theoreticalformu-
lation of the conditionsunderwhich eitherwill predominate.
-the analyticalseparationof structureand interactionovertime
permits of theorizingabout temporalstructuringand restruc-
turing which is precludedwhen the conceptualbondingof the
synchronic and the diachronic produces a seamless web of
'instantiations
'.
-the analyticaldistinctionbetween subjectand object over time
allows for theorizingabout the influences of men on society
and vice versa,avoidingthe 'desperateincorporation'68
of society
into man or the dubiousimputationof 'principles'articulating
the two.
It should be clear from the foregoingdiscussionthat the 'analytical
dualism' advocated is artificial and methodological:it implies no
commitment to the philosophical dualisms which Giddensrightly
attacks.
POSTCRIPT
However it would be unfair to conclude without noting Giddens's

view that the two approachesareengagedupon differentsociological
enterprises.To him the 'identificationof structurescan in no sensebe
regardedas the only aimof sociologicalinvestigation.Theinstantiation

of structurein the reproductionof socialsystems?as its mediumand

outcome, is the proper focus of sociological analysis'.69However
this distinctionis not one of substanceas is implied,but harksback
to a difference of origins, to potent imagesof society carriedover
from analogicalstartingpoints, i.e. from cyberneticsand linguistics
respectively.
In view of this the contrastappearsparticularlyinappositeas far
as the morphogeneticperspectiveis concerned.For generalsystems
theory has alreadyshed that part of its cyberneticheritagewhichled
it to focus on the identificationof structures.It has abandonedthe
sterile exercise of terminologicalredescriptionin which to translate
conceptions of social structureinto the languageof systems theory
was eitherthe end productor was confusedwith an understandingof
the logic or social systems.70Indeed it is now explicitly recognized
that basic cyberneticmodels are of no help in identifying,muchless
in theorizing about complex social systems. Essentiallya 'simple,
cybernetic feedback model of explicit group goal-seekingdoes
not fit most societies of the past and present because of a lack in
those societies of informed, centralizeddirection and widespread,
promotivelyinterdependentgoal behavioursof individualsand sub
groups'.7lHence the morpho-geneticperspectivenow concentrates
on thesocio-culturalsystemin its ownright,identztyingandexplaining
the real and variegatedstructureswhich have emergedhistorically
and theorizingabout theirconcreteelaborationin the future.
It is these italicized featureswhich properlydistinguishbetween
the two perspectives.For the structurationapproachhas shaken-off
much less of the linguisticanalogyand this means that Giddensstill
addressesthe social system indirectly,hoping that its variatis can
be subsumedunder the principlesgoverningthe analoguewhichwill
also providethe key to its transformations.
AlthoughGiddensstates clearly'I rejectthe conceptionthatsociety
is like a language',72 the late Wittgensteinstalks the text-to know a
form of life is to know a language.73 Thusthe key conceptsthemselves
come directfrom linguistics:the 'recursivecharacterof language-and,
by generalization,of socialsystemsalso'74-is the sourceof the 'duality
of structure':the notion thatsociety,like language,shouldbe regarded
as a 'virtualsystem' with 'recursiveproperties'75comes direct from
Saussure.Certainlyhe breaksaway fromsomeof thesestartingpoints,
Saussurein particular,but his ultimate aim is the closer integration
of semiotic studies with social theory in order to develop 'a theory
of codes, and of code production,groundedin a broadertheory of
social practice,and reconnectedto hermeneutics'.76 As Gellneraptly
commentedin a wider context, a culture,a form of life, and we can
add a code, 'is a problem-never a WhatGiddenshasdone
solution.77
in shacklingsociologyto semioticsis in fact to transferseveralproblems

to our domain-insubstantiality, indeterminacyand intractability.

versusstructuration
Morphogenesas 479
His approvingquotation from Eco gives the full flavourof insub-

stantiality,light years away from the examinationof realstructures.
'Semiotics suggestsa sort of molecularlandscapein which what we
are accustomedto recognize as everyday forms turn out to be the
result of transitory chemical aggregations. . . revealingthat where
we thought we saw images there were only strategicallyarranged
aggregationsof black and white points, alternationsof presenceand
absence'.78To ground this view of codes in a 'broadertheory of
socialpractice'merelyaddsthe indeterminacyproblem.Forpractices
themselvesare seen as transformationsof virtualordersof differences
(of codes in time and space). Societal changesthus become indeter-
minate, they arelike the shakingof a kaleidoscope-shiftingpatterns
produced by the manipulationof oppositions by the population
at large.
Finally, given the mutuality of codes and practices(in which we
cannot simply identify pre-existingcodes which generatemessages
because messagesalso enter into the reconstitutionof codes in the
dualityof structure),theirinterplaybecomesanalyticallyintractable,
for how can we 'break-in'to the circuit? (Analyticaldualismis of
coursethe deviceemployedin morphogenesisto dealwithits ongoing,
circularsystemic processes,but this is proscribedhere.) In practice
the answeris, by imputation,interpretationor interpolation-aswas
seen with the 'structural principles'-but this merely reinvokes
Levi-Strauss's problemof the absentcontext of justification.
The differencein sociologicalenterprise,as Giddensinitiallystated
it, is illusory.The morphogeneticperspectiveis not only concerned
with the identification and elaboration of social structures,it is
preoccupied above all with the specification of the mechanisms
involved-with the feedback 'process that contains both negative
(stabilizingor rigidifying)elementsandpositive(structure-elaborating,
or increasinglydisorganizing)features'.79This is the way in which
institutionalstructureshelp to create and recreatethemselvesin an
ongoing developmentalprocess.The ultimatedifferenceis not one of
enterprise, for an adequate theory of stabilization,disorganization
and elaborationobviouslyincorporatesthe instantiationof structure,
just as an adequatetheory of instantiationmustspecifythe conditions
of morphostasisand morphogenesis.The theory of structuration
remainsincompletebecauseit providesan insufficientaccountof the
mechanismsof stable replication versus the genesis of new social
forms, and will do so while ever it resists unpacking these two
connotationsof 'reproduction'.
MargaretS. Archer
Departmentof Sociology
Universityof Warwick

NOTES
1. I am extremely grateful to and G. Jefferson, 'A Simplest System-

Duncan Gallie, J ohn Heritage and Ian atics for the Organization of Turn-
Proctor for making many helpful Taking in Interaction Language, vol.
criticisms and constructive points when 50, 1974.
this paper was in draft form. 7. C. Levi-Strauss, Strllctural
2. The most detailed argument for A n thropology, New York, Basic Books,
the indispensability of both structure 1963; L. Sebag, Structuralisme et
and action appeared in the late 1960s Marxisme, Paris, Payot, 1964; Jean
- Percy S. Cohen, Modern Social Piaget, Structuralisme, Paris, P. U. F.,
Theory, London, Heinemann, 1968. 1968. See also R. Boudon, A quoi sert
See also P. M. Blau (ed.), Approaches la not.ion de 'structure ', Paris, Galli-
to the Study of Social Structure, mard, 1968; M. Glucksman, Structural-
London, Open Books,1976; P. M. Blau ist Analysis in Contemporary Thought,
and R.K. Merton, Continuities in London, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
Structural Inquiry, London and Beverly 1974; Tom Bottomore and Robert
Hills, Sage, 1981. Nisbet, 'Structuralism', in their (ed.),
3. Alan Dawe, 'The Two Socio- A History of Sociological Analysis,
logies',B.J.S.,vol. 21, no. 2,1970. London, Heinemann, 1979.
4. E.g. P. Blau, Ex change and Power 8. Morphostasis 'Refers to those
in So cial Life, New York, Wiley, 1964; processes in complex system-environ-
A. W. Gouldner, 'Reciprocity and ment exchanges that tend to preserve
Autonomy in Functional Theory', in or maintain a system's given form,
N.J. Demerath and R. A. Peterson organization or state. Morphogenesis
(eds), System, Change and Conflict, will refer to those processes which tend
New York, Free Press, 1976; Walter to elaborate or change a system's
Buckley, So ciology and Mod ern Sys- given form, structure or state', Buckley,
tems Theory, New Jersey, Prentice Sociology and Modern Systems Theory,
Hall, 1967; A. Etzioni, The Active op. cit., pp. 58-9.
So cie ty, New York, Free Press, 1968; 9. Walter Buckley, Sociology and
S.N. Eisenstadt and M. Curelaru, Modern Systems Theory, op. cit.;
'Macro-Sociology', Current Sociology, Walter Buckley (ed.), Modern Systems
vol. 25, no. 2, 1977. Research for the Behavioural Scientist,
5. E.g. D. Lockwood, 'Social Inte- Chicago, Aldine, 1968. See also
gration and Systems Integration', in Margoroh Maruyama, 'The Second
G. K. Zollschan and H. W. Hirsch, Cybernetics: Deviation Amplifying
Explorations in Social Change, Boston, Mutual Causal Processes', A merican
Houghton Mifflin, 1964; A. Pizzorno, Scientist, vol. 51, 1963.
'A propos de la methode de Gramsci', 10. Anthony Giddens, Central Prob-
L'Homme et la Societe, vol. 8, 1968, lems in Social Theory: Action, Struc-
A. Touraine, Le Mouvement de Mai ou ture and Contradiction in Social Ana-
le Communisme Utopique, Paris, Seuil, lysis, London, Macmillan, 1979, p. 7.
1968; Albrecht Wellmer, Critical 11. Ibid.
Theory of Society, New York, Herder 12. Ibid., p. 5.
& Herder, 1971; Jurgen Habermas, 13. A label Giddens appropriates.
Toward a Rational Society, London, Ibid., p. 7.
Heinemann, 1971, and Knowledge and 14. See May Brodbeck, 'Methodo-
Human Interests, London, Heinemann, logical Individualisms: Definition and
1972; Perry Anderson, Considerations Reduction' in her (ed.), Readings in
on Western Marxism, London, New the Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
Left Books, 1976. New York, Macmillan, 1971. For my
6. E.g. E. Goffman, 'The Neglected own defence of this concept and
Situation', American Anthropologist, its place in theorizing about social
vol. 66, 1964; H. Sacks, E. A. Schegloff structure see 'In Defence of Macro-

Sociology', in M. S. Archer, Social 36. Amitai Etzioni provides the

Origins of Educational Systems, boldest illustrationsof this point in his
London and Beverly Hills, Sage, 1979, discussions of 'under' and 'over
pp.5-42. managed societies and their typical
15. Giddens, Central Problems in and very different kinds of crises, The
Social Theory,op. cit., p. 5. Active Society, op. cit.
16. Ibid., p. 69. 37. Giddens, Central Problems in
17. I am indebted to Dr John So cial Theory, op. cit., p. 93 *
Heritagefor this insight. 38. See R. J. W. Selleck, English
18. Ibid,p.56. Primary Education and the Progres-
19. Ibid, p. 210. sives, 1914-3 9, London, Routledge
20. Ibid., p. 71. & KeganPaul, 1972.
21. Ibid.,pp.77-8. 39. It should be clear from the fore-
22. Ibid., pp. 69 -70. going that I endorse Lukess approach
23. Ibid., pp. 50 -2. to the concept of power rather than
24. Ibid.,p. 104. that of Giddens. Once again this is a
25. Activation need not involve cluestion of dualism versus duality.
power relationsunless Giddens'sprem- Lukes maintainsanalyticaldualism by
ise that all action is logically tied to seeking to draw a line between struc-
power is accepted. See ibid., p. 88. turaldeterminationand the exercise of
26. Ibid., p. 80. power. Hence he talks of 'where
27. As Gellner succinctly puts it, structural determination ends and
group variables 'can indeed only exist power begins' (S. Lukes, Essays in
if their parts exist-that is indeed the Social Theory, London, Macmillan,p.
predicament of all wholes-but their 18) and is predictably chastized by
fates qua fates of complexes can Giddens for tending to 'repeat the
neverthelessbe the initial condition or dualism of agency and structure'
indeed the final condition of a causal (Central Problems in Social Theory,
sequence', 'Holism Versus Individual- op. cit., p. 91). Giddenswants to over-
ism', in May Brodbeck, Readings in come this divide by defining power as
the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 'transformativecapacity', hence main-
op. cit., p. 263. taining duality by viewing structure
28. For example I have tried to show as implicated in power relations and
at length how a centralizedsystem of power relations as implicated in
education conditions subsequent pat- structure. Now Lukes does not deny
terns of educational interaction and these interconnections but he avoids
profoundly influences the processesby Giddens's compacting of the two
which change can be introduced in elements which blurs the distinction
ways quite different from those between responsible action and deter-
characteristicof decentralizedsystems. mined action, severingthe tie between
See my Social Origins of Educational power and responsibility which is
Systems, op. cit., especially ch. 5, essential to Lukes. On the contraryhe
pp. 265-8. tries to discover,explain and assessthe
29. Giddens, Central Problems in weight of structural limitations on
Social Theory, op. cit., p. 78. action which delimit the zone in which
30. Ibid., p. 76. it is proper (and profitable) to speak
31. Ibid,p. 144. of power relations. Thus to Lukes, in
32. M. Maruyama, 'The Second general, 'although the agents operate
Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying within structurallydefined limits, they
Mutual Causal Processes'; op. cit., none the less have a certain relative
p. 164. autonomy and could have acted differ-
33. Giddens, Central Problems in ently' (Lukes, ibid., p. 6-7). What is
Social Theory,op. cit., p. 215. then requiredin this dualisticapproach
34. Ibid., p. 7. 'is a sustained discussion of the nature
35. Ibid, p. 229. of, and conditions for, autonomy (and

MargaretS. Archer
482
its relation to social determination)' graphicallyinaccessible,those culturally
(S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, antagonistic, the very old and those
London, Macmillan, 1974)-in other who are diffident or discouraged).
words a specification of the degreesof Simultaneously however, social learn-
freedom within which power can be ing will have improved teaching
exercised. techniques between T2 and T3, thus
40. The following statement that offsetting resistance to some (un-
'power within social systems can thus known) extent. In any case the diagram
be treated as involving reproduced specifically excludes 100 per cent
relationsof autonomy and dependence success, and it makes no difference to
in social interaction' (Giddens,Central the argumentif literacyis only achieved
Problems in Social Theory, op. cit., at the 85 per cent level, say, ratherthan
p. 93) is significant in view of the the 95 per cent used for illustration.
connection he makes between power 52. Giddens, Central Problems in
and transformativecapacity. What is Social Theory, op. cit., pp. 243-4.
neglected throughout the book is 53. Ibid., p. 3.
interdependence, where two parties 54. See H. R. Wagner,'Displacement
can achieve joint control over some- of Scope: A Problemof the Relation-
thing (thus directing subsequenttrans- ship between Small Scale and Large
formations of it) on the basis of Scale Sociological Theories', op. cit.
reciprocalexchangebetween them. Yet 55. Giddens, Central Problems in
transformative capacity can depend So cial Theory, op. cit., p. 111.
just as much upon balanced trans- 56. Ibid., p. 81.
actions as upon power relations. 57. Ibid.,p. 106.
41. Giddens, Central Problems in 58. Ibid., p. 141.
Social Theory,op. cit., p. l98. 59. Ibid.,pp.162-3.
42. Ibid.5p .53. 60. Ibid.,p.lll.
43. Ibid., p. 80. 61. Walter Buckley, Sociology and
44. Idem. Modern Systems Theory, op. cit.,
45. Ibid.>p. 114. p. 125.
46. I shall say more in the next 62. Peter Blau, Exchange and Power
section about the location of these in Social Life, op. cit., p. 20.
modes and will only concentrate now 63. Walter Buckley, Sociology and
on their significancefor time. Modern Systems Theory, op. cit.,
47. Ibid., p.81. p. 128.
48. Ibid.,p.217. 64. I have provided an extended
49. One of Auguste Comte's rare illustration of these context/environ-
and valid aphorisms was that human ment/elaborationintetplaysin relation
society has more dead than living to growth in school enrollment,
members. 'Theorizing about the expansion of
50. 'Institutions are constituted and Educational Systems' in M. S. Archer
reconstituted in the tie between the (ed.), The Sociology of Educational
duree of the passing moment, and the Expansion, London and Beverly Hills,
longue duree of deeply sedimented Sage,1982.
time-space relations',Giddens,Central 65. 'Such conflicting social forces
Problems in Social Theory, op. cit., give rise to alternating patterns of
p. 110. structural change', P. Blau, Exchange
51. The curvesare purely hypotheti- and Power in Social Life, op. cit., p.
cal, without being wholly unrealistic 321.
(i.e. they embody no known counter- 66. Ibid., p. 314.
factuals). Certainlyexponentialgrowth 67. Percy Cohen has convincingly
will probably be distorted as universal demonstratedthe supremedifficulty of
literacy is approached,becausepockets designatingor distinguishing'primary',
of high resistance are encountered core or fundamental features of a
(made up, for example, of the geo- social system from minor, superficial

or periphericones. The samearguments Theory,op. cit., p. 177 (see 176-8).)

hold for processesof social change. 68. E. Gellner,'Holismvs. Individual-
'Even if there were no problems of ism', op. cit., p. 267.
identifying core elements of a system, 69. Giddens, Central Problems in
there would still be a problem of Social Theory,op. cit., p. 106.
distinguishing basic from superficial 70. An ambitious attempt, which
changes. This is important for the nevertheless manifests this defect, to
following reason:even if one identifies unify the concepts used in all the social
factor A as strategicin relation to B, C, sciences by translatingthem into the
D and E, this does not mean that these terminology of systems theory is
other, non-corefeaturesdo not change Alfred Kuhn, The Logic of Social
at all without an initial change in A, Systems, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco,
nor does it mean that changesin them 1976.
have no effect at all on changes in A 71. Walter Buckley, Sociology and
. . . The crucialquestion is: do changes Afodern Systems Theory, op. cit.,
in A produce radical changes in B, C, p. 206.
D or E, while changes in B, C, D and 72. Giddens, Central Problems in
E produce only superficialchanges in Social Theory, op. cit., p. 4.
A? And if the answer to this question 73. Ibid.,p.251.
is affirmative, does one have some 74. Ibid., p. 18.
measure for distinguishing radical 75. Ibid., p. 47.
changes from superficialones? And, if 76. Ibid., p. 48.
one does have such a measure, when 77. Ernest Gellner, Thought and
does one apply it? For the short-run Change, Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
effect of B on A might be superficial, London, 1964, pp. 184 ff.
while the long-run effect might be 78. Eco cited by Giddens, Central
radical! The gist of all this discussion Problems in Social Theory, op. cit.,
is that one can only know ex post p. 106.
facto whether a particularchange was 79. Walter Buckley, Sociology and
or was not a changein a acore"feature Modern Systems Theory, op. cit.,
of the social structure.'(Modern Social p. 137.


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Morphogenesis versus Structuration: On Combining Structure and Action

Author(s): Margaret S. Archer

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to undercut the problem by disclosing 'hidden structures'which

STRUCTURATION AND MORPHOGENESIS

Structuration In dealingwith 'structuration'this paperconcentrates

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actors in producingand reproducingtheir society, whilst acknowl-

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systemic emergence(groundedin humaninteraction,takingplace in

I THE 'DUALITY OF STRUCTURE' AND VOLUNTARISM/DETERMINISM

Basicallywhat Giddensis seeking to enfold here are two views of

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(which has more voluntaristicconnotations).Condensedin the brief

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counterfactualimage of hyperactivityin which actors explore and

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This oscillationbetweencontradictoryimagesderivesfrom Giddens

Stringencyof ConstraintsThereasonfor thisomissionis his principled

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centralizationas reducibleto the exercise of power by determinate

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Does Giddens'sformulationfare any better if we look at it the

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II'STRUCTURATION' AND SYNCHRONY/DIACHRONY

Giddens maintainsthat 'the conception of structurationintroduces

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eroded by cumulativeaction) or that collective action can reshape

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on the structuring over time.

Althoughall threelines arein fact continuous,the analyticalelement

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accumulation,demographicdistribution),but this does not affect

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(b) Action On the one hand, action initiatedat T2 takes place in

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III SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE INDIVIDUAL/SOCIETY DICHOTOMY

Giddens'sbasic aim here is to bringtogetherthe developmentof the

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embeddedin the time-spacedimensionsof social systems. . . I shall

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instead,by examiningthe mechanismstat the micro-level)producing

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which these failuresimply undercutsthe claim to have advanceda

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implication of a full acceptance of emergenceis the need to dis-

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organizationsand the opposition provokedby the constraintsthey

The differencesexploredbetween the morphogeneticperspectiveand

However it would be unfair to conclude without noting Giddens's

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of structurein the reproductionof socialsystems?as its mediumand

in shacklingsociologyto semioticsis in fact to transferseveralproblems

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His approvingquotation from Eco gives the full flavourof insub-

This content downloaded from 128.153.5.49 on Thu, 24 Oct 2013 03:37:47 AM

1. I am extremely grateful to and G. Jefferson, 'A Simplest System-

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