Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
3. Bar Course: Remedial Law; Lis Pendens and Doctrine of Exhaustion of Admin Remedies
Question: What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Answer: Jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is
a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted
first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal
to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed
for lack of cause of action.
Question: Under what instances the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled?
Answer: Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary
to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." In the same vein, case law likewise
instructs that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled in situations where: (a) there are exceptional
circumstances imputable to the party who caused the annotation; (b) the litigation was unduly prolonged
to the prejudice of the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; (c) the case
which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the part of the
plaintiff; or (d) judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a notatiom. In the case, Since
the Tenancy Case had already been decided against Sps. Gonzales with finality, it is but proper that the
PARAD order the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens subject of this case.
(Spouses Ramon and Ligaya Gonzales Vs. Marmaine Realty Corporation ;G.R. No. 214241.
January 13, 2016)
Finally, it emphasized that officials and employees of the judiciary are prohibited from engaging directly
in any private business, vocation, or profession even outside office hours to ensure full-time service and
avoid undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of cases. (Antonio A.
Fernandez Vs. Mila A. Alerta; A.M. No. P-15-3344. January 13, 2016)
Question: Is the payment of reasonable amount of cash/surety bond sufficient to suspend the period to
perfect the appeal?
Answer: To ensure that the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure that give
parties the chance to seek a reduction of the appeal bond are effectively carried out, without however
defeating the benefits of the bond requirement in favor of a winning litigant, all motions to reduce bond
that are to be filed with the NLRC shall be accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond
equivalent to 10% of the monetary award that is subject of the appeal, which shall provisionally be
deemed the reasonable amount of the bond in the meantime that an appellant's motion is pending
resolution by the Commission.. In this case, the posting of a P400,000.00 cash bond equivalent to more
than 20% of the monetary judgment, together with the Motion to Reduce Bond within the reglementary
period was sufficient to suspend the period to perfect the appeal. The posting of the said partial bond
coupled with the subsequent posting of a surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary judgment
also signified QFI's good faith and willingness to recognize the final outcome of its appeal. (Quantum
Foods, Inc. Vs. Marcelino Esloyo and Glen Magsila; G.R. No. 213696. December 9, 2015)
Question: Whether a certiorari petition is correct remedy for dismissal of the RTC Order dismissing with
prejudice the injunction case.
Answer: No. An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because
the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. A final order is
appealable, in accordance with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) declaring that "[a]n appeal may be taken from a judgment or fmal order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable."
In light of the foregoing rule, respondents' remedy from the March 1, 2010 and August 11, 2010 RTC
Orders, which dismissed with prejudice the injunction case, was therefore an ordinary appeal. To perfect
the same, respondents should have filed a notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.
However, instead of doing so, respondents erroneously filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on
October 30, 2010, or way beyond the reglementary period within which to perfect an ordinary appeal.
Given the improper remedy taken, the order of dismissal rendered by the RTC has, thus, become fmal and
immutable.(Rolando S. Abadilla, Jr. Vs. Sps. Bonifacio P. Obrero, et al.; G.R. No. 210855. December
9, 2015)
11. Bar Course: Criminal Law: Falsification for the crime of falsification of private documents
Question No. 1: Is Manansala (Manansala) criminally liable for the crime of Falsification of Private
Documents, defined and penalized under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (4), of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC)?
Answer: The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC are: (a)
that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of the same
Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such
damage. On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC are as follows:
(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are
absolutely false. In the instant case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found Manansala guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash Custodian, she is
legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents she prepares in connection with
her work, such as the subject report; (b) she knew all along that Siy never made any cash advance nor
utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c) despite such knowledge, she still proceeded in
revising the subject report by inserting therein a statement that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d)
she caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter was terminated from her job on account of the falsified
report that she prepared.
Question No. 2 : Is it correct to appreciate as "mitigating circumstance" the acting under an impulse
of uncontrollable fear?
Answer: No. "Acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating circumstances
enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12 (6) of
the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an accused, the
following elements must concur: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real
and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed.29 For
such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending,
and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act
be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. (Adina B. Manansala Vs. People of the Philippines;
G.R. No. 215424. December 9, 2015)
Answer: No. An employee has the right to security of tenure, but this does not give him a vested right to
his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him
where his service, as security guard, will be most beneficial to the client. Temporary "off-detail" or the
period of time security guards are made to wait until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or
client does not constitute constructive dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond six (6)
months. The onus of proving that there is no post available to which the security guard can be assigned
rests on the employer. (Vicente C. Tatel Vs. JLFP Investigation and Security Agency, Inc., et al.;
G.R. No. 206942. December 9, 2015)
Answer: Placing a security guard in temporary "off-detail" or "floating status" is part of management
prerogative of the employer-security agency and does not, per se, constitute a severance of the employer-
employee relationship. However, being an exercise of management prerogative, it must be exercised in
good faith - that is, one which is intended for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements.41 Moreover, due to the grim economic consequences to the security guard in which he does
not receive any salary while in temporary "off-detail" or "floating status," the employer-security agency
should bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the security guard
temporarily out of work can be assigned.Furthermore, the security guard must not remain in such status
for a period of more than six (6) months; otherwise, he is deemed terminated.. (Rafael B. Quillopa Vs.
Quality Guards Services and Investigation Agency and Ismael Basabica, Jr.; G.R. No. 213814.
December 2, 2015)
Answer: Yes. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater weight
of the credible evidence," is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be held civilly liable
where the facts established by the evidence so warrant,as in the case.(Dolores Diaz Vs. People of the
Philippines and Leticias S. Arcilla; G.R. No. 208113. December 2, 2015)
17. Bar Course: Remedial Law: Petition for Review under Rule 42
Question: Is CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for review for failure of Sps. Cayago to file
the same within the reglementary period despite that motions for extension to file pleadings has been
submitted to CA?
Answer: Yes. Appeals are perfected when it is filed within the period prescribed under the Rules of Court.
Specifically, Section 1,38 Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals to the CA taken from a
decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction should be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days, counted from notice of the judgment appealed from or from the denial of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. The original 15-day period to appeal is extendible for an additional 15 days
upon the filing of a proper motion and the payment of docket fees within the reglementary period of appeal.
Failure to successfully comply with the aforementioned procedure, especially in filing the appeal within
the prescribed period, renders the petition for review dismissible. However, where strong considerations
of substantial justice are present, the stringent application of technical rules could be relaxed in the exercise
of equity jurisdiction as in cases where petitioners showed no intent to delay the final disposition of the
case (Spouses Amador C. Cayago, Jr. and Ermalinda B. Cayago Vs. Spouses Evelito Cantara and
Soledad Cantara; G.R. No. 203918. December 2, 2015)
18. Bar Course: Remedial Law: Remedial Law and Political Law – Certiorari under Rule 65 and
Constitutionality of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770
Question: Whether the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy?
Answer:Yes. The case fall under the exception exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on
the authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. As a general rule, a motion for
reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity
for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of
the fundamental powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that
demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution.
Answer Yes. In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay,
Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an
interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.In several cases decided, the Court has ruled that Rule 65
petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA,
and not directly before this Court.
Question: Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?
Answer: Yes. The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.
The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing,
took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of
judicial power.
Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same
as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to
be a violation of the separation of powers principle. In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of
Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does
not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to
carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no
provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770-
attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian Case should squarely apply since the above-
stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or particular
subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman. (Conchita Carpio
Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman Vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) and Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Sr. G.R. Nos. 217126-27. November 10, 2015)
19. Bar Course: Remedial Law: Jurisdiction over the subject matter
Question: Whether Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter ( Intra-Corporate Dispute/Case)?
Answer: Yes. The Dismissal is incorrect. Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate
dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of
the designated Special Commercial Court, in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from
the time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
nature of the action.43 Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, e.g.,
Branch 276, instead of being assigned to the sole Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, which is Branch 256. This error may have been caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e.,
"Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages.
Answer: Yes - Considering that it relates to petitioners' averred rights over the shares of stock offered for
sale to other stockholders, having paid the same in full. Applying the relationship test and the nature of the
controversy test, the suit between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.
(Manuel Luis C. Gonzales and Francis Martin D. Gonzales Vs. GJH Land, Inc., et al.; G.R. No.
202664. November 10, 2015)
Question: Simulation takes place when the parties do not really want the contract they have executed to
produce the legal effects expressed by its wordings. Simulation or vices of declaration may be either
absolute or relative. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the
parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter when the parties conceal their true agreement. An
absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third
person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy binds the parties to their agreement.
Here, The failure of Sulit to take possession of the property purportedly sold to her was a clear
badge of simulation that rendered the whole transaction void and without force and effect, pursuant to
Article 1409 of the Civil Code. The fact that she was able to secure a Certificate of Title to the subject
property in her name did not vest her with ownership over it. A simulated deed of sale has no legal effect;
consequently any transfer certificate of title (TCT) issued in consequence thereof should be cancelled. A
simulated contract is not a recognized mode of acquiring ownership. (Renee B. Tanchuling, et al. Vs.
Sotero C. Cantela; G.R. No. 209284. November 10, 2015)
Question: Should the accused be held administratively liable despite the dismissal of criminal case by
the Office of the Ombudsman?
Answer:Yes Borja administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.The
dismissal of the criminal case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case, in consonance
with the rule that a criminal case is separate from an administrative case and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to each case Moreover, in criminal cases, the guilt of the
accused must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt before a conviction could be had, while
liability in administrative cases is only hinged on the lesser threshold of substantial evidence, defined as
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
(Office of the Ombudsman, represented by Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales Vs. Roger F. Borja/Lerma
S. Prudente and Damaso T. Abray Vs. Roger F. Borja; G.R. No. 201830/G.R. No. 201882. November
10, 2015)
Answer: The respondent's failure to carefully double-check the draft of the original SPA submitted to him
by his secretary led him to notarize a document which did not reflect the true intent of his client. His attempt
to escape administrative sanctions by pinning the blame on his secretary cannot be condoned as case law
instructs that in these instances, the lawyer himself, not merely his secretary, should be held accountable
for these kinds of misdeeds. Respondent-Lawyer himself caused the intercalation of the notarized SPA by
inserting handwritten alterations therein which changed its meaning - thus, violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Absent any competent proof, respondent's assertion that he was
verbally authorized by Magbuhos in altering the SPA is self-serving and cannot be given any credence. A
notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of
the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.(Elena Biete Leones Vda. De Miller Vs. Atty. Rolando B. Miranda; A.C. No. 8507.
November 10, 2015)
Question: Is mere inclusion as shareholder in General Information Sheet sufficient to prove that he is
shareholder of Company?
Answer: No. The mere inclusion as shareholder of petitioners in the General Information Sheet of PFSC
is insufficient proof that they are shareholders of the company.While it may be true that petitioners were
named as shareholders in the General Information Sheet submitted to the SEC, that document alone does
not conclusively prove that they are shareholders of PFSC. The information in the document will still
have to be correlated with the corporate books of PFSC. As between the General Information Sheet and
the corporate books, it is the latter that is controlling
Question: What are the 2 requisites in the application for the appointment of a management committee?
Answer: SEC. 1. Creation of a management committee. - As an incident to any of the cases filed under
these Rules or the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, a party may apply for the appointment of a
management committee for the corporation, partnership or association, when there is imminent danger
(1) Dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets or other properties; and
(2) Paralyzation of its business operations which may be prejudicial to the interest of the minority
stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public. (F & S Velasco Company, Inc., et al. Vs. Dr.
Rommel L. Madrid, et al.; G.R. No. 208844. November 10, 2015)
Question: What is the rule in filing a motion to withdraw Appeal in CTA en Banc?
Answer:A perusal of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA) reveals the lack of
provisions governing the procedure for the withdrawal of pending appeals before the CTA. Hence,
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 1 of the RRCTA, the Rules of Court shall suppletorily apply:
Sec. 3. Applicability of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court in the Philippines shall apply suppletorily
to these Rules.
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court - an adjunct rule to the appellate procedure in the CA under Rules 42, 43,
44, and 46 of the Rules of Court which are equally adopted in the RRCTA36 - states that when the case is
deemed submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing of the appellee's brief may
still be allowed in the discretion of the court:
RULE 50
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL
xxxx
Section 3. Withdrawal of appeal. — An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing
of the appellee's brief. Thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis supplied) (Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vs. Nippon Express (Phils.) Corporation;
G.R. No. 212920. September 16, 2015)
Answer: The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any
and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated
in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarity liable with the corporation
or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages(Jakerson G. Gargallo Vs. Dohel Seafront
Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al.; G.R. No. 215551. September 16, 2015)
Further, two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable: first, that the injury or
illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during
the term of the seafarers employment contract. (Jose Rudy L. Bautista Vs. Elburg Shipmanagement
Philippines, Inc. Augustea Shipmanagement Italy, and/or Captain Antonio S. Nombrado; G.R. No.
206032. August 19, 2015)
In contrast, constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment
is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay and other benefits. (Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc., and Antonio Steven L. Chan
Vs. Jane T. Siason; G.R. No. 215555. July 29, 2015)
43. Bar Course: Remedial Law: Filing of Petition for Review – Extension
Question: Can the filing of Petition for review before CA can be extended?
Answer: Yes.As a general rule, a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.30 This is in accordance with the
amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC31 where no provision for the filing of a motion for
extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the previous Section 4, Rule 6532 of the Rules of
Court which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding
15 days.33
Under exceptional cases, however, the Court has held that the 60-day period may be extended subject to
the court’s sound discretion.34
The Court laid down the following recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the 60-day
reglementary period: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice
not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice
and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with
the rules.
(Central Bicol State University of Agriculture, represented by its President, Atty. Marito T.
Bernales Vs. Province of Camarines Sur, represented by Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte,
Jr. and Gawad Kalinga Foundation, Inc., represented by its Executive Director, Jose Luis
Oquiñena, and its Camarines Sur Chapter Head, Harry Azana; G.R. No. 210861. July 29, 2015)