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A.C. No. 5851 November 25, 2008
GRACE DELA CRUZ-SILLANO, complainant
vs.
ATTY. WILFREDO PAUL D. PANGAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint filed by Grace Dela Cruz-Sillano
(complainant) against Atty. Wilfredo Paul D. Pangan
(respondent) for disbarment for having conspired in forging a
Special Power of Attorney.
The Facts
The facts in the Report and Recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) read as follows:
Respondent is accused of forging the signature of an
affiant [Zenaida A. Dela Cruz] in a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA). The affiant in this SPA is the mother
of complainant. The SPA appears to have authorized a
certain Ronaldo F. Apostol to "process, claim, receive
and encash checks representing my (affiant's)
benefits arising from my insurance policy with the
Insular Life Assurance Company Ltd." Consequently,
respondent also stands accused of notarizing a
document in the absence of the affiant. Complainant
specifically alleges:
"That on March 15, 1999, Atty. Pangan
conspiring and confederating with the other
accused R.F. Apostol falsified and forged a
document denominated as a Special Power
of Attorney (by forgering [sic] the signature
of my deceased mother and notarizing the
same), which empowered the accused
Ronaldo F. Apostol to process, receive claim
and encash check representing benefits
arising from the insurance policy of my
deceased mother Zenaida Apostol de la Cruz
(of which I am the beneficiary). The accused
successfully encash [sic] the check in the
amount of P71,033.53 to my damage and
prejudice."
The charge of forgery is premised on complainant's
claim that when the SPA was notarized on 15 March
1999, the affiant therein was bedridden in the United
States, who was sick with malignant cancer of the
lungs, and that, in fact, the alleged affiant died on 27
May 1999 also in the United States. Complainant
specifically alleges:
"The accused being both blood relatives
were well aware that my deceased mother
who resides in the U.S. of A has been
bedridden for several months as she was
diagnosed to be suffering from Malignant
Cancer of the Lungs, prior to her death on
May 27, 1999. Hence for obvious reasons,
my deceased mother could not have on
March 15, 1999 executed, prepared and
signed the Special Power of Attorney and
sworn to the same before Atty. Pangan. xxx"
In his comment Atty. Pangan claims that the "act of
notarizing was done in accordance with law and
practice." Moreover, respondent emphasized that:
"4. Respondent has no participation in the
submission and processing of the insurance
proceeds. Respondent Notary Public could
not have made use of the alleged falsified
document. He cannot be considered as
having benefited from the falsified
document as he was never a grantee nor a
beneficiary [in] said document. He did not
benefit from the insurance proceeds. He
never conspired with anyone in the
commission of any crime much less has
taken advantage of his position as notary
public to defraud any person or entity."1
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report2 dated 8 July 2005, IBP Commissioner for Bar
Discipline Doroteo B. Aguila (Commissioner Aguila) found
respondent guilty of notarizing the SPA in the absence of
affiant. Commissioner Aguila found that respondent violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for 30 days,
and that he be barred from acting as notary public, if he is
presently one, or from being given a commission to act as such,
for a period of one year from the effectivity of the
recommended penalty.
In a Resolution3 dated 22 October 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Aguila. The IBP Board
of Governors suspended respondent from the practice of law
for one year.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration dated 12
December 2005 before the IBP Board of Governors. In a
Resolution dated 28 January 2006, the IBP Board of Governors
resolved to deny respondent's motion for reconsideration
since the Board had no jurisdiction to consider and resolve a
matter already endorsed to this Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its
recommendations. Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer
and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he made it
appear that Zenaida A. Dela Cruz personally appeared before
him and executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
Ronaldo Apostol.
Respondent Notarized a Special Power of Attorney
in the Absence of the Affiant

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the Notarial Law provides:
Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgement shall be before a
notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of
the country to take acknowledgements of
instruments or documents in the place where the act
is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgement shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known
to him and that he is the same person who executed
it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be made under the official
seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not,
his certificate shall so state.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Moreover, Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial
Practice of 2004 emphasizes the necessity of the affiant's
personal appearance before the notary public:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document
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(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
In the present case, respondent does not deny notarizing the
questioned Special Power of Attorney. Moreover, instead of
exculpating respondent, the affidavits presented by
respondent prove that affiant was not in the personal presence
of respondent at the time of the notarization.
Ronaldo F. Apostol, respondent's co-accused in the criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, executed an affidavit
absolving respondent from any wrongdoing.
1. I was appointed by my Aunt Zenaida Apostol-Dela
Cruz to process and claim her benefits arising from
her insurance policy with the Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd.;
2. Pursuant to this authority I caused the preparation
of a Special Power of Attorney authorizing me to
process, claim, receive and encash said insurance
policy;
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3. I proceeded to the law office of a distant relative -
Atty. Wilfredo Paul D. Pangan to have the said Special
Power of Attorney notarized;
4. Atty. Pangan was, however, not present in their
office so I asked the staff how I can facilitate the
notarization of the said document;
5. The staff told me that as long as the grantor will
appear in their office they can vouched [sic] the
due execution of the document and they will just
include the documents among the "for signature"
so that Atty. Pangan can sign them when he comes
back from a hearing;
6. I left the law office and fetch [sic] an aunt of mine.
When I returned to the office, I told the staff that my
aunt is too sick to alight from the car;
7. Being a known relative of Atty. Pangan in the law
office I was able to convince the staff that said
aunt was indeed the one who executed the
document;
8. The following day I returned to the law office
and the staff gave me the notarized Special Power
of Attorney;
9. That I have not paid for said notarization as I have
been engaging the services of Atty. Pangan for free;
10. When a feud between me and my cousin who is in
the United States developed and their [sic] was a lack
of communication between us, I was surprised that
the matter of claiming the insurance policy was
brought when almost everybody in our immediate
family knew that I caused the claiming of the said
insurance and hold it in trust until we can
communicate with my cousin;
11. In fairness to Atty. Pangan, he has nothing to do
with whatever wrongdoings I have committed in the
claiming of the insurance policy;
12. The claiming was done in good faith as no one else
in the immediate family can process the same;
x x x.4 (Emphases added)
Laila N. Mesiano and Manolito F. Farnal, members of the staff
of respondent's law office, also executed a joint affidavit in
ostensible support for respondent.
2.Among our duties is to prepare notarial documents
for signature of our two (2) notaries public, Atty.
Tiburcio A. Edaño, Jr. and Atty. Wilfredo Paul D.
Pangan;
3.The two are very strict in requiring the personal
appearance of signatories to documents especially in
documents requiring acknowledgments;

4.Even those documents which were left by clients for
notarials and those which we brought to them while
they were having hearing in the nearby Hall of Justice
were notarized only if we will vouched [sic] that the
said client indeed personally appeared in our office
and executed the said document;
5.This practice in notarizing documents are relaxed
only in cases where mere jurat were required;
x x x.5
Respondent's comment gives us an insight as to how the
present administrative complaint arose:
6.If there was fraud, it may not have even been
committed in the execution of the Special Power of
Attorney nor in the processing of the claim but in the
way the insurance proceeds was shared. Will
complainant question the execution of the alleged
document had the grantee turned over to her the
insurance proceed [sic]? If respondent has conspired
with said grantee in the commission of the fraudulent
act, he would not have notarized the document and
let other notary public do the notarizing.
7.Respondent has always accommodated his relatives
in their legal problems for free. The imputation upon
him of any wrong doings in his practice as notary
public is only a result of the existing feud between the
heirs of the deceased and her relatives.6
In his defense, respondent objected to the evidence presented
against him thus:
All the exhibits were not properly identified and their
execution were not proven by the complainant.
In fact the original nor a certified true copy of the
questioned Special Power of Attorney was never
presented. The complainant never appeared to
identify her complaint affidavit. The Certificate of
Death is a mere xerox copy. The alleged record of the
criminal case allegedly filed were mere xerox copies
and the alleged passport was not properly identified
by the issuing authority.
In view if the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted
that the said exhibits are inadmissible in evidence.
The purpose for which the said exhibits was [sic]
being offered is likewise being objected to.
The records of the criminal case does [sic] not prove
that the accused have committed the crime charged.
They are presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
The death certificate of the alleged signatory does not
show that she could not have signed the alleged
document as the face of the questioned document
showed that it was executed before the alleged
passing of the signatory.
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The passport does not readily show that the signatory
could not have signed the said document nor will it
conclusively tell that the signatory could not have
signed the said document.
The hospital records does [sic] not show that the
signatory could not have possibly executed the said
document.
The check voucher does not show that the herein
respondent was not a party thereto.
The questioned Special Power of Attorney alone does
not prove that the signature appearing thereon in
[sic] not the signature of the signatory.7
The complaint before us is an administrative case where a fact
is deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept to justify a conclusion.8 Aside
from his lame objections, respondent does not categorically
deny notarizing the questioned Special Power of Attorney in
the absence of the affiant. The seriousness of respondent's
omission is not lessened by his claim that he "has always
accommodated his relatives in their legal problems for free."
The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers
commissioned as notary public to authenticate documents
without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However,
the adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh
whatever convenience is afforded to the absent affiants. Doing
away with the essential requirement of physical presence of
the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the
documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be
who they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act and deed.9
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantial
public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
of a private document converts the document into a
public one making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document
is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face
and, for this reason, notaries public must observe
with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined.
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public,
respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred
duties which are dictated by public policy and, as
such, impressed with public interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity
of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
sacrosanct.10

Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public
resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading
the function of notarization. Hence, respondent should be
liable for such negligence, not only as a notary public but also
as a lawyer.11 Respondent must accept the consequences of his
professional indiscretion. Thus, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, respondent's notarial commission
should not only be suspended but respondent must also be
suspended from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Wilfredo Paul
D. Pangan GUILTY of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for one year; REVOKES his incumbent notarial
commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being
commissioned as a notary public for one year, effective
immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5602 February 3, 2004
HILDA D. TABAS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BONIFACIO B. MANGIBIN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed with this Court on
January 30, 2002, complainant Hilda D. Tabas sought the
disbarment of respondent, Atty. Bonifacio B. Mangibin, for
allegedly having committed forgery.
Complainant avers that on March 5, 2001, a certain Anastacia
Galvan from Sta. Monica, Bauang, La Union, mortgaged to her a
piece of real property to secure a P48,000.00 loan. The deed of
mortgage of real property2was duly registered with the Office
of the Register of Deeds of the Province of La Union and
annotated in the tax declaration of the property.3
On October 17, 2001, however, a certain Lilia Castillejos, falsely
representing herself as complainant, appeared before
respondent and asked him to prepare a discharge of the said
mortgage and to notarize it afterwards.4
After having prepared the questioned discharge of real estate
mortgage,5 and without asking Lilia Castillejos for anything
other than a Community Tax Certificate (CTC), respondent
notarized the said deed. Subsequently, the mortgagor,
Anastacia Galvan, mortgaged the subject property again, this
time with the Rural Bank of Naguilian (LU), Inc.6
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Complainant further avers that after she learned of the
cancellation, she promptly informed respondent that her
signature in the "Discharge of Real Estate Mortgage" was a
forgery. However, respondent did nothing to help her and even
threatened to file a counter suit against her should she file a
case against him.7
In his answer,8 respondent admits that the discharge of real
estate mortgage is a forgery, but denies liability for the
falsification under a claim of good faith.9 Respondent avers that
he did not know Lilia Castillejos’ fraudulent intent. He also
submits that he cannot be faulted for simply relying on the CTC
bearing complainant’s name, which Lilia Castillejos presented
to him. He argues that it is beyond the "realm of his duty" and
scope of work to investigate the identity of persons appearing
before him and cites that as a matter of routine, he normally
requires only the CTCs of persons appearing before
him.10 Respondent also asserts that he does not have any
available means of ascertaining the real identities of persons
appearing before him.11
On August 7, 2002,12 the Court referred the instant case to the
IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation.lawphi1.nêt
Subsequently, the IBP required complainant to file her reply by
Order issued on October 14, 2002.13 In her reply dated
November 7, 2002,14 complainant argues that respondent’s
averment that he did not discover that Lilia Castillejos falsely
represented herself could only mean that respondent
knowingly participated in the falsification.15
On December 14, 2002, the IBP issued Resolution No. XV-2002-
627,16 which adopted and approved the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, warning respondent to be
more careful in the preparation of legal documents so that
similar incidents may be avoided in the future.
Following the submission of the IBP Resolution with the Court,
the Court required the Office of the Bar Confidant to submit its
comment on the IBP Resolution on March 19, 2003.17 In her
comment, Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina Layusa found
respondent liable for gross negligence in the discharge of his
duties as a notary public and recommended that the Court
impose upon respondent a graver penalty of suspension of one
(1) year18 from the practice of law.
The issue for our resolution now is whether respondent is
liable for violating the Notarial Law for which his commission
as notary public should be revoked and he should be
suspended also from the practice of law.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.19 It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts a
private document into a public one, making it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity.20 A notarial
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a
notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
public instruments would be undermined. A notary public
should not notarize a document unless the person who signed
the same is the very same person who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
matters stated in the document. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.21
The circumstances in this case indubitably show that
respondent did not take even ordinary precautions required in
the premises. In the acknowledgment portion of the document,
there is the phrase "Before me…personally appeared Hilda A.
Tabas…known to me and to me known to be the same person
who executed the foregoing document."22 Respondent thereby
attested that he knows Hilda A. Tabas, whose name appeared
in the acknowledgment, and that she personally appeared
before him. Indeed, it was his duty to ascertain the identity of
the person appearing before him and to make sure that she is
indeed Hilda A. Tabas. Considering the ease with which CTCs
may be obtained and the legal effect that notarization brings to
the deed of discharge of real estate mortgage that he himself
prepared, respondent should have requested other forms of
identification or asked questions to ascertain her identity.
Respondent’s conduct showed serious lack of due care in the
performance of his duties as a notary public. Because of his
carelessness, respondent failed to notice the glaring difference
in the signature of mortgagee in the deed of real estate
mortgage from her purported signature in the questioned
discharge of real estate mortgage.
It was respondent who prepared the questioned discharge of
real estate mortgage, which he subsequently notarized. Hence
he had adequate opportunity to verify the identity of Lilia
Castillejos. Not only did he have to interview her regarding her
personal circumstances, but also he had to interview her
regarding the background of the deed of real estate mortgage
to be cancelled. Apparently, respondent merely took the word
of Lilia Castillejos that she was Hilda Tabas and did not realize
the need to require her to present other forms of identification.
Such neglect is inexcusable.
Further, by notarizing the Discharge of Real Estate Mortgage
without ascertaining the identity of the signatory, respondent
lawyer acted with reckless disregard of his professional duties
and responsibilities. He caused grave injury to the
complainant. He also undermined the confidence of the public
on notarial documents. Hence, he breached Canon I of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to
promote respect for the law and legal processes as well as to
uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
WHEREFORE, for violation of the Notarial Law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Bonifacio B.
Mangibin’s notarial commission is REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a
period of two (2) years.
Respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for a
period of one (1) year, effective immediately. He is DIRECTED
to report to this Court his receipt of this Decision to enable the
Court to determine when his suspension shall have taken
effect.
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Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be
attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 7860 : January 15, 2009]
AVELINO O. ANGELES, LAURO O. ANGELES, MARIA O.
ANGELES, ROSALINA O. ANGELES, CONNIE M.
ANGELES, Complainants, v. ATTY. AMADO O. IBA
EZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint filed by Avelino O. Angeles, Maria O.
Angeles, Lauro O. Angeles, Rosalina O. Angeles, and Connie M.
Angeles in representation of the deceased Loreto Angeles
(collectively, complainants) against Atty. Amado O. Ibañez
(respondent) for disbarment for notarizing the "Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale" without a notarial commission
and in the absence of the affiants.
The Facts
The facts of CBD Case No. 06-1830, as stated in the Report and
Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), read as follows:
II. Statement of the Complaint
Complainants ... are residents of Highway, Sapang I, Ternate,
Cavite.
Respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez is a practicing lawyer who
holds office at 2101 Carolina (now Madre Ignacia) St., Malate,
Manila.
The lengthy and confusing narrative of what appears to be a
bitter land dispute notwithstanding, it can be gleaned from the
Complaint and Position Paper, and the personal clarification by
the complainants themselves after questioning by the
undersigned during the Mandatory Conference, that the
present administrative case is limited to an "Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale" which respondent Atty. Amado
Ibañez allegedly notarized in the City of Manila on 18 February
1979, and entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p. 157
and Book No. II, Series of 1979.
The complainants denied that they executed the said document
or that they ever appeared before respondent Atty. Ibañez for
this purpose. They alleged that respondent Atty. Ibañez did not
even have the authority to notarize the "Extrajudicial Partition
with Absolute Sale" as he did not have a commission as a
notary public at that time.

The complainants alleged that the respondent and his relatives
are presently using the said document in judicial proceedings
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite to their
damage and prejudice.
The complainants contend that respondent Atty. Ibañez's act of
notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale"
without requiring the presence of the parties thereto, and
despite his alleged lack of a notarial commission, constitutes
professional misconduct for which reason he should be
disbarred.
In support of their allegations, the complainants attached to
their Complaint and Position Paper the following documents:
1. Tax Declaration Nos. 20-004-00052, 1356, 1809 in the name
of Barselisa Angeles, and Tax Declarations 198, 283, 403 and
1544, in the name of Juan Angeles.
2. Certification dated 24 March 2006 issued by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila stating that
the Master List of Notaries Public shows that Atty. Amado O.
Ibañez was not appointed as such for and in the City of Manila
for the year 1976-1977.
3. Certification dated 28 April 2006 issued by the National
Archives stating that there is no notarial record on file with the
said office of Amado Ibañez, a notary public for and within the
City of Manila, and it has no copy on file of an affidavit allegedly
executed by Gabriel, Estebana, Eutiquio, Gloria, Leocadio,
Jovita, Samonte, and Renato, all surnamed Angeles, ratified
sometime in 1977 by the said notary public and acknowledged
as Doc. No. 202, Page No. 42, Book No. 1, Series of 1977.
4. Certification dated 11 April 2006 issued by the National
Archives stating that there is no notarial record on file with the
said office of Amado Ibañez, a notary public for and within the
City of Manila, and it has no copy on file of a partition
w/renunciation [sic] and affidavit allegedly executed by and
among Gabriela, Estebana, Eutiquio, Gloria, Leocadio, Jovita,
Samonte and Renato, all surnamed Angeles, ratified sometime
in 1977 by the said notary public and acknowledged as Doc.
No. 201, Page No. 41, Series of 1977.
5. Two (2) versions of a "Partihang Labas sa Hukuman at
Ganap na Bilihan" dated 28 March 1978, executed by and
between Gloria Angeles, Leocadio Angeles and Gabriela,
Estebana, Eutiquio, Jovita, Samonte and Renato, all surnamed
Torres.
6. Flow chart showing the history of Tax Declaration No. 403,
from 1948 to 1974.
7. Application for Free Patent over Cadastral Lot No. 460-C of
the Ternate Cadastral Sketching (CADS-617-D), SWO-04-
000598 and Cadastral Lot No. 460-B, executed by Atty. Amado
O. Ibañez.
8. Certification dated 24 March 2006 issued by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila stating that
the Master List of Notaries Public shows that Atty. Amado O.
Ibañez was not appointed as such for and in the year 1978-
1979.
-6-
9. "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" (with various
marginal notes made by the complainants) notarized by Atty.
Amado Ibañez in the City of Manila on 18 February 1979, and
entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p. 147 and Book
No. II, Series of 1979.
10. Real Estate Mortgage executed by Flora Olano in favor of
the Rural Bank of Naic, Inc., in the amount of Php350.00,
covering property located in Zapang, Ternate, Cavite and
described in Tax Declaration No. 1657-1658.
11. Certification dated 12 January 2007 issued by the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires
City stating that Atty. Amado O. Ibañez was not duly
commissioned as a notaryt [sic] public for and within the
Province of Cavite in the year 1979, and that it has no copy in
its records of an "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale"
allegedly notarized by Atty. Amado Ibañez on 18 February
1979 and entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p. 147
and Book No. II. Series of 1979.
III. Respondents' Position/Defense
In his Motion to Dismiss and Position Paper, respondent Atty.
Ibañez contended that the complainants are guilty of forum-
shopping inasmuch as they had previously filed the same
complaint, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3581, which
was eventually dismissed by then IBP CBD Comm. Victor
Fernandez.
The respondent admitted that he notarized the "Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale" but clarified that he did so as
Notary Public of the Province of Cavite, with a notarial
commission issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 1, Trece Martires City. He explained that the
designation of "Manila" as the place of execution of the said
document was a mistake of his former legal secretary, who
failed to correct the same through oversight.
Respondent Atty. Ibañez alleged that he notarized the
"Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in his capacity as
the official Notary Public of Puerto Azul, and the same was
actually prepared and typewritten by complainant Rosalina
Angeles for a consideration of Php20,000.00 as evidenced by a
photocopy of Commercial Bank & Trust Co. Cashier's Check
dated 31 January 1979 on file with the Puerto Azul office, as
well as an "Exclusive Authority" attached to the said document.
The respondent also alleged that complainant Rosalina Angeles
was at that time employed as a typist at Puerto Azul and that
she enjoyed the trust and confidence of the Puerto Azul
management.
The respondent stated that the land subject of the sale was
surveyed for Mrs. Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez by the late Angel
Salvacion, the official surveyor of Puerto Azul, and was
submitted to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval
and was approved on 14 February 1985 as CCN No. 04-
000038-D. Respondent Atty. Ibañez alleged that the property is
presently in the actual possession of Puerto Azul, with former
Sapang I Bgy. Captain Johnny Andra as tenant.
The respondent alleged that Puerto Azul's ownership of the
property is anchored on the "Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale," which is in turn the subject of a case, CA GR SP

No. 2006-1668, which is presently pending in the Court of
Appeals.
Respondent Atty. Ibañez alleged that a defect in the
notarization of a document of sale does not invalidate the
transaction, and he stated that his failure to require the
presence of the parties to the "Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale" is wholly justified because of the assurance of
complainant Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing in
the said document were indeed those of her co-heirs. The
respondent also alleged that almost all the complainants
submitted their residence certificates, the numbers of which
were recorded in the acknowledgement portion of the
document.
The respondent denied that he had committed any crime when
he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale"
because the offenses in the Revised Penal Code are "mala in se"
where the intention to commit the crime is required, which is
lacking in his case. The respondent added that there is
regularity in the performance of his duty as the official notary
public of Puerto Azul.
The respondent pointed out that nearly twenty eight (28)
years have lapsed without anyone questioning not only the
sale of the said property, but Puerto Azul's long possession of
the same as well. He alleged that the complainants are now
denying the sale because they want to make it appear that they
have land within or adjoining a quarry site which they have
invaded and taken over. He reiterated that the defect in his
notarization of the sale document notwithstanding, the sale
remains valid.
By way of his defense, respondent Atty. Ibañez submitted the
following documents:
1. Photocopy of a Supreme Court Resolution dated 31 July
2000 denying the complainants' motion for reconsideration in
Administrative Case No. 3581, entitled "Rosalina Angeles, et al.
v. Atty. Amado Ibañez"
2. Photocopy of IBP Board of Governors Resolution dated 27
June 1999, adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of Comm. Victor Fernandez dismissing
Administrative Case No. 3581, entitled "Rosalina Angeles, et al.
v. Atty. Amado Ibañez"
3. Photocopy of a Counter-Affidavit filed by Atty. Amado Ibañez
in OMB-1-C 06-0368-C/OMB-L C 06-0272-C, entitled "Mario O.
Angeles v. Sony Peji, et al.,"
4. "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" notarized by
Atty. Amado Ibañez in the City of Manila on 18 February 1979,
and entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p. 147 and
Book No. II, Series of 1979, with attached "Exclusive Authority"
executed by Maria Angeles, Flora Angeles, Lauro Angeles and
Avelino Angeles in favor of Rosalina Angeles.1
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In aReport2 dated 21 January 2008, IBP Commissioner for Bar
Discipline Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco) found
that respondent notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with
-7-
Absolute Sale" in the absence of affiants and without a notarial
commission. Thus:
As stated earlier, the present administrative complaint may
seem at first to be one for falsification, land grabbing, etc., but a
closer examination of the complainants' allegations coupled
with their own verbal confirmation during the Mandatory
Conference, shows that the complainants are actually accusing
respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez of notarizing an "Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale" in the City of Manila on 18
February 1979 (entered in his Notarial Book as Doc. No. 735, p.
147 and Book No. II, Series of 1979) without requiring the
presence of the parties thereto, and further, for notarizing the
said document even if he did not have a notarial commission at
that time.
The respondent contends that the complainants have
previously filed the same administrative complaint against
him, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3581, and that the
same was eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court. He
alleged that as in this prior complaint, the present case must
likewise be dismissed for forum shopping.
It appears, however, that Administrative Case No. 3581 is
entirely different and distinct from the present complaint. A
reading of the photocopy of IBP Board of Governors Resolution
dated 27 June 1999, adopting and approving the attached
Report and Recommendation of Comm. Victor Fernandez
dismissing Administrative Case No. 3581, entitled "Rosalina
Angeles, et al. v. Atty. Amado Ibañez" (as attached by the
respondent himself in his Motion to Dismiss) shows that this
earlier complaint pertains to herein respondent's alleged
"land-grabbing" of two (2) parcels of land in Bgy. Zapang,
Ternate, Cavite. As stated in the report authored by then
Commissioner Victor Fernandez, the earlier administrative
case relates to the sale of the said property to the Sps. Danilo
Andra and Angela Olano, and its subsequent sale to the
respondent, Atty. Amado Ibañez, who for his part later applied
for, and was granted, free patent titles over the same. Branding
the transaction as land-grabbing, the complainants filed an
action in court to recover possession and annul the titles but
the case was eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court for
lack of merit. The complainants then filed the same complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Dept. of Justice, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Supreme Court, which
eventually referred the matter to the IBP. In his report, then-
Commissioner Victor Fernandez declared that the
complainants were engaged in forum-shopping, reasoning that
unsuccessful in their effort to obtain the result they desire
from the courts, they would attempt to refile their dismissed
action under the guise of an administrative case.
The present administrative complaint may be in one way or
another related to the alleged land-grabbing which was the
subject of Administrative Case No. 3581, but it pertains to an
altogether different matter. In the present complaint,
respondent Atty. Ibañez is not being accused of land-grabbing
or falsification, but rather, for misconduct in notarizing a
document.
We would point out that respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez
admitted that he did not require the presence of the parties to
the document because he was assured as to the authenticity of
their signatures. We would also stress that the
respondent never denied that he notarized the "Extrajudicial

Partition with Absolute Sale," but claimed that he did so not in
Manila as stated in document, but in Cavite where he claimed
to be a commissioned notary public; he attributed the mistake
to his legal secretary, and he insisted that the sale remained
valid despite the defects in notarization.
That is not the point, however. The validity of the transaction
covered by the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" is
not at issue in this administrative case for that is a matter for
the courts to adjudicate, if they have not already done so.
As it is, no less than the respondent himself categorically
admitted that he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition
with Absolute Sale" in the absence of the parties thereto.
To make matters worse, the certifications submitted by
the complainants clearly indicate that respondent Atty.
Amado Ibañez did not have any notarial commission
whether for Manila or Cavite, in 18 February 1979 when
he notarized the subject document. The respondent, for
his part, has been completely unable to proffer any kind of
proof of his claim that he had a commission as a notary
public for and in the Province of Cavite in 1979, or of his
submission of notarial reports and notarial register during
the said period.
xxx
While the case of respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez is not
perfectly identical to the facts and circumstances obtaining in
these cases, his act of notarizing a document without the
necessary commission is nonetheless clear and undeniable.
Guided by the foregoing rulings of the Supreme Court vis-a-vis
the facts in the present complaint, it is therefore respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Amado Ibañez:
1. Be barred from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years, and in the event that he is presently
commissioned as a notary public, that his commission be
immediately revoked and suspended for such period; and
2. Be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year.
Respectfully submitted.3 (Emphasis added)
In a Resolution4 dated 6 February 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco. The Office of
the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the
records of the case on 10 April 2008.
Respondent filed a supplemental position paper on 28 May
2008 before the IBP Board of Governors. In a Resolution dated
29 May 2008, the IBP Board of Governors referred
respondent's submission to the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Respondent attached photocopies of the following:
respondent's Petition for Commission as Notary Public for and
within the Province of Cavite filed before the said Court on 16
February 1978; respondent's commission as Notary Public for
the province of Cavite for the term 1978 until 1979 issued by
Executive Judge Pablo D. Suarez on 21 February 1978; and
respondent's oath of office as notary public dated 21 February
1978.
-8-
The Ruling of the Court
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its
recommendations with modification. Respondent violated his
oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute
Sale" in the absence of the affiants.
Respondent Notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale" in the Absence of the Affiants
Respondent himself admits that he merely relied on the
representation of Rosalina Angeles that the signatures
appearing on the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale"
subject of the present complaint are those of her co-
heirs.5 Respondent claims that he reposed confidence upon
Rosalina Angeles because she is his confidential secretary.
Unfortunately for respondent, he cannot exculpate himself
from the consequences of his recklessness and his failure to
comply with the requirements of the law by relying on his
confidential secretary.
Time and again, we have reminded lawyers commissioned as
notaries public that the affiants must personally appear before
them. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law,
provides:
Sec. 1. (a) The acknowledgement shall be before a notary
public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged
that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be
made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004
reads:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved
as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; andcralawlibrary
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public
to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the
acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is
the parties' free act and deed.6
Notarization of a private document converts such document
into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to
a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to
the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree

and the protection of that interest requires preventing those
who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public
from imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.7
Under the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent's
notarial commission should not only be suspended but
respondent must also be suspended from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Amado O.
Ibañez GUILTY of notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale" in the absence of the affiants. Accordingly, the
Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one
year, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any,
and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary
public for one year, effective immediately, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7880 April 11, 2012
WILLIAM HECTOR MARIA, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. WILFREDO R. CORTEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative complaint1 filed by William Hector
Maria (William) against respondent Atty. Wilfredo R. Cortez for
having notarized a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) without
verifying the authenticity of the signatures contained therein in
violation of the Notarial Law.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Complainant William is a citizen of New Zealand, and married
to Ernita Villanueva-Maria (Ernita) from Bio, Tagudin, Ilocos
Sur. Sometime in September 2005, the complainant and his
wife Ernita (Spouses Maria) took a vacation in Ilocos Sur from
Australia. They met Emmanuel Biteng (Emmanuel) and Ethel
Biteng (Ethel), collectively called as Spouses Biteng, who
represented themselves as caretakers of certain parcels of land
purportedly for sale and specifically covered by Original
Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. P-69632 and P-69595, situated
in Sevilla and Paratong, Ilocos Sur, respectively. Taking interest
over the same, Spouses Maria had the metes and bounds
surveyed and came to know that the properties were
separately registered under the names of Emmanuel’s aunts
namely: Gundaway Biteng (Gundaway) and Namnama B.
Alberto (Namnama), and his late father Pascual Biteng
(Pascual).
-9-
Being confronted with the issue on ownership, Emmanuel
presented an SPA allegedly signed by Gundaway and
Namnama, appointing him as their attorney-in-fact in all
transactions pertaining to the subject properties. The SPA was
notarized by the respondent and entered in his Notarial
Register as Document No. 1553, Page No. 313, Book No. XV,
Series of 2005.2
The complainant, however, doubted the authenticity of the
document as it appeared to be a mere photocopy. Besides, he
learned that both Gundaway and Namnama were living abroad,
who allegedly never came home to execute an SPA in favor of
Emmanuel. Spouses Biteng, however, promised to send
Spouses Maria a duly signed SPA notarized in the USA. Relying
on their word, Ernita affixed her signature on the Deed of Sale
(as to the land owned by Gundaway and Namnama) and Deed
of Adjudication with Sale (as to the land owned by the late
Pascual).
When Spouses Maria were back in Australia, they received a
communication from the Philippines together with a General
Power of Attorney (GPA) signed by Gundaway and Namnama
executed in Daly City, California, USA; but said document was
allegedly not authenticated by the Philippine Embassy.
In the early part of 2006, Spouses Maria found out that
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over the subject properties
have already been issued in their names but were in the
possession of the Spouses Biteng who refused to deliver to
them due to some misunderstanding. This prompted the
Spouses Maria to get in touch with Gundaway and Namnama in
the USA who told them that they (Gundaway and Namnana)
did not execute any SPA in favor of Emmanuel.
On April 4, 2006, the complainant came back to the Philippines
and reviewed all the pertinent documents involved in the sale
of the subject properties and noticed that they were all
notarized by the respondent. Hence, the complainant filed the
instant administrative case which prayed for the respondent’s
suspension as a notary public and for his disbarment for
violating his sworn duty as a lawyer.
In his Answer,3 the respondent asserted that he had no active
participation in the sale nor did he exert any influence over the
parties into agreeing to said sale; that his two well-trusted
secretaries carefully scrutinized every document, specifically
the identities of the parties involved and the authenticity of
their signatures, before they were brought to him for his
notarial signature.
The respondent also averred that the SPA he notarized was not
the one used in the registration of the subject properties, since
it was replaced with another one upon the insistence of
Spouses Maria, who eventually signed the two (2) Deeds of
Sale on the same day. He even asseverated that the
complainant should not have allowed his wife to sign the two
Deeds of Sale if he doubted the authenticity of the SPA. More
importantly, the respondent stressed that he was merely being
implicated in the feud between the parties regarding the
selling price of the subject properties. The parties have settled
their differences and the titles of the land were finally turned
over to Spouses Maria. In support thereof, he presented the
following documents, to wit: (1) Affidavit executed by
Emmanuel stating that Spouses Maria refused to pay the price
they agreed upon and did threaten to declare the transaction

illegal by filing the instant administrative complaint against the
respondent; (2) OCTs Nos. P-69632,4 P-695955 and P-
696356 over the subject properties, issued in the name of
Ernita, married to William;7 and (3) the Joint Affidavit8 of his
secretaries attesting to the respondent’s integrity as a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The respondent,
thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The instant case was referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner set the case for mandatory
conference on August 4, 2006 which was reset to September 8,
2006. However, only the respondent was present. In an
Order9 dated September 8, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline terminated the conference and ordered the parties
to submit their respective Position Papers.
In his report,10 Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco
found the respondent administratively liable for having
notarized the SPA in the absence of the alleged affiants and
without knowing whether or not the signatures appearing
therein belong to the supposed affiants. As it appeared, the
signatures were falsified considering that Gundaway and
Namnama were not aware of such SPA. The Investigating
Commissioner further stated that it was of no moment that
such SPA was not utilized in registering the sale as alleged by
the respondent. The mere fact that the respondent notarized
such SPA with an acknowledgement that these affiants have
personally appeared before him as a Notary Public when in
fact, they did not, makes the respondent administratively
liable. Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that the respondent be reprimanded and denied commission
as a notary public for a period of one (1) year.11
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and
recommendation and issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-275
dated November 2, 2007 which states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and for respondent’s violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice,
Atty. Wilfredo R. Cortez is
hereby REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being
Commissioned as Notary Public for one (1) year.12
A motion for reconsideration was promptly filed by the
respondent, pleading that the penalty of disqualification from
being commissioned as notary public for one year was too
harsh. He reiterated that he was a victim of circumstances
considering that the instant administrative case merely arose
from the misunderstanding between the parties. The
respondent alleged that he has not committed any fraud,
dishonesty or deliberate injustice to anyone.1âwphi1 For the
past twenty years (20) engaging in notarial works, he has not
committed any kind of misconduct which may destroy his
honor and reputation as a member of the legal profession.13
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-399 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP
Board of Governors denied the respondent’s motion for
- 10 -
reconsideration which was duly noted by the Court in a
resolution issued on October 12, 2011.
The findings of the IBP are well-taken.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial
acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and
affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance
of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the
significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The
notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public
instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence
without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution.
Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty,
meaningless or routinary act.14
Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
reads:
Section 2. Prohibitions –
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the
person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document –
(1) is not in the notary’s presence
personally at the time of the notarization;
and
(2) is not personally known to the notary
public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
In the instant case, it was clearly established that the
respondent notarized the subject SPA without having
Gundaway and Namnama personally appear before him as
required by law. In his Answer, he stated that he merely relies
on his two secretaries in scrutinizing all contents of documents
including the authenticity of its signatories before the
documents are brought to him for his notarial signature. This
was what actually transpired with regard to the subject SPA
when Emmanuel went to the respondent’s office to have the
SPA notarized. The secretaries were familiar with Emmanuel
for being a long time Barangay Chairman. With the secretaries’
assurance that they knew Emmanuel in person, the respondent
affixed his notarial signature on the SPA without even
requiring the physical presence of Gundaway and Namnama
whose names appear as signatories on the SPA.
The respondent’s excuse that the SPA was never used or has
been replaced during the registration of the subject lands is of
no moment. The fact remains that the SPA was notarized
without complying with the requirements of the law.
It should be noted that a notary public’s function should not be
trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and
duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy
and fidelity.15 A notary public exercises duties calling for
carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves
of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not

take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.16
We agree with the IBP that the respondent’s Answer to the
complaint, is virtually an admission that he failed to exercise
the due diligence required of him in the performance of the
duties of notary public. Such negligence can not be
countenanced and definitely warrants sanction from the Court.
In imposing the penalty, the Court is mindful that removal from
the Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less
severe - reprimand, temporary suspension or fine - would
accomplish the end desired.17
Considering the circumstances of the case, particularly the
absence of bad faith and the fact that this is the first infraction
lodged against him for the past 20 years, the Court finds that a
suspension of six (6) months as notary public would suffice.
The respondent, and for that matter, all notaries public, are
hereby cautioned to be very careful and diligent in ascertaining
the true identities of the parties executing the document before
them, especially when it involves disposition of a property, as
this Court will deal with such cases more severely in the
future.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Wilfredo
R. Cortez is hereby REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from
being commissioned as Notary Public for six (6) months.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195191 March 20, 2012
CONGRESSWOMAN LUCY MARIE TORRES-
GOMEZ, petitioner,
vs.
EUFROCINO C. CODILLA, JR. AND HON. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, with application for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction. The
Petition seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 10-482 of
the Mouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in
HRET Case No. 10-009 (EP) entitled "Eufrocino C. Codilla, Jr. v.
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (Fourth District, Leyte)," which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Statement of the Facts and the Case
On 30 November 2009, Richard I. Gomez (Gomez) filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for representative of the Fourth
Legislative District of Leyte under the Liberal Party of the
Philippines. On even date, private respondent Codilla Jr. filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the same position under Lakas
Kampi CMD.
On 6 December 2009, Buenaventura O. Juntilla (Juntilla), a
registered voter of Leyte, filed a Verified Petition for Gomez's
disqualification with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
- 11 -
First Division on the ground that Gomez lacked the residency
requirement for a Member of the Fiouse of Representatives.
In a Resolution dated 17 February 2010, the COMELEC First
Division granted Juntilla's Petition and disqualified Gomez. On
20 February 2010, the latter filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with the COMELEC En Banc, which dismissed it on 4 May 2010,
six days before the May 2010 national, and local elections. The
dispositive portion of the COMELEC's Resolution1 is worded as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Respondent is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The Resolution of the Commission (First Division) is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2
On the same date, Gomez filed a Manifestation with the
COMELEC En Bane, alleging that, without necessarily admitting
the allegations raised by Juntilla, he was accepting the
aforementioned Resolution with finality, in order to enable his
substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for
substitution.
On 5 May 2010, petitioner Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez filed her
Certificate of Candidacy as substitute for the position of
representative of the Fourth Congressional District for the
Province of Leyte vice Gomez, her husband.
On 6 May 2010, Juntilla filed a Counter-Manifestation with the
COMELEC En Banc. At the same time, he wrote a letter to Atty.
Ferdinand T. Rafanan, Director of the Law Department of the
COMELEC, alleging the invalidity of the proposed substitution
of Gomez by petitioner.
On 8 May 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No.
8890, which approved and adopted the recommendation of its
Law Department to allow petitioner as a substitute candidate
for Gomez for representative of the Fourth Legislative District
of Leyte.
On 9 May 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the above COMELEC Resolution No. 8890.
Pending resolution of his motion, the national and local
elections were conducted as scheduled.
After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said
elections, petitioner emerged as the winner with 101,250 votes
or a margin of 24,701 votes over private respondent Codilla,
who obtained 76,549 votes.
On 11 May 2010, Codilla filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Suspend the Proclamation of Substitute Candidate Lucy Marie
T. Gomez (vice Richard I. Gomez) as the Winning Candidate of
the May 10, 2010 Elections for the Fourth Congressional
District of Leyte.
On the same date, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to
resolve the pending Motion for Reconsideration filed on 9 May
2010 relative to Resolution No. 8890 and to immediately order
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of the Province of Leyte to

suspend the proclamation of petitioner as a Member of the
House of Representatives, Fourth District, Province of Leyte.
On 12 May 2010, petitioner was proclaimed the winning
candidate for the congressional seat of the Fourth District of
Leyte.
Accordingly, on 21 May 2010, private respondent Codilla filed
a Petition with public respondent HRET against petitioner
docketed as HRET Case No. 10-009 (Election Protest).
On 2 July 2010, petitioner filed her Verified Answer to Codilla's
Election Protest questioning the alleged lack of the required
Verification and praying for its dismissal.
On 8 July 2010, Codilla filed a Reply to petitioner's Verified
Answer.
In an Order issued by public respondent HRET, the instant case
was set for preliminary conference on 2 September 2010.
On 1 September 2010, unsatisfied with the Order of the HRET,
petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion, persistent
in her position that Codilla's Election Protest should be
dismissed based on the grounds raised in her Verified Answer.
She also prayed for the deferment of the preliminary
conference until after the resolution of the said
motion.1âwphi1
On 9 September 2010, the HRET issued the assailed Resolution
No. 10-2823 resolving the Urgent Manifestation and Motion
filed by petitioner, the dispositive portion of which provides:
The Tribunal NOTES the Urgent Manifestation and Motion filed
on September 1, 2010 by the protestee; REITERATES its ruling
in Resolution No. 10-160 dated July 29, 2010 that the protest
cannot be considered insufficient in form, considering that the
examination of the original copy of the protest filed before the
Tribunal had revealed the existence of the required
verification; and DENIES the respondent's motion for
deferment of the preliminary conference scheduled on
September 2, 2010.4
Accordingly, on 30 September 2010, petitioner filed with
public respondent HRET a Motion for Reconsideration of the
above Resolution No. 10-282.
On 22 November 2010, public respondent HRET issued
Resolution No. 10-4825 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, ruling as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DENIES the instant motion for
reconsideration as regards the issues pertaining to
absence/defect of the verification and propriety of the election
protest; and DIRECTS the protestant to have his verification
properly notarized.6
Thereafter, petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Certiorari7 dated 7 February 2011. The Petition raises the
following grounds:
A.
- 12 -
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
DISMISS THE ELECTION PROTEST DESPITE AN
ADMITTEDLY DEFECTIVE VERIFICATION.
B.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN Y
ALLOWED THE PROTESTANT TO RAISE ISSUES ON
QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES IN AN ELECTION
PROTEST.8
Petitioner claims that there was a material defect in the
Verification of the Election Protest, a requirement explicitly
provided for in Rule 16 of the 2004 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HREF Rules).9 The
verification being a mandatory requirement, the failure to
comply therewith is a fatal defect that affects the very
jurisdiction of the HRET.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that what is in question
in the Election Protest is her qualification as a Member of the
House of Representatives, and not the number of votes cast.
Her qualification is allegedly not a proper ground for an
election protest, in which the issues should be the appreciation
of ballots and the correctness and number of votes of each
candidate.
On 15 February 2011 this Court required respondents to file
their comment on the Petition. Thereafter, Codilla filed his
Comment/Opposition dated 28 April 2011. In his Comment, he
argues that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the HREF in issuing the assailed Resolutions. He clarifies
that the Ejection Protest that he filed contained a validly
executed Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
(Verification).10 However, the defect that petitioner points to is
the portion of the jurat of the Verification, which states:
Subscribed and sworn to before me this__ day of May 2010 at
_____. Affiant personally and exhibited to me his (1) License ID
Card with Card No. 1103-80-002135 issued by LTO on January
16, 2009 (2) Philippine Passport No. XX4793730 issued on
"October 20, 2009 valid until October 19, 2014, he, being the
same person herein who executed the foregoing document
thereof.11
The date "May 21 2009" was stamped on the first blank in "__
day of May 2010." "May 21 2010" was written with a pen over
the stamped date "May 21 2009" and countersigned by the
notary public. Codilla claims that the date of the Verification
was a mere innocuous mistake or oversight, which did not
warrant a finding that the Verification was defective; much
less, fatally defective. He claims he should not be faulted for
any alleged oversight that may have been committed by the
notary public. Further, the same argument holds true with
respect to the absence of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Compliance Number of the notary public, as
well as the overdue Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) indicated
in the notarial stamp. In any case, the insufficiency of the
Verification was not fatal to the jurisdiction of the HRET.

With respect to the second issue, Codilla argues that the issues
in the Election Protest do not pertain to petitioner's
qualification, but to the casting and counting of votes. He
claims that his Election Protest contests the declaration by the
Board of Canvassers that the 101,250 votes should be counted
in favor of petitioner and be credited to him as these should
have instead been declared as stray votes.
Thereafter, public respondent HRET filed its Comment12 on the
Petition dated 5 May 2011. In its Comment, the HRET claims
that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it took
cognizance of Codilla's Election Protest despite an alleged
absence/defect in the verification. After all, an unverified
petition differs from one which contains a defective
verification, such as in this case. A defective verification is
merely a formal defect which does not affect the jurisdiction of
the tribunal. In any case, the summary dismissal of an Election
Protest, as well as the allowance of its amendments in matters
of form, is sanctioned by the HRET Rules.
The HRET further argues that it did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it took cognizance of the Election Protest. The
issue raised in the Election Protest was the validity of
petitioner's proclamation, in view of her alleged invalid
substitution. This is a matter that is addressed to the sound
judgment of the HRET.
On 7 June 2011, this Court, among others, required petitioner
to file a reply to Codilla's Comment. Petitioner later filed her
Reply dated 15 August 2011, citing an additional ground for
considering the Verification as defective. She claimed that
Codilla, a resident of Ormoc City, could not have possibly
appeared before a notary public in Quezon City; and that he
failed to prove that he was indeed in Quezon City when he
supposedly verified the Election Protest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the HRET.
On the Allegedly Defective Verification
While the existence of the Verification is not disputed,
petitioner notes three alleged defects. First, the Election
Protest was filed on 21 May 2010, but the Verification was
allegedly subscribed and sworn to on 21 May 2009.13Second,
Codilla, a resident of Ormoc City, could not have possibly
appeared personally before the notary public in Quezon
City.14 Third, in the notarial stamp, the date of expiration of the
notarial commission was handwritten while all other details
were stamped; the PTR indicated was issued in 2005; there
was no MCLE Compliance Number as required by Bar Matter
No. 1922.15 Petitioner claims that due to the lack of a proper
verification, the Election Protest should have been treated as
an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed.
The alleged defects of the Verification are more apparent than
real.
With respect to the date of the notarization, it is clear that the
stamped date "2009" was a mere mechanical error. In fact, the
notary public had superimposed in writing the numbers "10"
- 13 -
and countersigned the alteration. Thus, this error need not be
overly magnified as to constitute a defect in the Verification.
With respect to the second alleged defect, there is a
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
with respect to the jurat of the Verification, wherein the notary
public attests that it was subscribed and sworn to before him
or her, on the date mentioned thereon.16 Official duties are
disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. Thus,
contrary to petitioner's allegation, there was no need for
Codilla to "attach his plane ticket to prove he flew from Ormoc
City to Manila."17
Further, to overcome the presumption of regularity, clear and
convincing evidence must be presented.18 Absent such
evidence, the presumption must be upheld. The burden of
proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a
notarized document lies on the party contesting the
execution.19 Thus, petitioner's contention that she "had reliable
information that [Codilla] was in Ormoc City on the date
indicated in the Verification" cannot be considered as clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the
document was duly executed and notarized.
With respect to the third alleged defect, the fact that some
portions of the stamp of the notary public were handwritten
and some were stamped does not, in itself, indicate any defect.
Further, Bar Matter No. 1922 merely requires lawyers to
indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate
of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, whichever is
applicable - for the immediately preceding compliance period.
Clearly, the regulation does not apply to notarial acts. With
respect to the PTR number which was dated 5 years prior to
the date of notarization, the deficiency merely entails the
potential administrative liability of the notary public.20
In any case, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the HRET in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the
Election Protest and directing Codilla to have his Verification
properly notarized.
It has been consistently held that the verification of a pleading
is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. The purpose
of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely
speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting
the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.21
This Court has emphasized that in this species of controversy
involving the determination of the true will of the electorate,
time is indeed of paramount importance. An election
controversy, by its very nature, touches upon the
ascertainment of the people's choice as gleaned from the
medium of the ballot. For this reason, an election protest
should be resolved with utmost dispatch, precedence and
regard for due process. Obstacles and technicalities that fetter
the people's will should not stand in the way of a prompt
termination of election contests.22Thus, rules on the
verification of protests should be liberally construed.
At this point, it is pertinent to note that such liberalization of
the rules was also extended to petitioner.1âwphi1 A perusal of
the Verification and Certification attached to this Petition

shows she attests that the contents of the Petition "are true and
correct of [her] own personal knowledge, belief and based on
the records in [her] possession.23 Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which
contains a verification based on "information and belief or
"knowledge, information and belief," shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading. A pleading, therefore, wherein the
verification is based merely on the party's knowledge and
belief— such as in the instant Petition — produces no legal
effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the
deficiency to be remedied.24
On the Propriety of the Election Protest
Codilla's Election Protest contests the counting of 101,250
votes in favor of petitioner. He claims that the denial of the
Certificate of Candidacy of Gomez rendered the latter a non-
candidate, who therefore could not have been validly
substituted, as there was no candidacy to speak of.
It bears stressing that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. This exclusive
jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the
authority to hear and determine the controversy presented;
and the right to decide whether there exists that state of facts
that confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters arising
from the case legitimately before it.25 Accordingly, the HRET
has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the
question of its own jurisdiction - both as to parties and as to
subject matter; and to decide all questions, whether of law or
of fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the
question of jurisdiction.26 Thus, the HRET had the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine its authority and to take cognizance
of the Election Protest filed before it.
Further, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
HRET on this score. An election protest proposes to oust the
winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between
the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds
of electoral frauds and irregularities. Its purpose is to
determine who between them has actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the
office.27 The foregoing considered, the issues raised hi Codilla's
Election Protest are proper for such a petition, and is within
the jurisdiction of the HRET.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
The Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction is likewise DENIED.
Resolution Nos. 10-282 and 10-482 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4751 July 31, 2000
EMELITA SOLARTE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TEOFILO F. PUGEDA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
- 14 -
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is an administrative charge for gross misconduct,
filed by complainant Emelita Solarte against a member of the
bar, respondent Atty. Teofilo F. Pugeda. Respondent was a
municipal judge in the 1960s when, as notary public ex officio,
he allegedly notarized certain documents involving the sale of
land situated in Cavite, particularly two deeds of sale dated
circa 1964 and 1967 involving parcels of land located at
General Trias.
The lots belonged to Catalino Nocon, and was the subject of an
extrajudicial partition made by Catalino and his children. One
of the children, Herminia, was not a signatory thereto because
she was still a minor at that time.
Complainant claimed an interest in the lots sold because she
was a descendant of the original owner, Catalino Nocon.
Complainant's paternal grandfather, Felimon, was one of
Catalino's children. Some 30 years after the sale thereof, or in
mid-1990s complainant requested respondent for copies of the
aforesaid deeds of sale. She suspected them to be spurious and
wanted to have them examined by the NBI. Unable to obtain
copies from respondent, she went to Herminia Nocon, another
child of Catalino, who did not give her copies but allowed her
to look at the documents. Complainant recorded the contents
of the document on video and retyped the contents.
Complainant avers that respondent Pugeda could not have
legally notarized a document to which he also acted as witness.
She also cites as irregular or anomalous the absence of the
vendee's signature in one of the deeds of sale. Complainant
claims that respondent and his wife are in fact administering
the property at General Trias and they were responsible for the
wrongful partition of the property belonging to complainant's
kin. According to complainant, the acts of respondent
constitute gross misconduct.
Complainant alleges in particular that respondent participated
in the fraudulent partition and sale of the property of Catalino.
She discovered the fraud only recently according to her, when
she sought the titling of his father's portion of the property.
She now assails the validity of the partition made by Catalino
and his children – particularly since Herminia was not a
signatory thereto and the deeds of sale pertaining to the
property.
In his comment, respondent countered that, first, he was no
longer under any obligation to provide petitioner with the
documents she was asking for because he is no longer a notary
public ex officio. He says he was willing to look for the
documents he notarized some 30 years ago, but petitioner was
impatient and had left for the United States of America before
he could find the documents.
Second, respondent says there is nothing in the law that
prohibits the notary public from signing as witness the same
documents he notarized.
Third, as municipal judge, he avers he was empowered to
notarize documents under the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the
Revised Administrative Code. The documents in question were
notarized in the 1960s. According to respondent, this was
before the Supreme Court declared in 1980,1 that an ex

officio notary public can only notarize documents if such
notarization is in connection with the exercise of his official
functions and duties.
Fourth, respondent denies that he or his wife was responsible
for the partition of the lot subject of the deeds of sale, so
neither of them can be faulted therefor.
Attached to respondent's comment are copies of the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
TM-273, and of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 49757-R. Both decisions upheld the validity of the partition
and the deeds of sale.
The complaint, together with respondent's comment, was
referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP recommends that the charge be
dismissed, thus:
"It appears that complainant was not a party to the
documents which respondent notarized and
witnessed. The respondent cannot be faulted for
failure of the National archives to provide
complainant with copies of the requested documents.
Nowhere in the records is it shown that respondent
and his wife had a hand in the partition and sale of
the properties. Further, there is no prohibition for a
notary public to witness a document which he ratified
nor for his wife to sign as witness."2
We agree with the foregoing recommendation of the IBP.
Nothing in the law prohibits a notary public from acting at the
same time as witness in the document he notarized. 3The only
exception is when the document to be notarized is a will.4
Complainant offered no proof, but only mere allegations, that
(1) respondent was involved in the partition of the subject
property, and that (2) respondent employed fraud to effect
such partition. Such a grave charge against a member of the bar
and former municipal judge needs concrete substantiation to
gain credence. It could not prosper without adequate proof.
We note with dismay complainant's effort to mislead this Court
when she claimed in her petition that she discovered the
fraudulent partition of the property only recently. For the
records show that on June 7, 1967, Purificacion Alfaro,
petitioner's paternal grandmother, along with her children,
had filed an action for partition and annulment of document
before the Court of First Instance of Cavite.5 Purificacion and
her co-plaintiffs lost their case in the trial court and again in
the Court of Appeals, which rendered its decision on July 31,
1979.6Complainant was not unaware of that case.7 In fact, she
was wondering why respondent also knew of the case when he
was merely the notary public who notarized the documents.
Ultimately, what complainant wants is to annul the partition
and the sale of the subject property. However, both matters
were already brought before and upheld by the courts as far
back as 1979. After the lapse of more than 20 years, without
any appeal having been interposed, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49757-R upholding the validity of the
partition and the deeds of sale has already attained finality.
Complainant cannot now resurrect issues involved in said case.
- 15 -
This administrative charge against respondent lawyer, who as
municipal judge notarized the documents involved, is utterly
without merit.
WHEREFORE, as recommended, the instant complaint is
DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 192280 January 25, 2011
SERGIO G. AMORA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARNIELO S.
OLANDRIA, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside
the Resolutions dated April 29, 20101 and May 17,
2010,2 respectively, of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in SPA No. 10-046 (DC).
First, the undisputed facts.
On December 1, 2009, petitioner Sergio G. Amora, Jr. (Amora)
filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Candijay,
Bohol. At that time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of
Candijay and had been twice elected to the post, in the years
2004 and 2007.
To oppose Amora, the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC)
fielded Trygve L. Olaivar (Olaivar) for the mayoralty post.
Respondent Arnielo S. Olandria (Olandria) was one of the
candidates for councilor of the NPC in the same municipality.
On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a
Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged
that Amora’s COC was not properly sworn contrary to the
requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in
executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community
Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo
Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent
evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amora’s COC had no
force and effect and should be considered as not filed.
Amora traversed Olandria’s allegations in his Answer cum
Position Paper.3 He countered that:
1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a
Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed
out of time;
2. Olandria’s claim does not constitute a proper
ground for the cancellation of the COC;
3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora)
is personally known to the notary public, Atty.

Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the
document;
4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since
they have been members of the League of Muncipal
Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and
5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with
the requirement that the COC be under oath.
As previously adverted to, the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running for
Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
Posthaste, Amora filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 before
the COMELEC en banc. Amora reiterated his previous
arguments and emphasized the asseverations of the notary
public, Atty. Granada, in the latter’s affidavit,5 to wit:
1. The COMELEC’s (Second Division’s) ruling is
contrary to the objectives and basic principles of
election laws which uphold the primacy of the
popular will;
2. Atty. Granada states that while he normally
requires the affiant to show competent evidence of
identity, in Amora’s case, however, he accepted
Amora’s CTC since he personally knows him;
3. Apart from the fact that Amora and Atty. Granada
were both members of the League of Municipal
Mayors, Bohol Chapter, the two consider each other
as distant relatives because Amora’s mother is a
Granada;
4. It is a matter of judicial notice that practically
everybody knows the Mayor, most especially lawyers
and notaries public, who keep themselves abreast of
developments in local politics and have frequent
dealings with the local government; and
5. In all, the COC filed by Amora does not lack the
required formality of an oath, and thus, there is no
reason to nullify his COC.
Meanwhile, on May 10, 2010, national and local elections were
held. Amora obtained 8,688 votes, equivalent to 58.94% of the
total votes cast, compared to Olaivar’s 6,053 votes, equivalent
to only 41.06% thereof. Subsequently, the Muncipal Board of
Canvassers of Candijay, Bohol, proclaimed Amora as the
winner for the position of Municipal Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.6
A week thereafter, or on May 17, 2010, in another turn of
events, the COMELEC en banc denied Amora’s motion for
reconsideration and affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC
(Second Division). Notably, three (3) of the seven (7)
commissioners dissented from the majority ruling.
Commissioner Gregorio Larrazabal (Commissioner Larrazabal)
wrote a dissenting opinion, which was concurred in by then
Chairman Jose A.R. Melo and Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento.
- 16 -
In denying Amora’s motion for reconsideration and upholding
Olandria’s petition for disqualification of Amora, the COMELEC
ratiocinated, thus:
[Amora] himself admitted in his Motion that the Second
Division was correct in pointing out that the CTC is no longer a
competent evidence of identity for purposes of notarization.
The COC therefore is rendered invalid when [petitioner] only
presented his CTC to the notary public. His defense that he is
personally known to the notary cannot be given recognition
because the best proof [of] his contention could have been the
COC itself. However, careful examination of the jurat portion of
the COC reveals no assertion by the notary public that he
personally knew the affiant, [petitioner] herein. Belated
production of an Affidavit by the Notary Public cannot be given
weight because such evidence could and should have been
produced at the earliest possible opportunity.
The rules are absolute. Section 73 of the Election Code states:
"Section 73. Certificate of Candidacy. – No person shall be
eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein."
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 (Rules), the
requirements of notarization of an oath are:
"Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. – The term ‘Affirmation’ or
‘Oath’ refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of
the contents of the instrument or document."
The required form of identification is prescribed in [S]ection
12 of the same Rules, to wit:
"Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. – The phrase
‘competent evidence of identity’ refers to the identification of
an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
individual. x x x."
It is apparent that a CTC, which bears no photograph, is no
longer a valid form of identification for purposes of
Notarization of Legal Documents. No less than the Supreme
Court itself, when it revoked the Notarial Commission of a
member of the Bar in Baylon v. Almo, reiterated this when it
said:
"As a matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of
a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a person
who wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include

it in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries
public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons
appearing before them to have their documents notarized."
Seeking other remedies, [Amora] maintained that Section 78 of
the Election Code governs the Petition. Said section provides
that:
"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing,
not later than fifteen days before the election."
[Amora] however failed to note that the Petition relies upon an
entirely different ground. The Petition has clearly stated that it
was invoking Section 73 of the Election Code, which prescribes
the mandatory requirement of filing a sworn certificate of
candidacy. As properly pointed out by [Olandria], he filed a
Petition to Disqualify for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification, which, is governed by COMELEC Resolution
No. 8696, to wit:
"B. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO
SECTION 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND
PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS
OR POSSESSING SOME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
1. A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to
Section 68 of the OEC and the verified petition to disqualify a
candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds
for disqualification may be filed on any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date
of proclamation;
xxxx
3. The petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualification
or possessing some grounds for disqualification, shall be filed
in ten (10) legible copies, personally or through a duly
authorized representative, by any person of voting age, or duly
registered political party, organization or coalition of political
parties on the ground that the candidate does not possess all
the qualifications as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who possesses some grounds for
disqualification as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law."
xxxx
Finally, we do not agree with [Amora] when he stated that the
Second Division’s Resolution "practically supplanted congress
by adding another ground for disqualification, not provided in
the omnibus election code or the local government code. The
constitution is very clear that it is congress that shall prescribe
the qualifications (and disqualifications) of candidates for local
government positions." These grounds for disqualification
were laid down in both laws mentioned by [Amora] and
COMELEC Resolution 8696.7
- 17 -
Hence, this petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the COMELEC. On June 15, 2010, we issued a
Status Quo Ante Order and directed respondents to comment
on the petition. As directed, Olandria and the COMELEC filed
their respective Comments8 which uniformly opposed the
petition. Thereafter, Amora filed his Reply.9
Amora insists that the Petition for Disqualification filed by
Olandria is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course since the
purported ground for disqualification simply refers to the
defective notarization of the COC. Amora is adamant that
Section 73 of the OEC pertains to the substantive qualifications
of a candidate or the lack thereof as grounds for
disqualification, specifically, the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective local officials under the Local
Government Code (LGC) and the OEC. Thus, Olandria’s petition
was filed way beyond the reglementary period of twenty-five
(25) days from the date of the filing of the disputed COC.
Moreover, Amora maintains that his COC is properly notarized
and not defective, and the presentation of his CTC to the notary
public to whom he was personally known sufficiently complied
with the requirement that the COC be under oath. Amora
further alleges that: (1) Olaivar, his opponent in the mayoralty
post, and likewise a member of the NPC, is purportedly a
fraternity brother and close associate of Nicodemo T. Ferrer
(Commissioner Ferrer), one of the commissioners of the
COMELEC who disqualified him; and (2) Olaivar served as
Consultant for the COMELEC, assigned to the Office of
Commissioner Ferrer.
Olandria and the COMELEC reiterated the arguments
contained in the COMELEC en banc resolution of May 17, 2010.
Amora’s petition is meritorious.
We find that the COMELEC ruling smacks of grave abuse of
discretion, a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Certiorari lies where a court
or any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.10
In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold
Olandria’s claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to
possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch
of the imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for
disqualification from the specific wording of the OEC in Section
68, which reads:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having: (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to
a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective

office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
elections laws.
and of Section 40 of the LGC, which provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating
the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical
cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those
who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity
of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on
any of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the
foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify
that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification
of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that petition
upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify a
candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some
grounds for disqualification."
The proper characterization of a petition as one for
disqualification under the pertinent provisions of laws cannot
be made dependent on the designation, correctly or
incorrectly, of a petitioner. The absurd interpretation of
Olandria, respondent herein, is not controlling; the COMELEC
should have dismissed his petition outright.
A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a
candidate as ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment
fit for the position of mayor. The distinction between a petition
for disqualification and the formal requirement in Section 73 of
the OEC that a COC be under oath is not simply a question of
semantics as the statutes list the grounds for the
disqualification of a candidate.
Recently, we have had occasion to distinguish the various
petitions for disqualification and clarify the grounds therefor
as provided in the OEC and the LGC. We declared, thus:
- 18 -
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification on the one hand,
can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40
of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a
material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue
as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda
v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who
is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted
under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.11
Apart from the qualifications provided for in the Constitution,
the power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective
office and grounds for disqualification therefrom, consistent
with the constitutional provisions, is vested in
Congress.12 However, laws prescribing qualifications for and
disqualifications from office are liberally construed in favor of
eligibility since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable
one.13 We cannot overemphasize the principle that where a
candidate has received popular mandate, all possible doubts
should be resolved in favor of the candidate’s eligibility, for to
rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people.14
In stark contrast to the foregoing, the COMELEC allowed and
confirmed the disqualification of Amora although the latter
won, and was forthwith proclaimed, as Mayor of Candijay,
Bohol.
Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandria’s
petition is the fact that Amora claims to personally know the
notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom his COC was sworn.
In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue:
With all due respect to the well-written Ponencia, I respectfully
voice my dissent. The primary issue herein is whether it is
proper to disqualify a candidate who, in executing his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC), merely presented to the Notary
Public his Community Tax Certificate.
The majority opinion strictly construed the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice (the "2004 Notarial Rules") when it provided
that valid and competent evidence of identification must be
presented to render Sergio G. Amora, Jr.’s [petitioner’s] COC
valid. The very wording of the 2004 Notarial Rules supports
my view that the instant motion for reconsideration ought to
be granted, to wit:
Section 2. Affirmation or Oath . – The term "Affirmation" or
"Oath" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of
the contents of the instrument or document.
As quoted supra, competent evidence of identity is not
required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the
Notary Public, which is the case herein. The records reveal that
[petitioner] submitted to this Commission a sworn affidavit
executed by Notary Public Oriculo A. Granada (Granada), who
notarized [petitioner’s] COC, affirming in his affidavit that he
personally knows [petitioner].
[Respondent], on the other hand, presented no evidence to
counter Granada’s declarations. Hence, Granada[’s] affidavit,
which narrates in detail his personal relation with [petitioner],
should be deemed sufficient.
The purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters.1âwphi1 The people of Candijay,
Bohol has already exercised their right to suffrage on May 10,
2010 where [petitioner] was one of the candidates for
municipal mayor. To disqualify [petitioner] at this late stage
simply due to an overly strict reading of the 2004 Notarial
Rules will effectively deprive the people who voted for him
their rights to vote.
The Supreme Court’s declaration in Petronila S. Rulloda v.
COMELEC et al. must not be taken lightly:
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should
not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the
electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to
the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice
of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only
the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but
also the correct ascertainment of the results.15
Our ruling herein does not do away with the formal
requirement that a COC be sworn. In fact, we emphasize that
the filing of a COC is mandatory and must comply with the
requirements set forth by law.16
Section 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice lists the act to
which an affirmation or oath refers:
Sec. 2. Affirmation or Oath. — The term "Affirmation" or "Oath"
refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of
the contents of the instrument or document.
- 19 -
In this case, however, contrary to the declarations of the
COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement of a sworn
COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally
knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the League of
Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other
as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not
proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out
to be sufficient in this instance. On the whole, the COMELEC
should not have brushed aside the affidavit of Atty. Granada
and remained inflexible in the face of Amora’s victory and
proclamation as Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 10-046 (DC) dated April
29, 2010 and May 17, 2010, respectively, are ANULLED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6655
PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint1 of Pacita
Caalim-Verzonilla seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying a public document
and evading the payment of correct taxes through the use of
falsified documents.
Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent
prepared and notarized two Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement
of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with Sale. The first
deed2 was for a consideration of ₱250,000 and appears to have
been executed and signed by Lope’s surviving spouse, Caridad
Tabarrejos, and her children (complainant, Virginia Caalim-
Inong and Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki and
Shirley Mipanga. The second deed3was for a consideration of
₱1,000,000 and appears to have been executed by and for the
benefit of the same parties as the first deed. The two deeds
have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book
numbers in the notarial portion.
Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the
heirs’ signatures were falsified. She contends that her sister
Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and was
confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center, Tuguegarao
City, at the time the deeds were allegedly signed by her, as
shown by a certification4from said hospital. The certification,
dated February 6, 2004 and signed by Dr. Alice Anghad,
Medical Officer IV, attested that Marivinia has been confined at
the Psychiatry Ward of the Cagayan Valley Medical Center
since May 3, 1999 after being diagnosed of "Substance Induced
Psychosis" and "Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type."
Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not
presented to any of them and they came to know of their
existence only recently. She further claims that the Community
Tax Certificates5 (CTCs) in her name and in the names of her

mother and her sister Marivinia were procured only by the
vendee Shirley and not by them. Complainant submits the
affidavit6 executed by Edwin Gawayon, Barangay Treasurer of
C-8, Claveria, Cagayan, on August 3, 2002, attesting that the
CTCs were procured at the instance of Shirley and were paid
without the complainant and her co-heirs personally appearing
before him. Gawayon stated that the signatures and
thumbmarks appearing on the CTCs are not genuine and
authentic because it can be seen with the naked eyes that the
signatures are similar in all three CTCs.
Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by
respondent and Shirley to annul a previously simulated deed of
sale7 dated June 20, 1979 purportedly executed by Lope in
favor of the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. Said deed was
likewise a complete nullity because at that time Shirley
Mipanga was only sixteen years old and still single.
In his comment,8 respondent admits having prepared and
notarized the two disputed Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement
of the Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies any
irregularity in their execution. He claims that the preparation
and notarization of the subject deeds were made under the
following circumstances:
In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad,
Virginia and Shirley Mipanga went to his house and requested
him to prepare a deed of sale of a residential lot located in
Claveria, Cagayan. He was informed by the parties that the
agreed purchase price is ₱1,000,000 and was presented the
certificate of title to the property. Upon finding that the
registered owner is "Lope Caalim, married to Caridad
Tabarrejos" and knowing that Lope already died sometime in
the 1980s, he asked for, and was given, the names and personal
circumstances of Lope’s surviving children. He asked where
Marivinia was, but Caridad told him that Marivinia remained
home as she was not feeling well. As Caridad assured him that
they will fetch Marivinia after the deed of conveyance is
prepared, he proceeded to ask the parties to present their
CTCs. Caridad and Pacita, however, told him that they have not
secured their CTCs while Virginia forgot to bring hers. So he
instructed them to get CTCs from Claveria.
An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of
Caridad, Virginia, complainant and Marivinia. After he finished
typing the deed and the details of the CTCs, Caridad said that
she will bring the deed with her to Claveria for her daughters
to sign. He then told them that it was necessary for him to meet
them all in one place for them to acknowledge the deed before
him as notary public. It was agreed upon that they will all meet
at the house of the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00
noon on that same day.
Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before
12:00 noon. There he saw Shirley, Caridad, complainant, Pacita
and Marivinia with two other persons whom he later learned
were the instrumental witnesses to the execution of the
document. Upon being informed that the parties have already
affixed their signatures on the deed, he examined the
document then inquired from the heirs if the signatures
appearing therein were theirs and if they were truly selling the
property for ₱1,000,000. The heirs answered in the affirmative,
thereby ratifying and acknowledging the instrument and its
contents as their own free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, he
- 20 -
notarized the document and then gave the original and two
carbon copies to Shirley while leaving two in his possession.
Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps
were needed to effect registration of the deed and transfer of
the title in her and her husband’s name. He replied that all the
unpaid land taxes should be paid including the capital gains
tax, documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) which will then issue the necessary
clearance for registration. When asked how much taxes are
payable, he replied that it depends on the assessment of the
BIR examiner which will be based on the zonal value or selling
price stated in the deed of sale. He added that the estate taxes
due, with interests and surcharges, would also have to be paid.
Since the consideration for the sale is ₱1,000,000, the taxes
payable was quite enormous. Shirley asked him who between
the vendor and the vendee should pay the taxes, and he replied
that under the law, it is the obligation of the vendors to pay
said taxes but it still depends upon the agreement of the
parties. He asked if there was already an agreement on the
matter, but the parties replied in the negative.
Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the
payment of taxes. Caridad and her co-vendors, however,
refused and said that a big portion of the ₱1,000,000 paid to
them was already used by them to pay and settle their other
obligations. Shirley then offered to pay one-half of whatever
amount the BIR will assess, but Caridad insisted that another
document be prepared stating a reduced selling price of only
₱250,000 so that they need not contribute to the payment of
taxes since Shirley was anyway already willing to pay one-half
of the taxes based on the selling price stated in the first deed.
This resulted in a heated discussion between the parties, which
was, however, later resolved by an agreement to execute a
second deed. The prospect of preparing an additional deed,
however, irritated respondent as it meant additional work for
him. Thus, respondent went home.
Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded
with him to prepare the second deed with the reduced selling
price. Moved by his humane and compassionate disposition,
respondent gave in to the parties’ plea.
In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the
instrumental witnesses, respondent prepared and notarized
the second deed providing for the lower consideration of only
₱250,000. He used the same document number, page number
and book number in the notarial portion as the first deed
because according to him, the second deed was intended by the
parties to supplant the first.
Respondent denies complainant’s assertions that the two
deeds are simulated and falsified, averring that as stated above,
all the parties acknowledged the same before him. Likewise, he
and his clients, the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga,
presented the subject deeds as exhibits in Civil Case No. 2761-S
also pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,
of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as
she was allegedly under confinement at the Cagayan Valley
Medical Center on September 15, 2001, respondent cites a
medical certificate9stating that Marivinia was confined in said
hospital from May 3, 1999 to August 10, 1999. He also points
out that Marivinia is one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2836-

S pending before the RTC, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan,
for the annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the
complaint states that she is mentally or physically
incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs would have asked
the appointment of a guardian for her.
By Resolution10 dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation11 dated May 3, 2007,
Commissioner Jose Roderick F. Fernando found respondent
administratively liable on account of his indispensable
participation in an act designed to defraud the government. He
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for three months and that his notarial commission, if
still existing, be revoked and that respondent be prohibited
from being commissioned as a notary public for two years.
According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not
offer any tenable defense to justify his actions. As a notary, it
was his responsibility to ensure that the solemnities of the act
of notarization were followed. As a lawyer, it was likewise
incumbent upon him that the document he drafted and
subsequently notarized was neither unlawful nor fraudulent.
Commissioner Fernando ruled that respondent failed on both
counts since he drafted a document that reflected an untruthful
consideration that served to reduce unlawfully the tax due to
the government. Then he completed the act by likewise
notarizing and thus converting the document into a public
document.
On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved Commissioner Fernando’s report and
recommendation but imposed a higher penalty on respondent.
Its Resolution No. XVII-2007-285 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A;" and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent’s violation of Notarial Law and for his
participation to a transaction that effectively defrauded the
government, Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years and SUSPENSION of
his Notarial Commission for two (2) years with Warning that a
similar violation in the future will be dealt with severely.12
The above resolution is well taken.
By respondent’s own account of the circumstances
surrounding the execution and notarization of the subject
deeds of sale, there is a clear basis for disciplining him as a
member of the bar and as notary public.
Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject
deeds. He avers that the true consideration for the transaction
is ₱1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the parties when
they appeared before him for the preparation of the first
document as well as the notarization thereof. He then claimed
to have been "moved by his humane and compassionate
disposition" when he acceded to the parties’ plea that he
- 21 -
prepare and notarize the second deed with a lower
consideration of ₱250,000 in order to reduce the
corresponding tax liability. However, as noted by
Commissioner Fernando, the two deeds were used by
respondent and his client as evidence in a judicial proceeding
(Civil Case No. 2671-S), which only meant that both documents
still subsist and hence contrary to respondent’s contention that
the second deed reflecting a lower consideration was intended
to supersede the first deed.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the
documents annexed to the present complaint are insufficient
for us to conclude that the subject deeds were indeed falsified
and absolutely simulated. We have previously ruled that a deed
of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the true
consideration is nonetheless binding between the parties and
their successors in interest.13 Complainant, however, firmly
maintains that she and her co-heirs had no participation
whatsoever in the execution of the subject deeds. In any event,
the issues of forgery, simulation and fraud raised by the
complainant in this proceeding apparently are still to be
resolved in the pending suit filed by the complainant and her
co-heirs for annulment of the said documents (Civil Case No.
2836-S).
With his admission that he drafted and notarized another
instrument that did not state the true consideration of the sale
so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the
transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an
untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful
purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower
than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent
abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the
correct taxes due. His act clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Xxxx
Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an
activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack
of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath
in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and
fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon
its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its
nature and purpose.
In Gonzales v. Ramos,14 we elucidated on how important and
sacrosanct the notarial act is:
By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent
converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document
into a public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The
principal function of a notary public is to authenticate
documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution
and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives
the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the

purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a
notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should
surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of
their execution and delivery. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgement executed before a notary
public and appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary
public must discharge his powers and duties, which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.15
Moreover, while respondent’s duty as a notary public is
principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the
voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent
upon him to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement
or at least refrain from being a party to its
consummation.16Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from
performing any notarial act for transactions similar to the
herein document of sale, to wit:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. – A notary public shall not perform
any notarial act described in these Rules for any person
requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee
specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the
notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;
xxxx
In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed
despite knowledge of its illegal purpose. His purported desire
to accommodate the request of his client will not absolve
respondent who, as a member of the legal profession, should
have stood his ground and not yielded to the importunings of
his clients. Respondent should have been more prudent and
remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to commit falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any.17 As a lawyer, respondent is
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the integrity of the legal profession.18
Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of
the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice when he gavethe second
document the same document number, page number and book
number as the first:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. – x x x
xxxx
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or
document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also
state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register
on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left
between entries.
Xxxx
- 22 -
Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same
document number, page number and book number as in the
first deed, reasoning that the second deed was intended to
supplant and cancel the first deed. He therefore knowingly
violated the above rule, in furtherance of his client’s intention
of concealing the actual purchase price so as to avoid paying
the taxes rightly due to the Government.
Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to
reflect the true agreement of the parties and hence
superseding the first deed they had executed, respondent
remains liable under the afore-cited Section 2(e) which
requires that each instrument or document, executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before the notary public shall be given a
number corresponding to the one in his register. Said rule is
not concerned with the validity or efficacy of the document or
instrument recorded but merely to ensure the accuracy and
integrity of the entries in the notarial register.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.19 Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds _herefore. – A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Xxxx
In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document
despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories was
meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission
and disqualification from re-appointment for two years. The
notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice
of law for one year. Said penalty was in accord with the cases
of Bon v. Ziga,20Serzo v. Flores,21Zaballero v. Montalvan22 and
Tabas v. Mangibin.23 The Court found that by notarizing the
questioned deed, the respondent in Gonzales engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.24
In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be
meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of his notarial
commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. In line withcurrent jurisprudence, and as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the revocation of
his notarial commission and disqualification from re-
appointment as notary public for two years is in order.
With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of
law, we hold that the one-year suspension imposed in Gonzales
and the other cases is not applicable considering that
respondent not only failed to faithfully comply with the rules
on notarial practice, he also violated his oath when he
prepared and notarized the second deed for the purpose of
avoiding the payment of correct amount of taxes, thus abetting

an activity aimed at defiance of the law. Under these
circumstances, we find the two-year suspension recommended
by the IBP Board of Governors as proper and commensurate to
the infraction committed by respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years. In addition, his present notarial commission, if
any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.
He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the
land through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4545 February 5, 2014
CARLITO ANG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 139-B, Section
12(c) of the Rules of Court assailing Resolution Nos. XVII-2005-
1411 and XVIII-2008-6982 of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board of
Governors found respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana
administratively liable and imposed on him the penalty of
suspension for one year from the practice of law and the
revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification
from reappointment as notary public for two years.
The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint3 filed by
complainant Carlito Ang against respondent. Ang alleged that
on May 31, 1991, he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria
Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo,
executed an Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and
Partition4 involving Lot No. 2066-B-2-B which had an area of
6,258 square meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. (T-22409)-6433. He was given his share of
2,003 square meters designated as Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4,
together with all the improvements thereon.5 However, when
he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out that said TCT
No. (T-22409)-6433 had already been cancelled and in lieu
thereof, new TCTs6 had been issued in the names of William
Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D.
Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent had a direct participation in the commission of
forgeries and falsifications because he was the one who
prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss7 and Deed of
Absolute Sale8 that led to the transfer and issuance of the new
TCTs. Ang pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which
was allegedly executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17,
- 23 -
1989, was antedated and Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was
forged as clearly shown by the Certification9 issued by the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu. Further, the certified true copy of page 37, Book No. XII,
Series of 1989 of respondent’s Notarial Report indubitably
showed that Doc. No. 181 did not refer to the Deed of Absolute
Sale, but to an affidavit.10 As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was
allegedly executed by the late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29,
1994, it could not have been executed by her as she
Died11 three years prior to the execution of the said affidavit of
loss.
Ang further alleged that on September 22, 1995, respondent
made himself the attorney-in-fact of William Magpayo, Antonio
Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita Canque, Gregorio
Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero, and pursuant to the Special
Power of Attorney in his favor, executed a Deed of Sale 12 selling
Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4 to Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. on October
10, 1995. Ang complained that the sale was made even though
a civil case involving the said parcel of land was pending before
the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.13
In his Comment,14 respondent denied any wrongdoing and
argued that Ang is merely using the present administrative
complaint as a tool to force the defendants in a pending civil
case and their counsel, herein respondent, to accede to his
wishes. Respondent averred that Ang had filed Civil Case No.
Man-2202 before Branch 55 of the Mandaue City RTC. He
anchored his claim on the Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs
and Partition and sought to annul the deed of sale and prayed
for reconveyance of the subject parcel of land. During the pre-
trial conference in Civil Case No. Man-2202, Ang admitted that
he is not an heir of the late Candelaria Magpayo but insisted on
his claim for a share of the lot because he is allegedly the son of
the late Isaias Ang, the common-law husband of Candelaria
Magpayo. Because of his admission, the notice of lis pendens
annotated in the four certificates of title of the land in question
were ordered cancelled and the land effectively became
available for disposition. Ang sought reconsideration of the
order, but a compromise was reached that only one TCT (TCT
No. 34266) will be annotated with a notice of lis pendens.
Respondent surmised that these developments in Civil Case
No. Man-2202 meant that Ang would lose his case so Ang
resorted to the filing of the present administrative complaint.
Thus, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case for being
devoid of any factual or legal basis, or in the alternative,
holding resolution of the instant case in abeyance pending
resolution of Civil Case No. Man-2202 allegedly because the
issues in the present administrative case are similar to the
issues or subject matters involved in said civil case.
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, to whom the case was referred
for investigation, report and recommendation, submitted her
Report and Recommendation15 finding respondent
administratively liable. She recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held
that respondent committed an unethical act when he allowed
himself to be an instrument in the disposal of the subject
property through a deed of sale executed between him as
attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So Mercantile Co.
despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a
pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. The
Investigating Commissioner additionally found that
respondent "delegated the notarial functions to the clerical
staff of their office before being brought to him for his

signature." This, according to the commissioner, "must have
been the reason for the forged signatures of the parties in the
questioned document…as well as the erroneous entry in his
notarial register…."16 Nonetheless, the Investigating
Commissioner merely reminded respondent to be more
cautious in the performance of his duties as regards his
infraction of his notarial duties. She held, Respondent should
have been more cautious in his duty as notary public which
requires that the party subscribing to the authenticity of the
document should personally appear and sign the same before
respondent’s actual presence. As such notary public
respondent should not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed
by a member of the bar in accordance with Rule 9.0117 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.18
On November 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-141,19 adopting the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner but modifying the
recommended penalty. Instead of suspension for three months,
the Board recommended the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one year and revocation of respondent’s
notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment
as notary public for two years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,20 arguing that it
was neither illegal nor unethical for a lawyer to accept
appointment as attorney-in-fact of a client to sell a property
involved in a pending litigation and to act as such. He further
contended that granting that his act was unethical, the
modified penalty was evidently too harsh and extremely
excessive considering that the act complained of was not
unlawful and done without malice.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-69821 denying respondent’s motion
for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2005-
141. Hence, this petition for review.
Respondent reiterates that being commissioned by his own
clients to sell a portion of a parcel of land, part of which is
involved in litigation, is not per se illegal or unethical.
According to him, his clients got his help to sell part of the land
and because they were residing in different provinces, they
executed a Special Power of Attorney in his favor.22
We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding
respondent administratively liable.
After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that
respondent did not act unethically when he sold the property
in dispute as the sellers’ attorney-in-fact because there was no
more notice of lis pendens annotated on the particular lot sold.
Likewise, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to show that
the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Candelaria Magpayo on
April 17, 1989 was antedated.
However, the Court finds respondent administratively liable
for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the
personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized
the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on
April 29, 1994. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise
known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:
- 24 -
Sec. 1. x x x
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public
or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking
the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging
must appear before the notary public or any other person
authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents.23 In the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss
stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before
respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria,
however, was already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is
clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law.
Indeed, respondent averred in his position paper before the
IBP that he did not in fact know Candelaria personally before,
during and after the notarization24 thus admitting that
Candelaria was not present when he notarized the documents.
Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document
is not an empty act or routine.25 Thus, in Bernardo v. Atty.
Ramos,26 the Court emphasized the significance of the act of
notarization, to wit:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into
a public document thus making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a
notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who xecuted and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party’s free act and deed.
A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a
notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.27 It
devolves upon respondent to act with due care and diligence in
stamping fiat on the questioned documents. Respondent’s
failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading
the function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable for his
infraction, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is
mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his
office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed
with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of
the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat
is sacrosanct.1âwphi1Simply put, such responsibility is
incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now
accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion.28 As the Court has held in Flores v. Chua,29
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is
placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey
the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him
not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member
of the Bar in good standing." Respondent averred in his
position paper that it had been his consistent practice to
course through clerical staff documents to be notarized. Upon
referral, said clerical staff investigates whether the documents
are complete as to the fundamental requirements and inquires
as to the identity of the individual signatories thereto. If
everything is in order, they ask the parties to sign the
documents and forward them to him and he again inquires
about the identities of the parties before affixing his notarial
signature.30 It is also his clerical staff who records entries in his
notarial report. As aforesaid, respondent is mandated to
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties as a notary and to ascertain that the
persons who signed the documents are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein. In merely
relying on his clerical staff to determine the completeness of
documents brought to him for notarization, limiting his
participation in the notarization process to simply inquiring
about the identities of the persons appearing before him, and
in notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead person,
respondent is liable for misconduct. Under the facts and
circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial
commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years and suspension from
the practice of law for one year are in order.31
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana is found
administratively liable for misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year. Further, his notarial
commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is disqualified from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years, with
a stem warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be
attached to the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6258 August 24, 2010
- 25 -
LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For consideration is the disbarment complaint filed by
Luzviminda R. Lustestica (complainant) against Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe (respondent) for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed
of Donation of real property despite the non-appearance of the
donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica (complainant’s father) and his
first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead
at the time of execution of the said document.
In his Answer,1 the respondent admitted the fact of death of
Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero, considering
their death certificates attached to the complaint. The
respondent claimed, however, that he had no knowledge that
the real Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero were
already dead at the time he notarized the Deed of
Donation.2 He also claimed that he exerted efforts to ascertain
the identities of the persons who appeared before him and
represented themselves as the donors under the Deed of
Donation.3
After the submission of the respondent’s Answer to the
complaint, the Court referred the matter to the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline) for investigation, evaluation
and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
made the following findings:
The core issue is whether or not Respondent committed a
falsehood in violation of his oath as a lawyer and his duties as
Notary Public when he notarized the Deed of Donation
purportedly executed by Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia
P. Rivero as the donors and Cecilio R. Lustestica and Juliana
Lustestica as the donees on 5 August 1994.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2013, otherwise known as the
Notarial Law, explicitly provides:
x x x The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it acknowledged that the same is
his free act and deed. x x x.
As correctly observed by Complainant, Respondent’s
Acknowledgment is the best evidence that NO RESIDENCE
CERTIFICATES were presented by the alleged donors and the
donees. Had the parties presented their residence certificates
to Respondent, it was his duty and responsibility under the
Notarial Law to enter, as part of his certification, the number,
place of issue and date of each residence certificate presented
by the parties to the Deed of Donation. Respondent, however,
failed to make the required entries. Respondent’s claim that
the persons who allegedly appeared before him and
represented themselves to be the parties to the Deed of
Donation showed their residence certificates and that he
instructed his secretary to indicate the details of the residence

certificates of the parties is self-serving and not supported by
the evidence on record.
xxxx
The fact that Respondent notarized a forged/falsified
document is also undisputed not only by [the] strength of
Complainant’s documentary evidence but more importantly,
by Respondent’s own judicial admission. x x x. In view of
Respondent’s judicial admission that the alleged donors,
BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA and his first wife, CORNELIA P.
RIVERO, died on 7 September 1987 and 24 September 1984,
respectively, it is beyond reasonable doubt that said donors
could not have personally appeared before him on 5 August
1994 to [acknowledge] to him that they freely and voluntary
executed the Deed of Donation. Moreover, x x x quasi-judicial
notice of the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court finding
accused CECILIO LUSTESTICA and JULIANA LUSTESTICA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principals of the
crime of falsification of public document.4
In his Report dated August 15, 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland
R. Villadolid, Jr. found the respondent grossly negligent in the
performance of his duties as notary public and recommended
that the respondent’s notarial commission be suspended for a
period of one (1) year. The IBP Commissioner also
recommended that a penalty ranging from reprimand to
suspension be imposed against the respondent, with a warning
that a similar conduct in the future will warrant an imposition
of a more severe penalty.5
By Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 dated October 22, 2005, the
Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
adopted and approved the Report of the IBP Commissioner.
The pertinent portion of this Resolution reads:
[C]onsidering Respondent’s gross negligence in the
performance of his duties as Notary Public, Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year and Respondent’s notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years with a notification that this suspension of one year must
be served in succession to the initial recommendation of the
IBP Board of Suspension of one year in CBD Case No. 04-1371.6
From these undisputed facts, supervening events occurred that
must be taken into consideration of the present case.
First, CBD Case No. 04-1371, entitled Victorina Bautista,
complainant, v. Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, respondent, which was
the case referred to in Resolution No. XVII-2005-116, was
docketed as A.C. No. 69637 before the Court. In a decision dated
February 9, 2006, the Court revoked the respondent’s notarial
commission and disqualified him from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, for his failure to
properly perform his duties as notary public when he
notarized a document in the absence of one of the affiants. In
addition, the Court suspended him from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Second, on January 6, 2006, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 before the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The respondent moved to
- 26 -
reconsider the IBP Resolution, claiming that the penalty
imposed for the infraction committed was too harsh. The
motion was denied in Resolution No. XVII-2006-81, dated
January 28, 2006,8 for lack of jurisdiction of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, since the administrative matter
had then been endorsed to the Court.
Third, on January 4, 2006, a motion for reconsideration (the
same as the one filed with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline) was filed by the respondent before the Court. In a
Minute Resolution dated March 22, 2006, the Court noted the
findings and recommendations in Resolution No. XVII-2005-
116 and required the complainant to file her Comment to the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration. On April 28, 2006,
the complainant filed her Comment praying for the denial of
the motion.
On July 5, 2006, the Court issued a Minute Resolution noting
the denial of the respondent’s motion for reconsideration, by
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, and the complainant’s
Comment to the respondent’s motion before the Court.
Subsequently, on January 26, 2009, the Court declared the case
closed and terminated after considering that no motion for
reconsideration or petition for review, assailing both IBP
resolutions, had been filed by the respondent.9
On October 8, 2009, the respondent, through a letter addressed
to the Office of the Bar Confidant, requested that he be given
clearance to resume the practice of law and to allow him to be
commissioned as a notary public. In his letter, the respondent
alleged that he has already served the penalties imposed
against him in A.C. No. 6963 and the present case. He claimed
that after the receipt of the IBP Resolutions in both cases, he
did not practice his profession and had not been appointed or
commissioned as a notary public.
The Office of the Bar Confidant
Acting on the respondent’s letter, the Office of the Bar
Confidant submitted a Report and Recommendation, which
states:
1. The EFFECTIVITY of the respondent’s suspension
and disqualification should have been COMMENCED
on the date of receipt of the Decision of the Court and
not from the date of receipt of the Resolution of the
IBP recommending the respondent’s suspension from
the practice of law and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public, it being
recommendatory in nature;
2. The prayer of the respondent to resume his
practice of law in Adm. Case No. 6963 be denied;
3. The respondent be REQUIRED to submit
certification from competent courts and IBP that he
has fully served the entire period of suspension and
disqualification in Adm. Case No. 6963;
4. The Court may now FINALLY RESOLVE the findings
and recommendation of the IBP in its Resolution No.
XVII-2005-16, dated October 2005, in Adm. Case No.
6258, for final disposition of the case and for proper

determination whether the order of suspension and
disqualification in Adm. Case No. 6963 should be
lifted after the respondent has satisfactorily shown
that he has fully served the suspension and
disqualification.10
The Court’s Ruling
The findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline are well-taken. We cannot overemphasize the
important role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v.
Ramos,11 we stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive
public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document, making it admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.12 A
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face.13 It is for this reason that a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in
the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.14
The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited
by the respondent in discharging his duties as a notary public.
He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him
and failed to comply with the most basic function that a notary
public must do, i.e., to require the parties’ presentation of their
residence certificates or any other document to prove their
identities. Given the respondent’s admission in his pleading
that the donors were already dead when he notarized the Deed
of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to
ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before
him as donors in the Deed of Donation.
Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should
be made liable not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103),
but also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law)15 states:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public
or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking
the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
In turn, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes." At the same time, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this regard, a reading of the respondent’s Acknowledgment
in the Deed of Donation shows how these provisions were
violated by the respondent:
- 27 -
BEFORE ME, Notary Public for and in Bulacan
this AUG 05 1994 day of August, 1994, personally
appeared:
BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA: C.T.C. #
_______:________:________
CORNELIA RIVERO : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
CECILIO LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
JULIANA LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who
executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me
that the same are their free act and voluntary deed.16
The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct because he
falsely represented in his Acknowledgment that the persons
who appeared before him were "known to him" to be the same
persons who executed the Deed of Donation, despite the fact
that he did not know them and did not ascertain their
identities as he attested.17
Moreover, the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct when
he did not observe the requirements under Section 1 of the Old
Notarial Law that requires notaries public to certify that the
party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented,
before the notaries public, the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter the
residence certificate’s number, place, and date of issue as part
of the certification.18The unfilled spaces in the
Acknowledgment where the residence certificate numbers
should have been clearly established that the respondent did
not perform this legal duty.
With these considerations, we find that the imposition of
administrative sanctions for the above infractions committed is
in order.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the
penalty of suspension, for a period of one (1) year, from the
practice of law and disqualification from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two (2) years. Considering that
this is already Atty. Bernabe’s second infraction, we find the
IBP’s recommendation to be very light; it is not commensurate
with his demonstrated predisposition to undertake the duties
of a notary public and a lawyer lightly.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting,19 we disbarred a lawyer for failing to
subscribe to the sacred duties imposed upon a notary public. In
imposing the penalty of disbarment, the Court considered the
lawyer’s prior misconduct where he was suspended for a
period of six (6) months and warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.20
In Flores v. Chua,21 we disbarred the lawyer after finding that
he deliberately made false representations that the vendor
appeared before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale.
We took into account that he was previously found
administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (for bribing a judge) and sternly
warned that a repetition of similar act or acts or violation
 - 28 -

committed by him in the future would be dealt with more
severely.22
In Traya v. Villamor,23 we found the respondent notary public
guilty of gross misconduct in his notarial practice for failing to
observe the proper procedure in determining that the person
appearing before him is the same person who executed the
document presented for notarization. Taking into account that
it was his second offense, he was perpetually disqualified from
being commissioned as a notary public.24
In Social Security Commission v. Coral,25 we suspended
indefinitely the notarial commission of the respondent lawyer
who was found to have prepared, notarized and filed two
complaints that were allegedly executed and verified by people
who have long been dead. We also directed him to show cause
why he should not be disbarred.26
duties as notary public, and for his deceitful and
dishonest attestation, in the course of administering
the oath taken before him. Respondent Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. He is also PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public.
(4) DENY the request for clearance to practice law
and to apply for notarial commission of respondent
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe’s record, as a member of the bar, and copies furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

Considering these established rulings, read in light of the In view of the notarization of a falsified deed whose purported
circumstances in the present case, we find that Atty. Bernabe parties were already dead at the time of notarization, let a copy
should be disbarred from the practice of law and perpetually of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Prosecutor
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public. We General, Department of Justice for whatever action, within its
emphasize that this is respondent’s second offense and while jurisdiction, it may deem appropriate to bring against Atty.
he does not appear to have any participation in the falsification Sergio E. Bernabe.
of the Deed of Donation, his contribution was his gross
negligence for failing to ascertain the identity of the persons SO ORDERED.
who appeared before him as the donors. This is highlighted by
his admission27 in his Answer that he did not personally know
the parties and was not acquainted with them. The blank
spaces in the Acknowledgment indicate that he did not even
require these parties to produce documents that would prove
that they are the same persons they claim to be. As we
emphasized in Maligsa:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of

the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard
of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A
lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should
refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree
the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession.28

In light of the above findings and penalties, the respondent’s

request to be given clearance to resume the practice of law and
to apply for a notarial commission, after serving the
administrative sanctions in A.C. No. 6963, is now moot and
academic. We, accordingly, deny the request for clearance to
practice law and to apply for notarial commission.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) NOTE the letter dated October 8, 2009 of

respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe to the Office of the
Bar Confidant.

(2) ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline with
MODIFICATION on the administrative penalty
imposed.

(3) DECLARE respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe

liable for gross negligence, in the performance of his