Question 13: Why has the United States found it difficult to terminate the conflicts in

Afghanistan and Iraq?

Introduction

After more than 17 years of fighting what began as limited wars with limited political

objectives in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the U.S. invasion in Iraq, the United States

still finds itself deeply entrenched in a protracted war on insurgency compounded by the

difficulties of nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq. To date, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

are the longest running and most complex wars ever fought since the inception of the United

States, spanning three presidential administrations -- wars neither of which the Commander in

Chief, the American public nor her allies can afford to lose. The United States has found it

difficult to terminate the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq for several reasons. First, the United

States has consistently failed to understand the cultural and ideological differences that have

further complicated their political objectives. Second, the United States lacks ed war termination

strategies in both conflicts, which has left the U.S. without politically legitimate options to

terminate either war. Lastly, mission creep has gradually escalated the U.S.’ involvement in

Afghanistan and Iraq, resulting in a more complex situation than what had been anticipated.

The United States’ Failure to Understand the Culture that Drives Societies in Conflict

From the outset of both conflicts, United States-led coalition efforts in Afghanistan and

Iraq were based on the concept of a purely two-sided engagement—the respective government

versus the insurgentsthe United States against an identified enemy. The reality in both cases Formatted: Not Highlight

turned out to be much more complex. Ethnic, political, religious, institutional, and cultural

differences have created multiple sides to both conflicts. The shifting alliances between the

various ethnic, religious, cultural, and kinship factions haves led to a situation in which the
nominal national governments have very little control or influence beyond their respective

capitoals. The coalition’s failure to understand these underlying factors dramatically reduced the

effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts because the coalition failed to establish political

structures appropriate for each nation. ; Aas a result, its efforts to achieve one of its political

objectivees to respectively establish legitimate, democratic governments were have been

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significantly hindered. Understanding the impact of these issues requires a significant amount

of effort during the initial phase of war planning. Failure to do so, as evidenced in the protracted

conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, often results in outsiders (i.e., the United States) pursuing

actions that magnify the underlying problems, rather than reducing them. FurtherAdditionally,

even the most well-intentioned actions and/or decisions taken without a full understanding the of

the complex intricate interrelationships that exist amongst the various sectarian factions often

leaad to unforeseen and counterproductive consequenceses.

The US United States did a poor net assessment when planning for the things that mattered

most to Afghans; Islam and land. Building programs and projects took the place of mobilizing

the Afghanis to fight. The western attempts to build a government were not effective in bonding

Afghanistan’s dissimilar groups which gave legitimacy to the Taliban and resulted in more

conflict and no peace negotiations. 1

Dissimilar iIdeology complicatesmakes war termination even more complicated because

neither side can gain a decisive advantage off the battlefield that would force the other side to

negotiate some of its principles. Sunnis backed by Al-Qaeda and Shiites that lead the

1
Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier(New York,Oxford, 2013),
156

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government have deep ideological clashes and are a contributor to the US inability to terminate

the conflict in Iraq. . The United States did not realize the depth of the fault lines in Iraqi society

-- between Kurds and Arabs, Sunnis and Shiites, and the members of different tribes and local

religious groups. These tensions were contained during four centuries of Ottoman rule, and the

British, who took over from the Ottomans in 1920, put Iraq under strong Sunni control, centered

on Baghdad. Now, because of the destruction of the old Iraqi society, for the first time in

centuries, power is in the hands of the Iraqi Shiites. Sectarian violence was a real threat, but

especially so in Iraq, which had long been under control by the Sunni Ba’athists. 2

Neither side is willing to compromise its ideologic principles in order to reach a negotiated

settlement to terminate the conflicts. As Sun Tzu stated, “In a hundred battles, you will never be

in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or

losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle

to be in peril.”.2

Iraq

There was no Iraqi equivalent of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. An international

conference to legitimize an appointed government, as the UN-sponsored Bonn Conference did

with Afghanistan, would have been very difficult to organize in the prevailing international

climate. Many Iraqis were wary of a rapid turnover becoming Ba’athism without Saddam. Others

worried about Shi’ite domination. The Kurds worried about both of these scenarios and also kept

one eye on Turkey.39 In a similar vein, the few hundred Iraqi National Congress exiles, led by

2
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Ed. Samuel B. Griffith. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

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Ahmed Chalabi, were not well or widely employed and accomplished little when they were

brought into theater to help put an Iraqi face on coalition efforts.

For better or for worse, the United States toppled Saddam’s toxic, vile regime but has yet

to be able to replace it with a stable entity.

An Irregular Complicated War Focused Complicated by on Non-State Actors

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are were the first in U.S. history to target non-state

actors, causing difficulty in setting coherent and effective strategic goals to end the conflicts in

Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2001-2016, Jihad group participation s rose from 20 to 70

groups that add to the Rred Teteam’s adversaries.3 (Kadedcan lecture). These groups place the

US in uncharted territory as to who to engage and not engage in order to not overextend

themselves. (Genest lecture)

Throughout the era of the United States’ occupation in Afghanistan, corruption has

significantly undermined its political objectives in Afghanistan by destroying the legitimacy of

the Afghan government by strengthening popular support for the insurgency, in turn re-routing

material resources to insurgent groups. The U.S. continues to struggle with corruption at all

levels of the government, some of which the U.S. finds its lines of accounting re-routed to the

causes of insurgent groups. Lack of public legitimacy in government has bred insurgency,

bribery, fraud, and extortion as well as empowered the local warlords and their militias.

3
Professor Kadercan Lecture to Naval War College, RI: “GWOT in Iraq: When Global Becomes Local”,
February 8, 2019.

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 Afghanistan’s nominal national government has little influence or control outside of Kabul

which has allowed the Taliban and other groups to establish local power bases (fiefdoms, if you

will), which are in direct conflict with the government in Kabul. If the US coalition were to

withdraw under these conditions, Afghanistan would very likely be put on death ground and

become a failed state, and once again become a safe-haven for terrorist groups seeking to attack

the US. In order to avoid this outcome, the US must find solutions to help the government in

Kabul to develop the capacity to effectively govern the entire country. There are no quick

solutions or short cuts to nation building, and the process requires tremendous national resolve

and patience.

The war in Iraq has seen two failed war termination efforts, in 2003 and again in 2009-

201141(Kadedcan lecture). Both failed efforts were due to a rise or restructure of an insurgency.

General Petraeus was able to make some great success in 2007-2008, but advised the next

administration to place policy and diplomacy measures in place for a goal to get to peaceful

operations.5 (Tell Me How This Ends PG 350) The caliphate comeback in 2011, made worse by Commented [DA1]: What about in 2003? What
happened then?
civil war in Syria, gave birth to ISIS, yet another non-state actor in the conflict. ISIS is Formatted: Highlight
Formatted: Highlight
attempting to build a nation-state in what is now Iraq and Syria.
Formatted: Highlight

U.S. Military Mission Creep in Afghanistan and Iraq Commented [DA2]: What you have under this point –
Mission Creep – is the same as your point 3 below. Are you
still writing the mission creep section?
As demonstrated in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States missed prime Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: Not Highlight
opportunities following its initial invasion in both countries to replace each government with
Formatted: Not Highlight

4
Professor Kadercan Lecture to Naval War College, RI: “GWOT in Iraq: When Global Becomes Local”, Formatted: Plain Text
February 8, 2019.
5
Robinson, Linda. Tell Me How This War Ends, New York: Public Affairs Books, 2008. p. 350.

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legitimate interim nation authorities, thereby minimizing any prospects of public perception of

the conflict as U.S. occupation and instead, as U.S. liberation, which could have significantly

increased stability in the region from the very beginning. Analogous with the importance in the

medical field’s “golden hour” following a traumatic injury, the U.S. similarly missed its “golden

opportunities” to take action6, which have consequently resulted in significant complications that

still continue to inhibit U.S. war termination efforts to this day. As a result, the wars have

interminably dragged on with significant mission creep.

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States went to war

in Afghanistan since the loosely governed nation provided a strategic safe haven for al-Qaeda,

who was reportedly responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Little did the U.S. know at the time, the

original war against al-Qaeda was about to quickly morph into a war against the Taliban, where

the United States found herself on a mission fighting a non-state actor who found safe haven in

neighboring Pakistan, a supposed ally in the region. Meanwhile as the war continued, violent

extremist organizations’ activity metastasized into a complicated, unconventional web of

terrorist cells that still now, more than ever, span several continents, countries, religions, and

ideologies all with the same common frustration – anger in response to the U.S. for killing

Muslims in their own holy lands. What began as a seemingly limited reactionary response to

replace the government of Afghanistan aimed at protecting its population under the pretenses of

“peacekeeping” and “nation building” turned into a full-scale aggressive warfighting strategy

that sought to inflict mass casualties on the Taliban.7 During the Obama Administration, the

government of Kabul gained significant ground, but decreasing U.S. presence was not

6
Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. Formatted: Font: Italic
7
Robinson, Linda. Tell Me How This War Ends, New York: Public Affairs Books, 2008.

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sustainable and Afghan governance failed yet again, leaving the Afghan Security Forces to bear

the brunt of the fighting at the mercy of the Taliban. To further complicate matters in

Afghanistan, the U.S. became and continues to be deeply involved in the ever-ominous war on

two on fronts, in Iraq and Afghanistan. As history tends to repeat itself, the U.S.’ war on two

fronts has resulted in less focused energy in either of its political objectives across both conflicts.

Iraq

As former President George H.W. Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent

Snowcroft, later wrote in their reflections after the first Gulf War, “Trying to eliminate Saddam,

extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guidelines about

not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in “mission creep,” and would have incurred

incalculable human and political costs…We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad, and in

effect, rule Iraq…Under those circumstances, there was no viable “exit strategy” we could see.”8

The former President’s assessment could not be more accurate.

---

As a result, and a combination of not understanding the cultural issues in the Middle

Eeast region, and not having a clear strategic aim, the US was forced to improvise as it went

along – and created new goals (and new missions) as the conflicts progressed. 43 Previous

RAND research showed that insurgencies last approximately ten years, and that full success

often takes another six years to achieve. Complex insurgencies last even longer, and conditions

8
Bush, George and Snowcroft, Brent. A World Transformed. New York: Vintage Books, 2011.

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in insurgent warfare are highly dynamic.44 IS is one of the most complex and dynamic

insurgencies the U.S. has ever faced. While these analyses are not predictive, they do suggest the

kind of timelines for the IS campaign already envisioned by some U.S. military leaders: at least

10-20 years.45 Therefore, it would be more useful to envision a long-term state rather than to

declare a fixed path towards an end that most likely cannot and will not be achieved.

Iraq Formatted: Highlight

In order to defend what gains have been made in Iraq, the US has been drawn into conflict

with ISIS and became involved in the Syrian civil war. Although ISIS has been driven out of its

strongholds and considerably weakened, the US has been unable to withdraw from the conflict

because of lack of resolution in this never-ending war. The caliphate comeback in 2011 and Commented [DA3]: I’m guessing here – I really don’t
know except what I read…but I think that you can finish this
up.
made worse by the Syria civil war has given birth to ISIS that is looking to build a nation-state
Formatted: Highlight
which make conflict resolution extremely difficult because it intends to occupy Iraq and Syria Formatted: Highlight

which threatens to overthrow the Iraqi government and undo US presence in Iraq also allows the

access to neighboring countries

Afghanistan

is too weak and the US were the ones that formed that to sustain and US is concerned

with Who do you back to get rid of “the Armed group of the day or state of the day.” You will

always have inevitable tradeoffs when on someone else’s soil. How far to go with training them

as they can pop up later on and become a threat. Part of it is that it’s hard to end conflict when

dealing with non-state actors that have a high value object. (Dew lecture)

Counter-Argument

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 Some may argue that the United States finds it difficult to terminate the conflicts in

Afghanistan and Iraq due to the potential significant and negative lasting effects on domestic

opinion and international legitimacy of U.S. military operations if clear victories are not

achieved. If the United States were to terminate the wars immediately – the people of

Afghanistan and Iraq, along with U.S. and coalition veterans and Gold Star families would be

left with an unfillable void, wondering — “All that gave all, gave all for what?” Domestic and

international opinion is so critical and sacred to the preservation of the legitimacy of U.S.

military operations that within the span of these two conflicts -- three Commanders of Chief;

seven sitting and Acting Secretaries of Defense; six Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and

countless U.S. and Allied Commanders have yet to figure out how to terminate the war on

legitimate and justifiable terms, as seen through the war-tainted lenses of the public and world at

large.

Rebuttal

It is true that the United States finds it difficult to terminate the conflicts in Afghanistan

and Iraq due to its mission in preserving the sacredness of domestic opinion and its effects on

international legitimacy. However, after almost two decades of fighting these limited regional

wars with limited objectives, the United States has become politically estranged not only from

the global powers she went to total world war with twice in the past century against a bonafide

threat, but also the very nation states she initially sought to rebuild in the aftermath of the

respective Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. Public opinion and legitimacy have certainly

complicated war termination across these two cases, but as with any limited regional war and

especially ones of unprecedented lengths, one can conclude that the sanctity of public opinion

and legitimacy will inevitably erode as time progresses. The United States’ true underlying

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difficulties in terminating the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are attributed to the U.S.’ lack of

understanding the effects of cultural and ideological differences amongst her and her enemies

and further, collectively integrating those lessons learned into overarching political strategy and

military operations; her failure to establish measurable war termination goals at the outset of

each conflict; and her inexplicable oversight in failing to continuously reassess and synchronize

legitimate political and military objectives to avoid the inherent protraction of war due to mission

creep.

Conclusion

The historically complex and seemingly never-ending conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq

provide invaluable insight into the difficulties of war termination. As demonstrated across these

two case studies, irregular warfare against a hybrid combination of regionally entangled nation

states and non-state actors will only continue to develop and evolve in the foreseeable future.

Circumstances of future conflicts will inevitably vary, but U.S. lawmakers and military

strategists should at the very least, take the lessons learned from these cases into consideration

when planning and managing the political objectives and termination of war. Instead of seeking a

rigid “desired end state” which implies a timeline or fixed end condition, the United States

should focus its national and military efforts on achieving an “envisioned state” – a more

realistic and contemporary approach to unconventional war termination with modest, phased,

achievable, and culturally sound objectives.

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