NEYPES VS.

CA, 469 SCRA 633

Period Rule. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Facts: Neypes, et al. filed an action for WON Neypes had a fresh period of 15 days
annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or from denial of the MR within which to file an
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary appeal. – YES.
injunction before the RTC. Respondents Land
Bank of the Philippines and Heirs of del Mundo To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
filed a motion to dismiss. RTC initially denied the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
motion to dismiss, but later granted the same appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
after the Heirs filed an MR. Neypes, et al. received allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
and filed an MR on March 18, 1998. RTC denied receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
MR and Neypes, et al. received notice on July 22, trial or motion for reconsideration.
1998.

On July 27, Neypes, et al. filed a notice of appeal.This “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40
(appeals from MTC to RTC); Rule 42 (petitions for
CA: Denied the appeal for supposedly being filed review from RTC to CA); Rule 43 (appeals from
8 days late. quasi-judicial agencies to CA) and Rule 45
(appeals by certiorari to SC). The new rule aims
Neypes, et al. then filed a petition for certiorari to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
and mandamus under Rule 65, arguing that upon to be counted from receipt of the order denying
denial of the MR, they had a fresh 15- day period the motion for new trial, motion for
to file the notice of appeal. reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.
PINGA VS. HEIRS OF SANTIAGO, 494 SCRA 393
Effect of dismissal of main case to counterclaim when it is due to plaintiff’s fault. Under Sec.
3 Rule 17, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff does not necessarily carry
with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. The dismissal of the complaint is
without prejudice to the right of the defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.
Facts: WON the dismissal of the complaint carried
Pinga was defendant in a case filed by the dismissal of the counterclaim. – NO.
respondents Heirs of Santiago for allegedly
unlawfully entering the coco lands of the The Court held that such the earlier ruling in the
respondent. In that case, Pinga filed a case of BA Finance is erroneous. The Court
counterclaim, disputing the respondents’ ordered the remand of the case, for the RTC to
ownership over the properties and seeking to be hear and decide the counterclaim. The Rules of
awarded various types of damages. Because of Court have undergone a series of changes. In the
the recurring failure of the Heirs of Santiago’s old rule, a dismissal of the main claim
counsel to appear in trial and to present evidence, automatically results in the dismissal of the
the complaint was dismissed and Pinga and co- counterclaim. However, the present Sec. 3 Rule
defendant was allowed to present evidence ex- 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in
parte on their counterclaim. contrast to the previous rule and jurisprudence,
states explicitly that the dismissal of the
The Heirs sought for reconsideration, not for the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff does not
reinstatement of the complaint, but praying that necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the
the entire action, including the counterclaim, be counterclaim.
dismissed.

RTC: Granted this MR, on the basis of the fact

that “there is no opposition to the MR of the
respondents.”
PALOMA VS. MORA, 470 SCRA 711
(1) Doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
 question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
(2) Mandamus is a remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. It is not applicable
when the act being complained of is discretionary in nature.
Facts: Petitioner was terminated from his (1) WON the remedy of mandamus is
appointment as General Manager of the applicable. – NO.
Palompon, Leyte Water District. By reason Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of
thereof, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to
with prayer to be restored to his former position reinstate petitioner because the Board has the
and for preliminary injunction with damages discretionary power to remove him under Section
before the RTC. Unable to obtain a favorable 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768.
ruling with the RTC, petitioner filed a complaint Said section clearly states that the general
with the Civil Service Commission for alleged manager serves at the pleasure of the Board.
Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and for
Illegal Dismissal. The CSC, however, dismissed Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when
the petition for lack of merit, which was likewise refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. the performance of a discretionary duty.
Mandamus will not issue to control or review the
RTC and CA: Mandamus not the proper remedy exercise of discretion of a public officer where the
because the action being complained of was a law imposes upon said public officer the right and
discretionary act. Besides, it was prematurely duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
filed because he should have complained with the matter in which he is required to act. It is his
CSC first. judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.

(2) WON the trial court and the CA was

correct in ruling that the petition for
mandamus was prematurely filed. –
Yes.
The petition for mandamus was prematurely filed
because the Civil Service Commission has
primary jurisdiction over the case. The case
involved government employees and the validity
of an appointment/removal which is within the
expertise of the CSC.

Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy

involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
DIPAD VS. OLIVAN, G.R. NO. 168771, JULY 25, 2012
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a mode of appeal. The remedy, which is narrow
in scope, only corrects errors of jurisdiction. Thus, if the issue involves an error of judgment, the error
is correctible by an appeal via a Rule 45 petition, and not by a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Facts: Dipad filed a civil action for damages WON the RTC was correct in dismissing the
before the MTC against the respondents following Rule 65 petition for being the wrong
a collision between his car and the passenger remedy. – YES.
jeepney owned by respondents. During trial,
Dipad claims to have suffered loss of income for It is basic that a petition for certiorari under Rule
three months in the amount of P40,000. During 65 is not a mode of appeal.The remedy, which
cross-examination, the defense required him to is narrow in scope, only corrects errors of
produce his Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for
several years. Dipad objected to this on the
ground of confidentiality of the ITRs under the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Upon
receiving Comments from both petitioner and
respondents on whether ITRs are confidential in
nature, the MTC Judge issued an Order requiring
petitioner to produce his ITRs.
Petitioner then filed a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the RTC,
assailing the Order (requiring him to submit his
ITRs), saying that the Order violated the NIRC.
RTC: Dismissed the Rule 65 Petition for being the
wrong remedy, saying that at most, the judge
merely had an error in judgment not an error in
jurisdiction. Petitioner moved for an MR which
was denied by the RTC. Hence, Petitioner filed a
Rule 45 petition before the SC, questioning the
RTC’s dismissal of its Rule 65.
jurisdiction. Thus, if the issue involves an error of
judgment, the error is correctible by an appeal via
a Rule 45 petition, and not by a writ of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As defined in jurisprudence, errors of
jurisdiction occur when the court exercises
jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law.
They may also occur when the court or tribunal,
although it has jurisdiction, acts in excess of it or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
On the contrary, errors of judgment are those
that the court may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction.1âwphi1 They include errors
of procedure or mistakes in the court’s
findings based on a mistake of law or of fact.
Here, it is patently clear that petitioners do not
question whether the MTC has jurisdiction or
authority to resolve the issue of confidentiality of
ITRs. Rather, they assail the wisdom of the MTC’s
very judgment and appreciation of the ITR as not
confidential. Specifically, they claim that the
ruling violated the provisions of the NIRC on the
alleged rule on confidentiality of ITRs.

The RTC was correct in saying that if there is an

error to speak of the error relates only to a
mistake in the application of law, and not to an
error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Hence, Rule
65 was not the proper remedy.
CATIPON, JR. VS. JAPSON, G.R. NO. 191787 (JUNE 22, 2015)
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the court's judicial power can be sought.1âwphi1 The premature invocation of the intervention
of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses
and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons
of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case."

(Note: That this is only the general rule, there are exceptions that would allow a person not to observe
the exhaustion of administrative remedies such as when the case involves a denial of due process or
pure errors of law.)
Petitioner was allowed by his university to attend WON the dismissal of the petition was valid.
his college graduation ceremonies despite a – YES. Non-observance of the rule on exhaustion
deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science. After of administrative remedies warrants the dismissal
graduation, he found employment with the Social of a petition for being premature.
Security System (SSS) in Bangue, Abra. After a
few years, he took and passed the civil service
exams (professional level) and was promoted to
Senior Analyst. However, a former employee of
SSS Bangued filed a complaint with the Civil
Service Commission (CSC)-CAR Regional Director
(RD) alleging that petitioner made deliberate
false entries relating to his graduation date. He
should have put 1995 as his actual date of
graduation because that was the only time he
completed his military science units.
Petitioner was charged with dishonesty,
falsification, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the service. The CSC-CAR rendered
a decision suspending him. Petitioner filed an MR
but was denied. Petitioner then filed directly with
the CA a petition for review with injunctive relief.
CA: Denied the Petition, saying that petitioner
should have appealed with the CSC before filing a
petition for review with the CA.
An appeal with the CSC Proper (CSC
Commissioners) was the proper remedy
following a decision by the CSC Regional
Director.
Pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of Memo Circular 19
of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases, the
Civil Service Commission Proper, or Commission
Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of
Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on
petition for review. "Commission Proper" refers to
the Civil Service Commission-Central Office. It is
only the decision of the Commission Proper that
may be brought to the CA on petition for review.
Non-observance of exhaustion of
administrative remedies calls for dismissal
for prematurity.
In filing his petition for review directly with it from
the CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed
to observe the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. As correctly stated by
the appellate court, non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA
petition premature and thus dismissible.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that "before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, he or she
should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him
or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by
giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's
judicial power can be sought.1âwphi1 The
premature invocation of the intervention of the
court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based
on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses
and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice,
for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy
away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and
complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case." Indeed, the
administrative agency concerned – in this case
the Commission Proper – is in the "best position
to correct any previous error committed in its
forum.”
 The CA is further justified in refusing to take
cognizance of the petition for review, as "[t]he
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant
a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which
is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence." When petitioner’s recourse
lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in MC
19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to
acknowledge petitioner before it.
QUESADA VS. DOJ, 500 SCRA 454
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of
courts (ladder of appeals, or the order of appeals) must be observed to prevent inordinate delay in
the administration of justice. Non-observance of the hierarchy of courts can warrant the dismissal of
the case unless there are compelling reasons to make an exception.
RESPONDENT TERUEL FILED WITH THE OFFICE Whether or not the filing of the present
OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR IN MANDALUYONG petition directly with the Supreme Court
CITY AN AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT AGAINST constitutes an utter violation of the rule on
PETITIONER, CAMACHO, JR., AND CORGADO hierarchy of courts. – YES.
WITH THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE
315 (2) AND (3) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
WHICH IN TURN WAS OPPOSED BY PETITIONER Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, must be
WHO FILED A COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT THERETO. filed with the Court of Appeals whose decision
THEREAFTER, AN INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA may then be appealed to this Court by way of a
WAS FILED WITH THE RTC UPON THE petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
RECOMMENDATION OF ASSISTANT CITY the same Rules. A direct recourse to this Court is
PROSECUTOR ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR. AFTER THE warranted only where there are special and
LATTER’S ISSUANCE OF A RESOLUTION FINDING compelling reasons specifically alleged in the
PROBABLE CAUSE. IN THE MEANTIME, petition to justify such action. Such ladder of
PETITIONER FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF appeals is in accordance with the rule on
JUSTICE A PETITION FOR REVIEW CHALLENGING hierarchy of courts.
THE RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING
PROSECUTOR, BUT WAS HOWEVER, DISMISSED. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
PENDING THE CRIMINAL CASE AT THE RTC, functions assigned to it by the fundamental
PETITIONER FILED WITH THE SUPREME charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and
COURT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ALLEGING should not be burdened with the task of dealing
THAT THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, IN with causes in the first instance. Its original
DISMISSING HIS PETITION FOR REVIEW, ACTED jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION writs should be exercised only where absolutely
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF necessary or where serious and important
JURISDICTION. reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions
or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or
before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another
are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ’s
procurement must be presented.

The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the

venue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. It is a policy
 that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
NGO BUN TIONG VS. JUDGE SAYO, 163 SCRA 237
No court has the power to interfere by injunction, with the judgments or decrees of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction.
Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference between concurrent
and coordinate courts should be regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby
the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any
court of concurrent jurisdiction.
In 1976, the CFI of Manila rendered a decision in WON it was properfor CFI Judge Sayo to
the case of Caltex v. Pilares Construction ordering issue an injunctive order against the order
the latter to pay the awarded damages and costs. of CFI Manila. – NO. It violates the doctrine
The decision became final and executory and a of non-interference.
writ of execution was issued. The writ of
execution was not enforced so petitioner filed for It has long been settled that no court has the
an issuance of an alias writ of execution. power to interfere by injunction, with the
judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or
Pilares Construction filed with the same court (CFI coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to
Manila), an opposition to the issuance of the alias grant the relief sought by injunction. Pursuant to
writ and a motion to set aside decision which were the policy of judicial stability, the judgment of a
both denied. Pilares questioned the denial of the court of competent jurisdiction may not be
MR and motion to set aside before the CA, and interfered with by any court of concurrent
later on the SC. In the meantime, the sheriff of jurisdiction. For the simple reason that the power
CFI Manila enforced the writ and sold Pilares’ to open, modify or vacate a judgment is not only
levied property in an auction sale. possessed by, but is restricted to the court in
which the judgment was rendered.
Since the SC case has not been resolved yet,
respondent filed a complaint with CFI Caloocan In this case, private respondent Galauran and
(where the respondent Sayo sat as judge) to Pilares Construction, insists that the CFI of
declare the auction sale effective by the CFI Caloocan has the authority and jurisdiction to
Manila sheriff null and void. Judge Sayo issued a take cognizance and to act on the alleged
TRO and even held Caltex and the sheriff in irregularities of the execution sale already
contempt of court for not complying with the TRO. rendered final and executory by another Court of
First Instance, CFI of Manila, and subsequently to
order the return of the properties sold at public
auction to them. This contention is untenable.

Moreover, the filing of several cases against the

same party over the same issue, after the
appellate court has decided adversely against
them, constitutes contumacious defiance of the
authority of and flagrant imposition on the courts
and impedes the speedy administration of justice.
BF Homes vs. MERALCO, G.R. No. 171614, December 6, 2010
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. Under the EPIRA Law, the ERC (not the RTC)
has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 43(u) of the EPIRA over all cases contesting rates,
fees, fines, and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of its powers, functions and
responsibilities, and over all cases involving disputes between and among participants or players in
the energy sector. Section 4(o) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules and Regulation provides that the
ERC shall also be empowered to issue such other rules that are essential in the discharge of its
functions as in independent quasi-judicial body.
Facts: WON RTC had jurisdiction to issue the writ of
Meralco cut the power off water pumps of BF injunction against Meralco. – NO, subject matter
Homes because of non-payment of electric bills jurisdiction does not belong to the RTC.
amounting to 4 million1 . BF Homes requested
Meralco to apply their 4 million debt to the refund
they were entitled to based on a decision
promulgated by the SC the year before. In the
decision, they were allegedly entitled to 11 Million
pesos. Meralco refused to apply the refund money
because the Energy Regulatory Commission has
not yet approved the schedule of refund
payments. BF Homes then filed a writ of
injunction with the RTC to stop Meralco from
cutting off power from their water pumps. The
RTC granted the writ. The CA and SC reversed the
ruling, finding that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the disputes.
The material allegations of BF Homes and PWCC
in their Petition before the RTC show that the
subject matter of the petition is the off-setting of
the amount of refund they are supposed to
receive from MERALCO against the electric bills
they are to pay to the same company. This is
squarely within the primary jurisdiction of the
ERC as the administrative agency tasked to
supervise Meralco.
In the MERALCO Refund cases, the Supreme
Court affirmed the February 16, 1998 Decision of
the ERB (predecessor of the ERC) fixing the just
and reasonable rate for the electric services of
MERALCO and granting refund to MERALCO
consumers of the amount they overpaid. Said
Decision was rendered by the ERB in the exercise
of its jurisdiction to determine and fix the just and
reasonable rate of power utilities such as
MERALCO.

This is pursuant to the EPIRA law which expressly

grants subject matter jurisdiction over all cases
contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties
imposed by the ERC in the exercise of its powers,
functions and responsibilities, and over all cases
involving disputes between and among
participants or players in the energy sector. It can
be concluded that the ERC is the regulatory
agency of the government having the authority
and supervision over MERALCO. Thus, the task to
approve the guidelines, schedules, and details of
the refund by MERALCO to its consumers, to
implement the judgment of this Court in the
MERALCO Refund cases, also falls upon the ERC.
CABILI VS. BALNDONG, A.M. NO. RTJ – 10-2125 (2011)
Doctrine of judicial stability and non-interference. No court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court
that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents,
and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment.
Petitioner’s clients were awarded damages from WON Judge Balindong of the Marawi RTC
a case involving a vehicular accident before RTC erred in issuing the TRO against the sheriff
Iligan. A notice of garnishment was issued against of RTC Iligan. – YES.
Mindanao State University but the OSG opposed
and filed a petition before RTC Marawi. Judge of No court can interfere by injunction with the
the Marawi RTC issued a TRO against the judgments or orders of another court of
garnishment. concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant
the relief sought by the injunction.[23] The
A complaint was filed against Balindong for gross rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
ignorance of the law, graev abuse of authority, jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
abuse of discretion and grave misconduct. the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of
all other coordinate courts, for its execution and
over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgment.
 In a case where an execution order has been
issued is considered as still pending, so that all
the proceedings on the execution are still
proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a
writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own
processes.[26] To hold otherwise would be to
divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in
the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious
to the orderly administration of justice

Violation of the doctrine of non-interference may

call for the imposition of administrative sanctions
against the judge.

If the issuing court violated the law in issuing a

writ of execution, the remedy is NOT the resort to
another co-equal body, but to a higher court with
authority to nullify its action.

In this case, respondent judge was fully aware

that the garnishment was ordered by a court of a
co-equal and coordinate court, his issuance of the
TRO was clearly violative of the doctrine of non-
interference.
VILLAMOR VS. SALAS, 203 SCRA 540
No Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutinize, and much less declare as unjust a judgment of
another Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge thereof liable for damages without running afoul
with the principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, are vested with authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts.
Petitioner, RTC Judge Adriano Villamor, decided a Whether or not Judge Salas may take
case involving private respondent George Carlos cognizance of the actions for damages
and Gloria Naval. While the civil case was against Judge Villamor for rendering an
pending, Carlos filed a criminal case against unjust decision. – NO.
Naval. The criminal case was archived because of
the pendency of the civil case. Petitioner's No Regional Trial Court can pass upon and
decision states that Gloria Naval is the owner of scrutinize, and much less declare as unjust a
the disputed lot. Carlos reactivated the criminal judgment of another Regional Trial Court and
case, but it was dismissed by the petitioner, since sentence the judge thereof liable for damages
the criminal case became moot and academic without running afoul with the principle that only
since Naval is declared the legal owner. the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, are vested with
Dissatisfied with the dismissal of the case, Carlos authority to review and correct errors of the trial
filed an administrative case against Villamor. Said courts.
case was dismissed. Dissatisfied with the
outcome of the administrative case, respondent To allow respondent to proceed with the trial of
Carlos filed a civil action for damages the actions for damages against the petitioner, a
against Judge Villamor for knowingly co-equal judge of a co-equal court, would in effect
rendering an unjust judgment when he permit a court to review and interfere with the
dismissed the five (5) criminal cases against judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no
Naval, et al. The summons was served upon appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The
Judge Villamor, but instead of answering the various branches of a Court of First Instance (now
complaint, Judge Villamor issued an order of the Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not
direct contempt against Carlos and his lawyer interfere with each other's cases, judgments and
Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero, The said order of Judge orders.
Villamor was restrained by the SC.
 Only after the Appellate Court, in a final
The administrative case was filed before the RTC judgment, has found that a trial judge's errors
branch presided by Judge Salas. Judge Villamor were committed deliberately and in bad faith may
filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
Judge Salas. decision be levelled against the latter.
DELA ROSA VS. ROLDAN, 501 SCRA 34
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be
acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission. Neither is it conferred
by the acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the
rule, this matter being legislative in character. Thus, the jurisdiction over the nature of an action and
the subject matter thereof is not affected by the theories set up by defendant in an answer or motion
to dismiss.

Asiatrust vs. First Aikka, G.R. No. 179558, July 11, 2011
is well-settled that the court’s jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage of the proceedings, even for
the first time on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the
very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. In its
Opposition to the petition for rehabilitation, petitioner already questioned the court’s jurisdiction over
UDI. On appeal to the CA, it again raised the same issue, but it failed to obtain a favorable decision.
We cannot, therefore, say that petitioner slept on its rights. It is not estopped from raising the
jurisdictional issue even at this stage. In any event, even if petitioner had not raised the issue of
jurisdiction, the reviewing court would still not be precluded from ruling on the matter of jurisdiction.

TIJAM VS. SIBONGHANOY, 23 SCRA 29

Exception to the general rule that objection on the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of proceedings – estoppel by laches. The defenses of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and
prescription of action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal,
except that, for reasons of public policy, the objection to the lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be barred by estoppel laches when a party actively participates in all the stages of the
proceedings and lets a long period of time pass without invoking the objection.
Facts: WON the defense of lack of subject matter
Spouses Tijam filed an action for for recovery jurisdiction may be invoked 15 years after
before the CFI of Cebu for the sum of P1,908 from the institution of the civil action. – No,
the Spouses Sibonghanoy. The CFI ruled in favor estoppel by laches bars the objection.
of the Tijams. They later moved for a writ of
execution against the Surety of the The party who has already submitted itself to the
Sibonghanoys. The Surety then continuously jurisdiction of the court is barred from later
prayed for the quashal of the writ based on questioning such jurisdiction (for reasons of
procedural grounds. On Motion for public policy, not because the judgment or order
Reconsideration before the CA, they moved for of the court is valid and conclusive as an
the dismissal of the case raising for the first time adjudication). The defense of lack of jurisdiction
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI citing of the court may be barred by estoppel by laches,
the Judiciary Act of 1948 passed one month so that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
before the Tijams filed the case. The law placed court to secure affirmative relief against his
the action under the jurisdiction of inferior courts opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain
rather than the CFI. SC held the Surety to be such relief, repudiate or question that same
barred by laches from assailing the CFI’s jurisdiction for the first time on appeal or almost
jurisdiction after submitting itself under its 15 years after the questioned ruling had been
authority 15 years before by asking for rendered. Estoppel does not apply to confer
affirmative relief and questioning its jurisdiction jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a
only now upon appeal. cause of action.
CALIMLIM VS. RAMIREZ, 118 SCRA 399
(1) In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the
judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If
there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment
or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy.
 (2) The Doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on estoppel by laches is NOT the general rule. The
ruling in Tijamthat a party is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction applies only to
exceptional circumstances. What is still controlling is that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties.
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a WON there was estoppel by prior judgment
petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel (res judicata). – NO.
Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate a title In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it
in order that the same may be cancelled and a must be shown, among others, that the judgment
new one issued in the name of the said in the prior action must have been rendered by a
corporation. The said petition was granted by the court with the proper jurisdiction to take
respondent Court. Petitioner, upon learning that cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior
her husband's title over the parcel of land had judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack
been cancelled, filed a petition with the of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit
respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot
court, praying for the cancellation the TCT, operate as an adjudication of the controversy.
but the court dismissed the petition. This essential element of the defense of bar by
prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC a case for the case.
cancellation of the TCT but the same was
dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC filed in
the filing of a complaint for the cancellation of the LRC sittingas a land registration court. A Court of
conveyances and sales that had been made by First Instance, acting as a land registration court,
Independent Mercantile with respect to the is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As
property, against Francisco Ramos who claimed such, its proceedings are not adequate for the
to have bought the property from Independent litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil
Mercantile Corporation. Francisco Ramos filed action, such as, questions involving ownership or
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the title to real property.
same is barred by prior judgement or by
statute of limitations. Resolving the said WON petitioner cannot question the
Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the jurisdiction of the cadastral court which
case on the ground of estoppel by prior issued the prior judgment in accordance
judgment. with the ruling in Tijam. – NO.

Argument of Petitioner: On the other hand,

Petitioners claimed that estoppel by prior
judgment or res judicata has not set in because
the cadastral court did not have jurisdiction to
settle the issue of ownership.
Decision of respondent Court: Petitioner
cannot claim that the cadastral court did not have
jurisdiction, having been the one to file a case
with the cadastral court in the first place, there is
already estoppel by laches, as such, the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction can no longer be
raised.
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of
the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties.
The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from
the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is
to be regretted, however, that the holding in said
case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved
in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure
from the accepted concept of non-waivability of
objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather
the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the
issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
 In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of
jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was held to be barred by
estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of
jurisdiction having been raised for the first time
in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15)
years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for
being barred by laches. As defined in said case,
laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert
it."

The petitioners in the instant case may not be

faulted with laches. When they learned that the
title to the property owned by them had
erroneously and illegally been cancelled and
registered in the name of another entity or person
who had no right to the same, they filed a petition
to cancel the latter's title.
De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 103
The general rule is that what determines the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction
over the case are the allegations in the complaint. These cannot be made to depend upon the defenses
set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. The cause of action in a complaint is not
what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint
define and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the
complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint

STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS VS. GASTON, 374 SCRA 396

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an
answer or a motion to dismiss.
Private respondents filed a complaint for Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over
damages with preliminary injunction/before the the complaint. – YES.
Negros RTC alleging: at the time of their purchase In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction
of their subdivision, there was no requirement of over the dispute, it is necessary to resolve
membership in any homeowners’ association and preliminarily -- on the basis of the allegations
since then, they have remained non-members of in the Complaint -- whether private
SCHA; an arrangement was made wherein non- respondents are members of the SCHA. It is a
members of the association were issued ‘non- settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject
member’ gatepass stickers for their vehicles for matter is determined by the allegations in the
identification by the security guards and such complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas
arrangement remained undisturbed until SCHA or the theories set up by the defendant in an
disseminated a board resolution which decreed answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
that only its members in good standing were to jurisdiction would become dependent almost
be issued stickers for use in their vehicles; private entirely upon the whims of the defendant. The
respondent and his son were prevented from Complaint does not allege that private
entering the subdivision which caused suffer respondents are members of the SCHA. In point
moral damage. of fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the
HIGC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
Petitioners argued that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case as it involves an intra- Whether or not the complaint states a cause
corporate dispute between SCHA, the proper of action. – YES.
forum being the Home Insurance (and Guaranty)
Corporation (HIGC).
The test of the sufficiency of the allegations
constituting the cause of action is whether,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render
a valid judgment on the prayers. This test implies
that the issue must be passed upon on the basis
of the bare allegations in the complaint. The court
does not inquire into the truth of such allegations
and declare them to be false.

A complaint states a cause of action when it

contains these three essential elements: (1) the
legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of the said
legal right.

In the instant case, the records sufficiently

establish a cause of action. First, the Complaint
alleged that, respondents had a right of free
access to and from their residential abode.
Second, under the law, petitioners have the
obligation to respect this right. Third, such right
was impaired by petitioners.
Sun Insurance Office vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. While the non-payment of filing fees normally result
in the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, this rule is not inflexible when the party has shown
willingness to abide by the rules.
Private respondent Tiong filed a complaint for the WON a court acquires jurisdiction over a
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of case when the correct and proper docket fee
preliminary attachment against Sun Insurance. has not been paid. – Generally, no, but the
The prayer in the complaint did not quantify the present case calls for an exception. The
amount of damages sought, but the amount could discrepancy between what Tiong paid and
be inferred from the body of the complaint to be what he had to pay was immediately paid for
about P50M. Only P210.00 was paid by Tiong as by Tiong upon reassessment by the Clerk of
docket fee. Tiong then filed amended and Court.
supplemental complaints, and was reassessed - It is not simply the filing of the complaint
additional docket fees. Tiong paid a total of or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
P182,824.90 as docket fee. Sun Insurance insists payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that the amount should be P257,810.49, and that that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
because the proper fees had not been paid, over the subject-matter or nature of the
Tiong’s complaint should be dismissed and all action. Where the filing of the initiatory
incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. pleading is not accompanied by payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow
The Supreme Court ruled against the petition. payment of the fee within a reasonable
The Clerk of Court of court a quo instructed to time but in no case beyond the applicable
reassess and determine the additional filing fee, prescriptive or reglementary period.
and to require Tiong to pay the deficiency, if any. - The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and
A more liberal interpretation of the rules is called similar pleadings, which shall not be
for considering that unlike Manchester, Tiong considered filed until and unless the filing
demonstrated willingness to abide by the rules by fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
paying the additional docket fees as required. It may also allow payment of said fee within
is not simply the filing of the complaint or a reasonable time but also in no case
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment beyond its applicable prescriptive or
of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial reglementary period.
court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but
in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
- Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified
the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.

As distinguished from the case of

Manchester:
 Manchester Dev’t Corp. v. CA: “The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the
amended pleading.”
 In Manchester, petitioner did not pay any
additional docket fee until the case was
decided. Due to the fraud committed on
the government, the SC held that the
court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case and the amended complaint
could not have been admitted as the
original was null and void. In the
present case, a more liberal
interpretation of the rules is called
for considering that unlike
Manchester, Tiong demonstrated
willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as
required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchester must have had a
sobering influence on Tiong who thus paid
the additional docket fees as ordered.
BALLATAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 304 SCRA 34
Non-payment for a claim of damages which after the filing of the complaint does not warrant the
dismissal of the case. The additional filing fee on the claim because of the increase in the amount of
damages is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award
Petitioner Ballatan filed a claim for the recovery WON the CA erred in admitting the third-
of possession against Gonzalo and Winston Go, party complaint despite non-payment of
claiming that the respondents encroached on her filing fees for the damages t awarded. – NO
property because the land surveyor (Araneta
Institute of Agriculture and its Engineer, Jose
Queding) made an error in making the The third-party complaint in the instant case
subdivision plan. arose from the complaint of petitioners against
respondents Go. The complaint filed was
The Go’s filed their Answer with Third-Party for accion publiciana. The rule in this jurisdiction
Complaint, impleading Li Yao, AIA, and Queding. is that when an action is filed in court, the
They impleaded Yao because Yao, because of the complaint must be accompanied by the payment
same erroneous subdivision plan, encroached on of the requisite docket and filing fees. In real
their property, and AIA and Queding for causing
the error in the first place.
The trial court ruled in favor of Ballatan and
ordered the Go’s to vacate Ballatan’s portion to
the lot and demolish the improvements they built
therein. The trial court dismissed the third party
complaint.
On appeal to the CA, the CA modified the decision
by reviving the third party complaint as against
Yao and Queding, ordering Yao to vacate Go’s
property and for Queding to pay damages,
including attorney fees.
Petitioners filed a petition before the SC to
question the admission by the Court of Appeals of
the third-party complaint by respondents Go
against the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao.
Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint
should not have been considered by the
Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due
to third-party plaintiffs' failure to pay the
docket and filing fees before the trial court.
actions, the docket and filing fees are based on
the value of the property and the amount of
damages claimed, if any. If the complaint is filed
but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the
court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of
the fees within a reasonable time as the court
may grant, barring prescription. Where the fees
prescribed for the real action have been paid
but the fees of certain related damages are
not, the court, although having jurisdiction
over the real action, may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for
damages. Accordingly, the court may expunge
those claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a
reasonable time for amendment of the complaint
so as to allege the precise amount of damages
and accept payment of the requisite legal fees.
If there are unspecified claims, the
determination of which may arise after the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading,
the additional filing fee thereon shall
constitute a lien on the judgment award. The
same rule also applies to third-party claims and
other similar pleadings[

In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed

by respondents Go was incorporated in their
answer to the complaint. The third-party
complaint sought the same remedy as the
principal complaint but added a prayer for
attorney's fees and costs without specifying their
amounts. Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court
of Appeals did not err in awarding damages
despite the Go's failure to specify the amount
prayed for and pay the corresponding additional
filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees
refers to damages arising after the filing of the
complaint against the Go's. The additional filing
fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on
the judgment award.

TACOY VS. RTC OF TAGUM, 180 SCRA 433

Where the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of
certain of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the
action may not be dismissed. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as
to which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a
reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item
of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.
These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Whether or not the amount of damages
Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for claimed and the assessed value of the
recovery of possession (accion publiciana) property are relevant in the
against 3 defendants, Pineda, having himself the determination of the court’s
need to used the property, has demanded the jurisdiction in a case for recovery of
defendants to vacate the property and pay possession of property. – NO.
reasonable rentals therefore, but such were
refused. The complaint was challenged in the It is true that the complaints do not state the
Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant amounts being claimed as actual, moral and
alleging that it did not specify the amounts of
actual, nominal, and exemplary damages, nor the
assessed value of the property, that being bars
the determination o f t h e R T C s j u r i s d i c t i o n
in deciding the case.
The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the
claims for damages in the complaint were
expunged for failure to specify the amounts.
Thus, the defendants filed a Joint Petition for
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and temporary
restraining order against the RTC
nominal damages. It is also true, however, that
the actions are not basically for the recovery of
sums of money. They are principally for recovery
of possession of real property. Determinative of
the court’s jurisdiction in a recovery of
possession of property is the nature of the
action (one of accion publiciana) and not the
value of the property. It may be commenced and
prosecuted without an accompanying claim for
actual, nominal or exemplary damages and such
action would fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC. The court acquired
jurisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and
payment of the prescribed docket fees.
How docket fees are assessed, effect of
failure to allege amount of damages in
complaint:
For actions involving recovery of money
- Two situations may arise. One is where
the complaint or similar pleading sets out
a claim purely for money or damages and
there is no precise statement of the
amounts being claimed. In this event the
rule is that the pleading will "not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise
be expunged from the record." In other
words, the complaint or pleading may be
dismissed, or the claims as to which the
amounts are unspecified may be
expunged, although the Court may, on
motion, permit amendment of the
complaint and payment of the fees
provided the claim has not in the
meantime become time-barred.
- The other is where the pleading does
specify the amount of every claim, but
the fees paid are insufficient; and here
again, the rule now is that the court may
allow a reasonable time for the payment
of the prescribed fees, or the balance
thereof, and upon such payment, the
defect is cured and the court may
properly take cognizance of the action,
unless in the meantime prescription has
set in and consequently barred the right
of action.
For actions involving real property
- Where the action involves real property
and a related claim for damages - the
legal fees shall be assessed on the basis
of both (a) the value of the property and
(b) the total amount of related damages
sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over the action if the filing of the initiatory
pleading is accompanied by the payment
 of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not
paid at the time of the filing of the
pleading, as of the time of full payment of
the fees within such reasonable time as
the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
- But where the fees prescribed for an
action involving real property have been
paid, but the amounts of certain of the
related damages (actual, moral and
nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be
dismissed. The Court undeniably has
jurisdiction over the action involving the
real property, acquiring it upon the filing
of the complaint or similar pleading and
payment of the prescribed fee. And it is
not divested of that authority by the
circumstance that it may not have
acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages
because of lack of specification thereof.
What should be done is simply to
expunge those claims for damages as to
which no amounts are stated, which is
what the respondent Courts did, or allow,
on motion, a reasonable time for the
amendment of the complaints so as to
allege the precise amount of each item of
damages and accept payment of the
requisite fees therefor within the relevant
prescriptive period.
MONSANTO VS. LIM, G.R. NO. 178911, SEPTEMBER 11, 2014
A letter-complaint addressed to an Executive Judge does not qualify as an initiatory pleading since
there is no compliance with the requirements prescribed under the Rules of Court.
A Regional Director of Pag-IBIG, asked Judge WON an action may be instituted by a letter
Monsanto to intervene in an anomalous auction to a judge. – NO.
sale conducted by a Sheriff. Judge Monsanto WON OCA’s directive to Judge Usman that
transferred the case to Judge Usman because he take action on the motion vests the RTC
Petitioner, the owner of the property, is his with jurisdiction. – NO.
relative. Judge Usman set a date for hearing even
if no formal complaint was filed and referred the Pag- IBIG’s letter could not be considered as a
matter to the OCA. The representative of formal complaint or petition. The petition should
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Writ of Execution not be given due course for lack of a formal
and Notice to Vacate with the OCA. OCA directed complaint and non-payment of docket fees before
Judge Usman to take action on said motion. The the Trial Court.
Judge followed the directive of the OCA until the
case reached the SC. Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by
SC dismissed the case. It ruled that the RTC the filing of the original complaint in court."
Orders must be declared null and void because Moreover, "[e]very ordinary civil action must be
there was not initiatory pleading filed before the based on a cause of action."
RTC. The letter could not be considered as a
pleading because it does not comply with any of No proper initiatory pleading was filed before the
the requirements under Rule 7, ROC. trial court. • In this case, records show that no
formal complaint or petition was filed in court.
The case was supposedly "commenced" through
a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the intervention of
Executive Judge Monsanto on the alleged
 anomalous foreclosure sale conducted by De
Guzman. However, said letter could not in any
way be considered as a pleading. Section 1, Rule
6 of the Rules of Court defines pleadings as
"written statements of the respective claims and
defenses of the parties submitted to the court for
appropriate judgment." To stress, Pag- IBIG’s
letter could not be considered as a formal
complaint or petition. The parties were not
identified, the cause of action was not stated, and
there was no compliance with Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court. There was also no payment of docket
fees.

Section 1, Rule 141, ROC: “[u]pon the filing of the

pleading or other application which initiates an
action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor
shall be paid in full.” In Far East Bank and Trust
Company v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation: A
court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon
the payment of the prescribed fees.
YUCHENGCO VS. REPUBLIC, 333 SCRA 368
The timely filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional, considerations of law and equity
come into the picture. While the Supreme Court subscribes to the ruling that correct filing fees in
civil cases must be paid in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan, this does not preclude a an
exception when the petitioner acted in justifiable good faith. There was ample reason for uncertainty
and doubt on the intervenors part not merely as to the correctness of the amount to be paid but
whether or not docket fees should be paid at all.
The Republic of the Philippines filed with the WON the complaint-in-intervention should
Sandiganbayan a complaint for Rescission, be dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and the filing fees. – NO.
Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
Marcos and Prime Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter,
PHI. Alleging ownership of the properties of the While the Court is inclined to sustain the ruling
Marcoses sought to be forfeited by the Republic, that correct filing fees in civil cases must be paid
petitioner Yuchengco filed a motion for in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan, this
intervention and complaint-in-intervention, does not preclude a ruling that, in this case, the
impleading the Republic, the Presidential petitioner acted in justifiable good faith. There
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), was ample reason for uncertainty and doubt on
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos and PHI as the intervenors part not merely as to the
defendants-in-intervention. Petitioner paid a correctness of the amount to be paid but whether
docket fee of P400.00. or not docket fees should be paid at all. Esm

The Respondents alleged that the complaint-in-

Equitable considerations are equally significant.
intervention is essentially an action for the
Unlike the basis of the Manchester ruling, there is
recovery of ownership and possession of
no evidence in the present case that the
shareholdings in a corporation, and docket fees
petitioner tried to evade the payment of correct
based on the value of the shareholdings should
fees or in any way tried to mislead that court and
have been paid.
its employees. On the contrary, petitioner paid
dues and asked the Sandiganbayan what are the
Petitioner countered that pursuant to P.D. 1606,
correct docket fees, if the dues paid are not
all proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were
accurate. When Sandiganbayan came out with its
free of charge. Respondents replied, saying that
own computation, petitioner paid the corrected
that was only true when only criminal actions
amount. The Supreme Court cited a number of
were heard by the Sandiganbayan. Since the
cases where it allowed the late filing of docket
Sandiganbayan already hears civil cases, docket
fees for equitable considerations due to the
and filing fees should be paid.
exceptional factual background of said cases.
Petitioner moved to be allowed to post bond for
whatever docket fees he may be held to pay
which was vehemently opposed by Respondents.
VDA. DE MURGA VS. CHAN, 25 SCRA 441 (1968)
Interpretation of lease contracts is an action incapable of pecuniary determination that is beyond the
jurisdiction of the MTC.
Vda. De Murga was the owner of two parcels of WON the municipal court lacked jurisdiction
land it leased to the respondent. In their contract to try the case. – YES.
of lease, respondent was granted a period of ten While the petitioner insists that the action Is one
years renewable upon agreement by the parties. for unlawful detainer, the pleadings of the parties,
Prior to the expiration of the lease, several letters and the annexes thereto, clearly show that the
were sent by both parties attempting but failing jugular vein of the controversy hinges on the
to come to an agreement as regards increased correct interpretation of clause "7" of the contract
rentals or respondent’s purchase of the property. of lease, a matter outside the jurisdiction of the
municipal court. The lessor-appellee maintains
Petitioner finally demanded that respondent that the lease had terminated on January 31,
vacate the premises unless he pays a higher rent 1959, renewable only upon a new agreement of
of P700, even returning a check sent by the parties; on the other hand, the lessee-
respondent in the amount of P500. Respondent appellant contends that, inasmuch as the
disregarded the demand for him to vacate and controversy hinges on the interpretation of clause
continued occupying the premises, insisting that "7" of the contract, that is, whether or not said
the contract of lease had a stipulation on clause contemplated an automatic renewal of the
automatic renewal, entitling him to continuing lease, the action was not for unlawful detainer but
occupying the premises as long as he pays rent. one not capable of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, beyond the competence of the
Petitioner filed an ejectment case against municipal court.
respondent before the MTC of Zamboanga.
Respondent, in his answer, alleged that the MTC
had no jurisdiction over the case and that the
petitioner did not have cause of action for
unlawful detainer.

The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondent

appealed with the CFI, alleging that the MTC had
no jurisdiction to try the case because the
interpretation and enforcement of the terms of
the lease contract (incapable of pecuniary
determination) was outside the jurisdiction of the
MTC. The CFI ruled against respondent,
prompting him to file a petition before the SC.
HEIRS OF VALERIANO CONCHA VS. SPOUSES GREGORIO LUMOCSO, 540 SCRA 1
actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions
that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein.” Jurisdiction in these cases are determined by the assessed value of the real property.
Petitioners, claiming to be forcibly ejected from WON the action is one incapable of
their land, filed two complaints: one for pecuniary estimation. – NO.
reconveyance of four parcels of land, and another By examining the allegations in the complaint, it
actual damages for the value of their trees which is clear that the relief prayed for is the
the respondents cut. These were filed before the reconveyance of possession fo the property.
RTC, on the theory that the sum of assessed It has been held that actions for reconveyance of
value of the real property plus the value of their or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over
trees met the jurisdictional amount. Respondents real property are actions that fall under the
contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over classification of cases that involve "title to, or
the complaints because the assessed values of possession of, real property, or any interest
the subject lots alone amounted to less than therein.”
P20,000.
Under the present law, original jurisdiction over
cases the subject matter of which involves "title
Petitioners countered that the cases involve
actions the subject matters of which are incapable
of pecuniary estimation and thus within original
jurisdiction of the RTCs.
The SC explained the actions were either for
reconveyance or to remove a cloud on title.
Regardless, it is an action involving the title to or
possession of real property or any interest
therein. In such cases it is the assessed value of
the real property alone which determines
jurisdiction; since the lots were collectively
assessed at P11,000 the case should’ve been filed
with the MTC.
to, possession of, real property or any interest
therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is
divided between the first and second level courts,
with the assessed value of the real property
involved as the benchmark. This amendment was
introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of
the RTCs which would result in the speedier
administration of justice."
While it is true that that the value of the trees can
be included in “any interest therein”. However,
the law is emphatic that in determining which
court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value
of the realty involved that should be computed.

In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed

values of the subject properties as shown by their
tax declarations are less than P20,000.00.
Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases
belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.
Agustin vs. Bacalan, 135 SCRA 340
If a counterclaim is filed in the MTC in excess of its jurisdictional amount, the excess is considered
waived.
Facts: WON the Court of First Instance may, in an
Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor appeal, award the defendant-appellee's
space in a building owned by Susana Agustin. Due counterclaim in an amount exceeding or
to nonpayment of rentals an action to eject him beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin.
was filed. –NO.
In his answer, Bacalan included a counter-
claim. The City Court Of Cebu dismissed A court has no jurisdiction to hear and
counterclaim and ordered him to vacate, Bacalan determine a set-off or counterclaim in
filed an appeal the Cebu CFI. excess of its jurisdiction
A counterclaim beyond the court’s jurisdiction
The Cebu CFI reversed in favor of Bacalan, it also may only be pleaded by way of defense, the
awarded P16,000 in total damages. purpose of which, however, is only to defeat or
NO APPEAL was taken by AGUSTIN. The weaken plaintiff’s claim, but NOT to obtain
decision lapsed into finality and became affirmative relief (Section 5, Rule 5).
executory. Nevertheless, Bacalan set up his claim in excess
of the jurisdiction of the city court as a
Agustin filed a new complaint! He claims that the compulsory counterclaim.
damages awarded are beyond jurisdiction of City
court of Cebu, hence void. He claimed that the What is the legal effect of such a move?
award beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of
Cebu because Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of An appellant who files his brief and submits his
1948, as amended, limits the jurisdiction of the case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without
city courts in civil cases to P10, 000.00 as the questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision
maximum amount of the demand. is rendered therein, should be considered as
having voluntarily waives so much of his claim as
would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate
Court

Thus, by presenting his claim voluntarily before

the City Court of Cebu, the defendant-appellee
submitted the same to the jurisdiction of the
court. He became bound thereby. The amount of
P10,000.00 being the jurisdictional amount
assigned the City Court of Cebu, whose
jurisdiction the defendant-appellee has invoked,
he is thereby deemed to have waived the
 excess of his claim beyond P10,000.00. It is
as though the defendant-appellee had set up a
counterclaim in the amount of P10,000.00 only.

May the CFI then, on appeal, award

defendant-appellee's counterclaim beyond
that amount?

STILL NO: A counterclaim not presented in

the inferior court cannot be entertained in
the Court of First Instance on appeal

Thus, the defendant-appellee's counterclaim

beyond P10,000.00, the jurisdictional amount of
the city Court of Cebu, should be treated as
having been deemed waived. It is as though it has
never been brought before trial court. It may not
be entertained on appeal.

The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by

the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed
the jurisdiction of the court in which the action
began. Since the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant's
counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional
amount, the appellate court, likewise,
acquired no jurisdiction over the same.
Appellate jurisdiction being not only a
continuation of the exercise of the same judicial
power which has been executed in the court of
original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the
original and appellate courts are capable of
participating in the exercise of the same judicial
power

Award of damages in excess of the

jurisdictional amount (10k) is null and void
It is, of course, a well-settled rule that when court
transcends the limits prescribed for it by law, its
adjudications will be utterly void and of no effect
either as an estoppel or otherwise.
MANGALIAG VS. CATUBIG-PASTORAL, 474 SCRA 153
(See full digest)
(1) The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought
therein.
(2) Tijam is an exceptional case that should only be applied when there is laches.
Samson vs. Cabanos, G.R. No. 161693, June 28, 2005
Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a
general law to Municipal Trial Courts. - In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special
laws conferring jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court.
They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.

Even if the penalty prescribed for violation of IP laws is within the jurisdiction of the MTC,
the special law granting jurisdiction to the RTC prevails.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of unfair
competition before the RTC of Antipolo City.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged in the Information.
He argued that Section 170 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8293 provides that the penalty for violation
of Section 168 thereof is imprisonment from two
(2) to five (5) years and a fine ranging from fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to two hundred
thousand pesos from two (2) to five (5) years and
a fine ranging from fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00).”
Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, amending
Section 32 of B.P. 129, the MTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years irrespective of the fine.
As petitioner is charged with an offense penalized
by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, the
jurisdiction to try the case lies with the MTC and
not the RTC. In addition, petitioner submits that
the old Trademark Law, R.A. No. 166, conferring
jurisdiction on the Courts of First Instance (now
RTC) over complaints for unfair competition, has
been repealed by Section 239 of R.A. No. 8293.
Whether or not petitioner is correct in his
contention that the court has no jurisdiction
of the matter. – NO.
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took
effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty
for infringement of registered marks, unfair
competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is imprisonment
from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty
Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos,
to wit: SEC. 170. Penalties. - Independent of the
civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law,
a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2)
years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) shall be
imposed on any person who is found guilty of
committing any of the acts mentioned in Section
155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair
Competition] and Section 169.1 [False
Designation of Origin and False Description or
Representation]. Corollarily, Section 163 of the
same Code states that actions (including criminal
and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166,
167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the
proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under
existing laws, thus – SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of
Court. - All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164
and 166 to 169 shall be brought before the proper
courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing
laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent
and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No.
8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest
jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property
rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would
have expressly stated so under Section 163
thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory
construction is that in case of conflict between a
general law and a special law, the latter must
prevail.
Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional
Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a
general law to Municipal Trial Courts. - In the
case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are
special laws conferring jurisdiction over violations
of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial
Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A.
No. 7691, which is a general law.
Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case
for unfair competition is properly lodged with the
Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor
is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to
 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to
P200,000.00.

In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy

disposition of cases involving violations of
intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293,
the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated
February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional
Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts.

On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a

Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and
decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities
and Exchange Commission cases in specific
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Commercial Courts.
Sps. Bejer vs. CA, G.R. No. 79404, January 27, 1989
(1) Failure to avail of the conciliation process (PD 1508) does not warrant jurisdictional objection.
It merely renders the complaint vulnerable to a timely Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of
action or prematurity.
(2) For purposes of VENUE, the residence of a person is his personal, actual, or physical
habitation, or his actual residence, or place of abode, such residence being more than
temporary, characterized by continuity & consistency.
(3) The PRIMARY PURPOSE OF PD 1508 is to provide the conciliation mechanism as an alternative
to litigations in dispute settlement to members of corresponding barangays who are actually
residing therein.
Facts: WON P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay
Petitioners leased their properties to respondents Law), which requires the compulsory
by virtue of a verbal contract. In 1985, petitioners process of conciliation as a pre-condition for
notified respondents that they would be needing filing a case in court, apply where the
the leased premises for their own use, and asked plaintiffs are permanent residents of
the respondents to vacate the property after 3 another province but are temporarily
months, and upon payment of rent. residing for a transient purpose in the same
city where the defendants reside. – NO.
Respondents failed to pay the rentals and refused It must be remembered that non-compliance with
to vacate the property. P.D. 1508 does not warrant jurisdictional
objections; non-availment of the conciliation
Petitioners filed two cases for unlawful detainer process required therein only renders the
before the MTC of Manila. In their Answer, complaint vulnerable to a timely motion to
respondents raised the defense of lack of cause dismiss for lack of cause of action or prematurity
of action for failure to comply with barangay (such as what respondents did in this case).
conciliation, and alleged that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case. In procedural law, however, specifically for
purposes of venue it has been held that the
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. the residence of a person is his personal, actual or
lower court held that P.D. 1508 was not physical habitation or his actual residence or
applicable in both cases since the plaintiffs were place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
actual residents of Orense, Bauan, Batangas and, legal residence or domicile provided he resides
at the time of filing the individual suits against the therein with continuity and consistency.
respective defendants therein, the former were
merely transient residents of Pandacan, Manila. The residency requirement under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law must be
The RTC and CA affirmed this ruling. understood in light of its purpose. the primary
purpose of P.D. 1508 is to provide the conciliation
mechanism, as an alternative to litigations in
dispute settlement, to member of the
corresponding barangays who are actually
residing therein. Residence alone, without
membership, in said barangays would not be an
 accurate and reliable criterion, considering that
such residence may be actual but be merely
temporary, transient or categorized into other
permutations as in the case of a house guest or a
sojourner on a visit of a day or two. On the other
hand, mere membership in a barangay, without
actual residence therein, should not suffice since
absentee membership would not subserve the
avowed purpose of P.D. 1508 for lack of the
common bond and sense of community.

In other words, actual residence and membership

in the barangay is required for the Katarungang
Pambarangay to apply. In this case, petitioners
are not members of the barangay in Pandacan,
Manila, and are only transients to the place.
Hence, conciliation is not a requirement. The MTC
ruled correctly.

chanrobles virtual
Zamora vs. Heirs of Carmen, G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004
Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court. In this case, the
Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings.
There were confrontations before the barangay chairman on 9 different dates wherein not only the
issue of water installation was discussed but also the terms of the lease and the proposed execution
of a written contract relative thereto. While it is true that the Sertifikasyon is entitled ‘Ukol Sa Hindi
Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig’, this title must not prevail over the actual issues
discussed in the proceedings. In Diu vs. Court of Appeals, the SC held that “while the Pangkat was
not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay Chairman for
conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners’
violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law
which does not require strict adherence thereto.
The Zamoras, lessees, did not pay the increased WON Sec 412 was complied with before
rental imposed by the lessor, Izquierdos. The Punzalan filed an action with the Court —
Zamoras applied for a water installation but was YES, there was substanstial compliance.
not given by an owner’s consent by the attorney
of the Izquierdos. Zamoras had several 1. The primordial objective of PD 1508
confrontations in the barangay with the (the Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now
Izquierdos but no conciliation was made. The included under the LGC, is to reduce the
Izquierdos obtained a Certification to File Action. number of court litigations and prevent the
The Izquierdos filed a complaint for unlawful deterioration of the quality of justice which
detainer against the Zamoras. The Zamoras filed has been brought about by the indiscriminate
a motion to dismiss arguing that the Punong filing of cases in the courts. To attain this
Barangay, as Lupon Chairman, did not constitute objective, Sec 412(a) LGC requires the
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom parties to undergo a conciliation process
mediation proceedings should have been before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as
conducted as required by the LGC. a precondition to filing a complaint in court.
2. In this case, the Punong Brgy, as Chairman of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted
conciliation proceedings to resolve the
dispute bet. the parties herein. Contrary to
Ps’ contention, the complaint does not only
allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of
Punzalan to give her consent to the
installation of water facilities in the premises,
but also Ps’ violation of the terms of the lease,
specifically their use of a portion therein for
 their photox business and their failure to pay
the increased rental.
3. As correctly found by the RTC, confrontations
before the barangay chairman were held from
Jan-Aug, 1997 wherein not only the issue of
water installation was discussed but also the
terms of the lease and the proposed
execution of a written contract relative
thereto. It appears, however, that no
settlement was reached despite a total of 9
meetings at the brgy level.
4. It is of no moment that the complaint was
initially made by Zamora because Punzalan
was given by the Sangguniang Brgy the
authority to bring her grievance to the Court
for resolution. While it is true that the
Sertifikasyon is entitled Ukol Sa Hindi
Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng
Tubig, this title must not prevail over the
actual issues discussed in the proceedings.
5. Hence, to require another confrontation at
the brgy level as a sine qua non for the filing
of the instant case would not serve any useful
purpose anymore since no new issues would
be raised therein and the parties have proven
so many times in the past that they cannot
get to settle their differences amicably.
6. SC cannot sustain Ps’ contention that
the Lupon conciliation alone, w/o the
proceeding before the Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law
on Katarungang Pambarangay. Section
412(a) LGC, clearly provides that, as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, the
parties shall go through the conciliation
process either before the Lupon Chairman
(as what happened in the present
case), or the Pangkat.
7. Diu vs. CA: SC held that notwithstanding the
mandate in Section 410(b) LGC that
the Brgy Chairman shall constitute
a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts,
the same Sec 410(b) should be construed
together with Sec 412(a), as well as the
circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the
case.
8. Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted,
however, the parties met 9 times at the
Office of the Brgy Chairman for conciliation
wherein not only the issue of water
installation was discussed but also Ps
violation of the lease contract. It is thus
manifest that there was substantial
compliance with the law.

AQUINO VS. ABRE, FEBRUARY 18, 2008
The conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot
affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the
person of the defendant.
Facts:
Respondents Aure and Aure Lending filed a barangay conciliation proceedings is a
complaint for ejectment against Aquino before jurisdictional defect that warrants the
the MeTC. In her Answer, Aquino countered that dismissal of the complaint – NO.
the complaint lacked a cause of action because
Aure and Aure Lending do not have any legal right
over the subject property. The MeTC dismissed
the complaint on the following grounds: Non-
compliance with the barangay conciliation
process; misjoinder of parties; Lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
The RTC affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
The RTC stressed that the barangay conciliation
process is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of an ejectment complaint involving residents of
the same barangay, and failure to comply
therewith constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal of the action.
Aure appealed to the CA, arguing, among other
things, that the MeTC erred in dismissing his
Complaint with prejudice on the ground of non-
compliance with barangay conciliation process.
He was not given the opportunity to rectify the
procedural defect by going through the barangay
mediation proceedings and, thereafter, refile the
Complaint.
9. Ps’ MTD the complaint for unlawful detainer is
proscribed by Sec 19(a)1 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. Sec 19(a)
permits the filing of such pleading only when
the ground for dismissal of the complaint is
anchored on lack of jurisdiction over the subj
matter, or failure by the complainant to
refer the subj matter of his/her
complaint to the Lupon for
conciliation prior to its filing with the court.
This is clear from the provisions of Section
182 of the same Rule.
10. As discussed earlier, the case was referred to
the Lupon Chairman for conciliation.
Obviously, the MTD, even if allowed, is bereft
of merit.
Whether or not non-compliance with the
 Section 412 of the Local Government
Code provides that conciliation is a pre-
condition to the filing of a complaint in
court.
 The precise technical effect of failure to
comply with the requirement of Section
412 of the Local Government Code on
barangay conciliation is much the same
effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The complaint
becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-
maturity; and the controversy there
alleged is not ripe for judicial
determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
 Nevertheless, the conciliation
process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that non-compliance
therewith cannot affect the
jurisdiction which the court has
otherwise acquired over the subject
matter or over the person of the
defendant. Aquino cannot be allowed to
attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC after
having submitted herself voluntarily
thereto. Aquino did not raise in

1 SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this
Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
or failure to comply with the preceding section [referring to Section 18 on referral of the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation]
2 SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where
there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement
shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
The CA reversed the MeTC and RTC, and
remanded the case to the MeTC. The CA ruled
that the failure of Aure to subject the matter to
barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw
and it will not affect the sufficiency of Aure’s
complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise
such issue in her Answer. Moreover, mere
allegation of ownership does not deprive the
MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case for
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by law and is determined by the allegations
advanced by the plaintiff in his complaint. Hence,
mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in
an ejectment case will not oust the MeTC of its
summary jurisdiction over the same.
defense the lack of conciliation
proceedings in her Answer. By this
acquiescence, Aquino is deemed to have
waived such objection. (Rule 9, Sec 1)
The failure of a defendant in an ejectment
suit to specifically allege the fact that
there was no compliance with the
barangay conciliation procedure
constitutes a waiver of that defense.
Whether or not allegation of ownership
ousts the MeTC of its jurisdiction over an
ejectment case – NO.
Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by
the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long
as these allegations demonstrate a cause of
action either for forcible entry or for unlawful
detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter. This principle holds, even if the
facts proved during the trial do not support the
cause of action thus alleged.

Bañares, et al. vs. Balising, et al, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000
An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal
therefrom is timely filed. The remedy is merely to refile the complaint, and not to revived the
dismissed case.
Petitioners were accused of estafa. They filed a Whether the said order became final and
motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the executory. – YES.
criminal case without prejudice. After more than
two months, private complainants sought the An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a
revival of the criminal case. When the trial court final order if no motion for reconsideration or
allowed revival of the case, the accused appeal therefrom is timely filed. The law grants
questioned the order, claiming that the prior an aggrieved party a period of 15 days from his
dismissal had already become final and receipt of the decision or order to appeal or move
executory. to reconsider the same. After the order of
dismissal of a case without prejudice has become
final, and therefore becomes outside the court’s
power to amend and modify, a party who wishes
to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to
file a new complaint.
DIAZ VS. GESTOPA, A.M.-MTJ-11-1786, JUNE 22, 2011
Barangay conciliations not required for cases falling under Summary Procedure. While Section 408(g)
of the Local Government Code apparently gives the court discretion to refer the case to the lupon for
amicable settlement although it may not fall within the authority of the lupon, the referral of said
subject civil case to the lupon is saliently an unsound exercise of discretion, considering that the
matter falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Facts: WON it was proper for respondent judge to
Felicisima Diaz fled an administrative complaint refer the case for barangay conciliations. –
against Judge Gerardo Gestopa for gross NO.
ignorance of the law, neglect of duty and conduct
unbecoming of a judge. The Rule on Summary Procedure clearly provides
for judgment should be rendered within 30 days
Diaz filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before in keeping with the spirit of the rule which aims
the MTC of Naga presided by Judge Gestopa. to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
During the pre-trial conference, despite the determination of the cases falling thereunder.
manifestation of Diaz’ representative that they do
not want to go through barangay conciliation and
that Diaz no longer resided therein, Judge Judge Gestopa’s reliance on Sec. 408(g) of the
Gestopa insisted that he has authority to order LGC is untenable. In Farrales v. Camariste, the
the condut of the conciliation. Court explained that while the last paragraph of
the afore-cited provision apparently gives the
When Diaz filed the administrative complaint, the Court discretion to refer the case to the lupon for
OCA filed Judge Gestopa guilty of gross ignorance amicable settlement although it may not fall
of the law and procedure and recommended that within the authority of the lupon, the referral of
he be fined. Judge Gestopa argued that the said subject civil case to the lupon is saliently an
referral for barangay conciliation was made in unsound exercise of discretion, considering that
good faith and prayed for leniency. the matter falls under the Rule on Summary
Procedure. The reason is because the Rule on
Summary Procedure was promulgated for the
purpose of achieving "an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases." The fact
that unlawful detainer cases fall under summary
procedure, speedy resolution thereof is thus
deemed a matter of public policy. To do otherwise
would ultimately defeat the very essence of the
creation of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
DY VS. HON. PALARAN, G.R. NO. 196200, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013
(See separate digest)
General Rule: Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to the SC is improper
because the SC is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily
perform its constitutional functions.
Exceptions:
1. When dictated by the public welfare and advancement of public policy
2. When demanded by broader interest of justice
3. When challenged orders were patent nullities
4. When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified immediate
and direct handling of the case
Aala, et. al. vs. Honorable Uy, et.al., G.R. No. 202781, February 20, 2017
Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present:
(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance;
(3) when the case is novel;
(4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;
(5) when time is of the essence;
(6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
(8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded
by the broader interest of justice;
(9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
(11) When there are compelling reasons set forth in the petition;
(12) For pure questions of law
Crisanto Aala and Jorge Ferido residents of WON the case falls under the exceptions to
Tagum City Davao Del Norte opposed an the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. – NO.
ordinance which puts new schedule on market
values and assessment and classification of real The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical
properties in Tagum City. According to them the judicial policy designed to restrain parties from
ordinance violates the Local Government Code directly resorting to this Court when relief may be
particularly Sections 130(a), 198(a and b), obtained before the lower courts. The doctrine
199(b) and 201. Aala and Ferido alleged that that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts
Sections III C (1),(2),(3) and Sections III G 1(b) was created by this court to ensure that every
and 4(g) divided Tagum City into different zones level of the judiciary performs its designated roles
and assessed market values of real properties in an effective and efficient manner."
without taking into account their actual use and Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct
essential elements. The ordinance also imposes resort to it when relief can be obtained in the
real estate taxes on properties which Tagum City lower courts. This holds especially true when
cannot afford. questions of fact are raised.

However, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is

not an inflexible rule. In Spouses Chua v.
Ang, the Supreme Court held that "[a] strict
application of this rule may be excused when the
reason behind the rule is not present in a case[.]"
A direct invocation of ithe SC’s original jurisdiction
may be warranted in exceptional cases as when
there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in
the petition, or when what is raised is a pure
question of law.

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-

defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be
allowed when any of the following grounds are
present:

(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are

raised that must be addressed immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental
importance;
(3) when the case is novel;
(4) when the constitutional issues raised are
better decided by this Court;
(5) when time is of the essence;
(6) when the subject of review involves acts of a
constitutional organ;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy,
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
(8) when the petition includes questions that may
affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded
by the broader interest of justice;
(9) when the order complained of was a patent
nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an
inappropriate remedy. 1

None of the exceptions to the doctrine on

hierarchy of courts are present in this case.
Significantly, although petitioners raise questions
of law, other interrelated factual issues have
emerged from the parties' arguments.

Whether this case falls under the exceptions

to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. – NO.

No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

According to the Supreme Court as aggrieved
taxpayers Aala and Ferido must have filed the
appeal first to the Secretary of Justice by virtue
of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. It
states that taxpayers may raise a question of
legality or constitutionality against a local tax
ordinance by way of appeal to the Secretary of
Justice within 30 days from the effectivity of the
local tax ordinance. The Secretary of Justice is
then given 60 days to decide the case if he does
not act on it then the aggrieved taxpayer may go
to court. If the Secretary of Justice decided the
case within the prescribed time the taxpayer is
then given 30 days to go to court. The appeal
must not suspend the effectivity of the local tax
ordinance or the accrual of payments and fees for
such. The Supreme Court emphasized the
doctrine of the hierarchy of courts which prevents
parties from resorting to the Supreme Court
immediately when relief may be sought to the
lower courts the reason behind this is to prevent
unnecessary demands to the Supreme Court's
time and devotion which should be focused to the
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and for
the congestion of the court dockets as well.