Evidence2018–Lecture8

A.6. Dead Man’s Statute. Founded on truism that “death seals the lips of a person”.
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party x x
– Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative o a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim
or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such person or before such person became of unsound
mind.
This rule “applies only to a civil case or a special proceeding over the estate of a deceased or insane person”.

1. The defendant in this case is the executor or administrator or a representative of the deceased or the person
of unsound mind;

2. The suit is upon a claim by the plaintiff against the estate of said deceased person of unsound mind;

3. The witness is the plaintiff, or an assignor of that party, or a person in whose behalf the case is prosecuted;
and,

4. The subject of the testimony is as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person
or before such person became of unsound mind.
- When a counterclaim is set up by the administrator of the estate, the case is removed from the operation of the “dead
man’s statute”. The plaintiff may testify t occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim
which i not brought against the representative of the estate by the said representative
Lecture Outline No. 8
OUTLINE/ LECTURE ON OFFER OF EVIDENCE AND OBJECTIONS UNDER THE RULES OF COURT AS MODIFIED
BY THE JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE

1. Comparative Analysis of Rules on Offer of Evidence & Objections Unde the Rules of Court and the Judicial
Affidavit Rule
NOTE: Pursuant to the Judicial Affidavit Rule, a much later enactment than the Rules of Court, “Section 11. Repeal
or modification of inconsistent rules. – The provisions of the Rules of Court and the rules of procedure governing
investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence are repealed or modified
insofar as these are inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule”.

Sections 34 to 40, Rules of Court Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12- 8-8-SC)

Section 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in
consider no evidence which has not been formally judicial affidavit. – The party presenting the judicial
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is affidavit of his witness in place of direct testimony
shall state the purpose of such testimony at the
offered must be specified. (35)
Section 35. When to make offer. — As regards the
testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at
the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered
after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless
allowed by the court to be done in writing. (n)
Section 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence
offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course
of the oral examination of a witness shall be made
as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to
within three (3) days after notice of the unless a
different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be
specified. (36a)
Section 37. When repetition of objection
unnecessary. — When it becomes reasonably
apparent in the course of the examination of a
witness that the question being propounded are of
the same class as those to which objection has been
made, whether such objection was sustained or
overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the
objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party to
record his continuing objection to such class of
questions. (37a)
Section 38. Ruling. — The ruling of the court must
be given immediately after the objection is made,
unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to
inform itself on the question presented; but the
ruling shall always be made during the trial and at
such time as will give the party against whom it is
made an opportunity to meet the situation
presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection
need not be stated. However, if the objection is
based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining
the objection on one or some of them must specify
the ground or grounds relied upon. (38a)
Section 39. Striking out answer. — Should a
witness answer the question before the adverse
party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection
to the same, and such objection is found to be
meritorious, the court shall sustain the objection
and order the answer given to be stricken off the
record.
start of the presentation of the witness. The
adverse party may move to disqualify the witness or
to strike out his affidavit or any of the answers
found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court
shall promptly rule on the motion and, if granted,
shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by
placing it in brackets under the initials of an
authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a
tender of excluded evidence under Section 40 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Examination of the witness on his
judicial affidavit. – The adverse party shall have the
right to cross-examine the witness on his judicial
affidavit and on the exhibits attached to the same.
The party who presents the witness may also
examine him as on re-direct. In every case, the court
shall take active part in examining the witness to
determine his credibility as well as the truth of his
testimony and to elicit the answers that it needs for
resolving the issues.
Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits.
–
(a) Upon the termination of the testimony of his last
witness, a party shall immediately make an oral
offer of evidence of his documentary or object
exhibits, piece by piece, in their chronological order,
stating the purpose or purposes for which he offers
the particular exhibit.
(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse
party shall state the legal ground for his objection,
if any, to its admission, and the court shall
immediately make its ruling respecting that exhibit.
(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form
part of the judicial affidavits that describe and
authenticate them, it is sufficient that such exhibits
are simply cited by their markings during the offers,
the objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the
description of each exhibit.
Potential Ground for Objection would be as to the:
1) FORM and/ or 2) SUBSTANCE of the Contents of
the Judicial Affidavit
Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. – A
judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language
known to the witness and, if not in English or
Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or
Filipino, and shall contain the following:
a. The name, age, residence or business
address, and occupation of the witness;
b. The name and address of the lawyer who
conducts or supervises the examination of
the witness and the place where the
 On proper motion, the court may also order the
striking out of answers which are incompetent,
irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)
Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. — If
documents or things offered in evidence are
excluded by the court, the offeror may have the
same attached to or made part of the record. If the
evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for
the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of
the proposed testimony. (n)
examination is being held;
c. A statement that the witness is answering
the questions asked of him, fully conscious
that he does so under oath, and that he may
face criminal liability for false testimony or
perjury;
d. Questions asked of the witness and his
corresponding answers, consecutively
numbered, that:
1. Show the circumstances under which
the witness acquired the facts upon
which he testifies;
2. Elicit from him those facts which are
relevant to the issues that the case
presents; and
3. Identify the attached documentary and
object evidence and establish their
authenticity in accordance with the
Rules of Court;

e. The signature of the witness over his printed

name; and
f. A jurat with the signature of the notary
public who administers the oath or an
officer who is authorized by law to
administer the same

Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer.

(a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a sworn
attestation at the end, executed by the lawyer who
conducted or supervised the examination of the
witness, to the effect that:

1. He faithfully recorded or caused to be

recorded the questions he asked and
the corresponding answers that the
witness gave; and
2. Neither he nor any other person then
present or assisting him coached the
witness regarding the latter’s answers.
b. A false attestation shall subject the lawyer
mentioned to disciplinary action, including
disbarment.

Comments:
  Formal Offer v. Marking, Identification and Authentication. Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132,
evidence must be “formally offered” in order for it to merit consideration by the trial court. However,
mere marking, identification and authentication should not be equated with formal offer.
 “There is a distinction between identification of a documentary evidence and its formal offer as an
exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence
as an exhibit, while the second is done only when the party rests its case.
TIMELY OBJECTION-

 Rule when party is represented by several lawyers. – “It has been held that where a party is
represented by two attorneys, the fact that the examination in chief of a witness has been conducted
by one of them does not warrant the court in refusing to receive objections by the other to questions
asked on cross-examination”
 Evidence ORALLY OFFERED- Immediately after the offer is made

OBJECTION to Question Propounded in the course of examination of a witness– as soon as the grounds
therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

NOTE: “Reasonably Apparent” means as a GENERAL RULE that “An objection to the form of a question as
leading must be interposed before the question is answered”.

“The rule that objection is to be made when the question is propounded to the witness and before he gives
his testimony must be reasonably applied. Its object is to prevent a party from ‘gambling on his answer’ by
withholding his objection until he discovers the effect of the testimony, and then interposing his objection if
the testimony is unfavorable”
Evidence OFFERED IN WRITING- Shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer UNLESS a
different period is given by the Court.
PREMATURE OBJECTION- “An objection to evidence cannot be made in advance of the offer of the evidence
sought to be introduced.”

OBJECTION MUST BE SPECIFIC. Grounds.

1. Question is Leading
2. Calls for Hearsay Evidence
3. Lack of Basis, or Assumes a Fact Not in Established
4. Question invades filed of confidential communication
5. Vague
6. Calls for conclusion of law
7. Calls for conclusion of fact
8. Argumentative
9. The proper foundation has not been laid
10. Calls for opinion of witness
11. Misleading
12. Already answered
13. Witness is incompetent
14. Inadmissible under the Parol Evidence Rule
 15. Question attempts to elicit self-serving evidence
16. Document offered is self serving; e.g. diary
17. Question seeks to elicit evidence which is not the best evidence
18. Question calls for parol evidence of an alleged agreement under the Statute of Frauds
19. Question is improper on cross-examination
20. Question is improper in re-direct examination
21. Question is improper in re-cross examination

When and How to Formally Offer.

2.1. Under the Rules of Court:

 Testimonial Evidence: “At the time the witness is called to testify”.
 Documentary or Object Evidence: : “After the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence”

How? “Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing”.

2.1. Under the Judicial Affidavit Rule-

 Testimonial Evidence: Rules of Court apply because there is no conflict
 Documentary & Object Evidence:
NOTE: “upon termination of testimony of LAST WITNESS, documentary and object must be ORALLY OFFERED piece by piece
CHRONOLOGICALLY.

Effect of Failure to Formally Offer Evidence.

In the case of Heirs of Pedro Pasag rep. by Eufremio Pasag et al., v. Sps. Lorenzo and Florentina Parocha et al., the Supreme
Court instructed on the effect of inordinate delay in complying with the Rule on Formal Offer of Evidence, to wit:
“Waiver of the Offer of Evidence
The Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. A formal
offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the partie at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes
for which th proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.

Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal
offer of ones evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period of time. It explained that
the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would condone
an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and
derail the speedy administration of justice.

Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable ground to consider that
petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several
extensions of tim to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost
five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners failure comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is
anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice. Under the Rule on guidelines to be
observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial an case of deposition and discovery
measures, it is provided that :

On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his formal offer of evidence after the presentation
of his last witness and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose his objection thereto. Thereafter the
judge shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court. However, the judge has the discretion to allow the
offer of evidence in writing in conformity with Section 35, Rule 132.

On the other hand, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documentary and object evidence shall
be offered after the presentation of a partys testimonial evidence. It requires that such offer shall be done orally
unless allowed by the Court to be done in writing.
When should the oral offer of documentary pieces of evidence be made?
The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of Rule 132 jointly considered, it is made clear that the party who terminated the
presentation of evidence must make an oral offer of evidence on the very day the party presented the last witness.
Otherwise, the court may consider the party’s documentary or obje evidence waived.

Can the formal offer be made in writing instead?

While Sec. 35 of Rule 132 says that the trial court may allow the offer to be done in writing, this can only be tolerated in
extreme cases where the object evidence or documents are large in number say from 100 and above, and on where
there is unusual difficulty in preparing the offer.

(Note: while courts may “tolerate” written formal offer of documentary pieces of evidence pursuant to Section 35, Rule
132, Section 8 of the Judicial Affidavit Rul is eerily silent on this hence the likely conclusion is that in cases covered by
the Judicial Affidavit Rule, written formal offer cannot be “tolerated”, let alone allowed.

The party asking for such concession should however file a motion, pay the filing fee, set the date of the hearing not
later than 10 days after the filing of the motion and serve it on the address of the party at least three (3) days before
the hearing. In short, it is a litigated motion and cannot be done ex parte. Counsels for parties
should not however rely on the benevolence of the trial court as they are expecte to have thoroughly and exhaustively
prepared for all possible pieces of evidence to be presented and the purposes for which they will be utilized. As a
matter of fact, the draft of the offer of evidence can already be prepared after the pre-trial order is issued, for, then,
the counsel is already fully aware of the documentary or object evidence which can be put to use during trial.
Remember that under the pre-trial guidelines, the trial court is ordered to integrate in the pre-trial order the following
directive:
No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a partys evidence-in-
chief other than those that had been identified below and pre-marked during the pre-trial. Any other evidence
not indicated or listed below shall be considered waived by the parties. However, the Court, in its discretion,
may allow introduction of additional evidence in the following cases: (a those to be used on cross-examination
or re-cross-examination for impeachment purposes; (b) those presented on re-direct examination to explain
or supplement the answers of a witness during the cross-examination; (c) those to be utilized for rebuttal or
sur-rebuttal purposes; and (d) those not available during the pre-trial proceedings despite due diligence on
the part of the party offering the same.
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that both parties should obtain, gather, collate, and list all their respective
pieces of evidence whether testimonial, documentary, or object even prior to the preliminary conference before the
clerk court or at the latest before the scheduled pre-trial conference. Otherwise, pieces of evidence not identified or
marked during the pre-trial proceedings are deemed waived and rendered inutile. The parties should strictly adhere
to the principle of laying ones cards on the table. In the light of these issuances and in order to obviate interminable
delay in case processing, the parties and lawyers should closely conform to the requirement that the offer of evidence
must be done orally on the day scheduled for the presentation of the last witness.
Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents not
offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were
not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof
be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between
identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial
is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests its
case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit
for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.

Dismissal of the Complaint on a Demurrer to Evidence

Having established that the documentary evidence of petitioners is inadmissible, this Court is now tasked to
determine the propriety of the dismissal of the Complaint on a demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an
instrument for the expeditious termination of an action; thus, abbreviating judicial proceedings. It is defined as an
objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue. The demurrer
challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof
to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

In the present case, we have thoroughly reviewed the records and are convinced that petitioners have failed to
 sufficiently prove their allegations. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegations. How petitioners did not substantiate their allegations and merely argued that the Complaint should
be threshed out in a full blown trial in order to establish their respective positions on issues [which are] a matter of
judicial appreciation.

WHEN FORMAL OFFER NOT REQUIRED:

1. Summary Proceedings because documentary pieces of evidence are

only attached to Position Papers

2. Small Claims

3. Quasi Judicial Bodies

4. Documents Judicially Admitted or Taken Judicial Notice of

Court’s Ruling on Objections –

5.1. Best Practice in Ruling Upon Objections- “In the course of long experience said the Supreme Court- “we have
observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trivial objections to the
admission proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtf objections to its
materiality or technical objection to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is
impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of proof, to know with any certainty
whether testimony is relevant or not; and, where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering
the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof
offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides
a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning
the case for a new trial- step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admissio of proof in
a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, o relevancy is doubtful, can never result in
much harm to either litigant, because th trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is his duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial.”
The Court of Appeals, on its part, observed that ‘ as a matter of practice, it is more advisable, in controversial
questions, to err in favor of, then against, an opportunity to introduce evidence thereon, because of the considerable
delay which would result, if a higher court should believe that the resolution should have been otherwise and, as a
consequence, a new trial held”.

5.2. TIME FOR RULING ON OBJECTIONS. “A ruling on objections to evidence should be made as soon as possible, either
at the time the objection is made, or during the trial and before judgment is rendered, in time to give the opposite
part is to rule positively, one way or the other, when the evidence is offered, since if the court desires time to consider
 the objection, it may suspend the introduction of evidence until it has reached a conclusion, and, in some cases, it has
been held error to admit evidence “subject to objection”
-“In Lopezv. Valdez, the trial court’s ruling was that it “will be taken into consideration”, on an objection to the
introduction of secondary evidence without first establishing the existence, due execution and eventual loss or
destruction of the originals, “The Supreme Court, held that such is “prejudicial to the interests of a litigant since it
deprives the party against whom the ruling was made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the
ruling. It was deemed as REVERSIBLE ERROR”
-“Parties who offer objections to questions on whatever ground are entitled to a ruling at the time the objection is
made unless they present a question with regard to which the court desires to inform itself before making its ruling.
In that event it i perfectly proper for the court to take a reasonable time to study the questions presented by the
objection; but a ruling should always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom
the ruling is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling. x x

Repetition of Objections. – Continuing Objections

Striking Out Evidence-

NOTE:
Under the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the time to properly object is at the time when the witness is called to the
stand and his testimony is offered. This is because the Judicial Affidavit takes the place of Direct Testimony
offered orally.
However, note the requirements as to form and substance, IF THEREFORE, the grounds for objection
becomes apparent only at the time when the examination is being made, e.g. there is no translation of the
testimony which was given in the local dialect and not English or Filipino, then it would be too late to object
under the rules. But it is submitted that the RIGHT TO MOVE TO STRIKE OUT the portions of the JA or the
entirety if necessary, may be done still within reasonable time after the ground became apparent.

TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE (OFFER OF PROOF)

NOTE: Effect of the Judicial Affidavit Rule Because the testimonial evidence had been reduced to writing. The
objectionable portions shall be bracketed and marked as excluded evidence.
Tender of Excluded Evidence. Remedy in case Court denies Admission of Evidence. In Catacutan v. People the rule
on Tender of Excluded Evidence was discussed, thus:
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded
a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. When an opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hard claim denial of his
fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitione was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, argue his case vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the
opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due process.
There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as evidence the
CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well with the courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which
it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This is especially true when the evidence
sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case, concerns an administrative matter. As the
Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:
The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did not allow the Accused- appellant to present the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 5179 (Jose R. Catacutan vs. Office of the Ombudsman). The findings
in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal case, even if the criminal proceedings
are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter. The dismissal of a
criminal case does not foreclose administrative action or necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in
all respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an administrative case does not operate to terminate a criminal
proceeding with the same subject matter.
This action undertaken by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court was not without legal precedent. In
Paredes v. Court of Appeals, this court ruled:
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative case are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the
criminal liability for the same act.
xxxx
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.
xx
In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, the Court reiterated:
This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of
a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and that the
disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. x x x
On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has no option but to declare that the courts below
correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of the CA Decision. Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion
of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse
evidence which although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as
the ground for offering it.
At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the CA Decision,
petitioner is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court,
 the offeror may have the same attached to o made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the
offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance
of the proposed testimony.

As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CAs Decision for whatever
it may be worth, he could have included the same in his offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in
evidence is rejected, the party producing it should ask the courts permission to have the exhibit attached to the
record.
As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case, thus it has no probative weight. Any
evidence that a party desires to submit for th consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it
is exclude and rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal. The rules of procedure and jurisprudence
do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to evidence which was not formally offered.
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful.
xxxx
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving an private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evide bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Under said provision of law, three essential elements must thus be satisfied, viz:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government o gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
All the above enumerated elements of the offense charged have been successful proven by the prosecution.
First, petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during th time material to this case were it
not for his being a public officer, that is, as the Officer-In-Charge (Principal) of SNSAT. As such public officer, he
exercised officia duties and functions, which include the exercise of administrative supervision ove the school such as
taking charge of personnel management and finances, as we as implementing instruction as far as appointment of
teachers.
Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the appointments of private complainants.
As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:
The records clearly indicate that the refusal of Catacutan to implement the subject promotion was no longer
anchored on any law or civil service rule as early [as] the July 14, 1997 letter of the CHED Regional Director
addressing the four issues raised by the Accused-appellant in the latters protest letter. x x x In light of the
 undisputed evidence presented to the trial court that Catacutans reason for not implementing the
appointments was a personal dislike or ill feelings towards Posesano, this Court believes that Catacutans
refusal was impelled by an ill motive or dishonest purpose characteristic of bad faith. x xx
In the August 1, 1997 [m]emorandum issued by the CHED Regional Director, Catacutan was once again
directed, in strong words, to cease and desist from further questioning what has been lawfully acted upon by
competent authorities. Catacutan deliberately ignored the memorandum and even challenge the private
complainants to file a case against him. Such arrogance is indicative the bad faith of the accused-appellant.
Yet again, the [CSC] Regional Director wrote the Accused-appellant on September 5, 1997, clarifying with
finality the validity of the appointment. Still, Accused- appellant failed to implement the subject promotions.
This stubborn refusal to implement the clear and repeated directive of competent authorities established the
evident bad faith of Catacutan and belies any of his claims to the contrary
While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of private complainants valid
appointments, the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith when no less than the higher authorities
have already sustained the validity of the subject appointments and have ordered him to proceed with the
implementation. It is well to remember that good intentions do not win cases, evidence does.
Third, undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral certainty. Here, the private
complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able to assume their official duties as Vocational Supervisors
III despite the issuance of their valid appointments. As borne out by the records, they were able to assume their new
positions only on November 19, 1997. So in the interregnum from June to November 1997, private complainants failed
to enjoy the benefits of an increased salary corresponding to their newly appointed positions. Likewise established
is that as a result of petitioners unjustified and inordinate refusal to implement their valid appointments
notwithstanding clear an mandatory directives from his superiors, the private complainants suffered mental anguish,
sleepless nights, serious anxiety warranting the award of moral damage under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code.
At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that were threshed out and decided
upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed by the Sandiganbayan. Where the factual findings of both
the trial court and the appellate court coincide, the same are binding on this Court. In any event, apart from these
factual findings of the lower courts, this Court in its own assessment and review of the records considers the findings
in order.
 Evidence2018–Lecture9

IMPORTANT DOCTRINES ON WEIGHT & PROBABILITY OF EVIDENCE

TABLE of CONTENTS
Introduction
I. Judicial admissions

1.1 Dasmarinas T. Arcania Vs Noemi L. Ingram, G.R. No. 16444, February 15, 2017
1.2 Mere Allegation is not proof —Raffy Brodeth v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197849, November
29, 2017
II. Credibility of Complainant Witness
2.1 People v. Jhun Villalon Y Ordono, Accused-Appellants G.R. No. 215198, November 09, 2016
2.2 People v Cresencio Campit et al., G.R. No. 225694, 06 December 2017

III. Burden of Proof

3.1 Tze Sun Wong v Wong, G.R. No. 184, December 3, 2014
3.2 BJDC Construction v Lanuzo G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014
3.3 Alano vs Magud-Lugmao G.R. No. 1755540 (tel:1755540) April 7,2014
3.4 CHUA vs WESTMONT BANK, 667 SCRA 56, February 27, 2012
3.5 CHU vs GUICO, A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015

Iv. Burden Of Evidence

4.1 People vs CA, GR No. 183652, February 25, 2015

4.2 People vs Salahuddin G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016

V. Equipoise Rule

5.1 People vs Saturno 335 SCRA 578

5.2 People vs Ison, G.R. No. 205097, June 8, 2016
5.3 Edwina Remando Y Fernando v. People, G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017
Vi. Presumptions

6.1 Diaz vs People, GR No. 208113, December 2, 2015

6.2 People vs Alejandro, GR No. 205227, April 7, 2014
6.3 People vs Guinto, GR No. 198314, September 24, 2014
6.4 Tan vs Hosana, GR No. 190846, February 03, 2016
6.5 Sps. Charito M. Reyes vs Heirs of Benjamin Malance, GR No. 219071, August 24, 2016
6.6 Ofelia Hernan v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 05 December 2017
VII. Quantum of Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

7.1 People vs Roxas, G.R. No. 218396, February 10, 2016

7.2 Atienza vs People, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014
 7.3 franco vs People, G.R. No. 191185, February 01, 2016 – 31
7.4 Saraum vs People, G.R. No. 205472, January 25, 2016 – 32
7.5 Absence of Specific Details in Conduct of Buy-Bust Operation Blunts Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
7.5.1. People v. Marilou y. Diana and Lalaine Guadayo y Rojo, G.R. No. 210610, January 11,
2018 – 37

7.6 Mere Pain Suffered by Victim in Rape Case Not Enough to Convict for Consummated Rape – People v.
Noel Bejim Y Romero, G.R. No. 208835, January 19, 2018
7.7 Rape; ‘Women’s Honor Doctrine’ Abandoned; Location of Lacerations indicative of Either Consensual
or Non-Consensual Sex
7.8 Child Victim’s testimony accorded weight and credence~~

People v. Benjamin Salaver Y Luzon, G.R. No. 223681, August 20, 2018
People v. Juvy D. Aramela and Junard G. Racho, G.R. No. 225642-43, January 17, 2018

VIII. Substantial Evidence

8.1 Asian International Manpower Services, Inc vs DOLE, G.R. No. 210308,April 06, 2016
8.2 Republic vs Arias, G.R.No. 188909, September 17, 2014

IX. Preponderance of Evidence

9.1 BJDC Construction vs Lanuzu, G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014

X. Clear and Convincing Evidence

10.1. Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470

XI. Direct v. Circumstantial Evidence

11.1. People v. Golem Sota, G.R. No. 203121, November 29, 2017

XII.Findings of Fact of Trial Court Accorded Respect; Exception

12.1.People v. Rolando Santos Y Zaragoza, G.R. No. 223142, January 17, 2018
12.2 People v. Marilou y. Diana and Lalaine Guadayo y Rojo, G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 2018

XIII.Chain of Custody Issue

13.1 Lack of Surveillance. People v. Lawrence Gajo Y Buenafe, G.R. No. 217026, January 22, 2018

13.2 Failure to Properly Mark Shabu. People v. Brian Villahermoso, G.R. NO. 218208, January 24, 2018

13.3 Preservation of Integrity & Evidentiary Value of Items. People v. Niño Flor Y Mora, G.R. NO. 216017,
January 19, 2018

13.4 Chain of Custody of Drugs; Substantial Compliance Rule . Chain of Custody; Substantial
Compliance.People v. Abdulwahid Pundugar, G.R. No. 214779, February 07, 2018 .
 13.5 Chain of Custody of Drugs; Strict Interpretation. People v. Jesus Dumagay Y Suacito, G.R. No.
216753, February 07, 2018
13.6Rule on Authentication of Real Evidence; Chain of Custody —– People v. Romy Lim Y Miranda, G.R. No.
231989, 04 September 2018

RULE 133

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (1a)

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accuse is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doub Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. (2a)

Section 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. — An extrajudicial confession made by an accused,
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)

Section 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. — The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any
particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably
expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution. (6)

Section 7. Evidence on motion. — When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on
affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct tha the matter be heard wholly or partly
on oral testimony or depositions. (7)
i. Introduction

To recall the previous lectures dealt with the intricacies, nuances and niceties of evidence for purposes of
determining “admissibility”. The rules on admissibility therefore constitute as the first layer which needs to be
breached through by the litigator. Once successfully crossed, the next challenge or – second layer- for the litigator
is how to convince the judge that the evidence that he has adduced, afte having mustered the rules on
admissibility, carries such sufficient weight and that more likely than not, under the logic of probability, the judge
could be swayed to agree with his proposition in his case. Sections 1 to 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence provide
for the quantum of proof required in specific cases. But how to get from here to there is the question. Here are some
doctrines culled from recent jurisprudence which may provide the road map to guide the litigator through the
forest of the law on probability.

1. Judicial Admissions. Allegation v. Admission.

 Dasmarinas T. Arcaina Vs Noemi L. Ingram, G.R. No. 16444, February 15 2017

FACTS:

Arcaina is the owner of a property located at Salvacion, Sto. Domingo Albay. Banta, her Attorney-in-fact entered into
a contract with Ingram for the sale of property. Payments were made through installments. They separately executed
deeds of sale over the property in Ingram’s favour. Subsequently, they argued on the remaining difference of the
actual area of the property. Banta insisted that the fenced portion was unsold. However, Ingram contends that she
owns the whole l by virtue of the sale. Thus, a recovery case was instituted against Arcaina.

The MCTC dismissed the case. It held that the testimonies of Ingram and her witnesses suffer from several
inconsistencies and improbabilities. In addition, Ingram failed to show that she paid for the value of the excess land
area, the MCTC held that she cannot claim ownership and possession of the whole proper

The RTC reversed the MCTC’s decision. The RTC found that neither of the parties presented competent evidence to
prove the property’s actual area. The CA agree with the RTC that other than the uniform statements of the parties,
no evidence was presented to show that the property was found to have an actual area of more or less 12,000 sq. m.
lt held that the parties’ statements cannot be simply admitted as true and correct because the area of the land is a
matter of public record and presumed to have been recorded in the Registry of Deeds. The CA noted that the best
evidence should have been a certified true copy of the survey plan duly approved by the government agency.

ISSUE: whether the sale was made on a lump sum or per-square-meter basis RULING:

Judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same
case, are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. These admissions cannot be contradicted
unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Petitioners do not deny their previous admission, much less allege that they had made a palpable mistake. Thus, they
are bound by it.
1.2. Mere Allegation is Not Proof

Again, the only factual link to the territorial jurisdiction of the Me TC is the allegation that the subject checks were
issued in Manila. In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was committed
must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and cou not justify sentencing a man
to jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not be made equivalent to
proof.

 Raffy Brodeth v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197849, November 29, 2017

2. Credibility Of Complainant Witness. Is the complainant’s reaction befor during or immediately after the incident,
expected to conform to certain norms?

2.1 People v. Jhun Villalon Y Ordono, Accused-Apellants G.R. No. 215198, November 09, 2016

FACTS:

Accused was charged for raping his cousin, a minor child. Villalon threatened her not to tell anybody. The minor tried
to hide the incident but after a month, she could no longer contain the nightmares caused by the abuse so she told
her mother. They reported the incident. When the case was already in court, Villalon’s mother and wife allegedly
brought the victim and her mother to the offic of the defense counsel to sign an affidavit of desistance. However, it
was left unsigned. Villalon denied the allegations against him.

The RTC found Villalon guilty. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

WON the prosecution failed to prove the accused guilt beyond reasonabl doubt. WON the Court a Quo erred in
convicting the accused appellant despite the private complainant’s lack of credibility.

RULING:

The Court finds that the prosecution has successfully proved Villalon’s guilt beyon reasonable doubt. Even if the minor
did not shout for help, such could not and would not diminish her credibility. It must be emphasized that there is no
standard form of reaction for a woman, much more a minor, when confronte with a horrifying experience such as
sexual assault. The actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience should not be judged by the
norms of behavior expected from adults when placed under similar circumstances. People react differently to
emotional stress rape victims are no different from them.

Villalon’s alibi must necessarily fall. Physical impossibility pertains to the distance between the place where the
accused was during the commission of the crime and the place where the crime was actually committed, as well as
the facility of access between the two places. In this case, there was no physical impossibility for Villalon’s presence
at the scene of the crime.

It has been consistently held that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, the findings of a trial court on such matter
will not be disturbed unless the lower cour had clearly misinterpreted certain facts. The credibility of the witnesses is
 best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard them and
observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors
in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, th trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable
discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters
will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended,
or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. Also, where there is no evidence that the
witnesses of the prosecution were influenced by ill motive, as in this case, it is presumed that they were not so
actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

2.1. Weight of testimony of single witness; No Standard Behaviour When Person is Faced with Startling Occurrence

Time and again, the Court has held that the testimony of even a single eyewitness if positive and credible, is sufficient
to support a conviction even in a charge of murder. 33 Moreover, considering that Cresencio assailed the credibility of
the witnesses against him, it is incumbent upon him to show that Kristine and Leonisa were impelled by ill motives in
falsely accusing him of the crime charged. 34 Unfortunately for Cresencio, there was no showing of any ill motive on
the part of any of the eyewitnesses. Where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive on
why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.35 Similarly, Cresencio’s reliance in Be11jamin Reyes is misplace In said
case, the mother of the victim testified that she saw her husband stab her daughter but, instead of helping her, she
went home. While sustaining the conviction of the accused, the Court agreed with the defense’s submission that the
testimony of the victim’s mother was not credible. A reading of the said case, however, would reveal that the witness’
account was regarded by the Court to be against common experience not because of her failure to help her daughter
during the stabbing incident, but because of the peculiarity of her behavior immediately after the incident which
included, among others, the fact that she did not shout and ask her neighbors for help; that when she arrived home,
she casually brushed her teeth and slept with her husband, who was also her daughter’s killer; and that she remained
silent when the police came to their house despite the fact that her husband was not present; and was, thus, not
under threat at that time. More importantly, the Court declared therein that her testimony regarding the stabbing
incident did not deserve any credit because she categorically stated that she did not witness the killing of her
daughter. None of the circumstances in Benjamin Reyes which justified the finding of the witness’s lack of integrity is
present in this case. Torecall, Leonisa and Kristine did not remain silent during the felonious deed. They were shouting
and begging for Leon’s assailants to stop. Clearly, while they were crushed by the spectacle of Leon being stabbed to
death, fear prevailed upon them preventing them from doing anything to aid their loved one. Likewise, after
Cresencio and Emilio fled, Leonisa immediately rushed her father the hospital in the hope that he would survive.
Leonisa’s behavior is directly opposed to that of the witness in Benjamin Reyes who did not even bother to check on
her daughter after allegedly witnessing her being stabbed. Furthermore and as held in People v. Romeo Fernandez,
36 it would be unfair to gauge the actions of the eyewitnesses as incredible for there is no prescribed behavior when
one is suddenly confronted with a startling or frightening event. Different people react differently to a given
stimulus or situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
 startling or frightful experience. Thus, Kristine and Leonisa’ s inability to help and defend Leon due to their fear of
reprisal is understandable and not at all contrary to common experience. Thus, the Court finds no reason to disturb
the trial court’s fu faith in Kristine and Leonisa’s testimonies given that they were clear, credible, categorical, and
positive. Needless to state, their testimonies prevail over Cresencio’s defense of denial which has been repeatedly
considered as a weak defense.

 People v Cresencio Campit et al., G.R. No. 225694, 06 December 2017

III. Burden Of Proof

3.1. Tze Sun Wong, G.R. No. 184, December 3, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner is a Chinese citizen who acquired a permanent resident he owned a company called Happy Sun Travel and
Tours. Respondents, Kenny Wong is the owner and proprietor of San Andres Construction Supply. Respondent filed
before the BOI for violation of immigration laws alleging that the latter had misrepresented, in his driver’s license
application, that he was a Filipino citizen. In addition, he alleges that the petitioner and his business partner issued
postdated checks and bounced to his damage and prejudice. The petitioner denied the allegations claiming that it
was not him who filled up the application and that person entered wrong information particularly his name, birth year
and nationality

The BOI ordered the deportation of the petitioner on the grounds of illegal use of alias and misrepresenting himself
as a Filipino Citizen. Aside from pointing out th misrepresentations made by petitioner, the BOI took judicial notice
of the fact that driver’s license applications require the personal appearance of the applicant in order to prevent fraud.
Thus, by allowing someone to apply for him, he actively involved himself in the preparation and issuance of a
fraudulent driver’s license. B the same account he cannot then aver that he was without any participation in th entry
of his supposed Philippine citizenship in his driver’s license.

Appeal was filed before the SOJ and affirmed the BOI’s decision holding that since it undisputedly appears on the face
of petitioner’s driver’s license that he is a Filipino citizen under the name of Joseph Wong, he cannot then raise the
defense that it was not his doing but that of a stranger who merely helped him. It was further pointed out that
petitioner’s use of the alias “Joseph Wong” was illegal since said name is not registered in the BOI and does not fall
under the recognized exceptions where use of alias may be allowed. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA however denied.

ISSUE: Whether the CA’s dismissal of petitioner’s certiorari petition before it was correct.

RULING:

“In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction ove a case, the petitioner carries the
burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not merely a reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion
amountin to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order. Showing mere abuse of discretion is not
enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Gra abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-
 judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act
in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted
in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”

Petitioner’s certiorari petition before the CA basically revolves on his denial of the acts of misrepresentation imputed
against him, claiming that the same do not warrant his deportation. However, the commission of said acts involves
factual matters that have already been established during the proceedings before the B Board of Commissioners.

In this regard, it is crucial to point out that “[t]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner
violated certain provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not
interfere matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of the special
knowledge an expertise of administrative departments over matters falling within their jurisdictio they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard generally accorded respect, if not finality,
by the courts.” As petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to deviate from the BOI Boa of
Commissioners’ findings, courts are wont to defer to its judgment.

Besides, petitioner’s defenses anent what had actually transpired during the relevant incidents surrounding his
driver’s license application apparently constitu mere self-serving allegations barren of any independent proof. While
he blamed the unnamed fixer filling up the erroneous details in his application, his version of the story remained
uncorroborated. The lack of testimony on the part of the fixer leaves much to be desired from petitioner’s theory.

The rule is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
Thus, once more, his self-serving assertion cannot be given credence. This is especially so in light of the presumption
of regularity, which herein ought to prevail due to the absence of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Bustillo v. People states:

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will
be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in fav of its lawfulness.

3.2. BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014

FACTS:

This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime due to the
supposed negligence of a construction company then undertaking re-blocking work on a national highway. The
plaintiffs insisted that the accident happened because the construction company did not adequate lighting on the
site, but the latter countered that the fatal accident was caused by the negligence of the motorcycle rider himself.
 Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) filed a complaint for damages against BJDC Constructio Nena alleged that she was the
surviving spouse of the late Balbino who figured in the accident that transpired at the site of the re-blocking work at
about 6:30 p.m. on October 30, 1997; that Balbino’s Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade placed by the
company in the right lane portion of the road, causing hi to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly
cemented road, resulting in his instant death; and that the company’s failure to place illuminated warning signs on
the site of the project, especially during night time, was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino.

In its answer, BJDC denied Nena’s allegations of negligence, insisting that it had installed warning signs and lights
along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at the time of the incident, the lights were working and
switched on; that its project was duly inspected by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Office
of the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have satisfactorily taken measures
to ensure the safety of motorists.

The RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not heirs of Balbino were able to establish by preponderance evidence the negligence of BJDC.

RULING: NO. The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injur has the burden to establish the
allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof required is
preponderance of evidence.

In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The
burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complainant in the manner
require by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential
allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability.

The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of
proof, did not establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the
proximate caus of the fatal accident of Balbino.

During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of illumination instead of the total omission of
illumination. In contrast, the company credibly refuted the allegation of inadequate illumination. The Court observes,
too, that SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police officer detailed for more than 17 years at the Pili Police Station, enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties. In his report, it was mentioned that “upon arrival
at the scene of the incident it was noted that road sign/ barricade installed on the road has a light.”

3.3 Alano vs. Magud-Logmao GR No. 1755540 (tel:1755540) April 7, 2014

FACTS:

Amelito Logmao was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) by sidewalk vendors who allegedly saw him
fall from the overpass in Cubao, Quezon City. There, his patient’s data sheet identified him as Angelito Lugmoso.
Considering that his deterioration progressively deteriorated, and no vacancy wa available at the ICU of EAMC,
Logmao/Lugmoso was transferred to NKI. His nam was recorded as Angelito Lugmose at the NKI. There being no
relatives around, Jennifer, the transplant coordinator, was instructed to locate his family by enlisting the assistance of
the police and the media. Dr. Ona, the chairman of Department of Surgery, observing the severity of the brain injury
of Angelito Lugmoso/Logmao requested the Laboratory Section to conduct cross-matching and tissue typing, s that
if Angelito expires despite the necessary medical care and management, an found a suitable organ donor, provided
his family would consent to it, his organs could be detached and transplanted promptly to a compatible beneficiary.

Jennifer secured the patient data of Angelito from EAMC, where he was identified as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni
Avenue, Mandaluyong and contacted several television and radio stations for the purpose of locating the family of
Lugmoso. Sh sought the assistance of the PNP to locate the whereabouts of Angelito’s family. A proof, the radio and
t5v stations she contacted, as well as the pertinent police station, issued Certifications attesting to her effort to locate
Angelito’s family.

Angelito was eventually pronounced dead, hence Dr. Ona set in motion the removal of organs of Angelito for organ
transplantation. He sought permission fro the Executive Director, Dr. Filoteo Alano, who issued a Memorandum
approvinf th transplant as long as all the requisite requirements had been complied with and the NBI had been
informed of the planned transplant.

On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing the successful organ transplant. A cousin of Angelito
heard on the radio that the donor was a certain Angelito Lugmoso who is now at Funeraria Oro. Sensing a vague
resemblance to Angelito Logmao’s name, she reported it to his mother, Zenaida logmao. When they went to the
FunerariaOro to see the remains, it was there that they discovered the remains of Angelito in a cheap casket.
Previously, Arnelito’s sister Arlen reported on March 3, 1988 that her brother, Arnelito did not return home after
seeing movie in Cubao.

Because of this discovery, Zenaida filed a complaint for damages. Only Dr. Filote Albano was held liable for damages
by the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with modification, by reducing the award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether respondent’s sufferings were brought about by petitioner’s allege negligence in granting
authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal organs of respondent’s son who had been declared brain
dead.

RULING: Petitioner Doctor is not negligent. Petitioner gave authorization for the removal of some of the internal
organs to be transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance with the letter of the law, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
349, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 856, i.e., giving his subordinates instructions to exert all reasonable
efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of respondent’s son. Announcements were made through radio and
television, the assistance of police authorities was sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was notified. There can
be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives
of the deceased.

It is not petitioner’s fault if respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son’s death because the notices did
not properly state the name or identity of the deceased. The lower courts found that it was the EAMC, who had the
 opportunity to ascertain the name of the deceased, who recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased’s
identity to NKI. The NKI could not have obtained the information about his name from the patient, because as found
by the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.

Finding petitioner liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized that th internal organs of the deceased
were removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain by respondent due to the death
of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner.

3.4 CHUA vs WESTMONT BANK, 667 SCRA 56, February 27, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner Robert Chua (Chua) was charged with 54 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) for issuing
checks which were dishonored for either being drawn against insufficient funds or closed account. During the cours
of the trial, the prosecution formally offered as its evidence the demand letter.

Chua, however, objected to its admissibility on the grounds that it is a mere photocopy and that it does not bear any
proof that he actually received it. Also, Chua further alleged that it is not accompanied with a Post Office Registry
Recei and Registry Return Receipt. Chua asserts the absence of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the
demand letter dated November 30, 1993 prevented the legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds
from arising. On the oth hand, the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua’s actual receipt of the subject demand
letter is not affixed thereon, it is presumed that he received the same on the date of the demand letter (November
30, 1993). Moreover, the lower courts banked on the stimulation entered into by Chua’s counsel as to existence of the
demand letter anki of Chua’s signature thereon. By reason of such stipulation, the all held that Chua could no longer
impugn the said demand letter.

The MTC found Chua guilty of the crime charged. RTC and CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON CA erred when it upheld the rulings of the trial courts that the accused at the time of the issuance of
the dishonored checks had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds for the payment of the checks upon their
presentment, based merely on the presumption that the date of the preparation of the letter is the date of receipt by
the addressee.

RULING:

“To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently
dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew ‘at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check i full upon its presentment’.
Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie
presumption of su knowledge, as follows:

‘SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds-The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which
is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety(90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit
 unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment
in full by th drawee of such check within five(5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee.

In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to th maker or drawer of the bum check,
or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the presumption or prima facie
evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the
crucial 5-day.

The Court, however, disagrees with the lower courts. It is plain that the stipulation only referred to the existence of
the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereo In no way can an admission of Chua’s receipt of the demand letter
be inferred therefrom. Hence, Chua cannot be considered estopped from claiming non- receipt. Also, the Court
observes that Chua’s admission with respect to his signature on the demand letter is consistent with his claim that
See made him sig blank papers where the contents of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 where later
intercalated.

In view of the above discussion, the Court rules that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently prove the existence
of the second element of BP22.

3.5. CHU vs GUICO, A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015

FACTS:

Fernando W. Chu invokes the Court’s disciplinary authority in resolving this disbarment complaint against his former
lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr., whom he has accused of gross misconduct. Atty. Guico was the counsel of
Chu involving a labor case Guico asked Chu to prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC
Commissioner handling the appeal to ensure a favourable decision. Chu complied. Guico gave Chu an alleged draft
of decision of NLRC in their favor. The former asked the latter to raise another 300,000 to encourage the NLRC to
issue the decision. Chu only produced 280,000 and gave to his secretary, Nardo without issuing receipt. On follow ups,
Guico referred Cu t Nardo. Nardo and Chu met up and the latter asked on the status of the case and whether the
NLRC commissioner had accepted the money but Nardo replied on the negative and advised Chu to wait.

NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to Chu’s claims which resulted him to confront Guico. A motion for
reconsideration was prepared however denied. Appeal was filed and finally, Chu terminated Guico’s services as his
counsel.

Administrative complaint was filed against Guico. Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete with
lies and inconsistencies, and insisted tha the charge was only meant for harassment. He denied demanding and
receiving money from Chu, a denial that Nardo corroborated with his own affidavit. He further denied handing to
Chu a draft decision printed on used paper emanating from his office, surmising that the used paper must have
been among those freel lying around in his office that had been pilfered by Chu’s witnesses in the crimina complaint
he had handled for Chu.
 IBP suspended Atty. Guico for violation of CPR.

ISSUE: Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC?

RULING: In disbarment proceeding, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish respondent attorney’s
liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed, this Court has consistently required clearly
preponderant evidence to justify the imposition of either disbarment or suspension as penalty.

The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses, especially the act of Atty. Guico of
presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision that had been printed on used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s
office, sufficed to confirm that he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and receiving
P580, 000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the allegations
in his defense, but such denial d not overcome the affirmative testimony of Chu. We cannot but conclude that the
production of the draft decision by Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the chances
of obtaining the favorable result in the labor case. As such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to
establi his complaint against Atty. Guico. In this administrative case, a fact maybe deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which is reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.

lV. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

4.1 People vs CA, GR No. 183652, February 25, 2015

FACTS:

This case involves a case of Rape when the respondents conspiring with one another forcefully drunk a 16 year old
minor on a graduation dinner and brought t lodging house at Lanao del Norte. They took turns in having carnal
knowledge against the will and consent of the minor. When the minor woke up, she was all alone. Her body felt heavy
and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. There were also red stains on her
shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. She told her parents that she was raped. The father was
furious and the mother started hitting her. They reported to the police station and proceeded to the hospital to get
examined.

Accused denied the allegations. They further alleged that AAA consented with the sexual congress.

RTC found the respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It, however,
acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

CA reversed RTC’s decision. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the
sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She
never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The
appellate court further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAA’s
genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed
that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more
consistent with that of a parent who found out that he child just had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually
assaulted

ISSUE: WON the respondent court of appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the private
respondents.

RULING: It must be emphasized that when accused in a rape case claims that the sexual intercourse between him
and the complainant was consensual, a in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now
enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs
convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual.
Generally, th burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that it is
the accused who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral
certainty of guilt.

Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create
a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the
party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of
the issue in litigation. However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof
such a love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship between the
offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts
to the accused to prove his defense by substantial evidence. Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal
knowledge of AAA but unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them.

When it comes to the credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weig and is even conclusive and
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight o some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The
reason is obvious. Havin the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.
Matters of credibility are addressed basically to th trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court
to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared
before him. The appellate courts are far details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the
case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said
limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings must b given due deference. Since the
CA and the private respondents failed to show an palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings
of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding.

It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making
the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credence.

The SC found the respondents guilty of the crime of rape.

4.2 People vs Salahuddin G.R No. 206291, January 18, 2016

FACTS:

Salahuddin was charged of murder of Atty. Segundo Sotto, Jr. who sustained mortal gunshot wounds on the fatal
parts of his body which directly caused his death. Atty. Sotto together with his Niece, Liezel Mae while on the way
home, gun shots were fired towards them. The accused was also charged with frustrated murder for having fatally
wounded Liezel Mae in the same shooting incident.

RTC convicted Salahuddin. CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s decisio by increasing civil indemnity.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime of murder?

RULING: It is well settled that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect
because it is more competent to so conclud having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and
deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore, can better
determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in th ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide
or infanticide, attended by circumstance such as treachery or evident premeditation. The essence of treachery is the
sudden attack by the aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of th victim, depriving the latter of any
real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Two
conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately
and consciously adopted.

In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty. Segundo was attended by treachery because
appellant shot the said victim suddenly and without any warning with a deadly weapon.

The essence of evident premeditation, on the other hand, is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt:

1. the time when the accused determined to commit the crime.

2. an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and

3. sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
circumstances of his act.

In seeking his acquittal, appellant raises the defenses of denial and alibi. Howeve such defenses, if not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are
considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable
but also because they are easily fabricate and concocted.

Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to
 testify against the appellants. 21 Between the categorical statements of the prosecution eyewitnesses Jav and Delos
Reyes, on the hand, and the bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must prevail. After all, an affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it conies from the mouth of a credible witness. In
order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is also no enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the
offense wa committed, but it must likewise be shown that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crim or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

In contrast to the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Delos Reyes and Java who positively identified
appellant as the gunman, the testimonies of th defense witnesses in support of appellant’s denial and alibi, are tainted
with material inconsistencies.

The SC denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s ruling.

5.Equipoise Rule

5.1. People vs Saturno 335 SCRA 578

FACTS:

Accused were charged with multiple murder for killing 3 persons on different parts of their body with the use of a
firearm which resulted to their instantaneous death. Accused went to the house of Valdez and looked for him. They
went to the bedroom of Valdez while the latter was dead drunk and shoot him. Other companions were brought to
the room and were hog tied. A few hours after the incident, the police authorities interrogated Lucila and others who
may have knowledge about the crime. Lucila repeatedly started that she could not identify the assailants. Five (5)
empty shells of cal. 22 and two (2) deformed slugs were recovered from the cadavers of Rodelito Valdez and Florencio
Bulatao. All t accused denied the charges against them.

When Saturno was apprehended, he was repeatedly tortured until admitted since he could no longer endure the
pain. Delfin Gregorio was also maltreated and tortured. When he could no longer endure the pain, he said that he
knew accuse Saturno. Gregorio testified, however, that it was the first time that he saw accused Saturno. Accused
Abraham Rodriguez was apprehended and he denied the charges against him. Aside from Delfin Gregorio, he did
not know the victims and his other co-accused. Accused Benigno Andres denied any participation in the killing.

The trial court found accused-appellants guilty of multiple murder. The trial court acquitted accused Delfin Gregorio
for insufficiency of evidence.

Appellants raise as issue the prosecutions failure to approve their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They contended
that prosecution witness Lucila Valdez was n able to positively identify them. They claim an alibi, that is, it was
physically impossible for them to be at the locus criminis at the time the incident occurred.

The Solicitor General contends that the trial court correctly gave credence to the testimony of Lucila Valdez and that
the defense of alibi is weak. He maintains that appellants alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by
witness Lucila that they were the perpetrators of the crime as it is an entrenched jurisprudential doctrine that positive
identification prevails over denial and alibi.
 ISSUE: WON the accused were guilty of the crime of Murder?

RULING:

It is a basic rule that the guilt of an accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Before he is convicted, there
must be moral certainty of guilt—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are
to act upon it that he is guilty of the crime charged. Under our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is
not whether the court doubts the innocents of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.

The task of the prosecution is two-fold, to prove that a crime has been committed, and second, that the accused is
the person responsible therefor Thus, the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption o
innocence with evidence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. [32]

The fatigue cap and the light brown jacket (and the bloodstains found on it) were the basis for implicating accused
Saturno. These were not identified during the trial nor formally offered in evidence. As a matter of fact, the jack was
never seen after it was submitted for examination. The chemist who examined the bloodstains in the jacket was
not presented to identify the report and the jacket.

Witness Lucilas testimony regarding the identity of the accused, however, is too general to deserve consideration. On
the other hand, accused-appellants were able to present convincing evidence that they could not possibly be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The identification of appellants as the assailants could in no way be
considered as positive and credible.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish the fact of the killing; however, it failed to prove that
appellants perpetrated the crime. Where the prosecution has failed to discharge the onus probandi for a
pronouncement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused will result in acquittal.

True, the settled rule is that alibi is a weak defense. It has been held that courts will not at once look with disfavor on
the defense of alibi. Alibi may b considered in light of all the evidence for it may be sufficient to acquit the accused.
Appellants alibi and denial gain considerable strength in view of th unreliable identification of the perpetrators of the
crime.

Thus, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that
where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scale
in favor of the accused.

5.2 People vs Ison, G.R. No. 205097, June 8, 2016

FACTS:

Ison offered to sell 2 parcels of fishpond to Atty. Ramos and Barroga. Iso persuaded Ramos and Barroga to buy the
 fishponds after showing them Laguna lake Development Authority (LLDA) permits and receipts either in her name
or in the name of her husband. Ramos and Barroga were convinced of Ison’s ownersh of the fishponds and agreed to
buy the same. Payments were made in installments. Thereafter, Ramos and Barroga took possession of the
fishponds.

Ramos and Barroga received a call from a certain Ligaya Tupaz who told them th Colonel Pedro Vergara was the real
owner of the fishponds. They had a meeting and during the meeting, Ison admitted the she first sold the fishponds
to Vergara before she sold the same to Ramos and Barroga. Ramos and Barroga then asked lson to return their money
plus interest and damages. Ison promised to return the money but reneged on her promise. Demand letters were
sent to lson when failed to comply a complaint for estafa was filed against lson. Ison, on the other hand, claims that
she remains to be the registered owner of the fishponds.

RTC find the accused guilty of estafa. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: WON the RTC and CA had ignored, misconstrued or misunderstood material facts and circumstances, which if
considered, would result to her acquittal.

RULING:

“Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused while the other may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the Cou must
acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty required for conviction.”

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed beyond reasonable doubt that lson misrepresented herself as the owner of
the fishponds and entered into the Contract to Sell without authority from Col. Vergara. It was likewise not amply
established that the private complainants were completely unaware of the pertinent facts concerning the fishponds’
ownership. Hence, the essential elemen of reliance upon the misrepresentation, which should have induced the private
complainants to part with their money, is wanting. Inevitably, the Court is constrained to uphold the presumption of
innocence in lson’s favor an acquit her.

5.3. Equipoise Doctrine Applied to:

Overt Act or External Act Necessary to Prove Conspiracy

The fact that petitioner accompanied her husband at the restaurant and allowed her husband to place the money
inside her bag would not be sufficient to justify the conclusion that conspiracy existed. In order to hold an accused
liable as co- principal by reason of conspiracy, he or she must be shown to have performed a overt act in pursuance or
in furtherance of conspiracy.

This Court has held that an overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etre for the law
 requiring a direct overt a is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of
preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that
quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement
of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and
this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent
of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt a should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the
design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
offense after the preparations are made. The act done nee not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the
overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

The record is bereft of any hint that petitioner cooperated in the commission of th crime under Article 168 of the RPC.
Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty in order to establish that
petitioner conspired with her husband Romeo to commit the crime. Hence, in the absence of conspiracy, if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capab of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty20 and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 21 Exoneration must then be granted as a matter of right.
22 Thus, petitioner’s acquittal is in order.

-Edwina Remando Y Fernando v. People, G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017

6.Presumptions

6.1. Diaz vs People, GR No. 208113, December 2, 2015

FACTS:

Leticia S. Arcilla is a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents one of
whom is petitioner under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a
mon after they were entrusted. She entrusted merchandise consisting of umbrellas an bath towels worth P35, 300.00
to petitioner as evidence by an acknowledgement receipt. However, on March 20, 1996, petitioner was only able to
remit the amoun of P3, 300.00 and thereafter failed to make further remittances and ignored respondent’s demands
to remit the proceeds or return the goods.

In her defense, petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not as an agent but a mere
client.

The RTC acquitted the petitioner. The RTC found that the prosecution failed to establish any intent on the part of the
petitioner to defraud respondent and, thus, could not be held criminally liable. The CA upheld the petitioner’s civil
liability.

ISSUE: whether or not the CA committed reversible error in finding petitioner civill liable to respondent.

RULING:
 The CA correctly found that respondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction,
as well as petitioner’s failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the
same respondent incase such merchandise were not sold. This was established throug the presentation of the
acknowledgment receipt which, as the document’s name connotes, shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from
respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return the same on
March 20, 1996 if not sold.

In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal
presumption is that a person takes ordinary car of his concern. To this, case law dictates that the natural
presumption is tha one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences.
Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equal presumed that private transactions have been fair and
regular. This behoove every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document befor he signs and
delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case,
petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert this presumption. Also, respondent’s possession of the
document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished.
Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence.41
All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent’s favor.

6.2 People vs Alejandro, GR No. 205227, April 7, 2014

FACTS:

Marco P. Alejandro along with Imelda G. Solema and Jenny V. del Rosario where charged with violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. According t the prosecution, a buy bust operation was conducted. Sale of shabu was
consummated and arrested Imelda Solema as well as the woman passenger in the car identify as Jenny Del Rosario.

According to the defense, no buy bust took place. He further denied having the possession of the drug.

The RTC found that the police officers complied with all the requirement in conducting a buy-bust operation, and
that their testimonies were spontaneous, straightforward and consistent on all material points. On the other hand,
the RTC observed that the testimonies of defense witnesses do not jibe or are inconsisten with each other. It held
that appellant’s denial of the crime charged is negative se serving evidence and cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution who, being police officers, are presumed to have
performed their duties in accordance with law, and who have reason to fabricate the charges against the accused.

RTC found the accused guilty.

ISSUE: WON the accused was guilty?

RULING: All the elements of the crime were established by both the oral and object evidence presented in court. It is
settled that in cases involving violations the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witness who are
polic officers for they enjoy the presumption of having performed their duties in a regul manner, unless, of course,
 there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on their part or deviation from the regular performance of their
duties. Since no proof of such ill-motive on the part of the PDEA buy-bust team was adduced by appellant, the RTC
and CA did not err in giving full faith and credence to the prosecution’s account of the buy-bust operation. This Court
has repeatedly stressed that a buy-bust operation (which is a form of entrapment) is a valid mean of arresting
violators of R.A. No. 9165.

Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the
chain of custody rule does not necessarily rend the seized drug items inadmissible. In the instant case, although the
police office did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article ll of R.A. No.

9165, their noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seize from appellant as the chain of
custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroke under the circumstances of the case.

6.3 People vs Guinto G.R. No. 198314, September 24, 2014

FACTS:

Accused Richard Guinto y San Andres (Guinto) was charged of violation of Secti 5, Article ll of R.A. No. 9165.
According to the prosecution, a buy-bust operation was conducted after an informant called the Police regarding the
selling of shabu of a certain “Chard”. The sale was consummated and arrested Guinto.

The defense interposed denial.

The RTC ruled finding Guinto guilty. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the prosecution was able to prove the identity of the corpus delicti.

RULING: The prosecution failed to prove the identity of the corpus delicti. This is fatal in establishing illegal sale.
Moreover, the conflicting statements of the policemen on material points tarnished the credibility of the testimony
for the prosecution.

In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and consideration of the sale and delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. Hence, to establish a concrete
case, it an utmost importance to prove the identity of the narcotic substance itself as it constitute the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vita to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore imperative
for the prosecution t first establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before asserting other
arguments.

True, the absence of ill motive or ill will is ordinarily considered by this Court as proof that the statement of the police
officers is credible. As maintained by the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, In the absence of any
imprope motive, presumption of the regularity of performance of duty prevails. However, it must be similarly noted
that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of public officers does not outweigh another recognized
presumption- the presumption of innocence of the accused until proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In several occasions, the Court had declared that the presumption of regularity of performance of duties must be
 harmonized with the other interest of the State which is the interest of adherence to the presumption of innocence
of the accused. However in case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the
presumption of innocence of the accused, the latter must prevail as the law imposes upon the prosecution the
highest degree of proof of evidence to sustain conviction.

The present case shows that the prosecution fell short in proving with certainty th culpability of the accused and
engendered a doubt on the true circumstances of the buy-bust operation. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as
to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.

6.4 Tan vs Hosana, GR No. 190846 February 03, 2016

FACTS:

Spouses Jose and Milagros Hosana owned a house and lot. Milagros sold to Tomas Tan the subject property. Jose
later filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Re conveyance and Damages against Milagros,
Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City. Jose averred that while he was working i Japan, Milagros, without his
consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose’s signature making it appear that
Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas. Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good
faith and for value.

Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio further testified that Jose’s
signature in the SPA was forged. Bonifacio presented documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison:
Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis pendens,
community tax certificate, voter’s affidavit, specimen signatures, and a handwritten letter.

On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated Rosana Robles (Rosana), his
goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to confirm if Jose
knew about the sale transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose who
confirmed that he was aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale. Rosana informed
Tomas of Jose’s confirmation

The RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were void.

ISSUE: (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of consideration paid; and (2) whether
the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase price of the sale.

RULING: In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the ter “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible
evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probabili of truth. It is evidence
 that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belie than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment had the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. A mere allegation is not evidence,
and the person who alleges has the burden of proving of his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence,
which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.

While the terms and provisions of avoid contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude
the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract,
i.e., what each party has given in the execution of the contract.

Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned by the
Rules of Court. The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue,
which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.

The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertai the truthfulness of the consideration
stated and its actual payment. The purpose introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms
written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as
a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each
party has given under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. There is no
provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that
the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility.

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain
the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.

It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to of doubtful relevancy, incompetency,
or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical, but admit them unless
plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant o competent. On the other hand, their admission, if
they turn out later to be irreleva or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignorin
them.

6.5. Sps. Charito M. Reyes vs Heirs of Benjamin Malance, GR. No. 219071, August 24, 2016

FACTS:

Benjamin Malance was the owner of a parcel of agricultural land covered by Emancipation Patent No. situated at
Dulong Malabon, Pulilan, Bulacan.

During his lifetime, Benjamin obtained from the Magtalas sisters, who are distant relatives, a loan in the amount of
P600, 000.00, as evidenced by a Kalutan Ng Uk sa Utang dated June 26, 2006 (Kasulatan). Under the Kasulatan, the
Magtalas sisters shall have the right to the fruits of the subject land for the six (6) years or until the loan is fully paid.
After Benjamin passed away, his siblings, the Malance heirs, inspected the subject land and discovered that the
Magtalas sisters, their respective husbands, Roberto Reyes and Doming Maravillo, Jr. (petitioners), and their father,
Fidel G. Magtalas (Fidel), were cultivating the same on the basis of the Kasulatan.

Doubting the authenticity of the said Kasulatan, the Malance heirs filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession,
Declaration of Nullity of the Kasulatan and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against petitioners, before the RTC which the Malance heirs subsequently amended. They claimed
that: (a) During his lifetime, Benjamin accumulated enough wealth to sustain himself, was unmarried and had no
children to support;

(b) the Kasulatan was executed during the time when Benjamin was seriously ill and mentally incapacitated due to
his illness and advanced age; and (c) the Kasulatan was simulated as the signature of Benjamin appearing thereon
was no his signature. In their answers, petitioners denied that Benjamin had accumulated enough weal to sustain
himself as his only source of income was his farm, and averred that the are cultivating the land based on the
Kasulatan.

RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of the Malance heirs to substantiate their claim that Benjamin’s signature was
forged, and upheld the validity of the Kasulatan of the ground that it is notarized document which enjoys the
presumption of regularity in its execution. It declared the Kasulatan as a contract of antichresis binding upon
Benjamin’s heirs – the Malance heirs – and conferring the Magtalas sisters the right to retain the subject land until the
debt is paid. CA upheld RTCs findings.

ISSUE: WON Malance heirs was able to prove their challenge against its due execution and authenticity of a notarized
document.

RULING:

Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution,
and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity which may
only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized
documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective
notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private document. Consequently, when
there i a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached
to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is
preponderance of evidence.

In this case, the Court observes that the Kasulatan was irregularly notarized since it did not reflect any competent
evidence of Benjamin’s identity. Consequently, having failed to sufficiently establish that the regularity in the
execution of the Kasulatan, the presumption accorded by law to notarized documents does not apply and,
therefore, the said document should be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court which provides that “before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b)
 by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or hand writing of the maker.”

6.6. Presumption of Law When Public Officer Fails to Account Upon Demand

Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, despotic, or
whimsical manner when it denied petitioner’s motion to reopen especially in view of the fact that the rulings it seeks
to refute ar legally sound and appropriately based on the evidences presented by the partie On this score, the
elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of th Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender
is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office (3)
that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and ( 4) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented o through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take them. Thi article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to have dul forthcoming any
public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal uses.

As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense that she, together with her
supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP an handed the subject 111,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and,
thereafter, had n idea as to where the money went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one, Paraiso was
never presented to corroborate her version. For another, when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did
petitioner fail to make the sam readily available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed in
the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds, that she did not have the in her possession when demand therefor was made, and that she
could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so. 48 Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who
misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable for malversation. The Court quotes, with
approval, the trial court’s ruling, viz Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of P.11,300.00
and the corresponding deposit slip with the Bank Teller Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the deposit slip later, is
to be believed and then it came out that the said P.11,300.00 was not credited to the account of DOTC with the Land
Ban and was in fact missing, still accused Hernan should be convicted of malversatio because in this latter situation
she permits through her inexcusable negligence another person to take the money. And this is still malversation under
Article 217.49 Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision, thus:

Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina Ngaosi who misappropriated the amount
and should therefore be held liable, as the accused would want to portray, the Court doubts the tenability of
that position. As consistently ruled by jurisprudence, a public officer may be held liable for malversation even
if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the taking
thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. The accused, by
he negligence, simply created the opportunity for the misappropriation. Even her ,justification that her
deposits which were not machine-validated were nonetheles acknowledged by the bank cannot fortify her
defense. On the contrary, it all the more emphasizes her propensity for negligence each time that she
accepted deposit slips which were not machine validated, her only proof of receipt of her deposits.
  Ofelia Hernan v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 05 December

Vll. Quantum of Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

7.1 People vs Roxas, G.R. No. 218396, February 10, 2016

FACTS:

This case is classic illustration of the time-honored principle in criminal la that while the prosecution has the burden
of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden is shifted to the accused when he admits
the commission of the crime but interposes self-defense to justify his act.

Nestor Roxas y Castro was charged with the crime of murder for attacking and stabbing with a knife Severino Manalo
y Atienza while the latter was together with Alfredo and Vicente. The 2 became eyewitnesses and gave their positive
declaration.

The accused-appellant invoked self-defense. Without warning, Severino punched the accused-appellant, hitting him
on the lower eyelid portion. The accused- appellant again asked Severino why he was behaving that way as he had
done nothing wrong to him. Severino’s answer was to pull a knife, and poke it at the accused-appellant. This prompted
the accused-appellant to grab the knife and while they grappled for its possession, both Severino and the accused-
appellant fell and rolled on the ground. It was only when he stood up that the accused- appellant noticed that he
sustained stab wounds on his left hand and saw Severino lying on the ground.

RTC found Severino guilty. The RTC gave full credence to the positive and categorical declaration of Vicente
identifying accused-appellant as the perpetrat of the crime. Similarly, the trial court believe that the testimonies
of the other prosecution witnesses corroborated Vicente’s declaration. On the other hand the RTC rejected the
accused-appellant’s theory of self-defense for failure to show unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Moreover, the trial court declared th the killing was attended by treachery as the attack made on the victim was
sudden, unexpected and unforeseen. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision in toto.

ISSUE: whether the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder despite his plea of self-
defense; and (2) whether the court a quo gravely err in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

RULING:

The Court affirms the conviction of the accused-appellant.

The presence or absence of these essential elements deals with factual matters which are best left to the discretion
of the trial court to ascertain. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized in many cases, the trial court is in a better
position to determine the credibility of witnesses having heard and observed firsthand their behavior and manner of
testifying during trial. Thus, the reviewing court is generally bound by the trial court’s finding where no substantial
reasons exists th would justify a reversal of the assessments and conclusions drawn by the latter.

Following a meticulous review of the records of the instant case, the Court sees n compelling reasons to deviate from
this well-settled rule. Confronted with two conflicting versions, the Court is convinced that the trial court was correct
 in givin great weight and respect to Vicente’s testimony detailing who, when, where and how the crime was
committed in this case. As such, the Court agrees with the tria court’s ruling that there was no unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim.

The accused-appellant fails to establish the requisite of self-defense. Only the accused-appellant himself testified
regarding his allegation that the incident started with a sudden punch thrown at him by the victim. No other
witnesses were presented by the defense to bolster their theory of self-defense. Aside from being uncorroborated,
the trial court observed that the version of the accused-appellant is doubtful.

7.2 Atienza vs People, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014

FACTS:

This case involves crime of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document agains Atienza and Castro. Atienza and
Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, particularly assigned to its Budget Division and holding the positions of
Budget Officer I and Utility Worker l.

Atibula, Custodian of CA decisions was invited by Castro to attend Atienza’s part where the latter introduced Atibula
to a certain Dario and asked him to assist in searching for the CA decision. Thereafter, Atibula and Dario returned to
the office and search for the decision. Dario requested Atibula to insert a decision in one of the volumes of CA Original
Decisions where the latter refused and immediately le Atienza offered Atibula 50,000 in exchange for records. Atibula
reported the incident. He further discovered that some of the volumes were missing which he also reported.

Nelson D. Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s Division handed to Atibul a bag containing a gift-wrapped
package which turned out to be missing records He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the said
package to Atibula.

The contents of the returned records were reviewed by Atibula and it was not found that there were new documents
inserted therein. Upon Atibula’s compariso it was found that the duplicate original decisions did not bear such
promulgations On investigation, it was found that the signatures of the justices were forged.

Atienza denied the allegations.

RTC found that there is conspiracy. CA affirmed RTCs decision.

ISSUE: Is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction.

RULING: No. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main
fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is
more than on circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others,
as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record
is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other
 and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.

The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence, failing which, the presumption of
innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted. This, despite the fact that his innocence may be doubted,
for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness or even
absence of defense. If the inculpatory facts and circumstance are capable of two or more explanations, one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then evidence does not fulfill
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this case. Courts should be guided by the
principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict
one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.

Accordingly, there being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a conviction, the Court hereby acquits
petitioners, without prejudice, however, to an subsequent finding on their administrative liability in connection with
the incidents in this case.

7.3. Franco vs People, G.R. No. 19185, February 1, 2016

FACTS:

This is a case against the accused Guilbemer Franco who stole and carr away one (1) Nokia 3660 Model cellular phone
worth Php 18,500.00 belonging to Benjamin Nakamoto while both on them went to work out at the gym. This was
taken from the latter when he went to change his clothes.

After finding out that the phone was missing, witnesses at the gym informed that they saw Franco get the phone and
cap from the altar. Upon verification from the logbook, he found out that Franco had left within the time that he was
in the shower. Ramos, gym caretaker also testified that he saw Franco in the gym but h was not working out and was
just going around the area. In fact, it was just Franco’s second time at the gym. Ramos even met him near the door
and as Franco did not log out, he was the one who indicated it in their logbook. When Nakamoto announced that his
cell phone was missing and asked that nobody

leaves the place, he put an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in the logbook t indicate that he was the only one
who left the gym after cell phone was declared lost.

Nakamoto tried to locate Franco within the gym’s vicinity but they failed to find hi A report was filed to the police
station and while there, they received a report where Franco was. A vendor told them that he saw a person who was
holding a cell phone, which was then ringing and that the person was trying to shut it off. When they went to Franco’s
house, they were initially not allowed to come in but were eventually let in by Franco’s mother. They talked to Franco
who denied having taken the cell phone.

In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost his cell phone at around 1:00 p.m.,
he and his witnesses could have confronted him as at that time, he was still at the gym, having left only at around
2:45 p.m. He also admitted to have taken a cap and cell phone from the altar but claimed these to be his.

The RTC convicted Franco of theft. CA affirmed RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able prove Franco’s guilt beyond reasonabl doubt.

RULING:

No. The prosecution fails to prove the guilt of Franco. The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which
must rely on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense.

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance to convict; (2) the facts on which the
inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance to convict; (2) the facts on which the
inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.

The prosecution presented three witnesses – Nakamoto, the complainant; Ramos the gym’s caretaker; and Rosario,
another gym user. The RTC and CA wove these circumstances in order to arrive at the “positive identification” of
Franco as the perpetrator.

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the
very act of commission of the crime. There are two type of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspe
or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of
the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witnes may not
have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen
with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of th crime. This is the second, type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with the other piece of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused
is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others.

A witness’ testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive identification. While it may support the
conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it does not establish with certainty that what Franco
feloniously took assuming that he did, was Nakamoto’s cell phone. He was unable to particularly describe at first
instance what or whose cell phone Franco took from the altar. He only assumed that it was Nakamoto’s at the time
the latter announced that his cell phone was missing.

Neither can the prosecution’s testimonial evidence fall under the second categor of positive identification that is,
 Franco having been identified as the person or one of the persons last seen immediately before and right after the
commission o the theft. Records show that there were other people in the gym before and after Nakamoto lost his
cell phone.

It must be emphasized that Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere
conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions. It is iniquitous to base Franco’s guilt on the presumptions of the
prosecution’s witnesses for the Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and circumstance are
capable of two or more interpretations, on of which being with the innocence of the accuse and the other or others
consiste with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the
test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a conviction.

Under the rules of evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall
under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Section 20 of the same Rule, in turn,
provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either by anymore who saw the document executed written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Testimony of Rams shows that the log book was not identified and authenticated.

In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the rule is that the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves
presumed. The circumstantial evidence mus exclude the possibility that some other person has the offense charged.

Franco, therefore, cannot be convicted of the crime charged in this case. There is not enough evidence to do so. As a
rule, in order to support a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent
with th hypothesis that the accused is guilty. In this case, not all the facts on which the inference of guilt is based were
proved. The matter of what and whose cell phone Franco took from the altar still remains uncertain.

The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary
to warrant Franco’s conviction. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Not only that, where the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test
of moral certainty required for conviction.

7.4. Saraum vs People G.R. No. 205472, January 25, 2016

FACTS:

Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article ll (Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) of
Republic Act No. 9165. He was allegedly possession of 1 lighter, 1 rolled tissue paper and 1 aluminum tin foil which
are instruments and/or equipments fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting, or introducing,
any dangerous drug into the body. These were taken on a buy bust operation with coordination with the PDEA after
an information regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City.

By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on the date and time in
question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by
 men with firearms. They were already with “Antik” and “Pata,” both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he
had not committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only when he was
brought to the court.

The RTC found the accused guilty. On appeal, the CA sustained the judgment of conviction.

ISSUE: WON the accused was guilty with violation of Section 12, Article ll of RA No. 9165.

RULING: Saraum was arrested during the commission of the crime, which instanc does not require a warrant in
accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the
accused i apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or ha just committed an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.

The case is clearly one of hot pursuit. The valid warrantless arrest gave the office the right to search the shanty for
objects relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they
inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the polic officers were justified
in seizing them. Considering that Saraum’s arrest was legal the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise
lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefor admissible
in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure.

Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the court has no choice but
to sustain the judgment of conviction.

Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influenc have been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed because it has the advantage of hearin the witnesses
and observing their deportment and manner of testifying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where
said findings are sustained by the CA as in this case. In this case, the quantum of evidence necessary to prove Saraum’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt had been sufficiently met since the prosecution stood on its own strength and did not
rely on the weakness of the defense. The prosecution was able to overcome the constitutional right of the accused
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

7.5. Absence of Specific Details in Conduct of Buy-Bust

Operation Blunts Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

POI de Sagun’s testimony – consisting of generalizations which lacked material details, riddled with inconsistencies,
and uncorroborated – failed to establish the elements of the offense charged with proof beyond reasonable doubt.

POI de Sagun described the alleged buy-bust operation only m general terms, thus:

Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court why did your group arrest accused Marilou Hilario on January 22, 2008 at
about 11 o’clock in the evening?
A Through the buy-bust operation we conducted I was able to buy shabu from her, sir.
Q Alright in other words you pretended yourself to buy shabu. Were you able to buy shabu from the said accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q How much shabu did you buy [from] Marilou Hilario?
A Fiye hundred (P.500.00) pesos only, sir.
Q After buying shabu from the accused in the amount of five hundred pesos (P.500.00), what happened next?
A We immediately arrested the person, sir.
Q Were you in uniform on that time when you conducted the buybust operation?
A No sir, we were in civilian.
Q So after buying shabu you arrested the accused? A Yes, sir.
Q Were you alone or together with other police officers in arresting the accused?
A I was with POI Cabungcal, sir.
Q Who actually among you arrested accused Marilou Hilario?
A I, sir.
It’s a generic narrative of any buy-bust operation, offering no distinctive detail except for Hilario’s name as alleged
seller. POI de Sagun failed to describe how h came to know that Hilario was selling shabu; where Hilario was and
what she was doing that time; how he approached her and asked to buy shabu from her; how they came to agree
on the purchase price for the shabu; where Hilario got the sachet of shabu she handed to him; and what his pre-
arranged signal was to sho the other police officers that the sale had been consummated and Hilario could
already be arrested – details which police officers who carried out legit buy-bust operations should be able to
provide readily andcompletely.

When pressed for details during his cross-examination, PO 1 de Sagun was unable to give enlightening answers –
Q Prior to the conduct of the buy-bust operation, can you tell us what are the preparations you made?
A We prepared a pre-operation report, ma’am.

Q What is the basis of your pre-operation report? A Due to the sale of the illegal drugs, ma’ am.
Q You mean to tell us because of the alleged information that there was a rampant selling of illegal drugs?
A Yes, ma’am.

Q By the way Mr. witness did you conduct surveillance against Marilou Hilario and Lalaine Guadayo prior to January
22, 2008? A No, ma’am.
Q By the way, do you know this Marilou Hilario on January 22, 2008 or before that day?
A N9,ma’am.

Q Hbw about accused Lalaine Guadayo? A No, ma’am.

Q So, that was the first time that you saw on January 22, 2008 these Marilou Hilario and Lalaine Guadayo?
A Yes, ma’am.
xx xx

Q Do you have a copy of your pre-operation report?

A I have no copy of the pre-operation report, ma’am.

So according to PO 1 de Sagun, he and his fellow police officers conducted a bu bust operation in Brgy. Maguihan
based on information from unnamed source/s that selling of drugs was rampant in the area; they prepared a pre-
operation repo which was not produced in court; they went to Brgy. Maguihan without a specific target/subject;
they did not conduct any surveillance prior to the buy-bust operation on January 22, 2008; and they did not know
Hilario or Guadayo prior to the buy-bust operation and the arrest of the two. How then were the police officer able
to identify Hilario or Guadayo, from all the other residents of Brgy. Maguihan as the ones selling drugs in Brgy.
Maguihan and who would be the subject of the buy-bust operation?

The lack of specific details on the planning and conduct of the buybust operation on January 22, 2008 in Brgy.
Maguihan casts serious doubts that it actually took place and/or that the police officers carried out the same in the
regular performance of their official duties. Relevant herein is the following discourse of the Court on buy-bust
operations in People v. Ong.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It i commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending
law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from
the offender, without anybody inducing or proddin him to commit the offense. Its opposite is instigation or
inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him.
Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause.

To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in effecting
the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly
and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the courts could not merely rely
on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law
enforcement agents. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the
constitutionally protected rights of the individual. It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple
from th prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. Courts should not allow themselves to be used
as instruments of abuse and injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.

In People v. Doria, we stressed the “objective” test in buy-bust operations. We ruled that in such operations, the
prosecution must present a complete picture detailing the transaction, which “must star from the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of th consideration until
the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. We emphasized that the manner
by which the initial conta was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the ‘buy-bust’ money, and the
delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are
not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.” In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust
operation is incomplete.. The confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu
.started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO 1 Gonzales
who had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SP Gonzales’ testimony is hearsay and possesses no
probative value unless it can b shown that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule. To impart probative
value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his
constitutional right to confront the witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine him for his
truthfulness. As the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy- bust operation, its claim that there
was a valid entrapment of the appellants must fail. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
  People v. Marilou y. Diana and Lalaine Guadayo y Rojo, G.R. No. 210610 January 11, 2018

7.6. Mere Experiencing of Pain Not Enough To Convict for Rape; Consummation

The Court held in People v. Butiong28 that ”the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not
merely for the penis to stroke the surface of th female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or
touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.

Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either the labia of the
pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.” While “the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummatin the sexual
act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge,”29 “the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part
of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the
pudemdum.”30 Indeed, the grazing of the victims’ private organ caused pain, bu it cannot be presumed that carnal
knowledge indeed took place by reason thereo As the Court held in People v. Brioso,31 “the Court is loath to convict
an accused for rape solely on the basis of the pain experienced by the victim a a result of efforts to insert the penis
into the vagina.”

Significantly, from their own declaration following the public prosecutor’s questioning, they suffered pains not
because of appellant’s attempt to insert his penis but because of the grazing of their vagina.

Given the foregoing and since there is neither clear showing or direct proof of penile penetration or that appellant’s
penis made contact with the labias of the victims, which is an essential element of the crime of rape, we cannot sustain
appellant’s conviction for the crime of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6765; 07 CR-6766; 07-CR-6768; 07-CR-·6769
and 07-CR-6770.

- People v. Noel Bejim Y Romero, G.R. No. 208835, January 19, 2018

Rape; Women’s Honor Doctrine Abandoned; Location of Lacerations indicative of Either Consensual or Non
Consensual Sex

More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape cases are solely
decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on the
impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless
that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. 11 However, this misconception, particularly in this
day and ag not only puts the accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice. The “women’s honor”
doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case of People v. Tana, 12 the Court affirmed the
conviction of three

(3) armed robbers who took turns raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo The Court, speaking through
Justice Alejo Labrador, said: It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they
have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. ThiS is due to their natural instinct to protect their
honor. We cannot believe that the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place
unless it did actually take place. 13 This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting
back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual
assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman.
We, should sta away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman’s dynamic role in society today; she
who has over the years transfonned into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight
for her rights. In this wa we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or
cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. 14 Thus, in order f us to affirm a
conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim. In an
appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down, almost invariably, to the credibility and
story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is oftentimes constrained to rely on the observations of the trial
court who had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling and at times unfriendly, examination. 15 It has since become imperative that the
evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial court be accorded great respect by this Court; for it can be
expected that said determination is based on reasonable discretion as to which testimony is acceptable and
which witness is worthy of belief. 16 Although we put a premium on the factual findings of the trial court, especially
when they are affirmed by the appellate court, 17 this rule is not absolute and admits exceptions, such as when
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, and
misinterpreted. We follow certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before us, to
wit: First, the Court gives the highest respect to the R TC’ s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point,
the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. Second, absent any substantial
reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally
bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the
outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded. And third, the rule is even more
stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of
AAA’s testimony, reasonable doubt lingers as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The
following circumstances, particularly would cast doubt as to the credibility of her testimony: (1) the version of
AAA’s story appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her testimony in court; (2) AAA could not
have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first time; (3) her
testimony lacks material details on how she was brought under the stage against her will; and ( 4) the medical
findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry. First, AAA narrates
that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from the crowd at the beauty contest and made it easy for
Amarela to grab her without anyone noticing: Q: Now, you said that you watched the beau contest at around 7:00
in the evening on Feb. 10, 2009. After that, Ms. Witness, while watching, what did you do? A: I was on my way to the
CR. Q: And where is the CR located? A: Near the coop. Q: Can you please tell us the name of that cooperative?
A: Cooperative. Q: Can you recall the exact name? A: Maligatong Cooperative. Q: And, where is this Maligatong
Cooperative, Ms. Witness, in relation to the basketball court where the beauty contest was held? A: It’s near. xx xx
Q: Now, between the basketball court and the cooperative you referred to, wh separates these two buildings? A:
Durian trees and cacao. Q: Yousaid that you were going to the CR located at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative
to relieve yourself. And, were you able to go to the CR at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative? A: Nomore.
Q: Why not? A: [ Amarela] was waiting for me. Q: Exact can you please tell us the location where he was waiting for
you? A: At the back o the cooperative. /J’I Decision IO G.R. No. 225642-43 Q: And, upon seeing [Amarela] at the
back of the cooperative, Ms. Witness, tell us what happened? A: He pulled me. Q: Going to what place? A: Going
towards the day care center. 19 Meanwhile, her affidavit-complaint would indicate that Amarela pulled AAA away
from the beauty contest stage to the day care center: 6. At around 6:00 in the afternoon, I, my aunt [BBB]
together with her siblings and grandchildren went back to Maligatong Cooperative Building to watch a beauty
contest. My companions stayed at the multicab at the parking area of said building, while my cousin [CCC] and I went
closer to the stage. While at there, the person of [Amarela], drunk, suddenly appeared and introduced himself to me.
I resisted to get his hand on my hands because he is holding it tightly and forcibly brought m to the back portion of
the building. I asked for help but nobody heard me maybe because of the high volume of the sound system. 7. While
at the back of said building I saw my boyfriend Eric Dumandan coming and [Amarela] told him, “Ran (Eric’s palayaw)
naa si gemma diri!” and Eric responded, “ahh! tinga-a.” 8. When Eric left us, [Amarela] grabbed me going to the purok
beside the daycare center Sitio Maligatong, Brgy. Tawan-Tawan, Baguio District [more or less] 20 meters away from
the [cooperative] building . . I shouted for help but still nobody heard me. 20 It has often been noted that if there is
an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter should be given more weight since
affidavits being taken ex parte are usually incomplete and inadequate.21 W usually brush aside these inconsistencies
since they are trivial and do not impair the credibility of the rape victim.22 In this case, however, the version in AAA’s
affidavit-complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she was
pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; late in court, she says that she was on her way to the rest room when she
was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA’ s retraction because it goes into whether it was even
possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her wil If we were to take into account AAA’s initial claim that Amarela
pulled her away from the vicinity of the stage, people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a
woman against her will. Thus, AAA’s version that she was on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled away
from the crowd watching the beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice if AAA was being taken
away against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room when she was grabbed by Amarela, why does
her sworn statement reflect anothe story that differs from her court testimony? To our mind, AAA’ s testimony could
have been concocted to just make her story believable rather than sticking to her original story that Amarela
introduced himself and pulled her away from the stage We cannot say that this inconsistency is simply a minor detail
because it casts some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth – that she was abducted against her will before
she was raped. Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this instance already puts AAA’s
credibility in questio Again, we must remember that if we were to convict based solely on the lone testimony of the
victim, her testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human experience. We must set
a high standard in evaluatin the credibility of the testimony of a victim who is not a minor and is mentally capable.
Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole incident allegedly
happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was not illuminated and that she did not see
Amarela’s face: Direct Examination Q: Now, what separates this beauty contest from what you were testifying a while
ago as the daycare center? A: Coconut tree durian trees, and cacao. Q: ·what else? A: Several trees. Q: How about
grass? A: Yes, sir. Q: Now, can you please tell us the illumination in that place? A: It was dark. Q: Why is it that it was
dark? A: Because there was no lighting.23 Cross- Examination Q: Since it was already night time, it was very dark at
that time, correct? A: Yes, ma’am. /)rAj I 23 TSN, 12 May 2009, p. 19. Decision 12 G.R. No. 225642-43 Q: And when
you went to the CR to relieve yourself which CR was located at Maligatong Cooperative building, it was also dark on
your way? A: Yes ma’am. xx.xx Q: Now, while under the makeshift stage of that day care center, it was dark, very
dark? A: Yes, ma’am. Q: And you cannot see the face of [Amarela was not clear to you because it was very dark,
correct? A Y ‘ 24 : es, ma am. Re- Direct Examination Q: At the time that you said that while [Amarela] was undressing
you could not see his face, would you confirm that? A: Yes, sir. Q: Wh about his body? A: No, sir. Q: Why, Ms. Witness?
A: It was dark. xx xx Q: Now, at the time that you were raped you said that it was too dark, how did you then identify
that [Amarela] was the one who raped you? A: I know him when he broug me from the Coop. Q: From the Coop. to
the day care center that was the time th you identified him? A Y . 25 : es, sir. From AAA’s testimony, we are unsure
whethe she was able to see Amarela given the lighting conditions in the crime scene. In her re-direct examination,
AAA clarified that she identified Amarela while she was being pulled to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution
failed to clarify as to how she was able to do so when, according to AAA herself, the way to the day care ~enter was
dark and covered by trees. Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again draw reservations from AAA’s
testimony. Proving the identi of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution’s primary responsibility. The identity
of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of
the prosecution is not to prove the crim but to prove the It/ 24 TSN, 19 May 2009, pp. 2-6. 25 Id.atl5. Decision 13 G.R.
No 225642-43 identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no
conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.26 Third, her claim that she was forcibly
brought under makeshift stage, stripped naked, and then raped seems unrealistic and beyond human experience.
She said: Q: At the day care center, where exactly did he brin you? A: Under. Q: Under what? A: Under the makeshift
stage. Q: You said there was also a makeshift stage at the day care center? A: Yes. Q: Was it finished makeshift stage
or not? A: Not yet finished. Q: You said that he brought you unde that makeshift stage? A: Yes. Q: Please tell us how
did you fit in that makeshift stage? A: Because the flooring is about 2 feet high. Q: Since you said he pulled you
towards that makeshift stage, what was your reaction, Ms. Witness? A: I was scared. Q: And what did you do? A: I did
not know what to do then. xx xx Q: Now after that, what happened, Ms. Witness? A: He pushed me under. Q:
What happened after that? A: He [punched] me in my abdomen. Q: What else did he d to you? A: I felt weak. Q: After
that what happened? A: He undressed me. Q: Whil he was undressing you, what did you do, Ms. Witness? A: I was
just lying down.

/Jilli xx xx n 26 People v. Caliso, 675 Phil. 742, 752 (2011) cited in People v. Espera, 718 Phil. 680, 694 (2013). Decision
14 G.R. No. 225642-43 Q: What else did he do to you while you were resisting his advances? A: He boxed my upper le
thigh. Q: .What did you feel when he boxed your left thigh? A: I felt numbness. xx xx Q: Now, you said that he
undressed you, Ms. Witness, and you said he also undressed himself. What, then, [did he] do to you? A: He placed
himself on top o me. Q: What did he do after that? A: He inserted his penis in my sex organ. 27 From this, AAA would
like us to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA, and place himself on top of her while under a 2-
feet high makeshift stage. It is physically impossible for two human beings to move freely under a stage, much more
when the other person is trying to resist sexual advances.

Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly Amarela pulled her to the makeshift stage without any sign of struggle
or resistance. If indeed she was being held against her will, AAA could have easily called for help or simply run away.
Fourth, the challenge to AAA’s credibility is further supported by the medical findings of the medico-legal officer. The
medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect that AAA had no pertinent physical findings /or physical
injuries:28 FINDINGS GENERAL PHYSICAL FINDINGS Height 5 feet & 4 inches I Weight J 44Kg General Survey
Awake, afebrile, not in respiratory distress Mental Status Conscious, coherent, respond well to questions when
asked and maintained eye to eye contact. Pertinent Physical Normal findings Findings/Physical Injuries ANO
GENITAL EXAMINATION External Genitalia Normal findings Urethra and Normal findings Periurethral Area
Perihymenal Area ( +) Hyperemic/Erythematous perihymenal area. and Fossa Narvicularis Hymen (+)Complete
laceration at 9 o’clock and 3 o’clock positions with minimal bloody secretion on the lacerated area. Perineum Normal
findings fol 27 TSN, 12 May 2009, pp. 21-25. 28 Records

(Criminal Case No. 64,964-09), p. 9. Decision 15 G.R. No. 225642-43 Discharge None Internal and Not done Speculum
exam Anal Examination Good sphincteric tone DIAGNOSTIC AND EVIDENCE GATHERING Forensic Evidence
Pending laboratory results (Spermatocyte and Laboratory determination gram staining).

Results IMPRESSONS Anogenital findings are diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma.L’J Insofar as the
evidentiary value of a medical examination i concerned, we have held that a medico-legal report is not indispensable
to the prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature. 30 In convicting rapists based entirely on
the testimony of their victim, we have said tha a medico-legal report is by no means controlling.31 Thus, since it is
merely corroborative in character, a medico-legal report could even be d. d . h 32 1spense wit . A medico-legal’s
findings are at most corroborative because they are mere opinions that can only infer possibilities and not
absolute necessities. A medico-legal, who did not witness the actual incident, cannot testify on what exactly
happened as his testimony would not be based on personal knowledge or derived from his own perception.
Consequently, a medico-legal’ s testimony cannot establish a certain fact as it can only suggest what most likely
happened. In the same way, a medico-legal’s findings can raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged rape
victim. Based on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the medical examination on AAA, she
diagnosed that the ano-genital findings were caused by a blunt force of penetrating trauma. In a study conducted
by Radostina D. Miterva,33 the mos common sites for lacerations were determined, “in rape victims with ring- shaped
hymens, lacerations were most commonly located as followed at dorsal recumbence of the patient: (1) one laceration
at 6 o’clock position in 42.02% of cases; (2) two lacerations at 5 and 7 o’clock positions in 24.55% cases; (3) three
lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o’clock positions in 45.36% of case and (4) four lacerations at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o’clock
positions in 25% of cases. These findings were supported by an earlier study that described patterns of genital injury
resulting from sexual abuse.34 However, in a similar study comparing injuries from consensual and non-
consensual intercourse, the authors discovered that the statistical results of the locations of vaginal laceration
are almost the same. 35 Their findings suggest that the injuries ar similar after consensual and non-consensual
intercourse. 36 From all this, we observe that a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish
consensual from non-consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the frequency of
lacerations and whether they are located i different positions) to determine whether the sexual act was consensual
or not. If the frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of the vaginal orific then it would be a good
indicator that there was sexual abuse. On the other hand, if the lacerations are found in a specific area, it could
indicate forced rape, but could also suggest consensual intercourse. In the instant case, the lacerations were
found only at the 9 o’clock and 3 o’clock positions of the hymen. Considering the locality of these lacerations, we
cannot completely rule out the probability that AAA voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of bruises
on AAA’ s thighs-when she said she was punched there twice-reinforce the theory that AAA may have had consensual
intercourse. Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will
ofthefemale.37 It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and
shown to be without her consent.38 Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, provided she is
above the age of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent.39 The fema must not at any time
consent; her consent, given at any time prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere
verbal protests and refusals, prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and fre of initial
coercion.40 Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense, We must bear in mind that
the burden of proof is never shifted and /)II/ 34 M.S. Sommers, Defining Patterns of Genital Injury from Sexual Assault,
TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 2007. 35 S.Anderson, et. al., Genital Findings of Women After
Consensual and Nonconsensual Intercourse, Journal of Forensic Nursing, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2006. 36 Id. 37

People v. Butiong. 675 Phil. 621, 631 (2011 ). 38 Id. at 631-632. 39 Id. at 632. 40

Id. Decision . 17 G.R. No. 225642-43 the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits. Whether
the accused’s defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case. It is fundamental that the prosecution’s case
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.4 As to Racho’s case, we note
that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases. This means that both Amarela and Racho were convicted based
on her lone testimony. When we rely on the testimony of the private complainant in rape case we require that her
testimony be entirely credible, trustworthy, and realistic. For when certain parts would seem unbelievable, especially
when it concerns one of the elements of the crime, the victim’s testimony as a whole does not pass the tes of
credibility. Since we doubt AAA’ s account on how she was raped by Amarela, we have to consider her testimony
against Racho under the same light. In her testimony, AAA claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her
aunt’s house but instead forced her to go inside a house along the way. While inside the house Racho supposedly
boxed AAA’s abdomen, undressed himself, placed himself on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into AAA’ s vagina.
Afterwards, Racho got dressed and left AAA to go home by herself.42 We find it odd that AAA was not brought to
the police right after she arrived at Godo Dumandan’s house to seek help. Instead, she was brought to the Racho
residence where she told Neneng Racho what happened. Again, instead of reporting the incident to the police, AAA
insisted that she be brought to her aunt’s house nearby. This is way beyond huma experience. If AAA had already told
other people what happened, there was no reason for her not to report the incident to the proper authorities. Faced
with AAA’ doubtful narration before she went home alone, we are inclined to believe Racho’ version that they parted
ways when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. To begin with, Racho did not even want to bring AAA to her
aunt’s house nearby. 43 he had the intention to have sex with AAA, Racho would not have declined her mother’s
instruction. To add, Racho said he left AAA by herself because he did n want to bring AAA to her house since this was
in another town from her aunt’s house.44 His reason for leaving AAA to go home alone is supported by the fact that
he was able to immediately come home right after he left with AAA. Unlike AAA’s testimony, the version offered by
Racho is corroborated by the testimony of his mother. fj11J 41 People v. Cruz, 736 Phil. 564, 571 (2014) citing People
v. f~dan, 402 Phil. 297, 312 (2001); People v. Bormeo, 292-A Phil. 691, 702-703 (2014) citing People v. Quintal, 211 Phil.
79, 94 (1983); People v. Garcia, 289 Phil 819, 830 (1992). 42 TSN, 11 March 2009, pp. 29-32. 43 TSN, 22.February 2012,
6. 44 TSN, 6 June 2011, p. 7. Decision 18 G.R. No. 225642-43 Undeniably, the defenses of denial and alibi are
commonly raised in rape cases. Nevertheless, w have dismissed such defenses for being inherently weak, self-serving,
and, more often than not, uncorroborated. To recall, Racho did not deny that he accompanied AAA to her aunt’s
house, but he said he left her when AAA insisted that she wante to go home. Racho’s mother corroborated this part
of the story. To our mind, if the denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could have easily raised these defenses
and denied that AAA ever came to the house. His mother could have likewise covered up this story, but she did not
and confirmed that Racho was with AAA that night. If indeed Racho raped AAA that night, the best defense available
for him was alibi which he thought he did not have to raise, given that he was telling the truth when he left AAA by
herself to go home. To our mind, these are badges of truth which persuade us that Racho might be telling the truth.
In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must b supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty.45 Absolute guarantee of guilt is not demanded by the
law to convict a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least, be moral certainty on each element essential to
constitute the offense and on the responsibility of the offender.46 Thus, the prosecution has the primordial duty to
present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion.47 The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present clear story of what transpired. Whether AAA’s
ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must do its part to convince th
court that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources of the government to present a logical and
realistic account of every alleged crime, and they should, to the best of their ability, present a detailed story to get a
conviction But here we cannot ascertain what happened based on the lone testimony of AA It should have been the
prosecution’s duty to properly evaluate the evidence if it had enough to convict Amarela or Racho. Henceforth, we
are constrained to reverse the R TC and the CA rulings due to the presence of lingering doubts whic are inconsistent
with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal
case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to an acquittal, as a matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

– People v. Juvy D. Aramela and Junard G. Racho, G.R. No. 225642-43, January 17, 2018
 The Court gives great weight to the findings of the lower courts on the credibility of “AAA”. “It is settled
jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, because when a woman, more so if
she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.”30 A correctly held by the CA “AAA’s” recount of
her horrific experience at the hands her father was clear and straightforward. Appellant’s defenses of improper
motive and denial, which deserves no weight in law, cannot prevail over “AAA’s” positive

and categorical testimony. 3 1 The Court has ruled that “a young girl’s revelation that she had been raped, coupled
with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be
compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.”
This legal dictum especially applies in cases where the assailant was her father. The inconsistency alluded to in
“AAA’s” testimony, with respect to whether or not she immediately reported the first rape incident to her mother,
was trivial an should be liberally construed considering that it was not an essential element of the crime of rape. “What
is decisive is that [appellant’s] commission of the crime charged has been sufficiently proved.”“Such inconsistencies
on minor details are in fac badges of truth, candidness, and the fact that the witness is unrehearsed.”

~~~ People v. Benjamin Salaver Y Luzon, G.R. No. 223681, August 20, 2018

VIII. Substantial Evidence

8.1. Asian International Manpower Services, Inc vs DOLE, G.R. No. 210308, April 6, 2016

FACTS:

ON November 8, 2016, the Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch of the POEA conducted a surveillance of Asian
International Manpower Services, Inc. (AIMS) t determine whether it was operating as a recruitment agency despite
the cancellation of its license on August 28, 2006.

On surveillance, POEA operatives posed as applicants upon observation that there were people standing outside its
main entrance, and there were announcements job vacancies posted on the main glass door of the office. Through
the flyer, they learned that AIMS was hiring hotel workers for deployment to Macau and grape pickers for California.

POEA issued a Show Case Order directing AIMS and its covering surety, Country BANKERS Insurance Corporation,
to submit their answer or explanation to the Surveillance Report, however no Surveillance Report was attached. AIMS
on their defense maintained that they are not liable for any recruitment misrepresentation. Further, they contend
that they have no job vacancies and their license had been cancelled

POEA ruled that AIMS was liable for misrepresentation under Section 2 (e), Rule l Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules,
since the POEA records showed that AIMS had n job orders to hire hotel workers for Macau, nor grape pickers for
California, as its flyer allegedly advertised.

AIMS filed a motion for reconsideration before the DOLE. It alleged that its right to due process was violated because
the POEA did not furnish it with a copy of the Surveillance Report dated February 21, 2007, which was the basis of
the POEA Administrator’s factual findings.
 The CA dismissed AIMS’s charge of denial of due process for failure of POEA to furnish it with a copy of the
Surveillance Report dated February 21, 2007. It held that AIMS’ misrepresentation with regard to the recruitment of
workers for non- existent overseas jobs was supported by substantial evidence.

ISSUE: WON the AIMS right of due process was violated because it was never furnished with a copy of the POEA
Surveillance Report.

RULING:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied t administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunit to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In
the application the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the
denial of the opportunity to be heard.

“Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself.” “The observance of fairness in the conduct of an investigation is at the very heart of procedural due
process.” A long as he is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he is not denied due process. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity to the person charged to answer
the accusation against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.

According to the CA, AIMS was “obviously informed of the charges” against it during the May 9, 2007 preliminary
hearing at the POEA, where its representative Lugatiman appeared. But instead of rebutting the allegations of the
POEA operatives in their Surveillance Report, Lugatiman “failed to clarify the issues or t charges and nearly
manifested that AIMS already filed an answer and thus move for the resolution of the Complaint against it.” Thus,
the CA concluded that AIMS was given opportunity to be heard and to present its side but it failed to make use of the
said opportunity.

The Court does not agree. In concluding that, through Lugatiman, AIMS was “obviously informed of the charges”
during the preliminary hearing, the CA overlooked the crucial fact that, as the POEA itself admitted, it did not furnish
AIM with a copy of its Surveillance Report dated February 21, 2007, which contains th factual allegations of his
representation supposedly committed by AIMS. It is incomprehensible why the POEA would neglect to furnish AIMS
with a copy of th said report, since other than the fact that AIMS was represented at the hearing on May 9, 2007,
there is no showing that Lugatiman was apprised of the contents thereof. In fact, as AIMS now claims, the alleged
recruitment flyer distributed to it applicants was not even presented.

It is true that in administrative proceedings, as in the case below, only substantial evidence is needed, or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind may accep as adequate to support a conclusion. Unfortunately, there is no evidence
against AIMS to speak of, much less substantial evidence. Clearly, AIMS’s right to be informed of the charges against
it, and its right to be held liable only upon substantial evidence, have both been gravely violated.

8.2. Republic vs Arias, G.R. No. 188909, September 17, 2014

FACTS:
 Respondent Florentino B. Aris was the Assistant Bureau Director of the Bureau of Equipment (BOE), Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Respondent, along with other DPWH officials Burt B. Favorito, Director of
Administrative Manpower and Management Service; Emily M. Tanquintic, Directo of Controllership and Financial
Management Service; Oscar D. Abundo, Director Legal Service; Abraham S. Divina, Jr., Director of BOE, and several
unnamed presidential and non-presidential appointees of DPWH, were charged with violation of Section 3(e), (i) or
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended Sections 4(a),

(c) and 7(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, and the Memorandum from the President dated 19 November 1999 on the
doctrine of command responsibility for corruptio in government office.

Respondent denied the chargers. Respondent essentially relied on good faith an presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties of his subordinates.

After examination and evaluation of the pertinent documents, the appellate court found no sufficient basis to hold
respondent administratively liable. The appellate court noted that respondent had to rely to a reasonable extent on
his subordinate and on good faith of those who prepared and submitted the questionable documents.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, gros neglect of duty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

RULING: The quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administrative cases is substantial evidence.

Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deeme established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required ordinary civil cases, but such kind
of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence
commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.

In the instant case, it is petitioner’s submission that respondent cannot be exonerated from administrative liability
for mere reliance on his subordinates in view of the glaring irregularities on the documents.

On the contrary, respondent, whose argument was sustained by the Court of Appeals, insists that the signatures
appearing on the documents appear to be regular.

At the onset, this Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls
under a of the following recognized exceptions:

1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. Where there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
 to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; and
10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The instant case falls under the exceptions because the findings of fact of the Office of the President are contrary to
that of the Court of Appeals warranting review by this Court.

In sum, this Court finds substantial evidence to hold respondent administratively liable. Pursuant to Sections 22 and
23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, grave misconduct and gross
negligence in the performance of duty are classified as grave offenses punishabl by dismissal.

lX. Preponderance of Evidence

9.1. BJDC Construction vs Lanuzo, G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014

FACTS:

This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime accident due
to the supposed negligence of a construction company then undertaking re-blocking work on a national highway.
The plaintiffs insisted that the accident happened because the construction company did not provide adequate
lighting on the sight, but the latter countered that the fatal accident was caused by the negligence of the
motorcycle rider himself.

Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) filed a complaint for damages against BJDC Constructio Nena alleged that she was the
surviving spouse of the late Balbino who figured in the accident that transpired at the site of the re-blocking work at
about 6:30 p.m. on October 30, 1997; that Balbino’s Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade place by the
company in the right lane portion of the road, causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly
cemented road, resulting in his instant death ; and that the company’s failure to place illuminated warning signs on
the site of the project, especially during night time, was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino.

In its answer, BJDC denied Nena’s allegations of negligence, insisting that it had installed warning signs and lights
along the highway and on the barricades of the project, that at the time of the accident, the lights were working and
switched on ; that its project was duly inspected by the Department of Public Works and

Highways (DPWH), the office of the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili Municipal Police Station ; and that it was found to have
satisfactorily taken measures to ensure the safety of motorists.

The RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whose evidence was preponderant in establishing the negligence which proximately caused the death of
Balbino?

RULING: Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of the Court mandates that in civil case the party having the burden of proof
 must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the fac in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Generally the
party who denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court, but it may
rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or
defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability.

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.
It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence of either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” However, the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence an not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.

The Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of evidence that the
negligence on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident ofBalbino.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act us that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence

Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairl ascribed to the company considering
that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal
accident was not caused by any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had
the exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he overtook another
motorcycle rider at a fast speed. Moreover, by the time of the accident, the projec had been going on for more than a
month. Balbino, who had passed there on a daily basis in going to and from his residence and the school where he
then worked as the principal, was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Neither could the Lanuzo heirs
justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for it cannot be denied that Balbino’s motorcycle was equipped
with headlights. Balbin was also not wearing a helmet during such time.

X. Clear and Convincing Evidence

10.1. Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470

FACTS:

Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offenses of “accepting a advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of
conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The Hongkong Department of Justice requested
DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent Muñoz; the DOJ forward the request to th NBI then to RTC. On the same
day, NBI agents arrested him.

Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order of arrest.

The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Departmen of Justice thru DOJ. DOJ filed a
 petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.

Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of respondent. Meanwhile,
respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied the petition holding
that there i no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases and that private responded is “flight risk”.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted. Henc this petition.

ISSUE: whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.

RULING: EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him
at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
crimina investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty imposed on him unde the penal and criminal law
of the requesting state or government. Thus characterized as the right of the a foreign power, created by treaty to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a c crime within its territorial jurisdiction and the correlative
obligation of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.

The extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of
time in the detention should be reasonable.

In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muñoz has been detaine for 2 years without being convicted
in Hongkong.

The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty an due process and should not thereof
deprive the extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for the grant is satisfactorily met. In other
word there should be “clear and convincing evidence”.

However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing evidence that he be entitled
to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court for the determination and otherwise, should over the cancellation of
his bon and his immediate detention.

XI. Direct v. Circumstantial Evidence

11.1. Twin Requirements of Competence of Witness and Credibility of Testimony; Direct v. Circumstantial Evidence

Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for determining the weight of a particular
testimony. Evidence to be believed must no only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible
in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.

Although Jocelyn was only twelve years old when the incident happened and when called to the witness stand, the
Court takes note of the truth that she possessed all the qualification and none of the disqualification to testify in these
cases, viz:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may bewitnesses.
 Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of crime unless otherwise provided by
law, shall not be a ground for disqualification

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity.

-The following persons cannot be witnesses:

a. Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable
of intelligently making known their perception to others;

b. Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

Jocelyn’s young age had no bearing on her qualification to testify on what happened that night on 19 November 1999.
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such
awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Significantly, even under the crucible of an intense
cross examination, Jocelyn never wavered her narration as to the incidents that led to the killing of Artemio and the
burning of their house, and in the affirmative identification of Sota and Gadjadli as two of the five persons who were
responsible for these crimes

In Salvador v. People, the Court laid down the rule that direct evidence is not th only ground by which the guilt of an
accused may be anchored, viz:

Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may dra its conclusion and finding of
guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may
be established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community.

Jocelyn gave the credible testimony that on the night of 19 November 1999, Sota Gadjadli, and three other
unidentified persons lit the torch to burn their house but Artemio was able to put out the fire. Because the moon was
bright, she vividly sa that it was Sota who acted as the leader of the group while Gadjadli carried a pistol. She
witnessed that the group started to shoot at the house when Artemio became adamant not to open the door for fear
he would be killed. It was with this burst of gunshots that made her jump out of the window and run towards the
house of her brother Eusebio. When she looked back, their house was already burning while the group was shooting
at Artemio who ran down the house.36 Plainly, these circumstances as testified to by Jocelyn produced a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt that Sota, Gadjadli, and the three unidentified persons were responsible for the killing of
Artemio and the burning of their house.

----- People v. Golem Sota, G.R. No. 203121, November 29, 2017

XII.

12.1. Rule That Findings of Fact of Trial Court on Credibility of Witnesses is Accorded Respect

Equally important is that it is the general rule that “the factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
 testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions on the
credibility of the witnesses on which said findings were anchored are accorded great respect. This great respect rests
in the trial court’s first-hand access to the evidence presented during the trial, and in its direct observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor while they testify on the occurrences and events attested to.”46 Settled also is the rule
that factual findings of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is
a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.

– People v. Rolando Santos Y Zaragoza, G.R. No. 223142, January 17, 2018

12.2. Exception to Rule That Findings of Fact of Trial Court on Credibility of Witnesses is Accorded Respect

The rule that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the tri court on the credibility of witnesses
will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate the findings of fact and conclusions of
the lower court; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would
affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 22 All of
these exceptional circumstances are availing in the present case.

– People v. Marilou y. Diana and Lalaine Guadayo y Rojo, G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 2018

XIII. Chain of Custody Issues; Corpus Delicti

13.1. Lack of Surveillance & Substantial Compliance with Chain of Custody Rule

Jurisprudence has consistently held that “prior surveillance is not a prerequisite f the validity of an entrapment
operation x x x especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by their informant.” 11 Such is the
situation in this case. P02 Villaester, who was designated as the poseur buyer, was assisted by the confidential
informant, who contacted the appellant to inform the latter that there was a prospective buyer of ”shabu.”

As to the Chain of Custody Rule, the Court, taking into consideration the difficulty of complete compliance with the
said rule, has considered substantial compliance sufficient “as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending police officers.” 13 In this case, although the marking of the
evidence was done at the police station, the Court quotes with approval the discussion of the CA on the matter:

In the instant case the policemen were justified in marking the sachets of shabu at their office. [Appellant] was
struggling and trying to get away from the police, as testified by defense witness Alex Esconas. [Appellant] himself
testified that he even elbowed one of the arresting officers as he was resisting arrest. The priority of the arresting
officers is to apprehend the offender. They would have had difficulty, if not impossibility, in marking the corpus delicti
at that the scene of the crime considering that the [appellant] was quite out of control.

Likewise, the absence of a physical inventory and the lack of a photograph of the seized items are not sufficient
justifications to acquit the appellant as the Court in several cases has affirmed convictions despite the failure of the
arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule as long as the integrity and identity of the corpus
delicti of the crime are preserved.

In this case, it was established by the testimony of P02 Villaester that the appella was apprehended pursuant to a
 legitimate buy-bust operation; that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights; that he was brought to the
office of 7RCIDU together with the seized “shabu;” that the arrest was recorded in a polic blotter; that the two sachets
of “shabu” were marked as “BV-01” and “BV-02” by SPOl Noel Triste (SPOl Triste) in the police station; that the marked
sachets were delivered on the same day by SPO1 Triste to the crime laboratory for examination and that as per
Chemistry Report No. D-1632-2006, the two sachets submitted fo examination were positive for “shabu.”
Considering the foregoing, there is no reason for the Court to doubt the findings of the CA that the two sachets of
“shab seized from the appellant were the same sachets of “shabu” presented in evidence before the RTC.

All told, the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyondreasonable doubt for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and according sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P500,000.00

–People v. Brian Villahermoso, G.R. NO. 218208, January 24, 2018

Failure to Properly Mark Shabu: Acquittal of Accused

Lawrence and Rico contend that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of
non-observance of the chain of custody requirement under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 in the case.

The Court agrees.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by R.A.10640, pertinently provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors an< Essential Chemicals. Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. —

The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drug~. x x x so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs , x x x shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, o his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; ~1f at the nearest police station or at t nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provider; finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiar value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/tea shall not render void and invalid· such seizures and custody over said items. (2) Within
twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, x x x the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination:

(3) A certification of the~ forensic laboratory examination results x x x shall be issued immediately issued upon the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, x x x does not allow the completion
of testing within the time fr!1me, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein
the quantities of d!’l-ngero1..1s drugs still to b examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final
certification

xxx

In this ·case, Lawrence and Rico were indicted for illegal sale and possession of shabu. Thus, it is necessary for the
prosecution to establish with moral certainty the elements of these offenses. Specifically, for the case of illegal sale
of shab the prosecution must prove: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller as wel as the object and consideration
of the sale; and, 2) the delivery and payment of the object sold. As regards illegal possession of shabu, it is
necessary to establish: 1) the possession of the accused of an identified prohibited drug; 2) such possession was
not legally authorized; and. 3) the accused freely an consciously possessed it.38

At the same time, to convict Lawrence and Rico, it is primordial that the corpus delicti or the confiscated illegal drugs
had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This means that the same illegal drugs possessed and sold by the accused
must be the same ones offered in court. As such~ the required unbroken chain of custody under Section 21, Alticle II
of RA 9165 above-quoted comes into play to ensure that no unnecessary doubt is created on the identity of the seized
illegal 3 drugs.

More particularly, chain of custody refers to recorded authorized movements and custody of confiscated dangerous
drugs, or controlled substances. It involves testimony on every link in the chain – from the confiscation of the illegal
drugs to i receipt in the forensic laboratory up to its presentation in court. It is necessary tha every person who
touched the seized item describe how and from whom he or sh received it; where and what happened to it while in
the witness’ possession; its condition when received and at the time it was delivered to him.

Generally, there are four links in said chain of custody: l ) the seizure and marking if practicable, of the illegal drug
confiscated from the accused by the apprehending officer; 2) the turnover of the seized drug by the apprehending
officer to the Investigating officer; 3) the turnover by the investigating officer of sa item to the forensic chemist ‘for
examination; and, 4) the turnover and submissio from the forensic chemist to the court.

As stated, the first link requires seizure and marking of the illegal drugs. To stress marking must be done immediately
upon the seizure of the illegal drugs and in th presence of the apprehended violator of law. Such prompt marking is
important because the. Subsequent handlers of the seized items will use the marking as reference, “CT1e marking
also sets apart the seized item from other materials fro the moment. it was. confiscated until its disposal after the
proceedings. ln fine, marking is essential to preserve the ·integrity and evidentiary value of the recovered dangerous
drug.

In this case, however, the apprehending officer did not make a proper marking of the seized shabu.

P03 Justo confirmed that he marked the seized items upon arrival at the Police Station. He attested that he did not
immediately mark the three sachets of shabu from Rico and the one sachet recovered by PO 1 San Pedro from
Lawrence as there was already a commotion at the place of incident. Nonetheless, PO 1 San Pedro refuted such claim
of P03 Justo, to wit

Q: Why did you mark that in the police station?

Because that is our usual procedure, sir, that we mar[k] the evidence we confiscated already at the police station. So,
that is the only reason rvlr. witness, you don’t have any knowledge that these pieces of ol:~ed evidence should be
marked at the scene of the crime?

Formerly, sir, we used to mark the object evidence at the police station, because there were times that commotion
ensued whenever we are going to arrest and we were being stoned. so to avoid harm to ourselves, we just marked
them at the station.

After you have allegedly recovered the said shabu, you immediately proceeded to the police station and placed the
markings?

Yes, ma’am.

By the way, at that time, was there a commotion? None, ma’am.·

There was no commotion? l None, ma’am.

Since there was no commotion that transpired after the seizure of shabu, there was nothing· ·that would prevent P03
Justo from marking the shabu immediately after confiscation.

Xxx

Indeed, the failure to immediately mark the shabu after confiscation, and for marking it without the presence of the
accused constituted clear gaps in the chai of custody of the seized illegal drugs.

In People v. lsmael,47 the Court stressed that the failure to mark the illegal drugs immediately after confiscation from
the accused casts doubt on the prosecution’s evidence and warrants the acquittal of the accused on reasonable doubt.
Also, in Ismael, the Court ruled that the requirement that the marking be done in the presence of the accused is not
a mere technicality as it assures the preservation the identity and integrity of the illegal drugs. As such, the
noncompliance with thi requirement is fatal to this case against Lawrence and Rico.

ln addition, the second link was not complied with here.

Tb reiterate, to establish an unbroken chain of custody, every person who touche the seized illegal drug must describe
how and from whom it was received; its condition upon receipt, including its condition upon delivery to the next link
in the chain.

Here, P03 Justo supposedly turned over the confiscated shabu to Police Chief Inspector Anasmcio B. Benzon (PC/lnsp.
Benzon), the investigating officer. Nevertheless, the prosecution did not present PC/Insp. Benzon to testify on
thematter. Such non presentation undeniably constitutes another gap in the chain of custody of the seized prohibited
drugs.

Similarly, the third link in the chain of custody was also infirm. This is because the Request for Laboratory
Examinatton indicated a certain P02 Cruz as the person who delivered the specimens to the crime laboratory for
 examination.

Nevertheless, like in the case of PC/fnsp. Benzon. the prQst;;cu,tion did not present

P02 Cruz to testify on his receipt of the seized shabu. Evidently, this non presentation of a necessary witness
constituted another gap in the chain of custody.

 People v. Lawrence Gajo Y Buenafe, G.R. No. 217026, January 22, 2018;

For an accused to be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecutio must establish the following
elements: “the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and its payment.” 10 Time and again the Court has stressed that, “[w]hat is material is th proof that the transaction
actually took place, coupled with the presentation befor the court of the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus
delicti.”

Xxx

The failure of the police officers to immediately take an inventory of the seized shabu is not fatal to the prosecution
of the case. It did not render the arrest of the appellant who was caught in flagrante delicto illegal nor did the omission
render the seized drugs inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation o the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized drugs. In this case, despite th circumstances that prevented the police officers from
immediately taking an inventory of the seized drugs, we agree and uphold the findings of the CA that th shabu
presented in court was duly preserved with its integrity and evidentiary value uncompromised.

-People v. Niño Flor Y Mora, G.R. NO. 216017, January 19, 2018

Chain of Custody; Substantial Compliance

It is settled that failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory (and marking) of seized
drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is
essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

- People v. Abdulwahid Pundugar, G.R. No. 214779, February 07, 2018

Chain of Custody; Strict Interpretation

From the foregoing, it is very evident that the prosecution in dispensing with the testimonies of SPO 1 Gallego, the
investigating officer, and PCI Diestro, the forensic chemist, failed to show every link of the chain of custody. Without
the testimonies or stipulations stating the details on when and how the seized vials were brought to the crime
laboratory, and thereafter, to the court, as well as the details on who actually delivered and received the same from
the police station to the crime laboratory, and later, to the court for the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the
Comi cannot ascertain whether the seized vials presented in evidence were the same vials seized from appellant when
he was ancsted. These gaps in the chain of custody create doubt as to whether the corpus delicti of the crime had
been properly preserved. And more importantly, although appellant wa charged with violation of. Section 5, Article
 ll of RA 9165 for selling vials of ~ -·- 8

/VV~ Rollo, pp. 6-9 and 26-29. 83 Records, p. 69; Order dated August 7, 2008. 8

Id. at 63; Order dated August 4, 2008. Decision 11 G.R. No. 216753 morphine an Napdrolone Decanoate, the parties
however stipulated, per August 4, 2008 Orde of the R TC, that the items seized from appellant yielded positive results
for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Clearly, the identity of the corpus delicti of the crime
had not been properly established. The prosecution likewise failed to give an explanation or a justifiable reason why
the apprehending police officers had failed to mark the seized items and conduct the physical inventory of the same
at the place where the appellant was arrested. It bears stressing that the marking of the apprehending police officers’
initials or signature on the seized items must be made in the presence of the accused immediately upon arrest. 85
And although the Chain pf Custody Rule allows the physical inventory of the seized items to be done at the nearest
police station, this is more of an exception than a rule. Police officers, therefore, must provide an explanatio to justify
their failure to conduct the marking and the physical inventory at the place of arrest. The Court also noticed that,
although the prosecution stipulated that SPOI Gallego conducted the inventory, 86 the Certificate of Inventory87 was
signed by a certain PI Domingo. Considering all the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to ( 1)
prove the corpus d?licti of the crime; (2) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (3) offer any
explanation why the Chain of Custody Rule was not complied with. Accordingly, the Court is constrained to acquit
appellant based on reasonable doubt.

- People v. Jesus Dumagay Y Suacito, G.R. No. 216753, February 07, 2018

The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence mus be authenticated prior to its
admission into evidence. 12 To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent
needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. 13 In
other words, in a criminal cas the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could
reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims it to be. 14 Specifically in the prosecution of illegal
drugs, the well established federal evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the evidence is not readily
identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent
foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the
original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. 15

This was adopted in Mallillin v. People, 16 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody of seized
items should be established:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that th admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to
be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it wa
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 17
~ People v. Romy Lim Y Miranda, G.R. No. 231989, 04 September 2018