SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.

MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA

BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968

FACTS: The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of
interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was
originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint,
the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never
raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86
A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in
Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason
of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all
the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go
up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do
nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs'
motion for execution against the surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila
Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

LIBRADA M. AQUINO vs ERNEST S. AURE

G.R. No. 153567 | February 18, 2008 | J. Chico Nazario

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

FACTS:
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino before the
MeTC. Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired a parcel of land in Roxas, Quezon City from Librada Aquino and
her husband Manuel (spouses Aquino). Aure claimed that after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for
the sale of the subject property, they refused to vacate. Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks COA because Aure and
Aure Lending do not have any legal right over the subject property. As stated in the MOA that accompanied the sale, Aure
shall secure a loan in his own name using the subject property as collateral and turn over the proceeds thereof to the
spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure successfully secured a loan, the spouses Aquino did not benefited therefrom.

MeTC ruled in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for
non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other grounds. The MeTC observed that
Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has been
made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level. Also, Aure Lending was not a party to the case because it
would not incur any injury and the suit was one incapable of pecuniary estimation so it should have been filed with the
RTC. The RTC affirmed and stressed that the barangay conciliation process is a conditio sine qua non for the filing
of an ejectment complaint involving residents of the same barangay, and failure to comply therewith constitutes sufficient
cause for the dismissal of the action. The CA reversed the two courts and remanded the case to the MeTC. It declared
that the failure of Aure to subject the matter to barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the
sufficiency of Aure’s Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in her Answer. Also, mere assertion of
ownership does not divest the MeTC of its summary jurisdiction over the matter.

ISSUES:
WON non-compliance with barangay conciliation proceedings is a jurisdictional defect that leads to
dismissal - No
WON allegation of ownership ousts MeTC of jurisdiction - No

HELD:
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in the
judicial courts. This could be accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts which, according to the
conceptor of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character, and to make it
truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would
be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the
KatarungangPambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would be better served if an out-of-court settlement of the case is
reached voluntarily by the parties.

It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government
Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same
effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-
maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

We find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTCafter having submitted herself voluntarily
thereto. We have scrupulously examined Aquino’s Answer before the MeTC and there is utter lack of any objection on her
part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition. The fact that Aquino raised such
objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse
to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances when the court may motuproprio dismiss
the claim, and that is when the pleadings or evidence on the record show that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause; or (3) where the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may
not motuproprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the requirement
for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial
court of a case on its own initiative.

Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as these allegations
demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

That Aquino impugned the validity of Aure’s title over the subject property and claimed that the Deed of Sale was
simulated should not divest the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case. In other words, inferior courts are now
“conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment
suit.” These courts shall resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a
determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS. TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & DEVT. CORP. ET AL.
G.R. No. 173386 February 11, 2014

FACTS: Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. are the registered owners of a parcel of land in
Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. A portion of this land was awarded by respondent,
DAR to beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Trinidad opposed this move in the RTC and alleged
that: DAR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the valuation by Land Bank is
not just compensation, the register of deeds cannot cancel their title without a court order, and that Land Bank together
with the LRA and Register of deeds committed grave abuse of discretion when they cooperated to commit the act. In its
answer, DAR asserted that jurisdiction over all matters concerning agrarian reform exclusively belongs to DAR and that
the RTC’s jurisdiction in agrarian reform matters is limited only to the determination of just compensation and
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657. The RTC ruled in favor of Trinidad claiming that it has jurisdiction.
On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court’s decision citing that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said case hence this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

HELD: No. In view of Section 54 of RA 6657; the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended
petition as it did not have jurisdiction over both the petition and amended petition filed by Trinidad et al. which clearly
provides that it is the CA, and not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case. It is a cardinal principle in remedial law
that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing
of the complaint and the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the
law and cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties. It cannot also be acquired through or
waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. It is neither for
the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. The nature of an action,
as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of
the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by
the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Section 54 of RA 6657 leaves no room for doubt that decisions,
orders, awards or rulings of the DAR may be brought to the CA by certiorari and not with the RTC through an ordinary
action for cancellation of title. The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial
evidence. The Court likewise ruled in the similar case of DAR v. Cuenca that "[a]ll controversies on the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature." Given our ruling that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over the instant case, we find no necessity to address the other issues raised in the three consolidated
petitions. The petition is denied.
PHILIPPINE WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC.,v TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND
3RD GENERATION HEIRS FOUNDATION, INC
GR NO. 199595 2 APRIL 2014
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the issuance of an
order commanding the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the Court Sheriff of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, to
cease and desist from implementing the Court Resolutions denying with finality Philippine Woman's Christian
Temperance Union, Inc.'s (PWCTUI) petition for review of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision4 which affirmed the
Decision5 of the RTC in LRC Case which orders the RD to cancel TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and issue in lieu thereof a new
title in the name of Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc. free from all liens and
encumbrances. PWCTUI also prays, as ancillary remedy, for the re-opening of LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and as
provisional remedy, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.

Respondent Teodoro R. Yangco (2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs) Foundation, Inc. (TRY Foundation) filed before the RTC
of Quezon City, acting as a Land Registration Court, a Petition for the Issuance of New Title in Lieu of Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 20970 T-22702 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City docketed as LRC Case No. Q-
18126(04).7
TRY Foundation alleged that it is composed of the 2nd and 3rd generation heirs and successors-in-interest to the first
generation testamentary heirs of the late philanthropist Teodoro R. Yangco (Yangco) who donated a parcel of land subject
to two conditions.
The property was then registered in the name of PWCTUI by virtue of TCT No. 20970 at the back of which the
above-quoted conditions of the donation were annotated. PWCTUI’s corporate term expired. Five years thereafter, using
the same corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SEC Registration and forthwith applied for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970 over the subject property thru LRC Case No. 22702 (a new LRC Case). The application
was granted and PWCTUI was issued a new TCT No. 20970 T-22702 which, however, bore only the first condition
imposed on the donation.

TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of PWCTUI’s corporate term effectively rescinded the donation pursuant to
the "unwritten resolutory condition" deemed written by Article 1315 of the Civil Code14 prescribing that the Corporation
Code, specifically Section 122 thereof, be read into the donation. Interestingly the latter provision mandates dissolved
corporation to wind up their affairs and dispose of their assets within three years from the expiration of their term. Being
comprised of the heirs of the donor, TRY Foundation claimed that it is entitled to petition for the issuance of a new title in
their name pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. TRY Foundation prayed for the issuance of a
new title in its name after the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702.
PWCTUI opposed the petition arguing that: (1) TRY Foundation has no legal personality to bring the action because the
donation has never been revoked and any right to demand for its revocation already prescribed; (2) although PCWTUI’s
corporate term was not extended upon its expiration in 1979, it nonetheless registered anew and continued the operations,
affairs and social work of the corporation; it also continued to possess the property and exercised rights of ownership over
it; (3) only the appropriate government agency and not TRY Foundation or any other private individual can challenge the
corporate life and existence of PCWTUI; (4) TRY Foundation and its counsel are guilty of forum shopping because they
have already questioned PWCTUI’s corporate personality in a different forum but failed to obtain a favorable relief; (5)
TRY Foundation is guilty of fraud for failing to include PWCTUI as an indispensable party and to furnish it with a copy of
the petition; and (6) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition because PWCTUI is unaware of its publication
The RTC granted TRY Foundation’s petition by ordering the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702
and the issuance of a new title in the name of TRY Foundation.
PWCTUI appealed to the CA, arguing, among others, that it must be determined whether the condition imposed in the
donation has already occurred or deemed fulfilled. The CA affirmed the RTC’s findings.
PWCTUI no longer raised the jurisdiction issue before the CA and limited its appeal to the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the RTC on its corporate existence and capacity as the subject property’s uninterrupted owner. The matter
reached the Court thru a petition for review under Rule 45, but with the question of jurisdiction absent in the appellate
pleadings, the Court was constrained to review only mistakes of judgment.
PWCTUI sought recourse with the Court thru a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was denied for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision. PWCTUI moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied with finality. The court Resolution became final and executory.

ISSUE: 1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the petition of TRY Foundation?

RULING:
NO. The RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition of TRY Foundation. The RTC judgment in LRC Case
No. Q-18126(04) and all proceedings taken in relation thereto were void because the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the fundamental subject matter of TRY Foundation’s petition for the issuance of a title which was in reality, a complaint
for revocation of donation, an ordinary civil action outside the ambit of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.
 Observably, TRY Foundation is actually seeking to recover the possession and ownership of the subject property
from PWCTUI and not merely the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702. The propriety of pronouncing TRY
Foundation as the absolute owner of the subject property rests on the resolution of whether or not the donation made to
PWCTUI has been effectively revoked when its corporate term expired in 1979.
While PWCTUI could have still challenged the RTC’s jurisdiction even on appeal, its failure to do so cannot work
to its disadvantage. The issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel; no laches will even attach to a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction.51
Hence, since the Court Resolutions dated July 21, 2010 and September 15, 2010 in G.R. No. 190193 disposed the case only
insofar as the factual and legal questions brought before the CA were concerned, they cannot operate as a procedural
impediment to the present ruling which deals with mistake of jurisdiction.1âwphi1
This is not to say, however, that a certiorari before the Court is a remedy against its own final and executory judgment. As
made known in certain cases, the Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a
necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same.

Topic: Verification; Rule 45 petition; Jurisdictional error; Certiorari; Judicial courtesy

Juan Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club,
G.R. No. 190253, June 11, 2014

Facts: Uniwide filed a complaint to get the refund of the total value of misdelivered, unsaleable, defective and/or
damaged goods, and to enjoin Golden Sea and Trajano from encashing the remaining post-dated checks in their
possession. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-0265, was raffled to RTC of Parañaque – Branch 274, which was
presided by Judge FortunitoMadrona. On August 11, 2005, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting
Golden Sea and Trajano from encashing the postdated checks. Trajano moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ for
lack of factual basis.

On December 22, 2005, the RTC issued an ordersustaining the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. On January
11, 2006, Golden Sea and Trajano separately moved for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Madrona for his alleged bias
towards Uniwide. On February 15, 2006, Judge Madrona recused himself from the case, but Uniwide moved to reconsider
his voluntary inhibition. Thereafter, the case was re-raffled to the RTC of Parañaque – Branch 195, which was presided by
Judge Aida EstrellaMacapagal. Uniwide contested the re-raffling of the case due to its pending motion for reconsideration
of Judge Madrona’s voluntary inhibition. On June 30, 2006, Judge Madrona denied Uniwide’s motion for reconsideration
and the records of the case were subsequently transferred to Branch 195. On March 17, 2006, Trajano filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 93492before the CA. In his petition, Trajano sought to dissolve the writ enjoining him from encashing the
post-dated checks. On January 22, 2008, the CA dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction with respect to Trajano for
lack of factual basis. The CA held that Uniwide failed to prove that it had a clear and unmistakable right to be protected
that warrants the issuance of the writ. This decision eventually became final and entry of judgment was made on February
27, 2008. On August 28, 2006, Uniwide assailed Judge Madrona’s inhibition from the case in a petition for certiorari
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95885 before the CA. Uniwide argued that Judge Madrona’s perceived bias in its favor was
unfounded, and that the preservation of the parties’ trust and confidence was an insufficient ground for Judge Madrona’s
inhibition.

The RTC held that the issue of whether Judge Madrona should hear Civil Case No. 05-0265 presented a jurisdictional
question that prevented Branch 195 from resolving Trajano’s pending motions. Hence, Trajanofiled a petition for
certiorari assailing the orders of the RTC before the CA. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101815. The CA upheld
the RTC rulings deferring the resolution of Trajano’s motions and suspending the proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-0265
during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 95885. The CA ruled that judicial courtesy prompted the RTC to await the final
determination of CA-G.R. SP No. 95885 before taking cognizance of Trajano’s motions and continuing with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-0265.35
In the present petition, Trajano insists that the RTC should decide on his pending motions since the propriety of a judge’s
inhibition does not determine the RTC’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. He points out that jurisdiction is
vested in the court, not in its branch or in the judge presiding the case. Trajano also opines that whether Judge Madrona
correctly recused himself from the case merely involves the exercise of jurisdiction, not of jurisdiction itself. Trajano
further asserts that the CA incorrectly applied the principle of judicial courtesy since the disposition of his motions before
the RTC would not render the propriety of Judge Madrona’s voluntary inhibition moot.

Issues:
(1) Whether the petition lacks proper verification;
(2) Whether the petition availed of the proper remedy in appealing the CA decision dated January 3, 2008 and resolution
dated October 28, 2009;
(3) Whether the CA erred in not finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 05-0265.
Ruling: Petition partly meritorious.

1. The petition is not procedurally infirm as it contains proper verification

The records of the case show that the petition’s verification page containsTrajano’s competent evidence of identity.
Trajano’s failure to furnish Uniwide a copy of the petition containing his competent evidence of identity is a minor error
that this Court may and chooses to brush aside in the interest of substantial justice. In these cases, the rules of procedure
should not be applied in a very technical sense when it defeats the purpose, for which it had been enacted, i.e., to ensure
the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases.

2. The petition is not procedurally infirm because Trajano properly availed of a Rule 45 petition in
assailing the January 3, 2008 decision and the October 28, 2009 resolution of the Court of Appeals
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court invokes the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
questions of law that has been decided by the lower courts with finality. The CA decision assailed by the present petition
involves its final order regarding the alleged grave abuse of discretion involved in the RTC’s interlocutory orders.

This CA decision should not be confused with the RTC’s interlocutory orders that had been disputed before the CA, which
was correctly contested by Trajano through a petition for certiorari. Thus, Trajano correctly filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA in order to strike down the RTC’s interlocutory orders that he claims to have been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. In the same vein, Trajano’s present petition for review on certiorari is also the proper remedy, as it questions
the CA’s final order regarding the RTC’s interlocutory orders.

3. The RTC should continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-0265 during the pendency of G.R.
No. 193972

The mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court
does not automatically interrupt the proceedings in the lower court. A petition for certiorari does not divest the lower
courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. A petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an
original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the higher court should issue against the public respondent a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction in order to interrupt the course of the principal case. The petitioner in
a Rule 65 petition has the burden of proof to show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ
or order to suspend the proceedings before the public respondent. He should show the existence of an urgent necessity for
the writ or order, so that serious damage may be prevented. Nonetheless, even if an injunctive writ or order is issued, the
lower court retains jurisdiction over the principal case.

The Court also qualified and limited the application of judicial courtesy. We expressly delimited the application of judicial
courtesy to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and held that the principle of judicial courtesy
applies only "if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund
as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court." The principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the
exception rather than the rule.

From these perspectives, the appellate court erroneously applied the principle of judicial courtesy in the current case.
There is no strong probability that the issue of the propriety of Judge Madrona’s voluntary inhibition in CA-G.R. SP No.
95885 would be rendered moot and academic by the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court.
Furthermore, whether Judge Madrona properly inhibited himself from the case does not pose any jurisdictional problem
in resolving the issues in Civil Case No. 05-0265. Jurisdiction vests in the trial court, not in the judges. Each of the RTC's
branches is not a court separate and distinct from the other branches. When a complaint is filed before one branch or
judge, jurisdiction does not attach to this branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the others. Trial may be had or
proceedings may continue by and before another branch or judge. The different branches in the RTC of Parañaque do not
possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other.

TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs. TING GUAN TRADING CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 182153 April 7, 2014

FACTS:
- Ting Guan Trading Corp. (Ting Guan), a domestic corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines) obligated
itself under a contract of sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron and steel to Tung Ho, a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of Taiwan, Republic of China.
- Tung Ho filed a request for arbitration before the ICC International Court of Arbitration (ICC) in Singapore after Ting
Guan failed to deliver the full quantity of the promised heavy metal scrap iron and steel.
- The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho and ordered Ting Guan to pay Tung Ho.
- Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
- Ting Guan moved to dismiss the case based on Tung Ho’s lack of capacity to sue and for prematurity.
- Ting Guan subsequently filed a supplemental motion to dismiss based on improper venue.
- Ting Guan argued that the complaint should have been filed in Cebu where its principal place of business was located.
- The RTC denied Ting Guan’s motion to dismiss.
- Ting Guan moved to reconsider the order and raised the RTC’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over its person as additional
ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
- Ting Guan insisted that Ms. Fe Tejero, on whom personal service was served, was not its corporate secretary and was not
a person allowed under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to receive a summons.
o It also asserted that Tung Ho cannot enforce the award in the Philippines without violating public policy as
Taiwan is not a signatory to the New York Convention.
-The RTC denied the motion and ruled that Ting Guan had voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction when it raised
other arguments apart from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over Ting Guan?

HELD: Yes. Tejero was not the proper person to receive the summons. Nonetheless there is no reason to disturb the lower
courts’ finding that Tejero was not a corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the proper person to receive the summons
under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts; cannot re-examine, review or re-evaluate
the evidence and the factual review made by the lower courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, it will not deviate
from the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding on this Court.
Moreover, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court. However, the Court cannot agree with the legal
conclusion that the appellate court reached, given the established facts. To the Court mind, Ting Guan voluntarily
appeared before the trial court in view of the procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary appearance is
equivalent to service of summons.