FIRST SET OF CASES Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the
Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987
Petitioner, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent.
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is
that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not
titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-
called Third World. And it has many consequences.
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's
in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people
and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none
of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of
informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by
the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their
own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of
which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own
informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru,
and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going
to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The
only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that
there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin
American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in
possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine
government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was
accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to
the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under
Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In
doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the
The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the
problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately
been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in
by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the
duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with
the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our
public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from
casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-
452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he
had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC)
Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite,
Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from
presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his
witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified
that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being
Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death
of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was
sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-
examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew]
the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr.
any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the
subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable
land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of
legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation
of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8]
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The
appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the
CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the
computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
Appeals;[10] hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in
Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited
by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of
the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite
notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine,
especially when the property in question is agricultural land.
Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to
the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be
counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under
the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11
November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court
formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should
the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945
or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the
filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective
positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of
the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The
seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted,
should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration
proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit
and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by
the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG
remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have
been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart
from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.
Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well
as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land
of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the
land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of
Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land
sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land
of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the
property had already been converted into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively
from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2)
are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the
Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers
to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented
Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the
30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of
prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that,
assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public
lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land
was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the
particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and
the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to
the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has,
since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to
time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain are further classified according to their
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for
similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of
the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites
stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in
1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term
agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted
the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23] This is not actually
the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands
are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from
possession for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in
Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26,
1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at
least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged
the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is
virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the
registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is
Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the
public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and
the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may
have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or
that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed
or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section
14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of
the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of
the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-
existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the
first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has
primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court
for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted
Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both
provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily
establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been
in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section
14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive
right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well
provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b).
Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one
may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The
provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act
No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within
which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this
period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed
twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of
time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-
Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as
prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any
time prior to the period fixed by the President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right
granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31
December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the
OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest
be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must
have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs
approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June
1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as
amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in
Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of
Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies
its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945
would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation
renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize
the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in
Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of
the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover
lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June
1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a
bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their
imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory
passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration
proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the
requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to
explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein
concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the
Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession
prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession That statement, in
the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the
passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as
obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section
14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish
any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby
precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent
from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement
to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that
they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura
has any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other
hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it
precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in
exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12
June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was
decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between
Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section
14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v.
Court of Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration
had been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable.
The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between
the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v.
Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession that extended back
to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and
disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively
from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated
November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that
the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable
(sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-
I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the
real character of the land subject of private respondents application.
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the
absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth
noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to
contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property
still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the
lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession
of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant
to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of
private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their
application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were
able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule,
we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although
there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of
them.[29]
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of
public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35)
years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that
in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years
after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in
Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was
declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference
which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to
Section 14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning
Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an
obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further
discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such conversion,
such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who
have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this
case where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on
that provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their
claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we
can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as
the possible basis for application for original registration under
Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal
foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain
are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that
are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and
mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of
timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real
property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10)
years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith,[34] as well as just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly
provides that persons who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, it
unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the
registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical
question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does
encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property
of the State, which a private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated
jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable public
land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[36]
Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period, additional
complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates
would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty
(30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which
amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to
seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession
in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073,
which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first
time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977
could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by
implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil
Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that
there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary
acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted
adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act
No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal
basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under
the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a
material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated
under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No.
1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions
on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession
period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title,
without any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such,
throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor
jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such
a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with respect to the
present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as
the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession
period as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, which entitled those who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year
period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts
into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a
fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles
on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to
apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil
Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar
demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus:
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription. The identification
what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and
421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes
property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription
or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.[39] Lands of the
public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration
by the President or any duly authorized government officer of
alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under
the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial
property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable
lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113
provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of
public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is
this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable
or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is
intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that
the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service
or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus
affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and
disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants
claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the
Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands
owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable,
remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the
Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with
their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is
the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an
actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating
The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses,
etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law
authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions of
military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor
Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the
law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the
Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)[40] which in turn is
authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The President is
authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in
part.[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military
lands subject thereof are alienable and disposable pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of
government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military
lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands
did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes
the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds
for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and
Subic.[44] Such purpose can be tied to either public service or the
development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that
time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article
420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is
upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person
or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are
declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated
proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into
patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of
the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that
the period of possession before the public domain land becomes
patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the
prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it
becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to
the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2)
falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code,
there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still
classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1)
and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1)
mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under
Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2)
is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the
Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year
period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article
1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-
year period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns
a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No.
1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to
the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription
under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil
Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the
vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous
statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the
Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to
adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts
subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to
interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil
Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is
seeing how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on
prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for
acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by private persons through prescription. This is
brought about by Article 1113, which states that [a]ll things which are
within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may
be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good
faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that
bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through
ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to
impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable
requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith
involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as
Article 1127 of the Civil Code,[45] provisions that more or less speak
for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification.
Under Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription
when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of
ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if the
grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by
prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dacion in payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily
precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to
patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that the
State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the
possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that
the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the
one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription
derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or
any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be
counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the
property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription
begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has
been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property
is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in
possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires
ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the
owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the
registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be
remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition
of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the
registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of
ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the
system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought
about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the
Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since
12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites
for alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under
the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such
registration.[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the
Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial
property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof
expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms
that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June
1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable
and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as
it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized
as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development
of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The
person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription
under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property
may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under
ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish
that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax
Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the
legal doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture
over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every
untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this
ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the
Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino
people if we simply levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or
not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural
acquiescence, and is common among the so-called Third World
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a
legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been
unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the
encumbrance or alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation
of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most
attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as
revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or
exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised
their families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands
of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation
by their families and their communities as common law owners. There
is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate
states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive
law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public
dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of
land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of
such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before
the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite
two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites
for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of
well-being not only of that individual, but also to the persons family.
Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on
stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the
long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October
2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for
the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang,
Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient
evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of
land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the
land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification
dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864
Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco
located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952
is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting
Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of
legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to
the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of
the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the
RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan.
Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared
that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any
period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-
DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes
of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA,
his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine
especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its
declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the
declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for
lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure
converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest
of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years.
According to them, what was essential was that the property had
been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time
of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari
because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence
possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part
of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the
mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be
deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State.
Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v.
Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that
the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to
acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith
that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real
owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article
1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan
filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had
already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned
from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and
disposable by the State.
The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit
and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision
has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates
its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land
subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to
discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing
applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either
of public dominion or of private ownership.11 Land is considered of
public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.12
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although
of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land
that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs
to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first
introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws
of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain
belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to
have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public
domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified
lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or
timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands
may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of
public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to
wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must
only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber,
mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive
act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25
and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing
laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form
of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be
used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner
by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of
Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands
of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral,
forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the
law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b)
to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such
limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the
following requirements in order for his application to come under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest,
has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June
12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land
of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested
with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to
apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies,
and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and
disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the
land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise
have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any
possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification
produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12,
1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that
the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning
point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be
left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified
the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent
appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land
subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the
property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In
fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of
the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to
private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the
requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It
is for this reason that the property subject of the application of
Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the
requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of
the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to
determine the point at which prescription may run against the State.
The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied
with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public
possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is
not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a
grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified
Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof
for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed,
we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress
enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize
stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable
public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands,
subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended
for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration
of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into
patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription
can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the
disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration
of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under
belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed; Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit: as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth.1âwphi1
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for
Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified
as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided
the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the SO ORDERED.
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become
private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as
no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are
considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private
ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof
that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to
the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non
in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the
State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence
to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
U.S. Supreme Court
Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Cariño v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands No. 72
Argued January 13, 1909
Decided February 23, 1909
212 U.S. 449
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Syllabus
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of
bringing Cases to this Court. The latter method is in the main confined
to equity cases, and the former is proper to bring up a judgment of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of the
Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of
land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No.
926 of 1903 of the Philippine Commission which provides for the
registration and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns
property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496
of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is
absolute, practically it is a question of strength and of varying degree,
and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon
theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far
it will recognize actual facts.
Page 212 U. S. 450
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring
the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of
July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are
to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually
owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to
comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the
Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying
safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends
those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying
land for many years, and against the government which seeks to
deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a
subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in
force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United
States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more
than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued
possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 212 U. S. 455
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration
for the registration of certain land. The application was granted by the
court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government of
the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those
governments having taken possession of the property for public and
military purposes. The Court of First Instance found the facts and
dismissed the application upon grounds of law. This judgment was
affirmed by the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case then was
brought here by writ of error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in
error is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For
more than fifty years before the Treaty of
Page 212 U. S. 456
Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and
his ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived
upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle,
according to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems,
having been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and
had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in
his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and
he had inherited or received the land from his father in accordance
with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from
the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-
1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in
force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information
that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to be
occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a purpose
that has been carried out by the Philippine government and the United
States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under
the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process,
however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.
Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point.
The government has spent some energy in maintaining that this case
should have been brought up by appeal, and not by writ of error. We
are of opinion, however, that the mode adopted was right. The
proceeding for registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but
it is different in principle. It is a proceeding in rem under a statute of
the type of the Torrens Act, such as was discussed in Tyler v. Court of
Registration, 175 Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to equity, and is an
assertion of legal title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either
pigeon hole. A writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to
this Court, an appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.
There is no reason for not applying the general rule to this case.
Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 134 U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162
U. S. 478; Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
Page 212 U. S. 457
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is
suggested that, even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it
registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of
1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its
operation. But that act deals with the acquisition of new titles by
homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfecting of titles begun
under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he now owns the
land, and is entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission's
Act No. 496, of 1902, which established a court for that purpose with
jurisdiction "throughout the Philippine Archipelago," § 2, and
authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons
claiming to own the legal estate in fee simple, as the applicant does.
He is entitled to registration if his claim of ownership can be
maintained.
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below
-- namely, whether the plaintiff owns the land. The position of the
government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had
title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit
private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the
Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required
registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the
plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not
always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of
Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine
government is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so
far correct that the Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land
at the date of the Treaty of Paris, to which the United States
succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the
plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees,
embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward
people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those
Page 212 U. S. 458
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also that, in
legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign
nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute
power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength,
and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon
the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and
how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor
General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never
was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish
Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials
would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to
which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and
which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever
may have been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow that,
in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land. The
argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles
throughout an important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for the
want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted
and had not the power to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the
white race in the United States. Whatever consideration may have
been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of
the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that,
however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was
different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1,
1902, c. 1369, § 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the property and rights acquired
there by the
Page 212 U. S. 459
United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof." It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by
the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is
also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same
statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to
all. It provides that
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny
to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
§ 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from § 12, it is
hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next
breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet,
or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never
had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by
native custom and by long association -- one of the profoundest
factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.
It is true that, by § 14, the government of the Philippines is
empowered to enact rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to
public lands where some, but not all, Spanish conditions had been
fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than sixteen
hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native or his
ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section perhaps might be
satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land
admitted to be public land, and had not continued for such a length of
time and under such circumstances as to give rise to the
understanding that the occupants were owners at that date. We
hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who
had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the
wilder tribes afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from the
provision that we have quoted as to the administration of the property
and rights acquired by the United States such land and property as
shall be designated by the President for military or other reservations,
Page 212 U. S. 460
as this land since has been. But there still remains the question what
property and rights the United States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no
further than the necessities of decision demand, every presumption is
and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back
as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the import of
the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle examination of
ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the attitude of Spanish law,
humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it
was assumed that the wild tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt
with as the power and inclination of the conqueror might dictate,
Congress has not yet sanctioned the same course as the proper one
"for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not
discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us
that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and
laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate
pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume
to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers,
or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary
conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, while it commands
viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of
grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcion. It is true that it
Page 212 U. S. 461
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the
origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and
discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed
nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15,
1754, cited in 3 Phil. 546:
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it
shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a
valid title by prescription."
It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all
events, the principle is admitted. As prescription, even against Crown
lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient
reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines
in regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for
the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual
theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a
grant by competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by
providing that, for all legal effects, those who have been in possession
for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty
years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So
that, when this decree went into effect, the applicant's father was
owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. But, it is said, the
object of this law was to require the adjustment or registration
proceedings that it described, and in that way to require everyone to
get a document of title or lose his land. That purpose may have been
entertained, but it does not appear clearly to have been applicable to
all. The regulations purport to have been made "for the adjustment of
royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals." (We follow the
translation in the government's brief.) It does not appear that this land
ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6, it is provided
that
"interested parties not included within the two preceding
Page 212 U. S. 462
articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty
years] may legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full
ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to
be conducted in the following manner."
This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already
to be owners by lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the case of
parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of which they are
unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year, and threatens
that the treasury "will reassert the ownership of the state over the
lands," and will sell at auction such part as it does not reserve. The
applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father ever was made. Finally, it
should be noted that the natural construction of the decree is
confirmed by the report of the council of state. That report puts
forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view of the condition of
almost all property in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by
general rules on the principle that the lapse of a fixed period legalizes
completely all possession, recommends in two articles twenty and
thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and then suggests that
interested parties not included in those articles may legalize their
possession and acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those
"who may prove" possession for the necessary time, and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but
certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief
the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had
read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or
better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
Page 212 U. S. 463
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited
titles that were capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880, for
which adjustment had not been sought, should not be construed as a
confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact,
the applicant never was disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the
Court of Land Registration for another recognition of the common law
prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown
land.
It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish
law present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a different
legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice
the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be
observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case, we are of opinion
that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what
he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and
belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
G.R. No. L-3793 February 19, 1908
CIRILO MAPA, petitioner-appelle, vs. THE INSULAR
GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellant.
WILLARD, J.:
This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner
sought to have registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares in
extent, situated in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district of
Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the petitioner and the Government has appealed. A motion for
a new trial was made and denied in the court below, but no exception
was taken to the order denying it, and we therefore can not review the
evidence.
The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54,
paragraph 6 which follows:
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have
been in the open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide
claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of
ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when
prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
The only question submitted to the court below or to this court by the
Attorney-General is the question whether the land in controversy is
agricultural land within the meaning of the section above quoted. The
findings of the court below upon that point are as follows:
From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is
lowland, and has been uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in
the possession of the petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the
same has been used during the said period, and up to the present, as
fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses declare that
the land is far from the sea, the town of Molo being between the sea
and the said land.
The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural
public lands" as defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is found not
only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and
it seems that the same construction must be given to the phrase
wherever it occurs in any part of that law. The claim of the Attorney-
General seems to be that no lands can be called agricultural lands
unless they are such by their nature. If the contention of the Attorney-
General is correct, and this land because of its nature is not
agricultural land, it is difficult to see how it could be disposed of or
what the Government could do with it if it should be decided that the
Government is the owner thereof. It could not allow the land to be
entered as a homestead, for Chapter I of Act No. 926 allows the entry
of homesteads only upon "agricultural public lands" in the Philippine
Islands, as defined by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not
sell it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Act No. 926
for section 10 only authorizes the sale of "unreserved nonmineral
agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands, as defined in the act
of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two." It could not lease
it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the said act, for
section 22 relating to leases limits them to "nonmineral public lands,
as defined by section eighteen and twenty of the act of Congress
approved July first, nineteen hundred and two." It may be noted in
passing that there is perhaps some typographical or other error in this
reference to sections 18 and 20, because neither one of these
sections mentions agricultural lands. The Government could not give
a free patent to this land to a native settler, in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter IV, for that relates only to "agricultural public
land, as defined by act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two." In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the
Government could do nothing with this land except to lay out a town
site thereon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V, for
section 36 relating to that matter, says nothing about agricultural land.
The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but what
definition has been given to that phrase by the act of Congress. An
examination of that act will show that the only sections thereof
wherein can be found anything which could be called a definition of
the phrase are sections 13 and 15. Those sections are as follows:
SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the
provisions of this act and except as herein provided, shall classify
according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall
immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but
such rules and regulations shall not go into effect of have the force of
law until they have received the approval of the President, and when
approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to
Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and
unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they
shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the
Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not
exceed sixteen hectares in extent.
SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized and empowered on such terms as it may prescribe, by
general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance
to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands
such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and
mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem
wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the
sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four
hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, that
the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at
once or in partial payments shall be conditioned upon actual and
continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises
sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the
purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the
title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights
and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the
estates of decedents.
It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express
definition of the phrase "agricultural land." In fact, in section 15 the
word "agricultural" does not occur.
There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question.
The first is to say that no definition of the phrase "agricultural land"
can be found in the act of Congress; the second, that there is a
definition of that phrase in the act and that it means land which in its
nature is agricultural; and, third, that there is a definition in the act and
that the phrase means all of the public lands acquired from Spain
except those which are mineral or timber lands. The court below
adopted this view, and held that the land, not being timber or mineral
land, came within the definition of agricultural land, and that therefore
Section 54 paragraph 6, Act No. 926 was applicable thereto.
1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no
definition in the act of the phrase "agricultural land." The Commission
in enacting Act No. 926 expressly declared that such a definition
could be found therein. The President approved this act and it might
be said that Congress, by failing to reject or amend it, tacitly approved
it. Moreover, if it should be said that there is no definition in the act of
Congress of the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how any
effect could be given to the provisions of Act No. 916, to which we
have referred. If the phrase is not defined in the act of Congress, then
the lands upon which homesteads can be granted can not be
determined. Nor can it be known what land the Government has the
right to sell in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, nor what
lands it can lease in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III, nor
the lands for which it can give free patents to native settlers in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, and it would seem to
follow, necessarily, that none of those chapters could be put into force
and that all that had up to this time been done by virtue thereof would
be void.
2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying
that Congress has defined agricultural lands as those lands which
are, as the Attorney-General says, by their nature agricultural. As has
been said before, the word "agricultural" does not occur in section 15.
Section 13 says that the Government "shall classify according to its
agricultural character and productiveness and shall immediately make
rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the
public lands other than timber or mineral land." This is the same thing
as saying that the Government shall classify the public lands other
than timber or mineral lands according to its agricultural character and
productiveness; in other words, that it shall classify all the public lands
acquired from Spain, and that this classification shall be made
according to the agricultural character of the land and according to its
productiveness.
One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and indefinite
that it would be very difficult to apply it in practice. What lands are
agricultural in nature? The Attorney-General himself in his brief in this
case says:
The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible of
cultivation by the hand of man. The land in question in this case,
which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and any kind of crops
raised thereon. Mineral and timber lands are expressly excluded, but
it would be difficult to say that any other particular tract of land was
not agricultural in nature. Such lands may be found within the limits of
any city. There is within the city of Manila, and within a thickly
inhabited part thereof an experimental far. This land is in its nature
agricultural. Adjoining the Luneta, in the same city, is a large tract of
land, Camp Wallace, devoted to sports. The land surrounding the city
walls of Manila, between them and the Malecon Drive on the west, the
Luneta on the south, and Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east, is
of many hectares in extent and is in nature agricultural. The Luneta
itself could at any time be devoted to the growing of crops.
The objection to adopting this construction on account of its
uncertainty is emphasized when we consider that whether certain
land was or was not agricultural land, as defined by the act of
Congress, and therefore subject to homestead entry, to sale, or to
lease in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 926, would be a
question that would finally have to be determined by the courts,
unless there is some express provision of the law authorizing the
administrative officers to determine this question for themselves.
Section 2 of Act No. 926 relating to homesteads provides that the
Chief of The Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine
whether the land described is prima facie under the law subject to
homestead settlement. Section 13, relating to the sale of public lands,
provides simply that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall
determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry
whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for
timber purposes, but it says nothing about his decisions as to whether
it is or is not agricultural land in its nature. Section 26 relating to the
lease of public lands provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau
of Forestry whether the land applied for is more valuable for
agricultural than for timber purposes and further summarily determine
from available records whether the land is or is not mineral and does
not contain deposits of coal or salts. Section 34 relating to fee patents
to native settlers makes no provision for any determination by the
Chief of Bureau of Public Lands in regard to the character of the land
applied for.
After homesteads have been entered, lands, sold, and leases made
by the administrative officers on the theory that the lands were
agricultural lands by their nature, to leave the matter of their true
character open for subsequent action by the courts would be to
produce an evil that should if possible be avoided.
3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a
definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a careful
consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition
which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below.
Section 13 says that the Government shall "Make rules and
regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands
other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds, that is the only
definition that can be said to be given to acricultural lands. In other
words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. As was said in the case of Jones vs. The Insular
Government (6 Phil Rep., 122, 133) where these same section of the
act of Congress were under discussion:
The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to
them a construction that would be entirely free from objection. But the
construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less objectionable
than any other one that has been suggested.
There is nothing in this case of Jones vs. The Insular Government
which at all conflicts with the result here arrived at. The question as to
whether the lands there involved were or were not agricultural lands
within the meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor decided.
In fact, it appears from the decision that those lands, which were in
the Province of Benguet, were within the strictest definition of the
phrase "agricultural lands." It appears that such lands had been
cultivated for more than twelve years. What that case decided was,
not that the lands therein involved and other lands referred to in the
decision by way of illustration were not agricultural lands but that the
law there in question and the other laws mentioned therein were not
rules and regulations within the meaning of section 13.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 1413 March 30, 1904
ANDRES VALENTON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.MANUEL
MURCIANO, defendant-appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
I. The findings of fact made by the court below in its decision are as
follows:
First. That in the year 1860, the plaintiffs, and each one of them,
entered into the peaceful and quiet occupation and possession of the
larger part of the lands described in the complaint of the plaintiffs, to
wit [description]:
Second. That on the date on which the plaintiffs entered into the
occupation and possession of the said lands, as above set forth,
these lands and every part thereof were public, untilled, and
unoccupied, and belonged to the then existing Government of the
Philippine Islands. That immediately after the occupation and
possession of the said lands by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs began to
cultivate and improve them in a quiet and peaceful manner.
Third. That from the said year 1860, the plaintiffs continued to occupy
and possess the said lands, quietly and peacefully, until the year
1892, by themselves, by their agents and tenants, claiming that they
were the exclusive owners of said lands.
Fourth. That on or about the 16th day of January, 1892, Manuel
Murciano, defendant in this proceeding, acting on behalf of and as
attorney in fact of Candido Capulong, by occupation a cook,
denounced the said lands to the then existing Government of the
Philippine Islands, declaring that the said lands every part thereof
were public, untilled, and unoccupied lands belonging to the then
existing Government of the Philippine Islands, and petitioned for the
sale of the same to him.
Fifth. That before the execution of the sale heretofore mentioned,
various proceedings were had for the survey and measurement of the
lands in question at the instance of the defendant, Murciano, the latter
acting as agent and attorney in fact of said Candido Capulong, a
written protest, however, having been entered against these
proceedings by the plaintiff Andres Valenton.
Sixth. That on the 14th day of July, 1892, Don Enrique Castellvie
Ibarrola, secretary of the treasury of the Province of Tarlac, in his
official capacity as such secretary, executed a contract of purchase
and sale, by which said lands were sold and conveyed by him to the
defendant, Manuel Murciano, as attorney for the said Candido
Capulong.
Seventh. That on the 19th day of July, 1892, said Candido Capulong
executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which he sold and
conveyed the said lands to the defendants, Manuel Murciano.
Eight. That from the said 14th day of July, 1892, Manuel Murciano
has at no time occupied or possessed all of the land mentioned, but
has possessed only certain in distinct and indefinite portions of the
same. That during all this time the plaintiffs have opposed the
occupation of the defendant, and said plaintiffs during all the time in
question have been and are in the possession and occupation of part
of the said lands, tilling them and improving them by themselves and
by their agents and tenants.
Ninth. That never, prior to the said 14th day of July,, 1892, has the
defendant, Manuel Murciano, been in the peaceful and quiet
possession and occupation of the said lands, or in the peaceful and
quiet occupation of any part thereof.
Upon these facts the Court of First Instance ordered judgment for the
defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs had lost all right to the land
by not pursuing their objections to the sale mentioned in the sixth
finding. The plaintiffs excepted to the judgment and claim in this court
that upon the facts found by the court below judgment should have
been entered in their favor. Their contention is that in 1890 they had
been in the adverse possession of the property for thirty years; that,
applying the extra ordinary period of prescription of thirty years, found
as well in the Partidas as in the Civil Code, they then became the
absolute owners of the land as against everyone, including the State,
and that when the State in 1892 deeded the property to the
defendant, nothing passed by the deed because the State had
nothing to convey.
The case presents, therefore, the important question whether or not
during the years from 1860 to 1890 a private person, situated as the
plaintiffs were, could have obtained as against the State the
ownership of the public lands of the State by means of occupation.
The court finds that at the time of the entry by the plaintiff in 1860 the
lands were vacant and were public lands belonging to the then
existing Government. The plaintiffs do not claim to have ever obtained
from the Government any deed for the lands, nor any confirmation of
their possession.
Whether in the absence of any special legislation on the subject a
general statute of limitations in which the State was not expressly
excepted would run against the State as to its public lands we do not
find it necessary to decide. Reasons based upon public policy could
be adduced why it should not, at least as to such public lands as are
involved in this case. (See Act No. 926, sec. 67.) We are, however, of
the opinion that the case at bar must be decided, not by the general
statute of limitation contained in the Partidas, but by those special
laws which from the earliest times have regulated the disposition of
the public lands in the colonies.
Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription against the
State as to these lands; and if so, to what extend was it recognizes?
Laws of very early date provided for the assignment of public lands to
the subjects of the Crown. Law 1, title 12, book 4 of the Recopilacion
de Leyes de las Indias is an example of them, and is as follows:
In order that our subjects may be encouraged to undertake the
discovery and settlement of the Indies, and that they may live with the
comfort and convenience which we desire, it is our will that there shall
be distributed to all those who shall go out to people the new
territories, houses, lots, lands, peonias, and caballerias in the towns
and places which may be assigned to them by the governor of the
new settlement, who in apportioning the lands, will distinguish
between gentlemen and peasants, and those of lower degree and
merit, and who will add to the possessions and better the condition of
the grantees, according to the nature of the services rendered by
them, and with a view to the promotion of agriculture and stock
raising. To those who shall have labored and established a home on
said lands and who shall have resided in the said settlement for a
period of four years we grant the right thereafter to sell and in every
other manner to exercise their free will over said lands as over their
own property. And we further command that, in accordance with their
rank and degree, the governor, or whoever may be invested with our
authority, shall allot the Indians to them in any distribution made, so
that they may profit by their labor and fines in accordance with the
tributes required and the law controlling such matters.
And in order that, in allotting said lands, there may be no doubt as to
the area of each grant, we declare that a peonia shall consist of a
tract fifty feet in breadth by one hundred in length, with arable land
capable of producing one hundred bushels of wheat or barley, ten
bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as two yokes of oxen
may plough in a day, and for the planting of other trees of a hardy
nature as much as may be plowed with eight yokes in a day, and
including pasture for twenty cows, five mares, one hundred sheep,
twenty goats, and ten breeding pigs. A caballeria shall be a tract one
hundred feet in breadth and two hundred in length, and in other
respects shall equal five peonias — that is, it will include arable land
capable of producing five hundred bushels of wheat or barley and fifty
bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as may be ploughed
with ten yokes of oxen in a day, and for the planting of other hardy
trees as much as forty yokes may plough in a day, together with
pasturage for one hundred cows, twenty mares, five hundred sheep,
one hundred goats, and fifty breeding pigs. And we order that the
distribution be made in such a manner that all may receive equal
benefit therefrom, and if this be impracticable, then that each shall be
given his due.
But it was necessary, however, that action should in all cases be
taken by the public officials before any interest was acquired by the
subject.
Law 8 of said title 12 is as follows:
We command that if a petition shall be presented asking the grant of a
lot or tract of land in a city or town in which one of our courts may be
located, the presentation shall be made to the municipal council. If the
latter shall approve the petition, two deputy magistrates will be
appointed, who will acquaint the viceroy or municipal president with
the council's judgment in the matter. After consideration thereof by the
viceroy or president and the deputy magistrates, all will sign the
grants, in the presence of the clerk of the council, in order that the
matter may be duly recorded in the council book. If the petition shall
be for the grant of waters and lands for mercantile purpose, it shall be
presented to the viceroy or municipal president, who will transmit it to
the council. If the latters shall vote to make the grant, one of the
magistrates will carry its decision to the viceroy or president, to the
end that, upon consideration of the matter by him, the proper action
may be taken.
It happened, in the course of time, that tracts of the public land were
found in the possession of persons who either had no title papers
therefor issued by the State, or whose title papers were defective,
either because the proper procedure had not been followed or
because they had been issued by persons who had no authority to do
so. Law 14, title 12 book 4 of said compilation (referred to in the
regulations of June 25, 1880, for the Philippines) was the first of a
long series of legislative acts intended to compel those in possession
of the public lands, without written evidence of title, or with defective
title papers, to present evidence as to their possession or grants, and
obtain the confirmation of their claim to ownership. That law is as
follows:
We having acquitted full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands
territories, and possession not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown
and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper
and true deeds of grants be restored to us according as they belong
to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public
squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are
peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but
also the future and their probable increase, and after distributing to
the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,
confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and
unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of
pretorial courts designated, at such time as shall to them seem most
expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts,
farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them, and to the court
officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto.
And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and
receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and
all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to
deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it
has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he
did that the State remained the absolute owner.
In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement
that all those lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted
by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who proceeded him. This
statement excludes the idea that there might be lands no so granted,
that did not being to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was
not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private
person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the
mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are
required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to
be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or
showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is
apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession
for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the
lands possessed by them without any action on the part of the
authorities. It is plain that they were required to present their claims to
the authorities and obtain a confirmation thereof. What the period of
prescription mentioned in this law was does not appear, but latter, in
1646, law 19 of the same title declared "that no one shall be 'admitted
to adjustment' unless he has possessed the lands for ten years."
In law 15, title 12, book 4 of the same compilation, there is a
command that those lands as to which there has been no adjustment
with the Government be sold at auction to the highest bidder. That law
is as follows:
For the greater good of our subjects, we order and command that our
viceroys and governing presidents shall do nothing with respect to
lands the claims to which have been adjusted by their predecessors,
tending to disturb the peaceful possession of the owners thereof. As
to those who shall have extended their possession beyond the limits
fixed in the original grants, they will be admitted to a moderate
adjustment with respect to the excess, and new title deeds will be
issued therefor. And all those lands as to which no adjustment has
been made shall, without exception, be sold at public auction to the
highest bidder, the purchase price therefor to be payable either in
cash or in the form of quitrent, in accordance with the laws and royal
ordinances of the kingdoms of Castile. We leave to the viceroys and
president the mode and from in which what is here ordered shall be
carried into effect in order that they may provide for it at the least
possible cost; and in order that all unnecessary expense with respect
to the collections for said lands may be avoided, we command that
the same be made by our royal officers in person, without the
employment of special collectors, and to that end availing themselves
of the services of our royal courts, and, in places where courts shall
not have been established, of the town mayors.
And whereas, title deeds to lands have been granted by officers not
authorized to issue them, and such titles have been confirmed by us
in council, we command that those holding such a certificate of
confirmation may continue to possess the lands to which it refers, and
will, within the limits stated in the confirmation certificate, be protected
in their possession; and with respect to any encroachment beyond
such limits will be admitted to the benefits of this law.
Another legislative act of the same character was the royal cedula of
October 15, 1754 (4 Legislacion Ultramarina, Rodriguez San Pedro,
673). Articles 3, 4, and 5 of this royal cedula as follows:
3. Upon each principal subdelegate's appointment, which will
be made in the manner prescribed in article 1 of this cedula, and upon
his receipts of these instructions, of which every principal subdelegate
already designated or who may hereafter be appointed shall be
furnished a copy, said subdelegate will in his turn issue a general
order to the courts in the provincial capitals and principal towns of his
district, directing the publication therein, in the manner followed in
connection with the promulgation or general orders of viceroys,
presidents, and administrative courts in matters connected with my
service, of these instructions, to the end that any and all persons who,
since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and
publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or
not the same shall be cultivated of tenanted, may, either in person or
through their attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said
subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are
occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the period within which
such documents must be presented a term sufficient in length and
proportionate to the distance the interested party may have to travel
for the purpose of making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at
the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure
to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just
and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of an evicted from
their lands, and they will be granted to others.
4. If it shall appear from the titles or instruments presented, or
if it shall be shown in any other legal manner that said persons are in
possession of such royal lands by virtue of a sale or adjustment
consummated by duly authorized subdelegates prior to the said year
1700, although such action may not have been confirmed by my royal
person, or by a viceroy or president, they shall in no wise be
molested, but shall be left in the full and quiet possession of the
same; nor shall they be required to pay any fee on account of these
proceedings, in accordance with law 15, title 12, book 4 of the
Recopilacion de los Indias, above cited. A note shall be made upon
said title deeds to the effect that his obligation has been complied
with, to the end that the owners of such rival lands and their
successors may hereafter be free from denunciation, summons, or
other disturbance in their possession.
Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it
shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a
valid title by prescription; provided, however, that if the lands shall not
be in state of cultivation or tillage, the term of three months prescribed
by law 11 of the title and book cited, or such other period as may be
deemed adequate, shall be designated as the period within which the
lands must be reduced to cultivation, with the warning that in case of
their failure so to do the lands will be granted, with the same
obligation to cultivate them, to whomsoever may denounce them.
5. Likewise neither shall possessors of lands sold or adjusted
by the various subdelegates from the year 1700 to the present time
be molested, disturbed, or denounced, now or at any other time, with
respect to such possession, if such sales or adjustments shall have
been confirmed by me, or by the viceroy or the president of the court
of the district in which the lands are located while authorized to
exercise this power. In cases where the sales of adjustments shall not
have been so confirmed, the possessors will present to the courts of
their respective district and to the other officials hereby empowered to
receive the same, a petition asking for the confirmation of said sales
and adjustments. After the proceedings outlined by the subdelegates
in their order with respect to the measurement and valuation of the
said lands, and with reference to the title issued therefor, shall have
been duly completed, said courts and officials will make an
examination of the same for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
sale or adjustment has been made without fraud and collusion, and
for an adequate and equitable price, and a similar examination shall
be made by the prosecuting attorney of the district, to the end that, in
view of all the proceedings and the purchase or adjustment price of
the land, and the media anata having been duly, etc., paid into the
royal treasury, as well as such additional sum as may be deemed
proper, there will be issued to the possessor, in my royal name, a
confirmation of his title, by virtue of which his possession and
ownership of lands and waters which it represents will be fully
legalized, to the end that at no time will he or his heirs or assigns be
disturbed or molested therein.
The wording of this law is much stronger than that of law 14. As is
seen by the terms of article 3, any person whatever who occupied any
public land was required to present the instruments by virtue of which
he was in possession, within a time to be fixed by the authorities, and
he was warned that if he did not do so he would be evicted from his
land and it would be granted to others. By terms of article 4 those
possessors to whom grants had been made prior to 1700, were
entitled to have such grants confirmed, and it was also provided that
not being able to prove any grants it should be sufficient to prove "that
ancient possession," as a sufficient title by prescription, and they
should be confirmed in their holdings. "That ancient possession"
would be at least fifty-four years, for it would have to date from prior to
1700. Under article 5, where the possession dated from 1700, no
confirmation could be granted on proof of prescription alone.
The length of possession required to be proved before the
Government would issue a deed has varied in different colonies and
at different times. In the Philippines, as has been seen, it was at one
time ten years, at another time fifty-four years at least. In Cuba, by the
royal cedula of April 24, 1833, to obtain a deed one had to prove, as
to uncultivated lands, a possession of one hundred years, and as to
cultivated lands a possession of fifty years. In the same islands, by
the royal order of July 16, 1819, a possession of forty years was
sufficient.
In the Philippines at a later date royal of September 21, 1797 (4
Legislacion Ultramarina, Rodriguez San Pedro, p. 688), directed the
observation of the said royal cedula of 1754, but apparently without
being subject to the period of prescription therein assigned.
The royal order of July 5, 1862 (Gaceta de Manila, November 15,
1864), also ordered that until regulations on the subject could be
prepared the authorities of the Islands should follow strictly the Laws
of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the said
royal cedula of 1754.
The royal order of November 14, 1876 (Guia del Comprador de
Terrenos, p. 51), directed the provincial governors to urge those in
unlawful possession of public lands to seek an adjustment with the
State in accordance with the existing laws. The regulations as to the
adjustment (composicion) of the titles to public lands remained in this
condition until the regulations of June 25, 1880. This is the most
important of the modern legislative acts upon the matter of
"adjustment" as distinguished from that of the sale of the public lands.
The royal degree approving these regulations is dated June 25, 1880,
and is as follows:1
Upon the suggestion of the colonial minister, made in conformity with
the decree of the full meeting of the council of state, I hereby approve
the attached regulations for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands.
Articles 1, 4, 5, 8, and part of article 6 are as follows:
ART. 1. For the purpose of these regulations and in conformity with
law 14, title 12, book 4 of the Recompilation of Laws of the Indies, the
following will be regarded as royal lands: All lands whose lawful
ownership is not vested in some private, persons, or, what is the
same thing, which have never passed to private ownership by virtue
of cession by competent authorities, made either gratuitously or for a
consideration.
ART. 4. For all legal effects, those will be considered proprietors of
the royal lands herein treated who may prove that they have
possessed the lands without interruption during the period of ten
years, by virtue of a good title and in good faith.
ART. 5. In the same manner, those who without such title deeds may
prove that they have possessed their said lands without interruption
for a period of twenty years if in a state of cultivation, or for a period of
thirty years if uncultivated, shall be regarded as proprietors thereof. In
order that a tract of land may be considered cultivated, it will be
necessary to show that it has been broken within the last three years.
ART. 6. Interested parties not included within the two preceding
articles may legalize their possession and thereby acquire the full
ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to
be conducted in the following manner: . . .
(5) Those who, entirely without title deeds, may be in possession of
lands belonging to the State and have reduced said lands to a state of
cultivation, may acquire the ownership thereof by paying into the
public treasury the value of the lands at the time such possessors or
their representatives began their unauthorized enjoyment of the
same.
(6) In case said lands shall never have been ploughed, but are still in
a wild state, or covered with forest, the ownership of the same may be
acquired by paying their value at the time of the filing of the claim, as
stated in the fourth paragraph."
ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the
lands whose possession they are unlawfully enjoying within the time
of one year, or, the adjustment having been granted by the
authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their obligation in connection with the
compromise, by paying the proper sum into the treasury, the latter
will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the ownership of
the State over the lands, and will, after fixing the value thereof,
proceed to sell at public auction that part of the same which either
because it may have been reduced to cultivation or is not located
within the forest zone is not deemed advisable to preserve as the
State forest reservation.
The other articles of the regulations state the manner in which
applications should be made for adjustment, and the proceedings
thereon.
Do these regulations declare that those who are included in article 4
and 5 are the absolute owners of the land occupied by them without
any action on their part, or that of the State, or do they declare that
such persons must seek an adjustment and obtain a deed from the
State, and if they do not do so within the time named in article 8 they
lose all interest in the lands?
It must be admitted from the wording of the law that the question is
not free from doubt. Upon a consideration, however, of the whole
matter, that doubt must, we think, be resolved in favor of the State.
The following are some of the reasons which lead us to that
conclusion:
(1) It will be noticed that article 4 does not say that those persons
shall be considered as owners who have occupied the lands for ten
years, which would have been the language naturally used if an
absolute grant had been intended. It says, instead, that those shall be
considered owners who may prove that they have been in possession
ten years. Was this proof to be made at any time in the future when
the question might arise, or was it to be made in the proceedings
which these very regulations provided for that purpose? We think that
the latter is the proper construction.
(2) Article 1 declares in plain terms that all those lands as to which the
State has never executed any deeds are the property of the State —
that is, that on June 25, 1880, no public lands belonged to individuals
unless they could exhibit a State deed therefor. This is entirely
inconsistent with the idea that the same law in its article 4 declares
that the lands in question in this case became the property of the
plaintiffs in 1870, and were not in 1880 the property of the State,
though the State had never given any deed for them.
(3) The royal decree, by its terms, relates to lands wrongfully withheld
by private persons. The word detentados necessarily implies this.
This is inconsistent with the idea that by article 4 of the plaintiffs, in
1870, became the absolute owners of the lands in question, and were
not therefore, in 1880, withholding what did not belong to them.
(4) In the preface to this decree and regulations, the following
language is used:
SIR: The uncertain, and it may be said the precarious, state of real
property in various parts of the Philippine Islands, as yet sparsely
populated; the necessity for encouraging the cultivation of these
lands; the advantage of increasing the wealth and products of the
Archipelago; the immense and immediate profit which must result to
all classes of interests, public as well as private, from the substitution
of full ownership, with all the privileges which by law accompany this
real right, for the mere possession of the lands, have long counseled
the adoption of the provisions contained in the following regulations,
which, after consulation with the Philippine council, and in conformity
with an order passed at a full meeting of the council of state, the
subscribing minister has the honor to submit for the royal approval.
These regulations refer not only to tenants of royal lands in good faith
and by virtue of a valid title, but also to those who, lacking these, may,
either by themselves reducing such lands to cultivation or by the
application of intelligence and initiative, causing their cultivation by
others who lack these qualities, be augmenting the wealth of the
Archipelago.2
This preface is the most authoritative commentary on the law, and
shows without doubt that those who held with color of title and good
faith were, notwithstanding, holding wrongfully, and that true
ownership should be substituted for their possession.
(5) This doubt suggested by the wording of the law was the subject of
inquiries directed to the officers in Manila charged with its execution.
These inquiries were answered in the circular of August 10, 1881,
published in the Gaceta de Manila August 11, 1881, as follows:
Should possessors of royal lands under color of title and in good faith
seek adjustment?
It is evident that they must do so, for it is to them that article 4 of the
regulations refers, as also the following article covers other cases of
possession under different circumstances. It should be well
understood by you, and you should in turn have it understood by
other, that the adjustment of lands whose ownership has not passed
to private individuals by virtue of cession by competent authorities, is
optional only for those within the limits of the common district (legua
comunal) as provided by article 7. In all other cases where the
interested parties shall fail to present themselves for the adjustment of
the lands occupied by them shall suffer the penalties set forth in
article 8 of said regulations.
In determining the meaning of a law where a doubt exists the
construction placed upon it by the officers whose duty it is to
administer it is entitled to weight.
(6) There is, moreover, legislative construction of these regulations
upon this point found in subsequent laws. The royal decree of
December 26, 1884, (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 117), provides in
articles 1 that —
All those public lands wrongfully withheld by private person in the
Philippines which, in accordance with the regulations of June 25,
1880, are subject to adjustment with the treasury, shall be divided into
three groups, of which the first shall include those which, because
they are included in articles 4 and 5, and the first paragraph of article
7, are entitled to free adjustment.
There were exceptions to this rule which are not here important.
Article 10 provides that if the adjustment is free for those mentioned in
articles 4 and 5, who are included in the second group, the deed shall
be issued by the governor of the province. Article 11 says that if the
adjustment is not free, because the applicant has not proved his right
by prescription, then no deed can be issued until the proper payment
has been made. The whole decree shows clearly that the legislator
intended that those mentioned in article 4 and 5 should apply for a
confirmation of their titles by prescription, as well as those mentioned
in article 6. In fact, for the adjustment of those of the first group, which
necessarily included only those found within articles 4 and 5, a board
was organized (art. 15) in each pueblo whose sole duty it was to
dispatch applications made said two articles.
(7) The royal decree of August 31, 1888 (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p.
120), is another legislative construction of this regulation. That decree
repealed the decree of 1884, and divided all lands subjects to
adjustment under the regulations of June 25, 1880, into two groups. In
the first group were all those lands which bordered at any points on
other State lands, and those which, though not bordering on State
lands, measured more than 30 hectares. In the second group were
those which were bounded entirely by lands of private persons and
did not exceed 30 hectares. For the second group a provincial board
was organized, and article 10 provides a hearing before this board,
and declares —
If no protest or claim shall be filed, and the adjustment must be free
because the occupant has proved title by prescription, as provided in
articles 4 and 5 of the regulations promulgated June 25, 1880, the
proceedings shall be duty approved, and the head officer of the
province will, in his capacity of deputy director general of the civil
administration, issue the corresponding title deed.
The policy pursued by the Spanish Government from the earliest
times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain deeds therefor
from the State, has been continued by the American Government in
Act No. 926, which takes effect when approved by Congress. Section
54, sixth paragraph of that act, declares that the persons named in
said paragraph 6 "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have
received the same." Yet such persons are required by section 56 to
present a petition to the Court of Land Registration for a confirmation
of these titles.
We have considered the regulations relating to adjustment — that is,
those laws under which persons in possession might perfect their
titles. But there were other laws relating to the sale of public lands
which contained provisions fatal to the plaintiff's claims. The royal
decree of January 26, 1889 (Gaceta de Manila, March 20, 1889),
approved the regulations for the sale of public lands in the Philippines,
and it was in accordance with such regulations that the appellee
acquired his title. Article 4 of those regulations required the
publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the application to purchase,
with a description of the lands, and gave sixty days within which
anyone could object to the sale. A similar notice in the dialect of the
locality was required to be posted on the municipal building of the
town in which the land was situated, and to be made public by the
crier. Articles 5 and 6 declared to whom such objections shall be
made and the course which they should take. Article 8 is as follows:
ART. 8. In no case will the judicial authorities take cognizance of the
suit against the decrees of the civil administration concerning the sale
of royal lands unless the plaintiff shall attach to the complaint
documents which show that he has exhausted the administrative
remedy. After the proceeding in the executive department shall have
been terminated and the matter finally passed upon, anyone
considering his interests prejudiced thereby may commence a suit in
the court against the State; but in no case shall an action be brought
against the proprietor of the land.
Similar provisions are found in the regulations of 1883, approved the
second time by royal order of February 16 (Gaceta de Manila, June
28, 1883). Articles 18 and 23 of said regulations are as follows:
ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of
alienable royal lands shall be obliged to apply for the ownership of the
same, or for the adjustment thereof within the term of sixty days from
the time of the publication in the bulletin of Sales of the notice of sale
thereof.
ART. 23. The judicial authorities shall take cognizance of no
complaint against the decrees of the treasury department concerning
the sale of lands pertaining to the state unless the complainant shall
attached to the complaint documents which proved that he has
exhausted the administrative remedy
This prohibition appears also in the royal order of October 26, 1881
(Gaceta de Manila, December 18, 1881) which relates evidently both
to sales of public lands and also to the adjustments with the
occupants.
Article 5 of this royal order is as follows:
During the pendency of proceedings in the executive department with
respect to grants of land, interested parties may present through
executive channels such protest as they may deemed advisable for
the protection of their right and interests. The proceeding having once
been completed, and the grant made, those who consider their
interests prejudiced thereby may proceed in court against the State,
but under no circumstances against the grantees of the land.
The American legislation creating the Court of Land Registration is
but an application of this same principle. In both systems the title is
guaranteed to the petitioner, after examination by a tribunal. In
Spanish system this tribunal was called an administrative one, in the
American a judicial one.
The court finds that the plaintiffs made a written protest against the
sale to the defendants while the proceedings for the measurements
and survey of the land were being carried on, but that they did not
follow up their protest. This, as held by the court below, is a bar their
recovery in this action, under the articles above cited.
The plaintiff state in their brief that a great fraud was committed on
them and the State by the defendant in applying for the purchase of
this lands as vacant and belonging to the public, when they were in
the actual adverse possession of the plaintiffs.
We have seen nothing in the regulations relating to the sale of the
public lands which limited their force to vacant lands. On the contrary
there are provisions which indicate the contrary. In the application for
the purchase the petitioner is article 3 of the regulations of 1889
required to state whether any portion of the land sought has been
broken for cultivation, and to whom such improvements belong.
Article 9 provides that if one in possession applies to purchase the
land, he renounces his right to a composicion under the laws relating
to that subject. By article 13 the report of the officials making the
survey must contain a statement as to whether any part of the land is
cultivated or not and if the applicant claims to be the owner of such
cultivated part.
In the regulations of January 19, 1883 (Gaceta de Manila, June 28,
1883) is the following article:
ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of
royal alienable lands shall be obliged to apply for the ownership of the
same, or for the adjustment thereof, within the term of sixty days from
the time of the publication in the Bulletin of Sales of the notice of sale
thereof.
In view of all these provisions it seems impossible to believe that the
legislators even intended to leave the validity of any sale made by the
State to be determined at any time in the future by the ordinary courts
on parol testimony. Such would be the result if the contention of the
plaintiffs is to be sustained. According to their claim, this sale and
every other sale made by the State can be set aside if at any time in
the future it can be proved that certain persons had been in
possession of the land for the term then required for prescription.
If this claim is allowed it would result that even though written title
from the State would be safe from such attack by parol evidence, by
means of such evidence damages could have been recovered against
the State for lands sold by the State to which third persons might
thereafter prove ownership but prescription. The unreliability of parol
testimony on the subject of possession is well known. In this case in
the report which the law required to be made before a sale could be
had it is stated by an Ayudante de Montes that the tract had an area
of 429 hectares, 77 ares, and 96 centares uncultivated, and 50
hectares, 19 ares, and 73 centares broken for cultivation. The official
report also says (1890) that the breaking is recent. Notwithstanding
this official report, the plaintiffs introduced evidence from which the
court found that the greater part of the tract had been occupied and
cultivated by the plaintiffs since 1860.
It is hardly conceivable that the State intended to put in force
legislation under which its property rights could be so prejudiced.
We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these
Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these
lands by prescription, without any action by the State, and that the
judgment below declaring the defendant the owner of the lands must
be affirmed.
II. What has been said heretofore makes it unnecessary to consider
the motion for a new trial, made by the defendant on the ground that
the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence.
III. The exception of the defendant to the order vacating the
appointment of the receiver can not be sustained. The defendant at
no time made any showing sufficient to authorize the appointment of a
receiver.
The case does not fall under No. 4 of section 174 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Neither party in his pleadings asked any relief as to the
crops. They were not, therefore, "the property which is the subject of
litigation."
Neither does the case fall under No. 2 of section 174, for the same
reason.
Moreover, under No. 2 it must be shown that the property is in danger
of being lost. There was no showing of that kind. The pleadings say
nothing upon the subject. In the motion for the appointment of the
receiver it said that the plaintiffs are insolvent. There is no evidence,
by affidavit or otherwise, to support this statement. A bare, unsworn
statement in a motion that the adverse party is insolvent is not
sufficient to warrant a court in appointing a receiver for property in his
possession.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Neither party can recover
costs in this court.
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ANGELA RAZON and THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
appellant.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela
Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring
plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in
the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by
the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the
land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the
latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each
and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense,
alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of
the United States under the administration and control of the
Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in
accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the
plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs
against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took
this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The
holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the
plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question
is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to
recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the
sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering
that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the
Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the
Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac
sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase
the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for
about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio
Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to
Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it
(Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi
had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing
himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the
sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession
and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except
during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on
September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit
C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the
court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela
Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her
attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court,
Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase
thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said
application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6,
1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years
(Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the
Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold
the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds
of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title
to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required
Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do
so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice
of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit
F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions
raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely,
and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year
1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had
been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon
applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been
in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for
thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac
had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December
18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and
occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach
of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariño vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable
here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption
juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No.
2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for
a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right
to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII
of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and
had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon
did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the
public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to
recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute,
had already become, by operation of law, private property of the
plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin
Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and
hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF
DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD,
and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly
situated, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------
x Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE
LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A
LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present
occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey
of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a
premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to
12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped island’s three
barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of
Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by
named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of
PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and
Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves,
or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of
man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which
was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as
amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial
confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705.
Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into
ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the
following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in
possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of
land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees;
(3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters
and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was
purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal
hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They
decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution
upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay
Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the
Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos.
5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles
were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title
to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and
in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed
and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as
the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied
lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801
nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular
itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited
Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only
those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the
forest reserve.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The
Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC
decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were
part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The
Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each
side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27
Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this
Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification
of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They
have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay
since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in
developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class
resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a
proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed
agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926,
known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the
concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do
not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island.
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a)
of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island
are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the
two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land
classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and
PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and
all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in
Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF
PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL
OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997,
WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED
RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED
PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY
HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN
TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,
VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY
TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS
FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-
claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No.
173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They
do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of
190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded
by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138
issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to
determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the
executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,
and such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the
government great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.47 Thus, all lands that
have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the
public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary
power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the
way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon
the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands,
territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the
Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from
the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the
Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory
claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established
possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of
vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in
said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion
posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in
the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only
after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which
must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its
inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be
perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until
April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could
only be founded on royal concessions which took various forms,
namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special
grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de
compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or
possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the
Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of
1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided
for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also
provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63
Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act
No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a
system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens
system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed
Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced
the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease
of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality
of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of
the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next
ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No.
2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new,
more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands
to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act
No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as
amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted
to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No.
2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision
was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for
a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73
which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the
use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76
Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply
for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months
from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter,
the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No.
1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to
codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs
registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered
lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has
time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially
delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying
for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed
to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to
the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private
claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of
land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay
was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v.
The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under
the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is
a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced.
These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of
Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely
provided the manner through which land registration courts would
classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof
presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of
the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain
into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free
to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs
of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda.
De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo
Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed
open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted
by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there
was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of
the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No.
926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land
classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have
a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been
automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural
lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all
lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the
Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land,
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of
State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and
totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land
registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or
more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an
applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title
under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land
remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine,
continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not
absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If
there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural
uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite
the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-
General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact
that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of
itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other,
mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or
future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just
said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry,"
and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we
think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the
proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral
which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No.
1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the
land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry
or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or
mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa,
by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable
minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in
that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for
one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact
that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in
the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a
right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.
Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is
forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its
superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide
whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance
belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in
the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land
is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of
said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public
domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification
of lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already
became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to
classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the
public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were
issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for
determination by the land registration court of the property’s land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then
to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874
in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts
were no longer authorized to determine the property’s land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was decided in
1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko
cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v.
The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally
different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether
residential lots were included in the general classification of
agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a
residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was
prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural
land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in
Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act
No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already
stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when
the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as
agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not
create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also
contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island
for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso
facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may
apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v.
Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of
the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands
in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites
and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for
the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in
the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption
that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No.
705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified
land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No.
705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification
for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose
and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to
its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land
under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present
realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a
premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay
appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million
peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been
stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation
No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its
character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do
not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The
discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is
particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary
and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public
domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification
for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine
the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural
land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not
convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants
argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in
1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist
zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the
whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law
or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The
reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas
declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify
the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public
forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority
from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands
merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive
department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section
5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s
authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable
when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act
needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This
was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the
rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and
marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the
concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the
development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for
ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay
Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the
Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port
Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol,
Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan,
Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a
few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the
other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for
private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond,
the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part
of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership.
Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head,
who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the
public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts
have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to
disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of
reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The
Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each
side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right
of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of
Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No.
1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject
to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No.
1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into
agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest
under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657,
thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to
or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands
to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act
until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and
equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits
of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No.
705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural
land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public
domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols
v. Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public
forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were
unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a
"reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of
the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in
Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no
previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the
mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for purposes of determining which are
needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest
or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised
Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to
speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against
the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior
law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot,
apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public
forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been
previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights
over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No.
141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into
an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered
State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying
on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government
grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land
possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is
clear from the wording of the law itself.129 Where the land is not
alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long,
cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those
lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants
failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for
declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite
period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient
to prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of
the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in
1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to
convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation
commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay,
having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have
invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot.
They say their continued possession and investments give them a
vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation
No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private
claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay.
Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide
cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As
the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to
apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in
Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable
investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and
international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number
of years, thousands of people have called the island their home.
While the Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are
bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it
should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be
eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their
automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas
they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the
loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands.
Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as
builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect
their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of
applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or
sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or
ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up;
rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The
fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property
– crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written
down in a lumberman’s decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private 1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the
claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED
certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such AND SET ASIDE.
bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that
bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide. 2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture SO ORDERED.
may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the
classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd.
That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not
becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a
healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival.

Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for
politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as
destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control.
As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of
Forestry v. Munoz:134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands.
Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite
often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification.
For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
G.R. No. L-3894 March 12, 1909
JUAN IBAÑEZ DE ALDECOA, petitioner-appellant, vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 8th of March, 1904, in accordance with the new Land
Registration Act, Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa applied for the registration
of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 square meters in extent, situated
in the town of Surigao; a plan and technical description of said parcel
was attached to his application.
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an opinion of
the examiner of titles opposing the request of the applicant, had been
rendered, the Attorney-General by a writing dated March 21, 1905,
objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land in
question was the property of the Government of the United States,
and is now under the control of the Insular Government; that the title
of ownership issued by the politico-militar governor of Surigao,
Mindanao, issued on the 19th of June, 1889, to Telesforo Ibañez de
Aldecoa, antecessor of the petitioner with respect to the land in
question, was entirely null and void, for the reason that said grant had
not been made in accordance with the laws then in force on the
subject, and because the said governor had no authority to make
such a grant; he prayed the court below to dismiss the application
with costs.
As the case stood the applicant, Aldecoa, on the 8th of April, 1905,
amended his former petition, and relying upon the provisions of
paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, alleged that at the
time he requested the registration of the land in question, comprised
in the plan then submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in
force, and as the latter affords better facilities for securing titles to
property unprovided with them, as in the case with the land in
question, the applicant availing himself of the benefits granted by the
said Act, prayed that the same be applied to the inscription of his
land, inasmuch as it was included within paragraphs 5 and 6 of
section 54, Chapter VI, thereof, and prayed the court to take into
consideration the amendment of his petition.
Evidence was adduced by the petitioner at the trial of the case, and
on February 2, 1907, the judge of the Court of Land Registration
entered his decision in the matter and, in view of the opposition
offered by the Insular Government denied the petition without costs,
and ordered the cancellation of the entry made of the said property in
the record under No. 408, folio 206 of volume 2 of the municipality of
Surigao.
The applicant excepted to this decision and moved for a new trial; his
motion was overruled to which he also excepted and presented the
corresponding bill of exceptions which was approved and submitted to
this court.
The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal
interposed by counsel for Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a
parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and, ceasing to
be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the
legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which
may be alienated in favor of private individuals or corporations. While
from the remote time of the conquest of this Archipelago the
occupation or material possession together with the improvement and
cultivation for a certain number of years, as fixed by the laws of the
Indies, of given portions of vacant Government lands, was the method
established by the Government to facilitate the acquisition thereof by
private persons, later, by the royal decrees of June 25, 1880, and
December 26, 1884, the system of composition with the State and
that of sales by public auction were instituted as the means of
acquiring such lands.
In view of the difficulties which prevented the rapid dispatch of the
proceedings instituted for this purpose, the royal decree of February
13, 1894, was promulgated, establishing the possessory information
as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under
certain conditions which were set out in said decree.
After the change of sovereignty, the Commission enacted Act No.
926, relating to public lands, in accordance with the provisions of
sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Act of the Congress of the United
States of July 1, 1902, section 54, paragraph 6 of which (Act No. 926)
is as follows:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in
right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such
lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by
said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a
bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except
when prevented by a war or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this
chapter.
All applicants for lands under paragraph one, two, three, four, and five
of this section must establish by proper official records or documents
that such proceedings as are therein required were taken and the
necessary conditions complied with: Provided, however, That such
requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.
Given the above legal provisions and the data contained in the record,
it is seen that the land, the registration of which is claimed, was of the
class of vacant crown or public land which the State could alienate to
private persons, and being susceptible of cultivation, since at any time
the person in possession desired to convert it into agricultural land he
might do so in the same manner that he had made a building lot of it,
it undoubtedly falls within the terms of the said Act of Congress, as
well as the provisions of the abovecited section 54 and paragraph 6
thereof of Act No. 926, for the reason that the said land is neither
mining nor timber land.
We refrain from mentioning herein what originally was the nature of
the land whereon was built the greatest cities of the world; and
confining ourselves to that on which the cities and towns in these
Islands were erected, it can not be denied that, at the commencement
of the occupation of this Archipelago by the Spaniards, and at the
time of the distribution of lands, the latter were rural and agricultural in
their nature. Rural also were the old towns, the cradle and foundation
of the present cities and large towns of the Philippines, and as the
inhabitants increased, and added to the number of their dwellings, the
farms gradually became converted into town lots.
In provincial towns, and in the suburbs of Manila, many houses are to
be seen that are erected on lots that form part of land used for
agricultural purposes. If for the time being, and to the advantage of
the possessors thereof, they have ceased to be such agricultural
lands, they may later on again become transformed into farming land
and, by the industry of the owner, again be made to yield fruit.
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation,
and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kind of
vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestall in its
nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of
agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of
agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again
become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress
contains only three classifications, and makes no special provision
with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be
agricultural land.
In the decision rendered by this court in the case of Mapa vs. The
Insular Government, No. 3793 (10 Phil. Rep., 175), the legislation in
force was interpreted in a similar sense.
It is not to be believed that it was the sense of the two sovereign
powers that have successively promulgated the said laws, to place
those in possession of building lots under title of ownership in an
anomalous, uncertain and insecure position, rendering it impossible
for them to obtain legal titles to the lands appropriated by them, and
denying them the care and protection of the law to which they were
certainly entitled on account of the efforts they have made, both in
their behalf, and for the benefit of the cities and towns in which they
reside, contributing to the wealth and increase of the country.
In the case at bar we have to deal with laws that were enacted after
almost all the towns of this Archipelago were established, and it must
be assumed that the lawmakers have started from the supposition
that titles to the building lots within the confines of such towns had
been duly acquired; therefore, in special cases like the present one,
wherein is sought the registration of a lot situated within a town
created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to apply
thereto the laws in force and classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch
as it was agricultural prior to its conversion into a building lot, and is
subject at any time to further rotation and cultivation; moreover, it
does not appear that it was ever mining or forest land.
It should be noted that article 1 of the royal decree and regulation of
the 25th of June, 1880, says: "In the Philippine Islands, all vacant
lands, soils, and grounds without a lawful private owner, or, which
have never been under private control, shall be deemed to be
alienable crown lands for the effects of the regulation, and in
accordance with law 14, title 12, book 4, of the Novísima
Recopilación;" that article 1 of the royal decree of the 14th of
February, 1894, states: "Vacant lands, soils, grounds, and mountains
in the Philippine Islands shall be deemed to be alienable Crown lands,
provided they are not included within the following exceptions: (1)
Those of private ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone; (3)
those comprised in the communal laws, or within zones reserved for
the use in common by residents of the community; and (4) those
lands which are susceptible of private appropriation by means of
composition or possessory information;" and that although section 13
of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, directs the Government of the
Philippine Islands to classify public lands that are neither forest nor
mining lands according to their agricultural character and
productiveness, section 14 authorizes and empowers the said
Government "to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in
said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required
by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for
the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of
title, etc.;" and section 15 authorizes and empowers the said
Government of the Philippine Islands "on such terms as it may
prescribed, by general legislation, to provide for the granting, or sale
and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of
said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands of the United States on said Islands, as it
may deem wise, etc."
From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is
deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the
mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the
sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and,
provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or
reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be
acquired by any private or judicial person; and considering their origin
and primitive state and the general uses to which they were accorded,
they are called agricultural lands, urban lands or building lots being
included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural
and urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation
they may have undergone is no obstacle to such classification as the
possessors thereof may again convert them into rural estates.
If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor timber land,
and on the other hand is susceptible of cultivation the Act of Congress
contains no provision whatever that would exclude it from being
classified as agricultural land, and assuming that it falls within that
classification, the benefits of paragraph 6, section 54, of Act No. 926,
must forthwith be applied for the reason that it has been fully proven
that the applicant was in possession thereof for more than 13 years
prior to the 26th of July, 1904, when the said Act went into effect.
Furthermore, there is no legal reason or cause to exclude urban lands
from the benefits of the aforesaid Act; on the contrary, the
interpretation that urban real estate, that is not mineral or forestall in
character, be understood to fall within the classification of agricultural
land, is deemed to be most rational and beneficial to public interests.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be reversed, and that it should be, as it is,
hereby ordered, that, after holding in general default all such persons
as may have any interest in the said parcel of land, the registration of
the same shall be granted in accordance with the Land Registration
Act. No special ruling is made as to costs. So ordered.
Willard, J., concurs.
Carson, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN
and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson
and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to
implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to
the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the
Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of
the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it
grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen.
Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen,
a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders
and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al),
filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of
the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle
of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect
and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage
like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be
dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan
Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation
of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP
and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and
pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties
and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they
reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during
the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein,
in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral
and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous
peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of
minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be
their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for
not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility
to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and
3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining
the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the
due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation
and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the
sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP
that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to
the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,
Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and
practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to
property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous
peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall
be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of
the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides
that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said
Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65
and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional
and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing
the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and
desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Vitug.
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant
funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
and DISMISSED.
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate
of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and Panganiban.
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation
of Philippine natural resources."7 SO ORDERED.
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted
as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an
opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions
of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part
II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the
other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on
the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of
R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await
the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009
PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and
JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of
Appeals (CA) December 19, 2003 Decision1 and July 14, 2004
Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573. The assailed decision affirmed
and upheld the June 30, 1997 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 4632 for Declaration
of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a
British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old
Filipina.4 On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot
(Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay,
Aklan, for and in consideration of ₱129,000.00.5 The sale was
allegedly financed by Benjamin.6 Joselyn and Benjamin, also using
the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually
converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the
Admiral Ben Bow Inn.7 All required permits and licenses for the
operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino,
Joselyn’s sister.8
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran
away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the
latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into
contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.9
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as
lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease10 (Agreement) involving
the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of
₱12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed
before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the
property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.1avvphi1
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered
into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted
an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that
his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the
Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s
husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the
petitioner in defeault. On March 14, 1994, the RTC rendered
judgment by default declaring the Agreement null and void.12 The
decision was, however, set aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
34054.13 The CA also ordered the RTC to allow the petitioner to file
his Answer, and to conduct further proceedings.
In his Answer,14 petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with
Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the Boracay
property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin.
Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a
witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the transaction
and, impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into by his
wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity
of the Agreement.
There being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial on the
merits ensued.
On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992 consisting of eight (8)
pages (Exhibits "T", "T-1", "T-2", "T-3", "T-4", "T-5", "T-6" and "T-7")
entered into by and between Joselyn C. Taylor and Philip Matthews
before Notary Public Lenito T. Serrano under Doc. No. 390, Page 79,
Book I, Series of 1992 is hereby declared NULL and VOID;
2. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff
the sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND (₱16,000.00) PESOS as damages
representing unrealized income for the residential building and
cottages computed monthly from July 1992 up to the time the property
in question is restored to plaintiff; and
3. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff
the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (₱20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, for attorney’s fees and other incidental expenses.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of
Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was
necessary to validate any contract involving the property. Benjamin’s
right over the Boracay property was bolstered by the court’s findings
that the property was purchased and improved through funds
provided by Benjamin. Although the Agreement was evidenced by a
public document, the trial court refused to consider the alleged
participation of Benjamin in the questioned transaction primarily
because his signature appeared only on the last page of the
document and not on every page thereof.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable
decision. In its December 19, 2003 Decision,16 the CA affirmed the
conclusions made by the RTC. The appellate court was of the view
that if, indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned
transaction, the parties to the Agreement should have used the
phrase "with my consent" instead of "signed in the presence of." The
CA noted that Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin
involving the Boracay property; it was therefore unnecessary for
Joselyn to participate in the execution of the Agreement. Taken
together, these circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that
the contract was null and void having been entered into by Joselyn
without the consent of Benjamin.
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for
review on certiorari based on the following grounds:
4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN
TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE
DATED 20 JULY 1992. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT HIS
CONSENT IS REQUIRED, BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS DEEMED TO
HAVE GIVEN HIS CONSENT WHEN HE AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE
IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE AS WITNESS IN THE LIGHT OF
THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
SPOUSES PELAYO VS. MELKI PEREZ, G.R. NO. 141323, JUNE 8,
2005.
4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF
LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR,
A FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT OF CHEESMAN VS. IAC, G.R.
NO. 74833, JANUARY 21, 1991.
4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED ARTICLE 96
OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH IS A
PROVISION REFERRING TO THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF
PROPERTY. THE PROPERTY REGIME GOVERNING THE
PROPERTY RELATIONS OF BENJAMIN TAYLOR AND JOSELYN
TAYLOR IS THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS BECAUSE
THEY WERE MARRIED ON 30 JUNE 1988 WHICH IS PRIOR TO
THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 96 OF THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES FINDS NO APPLICATION IN
THIS CASE.
4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE EXECUTION OF
NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS.
4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PASS
UPON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT WAS NOT CONTESTED AND DESPITE THE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM.17
The petition is impressed with merit.
In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement
of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the
consent of her British husband. In addressing the matter before us,
we are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law issues, but
more importantly, with a constitutional question.
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989.
Said acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the
vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposes under
her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin
sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he
was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds
used in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not
enter into a valid contract involving the subject property without his
consent.
The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations
of petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family
Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable
constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:18
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.1avvphi1
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the
aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands.19 The primary purpose of this constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.20 Our
fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of
the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations
at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.21
In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 cited in Muller v. Muller,23 we
had the occasion to explain the constitutional prohibition:
Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,"
and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited
to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be
defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result
that Section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue
through which agricultural resources may leak into alien’s hands. It
would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x
xx
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not
including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result
would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and
whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in
their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial
plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts,
markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words, strictly agricultural."
(Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6) That this is obnoxious to the
conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.24
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to
acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in
constitutionally recognized exceptions.25 There is no rule more
settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens
attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through
another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or
indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases
where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of
their father’s estate;26 that they be reimbursed the funds used in
purchasing a property titled in the name of another;27 that an implied
trust be declared in their (aliens’) favor;28 and that a contract of sale
be nullified for their lack of consent.29
In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui,30 Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen,
acquired a parcel of land, together with the improvements thereon.
Upon his death, his heirs (the petitioners therein) claimed the
properties as part of the estate of their deceased father, and sought
the partition of said properties among themselves. We, however,
excluded the land and improvements thereon from the estate of Felix
Ting Ho, precisely because he never became the owner thereof in
light of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition.
In Muller v. Muller,31 petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and
respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany. During the
subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land
in Antipolo City and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo
property was registered in the name of the petitioner. They eventually
separated, prompting the respondent to file a petition for separation of
property. Specifically, respondent prayed for reimbursement of the
funds he paid for the acquisition of said property. In deciding the case
in favor of the petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware
that as an alien, he was prohibited from owning a parcel of land
situated in the Philippines. He had, in fact, declared that when the
spouses acquired the Antipolo property, he had it titled in the name of
the petitioner because of said prohibition. Hence, we denied his
attempt at subsequently asserting a right to the said property in the
form of a claim for reimbursement. Neither did the Court declare that
an implied trust was created by operation of law in view of petitioner’s
marriage to respondent. We said that to rule otherwise would permit
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
In Frenzel v. Catito,32 petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to
Teresita Santos; while respondent, a Filipina, was married to Klaus
Muller. Petitioner and respondent met and later cohabited in a
common-law relationship, during which petitioner acquired real
properties; and since he was disqualified from owning lands in the
Philippines, respondent’s name appeared as the vendee in the deeds
of sale. When their relationship turned sour, petitioner filed an action
for the recovery of the real properties registered in the name of
respondent, claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the
other cases, the Court refused to declare petitioner as the owner
mainly because of the constitutional prohibition. The Court added that
being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and
ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money
or property by knowingly engaging in an illegal contract may not
maintain an action for his losses.
Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 petitioner (an
American citizen) and Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of land
that was later registered in the latter’s name. Criselda subsequently
sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. G.R. CV No. 59573, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not is entered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Philip
give his consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his Matthews.
(petitioner’s) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him
and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue SO ORDERED.
of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in
land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; thus, the sale as to him was null and void.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between
Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in
the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership
thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor;
no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no
declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had
and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease
of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he
was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance
indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a
decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.34
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and
petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin.
Thus, we uphold its validity.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the
other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 19, 2003
Decision and July 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original
land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed
and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision1 promulgated on
July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution2 promulgated on
November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal
appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming
the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a
resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro,
now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold
and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss
Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8)
315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private
oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding
taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be
issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a
petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of
land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application was
docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to
Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro.6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant
died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and
Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted
as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989
dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that
the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject
land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to
publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in
the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is
of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction
over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory
provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of
1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23
[of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in
the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the
Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is
mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of
general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is
indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be
powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also
in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a
requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that
the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of
Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the
challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus
elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's
counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy
should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final
disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition
as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule
65.9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave
abuse of discretion"10 in holding —
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case
No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation,
and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of
initial hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication
in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial
court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with
the notice requirement of due process."11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply
with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in
the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of
Appeals ruled:13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and
in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms,
it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded
the opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus,
it justified its disposition in this wise:14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required
procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other
requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by
mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were
complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is
minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall,
within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the
date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for
land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting.
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice
of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided,
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to
all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it
may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to
appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical
terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question
boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and
register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the
demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale
behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by
the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the
court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes
an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a
statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute
rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the
term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In
Republic vs. Marasigan,16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the
initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting,
all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the
requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition
who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining
properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is
essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of
general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.
17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the
land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose
rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an
application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a
party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land
registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence
not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in
the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of
realty.18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This task,
which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all
persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or
interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to
come to court and show cause why the application should not be
granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the
claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the
name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and
opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice
by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and
posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at
hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official
Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published
therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the
all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and
the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as
possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any
excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the
statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority
to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is
room only for application.19 There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the
legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision

and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of
private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without
prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83290 September 21, 1990
STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
This case arose from proceedings to annul a 1912 decision of the
land registration court.
In 1912, the Tribuna del Registro de la Propiedad (Court of Land
Registration) of Zambales, through Judge James Ostrand, in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 6431, confirmed the title of Justo de
Perio over two (2) parcels of land in Zambales. On August 28, 1912,
Decree No. 9328 was issued by the court ordering the registration of
the two (2) parcels of land in the name of De Perio. On December 6,
1912, Original Certificate of Title No. 48 of the Registry of Deeds of
Zambales was issued to De Perio. Parcel No. 1 consists of an area of
eleven thousand six hundred ninety-seven square meters (11,697
sq.m.) while Parcel No. 2 consists of three hundred forty thousand
eight hundred twenty square meters (340,820 sq.m.). In 1936, a
portion consisting of ten thousand four hundred square meters
(10,400 sq.m.) of Parcel No. 2 was sold to the Province of Zambales.
The sale was annotated at the back of OCT No. 48. In 1954, OCT No.
48 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1369 was issued to Mercedes de
Valencia pursuant to an extrajudicial settlement of De Perio's estate.
In 1962, De Valencia sold Parcel No. 1 to Ricardo Baloy. Baloy was
issued TCT No. T-7696 in 1966. In 1967, De Valencia subdivided
Parcel No. 2 into five (5) lots (Lots 2-A to 2-E). TCT No. T-1369 was
cancelled and TCT Nos. 11865, 11866, 11867, and 11869 were
issued to De Valencia. TCT No. 11 868, corresponding to the portion
previously sold to the Province of Zambales, was issued to the
Republic of the Philippines. In 1970, De Valencia sold the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 to petitioner Sta. Monica
Industrial and Development Corporation. TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866
were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-12054 and T-12055 were issued to
petitioner. Petitioner consolidated the two (2) parcels of land and
subdivided them into five hundred thirty-six (536) residential lots
which it sold to individual buyers.
In 1985, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for the annulment
of the decree in LRC No. 6431, OCT No. 48 (issued to De Perio), TCT
No. T-1369 (issued to De Valencia) and TCT No. T-7696 (issued to
Baloy). Respondent alleged that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was null
and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land was inside the U.S.
naval reservation and that it was still within the forest zone in 1912,
having been released therefrom only in 1961, and hence cannot be
the subject of disposition or alienation as private property. Named
defendants were De Valencia and her husband, Baloy and his wife
and the Register of Deeds of Zambales. The case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 06259.
The Baloy spouses filed their answer to the complaint.
With leave of court, petitioner intervened and filed an answer-in-
intervention. Later, petitioner filed its first motion for preliminary
hearing on the affirmative defense of res judicata, which the Court of
Appeals denied. Petitioner did not seek reconsideration thereof.
Trial on the merits ensued. The Republic offered its evidence,
consisting of a land classification map prepared by the Director of
Forestry in 1961 to prove that the land became alienable and
disposable only in 1961, and rested its case. Petitioner then
proceeded to present its evidence. This was, however, cut short when
the Republic moved to amend its complaint to include as party
defendants all the other transferees of the land and, thereafter, filed
its amended complaint. Petitioner again moved for a preliminary
hearing on its affirmative defense of res judicata in an effort to shorten
the proceedings.
The Court of Appeals, holding that res judicata cannot be invoked as
a bar to an action for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, denied the motion. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was also denied, hence this petition.
After the comment and reply were filed, the Court gave due course to
the petition and, as required, the parties filed their respective
memoranda.
On April 2, 1990, the Court set the case for hearing on May 7, 1990
because, as stated in the resolution:
...after deliberating extensively on it, the Court finds the need to hear
the oral arguments of the parties on issues which are considered
determinative of the case, including the following:
1. the nature and classification, under the pertinent laws traced
back to the turn of the century, of the two parcels of land decreed and
originally titled in 1912 to De Perio; and
2. the legal considerations that compelled the Government to
seek the annulment of the decree of the Court of Land Registration
issued in favor of De Perio, his title, and the titles of his successors-in-
interest.
The parties were heard in oral argument and thereafter they were
required to submit their memoranda in amplification of their
arguments.
The question presented before the Court is whether or not respondent
CA committed reversible error of law in denying petitioner's motion for
preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense of res judicata.
As iterated in a long line of cases, the following requisites must
concur for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case:
(1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action [San Diego v. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281
(1940); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,
G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; Yusingco v. Ong
Hing Lian, G. R. No. L-26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589;
Aroc v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. L-
39674, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 350; Republic v. Alagad, G.R.
No. 66807, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 455; Vencilao v. Vano G.R.
No.
L-25660, February 23, 1990].
In contending that the judgment in LRC No. 6431 should be annulled
because the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, the respondent Republic puts in issue the
presence of the second requisite. Therefore, the ultimate issue before
the Court is whether or not the land registration court had jurisdiction
over the two (2) parcels of land claimed by De Perio, the predecessor-
in-interest of the petitioner herein.
Necessarily, the resolution of this issue requires an inquiry into the
nature of the subject parcels of land in light of the laws prevailing at
the time the judgment in the land registration case was rendered.
Petitioner's primary argument, as summarized in its memorandum,
was as follows:
17. It must, therefore, be presumed that in LRC Case No. 6431, the
court found from the evidence adduced by the parties that (1) the two
parcels of land in question were agricultural lands as the phrase is
used in Act No. 926, (2) Justo de Perio had been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof for at least 10
years, before July 26, 1912, and (3) his possession of the said parcels
of land was in the concept of owner; and thus the court confirmed
Justo de Perio's title thereto and ordered their registration in his
name. If the Attorney General, the Director of Forestry, the Director of
Lands and the Director of Public Works opposed the application, then
it must be presumed that the court declared the said two parcels of
land to be agricultural lands over their opposition. If they did not
oppose, then it must be presumed that they agreed with the court that
the said lands were really agricultural lands. It must be pointed out
that the question as to whether the two parcels of land in question are
agricultural lands and not timber lands is a question of fact and the
finding of Judge Ostrand that they are agricultural can not be
reviewed by this Honorable Court at this point in time [Petitioner's
Memorandum, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 211-212].
Additionally, petitioner argued that the boundaries of the two parcels
of land, as described in Decree No. 9328, debunk the contention that
they are forest lands. The parcels of land were bounded by privately
owned property. Moreover, they were described in the notice
published in the March 1912 issue of the Official Gazette, pp. 766-767
as "lying within the Civil Reservation, town site of Olongapo, situated
in the municipality of Olongapo, Province of Zambales, P. I." [Annex
"A" of Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 222-223].
On the other hand, the public respondent, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, contended:
Records disclose that by virtue of Proclamation dated November 11,
1908, then Governor-General James F. Smith reserved for naval
purposes certain lands of the public domain in Subic, Zambales which
included the parcels of land embraced under Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 48 secured by De Perio in 1912. It was only in 1961
that such Proclamation was revoked by a subsequent issuance,
Proclamation No. 731, issued by then President Garcia on February
2, 1961 and such portions already classified as alienable and
disposable and not needed for government purposes were declared
open for disposition under R.A. No. 274, in relation to C.A. 141 and
Act No. 3038. This means that the lands, subject matter of the case,
were portions of the U.S. naval reservation and were declared open
for disposition only on February 2, 1961 [Public Respondent's
Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, p. 230].
Public respondent then reiterated that "[a]t the time Original Certificate
of Title No. 48 was issued on December 9, 1912, the parcel of land
covered by the title was still within the forest zone and it was not until
January 31, 1961 that said land was released by the Bureau of Forest
Development as alienable and disposable under Land Classification
Map No. 2427" [Ibid].
It also added that "Land Classification Map No. 665 dated June 7,
1927 ... shows that the parcels of land covered by OCT No. 48 were
still part of the unclassified public forest at the time of the registration"
[Public Respondent's Memorandum, p. 4; Rollo, p. 231].
Weighing the arguments raised by the parties, we find that the
Republic has failed to make out a convincing case for the annulment
of the decree in Land Registration Case No. 6431. It has been
established that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the
two (2) parcels of land, and that OCT No. 48 and the Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) derived from OCT No. 48 are valid.
Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into
law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect on July 26, 1904, was
the law applicable to De Perio's petition for confirmation of his title to
the two (2) parcels of land. It provided:
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in
right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such
lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by
said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a
bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except
when prevented by war or force majeure shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this
chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, a person who had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious session and occupation of public agricultural land for a
period of at least ten (10) years prior to July 24, 1904 could petition
for the confirmation of his title over the land he had so possessed and
occupied.
The land registration court confirmed De Perio's title to the two (2)
parcels of land after due notice and hearing. From this, the following
conclusions may be derived:
1. that the two (2) parcels of land are agricultural as defined by
law, i.e., that they are neither timber land nor mineral land [Mapa v.
Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175 (1908)];
2. that De Perio had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the two (2) parcels of land for
at least ten (10) years prior to 1904;
3. that his possession and occupancy was under a bona fide
claim of ownership; and
4. that under the law De Perio had title to the land as of 1904,
although it was confirmed only later in 1912.
These conclusions serve as premises to arrive at other conclusions
determinative of the case.
If the land is agricultural as defined by law, and as confirmed by
Judge Ostrand, it could not have been forest land as claimed by
public respondent, the subsequent land classification map
notwithstanding. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the two
(2) parcels of land were in the Olongapo townsite and were bounded
by privately-owned land.
If De Perio had title to the land in 1904, although still imperfect, then it
could not have been prejudiced by the proclamation of Governor-
General Smith in 1908 which reserved for naval purposes land in
Subic, Zambales. Said proclamation recognized the existence of
private rights, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
...por la presente exceptuo de venta o colonizacion hasta nueva
orden y separo para reserva naval, salvo los derechos privados,
todos y cada uno de los terrenos publicos comprendidos dentro de
los siguientes limites, a saber: [Proclamation del Gobernador General
de las Islas Filipinos, 11 Noviembre 1908, para. 2, 6 O.G. 1885 (2
December 1908)].
Public respondent has also failed to explain the Republic's sudden
interest in the annulment of the decree and the certificate of title
issued to De Perio and the subsequent titles issued to his successors
after some seventy-three (73) years of inaction and after a portion of
the land has been developed by petitioner into a subdivision and
hundreds of residences have been built thereon. At this point in time,
that portion of land developed into a subdivision cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, be conceived as forest land. Anyway, the area
wherein the two (2) parcels of land are found, were released from the
unclassified public forest and the territory comprising the Subic naval
reservation way back in 1961.
Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was
released in 1961. In a few more months, the possessors of the land
would acquire title to the portions they adversely possess through
acquisitive prescription, without need of title or of good faith, pursuant
to the Civil Code [Art. 1137].
Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an action to annul a
judgment, the burden of proving the judgment's nullity rests upon the
petitioner. The petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the judgment is fatally defective. When the proceedings
were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was
issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of
the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely
on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of
the decree in 1912. These maps fail to conclusively establish the
actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that.
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said 'contention and refers, for
the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales
as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are
parts thereof. These, for reasons discussed earlier, are insufficient to
overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity,
more so when we consider that notice of the application for
registration and the date of hearing thereof, addressed to the Attorney
General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the
Director of Forestry, among others, was published in the Official
Gazette and that Governor General Smith's Proclamation of 1908
itself recognizes private rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the Court of Appeals is
ordered to DISMISS CA-G.R. SP No. 06259.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Petitioner, v. RUPERTO A.
VILLAREAL, Respondent.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of
mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If
they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they
may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent’s
claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove
swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal
applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for
more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including
the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial,
the application was approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz.
1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director
of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject
to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the
private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no
dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the
legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner
claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private
respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before
us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the
Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the
country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural,
mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained
in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it
was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter
expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even
permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This
provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in
the present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force
when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be
alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A No. 141.
Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private
ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and
so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated
in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglares were defined by the Court
as:
". . . mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which
grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered
by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their
seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove
flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some
extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet
we are of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in
which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American
jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains.
x x x
"Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the
law, the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands
into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along the
coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted
one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of
which would destroy vested interests and prove a public
disaster."cralaw virtua1aw library
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so
susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared,
despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the
public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of
1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
"Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. — For the purpose of
this chapter ‘public forest’ includes, except as otherwise specially
indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove
swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court
maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it
held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
". . . the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish
translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as ‘terrenos forestales.’ We
think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation
would be ‘terrenos madereros. Timber land in English means land
with trees growing on it. The manglar plant would never be cited a
tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or
aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called ‘timber land.’
x x x
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa
swamps does not change the general character of the land from
manglare to timber land."
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section
1820, the Court declared:
"In the case of Mapa v. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this
Court said that the phrase ‘agricultural lands’ as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands.
"Whatever may have been the meaning of the term ‘forestry’ under
the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classifies the
public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
"The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the
Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to
its enactment.
"These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court
should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are
agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by
Act No. 926."
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de
Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than
fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917.
Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:jgc:
"The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land
covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in his
opponent’s Exh. I, but we think this opposition of the Director of
Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that
mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase
is used in the Act of Congress."
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based
on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling
was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice
Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural
in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of
the trial court that:jgc:
". . . Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow,
where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes
and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not
convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in
character. They do not form part of the public domain."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko
v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that
"all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps,
manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands."cralaw virtua1aw library
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a
line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12
promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries
has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands
forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified
as forest lands."
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13
the Court was more positive when it held, again through Justice
Gutierrez:jgc:
"The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be
classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
‘mangrove swamps.’ Although conceding that a ‘mangrove swamp’ is
included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that
no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first,
second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove
swamp, is still subject to land registration proceeding because the
property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already ‘private land’ better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification."
"The petition is without merit.
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers.’Forested lands’ do not have to be
on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as ‘forest’ is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply."
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
14 where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General’s submission
that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or
forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable.
This case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a
need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and
for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural
lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to
the legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional
provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even
permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The
legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials
may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our public
lands pursuant to their constitutional duty "to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed" and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For
their part the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by
the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is
claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive.
Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue
and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and
utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of
the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public
lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify
the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner
transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of
their administration and disposition."
"Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time
to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession
under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same
law provides:jgc:
"For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of
the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified,
according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as
follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public
uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the
classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in
a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another."cralaw
virtua1aw library
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states
as follows:
"Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves —
Revocation of same. — Upon the recommendation of the Director of
Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the President of
the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands
and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such
reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest
reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall
remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same
manner as public forest.
"The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation
alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time,
or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such
forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though
such proclamation had never been made.
"Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes.
— Lands in public forest, not including forest reserves, upon the
certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall
be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands."With
these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised
within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited
Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature
having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion.
The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less
noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department.
More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the requisite
conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is
thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our
statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove
swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
That determination having been made and no cogent argument
having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply
it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our
agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands
over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative
Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly
acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we
ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute
commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as
timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly
a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor
forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from
1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not
be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership
claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for
registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and
reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the
Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove
swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land
is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of
such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove
swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is
ineffectual because it is clearly inofficious. The Director of Lands was
not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is
the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether
forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses,
as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for
private ownership
Thus we held in the Yngson case:jgc:
"It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the
public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as
disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau
of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other
purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
"The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose
of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain
while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and
not released for fishery or other purposes."cralaw virtua1aw library
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:jgc:
"It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest
land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The
adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the
forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession
of forest land, no matter how long cannot convert it into private
property."
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent
were practically the only basis used by the appellate’ court in
sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and
much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in
countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his
right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly,
the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative
definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution
and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they
are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural
land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
and the application for registration of title of private respondent is
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.

We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in

nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive
possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the
existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the
original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the conditions
for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it
been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or
registered in the registry of property and that the land has been under
the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for
twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These
matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof,
which is lacking in this case.