c





 c

  

I affirm: Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.

Definitions:

States are nation states.

Ought is a question of morality. Thus, if there is no proactive moral reason to possess a nuclear
weapon, you default affirmative because of the auxiliary of ought not. It is a moral question, such as if
killing is wrong. It does not mandate that I prevent all killing, but that I show that it is morally
impermissible. The resolution is a hypothetical question, thus the affirmative does not have to prevent
implementation or defend disarmament. The fairest ground is to allow an aff world without nuclear
weapons and a neg world with the status quo.

A nuclear weapon is a weapon which explodes from a nuclear reaction.1 Weapon is defined as a
tool used in fighting. The contingency of weapon makes the resolution only talk about nukes for hostile
purposes.

Possession is property under one͛s control.2

I value morality as the resolution calls for. It ought to be held the highest because governments
are obligated to uphold the rights of their people. Hart writes3

Accordingly, the contemporary modern philosophers of whom I have spoken, and preeminently Rawls in his @


, have argued that
—
—
—
—  — 

 —
 in any morally tolerable form of
social life—   — —     
—which constitute an
essential framework of individual rights. 


 ——  —
  ——   —
  of governments,   

 
  
—  —  
   
 The modern philosophical defence put forward for the
recognition of basic human rights does not wear the same metaphysical or conceptual dress as the earlier doctrines of the seventeenth and
eighteenth-century Rights of Man, which men were said to have in a state of nature or to be endowed with by their creator. Nonetheless, the
most complete and articulate version of this modern critique of Utilitarianism has many affinities with the theories of social contract which in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries accompanied the doctrine of natural rights. Thus Rawls has argued in V@


that though
any rational person must know that in order to live even a minimally tolerable life he must live within a political society with an ordered
—  — ——   — Ñ
 
— 

—
government,
— —

——
    — —  , what

1 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Third Edition, 1996, p. 208.

 þEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 1998, p. 322.

3
H. L. A. Hart in 79 (former principal of Oxford University, Tulane Law Review, ³The Shell Foundation
Lectures,

1978-1979: Utilitarianism and Natural Rights´, April, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 663, l/n)
c


 
 c

  

Mill called "the groundwork of human existence,"      — ——— 

  
 — ———even if the protection cannot be absolute.

Thus, societies ought to hold morality as the highest value. Because it is moral and rational to
uphold rights, the criterion is respecting status of persons. Morality calls for respect of individuals as
inviolable agents. Kamm explains

Because I thought, ͚
 it was the case that 
  the     —
— something
about all of us. It would mean that —
— were
— —— —
͛ You see, there͛s a kind of status that is defined in terms

of what it is permissible to do with people. One measure of people͛s worth is what we judge is permissible to do to them. It is true that the five
will be mistreated if I don͛t harm the one in order to stop their mistreatment. but they will still be the kind of beings who should not be treated
in that way. They will still be the kind of beings who are inviolable insofar as it is wrong to harm them in a certain way even in order to realise
the greater good of minimising that type of harm.     —  (the
one or the five) 
——
— highly  — . So it is this value that is being expressed by   — . It is true,

it stands in the way of saving more lives, and it doesn͛t stand in the way of being mistreated. but it  —— —this character or

—
   
——

— — —
and prohibits treating her in other ways. Alex Voorhoeve: What
is it about our nature that gives rise to these requirements? Frances Kamm: I don͛t know, though I suspect it has something to do with the fact that we are rational beings. But that was not
what I was trying to establish. What I cared about was this paradox of deontology. And I realized that the answer lies in the fact

Upholding the worth of persons requires respecting their status as inviolable agents.
Accountability must be upheld. Collective punishment indiscriminately punishes innocents. Dickson
writes Dickson writes5

While political leaders may attempt to influence external populations through a

variety of strategies, one prominent approach involves the use of what has in different settings been termed
a

a a or a

a 
  Under such measures, an authority who wishes to
influence a group¶s ³aggregate´ behavior ± overall outcomes such as the amount of terrorism or the nature of a country¶s
leadership regime ± indiscriminately penalizes group members, regardless of aspecific
individuals are causally responsible for the aggregate behavior.þhile collective sanctions can take many different forms, these
different forms rely on a common underlying logic ± that individuals within a group are liable to be sanctioned
until any ³unfavorable´ (to the sanctioner) aggregate behavior is changed, and that such sanctions may be 2
effective by giving group members incentives either to change their own behavior, or to exert influence over responsible group members in an
attempt to change theirs(Heckathorn 1988).

The implication is by collective punishment, those who are innocent suffer to gain some end.
This denies their status of inviolable agents which makes it more likely for violations to happen in the
future. Looking to a utilitarian calculus is nonsensical. Anderson writes

4
Kamm, Frances. "In Search of the Deep Structure of Morality. An Interview with Frances Kamm." Interview by Alex Voorhoeve. Vancouver
Island University. Vancouver Island University. Web.

5
On the (In)effectiveness of Collective Punishment:
An Experimental Investigation Eric S. Dickson* Associate Professor of Politics,
Psychology B.S. 1
, Caltech; M.A. 1, Princeton; A.M. 1, Ph.D. 2003, Harvard.
c


 
 c

  

One problem with

  — — is that it—— ! "
  — ! — 

—
  — "
 
— ——  —
 —
—   
 But we all know that the end does not justify the means. If that were so, then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the
end was to purify the human race. Stalin could justify his slaughter of millions because he was trying to achieve a communist
utopia. T  "
  — — 
"
 
=A particular
act cannot be judged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. — 
"


" —    — —— 
. Second,
  — — — 
     — ——

Americans in the eighteenth century could justify slavery on the basis that it provided a good consequence for a
majority of Americans. Certainly the majority benefited from cheap slave labor even though the lives of black slaves were much
worse. A third problem with utilitarianism is predicting the consequences. If— 
 —

 

——    —
—
  
 
—
—  #
——  

—

—  
—

— $
 
  — —  — 
 

"
% 


 —
—
—
&  — —   " —    
—  
"

—

—— 
"
—  
  —  
    —
—
—

You prefer the deontological framework because

1. Whether something is pleasure or pain varies on the lens of the evaluator. This resolution does not
provide a moral starting point which would make it possible to evaluate on a utilitarian calculus.

2. A deontological standard avoids the impossible necessity of having to weigh different impacts on one
plane. A consequentialist standard would have to determine the best impact on practical, moral, and
generational grounds. This is best for debate because it allows us to discuss an issue in-depth within our
time limits.

3. Deontology establishes rights that should not be violated, while utilitarianism just differs as to what
the state of affairs calls for. Thus, deontology is easier to make concrete.

4. Ends based impacts can always be iffy. The different probabilities of various events beg for judge
intervention to determine which impact is the greatest. Prefer deontology because it is constant and
concise.

I contend that the possession of nuclear weapons undermines the status of people.

ÿ
Anderson, 2004 (Kerby Anderson is the National Director of Probe Ministries
International, , Probe Ministries ³Utilitarianism:
The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number´ http://www=probe=org/theology-and-
philosophy/worldview--philosophy/utilitarianism-the-greatest-good-for-thegreatest-
number=html)
c


 
 c

  

First, nuclear weapons are intended to punish those who are not culpable for the actions of the
government. In the instance of nuclear deterrence, it would be the governments who are in conflict
instead of the people. This form of collective punishment is equivalent to hostage holding, which is
immoral. Lee explains

Second, —— —— — —  — 

 from the fact that they are threatened,  — — 
. %—   
— —  — — —   —— 
—
— ' through the threat's being carried out. Otherwise, the moral wrongness of hostage holding would be dissolved by the success of
the threat, which is absurd. Just as it is wrong to harm someone who is not deserving of harm,   — —
 —
—  — Third, —— — — 
 
    (—
———
  only —— — 
—       —If I pledge someone else's fidelity with my life or put up bail for
someone else in jail, I have consented to the threat imposed on me by the authorities to control the behavior of that other person. I am not
being held hostage, and there may be nothing wrong with a third-party threat in this kind of case. So, the three features of hostage holding
necessary (and jointly suf-ficient) for its moral wrongness are that (1) innocent third parties (2) have imposed on them a risk of harm (3)
without their consent. )
—  —    

The intention to maintain power is inherent to owning a nuclear weapon, and that power deters
people from taking action. That form of hostage holding onto innocent civilians disrespects their status.
Robert Churchill8 explains
It is in connection with the principles of jus in bello that— — 

— — .
—
—    — 
—  
 —     —— 
—   —— * 
—   — ———  
 
   ——
 
——
—  ——"
 
— —— —— —  . The theologian Paul Ramsey draws the analogy of deterring reckless automobile drivers
by tying babies to the front bumpers of their cars. He points out that this would be no way to regulate traffic even if it succeeds in regulating it
perfectly, for "such a system makes innocent human lives the direct object of attack and uses them as a mere means for restraining the drivers
of automobiles.

Even if nuclear weapons are not used, the possession of them implies some purpose. This
trivializes the status of people as some tool to achieve a political goal. The idea of nuclear deterrence is
risky and could lead to extinction. Even if nuclear weapons prevent conventional war, the status of life is
already seen as dispensable, so it does not matter. Looking to deterrence as effective assumes that
something will never happen just because it hasn͛t yet. Nuclear war would kill billions of people. Sagan
writes


@

 




 



 



 

  !"#!$%
&

'% '  




%!(")#%%!#*"+
#,,- .
.
@
/

 -
 .
/0http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381037


(#12)132(2(4(3
8
Robert Churchill, ÑProfessor of Philosophy at George Washington University ͞Nuclear Arms as a Philosophical and Moral Issue͟ Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 4
: September 183. Pp 2
-5.

„
   „

     „    

  
  
!"!
#$

%%%    


& &% '
c


 
 c

  

The World Health Organization, in a recent detailed study chaired by Sune K. Bergstrom (the
11   
 
182 Nobel laureate in physiology and medicine), concludes that

  
—
—— mainly in the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, China and
Japan. $ —   —11   

 
 "
 — — —    
  —

—— —. It thus seems possible —— +   
———
—  ,—(

   —————

—— 
 
—— —  

— 
  and, with no other adverse effects, would probably be enough to reduce at least the
Northern Hemisphere to a state of prolonged agony and barbarism.

The magnitude of nuclear war is so huge that they ought not be possessed. The risk of nuclear
war is heightened by mere possession because of the risk of accidents. Busch writes10

This study has demonstrated that the further spread of nuclear weapons would probably increase the risks of inadvertent use. As we
have seen,the risks of inadvertent use are relatively high among current NþSs, and there
is little reason to think that emerging NþSs will avoid these risks. The pressures to
build survivable forces caused both the United States and Russia to develop systems
that allowed for launch-on-warning. In order to allow for LOW, they placed their nuclear
weapons on permanent alert in the early 1
0s, which would allow the weapons to be
launched within fifteen minutes from a detected attack. They also developed
sophisticated early-warning systems to detect incoming nuclear attacks. As pessimists
have argued, the policies of LOþ require rapid decision-making, which significantly
increases the risks of panic-launches due to miscalculation or false warnings.

States could mistakenly detect a nuclear attack and launch a weapon.Nuclear weapons ought
not be possessed because they treat people as dispensable to some political gain. This undermines their
status which is immoral. Thus, you affirm.


Busch, Professor of Government at Christopher Newport University, µ4 (Nathan, ³No
End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation´ p 28-3
)
c


 
 c