NatRes Digest

Sunbeam convenience food vs CA

Facts:

On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of Sunbeam
Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, Bataan.

On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the ROD of Bataan who in turn issued
Original Certificate of Title in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels
of land.

Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title
was issued over the two lots in favour of defendant Coral Beach Development Corporation I

Thereafter, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines instituted before the
Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion. The CFI ruled in favor of the Sunbeam and
Coral adopting mainly the theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled emanated from the
administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the
disposition of the land.

The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal and according to him the CFI of bataan committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. It was contended that both lands are part of the public
domain and therefore not alienable and disposable.

Issue: Whether the subjects lots are alienable and disposable.

Held:

No, the subjects land are part of the public domain. The court held that our adherence to the Regalian
doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before
any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain.

The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if
the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.
Republic vs Sayo

The spouses Sandoval, filed an original application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No.
7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago and having an area of 33,950 hectares.Oppositions were filed
by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others,
including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.

Thereafter, after 20 years the parties entered into a compromise agreement namely: the Heirs of
Casiano Sandoval, the Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua,
and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of
Casiano Sandoval renounced their claims and ceded —

1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;

2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;

3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and

4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.

The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to and
acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano. In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the
respondent Judge approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the
parties in accordance with its terms.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present recourse in a bid
to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The SOG contends that the subject land is a public land
and no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for registration.

On the other hand, the respondents claimed that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the
Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings and the pre-war certification of the National
Library dated August 16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in
1896 and appearing in the Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered under the
'Spanish system of land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants'
predecessors-in-interest.

Issue: Whether the subject lot is a public land.

Yes, Under the Regalian Doctrine all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration
proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain.
Here, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for
registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a
photocopy of a certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to
the effect that according to the Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896, the
property in question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property of
Don Liberato Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document,
the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one of the grants
made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. It is an
inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question.

Further, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of land under the Torrens Act is
proof that the land is of private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is to beg the question. It
is precisely the character of the land as private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing.

Every applicant must show a proper title for registration and even in the absence of any adverse claim,
the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to establish a
proper title for official recognition. Furthermore, The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest
Development to the compromise agreement did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of
title required of the private respondents.

Hence, the considering that the respondent did not adduce clear and convincing evidence that the land
is of private ownership. The land in question is part of the public domain.
Seville vs National Development Company

Facts:

By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin Development Authority (LSBDA) was created
to integrate government and private sector efforts for a planned development and balanced growth of
the Sab-a Basin in the [P]rovince of Leyte, empowered to acquire real property in the successful
prosecution of its business. On June 14, 1980, Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot consisting of 464,920
square meters covered under Tax Declarations under the name of said vendor.

On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands
covering said lot together with other lots acquired by LSBDA.

After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No.
9353 was issued in the name of LSBDA on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title issued. On
December 14, 1989, LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to its Co-respondent National
Development Company as a result of which a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of
NDC.

On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega represented by judicial administrator Felipe Seville
filed with the RTC of Ormoc City, a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals and damages against
the respondents. Petitioners argue that LSBDAs title was void, having allegedly been obtained from
Calixtra Yap who had no right to it. They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed property by
acquisitive prescription, because they and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for
more than thirty years.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners Seville, it ruled that the Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra
Yap in favor of LSBDA, conveying the subject property to said LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
However, the CA ruled in favor of respondents, Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to
be privately owned are presumed to be part of the public domain, the CA held that, first, there was no
competent evidence to prove that the property in question was private in character. Second, possession
thereof, no matter how long, would not ripen into ownership, absent any showing that the land had
been classified as alienable. Third, the property had been untitled before the issuance of the
Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of the LSBDA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether, before the issuance of the title, the land in question is of public land.

Held :

Yes, Under the Regalian doctrine, all the lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. In Menguito v. Republic, the court held that
unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable.
Here, it should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title over the disputed
property. Although they claim that their title was based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to present
incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been classified as alienable. Instead, they maintain
that the private character of the land was evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale, and
Decisions of the trial court and even the Supreme Court.

Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership. At
best, they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. In Spouses Palomo v. CA, the Court also rejected
tax declarations as proof of private ownership, absent any showing that the forest land in question had
been reclassified as alienable. Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has been classified as alienable
is on the claimant. In the present case, petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Hence, their
possession of the disputed property, however long, cannot ripen into ownership.
Director of Lands vs Intermediate Appellate Court (219 SCRA 108)

Facts:

That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly
organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. The land subject of the Land
Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29,
1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe. That the constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 1962. That the
possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates
back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed
and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel.

That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public
from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the
applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have
been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the
latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations
or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of
Acme.

Issue: Whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme is valid and could be confirmed in
favor of the latter.

Held:

The Court held that the turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it
must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does
not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, where
the court held that it would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to
any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a
juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application
cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed. However, in the meralco case, the present Chief
Justice entered a vigorous dissent, he said that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public
land and becomes private property.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.

Here, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against
said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical,
rather than substantial since Acme can reconvey the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves
applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding
the lands back to Acme.
United Paracale vs Dela rosa

Facts:

In these petitions filed by petitioners United Paracale Mining Company, Inc. and Coco Grove, Inc.,
petitioners seek to set aside the Order of dismissal of the case they filed with the trial court for the
ejectment of their respective defendants from the mining claims which were allegedly privately owned
by them having been located and perfected under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 624.

The heart of these twin petitions is the question of constitutionality of P.D. 1214. Unless P.D. 1214 is
successfully assailed, the petitioners will be but mere applicants for the lease of the mining claims
involved and would thus have no causes of action against private respondents.

Issue: WON PD 1214 is unconstitutional.

Held:

No, The Court in Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr. 11 ruled that

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the
State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part,
and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset.

Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It merely
segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from
locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would
imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim.

Further, Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution which
states:

'All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State.
With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the
public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, and exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than development of
water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.'
Republic vs Registry of Deeds of Quezon

Facts:

On April 18, 1967, Atienza was awarded FP No. 324198 over a parcel of land located in Pagbilao,
Quezon. By virtue of such award, he was issued an Original Certificate of Title.

Sometime in 1968, an investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in connection with alleged
land grabbing activities in Pagbilao. It appeared that some of the free patents, including that of
Atienza's, were fraudulently acquired. Thus, a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
was against Atienza for allegedly falsifying their applications for free patent, the survey plans, and other
documents pertinent to said applications.

The trial court acquitted the accused of the crime charged but, finding that the land covered by the
application for free patent of private respondent was within the forest zone and declared as null and
void the Original Certificate of Title

In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public
forest land because by the approval of his application for free patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land
"was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land." Further, the subject land had been
declared disposable public land by the cadastral court in a Cadastral Case. He further alleged that
through a certain Sergio Castillo, he had been in possession of the land since the Japanese occupation,
cultivating it and introducing improvements thereon. The trial court ruled that "the land in question
was found definitely within the forest zone. However, on appeal, the appellate court set aside the lower
court's decision, declared as valid and subsisting Atienza's OCT.

Issue: WON the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable public land.

Ruling:

Yes, Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are
presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are
not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. Classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.

Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming
the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant who, in
this case, is Atienza. The records show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and absolute
evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim.
Atienza failed to present proof that he or his predecessor-in-interest was one of the claimants who
answered the petition filed by the then Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings. The
document reflecting said cadastral decision, a xerox copy, indicated the claimants simply as "Jose
Abastillas et al." In support of that decision, Atienza presented a certification purportedly issued by
someone from the Technical Reference Section of the Surveys Division, apparently of the Bureau of
Lands, stating that the subject land is a portion of the Pagbilao Cadastre," which evidence is, however,
directly controverted by the sketch plan showing that the land in controversy is actually outside the
alienable and disposable public lands.
Ituralde vs Falcasantos

Facts:

On October 17, 1986, Ituralde acquired by purchase from the heirs of Pedro Mana-ay a parcel of land
located at Baas, Lantawan, Basilan Province,

However, on November 3, 1986, Falcasantos applied with the Bureau of Lands in Isabela, Basilan
province, for the award to him of the same parcel of land under free patent. Thereafter, Ituralde filed a
protest to such application.

On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands rendered a decision giving respondent a period of
120 days to exercise the right to repurchase the land by reimbursing petitioner of all expenses he
incurred in the purchase of the property in question, and held in abeyance respondent's application for
free patent. Thereafter, the Regional Director issued an order declaring that respondent had waived his
right of repurchase, and rejected his application for free patent for lack of interest and allowed
petitioner to file a public land application for the subject land.

On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the RTC Basilan province, a complaint for recovery of ownership
and possession with preliminary injunction of the subject parcel of land.

In answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land occupied by him belonged to the Republic
of the Philippines, and that he had introduced improvements thereon such as coconut and other fruit
trees.

The trial court ruled that the petitioner is the owner and possessor of the subject parcel of land with all
the improvements existing thereon. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision.

Petitioner submits that the CA erred in setting aside the trial court's decision in his favor and dismissing
the complaint because when the Director of Lands allowed petitioner to file a public land application for
said property, it was equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer part of the public domain.

Issue: WON the subject land is still part of the public domain.

Held:

Yes, In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, the court held that "Forest lands, like mineral or timber
lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution,
become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public
land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

Further, In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the court said: Thus, before any land
may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain."

In view of the foregoing, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes and the rule is Possession of forest lands,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
Republic vs Court of Appeals and dela Rosa
GR L-43938
April 15, 1988

Facts:
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa. In support of the application, they claimed that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription and further presented tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts
from that year to 1964.

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Atok Big Wedge Corporation,
and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development. Benguet alleges
that they purchased the land and has been in OCEAN possession with it.

Atok on the other hand alleges that the land belongs to Emma and Fredia mineral claims and
they were in also in OCEAN possession with the subject land. The Bureau of Forestry Development also
interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of
its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The RTC denied the application for failure of the applicants to prove their claim of possession
and ownership of the land sought to be registered, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights
of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and
Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Issue: WON the right over the subject land could be used for mining and non-mining puposes
simultaneously

Held:

No, This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which is intended for the benefit of the State, not of
private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even
private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than
mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his
ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be
used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once
minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use
may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private
party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to
just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan vs Garcia Jr.

Facts:

Two lots of the Bataan Cadastre were registered in the name of the Province of Bataan. Both lots were
embraced in Original Certificate of Title , and occupied by the Bataan Community Colleges (BCC) and the
Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades (MLLSAT), both State-run schools.

On February 26, 1998, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 8562, authored by
Congressman Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. , converting the MLLSAT into a polytechnic college, to be known as
the Bataan Polytechnic State College (BPSC). Thereafter, Cong. Garcia wrote to then Governor of Bataan
Leonardo Roman, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan (petitioner), requesting them to cause
the transfer of the title of the aforesaid lots to BPSC. No transfer was effected.

Thereafter, Cong. Garcia wrote to then Governor of Bataan Leonardo Roman, and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Bataan (petitioner), requesting them to cause the transfer of the title of the aforesaid
lots to BPSC. No transfer was effected.

Thus, Cong. Garcia, along with the faculty members and some concerned students of BPSC filed a Special
Civil Action for Mandamus with the RTC against the Governor and the petitioner.

In their Comment, the Governor and the petitioner asserted that the subject properties were owned by
the Province of Bataan and not the State, for them to be simply transferred to the BPSC by virtue of the
law. The petitioner insists that the subject lots are not communal lands, or public lands but are the
patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, which were issued a Torrens title by the Cadastral
Court on August 11, 1969 in a Cadastral Case.

Issue: WON the subject land is the patrimonial property of the Province of Bataan.

Ruling:

No, under the well-entrenched and time honoured Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are
under the absolute control and ownership of the state.

Thus, in Cariño v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, the Supreme Court of the United
States of America acknowledged that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory
that all lands were held from the Crown." In Hong Hok v. David,22 citing Cariño, the Court likewise said
that the theory is a manifestation of the concept of the Regalian Doctrine, or jura regalia, which is
enshrined in our 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. As adopted in our republican system, this medieval
concept is stripped of royal overtones; and ownership of all lands belonging to the public domain is
vested in the State.

Here, The City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not
shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial
property. In the absence of a title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own, showing
that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the
State upon the creation of the municipality

It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in
the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for
governmental or proprietary purposes
Heirs of Gozo vs Philippine Union Mission Corp of the Seventh day Adventist

Facts:

Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of the Spouses Rafael and Concepcion Gozo who, before their
death, were the original owners of a parcel of land located in Lala, Municipality of Kolambugan, Lanao
del Norte. The respondents claim that they own a 5,000 square-meter portion of the property. The
assertion is based on the 28 February 1937 Deed of Donation in favor of respondent Philippine Union
Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist (PUMCO-SDA). Respondents took possession of the
subject property by introducing improvements thereon through the construction of a church building,
and later on, an elementary school.

On the date the Deed of Donation is executed in 1937, the Spouses Gozo were not the registered
owners of the property yet although they were the lawful possessors thereof. It was only on 5 October
1953 that the Original Certificate of Title covering the entire property was issued in the name of the
Spouses Gozo pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on 22
August 1953.

In view of Rafael's prior death, Concepcion, and their six children caused the extrajudicial partition of
the property. It was at this point that respondents brought to the attention of Concepcion that the 5,000
square-meter portion of the property is already owned by respondent PUMCO-SDA in view of the Deed
of Donation she executed together with her husband in their favor in 1937. When Concepcion, however,
verified the matter with the Register Deeds, it appeared that the donation was not annotated in the
title. The absence of annotation of the so-called encumbrance in the title prompted petitioners not to
recognize the donation claimed by the respondents

Thereafter, around six decades after the Deed of Donation was executed, petitioners filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Document, Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages against
PUMCO-SDA before the RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. Petitioners claimed that the possession of
PUMCO-SDA on the subject property was merely tolerated by petitioners and therefore could not ripen
into ownership. For their part, respondents insisted on the validity of the donation who had voluntarily
parted with their property as faithful devotees of the church for the pursuit of social and religious ends.
Petitioners also averred that the deed of donation was invalid for lack of acceptance which is an
essential requisite for a valid contract of donation.

The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners thereby declaring that they are the rightful
owners of the subject property since the contract of donation which purportedly transferred the
ownership of the subject property to PUMCO-SDA is void for lack of acceptance. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground
of laches.
Issue: WON the petitioner is the rightful owner of the property.

Held:

Yes, the court held that at the time the Deed of Donation was executed by the Spouses Gozo on 28
February 1937, the subject property was part of the inalienable public domain. It was only almost after
two decades later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded its right over the land in favor of the
Spouses Gozo by granting their patent application and issuing an original certificate of title in their favor.
Prior to such conferment of title, the Spouses Gozo possessed no right to dispose of the land which, by
all intents and purposes, belongs to the State.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land
or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. The
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government
and not the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as an unclassified land until it
is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

Here, it is beyond question that at the time the gratuitous transfer was effected by the Spouses Gozo
on 28 February 1937, the subject property was part of the public domain and is outside the commerce
of man. It was only on 5 October 1953 that the ownership of the property was vested by the State to the
Spouses Gozo by virtue of its issuance of the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the
President of the Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence, the donation of the subject property which took
place before 5 October 1953 is null and void from the very start.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan vs Garcia Jr.

Facts:

Two lots of the Bataan Cadastre were registered in the name of the Province of Bataan. Both lots were
embraced in Original Certificate of Title , and occupied by the Bataan Community Colleges (BCC) and the
Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades (MLLSAT), both State-run schools.

On February 26, 1998, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 8562, authored by
Congressman Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. , converting the MLLSAT into a polytechnic college, to be known as
the Bataan Polytechnic State College (BPSC). Thereafter, Cong. Garcia wrote to then Governor of Bataan
Leonardo Roman, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan (petitioner), requesting them to cause
the transfer of the title of the aforesaid lots to BPSC. No transfer was effected.

Thereafter, Cong. Garcia wrote to then Governor of Bataan Leonardo Roman, and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Bataan (petitioner), requesting them to cause the transfer of the title of the aforesaid
lots to BPSC. No transfer was effected.

Thus, Cong. Garcia, along with the faculty members and some concerned students of BPSC filed a Special
Civil Action for Mandamus with the RTC against the Governor and the petitioner.

In their Comment, the Governor and the petitioner asserted that the subject properties were owned by
the Province of Bataan and not the State, for them to be simply transferred to the BPSC by virtue of the
law. The petitioner insists that the subject lots are not communal lands, or public lands but are the
patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, which were issued a Torrens title by the Cadastral
Court on August 11, 1969 in a Cadastral Case.

Issue: WON the subject land is the patrimonial property of the Province of Bataan.

Ruling:

No, under the well-entrenched and time honoured Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are
under the absolute control and ownership of the state.

Thus, in Cariño v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, the Supreme Court of the United
States of America acknowledged that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory
that all lands were held from the Crown." In Hong Hok v. David,22 citing Cariño, the Court likewise said
that the theory is a manifestation of the concept of the Regalian Doctrine, or jura regalia, which is
enshrined in our 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. As adopted in our republican system, this medieval
concept is stripped of royal overtones; and ownership of all lands belonging to the public domain is
vested in the State.

Here, The City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not
shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial
property. In the absence of a title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own, showing
that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the
State upon the creation of the municipality

It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in
the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for
governmental or proprietary purposes
Republic vs Espinosa

Facts:

On October 1955,Cadastral Decree was issued to Valentina Espinosa. It covered a 28,880-square meter
lot located in Sipalay City, Negros Occidental. By virtue of the decree, OCT was issued on October 1962
in the name of Espinosa. On June 1976, Espinosa sold the property to Leonila B. Caliston.

On January 13, 2003, the State, represented by the Regional Executive Director of the DENR Iloilo City,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for annulment of title and/or
reversion of land with the RTC. The State claimed that the property is inalienable public land because it
fell within a timberland area per Land Classification Map No. 2978, as certified by the Director of
Forestry on January 1986.

In answer, Caliston countered that the property is not timberland. Invoking laches and prescription, she
argued that her title was issued earlier in 1962, while the map shows that the property was classified
only in 1986.

The RTC ruled in favour of the state and ordered the reversion of the property to the mass of the public
domain. On appeal,
Caliston argued that the trial court improperly relied upon LC Map No. 2978, which was prepared long
after the property was alienated and awarded to Espinosa, her predecessor-in-interest. The map, the
admissibility and genuineness of which have yet to be proved, cannot be used to defeat the cadastral
proceedings presumed to have been regularly conducted. The CA rendered a Decision modifying the
RTC Decision. It upheld the validity of the titles issued in the names of Espinosa and Caliston.

Issue: WON the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Held:

No, The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant of
the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa. In land registration proceedings, the applicant has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. Since cadastral proceedings are
governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of
title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts—that they are entitled
to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered.

Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree. Having been granted a decree in a
cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was
able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property in the
cadastral proceedings.
This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it is part of
the inalienable lands of the public domain. The State may still do so through an action for reversion, as
in the present case.

Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to
the mass of the public domain. It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to
private individuals or corporations.

In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the
cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa's favor. The argument for the State is
merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title because it is of the public
domain.

Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to prove
that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa. At
this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived her title, had already
established that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in
obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight
or mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa's title because it was of public dominion.

Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land classification map prepared
in 1986. The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in evidence. The
rules require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the presentation of
testimonial evidence. Not having been offered formally, it was error for the trial court to have
considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion of the property to the
mass of the public domain on the basis of the same.

Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this will not help to further the
State's cause. This is because the only fact proved by the map is one already admitted by the State, that
is, that the land was reclassified in 1986. This fact does not address the presumption/conclusion that
Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land is
alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in 1962.
Murray vs BEJ Minerals

Facts:

In 2006, an amateur paleontologist uncovered well-preserved fossils of the “Dueling Dinosaurs”

on a Montana ranch in an area known as Hell Creek. Lige and Mary Ann Murray own the
surface estate of the ranch where the fossils were found. In 2005, prior to the discovery of the
fossils, Jerry and Robert Severson, the previous owners of the ranch, sold their surface and one-
third of the mineral estate to the Murrays. In the conveyance, the Seversons expressly reserved
the remaining two-thirds of the mineral estate.

These fossils are now quite valuable. Thus, a dispute arose regarding the true owner of the
“Montana Fossils”. The Murrays filed an action in Montana state court seeking a declaratory
judgment that, as owners of the surface estate, they are the sole owners of the Montana Fossils.
The Seversons, on the other hand, asserted a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that
the Montana Fossils are part of the mineral estate.

If the Montana Fossils are minerals, the Seversons, as majority owners of the mineral estate, will own
two-thirds of the Montana Fossils. If the Montana Fossils are not minerals, they will belong to the
Murrays in their entirety.

The District Court found that the Montana Fossils are not included in the ordinary and natural meaning
of “mineral” under Montana law and therefore are not part of the mineral estate. Accordingly, the court
granted summary judgment for the Murrays. The Seversons now appeal.

Issue: Whether the Montana fossils are deemed “minerals” within the meaning of the mineral
deed under Montana law.

Held:

Yes, the court agree with the Seversons that definitions of “mineral” found in Montana statutes,
like dictionary definitions, are contradictory and therefore inconclusive.

The district court agreed with the Murrays and determined that:

The common understanding of “mineral” includes the mining of a hard compound or oil and gas
for refinement and economic exploitation. In contrast, dinosaur fossils are the remains of once-
living vertebrates. The fossils’ properties are not what make them valuable. Fossils are not
subject to further refinement before becoming economically exploitable. Instead, the fossils are
valuable because of their very existence. Dinosaur bones are not economically valuable to be
processed into fuel or materials or manufactured into jewelry. Further, dinosaur fossils are not
mined in the traditional sense, but rather discovered by happenstance.

On appeal, the Seversons argue that the district court’s interpretation of the dictionary definitions
is disconnected. The Seversons have the better of the arguments.
Certain of the definitions do not limit the “use” of the substance to use for economic or
commercial purposes; surely the Montana Fossils are being “used” in the general sense. For
example, under the Webster’s definition, the Montana Fossils are clearly “naturally occurring
homogeneous . . . solid substances . . . obtained for man’s use.”. Although it could be argued that
dinosaur fossils are unlike oil, gas, coal, and other substances traditionally thought of as minerals
because they are not used as fuel, neither are many of the other substances specifically listed in
the Webster’s definition, such as salt, sand, and gravel. In addition, as the Seversons point out,
oil, gas, and coal all derive from the remains of plants and animals,7 just like dinosaur fossils,
and should not be treated any differently because they are valuable for a different reason.

Second, there are other definitions of the word “mineral” not considered by the district court that
explicitly include fossils in general. For example, an older edition of Black’s law defines a
mineral as including “all fossil bodies or matters dug out of mines or quarries, whence anything
may be dug, such as beds of stone which may be quarried.” Mineral, Black’s Law Dictionary
(6th ed. 1990). Given the inconsistencies in dictionary definitions of “minerals,” and recognizing
that at least one of the definitions explicitly includes fossils as minerals, we disagree with the
district court’s conclusion that the word “minerals” in the Deed did not encompass dinosaur
fossils.

Further, statutory definitions inconclusive, the court rested on the following test from the Texas
Supreme Court’s decision in Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1949):

[S]ubstances such as sand, gravel and limestone are not minerals within the ordinary and
natural meaning of the word unless they are rare and exceptional in character or possess a
peculiar property giving them special value, as for example sand that is valuable for
making glass and limestone of such quality that it may be profitably be manufactured into
cement. Such substances, when they are useful only for building and road-making
purposes, are not regarded as minerals in the ordinary and generally accepted meaning of
the word.

The Seversons claim that a substance that is technically a mineral in the scientific sense is also a
mineral within the meaning of a real property agreement if it is rare and exceptional in character
or possesses a peculiar property giving it special value. The Murrays concede that the Montana
Fossils are rare and exceptional. Therefore, under the teachings of Farley, the Montana Fossils
are “minerals” pursuant to the terms of the Deed, and belong to the owners of the mineral estate