What Are Human Rights

TAU KAPPA PHI 1948 | EXCLUSIVE FRATERNAL ORDER OF THE FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CASE DOCTRINES
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF LAW
TRANSCRIBED BY
BUTOY S. LOFRANCO
2011 EDITION
CIVIL PROCEDURE | CASE DOCTRINES | ATTY. HENENDINO P. BRONDIAL | 2011

CIVIL PROCEDURE | CASE DOCTRINES BUTOY © 2011
“NEVER TAKE
SHORTCUTS .”
THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR
HARDWORK.
- B.S.L -
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
DOCTRINES UNDER JURISDICTION TO RULE 38:
COMPILED BY OMAR DISPO
DISCLAIMER: This compilation is primarily intended for those law students reviewing in
civil procedure. Components of this work is purely based on the author’s view a propos
the principles and set of guidelines laid down in settled jurisprudence. No part of this
compilation is proposed to replace the doctrines established by other students, law
professors or other entities. Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited.
FOR ACADEMIC PURPOSE ONLY [DO NOT REPRODUCE] SEE CASE CITATION FOR FULL REFERENCE |
TRANSCRIBED BY BUTOY S. LOFRANCO 2 | Page
COMPLETE LIST OF CASES

JURISDICTION
1 DUERO V. CA G.R. NO. 131282 | JANUARY 4, 2002
2 DONATO V. CA G.R. NO. 129638 | DECEMBER 8, 2003
3 SPS GONZAGA V. CA G.R. NO. 144025 | DECEMBER 27, 2002
4 ESCOBAL V. GARCHITORENA G.R. NO. 124644 | FEBRUARY 5, 2004
5 ASIA’S EMERGING DRAGON V. DOTC G.R. NO. 169914 | APRIL 7, 2009
6 AGAN JR. VS. PIATCO G.R. NO. 155001 | 5 MAY 2003
7 THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V. ATIENZA G.R. NO. 154599 | JANUARY 21, 2004
8 HANNAH SERANA V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 162059 | JANUARY 22, 2008
9 PLATINUM TOURS V. PANLILO G.R. NO. 133365 | SEPTEMBER 16, 2003
10 MANILA BANKERS V. NG KOK WEI G.R. NO. 139791 | DECEMBER 12, 2003
11 GSIS V. SANTIAGO G.R. NO. 155206 | OCTOBER 28, 2003
12 KATON V. PALANCA G.R. NO. 151149 | SEPTEMBER 7, 2004
13 PECSON V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 182865 | DECEMBER 24, 2008
RULE 1 TO 5
14 ALDAY V. FGU INSURANCE G.R. NO. 138822 | JANUARY 23, 2001
15 KOREA TECH V. LERMA G.R. NO. 143581 | JANUARY 07, 2008
16 MERCADO V. CA G.R. NO. 169576 | OCTOBER 17, 2008
17 ST LOUIS UNIV. V. COBBARUBIAS G.R. NO. 187104 | AUGUST 3, 2010
18 PROTON PILIPINAS V. BANQUE NATIONALE G.R. NO. 151242 | JUNE 15, 2005
19 RELUCIO V. LOPEZ G.R. NO. 138497 | JANUARY 16, 2002
20 G&S TRANSPORT V. CA G.R. NO. 120287 | MAY 28, 2002
21 CABUTIHAN V. LANDCENTER G.R. NO. 146594 | JUNE 10, 2002
22 DE CASTRO V. CA G.R. NO. 115838 | JULY 18, 2002
23 LOTTE PHIL. V. DELA CRUZ G.R. NO. 166302 | JULY 28, 2005
24 DELA CRUZ V. JOAQUIN G.R. NO. 162788 | JULY 28, 2005
25 ORQUIOLA V. CA G.R. NO. 141463 | AUGUST 6, 2002
26 PEOPLE V. CA G.R. NO. 132396 | SEPTEMBER 23, 2002
27 CHINA BANK V. OLIVER G.R. NO. 135796 | OCTOBER 3, 2002
28 PACIFIC V. SCHONFELD G.R. NO. 166920 | FEBRUARY 19, 2007
RULE 6 TO 9
29 BENGUET EXPLORATION V. CA G.R. NO. 117434 | FEBRUARY 9, 2001
30 MANILA BAY YACHT CLUB V. CA G.R. NO. 110015 | JULY 11, 1995
31 BIESTERBOS V. CA G.R. NO. 152529 | SEPTEMBER 22, 2003
32 OAMINAL V. CASTILLO G.R. NO. 152776 | OCTOBER 8, 2003
33 ASIAN CONSTRUCTION V. CA G.R. NO. 160242 | MAY 17, 2005
RULE 10 TO 14
34 VERGEL DE DIOS V. CA G.R. NO. 80491 | AUGUST 12, 1992
35 REMMINGTON INDUSTRIAL V. CA G.R. NO. 133657 | MAY 29, 2002
36 ANTONIO V. CA G.R. NO. 133657 | MAY 29, 2002
37 VALMONTE V. CA G.R. NO. 108538 | JANUARY 22, 1996
38 VILLAROSA V. BENITO G.R. NO. 136426 | AUGUST 6, 1999
39 MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL V. TAN G.R. NO. 131724 | FEBRUARY 28, 2000
40 RAMOS V. RAMOS G.R. NO. 144294 | MARCH 11, 2003
41 TEH V. CA G.R. NO. 147038 | APRIL 24, 2003
42 SANTOS V. PNOC EXPLORATION G.R. NO. 170943 | SEPTEMBER 23, 2008
43 MASON V. CA G.R. NO. 144662 | OCTOBER 13, 2003
44 SPS JOSE V. SPS BOYON G.R. NO. 147369 | OCTOBER 23, 2003
45 DOLE V. QUILALA G.R. NO. 168723 | JULY 9, 2008
46 MANOTOC V. CA G.R. NO. 130974 | AUGUST 16, 2002
47 PASCUAL V. PASCUAL G.R. NO. 171916 | DECEMBER 4, 2009
RULE 15 TO 19
48 HEIRS OF VINZONS V. CA G.R. NO. 111915 | SEPTEMBER 30, 1999
49 LEDESMA V. CA G.R. NO. 96914 | JULY 23, 1992
50 UY V. CONTRERAS G.R. NO. 111416 | SEPTEMBER 26, 1994
51 PEOPLE V. PEREZ G.R. NO. 142556 | FEBRUARY 5, 2003

52 SAGUID V. CA G.R. NO. 150611 | JUNE 10, 2003
53 YAO V. PERELLO G.R. NO. 153828 | OCTOBER 24, 2003
54 PINLAC V. CA G.R. NO. 91486 | JANUARY 19, 2001
55 MATICTIC V. ELBINIAS G.R. NO. L-48769 | FEBRUARY 27, 1987
RULE 21 TO 32
56 DASMARINAS INC. VS. REYES G.R. NO. 108229 AUGUST 24, 1993
57 INSULAR LIFE V. CA G.R. NO. 97654 | NOVEMBER 14, 1994
58 ALLIED V. CA G.R. NO. 118438 | DECEMBER 4, 1998
59 PEOPLE V. WEBB G.R. NO. 132577 | AUGUST 17, 1999
RULE 33 TO 38
60 MENDEZONA V. OZAMIS G.R. NO. 143370 | FEBRUARY 6, 2002
61 MESINA V. MEER G.R. NO. 146845 | JULY 2, 2002
62 BERNARDO V. CA G.R. NO. 119010 | SEPTEMBER 5, 1997
63 RADIOWEALTH V. VICENTE G.R. NO. 138739 | JULY 6, 2000
64 GARCIA V. CA G.R. NO. 117032 | JULY 27, 2000
65 PEOPLE V. LI KA KIM (AKA ED) G.R. NO. 148586 | MAY 25, 2004
66 MERCURY V. CA G.R. NO. 138571 | JULY 13, 2000
67 PHILPHOSPHATE V. CIR G.R. NO. 141973 | JUNE 28, 2005
68 FERNANDEZ V. CA G.R. NO. 131094 | MAY 16, 2005
69 HUNG HYUNG PARK V. EUNG WON CHOI G.R. NO. 165496 | FEBRUARY 12, 2007
RULE 39
70 BAÑEZ V. BAÑEZ G.R. NO. 133628 | JANUARY 23, 2002
71 FAJARDO V. QUITALIG A.M. NO. P-02-1535 | MARCH 28, 2003
72 SANTOS V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 155618 | MARCH 26, 2003
73 RCBC V. MAGWIN MARKETING G.R. NO. 152878 | MAY 5, 2003
74 CITY OF ILIGAN V. PMGI G.R. NO. 145260 | JULY 31, 2003
75 VILLARUEL V. FERNANDO G.R. NO. 136726 | SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
76 MORTA V. BAGAGÑAN A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1513 | NOVEMBER 12, 2003
77 SERRANO V. CA G.R. NO. 133883 | DECEMBER 10, 2003
78 D’ARMOURED SECURITY V. ORPIA G.R. NO. 151325 | JUNE 27, 2005
79 PEREZ V. CA G.R. NO. 157616 | JULY 22, 2005
80 PANOTES V. CTDC G.R. NO. 154739 | JANUARY 23, 2007
81 STRONGHOLD INSURANCE V. FELIX G.R. NO. 148090 | NOVEMBER 28, 2006
RULE 40 TO 56
82 DURISOL V. CA G.R. NO. 121106 | FEBRUARY 20, 2002
83 JMM PROMOTIONS V. CA G.R. NO. 139401 | OCTOBER 2, 2002
84 REXLON V. CA G.R. NO. 128412 | MARCH 15, 2002
85 TRES-REYES V. MAXIM’S TEA HOUSE G.R. NO. 140853 | FEBRUARY 27, 2003
86 LAND BANK V. DE LEON G.R. NO. 143275 | MARCH 20, 2003
87 ALFREDO V. BORRAS G.R. NO. 144225 | JUNE 17, 2003
88 PEOPLE V. CORPUZ G.R. NO. 148198 | OCTOBER 1, 2003
89 PAL V. CA G.R. NO. 127473 | DECEMBER 8, 2003
90 AUGUSTO V. RISOS G.R. NO. 131794 | DECEMBER 10, 2003
91 QBE INSURANCE V. RABELLO A.M. NO. P-04-1884 | DECEMBER 9, 2004
92 LPBS COMMERCIAL V. AMILA G.R. NO. 147443 | FEBRUARY 11, 2008
93 ESTINOZO V. CA G.R. NO. 150276 | FEBRUARY 12, 2008
94 MARMO V. ANACAY G.R. NO. 182585 | NOVEMBER 27, 2009
RULE 57 TO 61
95 MANGILA V. CA G.R. NO. 125027 | AUGUST 12, 2002
96 CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 139941 | JANUARY 19, 2001
97 DU V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE G.R. NO. 156580 | JUNE 14, 2004
98 DM WENCESLAO V. READYCON TRADING G.R. NO. 154106 | JUNE 29, 2004
99 IDOLOR V. CA G.R. NO. 141853 | FEBRUARY 7, 2001
100 GUSTILO V. REAL A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1250 | FEBRUARY 28, 2001
101 ALEMAR V. NLRC G.R. NO. 114761 | JANUARY 19, 2000
102 LAGROSAS V. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB G.R. NO. 168637 | SEPTEMBER 12, 2008
103 AGUILAR V. MANILA BANKING G.R. NO. 157911 | SEPTEMBER 19, 2006
104 LARROBIS V. PHIL. VETERANS BANK G.R. NO. 135706 | OCTOBER 1, 2004
105 OROSA V. CA G.R. NO. 111080 | APRIL 5, 2000
106 SMART V. ASTORGA G.R. NO. 148132 | JANUARY 28, 2008
107 SERVICE WIDE SPECIALIST V. CA G.R. NO. 110048 | NOVEMBER 19, 1999
108 HAO V. ANDRES A.M. NO. P-07-2384 | JUNE 18, 2008
109 DE ASIS V. CA G.R. NO. 127578 | FEBRUARY 15, 1999
110 PEOPLE V. MANAHAN G.R. NO. 128157 | SEPTEMBER 29, 1999
111 LOPEZ V. CA G.R. NO. 148510 | JULY 21, 2004
112 MONTEFALCON V. VASQUEZ G.R. NO. 165016 | JUNE 17, 2008
RULE 62 TO 65
113 ETERNAL GARDENS V. IAC G.R. NO. 73794 | SEPTEMBER 19, 1988
114 WACK WACK GOLF V. LEE WON G.R. NO. L-23851 | MARCH 26, 1976
115 MESINA V. IAC G.R. NO. 70145 | NOVEMBER 13, 1986
116 VELARDE V. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY G.R. NO. 159357 | APRIL 28, 2004
117 TAMBUNTING V. SUMABAT G.R. NO. 144101 | SEPTEMBER 16, 2005
118 ALMEDA V. BATHALA MARKETING G.R. NO. 150806 | JANUARY 28, 2008
119 MERALCO V. PHIL. CONSUMERS G.R. NO. 101783 | JANUARY 23, 2002
120 LAPID V. LAUREA G.R. NO. 139607 | OCTOBER 28, 2002
121 LACSON V. SECRETARY PEREZ G.R. NO. 147 780 | MAY 10, 2001
122 LICAROS V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 145851 | NOVEMBER 22, 2001
123 UP BOARD V. LIGOT-TELAN G.R. NO. 110280 | OCTOBER 12, 1993
124 TUASON V. RD OF CALOOCAN G.R. NO. 70484 | JANUARY 29, 1988
125 SECURITY BANK V. INDIANA G.R. NO. 146197 | JUNE 27, 2005
126 TORRES V. AGUINALDO G.R. NO. 164268 | JUNE 28, 2005
127 KORUGA V. ARCENAS G.R. NO. 168332 | JUNE 19, 2009
RULE 66 TO 71
128 MENDOZA V. ALLAS G.R. NO. 131977 | FEBRUARY 4, 1999
129 CALLEJA V. PANDAY G.R. NO. 168696 | FEBRUARY 28, 2006
130 AVELINO V. CUENCO G.R. NO. L-2821 | MARCH 4, 1949
131 GENERAL V. URRO/ARROYO G.R. NO. 191560 | MARCH 29, 2011
132 AGAN V. PIATCO G.R. NO. 155001 | MAY 5, 2003
133 REPUBLIC V. GINGOYON G.R. NO. 166429 | DECEMBER 19, 2005
134 ASIA’S EMERGING DRAGON V. DOTC G.R. NO. 169914 | APRIL 7, 2009
135 CITY OF MANILA V. SERRANO G.R. NO. 142304 | JUNE 20, 2001
136 NAPOCOR V. CA G.R. NO. 106804 | AUGUST 12, 2004
137 BARANGAY SAN ROQUE V. HEIRS OF PASTOR G.R. NO. 138896 | JUNE 20, 2000
138 UNION BANK V. CA G.R. NO. 133366 | AUGUST 5, 1999
139 ARDIENTE V. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, RD OF QC G.R. NO. 148448 | AUGUST 17, 2004
140 BPI FAMILY V. SPS VELOSO G.R. NO. 141974 | AUGUST 9, 2004
141 HEIRS OF TEVES V. CA G.R. NO. 109963 | OCTOBER 13, 1999
142 JAVELOSA V. CA G.R. NO. 124292 | DECEMBER 10, 1996
143 REFUGIA V. CA G.R. NO. 118284 | JULY 5, 1996
144 JASON V. YGAÑA A.M. NO. RTJ-00-1543 | AUGUST 4, 2000
145 DALUMPINES V. CA G.R. NO. 139500 | JULY 27, 2000
146 SILVERIO V. CA G.R. NO. 143395 | JULY 24, 2003
147 MELCHOR V. MELCHOR G.R. NO. 150633 | NOVEMBER 12, 2003
148 YASAY V. RECTO G.R. NO. 129521 | SEPTEMBER 7, 1999
149 HEIRS OF JBL REYES V. DEMETRIA ET. AL. A. M. NO. CA-01-32 | JANUARY 23, 2002
150 ESPAÑOL V. FORMOSO G.R. NO. 150949 | JUNE 21, 2007
151 SISON V. CAOIBES A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1771 | MAY 27, 2004
152 MONTENEGRO V. MONTENEGRO G.R. NO. 156829 | JUNE 8, 2004
JURISDICTION
DUERO V. CA
G.R. NO. 131282 | JANUARY 4, 2002
Question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time/stage of the action. The fundamental rule is
that the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by
their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the
jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a
matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances.
Rule On Estoppel. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of
its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the courts
jurisdiction, we note that estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial
and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement. Hence, estoppel
ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal
and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
DONATO V. CA
G.R. NO. 129638 | DECEMBER 8, 2003
Error of Judgment vis-à-vis Error of Jurisdiction. Error of judgment is one which the court may commit
in the exercised of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, Error
of Jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities. When technicality deserts its function of being an aid to justice,
the Court is justified in exempting from its operations a particular case. Technical rules of procedure should
be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable
objective, granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
Full determination of a case on the merits. Cases should be determined on the merits, after full
opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. Thus, what should guide
judicial action is that a party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or
defense rather than for him to lose life, honor or property on mere technicalities. (Republic v. CA; G.R. No.
130118 | July 9, 1998)
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; Requirement. The requirement regarding the need for certification
of non-forum shopping in cases filed before the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-compliance
thereto are found in the then prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-91. It provides that the petitioner himself
must make the certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for summary
dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of the
certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or
not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in the other courts or tribunal; even counsel of record
may be unaware of such fact. The Court has ruled with that with respect to the contents of the certification,
the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict
compliance with the rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscore its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded, but it does thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances.
SPS GONZAGA V. CA
G.R. NO. 144025 | DECEMBER 27, 2002
Effect of active participation; Bars question of lack of jurisdiction. It has been held that a party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction x x x Generally, an order or decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage. However, active
participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from
attacking its jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.
The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can
not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
ESCOBAL V. GARCHITORENA
G.R. NO. 124644 | FEBRUARY 5, 2004
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime must be in relation to one’s office. For the Sandiganbayan to
have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over the crimes committed by the public officer in relation to
their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and
the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. it is not enough to merely allege in the
Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that
would be conclusion of law.
Public Officers; Salary below grade 27. Even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to
his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below “27” the proper RTC or MTC, as
the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police
Senior Inspector, with salary grade “23.” He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal.
Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Section 20 and 32 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691. The petitioner’s contention that R.A.
No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a
substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.
ASIA’S EMERGING DRAGON V. DOTC

G.R. NO. 169914 | APRIL 7, 2009
SEE DOCTRINE UNDER RULE 67
AGAN JR. VS. PIATCO

G.R. NO. 155001 | 5 MAY 2003
Rule on Heirarchy of Courts. The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the trial courts and appellate courts generally applies to cases involving warring factual
allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to
determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties.
Cases which depends on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before the appellate
courts as they are not triers of facts. It goes without saying that when cases brought before the appellate
courts do not involve factual but legal questions, a strict applications of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary.
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V. ATIENZA

G.R. NO. 154599 | JANUARY 21, 2004
Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which the
application therefore will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy is determinative
of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (Inferior) courts should be filed with RTC, and those
against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue the writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
Forum Shopping; Exist if elements of Litis Pendentia are present. Forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) Identity of parties, or at
least such parties as are representing the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; (3) Identity with respect to the two (2)
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Requisites for filing of a Writ of Certiorari. Writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
HANNAH SERANA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 162059 | JANUARY 22, 2008
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is the one of those felonies within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that: (1) the offense is committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD. NO. 1606, as amended, and that; (2) The
offense is committed in relation to their office.
It is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An
investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public officer is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the power,
an individual is invested with some portion of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him
for the benefit of the public.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; Covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction
over the other officers enumerated in PD. No. 1606. In Geduspan vs. People, We held that while the first
part of section 4(A) covers only officials with SG 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of SG 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of
law placed under the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of PD. No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or
educational or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category . As the Sandiganbayan pointed out. The
Board of Regents (BOR) performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD. No.
1606.
PLATINUM TOURS V. PANLILO

G.R. NO. 133365 | SEPTEMBER 16, 2003
Jurisdiction” should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the
authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all questions arising from the case is but
an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is
merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the
court of the jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction defined. Jurisdiction is the power to hear, try, and decide a case. In general, jurisdiction may
either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over
the issues framed in the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred
by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
MANILA BANKERS V. NG KOK WEI

G.R. NO. 139791 | DECEMBER 12, 2003
Limitations of the Petition under Rule 45. The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the
impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
GSIS V. SANTIAGO
G.R. NO. 155206 | OCTOBER 28, 2003
Petition under Rule 45; Restrictions. The jurisdiction of SC in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a
trier of facts. Case law has it that the findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are
binding and conclusive upon this Court.
KATON V. PALANCA
G.R. NO. 151149 | SEPTEMBER 7, 2004
Residual Prerogative. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from
the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio
dismiss the claim or action.
In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly that the
action has prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been
invoked by the defendant.
In Gicano v. Gegato, trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred.
PECSON V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 182865 | DECEMBER 24, 2008
Residual Jurisdiction of the RTC in Election Cases. Decisions of the courts in election protest cases,
resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings,
should at least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is
especially true when attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of
the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
Disruption of public service cannot per se be a basis to deny execution pending appeal. “Disruption
of Public Service” necessarily results from any order allowing execution pending appeal and is a concern
that this Court was aware of when it expressly provided the remedy under the Rules. Such disruption is
therefore an element that has been weighed and factored in and cannot be per se a basis to deny execution
pending appeal.
RULE 1 TO 5
ALDAY V. FGU INSURANCE

G.R. NO. 138822 | JANUARY 23, 2001
Test to determine whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory. Quintanilla v. Court of

Appeals, is the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which requires “a logical relationship between the claim
and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would
entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.”
Non payment of docket fees does not result in automatic dismissal. In Suson, the Court explained that
although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does
not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent
and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper
docket fees for her permissive counterclaim.
KOREA TECH V. LERMA

G.R. NO. 143581 | JANUARY 07, 2008
Nonpayment of docket fees and non-attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping. The CA held
that the counterclaims of PGSMC were compulsory ones and payment of docket fees was not required
since the Answer with counterclaim was not an initiatory pleading. For the same reason, the CA said a
certificate of non-forum shopping was also not required. The rules on the payment of docket fees for
counterclaims and cross claims were amended effective August 16, 2004
Foreign arbitral awards; Subject to judicial review. While the RTC does not have jurisdiction over
disputes governed by arbitration mutually agreed upon by the parties, still the foreign arbitral award is
subject to judicial review by the RTC which can set aside, reject, or vacate it. In this sense, what this Court
held in Chung Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc. relied upon by KOGIES is applicable insofar as the foreign arbitral
awards, while final and binding, do not oust courts of jurisdiction since these arbitral awards are not
absolute and without exceptions as they are still judicially reviewable. Chapter 7 of RA 9285 has made it
clear that all arbitral awards, whether domestic or foreign, are subject to judicial review on specific grounds
provided for. Petitioner is correct in its contention that an arbitration clause, stipulating that the arbitral
award is final and binding, does not oust our courts of jurisdiction as the international arbitral award, the
award of which is not absolute and without exceptions, is still judicially reviewable under certain conditions
provided for by the UNCITRAL Model Law on ICA as applied and incorporated in RA 9285.
MERCADO V. CA
G.R. NO. 169576 | OCTOBER 17, 2008
Compulsory vis-à-vis Permissive counterclaim. A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may
have against any party) may be compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is
necessarily connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partys
claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is
merely permissive.
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY V. COBBARUBIAS

G.R. NO. 187104 | AUGUST 3, 2010
Appeal not perfected without compliance with the rules on payment of docket fees. In the present
case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA
decision on November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full only after seventy-two (72) days, when she
filed her motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and attached the postal money orders for
P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the full docket fees,
Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.
Exceptions to the Rule on Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees not applicable. Procedural rules
do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to and
enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions
on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays,
and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed.
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable
time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of
the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8)
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
without the appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in
the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of
sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort,
on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules.
In Cobarrubias' case, no such explanation has been advanced. Other than insisting that the ends of justice
and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits, Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her
failure to pay the docket fees in full when she filed her petition for review. To us, Cobarrubias’ omission is
fatal to her cause.
PROTON PILIPINAS V. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS

G.R. NO. 151242 | JUNE 15, 2005
Correct payment of prescribed docket fees. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, which vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
Additional filing fees; Constitute a lien on the judgment. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over
a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.
RELUCIO V. LOPEZ
G.R. NO. 138497 | JANUARY 16, 2002
A petitioner who is not a real party in interest, cannot be an indispensable party nor a necessary
party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action.
Elements of a cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in
violation of the legal right of the other. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
Sufficiency of a cause of action; Requirement of a motion to dismiss. A cause of action is sufficient if a

valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved. In order to sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not
exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
G&S TRANSPORT V. CA
G.R. NO. 120287 | MAY 28, 2002
Lack of cause of action; Determination of the winning bidders is a matter falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the sponsoring government agency. While petitioner G & S asserts that MIAA committed
grave abuse of discretion in pre-qualifying 2000 TRANSPORT, there certainly was no cause of action in
similarly seeking the nullification of the winning bid of NISSAN. From the beginning, G & S had no reason to
restrain NISSAN from the fruits of its efforts in winning the bid. Similarly, MIAA was merely relying upon the
Terms of Reference for Coupon Taxi Service Concession when it pre-qualified 2000 TRANSPORT and
proceeded with the bidding, hence, MIAA could not have abused its discretion in doing so. On the contrary,
it would have been grave abuse of discretion if MIAA were to suddenly abandon the Terms of Reference if
only to accommodate the objections of G & S.
CABUTIHAN V. LANDCENTER
G.R. NO. 146594 | JUNE 10, 2002
Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the courts own initiative at any
stage of the action. The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with the
said order would have been ground for dismissal of the action.
Payment of docket fees based on the assessed value of the real estate; Does not apply to an action
of specific performance. We hold that the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the
resolution of the case and to trifle with the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that
the assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing the filing
fees. But the Court has already clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for specific
performance, which is classified as an action not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Allowable period to pay the docket fees of an initiatory pleading. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
DE CASTRO V. CA
G.R. NO. 115838 | JULY 18, 2002
Rule on solidarity of co-owners does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit
filed by the creditor. Operators Incorporated vs. American Biscuit Co., Inc. Article 1216 of the Civil Code
says that the creditor `may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously.
LOTTE PHIL. V. DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 166302 | JULY 28, 2005
Rule on indispensable party; Joinder in an action. An indispensable party is a party in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is 'the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right
to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a
court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
Non-joinder of indispensable party; Not a ground for dismissal. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff's
failure to comply therefore. Domingo v. Scheer.
DELA CRUZ V. JOAQUIN

G.R. NO. 162788 | JULY 28, 2005
Res Judicata; Elements. The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order
must be final; (2) it must have been rendered on the merits of the controversy; (3) the court that rendered it
must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must have been -- between
the first and the second actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
Under res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters
determined in the previous suit. The term literally means a 'matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled
by judgment. The principle bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of
action. Public policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in time.
Substitution of heirs; Not a matter of jurisdiction. Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs
is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as
when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for
a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party must prove
that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
Rule on forum shopping; Appalling effect. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be
resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an
attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice, and
congests court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for the summary
dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt of court.
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in another. We note, however,
petitioners' claim that the subject matter of the present case has already been litigated and decided.
Therefore, the applicable doctrine is res judicata.
ORQUIOLA V. CA
G.R. NO. 141463 | AUGUST 6, 2002
Exception to the Rule that the SC is not a trier of facts. A buyer in good faith is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a
buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim
or interest of some other person in the property. The determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is
a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for review. An
exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
The sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably
rely on Mariano Lising’s Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party
claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land
subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.
Raising issues for the first time on appeal. As a general rule, raising issues for the first time on appeal
can not be done. Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on
appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial and even during proceedings before the
Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, we deem it proper that this issue be resolved now, (3 decades of litigation)
to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that
petitioners are indeed builders in good faith.
Necessary parties; Necessity of notice. A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the
land he is building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. As earlier discussed, petitioner
spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly
afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City
tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had notice of private respondent’s
adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to
petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties.
PEOPLE V. CA
G.R. NO. 132396 | SEPTEMBER 23, 2002
Double Jeopardy; Rule on acquittal. The acquittal of accused may no longer be reviewed, for to do so
would place her in double jeopardy in violation of the basic tenets of our fundamental law and current
jurisprudence. This, however, is without prejudice to any appropriate civil action that might be taken against
her by the aggrieved party.
Special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; Liberal construction of rules. Generally, it is the Office
of the Solicitor General who can bring actions on behalf of the state in criminal proceedings, before the
Supreme Court and/or the Court of Appeals. In People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143 (1989), however, we
said the action must be filed in the name of the private complainant and not of the People of the Philippines.
For the purpose of expeditious but inexpensive disposition of the case, and granting that Wilson has
sufficient interest as a person aggrieved to file the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, we shall
consider the allegations in her petition, pursuant to the underlying spirit of liberal construction of the rules.
CHINA BANK V. OLIVER

G.R. NO. 135796 | OCTOBER 3, 2002
Party in interest; Indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. It is true that mortgagor Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will
be affected by the outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid,
or injured in case her title is declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver Ones absence from the case does
not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner.
Indispensable party; Distinct and divisible interest. In Noceda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 313 SCRA
504 (1999), we held that a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by
a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. In this case, Chinabank has interest in the
loan which, however, is distinct and divisible from the mortgagors interest, which involves the land used as
collateral for the loan.
Non-joinder of indispensable party; Not a ground for dismissal. Non-joinder of parties is not a ground
for dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court, either on its own initiative or on
motion of the parties. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it found no abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court for denying Chinabanks motion to dismiss and, instead, suggested that
petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor Oliver One. A person who is not a party to an action
may be impleaded by the defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground of direct
liability to the plaintiff.
PACIFIC V. SCHONFELD
G.R. NO. 166920 | FEBRUARY 19, 2007
Absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the Rules on Venue of actions, in a contract, does not
make the venue exclusive. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the
vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are considered valid and
enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be
considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They
are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be
accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between
them be litigated only at the place named by them.
In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save
—," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or words of equal import were stated in the contract.
Discretion of courts; Assumption of jurisdiction. Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case
if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have
power to enforce its decision. Bank of America V. CA
RULE 6 TO 9
BENGUET EXPLORATION V. CA
G.R. NO. 117434 | FEBRUARY 9, 2001
Actionable Documents; Authenticity and Due Execution. The admission of the due execution and
genuineness of a document simply means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or
that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and
figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and
that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it
lacks, are waived by him. In another case, we held that When the law makes use of the phrase
genuineness and due execution of the instrument it means nothing more than that the instrument is not
spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed.
If the authenticity and due execution of a document is duly proved, it extends only to extrinsic validity
(formal/legal requirement) of the document and not the truth of the contents of the document, which is the
intrinsic validity (substance). The records of the case clearly shows that the document were contested.
Hearsay evidence has no probative value. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another
person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule.
MANILA BAY YACHT CLUB V. CA

G.R. NO. 110015 | JULY 11, 1995
SC is not a trier of facts. Well-settled is the general rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law; findings of fact of the
latter are conclusive.
BIESTERBOS V. CA
G.R. NO. 152529 | SEPTEMBER 22, 2003
Civil Law; Rule on interests. The matter of the suspension of the running of interest on the loan is
governed by principles which regard reality rather than technicality, substance rather than form. Good faith
of the offeror or ability to make good the offer should in simple justice excuse the debtor from paying
interest after the offer was rejected. A debtor cannot be considered delinquent who offered checks backed
by sufficient deposit or ready to pay cash if the creditor chose that means of payment. Technical defects of
the offer cannot be adduced to destroy its effects when the objection to accept the payment was based on
entirely different grounds. Thus, although the defective consignation made by the debtor did not discharge
the mortgage debt, the running of interest on the loan is suspended by the offer and tender of payment.
OAMINAL V. CASTILLO
G.R. NO. 152776 | OCTOBER 8, 2003
Service of defective summons was cured by voluntary appearance. The filing of Motions seeking
affirmative relief -- to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration -- are considered voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court.
Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be overlooked when they do not involve
public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident, when they have not
prejudiced the adverse party and have not deprived the court ot its authority. Conceived in the best
traditions of practical and moral justice and common sense, the Rules of Court frown upon hairsplitting
technicalities that do not square with their liberal tendency and with the ends of justice unless something in
the nature of the factors just stated intervene.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION V. CA
G.R. NO. 160242 | MAY 17, 2005
Third party claim; Prerequisite. A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis
for a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or
other substantive right. The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff
or to the defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the
third-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction.
Impleading a third party defendant; Grounds. The defendant may implead another as third-party
defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff;
or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant.[19] There must be a
causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity
or other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.
RULE 10 TO 14
VERGEL DE DIOS V. CA
G.R. NO. 80491 | AUGUST 12, 1992
Service of summons on amended complaint. The rule is that it is only when new causes of action are
alleged in an amended complaint filed before the defendant has appeared in court that another summons
must be served on the defendant with the amended complaint.
Direct service on a party not represented by counsel. The trial court was correct in holding that when
the private respondent sent by registered mail a copy of the amended complaint directly to the petitioner, he
was acting in accordance with Sec. 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, allowing direct service on a party if
not represented by counsel. At the time the amended complaint was filed, the defendant was not yet
represented by counsel, which entered its appearance only after the private respondent had filed his
amended complaint.
REMMINGTON INDUSTRIAL V. CA
G.R. NO. 133657 | MAY 29, 2002
Amendment of complaint as a matter of right is allowed when some but not all defendant have filed
their responsive pleading. The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the
complaint does not bar petitioner’s right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where
some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter
of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims
asserted against the other defendants.
ANTONIO V. CA
G.R. NO. 133657 | MAY 29, 2002
Dismissal of appeal; Negligence to confirm the status of the case. Neither has it been shown that
during the period his appeal was pending, the petitioner made inquiries with the respondent court about any
development in his case. In fact, it was only after all of 170 days from the time the dismissal of his appeal
became final and executory that it occurred to him to make his appearance at last. This was on August 21,
1972. Suspiciously, he re-emerged only ten days after the issuance by the trial court of the order for the
execution of the judgment against him.
Service to the lawyer; Operates valid service to client. As we held in Santos v. Tuazon, it is necessary
under this rule to present conclusive proof that the registry notice was received by or at least served on the
addressee before the 5-day period can begin to run. However, this requirement presupposes that the notice
is sent to the correct address as indicated in the records of the court. It does not apply where, as in the case
at bar, the notice was sent to the lawyer's given address but did not reach him because he had moved
therefrom without informing the court of his new location. The service at the old address should be
considered valid. Otherwise, no process can be served on the client through his lawyer if the latter has
simply disappeared without leaving a forwarding address. There is no need to stress that service on the
lawyer, if valid, is also valid service on the client he represents. The rule in fact is that it is on the lawyer and
not the client that the service should first be made.
VALMONTE V. CA
G.R. NO. 108538 | JANUARY 22, 1996
Service of summons; Action in rem and in personam. In an action in personam, personal service of
summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in
Rule 14, 7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who
does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with
summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons
may, by leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in
personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned either by means of
substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same
Rule. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the
defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in
accordance with Rule 14, 17.
E.B. VILLAROSA V. BENITO

G.R. NO. 136426 | AUGUST 6, 1999
Service of summons; Agent of corporations. “Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon
an AGENT of the corporation is NO LONGER authorized.” “The designation of persons or officers who are
authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly
specified in Section11, Rule 14. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager";
"corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase “agent, or any
of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.” “A strict compliance with the mode of service is
necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must
be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. . .” The liberal construction rule
cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which
summons should be served on a domestic corporation.
MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL V. TAN

G.R. NO. 131724 | FEBRUARY 28, 2000
Service of summons; Service to corporations. Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case
is notified of the existence of an action against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. If the defendant is a corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service of summons be
made upon the corporation's president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The
rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation
sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do
with any legal papers received by him.
Doctrine of substantial compliance; Requisites. In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court
enumerated the requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must
be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the
summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's
return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom
the summons was actually served. The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that
the purpose of the rule on the service of summons is attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to the third,
the appellate court held that petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof that it
received the copy of the summons and the complaint. There is, however, no direct proof of this or that
Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In contrast, in
our cases applying the substantial compliance rule, there was direct evidence, such as the admission of the
corporation's officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation through the person upon whom it was
actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the
corporation through the person on whom summons was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For
there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served
must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint
against it through some person or means other than the person actually served, the service of summons
becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd
Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the corporation.
Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman
employed by the corporation.
Receipt by petitioner of the summons and complaint cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed a
Motion to Dismiss the case. Respondent casts doubt on petitioner's claim that it came to know about the
summons and the complaint against it only after it learned that there was a pending foreclosure of its
mortgage. There is nothing improbable about this claim. Petitioner was in default in the payment of its loan.
It had received demand letters from respondent. Thus, it had reason to believe that a foreclosure suit would
be filed against it. The appellate court was, therefore, in error in giving weight to respondent's claims.
RAMOS V. RAMOS
G.R. NO. 144294 | MARCH 11, 2003
Service of summons; Nature of the action. The rules on the service of summons differ depending on the
nature of the action. An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an
action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or
obligation.
Well-settled is the rule that a final judgment is immutable and unalterable. It is well settled that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.
The only exceptions to this rule are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.
TEH V. CA
G.R. NO. 147038 | APRIL 24, 2003
Order of the lower court, denying a motion to dismiss, is an interlocutory order. When the appellate
court studied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and found that the contention therein was correct, it
proceeded to look into the merits of the petition. However, it found that the same should be dismissed for
lack of merit because it found that the trial court’s order assailed by the petitioner therein was an order
denying a motion to dismiss. Based on the factual circumstances of the case, the appellate court ruled that
the order sought to be reversed was an interlocutory order which is beyond the scope of a petition for
certiorari, and that the trial court did not commit abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss
(on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner) and ordered the issuance of an alias
summons to the latter.
SANTOS V. PNOC EXPLORATION

G.R. NO. 170943 | SEPTEMBER 23, 2008
Rule on substituted service through publication applies to both actions. The present rule expressly
states that it applies "in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies
to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
MASON V. CA
G.R. NO. 144662 | OCTOBER 13, 2003
No valid service of summons through persons not included in Sec. 11, Rule 14 (1997 RCP) We held
that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not
included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the
Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present
evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The
service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. We will deprive private
respondent of its right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if we disregard compliance with
the rules on service of summons.
SPS JOSE V. SPS BOYON

G.R. NO. 147369 | OCTOBER 23, 2003
Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made
promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must: (a)
indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to
locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the
defendant.
It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service
or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements
of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.
Failure to exert efforts to locate defendant, and lack of proper explanation. The Return of Summons
shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or
petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states
the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person
who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of
the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice
for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
In Madrigal V. CA, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of
substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service
failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing
that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified.
Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
DOLE V. QUILALA
G.R. NO. 168723 | JULY 9, 2008
Filing an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time constitutes voluntary submission. Under Section
20 of the same Rule, a defendants voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of
summons. As held previously by this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Summons on Domestic Corporations; Exclusive. Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a
domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est
exclusio alterius. Service must therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
MANOTOC V. CA
G.R. NO. 130974 | AUGUST 16, 2002
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the
court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.”
While substituted service of summons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the
usual method of service.” Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, “compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.”
Requirements for valid substituted service: (1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service; (2) Specific
Details in the Return; (3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion and; (4) A Competent Person in Charge.
Substituted service of summons; Served at residence. If the substituted service will be effected at
defendant's house or residence, it should be left with a person of 'suitable age and discretion then residing
therein. A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18
years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
Discretion is defined as 'the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed. Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such
person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and
fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for
the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the 'relation of confidence to the
defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The
sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of
legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least
notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in
the Return of Summons.
Service of summons; Duty of sheriff. In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, it was held that “x x
x the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this
case where it is patent that the sheriff’s return is defective (emphasis supplied).” While the Sheriff’s Return
in the Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve the summons, the
Return of Sheriff Cañelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts in general terms
lacking in details as required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if
Cañelas’ Return did not mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted service is
void.
In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., it may be true that the Court held that a Sheriff’s Return, which states
that “despite efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon the defendant on several occasions the
same proved futile,” conforms to the requirements of valid substituted service. However, in view of the
numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number of
unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation
and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the efforts made to find
the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and
circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of attempts made
at personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of
occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the Return to
satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were made to personally serve
summons on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal
service.
What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate
impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, “reasonable time” means no more than seven (7) days
since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, “reasonable time”
means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require
the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return
provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to
the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month
from the issuance of summons can be considered “reasonable time” with regard to personal service on the
defendant.
PASCUAL V. PASCUAL
G.R. NO. 171916 | DECEMBER 4, 2009
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the
court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.”
Personal service preferred over substituted service. Personal service of summons should and always
be the first option, and it is only when the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the
process server resort to substituted service.
RULE 15 TO 19
HEIRS OF VINZONS V. CA
G.R. NO. 111915 | SEPTEMBER 30, 1999
Non-compliance with condition precedent; Dismissal. In Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this
Court ruled that non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by PD 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity. Defendants, private respondents herein, objected to the failure of the
parties to undergo a confrontation at the barangay level in their answer and even during the entire
proceedings a quo to no avail as the trial courts merely brushed aside this issue. Hence, the Court of
Appeals had to rectify this error by the trial courts.
Referral to the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat should be made prior to the filing of the ejectment
case under PD 1508. Legal action for ejectment is barred when there is non-recourse to barangay
court. The Complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 2137, should have been coursed
first to the barangay court. Petitioners cannot rely on the barangay conciliation proceedings held in the other
cases and consider the same as compliance with the law.
LEDESMA V. CA
G.R. NO. 96914 | JULY 23, 1992
Complaint before the MTC; Failure to settle in the barangay. When private respondent stated that he
was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since he
was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory personal confrontation,
no complaint could be filed with the MTC.
UY V. CONTRERAS
G.R. NO. 111416 | SEPTEMBER 26, 1994
Conciliation process; Condition precedent for filing a complaint. P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation
process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance
with that condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition is
analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits
between family members, lacking which the case can be dismissed. While P.D. No. 1508 has been
repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to
the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on
prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.
PEOPLE V. PEREZ
G.R. NO. 142556 | FEBRUARY 5, 2003
Criminal procedure; Purpose of pretrial. The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea
bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of
objections to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes lawful defenses; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
Identification of accused; Police line up. The Court has held that there is no law requiring a police line-up
as essential to a proper identification. Even without a police line-up, there could still be a proper
identification as long as the police did not suggest such identification to the witnesses.
SAGUID V. CA
G.R. NO. 150611 | JUNE 10, 2003
Failure to file a pre-trial brief; Failure to appear. As a rule, Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render
judgment on the basis thereof.
The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration showing that his failure to file a pre-trial
brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The motion need not really stress the fact
that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is
already on record.
Assistance of lawyers in civil cases; Not indispensable. In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was
not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in
the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented by counsel and
that the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers,
while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such
that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.
YAO V. PERELLO
G.R. NO. 153828 | OCTOBER 24, 2003
Execution; Extends only to properties of judgment debtor. It is a basic precept that the power of the
court in the execution of judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment
debtor. The levy by the sheriff on property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made
under the authority of the court only vis-a-vis property belonging to the defendant. For indeed, “One man's
goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.”
Intervention; Requirements. To allow intervention it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not.
PINLAC V. CA
G.R. NO. 91486 | JANUARY 19, 2001
Lack of jurisdiction; ground for annulment. An action for annulment of judgment is grounded only on two
justifications: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. All that herein private
respondents had to prove was that the trial court had no jurisdiction; that they were prevented from having a
trial or presenting their case to the trial court by some act or conduct of petitioners; or that they had been
denied due process of law. Thus, the Court of Appeals need only to resolve the issues of lack of
jurisdiction, existence of extrinsic fraud, and denial of due process of law.
Failure to comply with the rules on publication; newspaper of general circulation. While the service of
summons by publication may have been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal
defect that the “Metropolitan Newsweek” is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The
Rules strictly require that publication must be “in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and
for such time as the court may order.” The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place
and the length of time that the summons was to be published. In the absence of such specification,
publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the rules.
MATICTIC V. ELBINIAS
G.R. NO. L-48769 | FEBRUARY 27, 1987
Dismissal of principal action has the effect of dismiss the motion for intervention. It will be illogical
and of no useful purpose to grant or even consider further herein petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus to compel the lower court to allow and admit the petitioner's complaint in intervention.
The dismissal of the expropriation case has no less the inherent effect of also dismissing the motion for
intervention which is but the unavoidable consequence.
RULE 21 TO 32
DASMARINAS INC. VS. REYES

G.R. NO. 108229 AUGUST 24, 1993
Depositions taken from witnesses outside the Philippines. The deposition-taking in the case at bar is a
"departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where
their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered
illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where
the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of
the deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the
Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
Rules of Court and the existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility — e.g., "that the witness if out
of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is
OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis supplied) — is first satisfactorily established.
Deposition; Purpose. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to
compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some
suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties;
requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and
mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not
only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own
witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the
material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or
motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and
completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all
the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open
court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at
the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual
oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is
hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time
that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during
the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at
the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.
Commission and Letters Rogatory; Definition. A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued
by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other
act by authority of such court or tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing Cyclopedic Law
Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent in the
name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined,
upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of
the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed."
INSULAR LIFE V. CA
G.R. NO. 97654 | NOVEMBER 14, 1994
Interrogatories to Parties; Failure to Appear or Serve Answer. Sec. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve
answers. — If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer
who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to
interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion
and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay
reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney's fees.
The matter of how, and when, the above sanctions should be applied is one that primarily rests on the
sound discretion of the court where the case pends, having always in mind the paramount and overriding
interest of justice.
ALLIED V. CA
G.R. NO. 118438 | DECEMBER 4, 1998
Requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents; Purpose. The purpose of the rule
governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve
parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted unless within a period designated in the request which shall not be less than fifteen (15)
days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom
the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.[12] Upon service of request for admission, the party
served may do any of the following acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters of which an admission is
requested, in which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may admit the truth of the matters of which
admission is requested by serving upon the party requesting a written admission of such matters within the
period stated in the request, which must not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within such further
time as the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement denying specifically the
matter of which an admission is requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny the matters of which an admission is requested.
The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission
rather than upon the party seeking the admission. Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a request to
admit, it may not argue that the adverse party has the burden of proving the facts sought to be admitted.
Petitioner’s silence is an admission of the facts stated in the request.
Summary judgment; When granted. It is a settled rule that summary judgment may be granted if the facts
which stand admitted by reason of a party's failure to deny statements contained in a request for admission
show that no material issue of fact exists. By its failure to answer the other party's request for admission,
petitioner has admitted all the material facts necessary for judgment against itself.
PEOPLE V. WEBB
G.R. NO. 132577 | AUGUST 17, 1999
Purposes of taking depositions. 1.] Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in
checking and preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent
claims and defenses; 3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which
otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in advance of trial as to
the real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5.]Expedite litigation; 6.]
Safeguard against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite and
facilitate both preparation and trial.
Written interrogatories; Time limit. The time within which to file and serve written interrogatories is
explicitly fixed by the rules, that is, in civil cases before responsive answer is filed with leave of court or
without leave of court after the filing of responsive answer; and in criminal cases before the setting of the
arraignment and pre-trial conference. The admissions made in the verified answer to the written
interrogatories may already be considered during the pre-trial conference and would definitely aid the
parties for purposes of a plea-bargaining.
Rules on evidence; Power of the court to stop further evidence. RULE 133, SEC. 6. Power of the
court to stop further evidence. - The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular
point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be
reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution.”
(emphasis and italics supplied.)
Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondent’s motion
considering that under the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to
adduce evidence in his defense. Certainly, a party can not feign denial of due process where he had the
opportunity to present his side. It must be borne in mind in this regard that due process is not a monopoly of
the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due process as much as the accused. Furthermore, while a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The deposition taking
can not be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable
manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. There is no indication in this case that in denying the
motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner.
Grave abuse of discretion “x x x implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of
law.”
RULE 33 TO 38
MENDEZONA V. OZAMIS
G.R. NO. 143370 | FEBRUARY 6, 2002
Exception to the Rule that the SC is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of the appellate court are
generally conclusive on this Court which is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to
analyze or weigh evidence all over again. However, this rule is not without exception. If there is a showing
that the appellate courts findings of facts complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, this Court must discard such
erroneous findings of facts.
Advanced years or physical infirmities does not presume incapacity to enter into contract. It has
been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of
physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities impair her mental faculties to such extent as to
prevent her from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights, is she considered
incapacitated. The respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April 28,
1989 Carmen Ozamiz had allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.
Requisites for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. A motion for new trial upon the
ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been
discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is
material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted,
would probably alter the result.
Lack of diligence in procuring newly discovered evidence. It has been held that a lack of diligence is
exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its
existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was
made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the facts in question,
especially where information was not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available
through public records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining
party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available
discovery procedures. Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly discovered
evidence to warrant a new trial.
MESINA V. MEER
G.R. NO. 146845 | JULY 2, 2002
Negligence or mistaken mode of procedure; Not a ground for relief. It is a settled rule that relief will not
be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy
at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will
be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure by counsel. Petitioners, however, place the blame on
their counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They contend that they lack legal education, hence, were
not aware of the required period for filing an appeal.
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this
Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the
instant case, especially since petitioners have squandered the various opportunities available to them at the
different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to
reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration
of justice.
Relief from judgment; An equitable remedy. Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed
only under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is
present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or
appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.
Relief from Judgement; When and where to file. Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or
other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court
which rendered the decision.
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule,
petition for relief from the judgment or final order of municipal trial courts should be filed with the regional
trial court. Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present Rule extends the remedy of relief to
include judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals since the Rule uses the phrase any court. We disagree.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and
regional trial courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of record. While Rule 38
uses the phrase any court, it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts.
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the
Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.
BERNARDO V. CA
G.R. NO. 119010 | SEPTEMBER 5, 1997
Demurer to Evidence; When filed with or without “leave of court”; Effect. In fine, under the new rule on
demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has
rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can still present
evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for
leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his
demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20 May 1994 the trial court denied her motion for
leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In such case, the only right petitioner has under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of
the Rules of Court after having been denied leave to submit a demurrer is to adduce evidence in her
defense. However, even without express leave of the trial court, nay, after her motion for leave was denied,
petitioner insisted on filing a demurrer instead of presenting evidence in her defense.
Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. But to
allow the accused to present evidence after he was denied prior leave to file demurrer is not discretionary.
Once prior leave is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the
court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present evidence. The only recourse left for the court
is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. And, unless there is grave
abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the instant case, the trial
courts denial of prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. However,
any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the accused to the appellate court.
RADIOWEALTH V. VICENTE
G.R. NO. 138739 | JULY 6, 2000
Demurrer to evidence; Reversed on appeal. When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is
reversed on appeal, the reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings. Rather, it should
render judgment on the basis of the evidence proffered by the plaintiff. Inasmuch as defendants in the
present case admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note both in their Answer and during the
pretrial, the appellate court should have rendered judgment on the bases of that Note and on the other
pieces of evidence adduced during the trial.
Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present their own evidence,
if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court
disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their
own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits,
inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.
In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on
the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate court
reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence
had in fact been admitted by defendants.
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the
basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly ruled that the
documentary evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated, and that
the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary exhibits enumerated in the appealed order, we
agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide the collection suit. A remand is
not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of the facts on record.
GARCIA V. CA
G.R. NO. 117032 | JULY 27, 2000
Summary judgment; Definition and Nature. A summary judgment is one granted upon motion by a party
for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact posed (except as to the amount of
damages) and therefore, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The aforecited rule does not vest in the trial court jurisdiction to summarily try the issues on depositions and
affidavits but gives it limited authority to render summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of
material fact at bar. Upon a motion for summary judgment, the sole function of the court is to determine
whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried, and any doubt as to the existence of an issue of fact
must be resolved against the movant. Courts are quite critical of the papers presented by the moving party
but not of the papers in opposition thereto. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
should take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such
party the benefit of all favorable inferences. That one may surmise from plaintiff's showing that defendant is
unlikely to prevail upon a trial is not a sufficient basis to assume that the allegations of defendant are sham,
frivolous or unsubstantial. If the defense relied upon by the defendant is legally sufficient and does not
appear patently sham, the motion for summary judgment should be denied.
PEOPLE V. LI KA KIM (AKA ED)

G.R. NO. 148586 | MAY 25, 2004
The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence is
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative,
or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment.
Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellant’s passport could have easily been presented
and produced during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellant’s passport, would hardly be material
to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the
perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly, appellant even identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not
as Huang Xiao Wei, that bolsters the conclusion that appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the
nefarious enterprise.
MERCURY V. CA
G.R. NO. 138571 | JULY 13, 2000
Non-revival of the right to appeal which had been lost though inexcusable negligence. Respondents’
failure to file an appeal from the decision rendering it final and executory is not a denial of due process.
They may have lost their right to appeal but they were not denied their day in court. The right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. In the same manner, the YEES’ failure to file
their petition for relief within the period provided for under the Rules is not tantamount to a denial of due
process. More important, no evidence was presented to support respondents’ bare and self-serving
allegation that their lawyer did not inform them of the decision against them. It bears stress that we are not
concerning ourselves with the lawyer’s duty to his client but with the timeliness of the filing of the petition for
relief which cannot be given due course on the simple and expedient claim of a party that their lawyer failed
to inform them of the decision in the case. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from
the effects of the judgment when the loss of remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost though inexcusable
negligence.
PHILPHOSPHATE V. CIR
G.R. NO. 141973 | JUNE 28, 2005
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it
apply the same standards against itself in refunding excessive payments.
When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke technicalities to
keep money not belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of
another.
Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing
motion for new trial or reconsideration - Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may
move for the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the
following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:
1. Fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his
rights; or
2. Newly discovered evidence, which could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
It is true that petitioner could not move for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence because in
order to have a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, it must be proved that:
1. the evidence was discovered after the trial;

2. such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence;
3. it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
4. it is of such weight that if admitted, will probably change the judgment.
This does not mean however, that petitioner is altogether barred from having a new trial. As pointed out by
Judge Acosta, the reasons put forth by petitioner should fall under mistake or excusable negligence.
The mistake that is allowed in Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
Negligence to be excusable must also be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have probably been impaired. the
test of excusable negligence is whether a party has acted with ordinary prudence while transacting
important business.
In this case, it cannot be said that petitioner did not act with ordinary prudence in claiming its refund with the
CTA, in light of its previous cases with CTA which did not require invoices and the non-mandatory nature of
the CTA circular.
It is borne by the records however that in its first motion for reconsideration duly filed on time, petitioner had
already prayed that it be allowed to present and offer evidence deemed lacking by CTA in its Decision of 11
August 1998. Thus, while it named its pleading as a Motion for New Trial only in its motion dated 25
January 1999, petitioner should not be deemed to have moved for new trial only at such time.
FERNANDEZ V. CA
G.R. NO. 131094 | MAY 16, 2005
Jurisdiction over the subject matter and person; Requirement in disposing a case. In general, in
order for a Court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the parties. Jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the jurisdiction to hear and
decide a case, is conferred by law. Jurisdiction over the person, on the other hand, is acquired by service of
summons or by voluntary appearance.
At first glance and mindful of the rule that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as the motion
for extension of time to file petition for review filed by Fernandez in this case, is considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court it may seem at once apparent that the Court of Appeals had in
fact acquired jurisdiction over his person. It has been repeatedly held that an appearance in whatever form,
without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such
appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.
HUNG HYUNG PARK V. EUNG WON CHOI

G.R. NO. 165496 | FEBRUARY 12, 2007
Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to evidence. When a DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE is filed without leave
of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the
accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to
decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil
action has been waived or reserved.
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil
liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused
by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any.
For in acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil action where -
1. the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

2. the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
3. the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted.
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
In case of A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the 2
aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in
such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and
at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not
insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient
to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does
not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court
grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized
instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a
finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such
determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
RULE 39
BAÑEZ V. BAÑEZ
G.R. NO. 133628 | JANUARY 23, 2002
Remedial Law; Condition of an Execution Pending Appeal. In Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA
381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency
outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an
instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression and inequity.
Remedial Law; An action for legal separation is not subject to multiple appeals. In Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 186, 194 (1996), this Court held: “Multiple appeals are
allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of
property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The
rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.”
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple
appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee
relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule
against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate
to the same marital relationship between the parties.
FAJARDO V. QUITALIG
A.M. NO. P-02-1535 | MARCH 28, 2003
Duty of sheriffs; As frontline officials of the justice system. Sheriffs must always strive to maintain
public trust in the performance of their duties. Sheriffs must see to it that the final stage in the litigation
process is completed without unnecessary delay.
Failure to make a return of a writ within the required period is nonfeasance. In Bautista v. De Castro,
the provincial sheriff of Zambales and his deputy were suspended without pay for 30 and 15 days,
respectively, for dereliction of duty. In Barola v. Abogatal, a sheriff who had received a writ of execution on
January 15, 1978, but made a return thereof only on May 22, 1978, was fined a month’s salary. In Lapeña
v. Pamarang, a sheriff whose Return was four days late was fined P2,000.
In Lumbre v. Dela Cruz, respondent, after being found guilty of an inexcusable seven-month delay in
carrying out a lawful Writ of Execution was fined P5,000. Justifying the penalty, the Court said:
“When a writ of execution is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of contrary
instructions, to have it implemented forthwith. The sheriff is primarily responsible for the speedy and
efficient service of all court processes and writs originating from the court and its branches, including such
as may be properly delegated to him by other courts. The delay of more than seven months, from the time
the writ of execution was issued by the court on 07 August 1998 to the time when respondent sheriff posted
the notice of sale or levy on 23 March 1999, is an inordinately long period for respondent to act thereon.
The importance of the role played by all court personnel in the administration of justice is never to be taken
lightly. It is the sheriffs particularly who are depended on, and who must properly attend to, the proper
implementation of court decrees and orders, and they are expected to do so with utmost diligence and
dispatch.”
SANTOS V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 155618 | MARCH 26, 2003
Remedial Law; Elements of Forum Shopping. Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Forum-shopping is considered a pernicious evil; it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice
since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and
trifles with and mocks judicial processes. The most important factor in determining the existence of forum
shopping is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule
on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs.
Remedial Law; A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it
should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good
reasons" and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.)
public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the
contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been pending (italics supplied).
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in the words of Tobon Uy
v. COMELEC, “bring back the ghost of the "grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest" techniques so often
resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This
would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate.”
Election Procedure; Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the
elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the court’s
decision that should prevail. In the case of Ramas V. COMELEC, All that was required for a valid
exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution should be
based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." The rationale why such execution is allowed in
election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, "to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge’s
decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers."
RCBC V. MAGWIN MARKETING

G.R. NO. 152878 | MAY 5, 2003
Remedial Law; Submission of a compromise agreement is never mandatory, nor is it required by

any rule. While a compromise is encouraged, very strongly in fact, failure to consummate one does not
warrant any procedural sanction, much less an authority to jettison a civil complaint worth P4,000,000.00.
As also explained therein, the proper course of action that should have been taken by the court a quo, upon
manifestation of the parties of their willingness to discuss a settlement, was to suspend the proceedings
and allow them reasonable time to come to terms (a) If willingness to discuss a possible compromise is
expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of
the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer,
pursuant to Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If despite efforts exerted by the trial court and the parties the
negotiations still fail, only then should the action continue as if no suspension had taken place.
Remedial Law; Dismissal on the ground of failure to prosecute must be supported with blatant delay
or carelessness. A court may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur but the real test of the
judicious exercise of such power is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is chargeable with want of
fitting assiduousness in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a party’s conduct
is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e.,
equivalent to default or non-appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which
would still amount to achieving the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the
disposition of the case or of a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part
of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to
dismiss.
CITY OF ILIGAN V. PMGI

G.R. NO. 145260 | JULY 31, 2003
Remedial Law; Discretion of the trial court to hold an appeal improper. The ascertainment of good
reasons for execution pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the appellate
court will not normally disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be proper, if it is shown that there
has been an abuse of discretion.
Normally, the trial court is not allowed to assess its own judgment and to hold that an appeal may not
prosper, or that it would merely be dilatory. In the present case, however, there are circumstances that
undisputedly serve as cogent bases for arriving at such a conclusion: (1) The existence of the MOA; (2)
petitioner failed to pay the occupants of the project site on time, thereby preventing respondent from fully
complying with its obligation under the MOA; (3) respondent admitted that the work accomplished was
52.89 percent, which was equivalent to P6,958,861.59. Obviously, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact on this point.
Civil Law; Implied power to rescind obligations. Article 1191 of the Civil Code states: The power to
rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case.
By failing to pay the occupants of the project site within the time required for the completion of the project,
petitioner did not comply with what was incumbent upon it. Applying the law to the undisputed facts, the trial
court had prima facie bases for rendering its partial summary judgment holding that respondent was entitled
to rescission and to the payment of P6,958,861.59.
VILLARUEL V. FERNANDO
G.R. NO. 136726 | SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
Remedial Law; Exception to the rule that acts of counsel binds the client. In Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la
Cruz, It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This
negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the
client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only when
the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be called for.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the petitioner has been
satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the petitioner had been
prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect.
In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the
general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the
respondents’ allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages.
Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the OSG’s errors. Petitioner should have taken the initiative
of making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the status of his case. Litigants
represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome
of their case. To agree with petitioner’s stance would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order
or decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on the part of his counsel. The Court will not
countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts long-settled doctrines of trial and procedure.
MORTA V. BAGAGÑAN
A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1513 | NOVEMBER 12, 2003
Administrative sanctions imposed upon those who cause perverse delays. Unreasonable delay in
resolving motions opens a judge to administrative sanctions. Likewise, a sheriff is administratively liable for
delayed implementation of a writ of execution and failure to render the required reports thereon. These are
necessary lessons from the time-honored principle that “justice delayed is justice denied.
SERRANO V. CA
G.R. NO. 133883 | DECEMBER 10, 2003
Rescission necessarily involves a repudiation of the contract and a refusal of the moving party to be
further bound by it. Generally, the rule is that to rescind a contract is not merely to terminate it, but to
abrogate and undo it from the beginning; that is, not merely to release the parties from further obligations to
each other in respect to the subject of the contract, but to annul the contract and restore the parties to the
relative positions which they would have occupied if no such contract had ever been made. With the
rescission of the deed of sale, etc., the rights of Emilio Geli under the said deed to redeem the property had
been extinguished.
Consent of mortgagor-debtor, requirement in paying redemption price of a foreclosed property. The

petitioners cannot even be compelled to subrogate the respondents to their rights under the real estate
mortgage over the property which the petitioners executed in favor of the GSIS since the payment of the
P67,701.84 redemption price was made without the knowledge of the petitioners. The respondents,
however, are entitled to be reimbursed by the petitioners to the extent that the latter were benefited.
Purchaser at public auction only has an inchoate right over the purchased property absent the
expiration of the redemption period. Before the lapse of the one-year period, the mortgagor-debtor
remains the owner of the property. The right acquired by the purchaser at public auction is merely inchoate
until the period of redemption has expired without the right being exercised by the redemptioner. Such right
becomes absolute only after the expiration of the redemption period without the right of redemption having
been exercised. The purchaser is entitled as a matter of right to consolidation of title and to the possession
of the property.
Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation,
often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal
duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy. The
summary decision of the trial court and the alias writ of execution against the respondent is not unjust and
unreasonable. Based on the facts of the case, The Spouses Geli reneged on their undertaking, by not
paying the GSIS with the proper balance. In addition, Emilio Geli and the respondents did not inform the CA
and the petitioners that Emilio Geli had paid the amount of P67,701.84 for the account of the petitioners.
The respondents even allowed their appeal to be dismissed by the CA, and the dismissal to become final
and executory. The petitioners were impelled to spend money for their counsel and for sheriffs fees for the
implementation of the writ of execution and the alias writ of execution issued by the trial court. In the
meantime, the respondents remained in possession of the property from 1969, when the said deed of
absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage was executed, up to the present, or for a period of 34
years without paying a single centavo. For the Court to allow the respondents to benefit from their own
wrong would run counter to the maxim: Ex Dolo Malo Non Oritur Actio (No man can be allowed to found a
claim upon his own wrongdoing). Equity is applied only in the absence of and never against statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure.
D’ARMOURED SECURITY V. ORPIA

G.R. NO. 151325 | JUNE 27, 2005
Rules on exemption, under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, do not extend to
corporations. The exemption contemplated by the provision involved is personal, available only to a
natural person, such as a dentist’s dental chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-15612, 30
Nov. 1962). As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt from
execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be enforced against the business
entity’ [Pentagon Security and Investigation Agency vs. Jimenez, 192 SCRA 492 (1990)].
It stands to reason that only natural persons whose salaries, wages and earnings are indispensable for his
own and that of his family’s support are exempted under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Undeniably, a corporate entity such as petitioner security agency is not covered by the exemption.
PEREZ V. CA
G.R. NO. 157616 | JULY 22, 2005
Distinctiveness and Independence of causes of actions, requirement for splitting or dividing.

Generally, a single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be made
the subject of two or more different actions. If only one right may be violated by several acts or omissions,
there would only be one cause of action. On the other hand, a single act or omission may be violative of
various rights at the same time, such as when the act constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal
obligations. The violation of each of these rights is a cause of action in itself. These causes of action that
are distinct and independent, although arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of fact may be
sued separately, and recovery on one is not a bar to subsequent actions on the others.
New legal theories do not amount to a new cause of action so as to defeat the application of the
principle of res judicata. In Siegel v. Knott, it was held that the statement of a different form of liability is
not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for
the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the
second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to
bring a second action after the loss of the first, merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of
recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.
Remedial Law; Non-division of the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his
pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is
bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied,
and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong
or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or
proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up
his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special
relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no
end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed.
Remedial Law; The Evidence Test Rule. The ultimate test to ascertain identity of causes of action is
whether or not the same evidence fully supports and establishes both the first and second cases.
Absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine qua non for the application of res judicata. It is
sufficient that there is a shared identity of interest. The rule is that, even if new parties are found in the
second action, res judicata still applies if the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a
party in the first action; otherwise, a case can always be renewed by the mere expedience of joining new
parties in the new suit.
Remedial Law; Two concepts of res judicata. Section 49(b) of Rule 39 enunciates the first concept of res
judicata, known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel by judgment, which refers to a theory or matter that
has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by a court of competent jurisdiction without fraud or
collusion.
Section 49(c) of Rule 39 enumerates the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. This is the second branch,
otherwise known as collateral estoppel or estoppel by verdict. This applies where, between the first case
wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is involved, there is no identity
of causes of action.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final
and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but
the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue
arising in the second. In order that this rule may be applied, it must clearly and positively appear, either
from the record itself or by the aid of competent extrinsic evidence that the precise point or question in issue
in the second suit was involved and decided in the first. And in determining whether a given question was
an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look behind the judgment to ascertain whether the evidence
necessary to sustain a judgment in the second action would have authorized a judgment for the same party
in the first action.
PANOTES V. CTDC
G.R. NO. 154739 | JANUARY 23, 2007
Execution of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action and not against one who
did not have his day in court. Strangers to a case, like CTDC, are not bound by the judgment rendered by
a court. It will not divest the rights of a party who has not and never been a party to litigation.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE V. FELIX

G.R. NO. 148090 | NOVEMBER 28, 2006
Trial court has no right to determine whether an appeal is patently dilatory and to depend on it in
granting motions. Well-settled is the rule that it is not for the trial court to determine the merit of a decision
it rendered as this is the role of the appellate Court. Hence, it is not within the competence of the trial court,
in resolving the motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and to rely
on the same as the basis for finding good reason to grant the motion.
Illness, to be considered as a good reason to justify execution pending appeal, must lie on the
judgment obligee. We agree with Stronghold Insurance that Garon failed to present good reasons to justify
execution pending appeal. The situations in the cases cited by the trial court are not similar to this case. In
Ma-Ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Cañete, Cañete filed an action for compensation for his illness. The
Workmen’s Compensation Commission found the illness compensable. Considering Cañete’s physical
condition and the Court’s finding that he was in constant danger of death, the Court allowed execution
pending appeal. In De Leon, et al. v. Soriano, et al., De Leon, et al. defaulted on an agreement that was
peculiarly personal to Asuncion. The agreement was valid only during Asuncion’s lifetime. The Court
considered that Soriano’s health was delicate and she was 75 years old at that time. Hence, execution
pending appeal was justified. In this case, it was not Garon, but her husband, who was ill.
RULE 40 TO 56
DURISOL V. CA
G.R. NO. 121106 | FEBRUARY 20, 2002
A judgment rendered by a trial court for alleged lack of jurisdiction cannot be considered void
where the party who has the right to challenge it failed to do so at the first instance. In the case at
bar, petitioner did not raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction in its answer to respondent DBP’s petition for
surrender of owner’s duplicate certificate. Neither did petitioner file any motion to dismiss on this ground.
Annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction; Filed before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
Rule 47, Section 3 expressly provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction
must be filed before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Hence, it has been held that while jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches
or estoppel has not supervened. It was only two decades after the institution of the case at bar, when the
issue of lack of jurisdiction was first raised. On the other hand, it is already too late to question such
jurisdiction since the judgment had already attained finality, considering that more than four years have
elapsed without any action from petitioner.
CFI acting as a land registration court; Removed by PD 1529. As to the argument of the petitioner with
respect to the CFI being a cadastral court - the distinction between the CFI acting as a land registration
court with limited jurisdiction, acting as an ordinary court exercising general jurisdiction has already been
removed with the effectivity of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529). The amendment was aimed at
avoiding multiplicity of suits. The change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the
designated trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for “original registration” but also “over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from
such applications or petition.”
JMM PROMOTIONS V. CA
G.R. NO. 139401 | OCTOBER 2, 2002
Supreme court is not a trier of facts. As an overture, clear and unmistakable is the rule that the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. Just as well entrenched is the doctrine that pure issues of fact may not be the
proper subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is
generally confined to questions of law. We therefore take this opportunity again to reiterate that only
questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Labor Law; Voluntariness in the execution of a quitclaim and waiver. Although quitclaims have long
been accepted in this jurisdiction, when the voluntariness of the execution of the quitclaim or release is
squarely at issue, then the employee’s claim may still be given due course. The law looks with disfavor on
quitclaims and releases by employees who have been inveigled or pressured into signing them by
unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities.
REXLON V. CA
G.R. NO. 128412 | MARCH 15, 2002
Decision rendered through fraud; Subject to annulment. Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where
a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case, "the effect of which prevents a party from having a
trial, a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy."
The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court. Hence, the Court has held that extrinsic fraud is present in cases where a party (1)
is deprived of his interest in land, because of a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested
when in fact they are; (2) applies for and obtains adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of
land which he knows has not been allotted to him in the partition; (3) intentionally conceals facts and
connives with the land inspector, so that the latter would include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable
stream; (4) deliberately makes a false statement that there are no other claims; (5) induces another not to
oppose an application; (6) deliberately fails to notify the party entitled to notice; or (7) misrepresents the
identity of the lot to the true owner, causing the latter to withdraw his opposition. Fraud, in these cases,
goes into and affects the jurisdiction of the court; thus, a decision rendered on the basis of such fraud
becomes subject to annulment.
TRES-REYES V. MAXIM’S TEA HOUSE

G.R. NO. 140853 | FEBRUARY 27, 2003
Exception to the Rule that the SC is not a trier of fact. The issue of whether a party is negligent is a
question of fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in
labor cases. Hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide
with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even
finality by this Court. But where the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in this
case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings.
Rules of procedure in labor cases should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. In labor
cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in the
frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should
not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the
parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the application of technical rules of
procedure may be relaxed.
LAND BANK V. DE LEON

G.R. NO. 143275 | MARCH 20, 2003
In the interest of fair play, equity and justice, LBP stresses the need for the rules to be relaxed so as
to give substantial consideration to the appealed cases. Before this case reached us, LBP had no
authoritative guideline on how to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts considering the seemingly
conflicting provisions of Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657.
SC Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from judgments of Special
Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given retroactive
application, it will prejudice LBP’s right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be
dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust
to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who
acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine.
ALFREDO V. BORRAS
G.R. NO. 144225 | JUNE 17, 2003
In a PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law
and not errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court. This
applies with greater force when both the trial court and the CA are in complete agreement on their factual
findings. In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied
upon by the trial court and appellate courts are borne out by the record. We agree with the conclusions
drawn by the lower courts from these facts.
Civil Law; A contract is perfected once there is consent of the contracting parties on the object
certain and on the cause of the obligation. In the instant case, the object of the sale is the Subject Land,
and the price certain is P15,000.00. The trial and appellate courts found that there was a meeting of the
minds on the sale of the Subject Land and on the purchase price of P15,000.00. This is a finding of fact
that is binding on this Court. We find no reason to disturb this finding since it is supported by substantial
evidence.
Civil Law; The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts either
partially or totally performed. Thus, where one party has performed one’s obligation, oral evidence will be
admitted to prove the agreement. In the instant case, the parties have consummated the sale of the Subject
Land, with both sellers and buyers performing their respective obligations under the contract of sale. In
addition, a contract that violates the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits under the
contract. Godofredo and Carmen benefited from the contract because they paid their DBP loan and secured
the cancellation of their mortgage using the money given by Armando and Adelia. Godofredo and Carmen
also accepted payment of the balance of the purchase price.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. The ten-year
prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is
not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not
run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a
suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten
years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that,
illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
Neither is the action barred by LACHES. We have defined LACHES as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable time, to do that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either had abandoned it or declined to assert it. Respondents discovered in
January 1994 the subsequent sale of the subject land and they filed this case in March 1994. Plainly, they
did not sleep on their rights.
PEOPLE V. CORPUZ
G.R. NO. 148198 | OCTOBER 1, 2003
Exception to the rule that the SC is not a trier of facts. It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial
court are accorded by this Court great respect because of the unique advantage of the trial court in
observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they
testify before the trial court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood
or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome
of the case. The exception obtains in this case.
An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as

principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in
illegal recruitment. Settled is the rule that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from
prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime.
The conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence. In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the
prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for the offense with which he is
charged.
PAL V. CA
G.R. NO. 127473 | DECEMBER 8, 2003
Exception to the Rule that the SC is not a trier of facts. In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed
upon by this Court. Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us especially when in
complete accord with the findings of the trial court. This is because it is not our function to analyze or weigh
the evidence all over again. However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to wit:
(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or
where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.
Justifiable reason to warrant the award of actual damages. We find no justifiable reason that warrants
the award of P100,000.00 as actual damages in favor of all private respondents. Article 2199 of the Civil
Code, provides that actual or compensatory damages may only be given for such pecuniary loss suffered
by him as he has duly proved. We explained in Chan vs. Maceda that:
A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but
must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best
obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts which could afford a basis
for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
Extraordinary diligence required on the part of a carrier. A contract of air carriage is a peculiar one.
Imbued with public interest, common carriers are required by law to carry passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due
regard for all the circumstances. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. And this because its business is mainly with the traveling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with a public duty. Failure of the carrier to observe this high degree of care
and extraordinary diligence renders it liable for any damage that may be sustained by its passengers.
As the lower courts have found, evidence positively show that petitioner has accommodated waitlisted and
non-revenue passengers and had overbooked more than what is allowed by law, to the prejudice of private
respondents who had confirmed tickets. Overbooking amounts to bad faith and therefore petitioner is liable
to pay moral damages to respondent Judy Amor.
AUGUSTO V. RISOS
G.R. NO. 131794 | DECEMBER 10, 2003
Final Order vis-à-vis Interlocutory Order. A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined. An order or judgment is deemed final if it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or
determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some
definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. Where no issue
is left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance with the terms of the order, such order is final
and appealable. In contrast, an order is interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case.
Property Registration Decree eliminated the distinction between general and limited jurisdiction of
the RTC. Jurisprudence has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a
cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for “original registration”
but also “over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions.” Under the amended law, the court is now authorized
to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues,
such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.
QBE INSURANCE V. RABELLO

A.M. NO. P-04-1884 | DECEMBER 9, 2004
Once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the property levied upon,
the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party claimant, unless the judgment creditor
files a bond approved by the court. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the moment a
third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to keep the property levied upon, unless the creditor insists
that it should be continued, which may be done if such creditor files a bond sufficient to indemnify the sheriff
for whatever damages he may be held liable should the third party succeed in vindicating his title in a
proper action brought separately for the purpose. However, respondent could not be faulted for QBE’s
mistake in availing of the wrong remedy [instead of availing of the remedy of "terceria" authorized under
Section 16 of Rule 39 which would have been the proper remedy considering that QBE is not a party to the
case against Rizal Surety, opted instead to file an urgent motion for the lifting of the notice of garnishment]
specially so in this case where QBE failed to show that respondent’s acts were motivated by malice or bad
faith.
As officers of the Court, however, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are bound to discharge their duties with
utmost care and diligence, particularly in implementing the orders of the court, for if they err, they will affect
the efficacy of the process by which justice is administered.
LPBS COMMERCIAL V. AMILA

G.R. NO. 147443 | FEBRUARY 11, 2008
Importance of the hierarchy of courts. The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy
of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two
reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances
had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
ESTINOZO V. CA
G.R. NO. 150276 | FEBRUARY 12, 2008
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are
mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.
The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be
that those questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is
appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.
Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still this Court cannot
grant the writ prayed for because we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the
challenged issuances. The rule, as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period
for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases before
this Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the extension requested.
In Amatorio v. People - relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of
procedure.
As a final note, party-litigants and their lawyers are reminded to refrain from filing frivolous petitions for
certiorari. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, now
provide that:
x x x However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against
the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139
and 139-B of the Rules of Court. x x x
The Court may impose motu propio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or
measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.
MARMO V. ANACAY
G.R. NO. 182585 | NOVEMBER 27, 2009
Denial of a Motion to Dismiss is interlocutory. The denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order
which is not the proper subject of an appeal or a petition for certiorari.
Section 1 of Rule 41, an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable. It explicitly states as well
that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. In law, the word "interlocutory" refers to intervening
developments between the commencement of a suit and its complete termination; hence, it is a
development that does not end the whole controversy.26 An "interlocutory order" merely rules on an
incidental issue and does not terminate or finally dispose of the case; it leaves something to be done before
the case is finally decided on the merits.
An Order denying a Motion to Dismiss is interlocutory because it does not finally dispose of the case, and,
in effect, directs the case to proceed until final adjudication by the court. Only when the court issues an
order outside or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief, will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest.
An indispensable party is a party without whom there can be no final determination of an action and who,
for this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. Jurisprudence further holds that a party
is indispensable, not only if he has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also if his interest
is such that a final decree cannot be made without affecting this interest or without placing the controversy
in a situation where the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He
is a person whose absence disallows the court from making an effective, complete, or equitable
determination of the controversy between or among the contending parties.
RULE 57 TO 61
MANGILA V. CA
G.R. NO. 125027 | AUGUST 12, 2002
Improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment. In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:
“It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of defendant - issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment - these do
not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually
obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary
submission to the court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences
implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the
applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5
of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint xxx.”
Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages:
first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to
the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary
that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the
writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction,
the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the
Court will not bind the defendant.
Improper Venue. The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue on
which an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to
preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such
stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties’ intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a
particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional requirements are
followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule
supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting
venue to the specified place.
In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There are no qualifying or
restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the intention of the parties that Makati is the “only or
exclusive” venue where the action could be instituted. We therefore agree with private respondent that
Makati is not the only venue where this case could be filed.
CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 139941 | JANUARY 19, 2001
Preliminary attachment issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of
action. When the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s
cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of
Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff’s application and affidavits on
which the writ was based – and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly
issued – the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount
to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere
hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.
The merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a
motion for dissolution of the attachment, otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of
the merits of the case on a mere motion.
There are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a counterbond immediately; or
(b) by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance. These grounds for the dissolution
of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the Court to dissolve an
attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified therein. Petitioner’s motion to lift attachment failed to
demonstrate any infirmity or defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a
counterbond.
DU V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
G.R. NO. 156580 | JUNE 14, 2004
Preference is given to a duly registered attachment over a subsequent notice of lis pendens, even if
the beneficiary of the notice acquired the subject property before the registration of the attachment.
Under the torrens system, the auction sale of an attached realty retroacts to the date the levy was
registered. In the case of Tambao v. Suy, 52 Phil. 237, it has been held that “Where a preliminary
attachment in favor of ‘A’ was recorded earlier, and the private sale of the attached property in favor of ‘B’
was executed a year later, the attachment lien has priority over the private sale, which means that the
purchaser took the property subject to such attachment lien and to all of its consequences, one of which is
the subsequent sale on execution.”
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent
registration of the prior sale. In Capistrano v. PNB, if the attachment or levy of execution, though
posterior to the sale, is registered before the sale is registered, it takes precedence over the latter. “The rule
is not altered by the fact that at the time of the execution sale the Philippine National Bank had information
that the land levied upon had already been deeded by the judgment debtor and his wife to Capistrano. The
auction sale being a necessary sequel to the levy, for this was effected precisely to carry out the sale, the
purchase made by the bank at said auction should enjoy the same legal priority that the levy had over the
sale in favor of plaintiff. In other words, the auction sale retroacts to the date of the levy. Were the rule
otherwise, the preference enjoyed by the levy of execution in a case like the present would be meaningless
and illusory.”
Good faith: Defense in registration of attachment. It is settled that a person dealing with registered
property may rely on the title and be charged with notice of only such burdens and claims as are annotated
thereon. This principle applies with more force to this case, absent any allegation or proof that Stronghold
had actual knowledge of the sale to petitioner before the registration of its attachment. Thus, the annotation
of respondent’s notice of attachment was a registration in good faith, the kind that made its prior right
enforceable.
DM WENCESLAO V. READYCON TRADING

G.R. NO. 154106 | JUNE 29, 2004
Proof of bad faith or malice in obtaining a writ of attachment need be proved only in the claim for
damages on account of the issuance of the writ. However, the mere existence of malice and bad faith
would not per se warrant the award of actual or compensatory damages. To grant such damages, sufficient
proof thereon is required.
Civil Law; When the terms of a contract are clear and readily understandable, there is no room for
construction. Respondent argues that the stipulation in the sales contract is very clear that it should be
paid within fifteen (15) days without any qualifications and conditions. Under Article 1582 of the Civil Code,
the buyer is obliged to pay the price of the thing sold at the time stipulated in the contract. Following the rule
on interpretation of contracts, no other evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except when a party puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent of the parties.
IDOLOR V. CA
G.R. NO. 141853 | FEBRUARY 7, 2001
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in
esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right.
Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and
positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has
committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of
said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the
judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly
adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.
Where the parties to the new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of
the old one, where, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no
novation. The “Kasunduang Pag-aayos” which is quoted earlier does not support petitioner’s contention
that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate did not appear by express agreement of the
parties nor the old and the new contracts were incompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly
recognized in the Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old obligation where she acknowledged
her long overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and
asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before December 21, 1996 and that
upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to repurchase without interest within one
year in favor of private respondents.
GUSTILO V. REAL
A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1250 | FEBRUARY 28, 2001
Guidelines for the issuance of an injunctive writ. Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential
that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected; and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right. The onus
probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the
act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.
In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He had
taken his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We
do not see how the complainants exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the
right of the losing candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order to maintain the
status quo. We see no reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident purpose of the
second TRO was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Respondent must be held liable for violating Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that,
In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by
partisan interests, public opinion, or fear of criticism.
ALEMAR V. NLRC
G.R. NO. 114761 | JANUARY 19, 2000
Jurisprudence has established that a stay of execution may be warranted by the fact that a
petitioner corporation has been placed under rehabilitation receivership. However, it is undisputed
that on March 5, 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued an order approving the proposed
rehabilitation plan of petitioner and placing it under liquidation pursuant to Presidential Decree 902-A.
Subject to the control of the SEC, the liquidator, Ledesma, Saludo & Associates, was ordered to "wind up
the affairs of the corporation, continue to manage the corporation for purposes of liquidation in order to
protect the interest of its creditors and avoid dissipation, loss, wastage, or destruction of the remaining
assets and other properties of the corporation and to ensure orderly payment of claims against such
corporation in accordance with applicable laws."
Thus, petitioner pointed out that the SEC's order suspending all claims against it pending before any other
court, tribunal or body was pursuant to the rehabilitation receivership proceedings. Such order was
necessary to enable the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from any judicial or
extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company. Since
receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioner's rehabilitation receiver and liquidator, Ledesma
Saludo & Associates, has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation, the cited order of
the Securities and Exchange Commission has been rendered functus officio. Thus, there is no legal
impediment for the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of separation pay.
LAGROSAS V. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB

G.R. NO. 168637 | SEPTEMBER 12, 2008
Labor Law; Misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal. It (a) must be serious;
(b) must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) must show that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer.
Tested against the foregoing standards, it is clear that Lagrosas was not guilty of serious misconduct. It
may be that the injury sustained by Lim was serious since it rendered her unconscious and caused her to
suffer cerebral contusion that necessitated hospitalization for several days. But we fail to see how such
misconduct could be characterized as work-related and reflective of Lagrosas' unfitness to continue working
for Bristol-Myers.
Remedial Law; The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous

irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.
A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not explicitly
exempted, files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or
person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the
court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a
writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
AGUILAR V. MANILA BANKING

G.R. NO. 157911 | SEPTEMBER 19, 2006
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special
civil action for certiorari. The plain and adequate remedy referred to Rule 65, Sec. 1 is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision or order. The purpose for this requirement is to grant an opportunity
for the court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case without the intervention of a higher court.
While jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the rule, such as:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved,
None of these exceptions apply in the case. In the present case, the petitioners not only failed to explain
their failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, they also failed to show sufficient
justification for dispensing with the requirement. A motion for reconsideration is not only expected to be but
would actually have provided an adequate and more speedy remedy than the petition for certiorari.
Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners' own omission to
file the required motion for reconsideration.
Connotation of the “law of the case”. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
Res judicata vis-à-vis Law of the Case. In Padillo v. Court of Appeals, the Court distinguished the two as
follows: x x x Law of the case does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata, and applies only to
that one case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in
another case.
In the 1975 case of Comilang v. Court of Appeals (Fifth Division.), a further distinction was made in this
manner:
The doctrine of law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its application. It
relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same
case. The doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to the conclusive determination of
issues of fact, although it may include questions of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings
in the same action or general proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a
wholly independent proceeding.
To elucidate further, res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has
been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. The four
requisites for res judicata to apply are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or
an order on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties,
of subject matter and of cause of action.63 The fourth requisite is wanting in the present case. There is only
one case involved. There is no second independent proceeding or subsequent litigation between the
parties. The present petition concerns subsequent proceedings in the same case, with petitioners raising
the same issue long settled by a prior appeal.
LARROBIS V. PHIL. VETERANS BANK

G.R. NO. 135706 | OCTOBER 1, 2004
CHECK THE CASE OF Provident Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Unlike Provident Savings Bank,
there was no legal prohibition imposed upon herein respondent to deter its receiver and liquidator from
performing their obligations under the law. Thus, the ruling laid down in the Provident case cannot apply in
the case at bar.
Receivership; Failure of a receiver. Settled is the principle that a bank is bound by the acts, or failure to
act of its receiver. As we held in Philippine Veterans Bank vs. NLRC, a labor case which also involved
respondent bank, … all the acts of the receiver and liquidator pertain to petitioner, both having assumed
petitioner’s corporate existence. Petitioner cannot disclaim liability by arguing that the non-payment of
MOLINA’s just wages was committed by the liquidators during the liquidation period.
However, the bank may go after the receiver who is liable to it for any culpable or negligent failure to collect
the assets of such bank and to safeguard its assets.
OROSA V. CA
G.R. NO. 111080 | APRIL 5, 2000
Remedial Law; On matters of Jurisdiction and Res Judicata. Jurisdiction is simply the power or
authority to hear a case. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to review decisions and orders of
lower courts is conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. As to the issue of res judicata, the decisions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 84979 did not pass on the
merits of this case. It merely ruled on the issues of whether the surety, Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., can
be held jointly and solidarily liable with plaintiff-appellant and whether execution pending appeal is proper
under the facts and circumstances of this case. Consequently, this Court is not estopped from reviewing the
conclusions reached by the court a quo.
Civil Law; Good faith as a defense in awarding moral damages. To constitute malicious prosecution,
there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person,
and that it was initiated deliberately, knowing that the charges were false and groundless. Such was not the
case when the instant complaint was filed. The rule has always been that moral damages cannot be
recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith. The law always presumes
good faith such that any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden
of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive.
Anent the award of exemplary damages, jurisprudence provides that where a party is not entitled to actual
or moral damages, an award of exemplary damages is likewise baseless.
SMART V. ASTORGA
G.R. NO. 148132 | JANUARY 28, 2008
Replevin; an action beyond the jurisdiction of labor arbiters. In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante - Replevin is a
possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought
therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary
statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of
whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the
adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside
the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may
recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains
such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie
from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself,
for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which
possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.
Labor Law; The validity of termination can exist independently of the procedural infirmity of the
dismissal. In DAP Corporation v. CA, we found the dismissal of the employees therein valid and for
authorized cause even if the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement under Article 283 of the
Labor Code. This Court upheld the dismissal, but held the employer liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements.
SERVICE WIDE SPECIALIST V. CA

G.R. NO. 110048 | NOVEMBER 19, 1999
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. A foreclosure under a chattel
mortgage may properly be commenced only once there is default on the part of the mortgagor of his
obligation secured by the mortgage.
The replevin in this case has been resorted to in order to pave the way for the foreclosure of what is
covered by the chattel mortgage. The conditions essential for such foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the
existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. These requirements must be
shown because the validity of the plaintiffs exercise of the right of foreclosure is inevitably dependent
thereon.
Since the mortgagee's right of possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be
controverted, the inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in
order to allow a full and conclusive determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in
order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the
mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to levy
the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for such action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse
possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the
terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.
When there is doubt as to the right of possession on the part of the applicant in a complaint for
replevin and damages, the absconding debtor-mortgagor must be impleaded. In case the right of
possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such possession or that of his principal, is put
to great doubt; it could become essential to have other persons involved and impleaded for a complete
determination and resolution of the controversy.
In the case under scrutiny, it is not disputed that there is an adverse and independent claim of ownership by
the respondent as evinced by the existence of a pending case before the Court of Appeals involving subject
motor vehicle between the same parties herein.
That petitioner could not locate the mortgagor, Leticia Laus, is no excuse for resorting to a procedural short-
cut. It could have properly availed of substituted service of summons under the Revised Rules of Court. If it
deemed such a mode to be unavailing, it could have proceeded in accordance with Section 14 of the same
Rule. Indeed, petitioner had other proper remedies, it could have resorted to but failed to avail of. For
instance, it could have properly impleaded the mortgagor. Such failure is fatal to petitioner's cause.
HAO V. ANDRES
A.M. NO. P-07-2384 | JUNE 18, 2008
Duty and Disposition of property by sheriff. The rule is clear that the property seized should not be
immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least
five days. Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to Silver for
whatever purpose, without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.
In Sebastian v. Valino, Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not
to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and he shall
return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return and files a counterbond.
DE ASIS V. CA
G.R. NO. 127578 | FEBRUARY 15, 1999
Civil Law; The raison d’ etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or
compromise of the right to support. [refer to Article 301 and 2035] “The right to support being founded
upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right
for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounced;
hence, support, which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. xxx To allow renunciation or
transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or
the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy. xxx
In order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the
parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially
established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. “The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the
right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an
authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.” Although in the case under
scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and
does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
PEOPLE V. MANAHAN
G.R. NO. 128157 | SEPTEMBER 29, 1999
Criminal Law; Love is not a license of lust. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.
Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon her
on the pretext of love.
Equally untenable is the accused's contention that there can be no rape since the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the element of intimidation. One of the modes of committing the crime of
rape is by having carnal knowledge of a woman using force and intimidation. Even if we concede the
absence of intimidation in this case, the fact remains that the accused employed force against his victim.
Thus, testifying in a clear, definitive and convincing manner as concluded by the trial court, Teresita
established beyond any scintilla of doubt the presence of force essential in rape.
Support of the child; Acknowledgment by a married man. On the matter of acknowledgment and
support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal
Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us,
compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in
doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v.
Guerrero, "the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring
of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion
of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused
to support the child as it is in accordance with law.
LOPEZ V. CA
G.R. NO. 148510 | JULY 21, 2004
Judgment for support; Never becomes final. En passant, the dismissal of the petition notwithstanding,
petitioner is not without remedy. For as what he seeks to assail is the amount of support he was adjudged
to provide, he can file a motion with the trial court for its modification since a judgment granting support
never becomes final.
MONTEFALCON V. VASQUEZ
G.R. NO. 165016 | JUNE 17, 2008
Substituted service of summons as a means to acquire jurisdiction. To acquire jurisdiction over the
person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable
time, then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual
employees. They go back to the country once their contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another
contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if they wish. It is therefore common knowledge
that a Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro Manila, where majority
of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home address in the province where he originates.
In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the
complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in either place.
Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service was
made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino
resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section
16 of the Rules of Court.
In Montalban v. Maximo, we held in said case that the normal method of service of summons on one
temporarily absent is by substituted service because personal service abroad and service by publication are
not ordinary means of summoning defendants. Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent
resident may be by substituted service as domiciliaries of a State are always amenable to suits in personam
therein.
Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, the
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity and
filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as father in Laurence's
certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent
evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of
the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for
acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act.
As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were able to prove that
Laurence needs Vasquez's support and that Vasquez is capable of giving such support. Dolores testified
that she spent around P200,000 for Laurence; she spends P8,000 a month for his schooling and their
subsistence. She told the lower court Vasquez was earning US$535 monthly based on his January 10,
2000 contract of employment with Fathom Ship Management and his seafarer information sheet. That
income, if converted at the prevailing rate, would be more than sufficient to cover the monthly support for
Laurence.
RULE 62 TO 65
ETERNAL GARDENS V. IAC

G.R. NO. 73794 | SEPTEMBER 19, 1988
Interpleader: Rule founded on equity and justice. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the
essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the
petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. It is a rule founded on justice
and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the
pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto."
Power of the courts; Amendment of judgments. The courts have inherent power to amend their
judgments to make them conformable to the law applicable provided that said judgments have not yet
attained finality.
Motion for Reconsiderations: Purpose. Motions for Reconsiderations are allowed to convince the court
that their rulings are erroneous and improper and in so doing the courts are given opportunity to correct
their errors.
WACK WACK GOLF V. LEE WON

G.R. NO. L-23851 | MARCH 26, 1976
Interpleader; Separate suit and Final judgment. If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the
adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have
that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil
case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead
Tan in the same litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper
because it was filed much too late.
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order of
interpleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become
independently liable to any of the claimants.
It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is filed after judgment has been
rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, this being especially true when the holder of the funds
had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and had an opportunity to implead
the adverse claimants in the suit in which the judgment was rendered. United Procedures Pipe Line Co. v.
Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v. McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S.W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223,
Sec. 11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108 A.L.R., note 5, p. 275.
Interpleader; Protection against multiple actions. The remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the
party from the annoyance and hazard of two or more actions touching the same property or demand; but
one who, with knowledge of all the facts, neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to take the chances
for success in the actions at law, ought to submit to the consequences of defeat. “To permit an
unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish
the number of suits; to put upon the shoulders of others the burden which he asks may be taken from his
own.”
MESINA V. IAC
G.R. NO. 70145 | NOVEMBER 13, 1986
Interpleader; Prior measures. The records of the case show that respondent bank had to resort to details
in support of its action for Interpleader. Before it resorted to Interpleader, respondent bank took a
precautionary and necessary measures to bring out the truth. On the other hand, petitioner concealed the
circumstances known to him and now that private respondent bank brought these circumstances out in
court (which eventually rendered its decision in the light of these facts), petitioner charges it with "gratuitous
excursions into these non-issues." Respondent IAC cannot rule on whether respondent RTC committed an
abuse of discretion or not, without being apprised of the facts and reasons why respondent Associated
Bank instituted the Interpleader case. Both parties were given an opportunity to present their sides.
Petitioner chose to withhold substantial facts. Respondents were not forbidden to present their side-this is
the purpose of the Comment of respondent to the petition. IAC decided the question by considering both the
facts submitted by petitioner and those given by respondents. IAC did not act therefore beyond the scope of
the remedy sought in the petition.
Commercial Law; Cashier’s check obtained by a holder not a holder in due course. The holder of a
cashier's check who is not a holder in due course cannot enforce such check against the issuing bank
which dishonors the same. If a payee of a cashier's check obtained it from the issuing bank by fraud, or if
there is some other reason why the payee is not entitled to collect the check, the respondent bank would, of
course, have the right to refuse payment of the check when presented by the payee, since respondent bank
was aware of the facts surrounding the loss of the check in question. Petitioner failed to substantiate his
claim that he is a holder in due course and for consideration or value as shown by the established facts of
the case. Admittedly, petitioner became the holder of the cashier's check as endorsed by Alexander Lim
who stole the check. He refused to say how and why it was passed to him. He had therefore notice of the
defect of his title over the check from the start.
VELARDE V. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

G.R. NO. 159357 | APRIL 28, 2004
A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the
law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the
procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant
circulars/orders of the Supreme Court.
Under the law, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the
written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.
The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity
and must be struck down as void.
TAMBUNTING V. SUMABAT
G.R. NO. 144101 | SEPTEMBER 16, 2005
Declaratory relief; may be entertained only before breach or violation. An action for declaratory relief
should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or ordinance before breach or violation thereof.
The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior
to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action.
Declaratory relief; Requirement of prior transgression. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction
over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a
cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to
explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order.
ALMEDA V. BATHALA MARKETING

G.R. NO. 150806 | JANUARY 28, 2008
Declaratory relief; Definition. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a
declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of
provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified,
as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.
Declaratory relief; Requisites. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief,
as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof
are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in
question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons
whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is
not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
MERALCO V. PHIL. CONSUMERS

G.R. NO. 101783 | JANUARY 23, 2002
A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections. After according both parties the
opportunities to be heard, the BOE disposed of the controversy by resolving the rights of the parties under
P.D. No. 551. In its Decision, the BOE declared in clear and unequivocal manner that Meralco "has been
duly authorized to retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D. No. 551" and that private
respondent PCFI’s argument to the contrary is "untenable." The BOE's Decision was upheld by this Court in
G.R. No. 63018.
A party by bringing forward, in a second case, additional parties cannot escape the effects of the
principle of res judicata when the facts remain the same. Res judicata is not defeated by a minor
difference of parties, as it does not require absolute but only substantial identity of parties. The inclusion of
ISIP as a plaintiff is inconsequential.
All the requisites of res judicata are extant in the records of the case and thus, beyond dispute. Res
judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered
and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose,
and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein.
For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: 1) there must be a final
judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3)
it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the two cases identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action.
Action for declaratory relief may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute,
deed, contract etc., to which it refers. The purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract etc. for
their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof. The petition gives a practical remedy in ending controversies which have not
reached the stage where other relief is immediately available. It supplies the need for a form of action that
will set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights, and the
commission of wrongs. Here, private respondents brought the petition for declaratory relief long after the
alleged violation of P.D. No. 551.
A lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, especially of this
Court, for to do so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review.
A final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. Thus, it is the duty of the lower courts to
obey the Decisions of this Court and render obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts.
"A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in
the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation."
"There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings," as
eloquently declared by Justice J. B. L. Reyes.
LAPID V. LAUREA
G.R. NO. 139607 | OCTOBER 28, 2002
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the
purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for
certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly
relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run
and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated.
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
Associated to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. In the instant case, the
petition was bereft of any persuasive explanation as to why petitioners Ramon and Gladys Lapid failed to
observe procedural rules properly. The record shows that through their counsel they failed not only once but
twice to indicate the material date required by law. Counsel for petitioners had all the opportunity to comply
with the rules, but counsel remained obstinate in her non-observance thereof even when she sought
reconsideration of the ruling of the respondent court dismissing her clients’ petition. Such obstinacy is
inconsistent with her late plea for liberality in construing the rules on certiorari. Thus, any further delay that
would inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is one purely of petitioners’ own making,
considering that it is an elementary principle in law that negligence of counsel binds the client.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather
than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of
justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively
prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking
on the policy of liberal construction.
LACSON V. SECRETARY PEREZ

G.R. NO. 147 780 | MAY 10, 2001
Extraordinary remedy under Rule 65; Directly filed to the SC. Petitioners' contention in LACSON
Petition, DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO Petition, and LUMBAO Petition that they are under imminent danger of
being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and
prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law.
Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he
may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine
whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person
subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods
provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for
delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested
can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for
damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of
other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and
mandamus improper at this time.
LICAROS V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 145851 | NOVEMBER 22, 2001
The unreasonable delay of more, than ten (10) years to resolve a criminal case, without fault on the part of
the accused and despite his earnest effort to have his case decided, violates the constitutional right to the
speedy disposition of a case. Unlike the right to a speedy trial, this constitutional privilege applies not only
during the trial stage, but also when the case has already been submitted for decision.
The Right to a Speedy Disposition of cases. It must be understood that in the ordinary course of a
criminal proceeding, a court is responsible for the ultimate disposition of the case. This is true irrespective of
the prosecution's punctual performance of its duty. Hence, notwithstanding the filing of the information, the
presentation of evidence and the completion of the trial proper, the eventual disposition of the case will still
depend largely on the timely rendition of judgment by a court. And where it does not act promptly on the
adjudication of a case before it and within the period prescribed by law, the accused's right to a speedy
disposition of the case is just as much prejudiced as when the prosecution is prolonged or deferred
indefinitely. Accordingly, with all the more reason should the right to the speedy disposition of a case be
looked upon with care and caution when that case has already been submitted to the court for decision.
Mandamus as an appropriate remedy. Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a
public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the
Constitution. To reiterate, the right of the accused to the speedy disposition of a case is a right guaranteed
under the fundamental law. Correlatively, it is the bounden duty of a court, as mandated by the Constitution,
to speedily dispose of the case before it. Thus, a party to a case may demand, as a matter mandated by the
Constitution, expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
Undue delay in deciding a case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan's
inordinate delay in deciding the subject criminal case prejudiced the right of petitioner to a speedy
disposition of his case. Such undue delay can be characterized as no less than a grave abuse of discretion,
resulting in manifest injustice on the part of petitioner. In view of these circumstances, the case falls
squarely into the established exception and will justify this Court's action of substituting the discretion of
respondent with that of its own.
UP BOARD V. LIGOT-TELAN
G.R. NO. 110280 | OCTOBER 12, 1993
The matter of admission of students is within the ambit of academic freedom and therefore, beyond the
province of the courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear stressing.
Admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students
have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution.
A school or college which is possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending
to the choice of students." Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology
TUASON V. RD OF CALOOCAN
G.R. NO. 70484 | JANUARY 29, 1988
Acts done by an executive officer which is judicial in nature may be walloped by a writ of certiorari.
The acts of President Marcos may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because it was
done by him in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, and it was shown that the acts
were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was
never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him were in the
circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as
chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as
head of the martial law regime.
SECURITY BANK V. INDIANA

G.R. NO. 146197 | JUNE 27, 2005
Remedial Law; Non-complaince with the rule on a statement of material dates under Rule 43. In the
recent case of Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, we held that "the failure to comply
with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident
from the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of
receipt of the trial court’s order denying the motion for reconsideration, which date is admittedly stated in the
petition in the present case. The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if
reasonably evident. Thus, in this case the Court deems it proper to relax the Rules to give all the parties the
chance to argue their causes and defenses.
TORRES V. AGUINALDO
G.R. NO. 164268 | JUNE 28, 2005
By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
Duty of the Secretary of Justice; Power of Control over his subordinates. While it is the duty of the
fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be
guilty of a crime, the Secretary of Justice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons
from groundless, false or serious prosecution. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he
orders or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the
evidence warrants the filing of the action in court.
KORUGA V. ARCENAS
G.R. NO. 168332 | JUNE 19, 2009
Banking activities are regulated and supervised by the BSP. It is well-settled in both law and
jurisprudence that the Central Monetary Authority, through the Monetary Board, is vested with exclusive
authority to assess, evaluate and determine the condition of any bank, and finding such condition to be one
of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve a probable loss to its depositors or creditors,
forbid bank or non-bank financial institution to do business in the Philippines; and shall designate an official
of the BSP or other competent person as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities.
As a rule, the court’s jurisdiction could may only have be invoked after the Monetary Board had taken action
on the matter and only on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave
abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RULE 66 TO 71
MENDOZA V. ALLAS
G.R. NO. 131977 | FEBRUARY 4, 1999
A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such
successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto
itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person — to determine whether he is
constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which
he lays claim.
Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by what right
they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution and
laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state. In other
words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise
of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
CALLEJA V. PANDAY
G.R. NO. 168696 | FEBRUARY 28, 2006
Rule 45, wrong remedy since an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and
therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. In Bangko
Silangan Development Bank vs. Court of Appeals, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be
reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to
be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment.
However, in Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking, the Court proceeded to give due course to a case
despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the petitioner therein, stating thus:
While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an
interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the perpetuation of an apparent error committed
below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to ignore the
technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as a
special civil action for certiorari. Not much, after all, can be gained if the Court were to refrain from now
making a pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by the parties.
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons
who usurp an office in a private corporation. As explained in the Unilongo v. CA case, Section 1(a) of
Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase "or an office in a corporation created by
authority of law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of
quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their
office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of
R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
Under R.A. No. 8799 which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial
court, and not Rule 66, since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the
office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
AVELINO V. CUENCO
G.R. NO. L-2821 | MARCH 4, 1949
Quo Warranto; Extends to officers in the legislative branch. Section 1, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court
provides: An action for usurpation of office of franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against: (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercise a public office, or
a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by authority of law
This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its scope does not exclude officers appointed by the
legislative branch of the government. Although this Court has no control over either branch of the Congress,
it does have the power to ascertain whether or not one who pretends to be its officer is holding his office
according to law or the Constitution. Political questions as a bar to jurisdiction can only be raised by the
supreme power, by the legislature, and not by one of its creatures. (Luther vs. Border, 48 U.S. 7 How. 1, 12
Law ed., 581.) If there were two lesser officers of the Senate appointed by different faction thereof and
contesting each other's right to the office, it would not be the Senate by the Court which would be called
upon to decide the controversy. There is more reason for the Court to intervene when the office of the
President of the Senate is at stake. The interest of the public are being greatly imperiled by the conflicting
claims, and a speedy determination of the same is imperatively demanded, in the interest of good
government and public order.
GENERAL V. URRO/ARROYO
G.R. NO. 191560 | MARCH 29, 2011
Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Generally, quo
warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such action if he claims to be entitled
to the public office allegedly usurped by another.
Petition for quo warranto; requirement of right to office. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding
who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear
right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.
From this perspective, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office as a
condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents’ appointments. The
petitioner’s failure in this regard renders a ruling on the constitutional issues raised completely unnecessary.
AGAN V. PIATCO
G.R. NO. 155001 | MAY 5, 2003
Equal footing as an element of a publicly bidded contract. An essential element of a publicly bidded
contract is that all bidders must be on equal footing. Not simply in terms of application of the procedural
rules and regulations imposed by the relevant government agency, but more importantly, on the contract
bidded upon. Each bidder must be able to bid on the same thing. The rationale is obvious. If the winning
bidder is allowed to later include or modify certain provisions in the contract awarded such that the contract
is altered in any material respect, then the essence of fair competition in the public bidding is destroyed. A
public bidding would indeed be a farce if after the contract is awarded, the winning bidder may modify the
contract and include provisions which are favorable to it that were not previously made available to the
other bidders.
Regulation of Monopolies. A monopoly is “a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more

persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of a particular commodity.” The 1987 Constitution strictly
regulates monopolies, whether private or public, and even provides for their prohibition if public interest so
requires.
In the cases at bar, PIATCO, under the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA, is granted the
“exclusive right to operate a commercial international passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon” at the
NAIA IPT III. This is with the exception of already existing international airports in Luzon such as those
located in the Subic Bay Freeport Special Economic Zone (“SBFSEZ”), Clark Special Economic Zone
(“CSEZ”) and in Laoag City. As such, upon commencement of PIATCO’s operation of NAIA IPT III,
Terminals 1 and 2 of NAIA would cease to function as international passenger terminals, thus, would affect
the employment of several workers.
REPUBLIC V. GINGOYON
G.R. NO. 166429 | DECEMBER 19, 2005
The issuance of the writ of possession does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. As
earlier pointed out, expropriation is not completed until payment to the property owner of just compensation.
The proffered value stands as merely a provisional determination of the amount of just compensation, the
payment of which is sufficient to transfer possession of the property to the Government. However, to
effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the Government to pay the property owner the final
just compensation.
Appointment of commissioners. It must be noted that Rep. Act No. 8974 is silent on the appointment of
commissioners tasked with the ascertainment of just compensation. This protocol though is sanctioned
under Rule 67. We rule that the appointment of commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in
expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions of Rule 67 in
that regard do not conflict with the statute. As earlier stated, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules does
allow such other incidents affecting the complaint to be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Even without Rule 67, reference during trial to a commissioner of the
examination of an issue of fact is sanctioned under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court.
Insufficient Ground for Inhibition of Respondent Judge. The disqualification of a judge is a deprivation
of his/her judicial power and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It
certainly cannot be predicated on the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings towards the movant for
inhibition, especially if these rulings are in accord with law. Neither could inhibition be justified merely on the
erroneous nature of the rulings of the judge.
We emphasized in Webb v. People: To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent judge,
petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions.
By themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent judge.
To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source
and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long
as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal
bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter
how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on
grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although
the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic
evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The only exception
to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or
malice.
ASIA’S EMERGING DRAGON V. DOTC

G.R. NO. 169914 | APRIL 7, 2009
Special rights granted to original proponent in public biddings. The special rights or privileges of an
original proponent come into play only when there are other proposals submitted during the public bidding
of the infrastructure project. As can be gleaned from the plain language of the statutes and the IRR, the
original proponent has: (1) the right to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within 30 working
days from notice thereof, and (2) in the event that the original proponent is able to match the lowest or most
advantageous proposal submitted, then it has the right to be awarded the project. The second right or
privilege is contingent upon the actual exercise by the original proponent of the first right or privilege. Before
the project could be awarded to the original proponent, he must have been able to match the lowest or most
advantageous proposal within the prescribed period. Hence, when the original proponent is able to timely
match the lowest or most advantageous proposal, with all things being equal, it shall enjoy preference in the
awarding of the infrastructure project.
It is without question that in a situation where there is no other competitive bid submitted for the BOT project
that the project would be awarded to the original proponent thereof. However, when there are competitive
bids submitted, the original proponent must be able to match the most advantageous or lowest bid; only
when it is able to do so, will the original proponent enjoy the preferential right to the award of the project
over the other bidder.
It is already an established fact in AGAN V. PIATCO (2004) that AEDC failed to match the more
advantageous proposal submitted by PIATCO by the time the 30-day working period expired on 28
November 1996;8 and since it did not exercise its right to match the most advantageous proposal within the
prescribed period, it cannot assert its right to be awarded the project.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Corona and Velasco. Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona submits that the
original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for a (Build Operate Transfer) BOT project, under Section 4-A
of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended, is entitled to the award of the project in at least three
circumstances: (1) no competitive bid was submitted; (2) there was a lower bid by a qualified bidder but the
original proponent matched it; and (3) there was a lower bid but it was made by a person/entity not qualified
to bid, in which case, it is as if no competitive bid had been made. Both Justice Corona and Mr. Justice
Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr., in their dissenting opinions, conclude that AEDC is entitled to the award of the
NAIA IPT III project as the original proponent thereof because the third circumstance is extant in this case.
CITY OF MANILA V. SERRANO

G.R. NO. 142304 | JUNE 20, 2001
Expropriation proceedings consist of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of
just compensation to be paid for the taking of the private property to be made by the court with the
assistance of not more than three commissioners.
An order granting a writ of possession; merely interlocutory from which no appeal could be taken.
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules for Civil Procedure applies only to final judgments or orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Regional Trial Court. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is the
suitable remedy in view of Rule 65.
NAPOCOR V. CA
G.R. NO. 106804 | AUGUST 12, 2004
The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right over
his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is
for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due process of law. The dismissal,
withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court
that the expropriation is not for some public use, then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action.
However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the
dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant's right to have his damages ascertained either in
the same case or in a separate action.
NPC must Pay Just Compensation for the Entire Property. Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation
case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner.42 However, when possession of the
land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so,
the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and practical to restore
possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The
Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if
NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property.
In United States v. Causby, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is rendered
uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete. Such
taking is thus compensable.
In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and
devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just
compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.
Entities cannot trifle with a citizen's property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary
power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements.
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE V. HEIRS OF PASTOR

G.R. NO. 138896 | JUNE 20, 2000
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.
The subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that
is incapable of pecuniary estimation. “Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in
actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class
cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has
deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record
at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction.”
UNION BANK V. CA
G.R. NO. 133366 | AUGUST 5, 1999
Foreclosure may be effected either judicially or extrajudicially. In a public bidding during extra-judicial
foreclosure, the creditor —mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized to act for the creditor may
participate and purchase the mortgaged property as any other bidder. Thereafter the mortgagor has one
year within which to redeem the property from and after registration of sale with the Register of Deeds. In
case of non-redemption, the purchaser at foreclosure sale shall file with the Register of Deeds, either a final
deed of sale executed by the person authorized by virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed or
mortgage, or his sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption; whereupon, the Register of Deeds
Shall issue a new certificate of title in favor of the purchaser after the owner's duplicate of the certificate has
been previously delivered and canceled. Thus, upon failure to redeem foreclosed realty, consolidation of
title becomes a matter of right on the part of the auction buyer, and the issuance of a certificate of title in
favor of the purchaser becomes ministerial upon the Register of Deeds.
ARDIENTE V. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, RD OF QC

G.R. NO. 148448 | AUGUST 17, 2004
It is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage

foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will
invalidate the notice and the sale at least voidable.
The issue of lack of publication of notice cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In the case of
Go v. Court of Appeals, as in the present case, despite the fact that the mortgagees pleaded as a defense
in their Answer the "receipt of the ‘notice of the sale which was published in a newspaper of general
circulation,’’’ the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure was never raised in issue by the
mortgagors.
“Indeed, as correctly held by the respondent Court, the issue of lack of publication of the notice of
foreclosure of the mortgage was raised only on appeal. Petitioner does not represent that he directly
attacked in his complaint in Civil Case No. 8920 the validity of the foreclosure because of such lack of
notice. His own Statement of the Facts and of the Case in the instant petition makes no reference to such
lack o notice as one, or even just as a basis for any, of his causes of action in the complaint. He sought the
cancellation of the contract of mortgage because he allegedly never received the amounts indicated in the
promissory notes. Of course, nullity of the mortgage due to absence of consideration is leagues apart form
the nullity of the foreclosure of a mortgage because of non-publication of the notice of foreclosure.”
BPI FAMILY V. SPS VELOSO

G.R. NO. 141974 | AUGUST 9, 2004
Respondent’s right to redemption; Requisites. In order to effect a redemption, the judgment debtor must
pay the purchaser the redemption price composed of the following: (1) the price which the purchaser paid
for the property; (2) interest of 1% per month on the purchase price; (3) the amount of any assessments or
taxes which the purchaser may have paid on the property after the purchase; and (4) interest of 1% per
month on such assessments and taxes x x x.
Furthermore, Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The vendor cannot avail himself of the right to repurchase without returning to the vendee the price
of the sale x x x.
It is not difficult to understand why the redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else
validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem
is being made in good faith.
HEIRS OF TEVES V. CA
G.R. NO. 109963 | OCTOBER 13, 1999
Requisites for Partition. For a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following
conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts
left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their
judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or
affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds.
Clear and strong evidence; requirement in questioning a public document. In order to overthrow a
certificate of a notary public to the effect that the grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged
the fact of its execution before him, mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence
must be so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the
certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld. The appellate court's ruling that
the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the clear, strong, and convincing
evidence necessary to overcome the positive value of the extrajudicial settlements executed by the parties,
all of which are public documents, being essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to great respect by the
appellate court and should not be disturbed on appeal.
An action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil Code
prescribes in ten years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title. Asuncion
Teves acquired title over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-appellants in
1984, which is more than 10 years from the issuance of title.
JAVELOSA V. CA
G.R. NO. 124292 | DECEMBER 10, 1996
Unlawful detainer; applicable to land unlawfully withheld. An action for unlawful detainer may be filed
when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of their right to hold possession, by virtue
of a contract, express or implied.
Under the Rules, if the mortgaged property is not redeemed within one year from the foreclosure sale, the
purchaser at public auction is entitled to possession of the property. To obtain possession, the vendee or
purchaser may either ask for a writ of possession or bring an appropriate independent action, such as a suit
for ejectment, which private respondents did. The RTC case assailing the public auction sale of the
property and seeking annulment of mortgages did not preclude the filing of an ejectment case against
petitioner.
Pendency of an action for annulment is not a defense against an action for ejectment. The pendency
of an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance (which necessarily involves the issue of ownership)
may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment, the issue in the latter being
merely physical possession. To be sure, private respondents’ most effective remedy was to file a separate
action for unlawful detainer against petitioner.[17] They cannot ask for a writ of possession from the RTC
where the case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale is pending because after the mortgagee
was able to consolidate his title on the land and a new title issued in his name, petitioner was able to obtain
an Order[18] from the RTC directing the mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) to
desist from further enforcing the foreclosure proceedings.
REFUGIA V. CA
G.R. NO. 118284 | JULY 5, 1996
Issue of Jurisdiction; Barred by Estoppel and Laches. Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al. where it was
held that a party, after voluntarily submitting a cause, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court
simply because it thereafter obtained an adverse decision on the merits. The Court explained therein that
the “party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for
reasons of public policy.” It will be noted that the jurisdictional issue involved in the instant case was raised
only for the first time in the present petition for review on certiorari. The lack or absence of appellate
jurisdiction was never questioned by petitioners either in their Comment submitted with respondent court or
in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal which was grounded solely on the fact that the petition for review filed
before said court was not verified.
Despite several opportunities to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals, petitioners did not
challenge its appellate jurisdiction and did so only after an adverse decision was rendered against them. To
be more precise, they raised the issue of jurisdiction, for the nullification of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, when the case was already on appeal before this Court. They are now barred from doing so
under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. Additionally, having participated actively in the proceedings before
the appellate court, petitioners can no longer question its authority.
Ejectment vis-à-vis actions for recovery. The proceedings in ejectment cases are summary in nature,
whereas actions for recovery of ownership require a full-blown trial on the merits. The difference in the
procedure in special civil actions, like ejectment, and in ordinary civil actions, such as accion reivindicatoria,
inveigh against the consolidation of said cases or the joinder of the different causes of action involved.
As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now stands, even where the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of ownership albeit only to
determine the issue of possession.
An action for unlawful detainer is different from a forcible entry case in that the former involves an act of
unlawfully withholding the possession of the land or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or
other person after the expiration or termination of the detainer’s right to hold possession by virtue of a
contract, express or implied, and neither is prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff
necessary; whereas in the latter, the main issue is one of priority of possession.
Inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an
ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication
of the issue of possession. Certain guidelines, however, must be observed in the implementation of this
legislative prescription, viz.:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that ownership is merely
ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under consideration
applies only where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of
the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff really and primarily
seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the
reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery
of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental
attribute of such claim for ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be
resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property.
3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where the relationship of lessor and
lessee has been sufficiently established in the ejectment case, unless it is sufficiently established that there
has been a subsequent change in or termination of that relationship between the parties. This is because
under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in
his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Corollarily, if
prior possession may be ascertained in some other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude
into the issue of ownership.
5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the
disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who
among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of
possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other
contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these
issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting
ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice
an action between the same parties involving title to the land.[26] Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land or building.
Justice and equity does not favor the use of procedural technicalities in Summary cases. There have
been cases where persons who have failed to adduce any legal ground for their continued stay on property
belonging to another have nonetheless managed to stave off eviction for several years through the
improper use of procedural technicalities. Conformably, if we were to allow the dismissal of an ejectment
case for the reason that the question of ownership is incidentally involved in determining the question of
possession, we are in effect providing the defendants in ejectment cases with the opportunity to prolong
their occupancy of premises, over which they have ceased to have any valid possessory right, during the
time that an action for recovery of ownership, which involves a more tedious and lengthy court proceeding,
is actually pending in court.
It is indeed ironic that a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case which is intended to be disposed of in
summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be the most cumbersome and difficult to decide. It is thus about
time that this situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of the worsening problem of court
congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving them a full-blown treatment in all the courts in the
judicial structure, and thereby save the courts the expenditure of precious time and energy which could
otherwise be devoted to more significant and vital litigations.
Occupation by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate the same upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him. The status of petitioners is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but
whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
JASON V. YGAÑA
A.M. NO. RTJ-00-1543 | AUGUST 4, 2000
Appelate court can not decree the execution of a decision which it affirmed from the lower court. In
Sy v Romero (214 SCRA 187, 195 [1992]), we explicitly stated: “In an ejectment case, the appellate court
which affirms a decision brought before it on appeal cannot decree its execution in the guise of an
execution of the affirming decision. The only exception to that is when said appellate court grants an
execution pending appeal.”
Deliberately disregard an unequivocal rule on execution of judgment is gross ignorance of the law.
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it
is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
requires that the judge should be studious of the principles of law. Canon 18 mandates that he should
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is
not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.
DALUMPINES V. CA
G.R. NO. 139500 | JULY 27, 2000
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property involved.
In giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect
the person who in fact has actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondent ESTOYA is already
68 years old and had been in actual possession of a portion of Lot 725 since birth.
SILVERIO V. CA
G.R. NO. 143395 | JULY 24, 2003
In ejectment cases, the trial court does not assume jurisdiction if the complaint fails to allege that a
demand has been made. In case the plaintiff fails to prove said demand despite allegations in the
complaint to that effect, the case should be dismissed not because of lack of jurisdiction but because the
complainant did not meet the evidentiary requirement (preponderance of evidence) to merit the judicial
eviction of a defendant. In the case at bar, the complaint shows that respondent made an oral and
thereafter a written demand on the petitioners to vacate the premises.
The pendency of an action questioning the ownership of the property does not bar the filing or
consideration of an ejectment suit nor the execution of the judgment therein.
Requisites to stay the execution of a judgment in an ejectment case. To stay the immediate execution
of a judgment in an ejectment case while appeal is pending, the defendant must: (a) perfect his appeal; (b)
file a supersedeas bond; and (c) periodically deposit the rentals which become due during the pendency of
the appeal. Because petitioners did not file a supersedeas bond, the trial court, upon motion of the
respondent, correctly ordered the execution of the judgment.
MELCHOR V. MELCHOR
G.R. NO. 150633 | NOVEMBER 12, 2003
The Municipal Trial Court would not have jurisdiction over a purported unlawful detainer suit, if the
complaint fails to allege jurisdictional facts. In ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. The test for determining the sufficiency of those allegations
is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer
of the plaintiff.
A review of the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners discloses these pertinent allegations: the
absolute owner of the subject land was their father, Demetrio Melchor, who bought it on February 14, 1947
from respondent’s father, Pedro Melchor; being the heirs of Demetrio Melchor, petitioners became the
owners of the property by reason of succession; as such, they sent a formal demand letter to respondent,
who had been using the property since February 14, 1947, for grazing cows and carabaos and for planting
crops; and in that letter, they asked him to vacate and surrender the property, but he failed to do so. It is
clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case for either forcible
entry or unlawful detainer.
Distinction between an action for forcible entry and illegal detainer. (1) In an action for forcible entry,
the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived
thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and
(2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful
but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the
plaintiff.
In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be
specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.
YASAY V. RECTO
G.R. NO. 129521 | SEPTEMBER 7, 1999
A distinction between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something
ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against
the authority or dignity of the court.
"The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the
dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial."
Corrective nature of the power to punish contempt. While the SEC is vested with the power to punish
for contempt, the salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The
courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power to punish for
contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
HEIRS OF JBL REYES V. DEMETRIA ET. AL.

A. M. NO. CA-01-32 | JANUARY 23, 2002
The Court of Appeals has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own
decision. Discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section 2(a), Revised Rules of Court, as amended,
applies to a judgment or final order of the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after
due hearing.
The Court cannot permit any act or omission, which yanks public faith away from the judiciary, for a
judge’s utter lack of familiarity with the rules undermines public confidence in the competence of
the courts. In fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges must be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence. He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hand and be proficient
in the interpretation of laws and procedural rules.
In order to discipline a judge, it must be clearly shown that the judgment or order is unjust as being
contrary to law and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice. Judges cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of their official
acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act fraudulently or
corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be held criminally or administratively responsible. An erroneous
decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith in the absence of proof to the contrary.
“Justice Malcolm aptly described ideal judges as ‘men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial
system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government.’ Those who wield the judicial
gavel have the duty to study our laws and their latest wrinkles. They owe it to the public to be legally
knowledgeable for ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice.”
ESPAÑOL V. FORMOSO
G.R. NO. 150949 | JUNE 21, 2007
Direct vis-à-vis indirect contempt. In Narcida v. Bowen, this Court characterized direct contempt as one
done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice." It is a
contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing.10 In other words, one
may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the
commission of the act of contumely.
Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may
include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
SISON V. CAOIBES
A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1771 | MAY 27, 2004
A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties. The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him
accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve
the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from
callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed,
the power of contempt is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish
disobedience, disrespect or interference with the court’s orderly process by exacting summary punishment.
The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as
respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the good order of
society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves. And, as in all other powers of the court, the
contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly.
MONTENEGRO V. MONTENEGRO
G.R. NO. 156829 | JUNE 8, 2004
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to
create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as
"disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity." The power to punish
contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,
and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due
administration of justice.
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct
contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal
to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do
so.
On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which constitute
indirect contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of
a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any
court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an
order or process of a court held by him.
+++ NOTHING FOLLOWS +++

Last Edited: Sunday, October 2, 2011; 18:44:21
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TAU KAPPA PHI 1948 | EXCLUSIVE FRATERNAL ORDER OF THE FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY

FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY

CIVIL PROCEDURE | CASE DOCTRINES | ATTY. HENENDINO P. BRONDIAL | 2011

COMPLETE LIST OF CASES

51 PEOPLE V. PEREZ G.R. NO. 142556 | FEBRUARY 5, 2003

ASIA’S EMERGING DRAGON V. DOTC

SEE DOCTRINE UNDER RULE 67

AGAN JR. VS. PIATCO

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V. ATIENZA

HANNAH SERANA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

PLATINUM TOURS V. PANLILO

MANILA BANKERS V. NG KOK WEI

ALDAY V. FGU INSURANCE

G.R. NO. 138822 | JANUARY 23, 2001

Test to determine whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory. Quintanilla v. Court of

KOREA TECH V. LERMA

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY V. COBBARUBIAS

PROTON PILIPINAS V. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS

Sufficiency of a cause of action; Requirement of a motion to dismiss. A cause of action is sufficient if a

LOTTE PHIL. V. DELA CRUZ

DELA CRUZ V. JOAQUIN

CHINA BANK V. OLIVER

MANILA BAY YACHT CLUB V. CA

E.B. VILLAROSA V. BENITO

MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL V. TAN

SANTOS V. PNOC EXPLORATION

SPS JOSE V. SPS BOYON

DASMARINAS INC. VS. REYES

PEOPLE V. LI KA KIM (AKA ED)

1. the evidence was discovered after the trial;

G.R. NO. 131094 | MAY 16, 2005

HUNG HYUNG PARK V. EUNG WON CHOI

1. the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

RCBC V. MAGWIN MARKETING

Remedial Law; Submission of a compromise agreement is never mandatory, nor is it required by

CITY OF ILIGAN V. PMGI

Consent of mortgagor-debtor, requirement in paying redemption price of a foreclosed property. The

D’ARMOURED SECURITY V. ORPIA

Distinctiveness and Independence of causes of actions, requirement for splitting or dividing.

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE V. FELIX

TRES-REYES V. MAXIM’S TEA HOUSE

LAND BANK V. DE LEON

An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as

QBE INSURANCE V. RABELLO

LPBS COMMERCIAL V. AMILA

DM WENCESLAO V. READYCON TRADING

LAGROSAS V. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB

Remedial Law; The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous

AGUILAR V. MANILA BANKING

LARROBIS V. PHIL. VETERANS BANK

SERVICE WIDE SPECIALIST V. CA

G.R. NO. 127578 | FEBRUARY 15, 1999

G.R. NO. 148510 | JULY 21, 2004

ETERNAL GARDENS V. IAC

WACK WACK GOLF V. LEE WON

VELARDE V. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

ALMEDA V. BATHALA MARKETING

MERALCO V. PHIL. CONSUMERS

LACSON V. SECRETARY PEREZ

SECURITY BANK V. INDIANA

Regulation of Monopolies. A monopoly is “a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more

ASIA’S EMERGING DRAGON V. DOTC

CITY OF MANILA V. SERRANO

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE V. HEIRS OF PASTOR