374.

Icasiano v Sandiganbayan; G.R. No. 95642; 28 May 1992; 209 SCRA 377

FACTS:

The Tanodbayan conducted a preliminary investigation in connection with a complaint filed against
petitioner for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint was dismissed
for lack of merit on the recommendation of the special prosecutor. Another complaint was lodged
against him for the same violation and a corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. The dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present prosecution, since
double jeopardy does not apply. A preliminary investigation is not a trial to which double jeopardy
attaches.

Petition is DENIED.
375.

People v Grospe; G.R. Nos. 74053-54; 20 Jan 1988; 157 SCRA 154

FACTS:

After proceeding with the trial against respondent-accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
the crime of estafa, respondent judge dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction. The People filed a
petition for certiorari challenging the dismissal of the two criminal cases.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not respondent-accused will be placed in double jeopardy if the dismissal will be set aside.

RULING:

NO. The questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon respondent
judge’s erroneous conclusion that his court had no “territorial jurisdiction” over the cases. The dismissal
being null and void, the proceedings before the trial court may not be said to have been lawfully
terminated. There is therefore no second proceeding which would subject the accused to double
jeopardy.

Decision of respondent judge is SET ASIDE and he is ordered to REASSUME JURISDICTION over the
criminal cases and to RENDER JUDGMENT of either conviction or acquittal.
376. Wala ako nahanap maikli. “Digest” niyo na lang pag isulat. I would.

Cruz vs Enrile, 160 SCRA 702, April 15, 1988

Facts: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced on October 1, 1986 to test the legality of the
continued detention of some 217 so-called “political detainees arrested in the nine-year span of official
martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for
common crimes before various courts martial; if any of these offenses had any political color, this had
neither been pleaded nor proved. Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed as
military personnel. One hundred and fifteen (115) accused had been condemned to die. Forty-six (46)
were sentenced to life imprisonment. To nine (9) others were meted prison terms of from twenty to
thirty years; to forty-one (41), prison terms of ten to twenty years; and to three (3), less than ten years.
Presidential amnesty was granted to petitioner Virgilio Alejandrino, yet to this date he remains a
prisoner at the Penitentiary, as to Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and
Daniel Campus, although they were acquitted of the charges against them, and Reynaldo C. Reyes and
Rosalino de los Santos, who appear to have fully served the sentences imposed on them by the military
commissions which convicted them.

The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military tribunals as
well as General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, and the nullity of all the proceedings had against
them before these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. Their plea
is for the grant of a retrial of their respective cases in the civil courts, where their right to due process
may be accorded respect. The writ of habeas corpus issued on July 31, 1987, two weeks after an
amended petition was filed with leave of court, reiterating the arguments originally pleaded, and setting
forth the additional claim that the pronouncement of this Court of the lack of jurisdiction of military
tribunals to try cases of civilians even during martial rule, as declared in Olaquer, et al. vs. Military
Commission No. 34, et al., entitled the petitioners to be unconditionally freed from detention.

Issue: Whether the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order No. 8 ordaining their
creation may be declared unconstitutional

Held: Yes.

In Olaquer, this Court in no uncertain terms affed that —

… a military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial
law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and
functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned (People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264, 274 [1975]).
For the same reasons, Our pronouncement in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2 (L-37364,63 SCRA
546) and all decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent with this
pronouncement, should be deemed abandoned.16

Such is the statement of the doctrine squarely applicable in these cases.

1. Clearly, no right to relief under Olaquer exists in favor of the 26 petitioners who were
admittedly in the military service. 17 Over them the courts martial yardly exercised jurisdiction. It need
only be said that these tribunals were created precisely to try and decide cases of military personnel,
and the validity of General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, although repeatedly challenged on
constitutional grounds, has as many times been upheld by the Court, either expressly or impliedly. 18 As
to these petitioners, the writ is thus unavailing.

2. Deference to the Olaquer decision impels on the other hand the application thereof to all
civilians, without distinction, who were haled before military tribunals. To be sure, due consideration was
given to the submittal that the doctrine is, or should be declared as, limited in aplicability to “political of
fenders,” and not “ordinary crimes” such as those of which the civilian petitioners were convicted. 18a
But distinction should not be set where none were clearly intended. The issue in Olaquer, as here, is the
jurisdiction of courts martial over the persons of civilians, and not merely over the crimes imputed to
them, regardless of which they are entitled to trial by judicial, not executive or military process.
Conformably with this holding, the disposition of these cases would necessarily have, as a premise, the
invalidity of any and all proceedings had before courts martial against the civilian petitioners. There is all
the more reason to strike down the proceedings leading to the conviction of these non-political
detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice in the first place, as their offenses
are totally unrelated to the insurgency avowedly sought to be controlled by martial rule.

Due regard for consistency likewise dictates rejection of the proposal to merely give “prospective effect”
to Olaquer. No distinction should be made, as the public respondents propose, between cases still being
tried and those finally decided or already under review. All cases must be treated alike, regardless of the
stage they happen to be in, and since according to Olaquer, all proceedings before courts martial in cases
involving civilians are null and void, the court deems it proper to adhere to that unequivocal
pronouncement, perceiving no cogent reason to deviate from the doctrine.

The petition is hereby granted insofar as petitioners Vergilio Alejandrino, Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar
Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado, Del Campus, Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santosare
concerned. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to effect the immediate release of
the above-mentioned petitioners, unless there are other legal causes that may warrant their detention.

The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio
B. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo
Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie
A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin, Rosendo I.
Ramos, Pacifica Batacan, Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis, Democrito Loraña who are all military
personnel.
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary
informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved, within one
hundred eighty (180) days from notice of this decision, without prejudice to the reproduction of the
evidence submitted by the parties and admitted by the Military Commission. If eventually convicted, the
period of the petitioners’ detention shall be credited in their favor.

The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with dispatch the
necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the grant of bail which may be initiated by the accused.
377.

People v Puno; G.R. Nos. 61864-69; 08 May 1992; 208 SCRA 550

FACTS:

The City Fiscal moved for the withdrawal of the six informations it filed with the City Court after filing the
same with the Court of First Instance in compliance with a directive of the Ministry of Justice. The City
Court subsequently issued an order dismissing one of the cases for lack of jurisdiction and all six cases
before the CFI were consolidated for trial.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not respondent-accused was placed in double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. Since the first proceeding was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the State was not afforded the
right to present its own evidence to substantiate the allegations in the information, there is no second
jeopardy to speak of. The City Court’s order of dismissal cannot be considered as a judgment of acquittal
since the said court has no jurisdiction to try the case.

Petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The cases are REMANDED to
the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
378.

Gonzales v. CA, 232 SCRA 667

Way ruun.

Same lang to in name so use it as palaman. O yaz. http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2013/02/gonzales-

v-court-of-appeals-ca-digest.html
379.

Cunanan v. Arceo, 242 SCRA 88

Waka waka eh eh. Hilak na lang pag ito tinanong ni Judge. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
380.

People v Balisacan; G.R. No. L-26376; 31 Aug 1966; 17 SCRA 1119

FACTS:

Defendant-appellee was charged with homicide. Despite pleading guilty during his arraignment, he was
allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. On the basis of his testimony, the trial
court rendered a decision acquitting the accused.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the People’s appeal would place the accused in double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. Testifying to prove mitigating circumstances after pleading guilty to the charge had an effect of
vacating accused plea of guilty. The trial court should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or
at least directed that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. Here having been no standing plea at
the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to
the appeal.

Judgment appealed from is SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court for further proceedings
under another judge.
381.

People v Judge Pineda; G.R. No. 44205; 11 Feb 1993

FACTS:

Private respondent was charged with two counts of estafa, each one filed with separate courts. She
sought the quashal of the latter charge on the apprehension that she is in danger of being condemned
for an identical offense. Respondent judge granted the motion to quash.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not private respondent was in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act.

RULING:

NO. The mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the
invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction,
acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused.

Petition is GRANTED and respondent judge’s orders are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
382.

People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586

Wakanda. Pero may nakita ako na Double Jeopardy na People vs Milflores sa Scribd.
383. 2 pages to sa Scribd kaso blurred ang page 2. But let’s be honest. Di mo naman isusulat ang whole
digest, di ba?

PEOPLE v. CITY COURT OF MANILA Branch XI, 121 SCRA 637, September 24, 1987

FACTS:

Petition for review on certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent City Court of Manila, Branch VI,
dated 20January 1973, dismissing the information (for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code) against the accused, herein respondent Agapito Gonzales, in Criminal Case No. F-147348 and its
amended order, dated 16March 1973, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the first order.

Gonzales and Pangilinan publicly exhibited some indecent and immoral films that have not been
submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview/examination. Both were accused of
violating Sec. 7 in relation Sec.11, RA 3060 (Case 1) and Art. 201 (3) of the RPC (Case 2). Pangilinan
remained at large.

Accused pleaded not guilty to both charges. He filed a motion to quash the information in the 2 cases on
the ground that said info did not charge an offense (denied and cases were set for trial). He moved for
permission to withdraw his plea of “not guilty” on Case 1 without however, substituting or entering
another plea (granted, hearing of cases reset).He moved to quash the information in Case 2 on the
ground of double jeopardy, because Case 1 was still pending, and he alleges that both contained the
same allegations.

Petitioner opposed the motion to quash but the respondent City Court dismissed Case 2

-Case 1 – basis of the charge is a special law, RA 3060; Case 2 – basis of the charge is the
pertinent provision of the RPC

-Considering that the allegations in the information of said cases are Identical the plea
entered in one case by the accused herein can be reasonably seen as exposing him to double
jeopardy in the other case, as said allegations therein are not only similar but [sic] Identical facts.

In Case 1, accused changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of Rep. Act
No. 3060.He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing Case 2 (denied). Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.

Petitioner contends that the accused could not invoke the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy, when there had been no conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of criminal proceedings
in another case for the same offense. The respondent, on the other hand, argues that conviction or
acquittal in, or dismissal or termination of a first case is not necessary, so long as he had been put in
jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in the first case of the same offense.
ISSUES:

WON the accused could invoke the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy – NO (relevant
issue)

HELD:

It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present:(1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the
same or a frustration thereof All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with
which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense, contrary to private respondent's
allegations. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the
exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not
include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing
the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures.
384.

People of Judge Villarama; G.R. No. 99287; 23 Jun 1992; 210 SCRA 246

FACTS:

Private respondent was charged for illegal possession, custody and control of a regulated drug. He
entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. After the prosecution has rested its case, private
respondent filed a request to plead guilty to a lesser offense which respondent judge granted
notwithstanding the opposition from prosecution.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not a review of private respondent’s change of plea and his conviction to a lesser offense will
violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. The right against double jeopardy applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party
consent to the private respondent’s change of plea. Otherwise, the private respondent cannot claim
such privilege.

Petition is GRANTED. Judgment and order of the lower court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the trial court for continuation of trial.
385. “The galaxy… is on… Gorion’s belt.” –MIB, 1997

Gorion v. Regional Trial Court, 213 SCRA 138

http://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c771d
386.

Paulin v Judge Gimenez; G.R. No. 103323; 21 Jan 1993; 217 SCRA 386

FACTS:

The Municipal Trial Court, acting on a motion of petitioners, dismissed the criminal case for grave threats
against them. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order which the
court granted.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not, in reversing the dismissal of the criminal case against them, petitioners were placed in
double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he is
deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy.

[The MTC decision dismissing the case is not an acquittal from the charge considering that no finding was
made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.]

Petition is DISMISSED.
387.

People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April 1993]

Facts:

On 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed Criminal Cases 7396
and 7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde, Gloria
Salde-Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for allegedly conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in
assaulting the spouses Teresa and Amado Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and hacking him
with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left fronto-parietal area which would have caused his death in
Criminal Case 8572 (GR 101557), and by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with a
bolo which would have caused her death in Criminal Case 8573 (GR 101558). On 3 June 1988, Leonardo
Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned. They all
pleaded "not guilty." On 2 August 1988, Jojeta Panaguiton was also arraigned and likewise entered a plea
of "not guilty."

On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal together with
counsel for accused jointly moved for the suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion
filed by the accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z.
Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor. On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave,
notice to the Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the Department of
Justice. On 2 February 1989, pending appeal to the Department of Justice, Provincial Fiscal Gacott, Jr.,
moved for the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that spouses
Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense. On 9
February 1989, acting on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52,
ordered the dismissal of Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397. Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of
Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor to refile the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, 2 new
Informations for frustrated murder against the same accused were filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor
Clarito A. Demaala (Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573). On 13 May 1991, after pleading "not guilty" to the
new Informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was opposed
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July 1991, the trial court granted the motion and
dismissed Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573. The motion to reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by
Acting Provincial Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Amado and Teresa Rubite filed the
petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether Salde, et. al. gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original Informations; and,
whether the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.
Held:

The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of
which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril
and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. It is undisputed that valid Informations
for frustrated murder, i.e., Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 were filed against Salde, et. al. before the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent jurisdiction. It is likewise admitted that Salde, et.
al., after being properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The only question then remaining is
whether the cases against them were dismissed with their express consent. This is hardly what Saldy, et.
al. gave. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To
equate this with express consent of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain
the meaning of "express consent" too far.

Simply, there was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the
original Informations. While it may be true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a notice of
hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these cases present an unusual situation where the motion
to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after
instituting Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that after a
reinvestigation it was found that "the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The
spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused Salde, Sr. and his co-accused
merely defended themselves from the attack of the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary
and unjustified to prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case." Since it was the prosecuting officer
who instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved for their dismissal, a hearing on his motion to
dismiss was not necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a hearing is necessary only in cases of contentious
motions. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best
interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. The Rubites, on the other hand, are precluded from
questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal action. Hence, a
hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and futile. The order of the court granting the motion
to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in
the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains
its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is
either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the
complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari. Hence, the conditions for a valid
defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense
as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense of double jeopardy must prevail.
388.

People v Quisada; G.R. Nos. L-61079-81; 15 Apr 1988; 160 SCRA 516

FACTS:

Three separate informations for grave oral defamation were filed against the accused. After pleading not
guilty to all three informations upon her arraignment, she moved to quash the same which the trial
judge granted. The prosecution challenged the dismissal.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the reversal of the dismissal and reinstatement of the cases would place the accused in
double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. It was the accused herself who moved to quash the charges against her on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction. The dismissal was made not only with her express consent but, indeed, upon
her own motion.

Petition is GRANTED. Orders of dismissal are SET ASIDE. Criminal cases are REINSTATED and REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.
389.

Sta. Rita v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 484

Wasabi.

http://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c8196
390. Ayaw ko na mag type pabalik. Kung link lang, that means full case lang nahanap ko.

People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/mar1996/104386.htm
391.

People v City Court of Silay; G.R. No. L-43790; 09 Dec 1976; 74 SCRA 248

FACTS:

Private respondents were charged with falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to
dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable ground. Respondent court dismissed the case principally on the
ground that the acts committed do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the reversal of the dismissal will place private respondents in double jeopardy.

RULING:

YES. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however,
this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the
evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.

Petition is DISMISSED.
392.

People v Doneza; G.R. No. L-24162; 31 Jan 1973; 49 SCRA 281

FACTS:

Respondent judge dismissed the information charging private respondent with the crime of homicide
and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence after the prosecution presented its evidence
and rested its case.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not private respondent will be placed in double jeopardy if the dismissal of the case is
reversed.

RULING:

YES. A dismissal ordered after the termination of the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution
has the force and effect of an acquittal. Such a dismissal cannot be appealed from because to do so
would do violence to the constitutional provision on double jeopardy.

Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

393.

Comelec v Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 501

>insert “we ain’t found sh*t” GIF

394.

ESMENA VS. POGOY [102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-54110; 20 FEB 1981]

Facts: Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for
allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be
given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded “Not
Guilty”. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it on another date.
Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the
court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to
speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused
and that the priest’s telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to
recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27
days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving
the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to
complainant’s failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case
has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an
acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s incapability to present its evidence
due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution
of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be
present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of
competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint
or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion,
filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present
then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his
express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In
the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the
trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent
to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the
competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be
equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.
395.

People v Obsania; G.R. No. L-24447; 29 Jun 1968; 23 SCRA 1249

FACTS:

Defendant-appellee was charged with the crime of rape. Respondent judge dismissed the case, upon the
motion of the defense, ruling that “the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that
the acts committed by the accused were with ‘lewd designs’ does not give this Court jurisdiction to try
the case.”

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not prosecution’s appeal of the dismissal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. The controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the
complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on the
right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The appealed
order of dismissal did not terminate the action on the merits.

The order appealed from is SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law.
396.

People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 364

Soooooo, 3 nakita ko. May galing casebrief kaso US yun eh. May isa galing scribd na criminal law pero di
ako sure. May isa na criminal procedure. Your choice, your music.

https://www.scribd.com/document/353372453/119-People-v-Navarro

remediallawnotes.blogspot.com/2017/08/people-vs-noel-navarro-case-digest.html
397.

People v. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289

Wala rin.
398.

People v. Mogol, 131 SCRA 296

Ano ba tong cases oy? Mas rare pa sa shiny pokemon.

399.

Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme [GR L-54904, 29 January 1988]

Facts: Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held guilty only of less serious physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P500.00. The trial court said the defendant could not be held liable for homicide because the
wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial. The certified cause of death was pneumonia, and this
was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which was needlessly performed upon him. In short,
the victim had succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a result
of the attending physician's gross incompetence. The heirs of the deceased did not agree. Through their
counsel acting under the direct control and supervision of the provincial fiscal," they filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision notified to them on 23 January 1980. This motion was sent by registered
mail on 2 February 1980. It was denied on 28 February 1980, in an order that was communicated to the
private prosecutor on 18 March 1980. On 20 March 1980, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court
under the signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the private prosecutor.After considering the
opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, Judge Romeo N. Firme (Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union) dismissed the appeal on 14 April 1980, for tardiness.
Both the fiscal and the private prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied on 12 May 1980. The heirs of Tito Rillorta filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether double jeopardy will attach to a judgment which is allegedly tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Held: Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot
appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." This provision is based on the old
case of Kepner v. United States, where the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the Philippine
Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of
acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in
double jeopardy. It has been consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction. It need only be stressed
that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less then can the offended party or his heirs, who are
mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity. The prohibition operates as a "bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information." There is no question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which
the accused in this case was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. The petitioners
argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the judgment convicting the accused of less serious
physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore null and void. This argument is
flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of
error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may
be. Infine, thus, however erroneous the order of the respondent court is, and although a miscarriage of
justice resulted from said order, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double
jeopardy.
400. Apparently, 2 ang nakalagay sa 400. Ilagay ko na lang din yung isa. In case.

Martinez v CA; G.R. No. L-112387; 13 Oct 1994; 237 SCRA 575

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of libel. At the instance of the City Prosecutor upon orders of the
Department of Justice, the information was dismissed even before its arraignment.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the private complainant’s appeal of the dismissal would place petitioner in double
jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. Appeal against the order of dismissal was not foreclosed by the rule of double jeopardy, said order
having been issued before arraignment.

Petition is DENIED.

Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. v Son; G.R. No. 80268; 27 May 1992; 209 SCRA 329

FACTS:

Petitioner Robert Hermosa and private respondent were charged with the crime of qualified theft of a
large rubber tire. After their arraignment but before the prosecution could commence, the original judge
discharged petitioner Hermosa from the information on the instance of petitioner Bogo-Medellin that he
be utilized as a state witness against his co-accused. Before the hearing, original judge was replaced by
respondent judge who ordered the reinstatement of petitioner Hermosa as co-accused in the case for
qualified theft.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the reinstatement of petitioner as co-accused would place him in double jeopardy
considering that his discharge from the information amounted to his acquittal.
RULING:

YES. – The discharge from the information of a co-accused who is to be utilized as a government witness
must be considered solid for purposes of determining whether a second prohibited jeopardy would
attach upon reinstatement as a co-accused. Petitioner Hermosa having been acquitted of the charge of
qualified theft, could not be subsequently reinstated as a co-accused in the same information without a
prohibited second jeopardy arising under the circumstances, absent satisfactory proof that he had
refused or failed to testify against his co-accused.

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED DUE COURSE. Order of respondent judge are SET ASIDE and order of
original judge REINSTATED.
401.

Perez v CA; G.R. No. L-80838; 29 Nov 1988; 168 SCRA 236

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of the crime of consented abduction. He was later acquitted
on appeal, the Court of Appeals ruling that he committed seduction and not abduction. Subsequently,
private complainant filed another criminal complaint against him for qualified seduction.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the filing of a subsequent information arising from the same facts would place petitioner
in double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if
each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

Petition is DENIED.
402.

Mallari v. People, 168 SCRA 422

Wala rin. May nahanap ako People vs Mallari pero iba ang SCRA number.
403.

Lamera v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186, June 5, 1991

FACTS:

At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an
owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto
Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.

As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim.

On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of
Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April
1989, petitioner was arraigned for violation of Article 365. He entered a plea of not guilty.

He filed a petition for review in the CA but which was denied. He raised before the SC that that he
cannot be penalized twice for an “accident” and another for “recklessness.” He maintained that since he
is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence, which offense carries heavier penalties under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under Article 275, par. 2, for
abandonment for failing to render to the persons whom he has accidentally injured.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to
prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code because it constitutes double
jeopardy.

RULING:

No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The rule on double
jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
He is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez, the SC
held that it is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense or identical offenses. Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.

The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first, for reckless
imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi
Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2,
Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty
and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.

Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against Security are
committed by means of dolo.

Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of the offenses charged. The constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the
earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.
404. Sayang. Error 404 sana. Tsk

People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368

Facts: At around 11:00 p.m. of 24 February 1989, Leonardo Bolima y Mesia and his wife were awakened
by the loud knocks on their door. Leonardo opened the door and they saw that the person who was
knocking was their "Pareng Troping", Eutropio Tiozon. Leonardo invited Tiozon, who appeared to be very
drunk, to come inside their house. Once inside their house, Tiozon sat down and the two exchanged
pleasantries. Tiozon showed a gun to her husband and the latter even toyed with it. The two left. 5
minutes later and or after Leonardo's wife heard two successive gunshots, and heard Tiozon knocking at
their door and at the same time informing her that he accidentally shot Leonardo, "Mare, mare, nabaril
ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya."Leonardo's wife sought help to carry Leonardo towards the main road.
Some of the neighbors arrived bringing with them lights. Thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so
she caused the arrest of Tiozon. In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City on
27 February 1989 with Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan City) of the National Capital
Judicial Region, Eutropio Tiozon y Acid was charged for violation of Presidential Decree 1866, as
amended. Tiozon pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15 March 1989. Pre-trial was conducted and
thereafter the trial court received the evidence for the parties. In a decision promulgated on 30 June
1989, the trial court found Tiozon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder
qualified by treachery and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Leonardo Bolima the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00 as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial expenses and to pay the costs. According to
the trial court, were it not for its abolition, "the death penalty, the sentence imposable under 2 nd pa.,
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended", should have been imposed. On 5 July 1989 Tiozon filed a motion to
reconsider the decision which, however, was denied by the court in its order of 16 August 1989. On 17
August, Tiozon filed a Notice of Appeal.

Issue: Whether prosecution for violation of PD 1866, which is qualified by murder or homicide, bars
prosecution for murder or homicide, in light of the right against double jeopardy.

Held: Section 1 of PD 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed." It may be
loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in Section 1 of PD 1866 because it is
a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is
absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a
malum prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification is to effectively deter violations of the laws on
firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the
proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms." In fine then, the killing of a person with
the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of
PD 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal
Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double
jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or
murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
405. Ito pa daw yung wala. Di pwede ipalit ang 404 at 405?

People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jul2002/134762.htm
406. Lol. Siya yung bida sa 300. Si King Denunida.

People v. Deunida, 231 SCRA 520

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/mar1994/gr_105199_200_1994.html
407. Not sure.

People v. Asuncion, 208 SCRA 231

https://www.scribd.com/document/149333067/Republic-vs-Asuncion
408.

People v. Judge Relova, 148 SCRA 292

FACTS:

Respondent herein is the judge who rendered the decision dismissing the petition of the prosecutor to
charge Manuel Opulencia in violation of Municipal ordinance S1 of 1974 for illegal installation of electric
wire do reduce electric consumption for his factory - Opulencia Ice Plant. An information however was
filed after almost 9 months. The responded herein then moved to quash the charges for grounds of
prescription, that since the violation is classified as light felony, only two months is given for prescription.

The lower court granted the motion to quash. The prosecutor then, after the motion was granted, filed
another charge against the respondent company owner, on ground of theft. That according to the
prosecutor, illegal installation which is punishable under the municipal ordinance and theft of electricity
punishable under the RPC are different.

ISSEUE:

Whether the dismessal fo the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash.

HELD:

The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is
for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both
the first and second offenses ma be based upon the same act or set of facts.

But the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently udner a national statude, provided that
both offenses spring from the same act or set of facts.

The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be
twice put to jeopardy provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charges is not
included or does not icnlude, the crime charged it he other case. The second sentence applies even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and
the other a violation of the statues. If two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution under other.

In the case at bar, the Supreme held that the theft of electric current contended by the prosecutor is
indeed part of the offense charged under the municipal ordinance of Batangas, which is the illegal or
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring because immediate physical effect of the installation is the
inward flow of electric current into Opulencia’s ice plant.

The petition is dismissed.

409.

People vs Judge Villarama; G.R. No. 99287; 23 Jun 1992; 210 SCRA 246

FACTS:

Private respondent was charged for illegal possession, custody and control of a regulated drug. He
entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. After the prosecution has rested its case, private
respondent filed a request to plead guilty to a lesser offense which respondent judge granted
notwithstanding the opposition from prosecution.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not a review of private respondent’s change of plea and his conviction to a lesser offense will
violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. The right against double jeopardy applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party
consent to the private respondent’s change of plea. Otherwise, the private respondent cannot claim
such privilege.

Petition is GRANTED. Judgment and order of the lower court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the trial court for continuation of trial.