FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003

BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of a Decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001, as well as its Resolutions dated
1

September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.

On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following Information against Benito
Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the
Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with unidentified persons, who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES,
who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato
Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them
to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of
their personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to the island of
Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with
the government’s campaign against illegal logging. The team was composed of Forester II Moises
dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto
Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team
leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian. 3

The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw two
yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting with the local barangay officials, the team
learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not
around at the time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay. 4

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats being constructed in
the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop
and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the DENR’s service pump boat and
proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with
the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor
Astorga. 5

When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian, approached Mayor
Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on
the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed, "Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha
Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay
puwede kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can make you swim back to Tacloban. Don’t you know
that I can box? I can box. Don’t you know that I can declare this a misencounter?) Mayor Astorga6

then ordered someone to fetch "reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes later, or between 5:00-
6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The
men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at
the team members. At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of his team’s mission. He
7 8

then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact his people at the DENR
in Catbalogan to inform them of the team’s whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed
Simon’s radio, saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon hain
kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig." (It’s better if you have no radio so that your office would not
know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for help). Mayor Astorga again slapped the right
9

shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri kamo
puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not tolerate
it here.) Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga
10

retorted that they would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to
Daram. Mayor Astorga then addressed the team, saying, "Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an
11

mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat
ipadakop an akon." (If you really want to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you
confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender mine.) Simon then tried to
12

reiterate his request for permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who
angrily said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro
istorya." (You cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many things to
discuss there.) 13

The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served dinner. The team
had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table, and the meal lasted between 7:00-
8:00 p.m. After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the
14

house, but not to leave the barangay. On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the
15

house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to leave. 16
1awphi1.nét

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and his men,
which led to the filing of the above-quoted Information.

Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the
offenses charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and
17

SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint Affidavit. However, the presentation of Simon’s testimony was not
18

completed, and none of his fellow team members came forward to testify. Instead, the members of
the team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 19
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENITO

ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correctional as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 20

The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 2001 which was denied by the
21

Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated September 28, 2001. A Second Motion for Reconsideration
22

dated October 24, 2001 was also filed, and this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10,
23

2002. 24

Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for review:

5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of Arbitrary Detention as defined and
penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, based on mere speculations, surmises and
conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5)
complaining witnesses wherein the latter categorically declared petitioner’s innocence of the crime
charged. 25

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused, especially in light of the fact that the private complainants executed a
26

Joint Affidavit of Desistance. Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of the case is there any
27

competent evidence that could sufficiently establish the fact that restraint was employed upon the
persons of the team members. Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed men at the
28

scene does not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the minds of
the team members, to the extent that they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. 29

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person. The elements of the crime are:
30

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds. 31

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar
is not disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or
employee, is undeniably present.

Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by
some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his "instinct for
self-preservation" and the feeling that he was being "singled out." The detention was thus without
32

legal grounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.

What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta, which involved the illegal detention of a child, we found the
33

accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show that any physical
restraint was employed upon the victim. However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and
he was warned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned, he was
practically a captive in the sense that he could not leave because of his fear to violate such
instruction. 34

In the case of People v. Cortez, we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his
35

liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom
of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to
the owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave
the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she do so.
We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they
had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we
concluded that fear has been known to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an
individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or
violence. 36

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s
liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and actuations of
the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the
extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the
wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and
the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by
37

the call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. Given 38

such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s statement that it was not "safe" to
refuse Mayor Astorga’s orders. It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident
39

effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The
intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainants, suffice it to say
that the principles governing the use of such instruments in the adjudication of other crimes can be
applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the sole consideration that can result
in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge. Here, there are no such circumstances. Indeed, the belated claims made in
40

the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations that the incident was the result of a
misunderstanding and that the team acceded to Mayor Astorga’s orders "out of respect," are belied
by petitioner’s own admissions to the contrary. The Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private
41

complainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged in the information and
proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the
case. This conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
1awphi1.nét

11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity and improving DENR relations
with the local Chiefs Executive and other official of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and
project can be effectively implemented through the support of the local officials for the betterment of
the residence living conditions who are facing difficulties and are much dependent on government
support. 42

Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence, pointing out that the
Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that
SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants in the case. He also makes much of the fact
43

that prosecution witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly privy to, and knowledgeable of,
what exactly transpired between herein accused and the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon,
from their alleged ‘confrontation,’ until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2
September 1997." 44

It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court’s factual findings are conclusive and binding upon
appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. Nothing in the case at bar prompts us to deviate
45

from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants is
completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be
exclusively supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor
Astorga’s claim that SPO1 Capoquian was "not exactly privy" to what transpired between Simon and
himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian testified that he accompanied Simon when the
latter went to talk to petitioner. He heard all of Mayor Astorga’s threatening remarks. He was with
46 47

Simon when they were encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14
rifles. In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances which led to the Arbitrary Detention
48

of the team at the hands of Mayor Astorga.

Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy. Lucob-
Lucob or whether they had simply decided to "while away the time" and take advantage of the
purported hospitality of the accused. On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied
49

that they were simply "whiling away the time" between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their
departure early the following morning. SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that they did
50

not use the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following
morning to "enjoy the place" and that, given a choice, they would have gone home. 51

Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge", because the ponente
of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate and advocate when he propounded "very
extensive clarificatory questions" on the witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not
an idle arbiter during a trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to ferret out
the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be assailed on the ground that clarificatory questions
were asked during the trial.52

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that, where the
detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to
two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to
a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion
in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed by public officials in committing arbitrary
or illegal detention, and called for the intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by government officers form
part of our statute books even before the advent of American sovereignty in our country. Those
provisions were already in effect during the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American
rule; continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were not
repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign Republic of
the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violations of said provisions,
it is very seldom that prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact that the erring
individuals happened to belong to the same government to which the prosecuting officers belong. It
is high time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting officers
should not answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or
illegal detention.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code
will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as depicted
in this case. The responsible officials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees’ right
to the indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental
rights.
53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Azcuna, J., on leave.

Footnotes

Records, p. 255; penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, concurred in by

1

Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

2
Records, p. 1 (italics and emphasis in the original).

3
TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 6; Exhibit B, p. 1.

4
Id., pp. 7-8; Exhibit B, p. 1.

5
Id., pp. 8-9; Exhibit B, p. 1.

6
Id., pp. 10-12; Exhibit B, p. 1; TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 6.

7
Id., pp. 14-16; Exhibit B, p. 1.
8
Exhibit B, p. 2.

9
TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 13; Exhibit B, p. 2.

10
Exhibit B, p. 2.

11
TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 19.

12
Exhibit B, p. 2.

13
Id.

14
TSN, August 15, 2000, pp. 7, 39.

15
Id., pp. 9, 22.

16
Id., pp. 25, 36.

17
Records, pp. 129, 135.

18
TSN, August 14-15, 2000; Exhibit B.

19
Records, p. 158.

20
Id., p. 265 (emphasis in the original).

21
Id., p. 271.

Id., p. 306; penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, concurred in by Associate

22

Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

23
Id., p. 315.

Id., p. 370; penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, concurred in by Associate

24

Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

25
Rollo, p. 18.

26
Id., pp. 18-19.

27
Id., p. 35; Records, p. 158.

28
Id., pp. 25-26.

29
Id., p. 27.

30
Revised Penal Code, art. 124.
 II Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 43 (14th ed. 1998); citing U.S. v. Braganza, 10 Phil. 79
31

[1908] and Milo v. Salanga, G.R. No. 37007, 20 July 1987, 152 SCRA 113 (emphasis in the
original).

32
Rollo, pp. 30-31.

33
107 Phil. 360 [1960].

34
Id.; emphasis supplied.

381 Phil. 345 [2000]; citing People v. Dela Cruz, 342 Phil. 854 [1997] and People v. Ramos,
35

358 Phil. 261 [1998].

36
Id.; citing People v. Hope, 177 N.E. 402, 257 N.Y. 147.

37
TSN, August 14, 2000, pp. 19-20; TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 17.

38
Id., pp. 14-16; Exhibit B, p. 1.

39
TSN, August 15, 2000, pp. 19-20.

40
People v. Ballabare, 332 Phil. 384 [1996].

41
Records, p. 158; Rollo, pp. 27, 30-31, 32-33, 41.

42
Id., p. 159.

43
Rollo, pp. 28-29.

44
Id., p. 20.

People v. Torellos, G.R. No. 143084, 1 April 2003; citing People v. Daramay, G.R. Nos.
45

140235 & 142748, 9 May 2002.

46
TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 10; Exhibit B, p.1.

47
Id., pp. 10-14, Exhibit B, pp.1-2.

48
Id., p. 15; Exhibit B, p.1.

49
Rollo, pp. 24-25.

50
TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 36.

51
Id., p. 26.

52
People v. Pinuela, G.R. Nos. 140727-28, 31 January 2003.

53
Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 983 [1947]; concurring opinion of Justice Perfecto.
BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 154130-August 20, 2004

FACTS
On September 1, 1997, private offended parties together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1
Rufo Capoquian, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence
operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats
measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob.
There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of
the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for
reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at
the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner
and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention

Held: Petitioner Benito Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear
in the minds of the private offended parties. The court fail to discern any element of fear from the
narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their
mission. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the
barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that
petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by
boat.

Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether
petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure,
capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties
were taken to petitioner’s house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is
equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and
drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea
travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains and ate together with the private offended parties and
even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile
confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic
drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a
matter of right. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of
which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man
than to convict an innocent man.