NEMENCIO C. PULUMBARIT, SR. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS (17 th Division Composed of JUSTICE BIENVENIDO L.

REYES,
PONENTE; JUSTICE ROBERTO A. BARRIOS, Chairman; AND JUSTICE EDGARDO F. SUNDIAM, Acting Third Member),
LOURDES S. PASCUAL, LEONILA F. ACASIO, AND SAN JUAN MACIAS MEMORIAL PARK, INC.
G.R. NOS. 153745-46
October 14, 2015
------------------------------------------
LOURDES S. PASCUAL, LEONILA F. ACASIO AND SAN JUAN MACIAS MEMORIAL PARK, INC. v. NEMENCIO C.
PULUMBARIT, SR.
G.R. No. 166573
JARDELEZA, J.

DOCTRINE: In In the Matter of Contempt Proceedings Against Ventura, O. Ducat and Teng Mariano and Cruz Law
Offices, we resolved to grant a petition to cite respondents Ducal et al. in contempt for delaying the satisfaction of a
final judgment against them "by re-filing motions and attempting to re-open finally settled issues through the
expediency of hiring a new counsel."

FACTS:

Sometime in 1982, San Juan Macias Memorial Park, Inc. (SJMMPI), through its President Lourdes S. Pascual,
authorized Atty. Soledad de Jesus to look for a buyer for the San Juan Memorial Park (Memorial Park) for P1,500,000.00.
Thereafter, Lourdes Pascual, Leonila F. Acasio, and the other officers of SJMMPI (Pascual et al.) were introduced to
Nemencio Pulumbarit (Pulumbarit). The parties eventually came to an agreement, with Pulumbarit issuing eighteen (18)
checks in the name of SJMMPI Secretary-Treasurer Leonila Acasio. Pulumbarit and/or his lawyer took charge of reducing
the agreement into writing and securing the signatures of all concerned parties.

On June 13, 1983, Pascual et al. sent a letter to Pulumbarit requesting for a copy of their written agreement. In
another letter of even date, they also asked Pulumbarit to reissue new checks to replace the ones he previously issued.
Failing to get a favorable response, Pascual et al. filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract, Damages and Accounting
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Receivership against Pulumbarit. On February 3, 1984, Pulumbarit filed a
Motion praying for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action, attaching a copy of the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA).

Pascual et al. amended their Complaint on June 5, 1984. Therein, they alleged that Pulumbarit falsified their
agreement, as the MOA provided did not reflect the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. They disputed the
statement in the MOA that the agreement was a sale of all the paid-up stocks of SJMMPI and not a management
agreement with option to buy. Pascual et al. argued that the falsified MOA was a nullity and therefore without force and
effect. In a motion filed on July 5, 1984, and pending resolution of Pulumbarit’s Motion to Dismiss, Pascual et al. sought
to have Pulumbarit declared in default. The trial court granted this motion and allowed Paseual et al. to present their
evidence ex parte. On September 5, 1984, the trial court rendered a default judgment in favor of Paseual et al. This
judgment of default was reversed by the CA on January 15, 1989 and the case was remanded to the trial court for
reception of Pulumbarit’s evidence.

Prior to the reversal of the trial court’s default judgment, however, Pascual et al. applied for the appointment of
a receiver to take possession of the Memorial Park and all its records and business transactions during the pendency of
the case. This application was denied by the trial court in an Order dated October 10, 1991. Pulumbarit filed a Notice of
Appeal dated August 19, 2000. His appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69931. Meanwhile, and before the
transniittal of the records of Civil Case No. 7250-M to the CA, Pascual et al. filed with the trial court motions praying for
(1) the issuance of a writ of injunction against Pulumbarit and (2) the execution of the decision pending appeal. The trial
court granted these motions on September 13, 2000 pursuant to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Pulumbarit’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration of this Order (directing discretionary execution) was denied on October 3, 2000.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pascual et al.’s filing of an Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931,
despite knowledge of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 constitutes abuse of the court’s processes.
HELD:
Yes. Pascual et. Al. committed abuse of court’s processes. We, however, note with disapproval the
circumstances surrounding Pascual et al.'s filing of said motion.

In In the Matter of Contempt Proceedings Against Ventura, O. Ducat and Teng Mariano and Cruz Law Offices,49 we
resolved to grant a petition to cite respondents Ducal et al. in contempt for delaying the satisfaction of a final judgment
against them "by re-filing motions and attempting to re-open finally settled issues through the expediency of hiring a
new counsel." We ruled:

We grant the motion of petitioner as we find respondent Ventura O. Ducat and his counsel Atty. Elgar
Cruz guilty of indirect contempt, of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71, of the Rules of Court.

xxx

A comparison of the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on 14 September 1993 with the urgent motion to
declare failure of auction sale of the Wack Wack properly filed on 18 August 1994 discloses that the
latter motion merely echoed the allegations found in the former motion. Furthermore, both motions
prayed for the same relief, namely, the annulment of the auction sale conducted on 7 September 1992.
In effect, respondents asked the trial court in the 18 August 1994 motion to resolve an issue which has
been settled by the same court as early as 3 November 1993, affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 31
January 1994, and by this Court on 11 July 1994. Equally disdainful is the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of the 11 July 1994 ruling was still pending before this Court when respondents filed the
18 August 1994 motion. The foregoing actuation demonstrates defiance of the tuithority and dignity of
this Court and disrespect of the administration of justice.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Here, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction against the
discretionary execution on January 26, 2001 and March 28, 2001, respectively. On April 16, 2001, Pulumbarit posted the
required bond amounting to P500,000.00.Pascual et al., on the other hand, filed their motion for execution
pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 on May 11, 2001, nearly four months after the issuance of the TRO, two months
after the writ of injunction and almost a month from Pulumbarit's posting of the bond.

Said motion is clearly an attempt on Pascual et al.'s part to undermine the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 in Pulumbarit's favor. (Notably, Pascual et al. do not appear to have
sought the reconsideration of the issuance of said injunctive orders.) Not unlike Ducat,therefore, Pascual's filing of
the motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 demonstrates defiance of, if not lack of due respect for, the authority of the CA
which earlier issued injunctive writs against the execution by the trial court of the appealed Decision.
 G.R. No. 177600, October 19, 2015
MAYOR ANWAR BERUA BALINDONG, LT. COL. JALANDONI COTA, MAYOR AMER ODEN BALINDONG, AND ALI
BALINDONG, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, STATE PROSECUTOR LEAH ARMAMENTO, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AND ZENAIDA LIMBONA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 178684

ZENAIDA M. LIMBONA, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE ALEXANDER S. BALUT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 76, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.

DOCTRINE: Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice
and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct which tends
to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due
administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct
as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties
litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No.
173290. To start with, there was no indication in his Order that bad faith had moved him to suspend the
implementation of the warrants of arrest against Balindong, et al., or that he had thereby acted with a willful and
deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence
of the clear showing of bad faith on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he could
not be held to account. Secondly, the history of the criminal cases, x x x must have probably persuaded Judge Balut to
tread the path of prudence and caution. x x x And, thirdly, his actuations were entirely different from those of Judge
Lee's, who downgraded the offenses.

FACTS:

The long-drawn controversy now raised in the instant petition was instigated by a shooting incident that took
place in Poblacion, Malabang, Lanao del Sur on May 11, 1998 that resulted in the death of Dante Limbona and Ante
Maguindanao, and the serious wounding of Azis Panda and Kiri Hadji Salik. In the course of the preliminary investigation
the investigating prosecutor found probable cause to charge private respondents Lt. Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar
Berua Balindong, PO1 Kennedy Balindong, Amer Oden Balindong and Ali Sarip Balindong with Double Murder with
Multiple Frustrated Murder. The Information was thereupon filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malabang, Lanao del
Sur, Branch 12. However, after reinvestigation ordered by the trial court, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
downgraded the charges against private respondents Lt. Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong and Kennedy
Balindong and dropped the charges against Amer Oden Balindong and Ali Balindong. Private complainant Zenaida
Limbona, the widow of the victim Dante Limbona, filed a petition for review questioning the Provincial Prosecutor's 28
August 1998 Resolution before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a 4 August 1999 Resolution, then Secretary Serafin
Cuevas modified the assailed resolution and directed the Provincial Prosecutor to file instead "two (2) informations for
frustrated murder with attempted murder, two (2) informations for frustrated murder and an information for attempted
murder" against private respondents. Subsequently, in a 1 December 1999 Resolution, Secretary Cuevas denied private
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.

In view, however, of the Supplemental Manifestation filed by Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote, the dispositive
portion of the Resolution had been modified. The corresponding Amended Informations were accordingly filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Maguindanao, Cotabato City.

Private respondents, in the meantime, filed a second Motion for Reconsideration, which the succeeding DOJ
Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero in a 16 March 2000 Resolution denied "with finality and with warning that no further
pleadings will be entertained". Undeterred by the tenor of the denial of their second motion for reconsideration, they
filed a Third Motion for Reconsideration that was eventually granted by the new DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a 12
March 2001 Resolution. Private complainants sought reconsideration thereof but the same was subsequently denied in
a 24 July 2001 Resolution, prompting them to bring the matter before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari
docketed as C.A. G.R. SP No. 66858.

Later, Criminal Case Nos. 2503 and 2573 were re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
219 and re-docketed. Then, pursuant to the 22 May 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 219 issued a
resolution finding probable cause to charge private respondents for Murder with Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No.
Q-01-998992-93 [sic], Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-01-100542-43, and Attempted Murderin Criminal Case
No. Q-01-100594. The warrants of arrest were accordingly issued against private respondents, who, undaunted, went up
to the Supreme Court to question the Decision of the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 159962. Soon after, the Supreme Court promulgated therein its 16 December 2004 Decision,
denying the Decision of the CA.

Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied with finality as the Supreme
Court declared in its 6 June 2005 Resolution that "there is no longer any obstacle to the implementation of the existing
warrants of arrest". Despite the categorical pronouncement, however, private respondents adamantly filed another
motion purportedly for clarification of the 16 December 2004 Decision but which was in fact an attempt to have the High
Court order a re-determination by the trial court of the appropriate crime with which to charge private respondents. In
the 14 August 2005 Resolution, the Supreme Court ruled thus:

"The Court Resolves to (a) EXPUNGE from the records of this case petitioners' urgent motion
for clarification dated June 25, 2005, xxx; and (b) ADMONISH petitioners and their counsel to pay heed
to the directives of this Court and against misrepresenting the import of its rulings and to desist from
any further unauthorized pleadings UNDER PAIN OF CONTEMPT."

After issuing the Order relative to the enforcement of the warrants of arrest against private respondents,
however, the presiding judge of the RTC-Branch 100 inhibited herself as well from hearing the criminal cases and the
same were re-raffled anew to the RTC-Branch 83, presided by respondent Judge Ralph S. Lee.

Private respondents then filed before RTC-Branch 83 a Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-Existence of
Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant Dismissal - Even of the Appropriate Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and
Attempted Homicides. Private complainants, on the other hand, moved for respondent Judge Lee's inhibition when the
latter failed to act upon a motion for the issuance of Alias Warrants of Arrest. However, prior to voluntarily inhibiting
himself from the subject criminal cases, respondent Judge Lee issued the assailed 12 May 2006 Order granting private
respondents' motion for redetermination of probable cause and consequently ordering the downgrading of the crimes
charged. The cases were then re-raffled to RTC-Branch 77, presided by respondent Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, who then
issued the second assailed 18 October 2006 Orderdenying a Motion for Reconsideration of the 12 May 2006 Order issued
by respondent Judge Lee and setting the arraignment on November 3, 2006.

Private complainants filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition of respondent Judge Baclig, who later denied
said motion and re-set the arraignment.

Aggrieved by the orders issued on May 12, 2006 and October 18, 2006, respectively, by Judge Ralph S. Lee and
Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, the State, through the Office of Solicitor General, commenced a special civil action
for certiorari in the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 97121), alleging that:
RESPONDENT JUDGES COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED MAY 12, 2006 AND OCTOBER 18, 2006 ORDERS.

On November 20, 2006, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 173290 adjudging Judge Lee and
Balindong, et al. guilty of indirect contempt.
 The December 16, 2004 Decision of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 clearly sustained the filing of two Informations
for Murder with Attempted Murder, two Informations for Frustrated Murder and an Information for Attempted Murder
against private respondents. The Court even directed the implementation of the arrest warrants against them. This,
notwithstanding, private respondents filed a motion for determination of probable cause and/or dismissal of the case
against them. Worse, this was done after being admonished by the Court to pay heed to its directives under pain of
contempt.

With the finality of this Court's Decision, all issues relative to the determination of the proper offenses with
which to charge private respondents had been laid to rest. In continuing to file pleadings and motions purportedly
seeking for the clarification of the proper charges against them, respondents merely rehashed their tired arguments and
unavailing assertions. They did not only succeed in delaying the conduct of the trial of the aforesaid cases but also
willfully and deliberately flouted this Court's directives with their stubborn refusal to abide by our pronouncement and
their incessant nit-picking of issues already resolved with finality.

In granting respondents' motions for reconsideration and re-determination of probable cause, and consequently
down-grading the charges against respondents in his Order dated May 12, 2006, Judge Lee contravened this Court's
directive in G.R. No. 159962 and in the subject Resolutions. He impudently substituted his own judgment for that of this
Court. Had he thoroughly reviewed the records of the case, it would have been impossible for him to misread the import
of said Decisions and Resolutions.

Aggrieved by the dispositions of Judge Tolentino-Genilo, Balindong, et al. filed their Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of Arrest.As the new trial judge, however, Judge Balut opted to defer
action to await the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177600.He further suspended the enforcement of the alias warrants
issued for the arrest of Balindong, et al. Hence, Limbona commenced G.R. No. 178684.

The CA declared the assailed orders of Judge Lee and Judge Baclig to be in clear defiance of the Court's decision
in G.R. No. 159962.14 It pronounced that Judge Lee erred in opining that the Court had only sustained in G.R. No. 159962
the executive determination of probable cause by the DOJ, and had not touched on what appropriate crimes should
have been charged against Balindong, et al.;15 and that Judge Baclig similarly erred in holding that the Court "did not
prohibit the trial judge from determining the appropriate crime to be filed against the accused [once] the cases were
brought to his sala."

The CA took note of the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 173290, which said in part:

X x x x In granting private respondents' motion for reconsideration and re-detcrmination of

probable cause, and consequently downgrading the charges, the Supreme Court found respondent
Judge Lee guilty of indirect contempt for having clearly contravened the Court's directive in G.R. No.
159962 and impudently substituting his own judgment for that of the Court. It further found private
respondents' persistent attempts to raise issues long settled by a final and executory judgment a
contumacious defiance of the Court's authority. x x x

x x x x

Accordingly, private respondents have been penalized for their contumacious acts and the issue
concerning the proper crimes with which they should be charged has been laid to rest. Balindong, et al.
have appealed the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121 (G.R. No. 177600).

In G.R. No. 178684, Limbona raises as the sole ground for her petition to cite in contempt of court Judge Balut
and Balindong, et al. that:
 Petitioner respectfully submits the foregoing acts of Respondent in willfully disobeying the decision and
resolutions issued by the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. 173290 (sic), which tend to impede upon or
obstruct the administration of justice, constitutes an indirect contempt which ought to be punished.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Balut is guilty of indirect contempt.

HELD:
No. Judge Balut has justified his actions by invoking judicial courtesy and asserting his judicial discretion on the
matters in question, to wit:

As a backgrounder, five (5) consolidated criminal cases were filed charging the accused Mayor
Anwar Berua Balindong et al. with murder with attempted murder, frustrated murder and attempted
murder. Thereafter, a legal battle ensued concerned mainly on what is the appropriate crime with which
to charge the accused. After several years of legal haggling, flip-flopping of charges and the inhibition of
five (5) trial judges, these cases finally landed in the undersigned's sala with a pending incident: the
accused's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR RECALL SUSPEND ORDER OF ARREST. Conscientious
of his duty to dispose of pending incidents with dispatch, the undersigned, fully aware that any
resolution of the said incident would spark controversy, which would necessarily entail another series of
legal maneuverings resulting in the further delay of the disposition of these cases, resolved to withhold
action thereon and deemed it best to observe judicial courtesy and await this Honorable Court's
determination of the accused's petition for review in G.R. No. 177600.

No less than the imperative of judicial courtesy impelled the undersigned Presiding Judge to
issue the order dated July 16, 2007. A PETITION FOR REVIEW assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision
reversing and setting aside the May 12, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
83), as well as the October 18, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 77) is
pending before this Honorable Court. It is to be recalled that in the May 12, 2006 Order, Judge Ralph S.
Lee downgraded the offenses charged in the informations from Murder with Attempted Murder,
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder, to Double Homicide with Attempted Homicide, Multiple
Frustrated Homicide and Attempted Homicide, respectively. In the October 18, 2006 Order, Judge
Vivencio S. Baclig denied the prosecution's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION thereof. In ordering the
suspension of the enforcement of the alias warrants of arrest dated May 25, 2007, the undersigned, not
unmindful of the Decision dated December 16, 2004 in G.R. No. 159962, the two Resolutions dated June
6, 2005 and December 12, 2005, and the Decision dated November 20, 2006 in G.R. No. 173290, merely
exercised his judicial discretion. He most respectfully submits that the issuance of the Order
downgrading the offenses is a supervening fact which now divides the procedural antecedents of the
case, i.e, "prior to the order dated May 12, 2006" and "after said order". Prior to the order, this
Honorable Court in ordering the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 219) to implement its
Resolution dated December 3, 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest against all the accused,
resolved that there is no longer any obstacle to the implementation of the existing warrants of arrest,
and ordered Judge Marie Christine A. Jacob (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 100) to enforce the warrants of arrest against the petitioners on December 3, 2004 with utmost
dispatch. In this stage, there could certainly be no question or issue as to the enforcement of the
warrants of arrest. The Court indeed spoke with finality. However, "after the Order, " where the
undersigned is, another issue evolved, which issue is still pending final determination by the Honorable
Court. The foundation for this Honorable Court's issuances, "before the order" could not be said to be
the same judicial foundation now, "after the order," as to hold the undersigned for contempt in
suspending the enforcement of the warrants of arrest. The legal milieu has changed. x x

Contempt of court is defined in jurisprudence in this manner:

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its

authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts
 orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a
defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their
witnesses during litigation.

It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No.
173290. To start with, there was no indication in his Order that bad faith had moved him to suspend the
implementation of the warrants of arrest against Balindong, et al., or that he had thereby acted with a willful and
deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence
of the clear showing of bad faith on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he could
not be held to account. Secondly, the history of the criminal cases, from the transfer of venue at the behest of Secretary
Tuquero from Cagayan de Oro to Quezon City; to the successive inhibitions of several RTC Judges; to the succession of
petitions for certiorari bearing on the handling of the criminal cases brought to the higher courts, including this
Court,32 must have probably persuaded Judge Balut to tread the path of prudence and caution. Indeed, he expressed in
his Order of July 16, 2007 the desire "to avert any conflicting determinations" pending the promulgation of the Court's
Decision in G.R. No. 177600. And, thirdly, his actuations were entirely different from those of Judge Lee's, who
downgraded the offenses from two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one
count of attempted murder to double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide, and ordered the issuance of the
warrants of arrest for such downgraded offenses. Judge Lee thereby directly contradicted the ruling in G.R. No. 159962.

The contempt power of the courts has been discussed in Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.,34 to wit:

Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is
an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity
of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from callous
misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the
power of contempt is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish
disobedience, disrespect or interference with the courts orderly process by exacting summary
punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and
necessity, in as much as respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are
necessary to the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves.

Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and
judiciously.36 Self-restraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule unless the act complained of is clearly
contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.
 BRO. BERNARD OCA, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, CIRILA N. MOJICA, ALEJANDRO N. MOJICA, JOSEFINA
PASCUAL, SILVESTRE PASCUAL AND ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE, INC. v. LAURITA CUSTODIO
G.R. No. 199825
July 26, 2017
LEONEN, J.

DOCTRINE: The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt and criminal contempt. Civil
contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other
party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or commits a
forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge. This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which
seeks: (i) to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to compel the party to do an act or duty
which it refuses to perform.

The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was further elaborated in People v. Godoy: It
has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or the dominant
purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when
the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both
criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil than criminal. The purpose of the filing and the
nature of the contempt proceeding show that Custodio was seeking enforcement of the trial court orders in the intra-
corporate controversy because petitioners refused to comply. Hence, this is a civil contempt case, which does not need
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

This indirect contempt case stemmed from an intra-corporate controversy among the Board of Trustees of
petitioner St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. which was consists of Laurita Custodio , petitioner Cirila N.
Mojica, petitioner Josefina Pascual , Monsignor Felix Perez, and Brother Vernon Poore then they entered into an
agreement with La Salle Brothers to give necessary supervision to establish the school's academic foundation. In which
they formalized it and given La Salle appointed supervisors to sit in the Board of Trustees without voting rights. In 1998,
petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca became a member of St. Francis School as a La Salle-appointed supervisor. He sat in the
Board of Trustees and was later elected as its Chairman and St. Francis School's President. In 2000, petitioner Bro.
Dennis Magbanua was also admitted as a La Salle-appointed supervisor. He sat as a trustee and was later elected as
Treasurer of St. Francis School. Sometime in 2001, they came into disagreement in regards of school administrative
structure and La Salle’s supervision over the school because of the opposition of Custodio thus she filed a complaint
against St. Francis School,Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua alleging that they are not qualified to sit in the Board of Trustees
and also prayed for a TRO to prevent the calling of a special meeting to remove her. The case was dismissed and she was
subsequently removed from her position. Then she filed an appeal but later withdraw and then filed a new suit against
them in violation of Corporation Code disqualiying Bro.Oca and Bro. Magbanua. The day after the hearing, the counsel
of the petitioners instruct the parents not to acknowledge Custodio’s administration and directed their payment to the
son of Cirila which is Alejandro Mojica who held an office held office at the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. which was
allegedly owned by the family of petitioner Josefina. She moved that the hearing be converted into an injunction hearing
be issued to allow her to continue functioning as school director and curriculum administrator. Custodio also filed a
Motion for Clarification praying that the trial court clarify to whom the school's fees should be paid while her Complaint
and Manifestation and Motion were still pending. It was reiterated by Custodio that Alejandro Mojica do not have an
authority to receive payments as he was not the school cashier rather it was Reynante Herminia.

On October 21, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order designating Reynante to act as school cashier
"with authority to collect all fees" and, together with Custodio, "to pay all accounts." The trial court also directed all
parties in the case to submit a report on and to turn over to Reynante all money previously collected. The petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation and
Compliance. They alleged that they partially complied with the October 21, 2002 Order by submitting an accounting on
the tuition fee collections and by turning over to Reynante a manager's chec payable to St. Francis School. The amount
allegedly represented the school's matriculation fees from October to December 2002. Custodio filed a Comment
manifesting that the petitioners did not even substantially comply with the Order because it excluded from its
accounting and turnover and she also claims that she and only Reynante were authorized to pay the outstanding
accounts of the school. On March 2003, the RTC issued another Order directing petitioners to full comply with the
earlier order. Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003,
praying, among others, that the trial court issue an order excluding from its March 24, 2003 Order the amounts which
were not covered in its October 21, 2002 Order which was denied by the RTC. In the meantime, La Salle served Custodio
a notice that they were terminating the Memorandum of Agreement with St. Francis School. On August 2003, the
Regional Trial Court issued an Order granting Custodio's Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002 and issuing a
status quo order allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and curriculum administrator. The trial
court ruled in favor of Custodio when it found that petitioners had already established another school, the Academy of
St. John in Sta. Clara, General Trias, Cavite. Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification Petitioners, they alleged that the
bulk of the money ordered to be turned over to Custodio and Reynante was allotted to St. Francis School's teachers'
retirement fund. Thus Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court which was granted by the RTC for the failure to comply with the order of the courts thus the petitioners were
found guilty for indirect contempt. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but the Petitioner filed a Petition for Review
under rule 45 contending that they complied in good faith to the Orders issued by the RTC and the CA erred for not
dismissing the petition with respect to Alejandro and Atty Silvestre who was not a party in SEC case where the assailed
orders were issued. The court denied the petition as it was factual in nature and petitioners failed to raise any
irreversible errors of the CA, thus they filed a motion for reconsideration. The court set aside its resolution and ordered
Custodio to file a comment in which she asserts that the petitioners defied the orders of the court and they were
afforded due process as their Manifestation and Compliance were heard by the RTC. The Court ruled that the RTC orders
were valid and the Status Quo Order was set aside.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt.

HELD:

YES. The Court ruled that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of indirect contempt. There
is a contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the RTC Orders. Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the
court and disregard or defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity.It constitutes conduct which "tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties['] litigant or their witnesses during litigation." There are two (2) types of
contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and (ii) indirect contempt. Direct contempt consists of "misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before [it]." It includes: (i) disrespect to the
court, (ii) offensive behavior against others, (iii) refusal, despite being lawfully required, to be sworn in or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition. It can be punished summarily without a hearing.Indirect contempt is
committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. (a) Misbehavior of an
officer of a court in the performance of his [or her] official duties or in his [or her] official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process
of a court held by him [or her].

Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard is given to the party
charged. In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt through "disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order, orjudgment of a court." The RTC’s orders were clear that not only the marticulation fees
should be turn over but all the fees collected but the petitioners were still not able to comply rather they Manifestation,
Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion which was denied by the RTC and reiterated their previous order to be
complied which was refused by the petitioners. As Custodio filed a petition to cite in contempt the petitioners instead of
complying with the previous orders, they instead argued in the contempt proceedings. All these acts show petitioners'
contumacious refusal to abide by the orders of the trial court. Again, the trial court did not exclude any other kind of
money in its October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003 Orders, all of which directed petitioners to turn
over all monies. Petitioners, however, still insisted that they had complied because they had remitted the matriculation
fees. Even after clarification, petitioners were defiant. The trial court also noted that even after petitioners had already
established another competitor school and Custodio and Reynante had already posted bond, petitioners still refused to
comply. The trial court reiterated the orders to turn over the amounts at least thrice. Petitioners' filing of numerous
pleadings reveals their contumacious refusal to comply and their abuse of court processes. In the case at bar, we find
that petitioners were not denied due process by the trial court when it issued the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003,
August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003. The records would show that petitioners were given the opportunity to ventilate
their arguments through pleadings and that the same pleadings were acknowledged in the text of the questioned
rulings. Thus, petitioners cannot claim grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court on the basis of denial of
dueprocess. The same principle applies to petitioners' argument that the trial court orders were being questioned in
G.R. No. 174996. In intra-corporate controversies, all orders of the trial court are immediately executory. Questioning
the trial court orders does not stay its enforcement or implementation. There is no showing that the trial court orders
were restrained by the appellate court. Hence, petitioners could not refuse to comply with the trial court orders just
because they opined that they were invalid. It is not for the parties to decide whether they should or should not comply
with a court order. In the two (2) cases involved, there are two (2) separate issues. In G.R. No. 174996, the issue was
whether the orders of the trial court were valid. In this indirect contempt case, the issue is whether petitioners willfully
disobeyed the orders of the trial court. Although this Court may find the orders invalid in G.R. No. 174996, the
petitioners may still be cited in contempt for their contumacious refusal and defiance of the trial court orders.
Therefore, the finding of indirect contempt will not render moot this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 174996. The Court has
acknowledged the trial court's power to cite parties in indirect contempt for their refusal to follow its orders, although
the validity of the orders is being questioned in another proceeding. In this case, petitioners were given several
opportunities to comply with the trial court orders. Even after the trial court clarified which funds to turn over, they still
refused to obey. While petitioners questioned the legality of these orders, they are immediately executory. Moreover,
the parties do not have the power to determine for themselves what should and should not be excluded from the
orders. Their failure to turn over the amounts showed petitioners' defiance and disregard for the authority of the trial
court.

Petitioners argue that contempt proceedings are similar to criminal proceedings, and thus, there must be proof
beyond reasonable doubt of their guilt. The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt and
criminal contempt. Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the
benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and
dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge. This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of
contempt which seeks: (i) to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to compel the party to
do an act or duty which it refuses to perform. The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was
further elaborated in People v. Godoy: It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined
by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose
is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. While the nature of the
punishment imposed is a mixture of both criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil than
criminal. The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding show that Custodio was seeking
enforcement of the trial court orders in the intra-corporate controversy because petitioners refused to comply.
Hence, this is a civil contempt case, which does not need proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court finds that it was
sufficiently proven that there was willful disobedience on the part of petitioners. Therefore, petitioners ought to be
cited in contempt. The Court rules that the charges against Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre ought to be dismissed. While
they were not parties to SEC Case No. 024-02, the trial court ruled that they were guilty of indirect contempt. In Ferrer v.
Rodriguez, the Court ruled that a non-litigant may be cited in contempt if he or she acted in conspiracy with the parties
in violating the court order: Nevertheless, persons who are not parties in a proceeding may be declared guilty of
contempt for willful violation of an order issued in the case if said persons are guilty of conspiracy with any of the parties
in violating the court's order. However, there is no evidence of conspiracy in this case. The power to punish contempt
must be "exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously." Without evidence of conspiracy, it cannot be said that the
non-litigants are guilty of contempt. The Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy to hold both
Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre liable for contempt. Athough Alejandro collected marticulation fees, he doesn’t have
authority to order how it would be kept or disposed and moreover it was turnover to Reynante. Atty. Silvestre was
indeed a member of the Board of Trustees but the decisions of BOT was not subject to the control of one man. Thus, it is
not correct to say that a board member is empowered to cause compliance of the trial court orders. The burden of
proving contempt is upon complainants and there is no presumption of guilt in contempt proceedings such that the
party accused of contempt must prove that he is innocent.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION (CONTEMPT IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES)

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are
punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is
to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders.
Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act
involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both
a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be
conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is
consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern
criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the
protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly
construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights
of the accused are preserved.

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for
the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise
expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an
action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one
for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special
order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment
is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal
prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings ...

In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has
a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is
the real prosecutor.

Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is
on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no
presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable
doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a
civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair
preponderance" burden.
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey acourt order, judgment, or decree which he or she
refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and the preservation of a right of a private party,
who is the real party in interest in the proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's punishment is to compel obedience
to the order. Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
necessary to prove it.