Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The MIT Press and American Academy of Arts & Sciences are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Daedalus.
http://www.jstor.org
Anne-Marie Slaughter
quences, for good or ill. In other words, of a very different kind of world order in
members of a government network are the growing system of government net
In this system, political power
likely to try to meet agreed standards of works.
behavior and substantive will remain primarily in the hands of na
professional
commitments to one another because tional government officials, but will be
else iswatching. a select group of supra
they know everyone supplemented by
In the context of the larger drama of national institutions far more effective
- than those we know
global justice capturing terrorists, try today. And in it,
creating new interna could become more than a
ing war criminals, global justice
- Iwill de
tional courts the activities dream.
justice requires order, and order requires 1 he logs of embassies around the world
-
at least ameasure of regulation or, in are the best evidence for the
perhaps
the global sphere, some form of gover growing importance of the networks of
nance, short of the Leviathan that Kant national regulators. U.S. embassies, for
feared creating. The emergent global instance, host far more officials from
system of government networks per various regulatory agencies than from
forms precisely this function. Within the State Department, and foreign af
this system, national and supranational fairs budgets for regulatory agencies
officials must cooperate, coordinate, and across the board have increased dramati
but without coercive as the State
regulate, power. cally, even Department's
Each member of a transgovernmental budget has shrunk. Regulators, at both
- a securities
network national regulator, the ministerial and bureaucratic level,
-
or a utilities commissioner ex are a new of diplo
say, may becoming generation
ercise ameasure power at
of coercive mats.
home. But within the network, regula Where are these networks of national
tors cannot compel one another to take In some familiar places, and
regulators?
certain measures, either by vote or the in some surprising ones. Briefly Iwill
binding force of international law. They outline the genesis of several such net
do not have the power to conclude trea works.
together to make rules. Trade ministers cial reform proposals from the G-22 that
dominated GATT ;finance ministers ran were
subsequently by the G-7
endorsed
the IMF; defense and foreign ministers (now the G-8). The United States pushed
met at NATO ;central bankers at the for the formation of the G-22 in 1997 to
Bank for International Settlements create a network of
transgovernmental
(bis)."2 officials from both developed and devel
More recently, transgovernmental net oping countries, largely to counter the
works have arisen through executive Eurocentric bias of the G-7, the Basle
agreement. Between 1990 and 2000, the Committee, and the IMF's Interim Com
U.S. president and the president of the mittee, which is itself a group of finance
European Union (eu) Commission con ministers.
cluded a series of agreements to foster Even more striking are the transgov
increased cooperation, including the ernmental networks that have emerged
Transatlantic Declaration of 1990, the more or less These have
spontaneously.
New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 (with been formed in two main ways. Some
a U.S.-EU action networks have institutionalized them
joint plan attached),
and the Transatlantic Economic Partner selves as
transgovernmental regulatory
ship agreement of 1998. Each of these organizations. The Basle Committee on
agreements spurred ad hoc meetings be Banking Supervision was created in 1974
tween lower-level officials, as well as and is now composed of the representa
among business enterprises and envi tives of thirteen central banks that regu
ronmental and consumer activist late the world's largest banking markets.
groups, on issues of common concern. The InternationalOrganization of Secu
Many of these networks of lower-level rities Commissioners ( IOS CO) emerged
officials were anyway, for in 1984, followed in the 1990s by the cre
emerging
functional reasons, but they undoubted ation of the International Association of
a boost from agreements at and of a network
ly received Insurance Supervisors
the top. of all three of these organizations and
Or consider the web of transgovern other national and international officials
mental networks among financial offi for financial
responsible stability around
the world called the Financial Stability
2 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
Forum. These networks do not fit the
"The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation model of an organization held either by
and Problems of Democratic pa international or scien
Legitimacy,"
lawyers political
per prepared for the American Political Science - are not
tists they composed of states
Convention, Washington, D.C., 31 August-3
ments embrace principles that can be It isworth bearing in mind that the
implemented by the regulators them governing committees of the 'global'
selves ; they do not need further approval organizations I have just described are
from national legislators. Widespread mainly comprised of ministers from the
use of Memoranda of Understanding most powerful economies. The Basle
and of even less formal initiatives has Committee, for example, is explicitly
through formal organized bodies, such practices. The Basle Committee of Cen
as Interpol (International Criminal Po tral Bankers, the International Organiza
lice Organization) and Europol, and on a tion of Securities Commissioners, and
more
regional and bilateral level through financial regulators around the world
national agencies. For instance, Interpol have all issued codes of best practices,
has a general secretariat that provides in on
everything from how to regulate the
formation an auto securities market to how to prevent
exchange through
regulators will judge domestic and trans tiala documents, replication, regardless
national activities within their compe of motives, is a clear and measurable ef
tence. fect of transgovernmental interaction.6
Best practices can also be disseminat
ed in a less formal manner. Since 1997, to providing
In addition part of the crit
the Public Utility Research Center at the ical infrastructure for any hope of global
University of Florida has hosted eleven networks
justice, transgovernmental
International on Util teach us several lessons that are vital for
Training Programs
ity Regulation and Strategy in coopera future efforts to achieve on a
anything
tion with the WorldBank. The program
global scale.
brings together senior public utility reg First is the value of soft power, not as a
ulators to address the "principal areas of substitute but as a complement, for hard
concern" faced by utility regulators power. Second is the value and strength
worldwide. Reports from the organizers, of pluralism, based on a concept of legit
such as from British water regulators imate difference. Third is the need for
and Russian electricity regulators, attest active cooperation and collaboration, an
to the nature of the international best ethos of positive rather
engagement
practice that prevails.
transfer than of respectful noninterference. Fi
Information as discussed networks are a direct
exchange, nally, governance
above, may be an end in itself or ameans of the disaggregation of the
- outgrowth
to future cooperation. And whether an state - that is, of the ability of different
ulterior motive or an unintended effect institutions to interact with
political
-
the replication of a particular form of their national and supranational coun
or of a type of reg on a basis.
regulation, particular terparts quasi-autonomous
ulatory institution, might accompany it. That disaggregation the creation
permits
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Com of awide range of new forms of gover
mission, for instance, enters into bilater nance, including between
relationships
al agreements with securities regulators national and international courts, that
all over the world with the explicit aim will be the backbone of a genuinely glob
of replicating itself and its relationship al justice system.
with Congress.
Treatises on 6 Kai Raustiala, "The Architecture of Interna
globalization speak glibly
of 'convergence,' as if forces tional : Net
impersonal Cooperation Transgovernmental
works and the Future of International Law,"
were at work homogenizing national
Journal International Law 43 (2002).
cultures and institutions. A closer exam Virginia of
jection of domestic institutions onto a free speech, and the enforceability and
we should be less scope of economic, social, and cultural
global screen, thinking
- courts
of replicating domestic institutions rights. Ordinary involved in
courts, regulatory even transnational are com
agencies, legisla litigation openly
tures - at the global level, than of con municating with one another to try to
necting the national institutions we al out where and how a
figure particular
in global networks. case should be tried. And
ready have These bankruptcy
government institutions exercise an in judges are negotiating mini-treaties to
measure of coercive power, ensure the of de
dispensable orderly management '
combined with an as yet unmatched funct multinational corporations fi
measure of public legitimacy. nances. All of these open
developments
Further, once we have got used to new institutional horizons for the possi
thinking about domestic government in bility of global justice.
stitutions linking up with their foreign
counterparts, it is also easier to start A he new world order has thus far pro
about how they might link up a
thinking moted healthy amount of transgovern
with supranational equivalents. mental comity. "Neither amatter of ob
Here the judicial possibilities are
by far ligation
on the one hand, nor of mere
the richest. As has been demonstrated in
courtesy and good will on the other...
the EU, it is possible for a supranational in the words of the U.S. Su
comity,"
court such as the European Court of Jus Court in 1895, "is the recognition
preme
tice to forge a dynamic and highly effec which one nation allows within its terri
tive relationship with different national
tory to the legislative, executive, or judi
courts for the interpretation and appli cial acts of another nation_"7 'Recog
cation of EU law. The International nition' is generally a
passive affair, sig
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the to another nation's ac
naling deference
former Yugoslavia also have structured tion, as regulators participating in gov
relationships with national courts built ernment networks must often choose
into their charters ; they can ask a na
tional court to cede jurisdiction over a 7 Hilton v 159 US 113,163 -164 (1895).
Guyot,