Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M.
CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private
respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private
respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no
marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his
answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial
proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas
were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M.
Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract
itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the
name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro
Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife
since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was
only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant,
that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple
parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby
was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her
daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before
leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her
marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there
was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from
the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay
City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970
cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear
from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
1
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on
or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did
she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only
on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance
of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent
appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local
civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the
Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the
contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent
appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by
the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their
record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued.
Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-
serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent
Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject
marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and
the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient
to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a
marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the
parties as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded
the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M.
Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the
marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly
presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not
the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24,
1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code.
The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of
the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license
would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of
due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court
is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by
an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found
to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist
in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find"
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony
in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her
petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil
ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage"
— a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a
civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives
and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas
was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during
the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F.
Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a
copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the
same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default.
Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of
interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no
evidence on record to show that there was collusion between
private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court
that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void
for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that
indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to
the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no
showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate
court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO
SY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, denying the petition[3] for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy
contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our
2
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.[4] Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah
Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14,
1978,respectively.[5]
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila,
then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.[6]
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children
were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick
transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila
on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father.[7]
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court
of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the
action was later amended to a petition for separation of property
on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just
cause; that they have been living separately for more than one
year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that
would govern the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.[8] Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of
properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by
the spouses.[9] The trial court also granted custody of the children
to Filipina.[10]
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006,
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in
the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated
by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando,
Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her
and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad,
took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him.
At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and
punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed
that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor,
and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina
suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her
body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced
by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren.
She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her.[11]
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its
decision[12] dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20
days imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against
private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the
following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual
infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4)
abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for
more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, in its decision[13] dated December 4,1991, granted the
petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual
infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded
custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions
for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's
infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of
her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of
psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her
husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part,
choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have
sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself.
Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of
her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their
marriage and became manifest thereafter.[15]
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its
decision[16] dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina
Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited
by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may
warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the trial court. In the decision[17] of the Court of Appeals
dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner
concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls
short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage
celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had
existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It
reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital
problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date
of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in
1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to
be in accordance with law and the evidence on record. [18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996. [20]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises
the following issues: Jurismis
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE
OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON
NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein
petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER
MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED
UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED
OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS
CELEBRATED IN 1973; Jjjuris
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN
TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH
RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A
REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF
APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.[22]
In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a
declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being
void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their
3
marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an
issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the
basic rules of fair play and justice,[23] in a number of instances, we
have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that
technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and
promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules
ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the
very reason for their existence would be defeated.[24] Hence, when
substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case
from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to
cavil.[25] In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the
issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando
which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply
seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however,
that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required
now is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in
her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the
incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration
of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her
marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out
that these critical dates were contained in the documents she
submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage
license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained
in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the
trial.[26] The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of
Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted
both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph
three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer
admitting it.[27] This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open
court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination, [28] as
follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married
on November 15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the
parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which
are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the
trial.[29] These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably
show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its
absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner
nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.[30]
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record,
we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition
before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date
of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the
issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she
presented, the marriage license was issued on September
17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on
record. Article 80 of the Civil Code[31] is clearly applicable in this
case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the
purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent
could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-
79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of
the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are
only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick
and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were
marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which
shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial
court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity
and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the
date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November
15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted
in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto,
these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts
contained therein.[33]
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private
respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our
conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was
solemnized. Esmm is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated
December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21,
1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November
21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage
celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap
and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab
initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
[31]
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character;
xxx
[32]
ART. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties
to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger,
dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party
may apply to the court for relief.
ART. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other.
The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or
thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting
obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the
spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors
who acted in good faith.
ART. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall
be governed in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local customs.
ART. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements,
agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of
property as established in this code shall govern.
4
ART. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements
may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the
marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and
136.
ART. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof
shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the
celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons
unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the
marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of
property.
ART. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may
also enter into marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if
the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the
marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the
provisions of Title IX of this Code.
ART. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by
a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be
indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to
be made a party thereto.
[33]
See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison vs. CA,
276 SCRA 582 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated
20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated
25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla
before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose
Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita
went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the
Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and
Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of
the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage
license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently,
no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and
claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May
1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages
were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the
National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of
marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May
19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain
Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in
Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil
rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an
aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together
with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That
although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San
Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage
contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any
marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him
through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of
San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was
issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said
office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this
time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where
they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same
marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations
and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly
shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding,
he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their
first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents
continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in
Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their
marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him
to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started
living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before
they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when
defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant
in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation
of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself
manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and
after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage,
he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan
where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the
Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious
wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated
March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994
(Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and
received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto,
issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11,
1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office."
Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a
certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant
(Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh.
"G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony,
having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall,
Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan,
Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of
San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March
11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr.,
the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have
been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had
a steady romantic relationship after they met and were introduced
to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her
family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff
who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to
Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family
and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to
Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton
Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry.
Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but
Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything,
and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was
still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites,
without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-
28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she
was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they
had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared
and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital.
Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations.
Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation
during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they
5
finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician
and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some
traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out
plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her
knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover,
plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which
she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far
and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their
marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant
attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A
compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when
he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines,
benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep
and then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon."
Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but
failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home
since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and
a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would
send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked
as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying,
did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in
their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela
Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not
aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his
daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned
home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since.
His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance,
and he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and
hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and
corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the
preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in
civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated
that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of
the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that
because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order
for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the
United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the
knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a
certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21).
During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792,
the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract
(Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the
marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following
justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the
marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage
void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs.
"I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one
issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage
license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh.
"F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value
under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage
between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized
by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969
as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious
rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May
31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage
license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No.
601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila
be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and
property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the
Solicitor General for its record and information. 7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the
trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the
Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption
is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local
civil registry of San Juan testified that they"failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for
the reason that "the employee handling is already
retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume
that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract
was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local
civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage
license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage
license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put,
if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong
possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage
license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on
the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with
defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a
marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not
substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005
which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April
2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in
accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration
of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied
on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the
issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of
the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a
marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry
of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the
presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact
of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or
not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the
marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to
declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force
at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and
80.12
6
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an
essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage
between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one
involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence
of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the
Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case
of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It
then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of
Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the
issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put
her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without
the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications
issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the
decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including
the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
must categorically state that the document does not exist in his
office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof
of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by
an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage
License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements
and deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by
this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number
2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
 Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969
force locating the above problem. to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?

San Juan, Metro Manila A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

March 11, 1994 Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for
subpoena?
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Local Civil Registrar
Q Did you bring that with you?
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and
provides: A No, sir.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: Q Why not?

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were
ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License
Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full
force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no
Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License
No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not
exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be
fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested
party for whatever legal intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope
and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force
locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the
said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not
exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of
Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise,
both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or
not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative
from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita
Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already
retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not
presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former
custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his
testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts
to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had
been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to
this Court among other things the register of application of/or (sic)
for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage
applications that your office maintains as required by the manual
of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license
2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to
license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him
how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office.
Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But
for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now,
was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that
utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where
Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the
Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively
rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is
among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of
evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no
other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence. One such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has
been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case
at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the
tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of
non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean,
as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot
be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search
for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.24

7

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
lived together for several years producing two offsprings,26 now
adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another
individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward
petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his
freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit
and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence,
their preservation is not the concern of the family members
alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume
marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on
the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling
with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said
in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.,
J.J., concur.
Footnotes
1Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate
Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A.
Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31.
2 Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
10
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
8
11
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
12ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional charater.
13 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.
14 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
15
Records, Vol. I, p. 103.
16 Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before
the trial court that in his letter requesting for the issuance of a
certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
he mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as 2880792 instead
of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)
17 Id. at 228.
18 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.
19 Id. at 735-737.
20
Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
xxxx
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence;
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind!
North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the
reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and
slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the
other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong)
and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas
and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In
particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a
person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of
name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result
of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of
Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that
he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged
to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex
from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in
Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil
registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as
witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of
petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would
be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of
a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is
not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will
be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.
On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and
the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground
to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
9
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a
decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change
of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted
the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex
in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the
Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his
petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features
of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes
sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled
by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error
Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name
or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned
city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the
power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name
to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change
of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change
of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first
name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. –
The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed
in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was
his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s
legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative,
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had
no merit since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of
his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate
As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need
for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical
error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed
in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing
or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth
or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference
to other existing record or records:Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
10
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss,
or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407
of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can
justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of
sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no
error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry
of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of
illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such
as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of
nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees
produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not
among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation
(that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in
view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In
this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration
of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall
be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by
either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to
the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents
or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such
other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record
of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in
the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from
a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female
is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the
sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing
ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law
was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot
be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-
to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name
or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice
to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-
ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial
court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent unionbetween a man and a woman.37 One
of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of
a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a
male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code 40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is
to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case
where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change
of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
11
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and
sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol
on when a person may be recognized as having successfully
changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact
a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written
word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life
of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams."
No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that,
at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his
Bachelor of Science in Statistics and Master of Arts, in the
University of the Philippines. He took up Population Studies
Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy in
Sociology at the University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii,
U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2 This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral
oschiectomy [or orchiectomy which is the surgical excision of the
testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the
vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and augmentation
mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the size and shape of the
breasts]." Id.
3 On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
4 Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
5
Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
6 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
7 Special Sixth Division.
8
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with
Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman
concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9
Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
10
An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an
Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil
Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the
Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
11Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March
2005, 454 SCRA 155.
12 Id.
13K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or.
371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
14
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or
nickname given to a person which may consist of one or more
names in addition to the middle names and last names. Thus, the
term "first name" will be used here to refer both to first name and
nickname.
15
The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. –
xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar
or the consul general, the petitioner may either appeal the decision
to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the
proper court.
16 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any
person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a
clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first
name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified
petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality
where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the
country and it would not be practical for such party, in terms of
transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person
before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be
corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the
local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is
presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars
concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the
petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled
in foreign countries may file their petition, in person, with the
nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general shall be processed in accordance with this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change
of first names or nicknames may be availed of only once.
17SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition
shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before
any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit
shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition
and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to
testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular
erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or
the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of
the registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be
corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct
entry or entries upon which the correction or change shall be
based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal
civil registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and
necessary for the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall
likewise be supported with the documents mentioned in the
immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be
published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall
submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcement
agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.
18Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992,
209 SCRA 189.
19 Supra note 11.
20 Id.
12
21
In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
22
Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
23 Id.
24
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February
2004, 423 SCRA 420.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
28
Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995 Edition, Rex
Bookstore, p. 238.
29
This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407
and 412 of the Civil Code which authorizes the recording of acts,
events and judicial decrees or the correction or change of errors
including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such cases,
the entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected or
changed. The decision of the court granting the petition shall be
annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil
register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil
Register of Manila, supranote 24)
30
The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male"
or "female" but the genitals of the child are that of the opposite sex.
31Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The
body that he inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what
the physicians have supplied.
32 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.
33 Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.
34In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221
(No. 2002-T-0149, slip op., Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL
23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999).
35 Id.
36Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct.
502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
37
Article 1, Family Code.
38
Article 2(1), Id.
39These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include
nightwork prohibition, facilities for women, prohibition on
discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among others.
40
These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on
qualified seduction, simple seduction and acts of lasciviousness
with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342 and 343 on
forcible and consented abduction, among others.
41
Section 3(jj)(4).

Article 4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C.
SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and
NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C.
Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I,
Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively
the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were
charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization
of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3)
bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-
issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing
fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed
their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents
was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to
Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga
City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was
however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N.
Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his
wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual
antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from the
records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against
respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages
even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following
couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying
the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a
marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin,
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria
Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a
consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and
A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being
that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the
ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with
the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares
the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the
lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved,
13
but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said
marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed
Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile
to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he
was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was
only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage
Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who
failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to
register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently
Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this
administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all
file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent
Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow
up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage
licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage
between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34
of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo
to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the
same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in
order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized
their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar;
that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative
complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage
contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date
and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are
in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria
Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since
he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license;
that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence
of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but
that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which
remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the
number of marriages solemnized and the number of documents
notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he
solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when
in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and
void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have
notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial
Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
documents which were notarized during that month; and that
respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each
document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and
failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry
where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered
is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon
Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible
for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are
merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which
are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is
Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that
she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference
there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those
payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees
she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00
charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part
of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general
fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the
discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by
complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the
preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number
of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant
Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be
based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the
marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims
that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the
month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued
by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held
accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees
because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that
this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his
failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore,
respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or
preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the
ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of
court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the
applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog.
However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for
duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out
that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave
a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she
purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed
clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no
longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to
respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in
his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications
for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has
the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand
in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-
conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8)
months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims
that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which
could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs.
Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by
respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that
she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt
therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has
been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was
never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown
that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of
Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited
with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk
of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that
the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the
bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the
proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was
archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the
accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with
the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of
court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention
prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who
is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of
respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured;
that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant
to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never
employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate
14
household help; and that he had to order the case archived
because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and the
accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from
the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such
entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that
while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy
failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she
deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate
Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick
leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from
said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she
was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the
check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank
account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her
account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted
P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to
the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive
Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report
and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the
administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the
same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and
exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in
said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry
and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which,
being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by
logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at
length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized
without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh.
B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh.
G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the
marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage was
solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not
filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed
their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his
signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and
Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate
as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of
the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family
Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The
testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the
photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their
marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared
that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten
(10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them
their marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living
together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites
of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have
a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the
parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the
marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized
the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon
explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the
marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage
and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the
mother of one of the contracting parties that he consent to be
photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage
as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was already
prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the parties
where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20)
kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The
fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract,
the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do
not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage.
His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of
Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya
and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after
ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had
not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up
to the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge
Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4,
K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot
possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage.
One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of
Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge
Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if he was
solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he
did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly
improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an
instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and
Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not
solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B),
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but
he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a
marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh.
AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when
it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen
(18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost
six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their
joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13)
years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is
hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of
this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to
ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might
ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant
marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed,
Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time
with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge
Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple
for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at
all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his
instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage
certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of
Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license
15
already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he
solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage
license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage
certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under
exceptional character where a marriage license was not required,
why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license
when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of
Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage
certificate did not state the date when the marriage was
solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a
copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not
any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning.
Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage
certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64
Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from
responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the
Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy
of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
(Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed
joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario
testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did
not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage
license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that they
did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told,
Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain
Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and sign
their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their
two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs.
F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June
7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of
Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage
license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the
marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why
did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that
she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-
28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge
Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and
Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give
the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to
believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized
also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting
parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and
paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor
of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina,
however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no
probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have
been that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter
his chamber in order to get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of
preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their
witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to
Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His
purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing
marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN,
p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are
supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare
that they take each other as husband and wife before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses
before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6,
Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as
to his alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a
marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the
testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the
practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting
parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that
he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday.
On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows
that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh.
E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also
that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month
(Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages,
respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in
evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of
persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs.
12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however,
did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and
certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not
charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is
not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having
falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme
Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of
documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the
notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants
insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and September,
1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for
said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to
H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen
(113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said
month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the
monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six
(6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official
receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged
official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6)
documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with
respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based
on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees,
but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying
and checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports
because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court
and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the
records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already
signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because
he is required to have close supervision in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper
16
discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs.
Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581,
it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency
or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the
falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo
whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly
report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her
own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties
she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never
bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the
number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the
monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter
as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the
data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check
whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in
custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial
register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because
as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other
properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full
control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p.
11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge
of falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not
account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those
documents notarized during the month of July and September,
1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show
that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them
to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued
temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have
been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents
notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113)
as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there
were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month,
though the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56)
documents actually notarized. The fee for each document
notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50.
Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually
being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that
P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned
over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she
really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for
each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for
considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees
were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later.
Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by
Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances
where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage
license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless
the contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge
Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn
over to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It
was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the
minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of
Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy
informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the
functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of
legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did
not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July
and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any
demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees
supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any
memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that
she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the
personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-
A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash
bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office
and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh.
Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the
alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond
was deposited informed her that they would settle the case
amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993,
after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28;
12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy
opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26,
1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One
Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash
bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself
the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one
year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the
filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally
deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of
Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or
order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost
three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said
cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February
28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in
Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent
Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and
X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank
or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the
parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle
the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months
later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of
said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on
October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for
cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she
received. She further admitted that some of these temporary
receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts
such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93).
Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official
receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993,
after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing
official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be
appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air
conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air
conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
(P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in
cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner
was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of
Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was
bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for
Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a
down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof
thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May
29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents
and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and
another person as witness.
17
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It
was bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the
vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air
conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of
Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt
could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in
this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of
the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of
at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA
27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash
bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria
Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a
receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her
affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that
this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of
respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and
this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of
detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped
while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact,
the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge
Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular
charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs.
Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano
and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the
municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and
0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken
by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused
was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge
Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a
former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The
complainants should have presented records from the police of
Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the
municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said
accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in
Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without
basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and
the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against
the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for
the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The
records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return
of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing
that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992
archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused
who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted
because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested.
Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of
Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be
confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take
custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the
case archived was because he heard from the police that Alano
escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should
ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano,
the former should have been required to explain in writing why
Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano
escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It
is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case
should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this case
for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another
circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have
really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants
could not present records or other documentary evidence to prove
the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing
fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying
filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was
deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the
bank. The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the
Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection
against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited
Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural
Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of
money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment
of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was
respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4,
1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank
paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated
January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she
would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6,
comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank
of Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees
pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening
the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to
have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was
made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos
was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12,
1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her
obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by
the complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license,
and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court,
particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it
has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were
falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same
or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts
or certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a
marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage
contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting
parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local
Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage
contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a
marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer
is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with)
the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the
Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to
comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the
performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the
preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya,
58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly
report of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the
same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her,
to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by
his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held that
"A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of
18
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the
monthly report of cases for the months of July and September,
1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for
having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said
two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the
solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized,
but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized
issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued
unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October
29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for
which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for
depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March
26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her possession and
after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any
court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993;
for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered
temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with
a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered
released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection
cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal
Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended
that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be
dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the
clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city
or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits
cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised
Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p.
127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the
Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact
the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and
their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and
order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136,
Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular
No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of
funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be
deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon
receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where
his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits
shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing
circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated
them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for
the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a
clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her
duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which
warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola
vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City;
A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of
court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies
received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt
thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme
Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated
December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash
bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct
and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty.
"Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and
serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the
service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct
and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must
be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is
more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without
qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its
personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of
ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter
alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those
affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for
herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised
Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of
course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to
be imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified.
For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of
marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but
actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage
and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his
undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as
hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree
of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of
judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00
on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern
warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the
future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished
to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes
1 Original Record, 1.
2 Ibid., 9 and 23.
3 Ibid., 86.
4 Ibid., 134.
5 Annong vs. Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602, October 15, 1991,
202 SCRA 635.
6 Capuno, et al. vs. Jaramillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, July 20,
1994.
7 Article 3(2), Executive Order No. 209, as amended.
19
8 Article 4, id.
9 Article 352, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 39, Act
No. 3613.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with
Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23
May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on
17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to
her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this
marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the
marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties
left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of
receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent
judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which
allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief
Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for
appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that
he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000
to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17
February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty
walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan
which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the
ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him
by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess
the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the
marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However,
due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and
the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared
that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license
and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render
the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent
judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of
that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his
sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting
parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a
marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance
dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator.
She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize
her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and
that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he
eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this
administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and
Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January
2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license
shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner
nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued
a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly
took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another
Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of
the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their
marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent
judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her
marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001,
a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent
judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the
failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and
Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent
judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed
on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the
authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior
courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs.
Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within
the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance
to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with.However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months
on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his
jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held
that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts,
are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than
the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
20
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the
instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes
in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent
judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. [3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is
limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance
of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs.
Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of
such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to
the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize
a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in
a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration
of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve
purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to
depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one
reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound
by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves
the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise,
that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of
a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as
a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is
fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment [2] dated August
5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in
Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner
Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000,
denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for
a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost
contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia
Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange
of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada
to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to
petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada
leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted
by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February
17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran
City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic)
among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His
motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy
case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment
in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds
accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners
claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that
want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must
first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court
cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce,
has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in
contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the
21
law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a
violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences
thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700
was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between
Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually
took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court
stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio.
The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article
349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved.
Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree
obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded
validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the Civil Code
and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of
public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as
the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for
lack of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed
that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then
there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein
petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL.
817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not
petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good
faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in
good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He
highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly
and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be
doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent
is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime
of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised
Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that
there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and
the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily
follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but
flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no
account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith
because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is
negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of
criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of
bigamy are present in this case. InMarbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we
laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been
for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during
the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch
1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by
petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in
Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that
such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage.
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date
of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date
of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the
eyes of the law, never married.[24] The records show that no appeal
was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused
must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking,
the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is
22
no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of
a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion,
for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time
he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and
the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished
from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who
enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even
if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void. [26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was
actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge
where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least,
the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later
declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also
find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense
of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court
dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY
on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral
certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon
and Edgardo P. Cruz.
[2]
Records, pp. 114-119.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with
Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon,
concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis,
dissenting.
[4] THIRD DIVISION
Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for
emphasis). See Exh. B, the copy of their marriage contract.
Records, p. 10.
[5]Theaccusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p.
1, reads:
RESTITUTO M. G.R. No. 167746
That, on or about the 4th
day of October, 1992, in the City of ALCANTARA,
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Petitioner,
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously Present:
united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990
and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and
prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during trial. Chairperson,
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
[12] - versus -
ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be CHICO-NAZARIO,
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally NACHURA, and
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the REYES, JJ.
proper proceedings.
[13]Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
Promulgated:
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
and HON. COURT OF
[14]
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other APPEALS,
August 28, 2007
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
Respondents.
which they are executed.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
- - -x
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
DECISION
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
[19]
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
[20]
petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court
Supra. of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724
[21] CA Rollo, p. 38. denying petitioners appeal and affirming the decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil
[22] Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition
for annulment of marriage.
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in

Chapter 2 of this Title; and The antecedent facts are:

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance

of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
[23]
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
[24] Rollo, p. 54.
[25] G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
[26] Id. at 124.
A petition for annulment of marriage [3] was filed by petitioner
against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of
looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They
met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day, 8
December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another
marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church
in Tondo,Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The
alleged marriage license, procured inCarmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a
resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for
a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14
October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose
Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate
lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to

23
cancel the corresponding marriage contract[5] and its entry on
file.[6]
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage,
respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that
there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary
to petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to their first
child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October
1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three
children.[8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to
evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has
filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143,
rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two
(2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.[11]
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6
April 2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties
is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not
presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover,
the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima
facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.[13]
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following
issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and
factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no
marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the
marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite
the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence
during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number
appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
24
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court
in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals.(G.R. No. 127263, 12 April
2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect
and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with
the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license
because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and
dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them. [15] The
wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in
CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized
the marriage belongs.[16] He and respondent did not go
to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a
marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them,
neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
cannot be given weight because the certification states that
Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage
license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8
December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53
of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to
Article 58 of the same Code.[19]
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the
time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.[21]
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court
considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil
Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182
was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of
due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported
marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is
absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage
void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as
void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The
court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and
the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued
on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took
place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage
license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage
license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification
moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to
whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating
the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz
of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed
in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor
of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December
8, 1982.
25
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita
A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was
done in the regular conduct of official business. [27] The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no
less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption
and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.[28] Significantly,
apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage
license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a
resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is
no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents
marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality,
not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance
of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered
mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.[31]
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage
license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage
license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this
argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the
marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1,
such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or
7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to
the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with
clean hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not
responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now
insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner
admitted that the civil marriage took place because he initiated
it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical
engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to
the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went
through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action
and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his
mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste
or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery.
His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage
betrays his bad faith.[34]
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony
twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage
license. There is no claim that he went through the second
wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his
head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part
of the petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they
presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage
contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before
the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as
follows
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary
document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I
am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I dont remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a
Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is good enough for the
marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose
de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage
Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same
marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage
License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.[35]
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing
participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil
wedding.[36]
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared
before a fixer who arranged everything for them and who facilitated
the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of
the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his
posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence
of any showing to the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing
officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage
license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the
license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has
fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always
in favor of the validity of the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the
law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 30 September 2004affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
26
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of
Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate
court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty
of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena
Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond
Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime
of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA,
JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA,
and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still
subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-
accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented
and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted
by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty
was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other
hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14,
2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the
prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he
admitted that he contracted the second marriage to Rowena P.
Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the
Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December
8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s
resolution is whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was
set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective
testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was
working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base
Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999,
they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’). While working in said
hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and
because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and
returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon
arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with
co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit
‘B’) when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted
Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig
and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between
complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P.
Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she
allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him
so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends.
Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of
her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she
(private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the
latter’s residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there
in the house together with a friend and she heard everything that
they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return
to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income
opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or less.
When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared
that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained
[thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of what
happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi
Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to
assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of
her money in the amount of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005,
pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the
marriage between the private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding.
Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private
complainant to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena
P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the
private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation
and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she
(Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and
the private complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24,
2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein
assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two
(2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and
the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that
he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with the private
complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to
marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
27
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to
the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a
Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one
Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A.
Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly
converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’ and
‘4’). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of
Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji
Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A.
Alyamin (Exhibit ‘7’).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim
convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this fact when
he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said
private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having
learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She
[sic] further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of
his first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell
her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he
does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is
indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but that he was not
aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage
Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was also
indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim
since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also
indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said
first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is
the founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of
the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and
authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He
alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and after
receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated
regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992,
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then
directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for
a certification because of the filing of the instant case. On October
2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10,
1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their ‘Imam’
also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit ‘7’). He declared that
a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy
Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth
wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be
secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity
to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim
convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the
same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim
also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them
equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but
was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena
P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he
advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in
accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will
not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages
3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim
in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does
not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only
came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is
the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been
married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private
complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said
marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
if he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She
also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage
but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she
learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after
learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim
rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that
she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this
knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved him very
much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN,
August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted
Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to
prosecution for bigamy: Article 417 of the Family Code, or
Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083.
The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for
allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim
male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them
in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic
Law and only in exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and
polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with the
permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a
second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because
having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged,
under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in
the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir,
1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any
Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages,
before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place
where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy
thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an
Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails
to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court
shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain
her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-
accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-
mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that
he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal
intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused
entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody
again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear,
therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just
marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are
requirements that the Shari’a law imposes, that is, he should have
notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of
said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that
notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is
of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a
law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused
recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites.
However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient evidence
that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence
presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she
knew of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano
Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations.
Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano
Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena
P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their
conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded
28
that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano
Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced
since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P.
Geraldino understands what was going on between her and
Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance
favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into account, proof
against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs.
Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit
Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders
judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of
his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by
law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of
Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his
temporary liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. The
trial court granted Nollora’s motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one
error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second
marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic religion
and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court denied
Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the
prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to
Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1Nollora’s two marriages were not
conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora’s
claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render
it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court
denied Nollora’s motion for reconsideration. The allegations in the
motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nollora’s earlier
arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to
modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6
April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Court’s Ruling
Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the
appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
or her spouse is absent, theabsent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of
bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; 14 (2) Nollora and
Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of
the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his
second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the
lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states
that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF
Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April
1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church
officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and
Geraldino’s marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were
married at Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro
Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated
the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil
Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have
been born on February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR
and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of
Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following
information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim
religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion allows him Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora
to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed
of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies
were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable
Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil
institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed
by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except
that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be
perfected unless the following essential requisites are complied
with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least
two competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali)
has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by
two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at
least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of
puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under
the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is
presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of
fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage
ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall
be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall
be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the
contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the
contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the
solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe
solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is
competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit
Court or any person designated by the judge, should the
proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the
solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized
publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office of the
Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower
may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before,
during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the
value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl)
shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court
according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states
that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-
Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
No. 209,19 in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply."
Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the
claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to
cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his
civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora’s marriage
contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or
falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in the marriage
certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such
omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for bigamy.
Nollora’s false declaration about his civil status is thus further
compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you
indicated here as your religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were
saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim
convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim
convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage
contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you
have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage
contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didn’t
know why they did not place any Catholic there.
29
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with
respect to your marriage contract with your co-accused in
this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr.
Witness, considering that you said that you are already a
[M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage
contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping,
I was keeping it as a secret my being my Balik-Islam, that’s
why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society
doesn’t approve a Catholic to marry another, that’s why I
placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you
indicate there that you’re single, Mr. Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier
married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that
your faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact you were already
as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so
we can get married under the Catholic rights [sic] because after
that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your
Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you
required under your faith to secure the permission of your first wife
to get married?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa
Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was
very mad at me, at the start, she was always very mad, ma’am. 23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity
of his marriage to Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may not impugn his
marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal
liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we
stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such
a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the
State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30
September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February
2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with
a term of two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the
accessory penalties provided by law.
30
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
*Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1074 dated 6
September 2011.
**
Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1066 dated 23
August 2011.
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
7
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
8 Article 180. Law applicable. The provisions of the Revised Penal
Code relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person
married in accordance with the provisions of this Code or, before
its effectivity, under Muslim law.
16 Exhibit "B," Records, p. 118. Also Article 2 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 209 (1988).
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites
are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
17 Exhibit "A," Records, p. 117.
18 Exhibit "B," id. at 118.
19
Exhibit "C," id. at 119.
20
Id. at 195-198, 201, 206-207. Nollora presented various proofs
of his Muslim affiliation:
Exhibit "1" and submarkings - Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of
the Philippines’ Membership Application Form accomplished in
handwritten form, dated 10 January 1992;
Exhibit "2" and submarkings - Certificate of Conversion to Islam
dated 2 October 2004 issued by Hadji Abdul Hai Qahar Madueño,
President of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines;
Exhibit "3" and submarkings - Certificate of Conversion to Islam
dated 17 December 2003 issued by Abdullah M. Al-Hamid,
Director General of the Riyadh branch of the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia;
Exhibits "4," "12" and "13" - Certificate of Conversion to Islam
dated 17 December 2003 issued by the Civil Registry of
Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur; and
Exhibit "7" and submarkings – Nollora’s Pledge of Conversion
dated 10 January 1992 issued by Hadji Abdul Hai Qahar Madueño,
President of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines.
21 Supra note 8.
22
TSN, 30 January 2006, pp. 11-12.
23 TSN, 29 May 2006, pp. 6, 9-10.
24 467 Phil. 723, 744 (2004).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the
April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite
(RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and
respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios
were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial
and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine
the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled
investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor
appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly
notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
Decision,5
In its April 25, 2008 the RTC declared the marriage void
ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee
Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using
the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it
and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it
stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again communicated with
her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus,
ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception.
31
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The
RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the
motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent
to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and
that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained
that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that
is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire
American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both
parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly
and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG,
consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the
concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition,
reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage
by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its
arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is
a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the
phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This
has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose
of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or
acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one
entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which
is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out
those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases.
It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.
"This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires
the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not
"entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of
the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,
does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a
sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946,
the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order
to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to
marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a
marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay
in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all.
Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what
forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which
may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule:
a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that
a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if
the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing
it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they
will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive,
they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and
it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v.
Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into
solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non
subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has,
therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being
that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally
denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a
couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that
when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on
to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the
RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
32
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00.
They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the
parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family
Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite
shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
"freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly
and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in
the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24Consent must
also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable
of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial
or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and
the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage,
as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage
in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage
status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not
be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating
a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage
not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal
ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely
no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be
bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family
Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The
possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to
nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and

formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void
or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go
into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows
married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided
that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31are equally valid.
Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to
utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration,
it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground
of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife
of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or
deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer
both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of
marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void
would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in
their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not
be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in
violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court
cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29,
2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414
is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
*Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic
Mario Victor F. Leonen per Special Order No. 1570 dated October
14. 2013.
**
Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto
A. Abad. Per Special Order No. 1554dated September 19, 2013.
1Rollo. pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez.
Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato. Jr. and
Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino of the Fifth Division. Manila.
33
11
Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000
956. Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).
12
Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000
956; citing Schibi v. Schibi , 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying
annulment where parties married only to give a name to a
prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop , 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct.
1970); Erickson v. Erickson , 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(holding similarly to Schibi ); Delfino v.Delfino , 35 N.Y.S.2d 693
(Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of marriage
was to protect the girl’s name and there was an understanding that
the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v.
Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore , 189
S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties
entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander
v. Chander , No.2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App. June
22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married husband to get
his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because
husband knew that was the purpose of the marriage).
13
Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)
(2000).
14
Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage
; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132
CONG.REC. 27,012, 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep Mc Collum)
(promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986).
15
511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
16Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
17 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
18 United States v. Rubenstein , 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
19
Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex.
1969), aff’d , 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
20Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000
956; citing Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.
Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
28 Article 4, Family Code.
29
Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200,
1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
30Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v.
McGuire , 59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
31 Article 4, Family Code.
32 Const. ( 1987), Article XV, Section 2.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-
CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24,
2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109.
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in
Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the
annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that
Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on
January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met
Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married
on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in
the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at
around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s
residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the
nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria
signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In
July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July
11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing
in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a
certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification
reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed
in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor
of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8,
1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7
34
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy
cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic
appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining
to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage
licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically. 10 He
testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and
signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967
was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of
the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. 11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and
May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister
of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at
the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary
Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing
marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez
gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding,
and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license
with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the
wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin
secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8,
1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the
marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding
ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as
sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the
couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann
Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed
Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She
testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila
City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before
the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house
with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the
same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage
license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev.
Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did
not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she
was told that the marriage license was obtained from
Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed
by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003,
pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of
Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen
in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons
depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of
Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will
get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned
with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she
and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they
gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were
married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on
June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who
had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the
existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on
August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the
one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around
them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no
valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage
License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for
Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither
party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the
Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from
the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage
license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of
the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas
on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005,
but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment
of errors:
I 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL
AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.
35
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER
AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE
OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her
appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled
that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence
that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed
the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil
Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The
marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas
contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1,
200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9,
Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that
would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3),
which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the
Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor
is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid
marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The
resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid
marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held
that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that
there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or
a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as
permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by
an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license,
the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia,
of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil
registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued
a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria
and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No.
36
9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite,
and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the
certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite
diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification used
stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no
diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could
not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the
Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage
license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held,
"The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking
the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact,
proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted
to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a
copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage
license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for
the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity
and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses
she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as
none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of
the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the
license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified
as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the
marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of
the marriage license could have simply been secured from that
office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably
failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid
marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of
Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of
Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of
the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was
valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license
was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity
in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No
marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and
Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the
alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its
conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the
CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down
by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate
of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in
favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely.
Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the
marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented
showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer,
the witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken
during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where
the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all
is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage
Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on
15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he
filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note
that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after
an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was
filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage
with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not
ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage
and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4
of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family
Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license
is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among
the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a
marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria,
it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to
evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make
up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The
law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is
clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated
October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is
hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
37
Footnotes
33
Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is
required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.
51
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at
the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
ailing party subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no
means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally
before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized
without necessity of a marriage license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the
solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the
local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to
administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis
or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or
barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil
registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain
the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the
absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding
article, together with a legible copy of the marriage contract, shall
be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil
registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the
period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew
members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an
airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in
flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned
officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in
articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military
operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.
Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic
cultural communities may be performed validly without the
necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August
2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September
1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and
Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally
GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December
1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in
order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice
and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired
the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the
name of Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos.
8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to
Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in
the name of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally
left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity
of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage
to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a
valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition
of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article
148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration
of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44
registered properties became the subject of the partition before the
trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by
Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to
evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for
reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which
the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present
any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her
petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally
several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2
October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite
repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present
her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case
submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor
ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated
21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982
and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued
to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was
38
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage
was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage
license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial
court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice
and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial
court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was
not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for
Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask
for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not
claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her
conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally
was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that
Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave
the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his
brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely
descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two
lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that
they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally
failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or
industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-
193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the
lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were
purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court
ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and
190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to
Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a
separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because
she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article
148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the
properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor
of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his
conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.
and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further
declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the
thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724,
17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos.
188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622,
194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629,
194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636,
194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211,
206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto
E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are
the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to
delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37)
titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money
without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties
of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is
appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties.
Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections
of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is
further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn
over and surrender control and possession of these properties
including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these
properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them
equally. However, the share of respondent is declared
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go
Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and
distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed
pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding
pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and
counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial
Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in
Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion
for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial
court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision
before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted
the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not
err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted
that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance
of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly
warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case
would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the
warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not
subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin
failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his
prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the
marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted
the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage
to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin
and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The
Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and
his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court
of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were
acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive
properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be
shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to
the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena
while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear
and convincing proof of bad faith.
39
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear
and convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on
the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the
case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are
hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well
as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be
owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the
share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-
appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’
decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to
present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the
property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence.
Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she
and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or
postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of
evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there
were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11
September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled
hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in
case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be
submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing,
despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted
on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that
day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on
the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial
court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case.
Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to
present her evidence because all the postponements were at her
instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit
the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence
on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to
present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right
to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s
continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities
given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with
the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case
because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals
on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer
to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue
any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not
accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that
trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed
by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could
not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio.
Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her
evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To
prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider
that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by
declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant
in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was
their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and
friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real
property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally
further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth
certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was
duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true
copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita
Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only
Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the
month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified
that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage
License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from
the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission
for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil
Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial
court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only
in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally,
intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming
from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents
seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious
marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of
Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin
and Sally were married on 8 March 1982 18 while Sally was the
informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982. 19 Benjamin
40
and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not
match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning."
In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued
by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February
1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which
made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general
rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio
and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision
and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court
of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned
from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest
of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the
concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is
not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall
not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence
to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on
the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of
bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G.,
4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting
marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage
of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no
marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent
that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be
sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the
marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or
criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid
marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have
all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a
prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not
exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share
in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were
given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance.
Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted
that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses which
included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the
decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722
was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married
to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married
to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of
a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no
co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge
Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the
failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically
labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality
against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a
matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in
addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision
or order itself.32In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision
because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge
Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the
decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally
or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would
justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the
14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 October 2012.
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme
Court Associate Justice) Estela M. PerlasBernabe with Associate
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a Supreme Court
Associate Justice) and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.
41
12
Article 35 of the Family Code states:
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as
to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
21 Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void
from the beginning:
xxxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
xxxx
Article 21
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the
March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace
J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994
at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted
Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. [4] They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the
Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -
- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November,
1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he
had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding
and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending --
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed
on the ground that it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the
Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15]The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and
Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that
the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus,
there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1 the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree
obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his
first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2 evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian,
to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes
absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage
to the respondent
3 the following:
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the
Family Code in this case.
4 marriage was dissolved or annulled;
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts.
11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable
provisions in this case.
5
42
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts. [19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision,
we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction
only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She
adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
the law of the place where they were celebrated (thelex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to
the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the
Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading
and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.These articles
read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce
decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian
family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment
is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad
is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of
a judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act
of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant
of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked
in that country for quite a long time.Besides, the Australian divorce
law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take
judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
43
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was voidab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was
validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types.The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree --
a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under
some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground
of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. [47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity
of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree
raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 [49] of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. [50]

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit
A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City
Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was
in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit
1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit
5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between
Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent,
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree
with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that
the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status;
or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may
turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the
trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial
justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose
of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the
parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[9]
The couple secured an Australian Statutory Declaration of their
legal separation and division of conjugal assets.
[17]
RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.
[18]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11,
2000, upon this Courts receipt of the Memorandum for petitioner,
signed by Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for
respondent, signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and
Associates, had been filed on December 10, 1999.
[19]
Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 242-243.
[20] 43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.
[21]
Ruben F. Balane, Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence
in Family Law, Journal of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, 1st & 2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.
44
[22]
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
[23]
ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
xxxxxxxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
[24]
Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29,
1965; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March 7,
1933.
[25]Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and
(6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27, 1987)
[26]Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October
8, 1985; and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, 663, June 30,
1989.
[27] Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.
[28]
Ibid., p. 143.
[29]
For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private
International Law, 1995 ed. pp. 295-300. See also Jose C.
Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p.
16;
[30]
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x.
[31]
Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil
Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; 3, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself.
[32]
SEC. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x.
[33]Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy
of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
[34]
Sec. 24. Proof of official record.The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office.
See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550-
551, September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-
134, May 6, 1988.
[35]The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original
copies of the divorce decrees were presented in court (TSN,
December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p. 176), but only photocopies
of the same documents were attached to the records (Records,
Index of Exhibits, p. 1.).
[36] TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
[37] TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
[38]
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28,
1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November 10, 1908; People
v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18, 1997; De la Torre v. Court
of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14, 1998; Maunlad
Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 114942,
November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.
[39] Art. 15, Civil Code.
[49]SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
[50]In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is
merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirement for
procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code,
an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated
on the basis of a marriage license issued without that
certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-
Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997
reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria
Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.)
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 152577
PHILIPPINES,
Present:
Petitioner,
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus-
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
45
Promulgated:
September 21, 2005
CRASUS L. IYOY,
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated
30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a
Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at
Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result
of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that
Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely
left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after
Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from
her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children,
that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her
American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was
afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she
had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times
more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in
1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in
1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using
the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations
made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the
time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left
and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus
finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to
Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American
citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While
she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and
having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations
made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that
she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she
may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain
occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to
contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not
have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money
for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons
as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning
as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to
support their family. Although she left all of her children with
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to
them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was
able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert,
who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a
letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus,
Fely married her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American
husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely
also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently
living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount ofP90,000.00 which
she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and
that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00
she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-
Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to
present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the
Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December
1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands
surname, Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take
the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children,
Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the
consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California,
U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders [12]and
Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of
New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the
witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was
ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been
over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence
and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, [14] considering Fely
to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was
thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely
null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
46
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves
a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is
decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the
United States of America and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already
married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case
in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution
of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout
the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of
the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal
Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the
Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things
over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for
these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of
plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and
void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of
the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC,
finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of
the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the determining its existence.
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she
has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant
has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the
was defined, thus
benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino
citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship
and thus becomes herself an alien.
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former.
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
of the marriage of the parties.[16]
celebrated[21]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
2002,[17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic
filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
a marriage;
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do
not per se constitute psychological incapacity. (b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were
in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
involved.[22]
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at
bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained
that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after a
full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already
become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality
of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable
laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down
by this Court inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be
reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and

the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
I
solidarity.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to

support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.

47
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity,
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations presented during the trial.
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus
before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
(2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in
thereto.
which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily obligations of marriage.
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27]
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases,
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves.
It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.
Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was
not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified,
then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v.
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under
explained.
Canon 1095.[24]
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no
the marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be

48
policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. [32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and
the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By
its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot
be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left
for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that
she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she
was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until
now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses.
Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages;
hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file
the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that
49
the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender
of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only
serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than
thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or
the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this
Court or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State,
in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when
the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it
shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate
courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of
the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198
(1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
(2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should
dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority
of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General
to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal
to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It
may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally
or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of
the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration
or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to
those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the
validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus
and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and
bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent
Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless
and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated
30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-
Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Azcuna, JJ
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgate
October 5,
x----------------------------------------------
----x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to
make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented
as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph
of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-
an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566
A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but
G.R. No. 154380
it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
Present:
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies
to Jr.,
Davide, a valid
C.J.,mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
(Chairman),
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
Quisumbing,
governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. [6]
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio,For
andhis part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
50
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed
before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory
relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the
issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to
a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while
in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists
on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying
for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about
in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its
enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code,
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is
51
one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as
an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while
the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity
of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be
validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse
is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time Petitioner,
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
Present:
the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American

citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated CARPIO MORAL
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her BRION,
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
- versus - BERSAMIN,
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to *ABAD, and
remarry.
VILLARAMA, JR
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper
remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be
a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
Promulgated:
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage DAISYLYN TIROL STO. August 11, 2010
tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
married to the naturalized alien spouse. GENERAL,
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent Respondents. -- -
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule x-----------------------------------------------------------------
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.[13]
DECISION
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove
his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a BRION, J.:
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must
also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the
as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into elevated via a petition for review oncertiorari[2] under Rule 45 of
another marriage. the Rules of Court (present petition).
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by
E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering on November 29, 2000.[3] OnJanuary 18, 2005, Gerbert married
that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due
and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
declaration could only be made properly upon respondents another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor,Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
SO ORDERED. fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
Republic of the Philippines
and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
Supreme Court divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
Manila subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. [6]

THIRD DIVISION Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of

foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as

52
dissolved (petition) with the RTC.Although summoned, Daisylyn
did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. [9] Article 26
of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account
the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file
the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims
to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party,
vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there
is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries
his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates,
involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
53
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative
history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on
the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in
the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20]and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right
to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24]Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode
of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed
by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right
that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of
a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
54
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of
his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of
the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless
we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless
to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with
our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicataeffect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and
for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate
based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider
the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, orhis being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in
the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name
and naturalization register.
55
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present
case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out
of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on
the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition
that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not,
by itself, authorize thecancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties
to the proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must
be published in a newspaper of general circulation. [40] As these
basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC
as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish
the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of LaoagCity, Branch 11, as well as
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January
2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate
the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately
issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case
from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
–
56
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of
the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in
"gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements
may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the
husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can
file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is
"for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki
and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition
of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition
by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code
on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be
absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue.
In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that
the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a
nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108
is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act
No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for
divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree
of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that
the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the
petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may
be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a
case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed"
the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated
its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and
improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of
divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks
to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other hand, the RTC
did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for
dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other
ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition
based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court
held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum
shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under
Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted
the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General
filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the
RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x
x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is
an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy.
In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he
or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal
remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the
present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected
57
the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino
citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears
on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be
proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact
that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied
that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other
hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and
Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does
not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific,
a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may
prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in
a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and
the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the
purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic
public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This
is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it
can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as
well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts
have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as
a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
58
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death
or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule
108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara
in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt
that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68)
his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right
to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further
to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity
of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to
sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse
of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section
2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is
a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there
is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share
in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is
also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting
his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated,
the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in
the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse
"is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is
entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For
this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare
as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the
entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus,
the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente
lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither
can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
59
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure
to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a
Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen,
whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino
spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The
Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the
foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage,
is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If
the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the
Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse
is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A
critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy,
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but
this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of
the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of
a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether
the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy
in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to
prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence
of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves
as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil

registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground
for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer
sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents
and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No.
Q-11-68582 are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
2 10
In Pasay City, Metro Manila.
3 11
See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009,
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz Galela
Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010. Translated
by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office (see
rollo, p. 89).
4 Id.
5FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as
amended):
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 41;
xxxx
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
6 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
7 The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED
and WITHDRAWN from the active civil docket of this Court. The
RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to the petitioner the
amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the
Sheriff’s Trust Fund.
60
8
Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall allege
the complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of
the parties and specify the regime governing their property
relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between
the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for
spousal support, custody and support of common children,
visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property,
and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against
forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by
counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and
certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the
duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation,
consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be
a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.
9RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56
(Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration).
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The
following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 41;
xxxx
12 Rollo, p. 56.
13FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
14
Rollo, p. 68.
15
Enacted 26 November 1930.
16
CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
17Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers
and priests or ministers authorized to solemnize marriages shall
send a copy of each marriage contract solemnized by them to the
local civil registrar within the time limit specified in the existing
Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty
of the successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local civil registrar
of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and
address of each of the contracting parties, their ages, the place
and date of the solemnization of the marriage, the names and
addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address, and
relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person
or persons who gave their consent to the marriage, and the full
name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the
marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be
recorded the names of the parties divorced or whose marriage was
annulled, the date of the decree of the court, and such other details
as the regulations to be issued may require.
18 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to
cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
29
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:
Contents and form of petition. – x x x
xxxx
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against
forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by
counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and
certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the
duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation,
consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.
xxxx
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be
a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.
30 Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.
31 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.
32Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation
and Motion (In Lieu of Comment)" of the Solicitor General stated:
In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed
to comply with the requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully prayed that
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise
prayed for.
46 Id.
47
Supra note 33.
48
Supra note 33 at 655.
49 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official
record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph
(a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy
of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
61
The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. —
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order, is
as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
50
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also
Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra note 36 at 282.
51 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.
52 Id., Sec. 6.
53 Id., Sec. 9.
54 Id., Sec. 11-15.
55 Id., Sec. 17-18.
56
Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.
57Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene
Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 386.
60 Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x
xxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
61 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as
the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations
resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the
harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and – in
a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case
of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: ‘rest and quietness.’"
(Citations omitted)
62
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity,
utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts
of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries." (Citations omitted)
63 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
64Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628
SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, supra.
65
FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
66Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is
established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall
be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of
marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h)
acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j)
changes of name.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to
cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
67
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.
68 FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.
69 FAMILY CODE, Art. 74-148.
70 FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
71 See supra note 69.
72 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law x x x."
73
FAMILY CODE, Art. 68-73.
74
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
75 Emphasis supplied.
76Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349.
Bigamy. - The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
77See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997),
518.
78
RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
xxxx
79 Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A
real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.
80 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
81 Supra note 25.
82
Supra note 25.
62
83 See supra note 68.
84
FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and
in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the
spouses and the custody and support of their common children.
The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and
material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with
whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
85 FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs
(2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply
in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 102 and 129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If the court renders
a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued
by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
86
FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public
prosecutor. — (1) Within one month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the
parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and
their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state
the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective
comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt
of a copy of the report The court shall set the report for hearing
and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss
the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the
court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
93 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules
of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.
Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — x x
x
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it
may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall
last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil
action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in
the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to
cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in
the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence.
The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL &
PEPITO NIAL, JR.,petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in
a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when
at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial
is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers
death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an
63
action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review
with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct."
It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no
legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3] However,
upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. [9] This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as
an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life
which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license
is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of
their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we
now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may
have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In
other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known
to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the
same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent.
It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as
being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case
is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
64
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void
after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the
death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not
a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable
and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable
is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage
that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, [23] and its
effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53
and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of
either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree
is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. [24] "A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as
well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind
of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal
rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity
can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death
of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof
of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on
the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is
made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only
on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law
makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of
either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for

defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose
is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing
Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
[1]The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998
issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court
(RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises
considered, defendants motion to dismiss is hereby granted and
this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p.
6; Rollo, p. 21).
[2]
Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
[3]
Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
[4] Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
[5] Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
[6]
Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be
solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely
given;
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
[7]
Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages
shall be void from the beginning:
xxxxxxxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character.
xxxxxxxxx
[8]
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 75, no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
[9]
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
[10]
Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.
R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256
SCRA 158 (1996).
[11] Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
65
[12]
Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life.
x x x.
[13]
Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
[14]
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall
be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
[15]
Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[16] Rollo, p. 29.
[17] Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.
[18]Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years."
Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years"
[19]
Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
[20]
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by
the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party
whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within
five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time
before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane
spouse, who had no knowledge of the others insanity; or by any
relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane,
at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane
spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured
party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured
party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or
undue influence disappeared or ceased;
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE
R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties
who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of
contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge
Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan.
For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. [1] Four
children were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. [3]When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly
stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that
when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he
did not know that Manzano was legally married.What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested
in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the
late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not
to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack
of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest
whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the
affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his
plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier
Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which
were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his
instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since
their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels,
they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge
alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34
of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to
apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment
to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he
had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
66
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their
prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he
would have discouraged him from contracting another
marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of
Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article
63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but
in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise
stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much
less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more
when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for
at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between
two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other
is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could
not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the
law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The
maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. [9] And when the
law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator
is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of
fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De
Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly
nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991.
They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in
October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When
the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed
an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple
got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and
did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named
Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent has
been the one supporting her out of her income as a government
dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial
court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and
Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that
their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by
a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to
her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice
from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they
never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never
seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because
it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give
her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion
when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not
have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that
a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration
of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child
was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’
marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon
petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity
and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last
time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to
relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being
irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit
dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily
admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for
support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage
of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case. There was no participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show
that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that
can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the
instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should
have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child
and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily
entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16
October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National
67
Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the
appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was
denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled
his marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence
and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they
executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration
of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived
together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be
allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage
license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for
the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is
only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment
or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case,
petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an
affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the
subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute
another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for
declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would
be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties,
would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the
burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the
nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of
the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred
in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required
respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
their respective comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a
mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court
of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court,
she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked
collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of
her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and
straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive
in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover,
she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial
court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and
void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts
may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support,
since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence
of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the
proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage
license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court
correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the
trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus
entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial
court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and
second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose
is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it
is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two
marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the
validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas
a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for
more than five years.24 However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before
March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses
with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the
father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax
68
exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of
the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO
who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque,
Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the
trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner
is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by
respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend.
While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the
latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have
sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as
earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced
to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the
occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1"
and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and
"F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the
pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the
wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs.
"E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the
petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000
is hereby REINSTATED.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 31-41.
2Captioned Annabelle Assidao–De Castro v. Reinel Anthony B.
De Castro.
3
The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC,
presided by Judge Pablito M. Rojas.
23 Family Code, Art. 4.
24
Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which
provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
25 TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.
26
Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 669 (2000), citing THE
REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, p. 80.
27 Family Code, Art. 175.
28 Family Code, Art. 172.
In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, p. 246 (1988), the following were given as
examples of "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws:" (a) the baptismal certificate of the child ; (b) a judicial
admission; (c) the family bible wherein the name of the child is
entered; (d) common reputation respecting pedigree; (e)
admission by silence; (f) testimonies of witnesses; and (g) other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and
G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa
were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized
by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to
his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to
Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a
boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three
weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay
City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of
paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He
initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him
that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who
had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the
pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left.
It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of
paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When
he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his
marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the
latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and
defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality
of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age
difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3
June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose
69
with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty
of suspension from service for one year without emolument. 7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the
Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds
that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented,
the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November
1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose]
could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual,
as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it
[was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release
of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have
put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa]
told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the
papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic]
purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by
[Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied
by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when
he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets
and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he
discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham
and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of
[Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This
Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was
written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there
then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers
her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath,
she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to
the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his
[sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she
was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes.
The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his
consent was procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action
had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he
could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered
the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take
any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision
to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the
Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that
the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action
for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4)
and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained
by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four
(4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch
as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987
then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action
for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993
that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to
Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect
the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was
misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the
solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate
court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of
marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their
marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument
that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals,
Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the
contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing
officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established
only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the
parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion
for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was
that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from
a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration
and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended
Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED
and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage
between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling
of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit
that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried,
they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they
desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
70
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united
in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no
avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution 22 dated 10 May
2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this
Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August
2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the
interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION
OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM
HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior
marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for
bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in
order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity
of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and
Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly
tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances
give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between
Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by
citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. 26 To
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed
by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not
affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal
requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not
required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally
obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license
is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the
parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that
they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In
addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract
states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as
his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the
Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City,
attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and
wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2
May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue
of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union.
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil
Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil
Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for
the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit,
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point
of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2)
consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)
71
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation
under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and
a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission,
is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage
such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central issues
in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of
marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of
the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions
to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably
construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and
the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no
other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had,
since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite
of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to
be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied
in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76
also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of
Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or
March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also
cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when
Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings
are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-
settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is
when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the
exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this
Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,
executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement
of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of
the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it
cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in
Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this
Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar.
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will
not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa
was entered into without the requisite marriage license or
compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead
or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the
law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for
a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union
but the exposure of an invalid one as well. 53 To permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that
violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact
that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no
marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in
the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
72
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,
then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.
Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be
stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a
law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose
is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for
lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had
lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and
that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans
a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void
marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule
that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76
means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their
criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
PRESBITERO J.
DANTE O. TINGA*
VELASCO, JR.**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Acting Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice Dante O.
Tinga to replace Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
who is on official leave under the Court’s Wellness Program and
assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting
Chairperson.
**
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as
additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
per Raffle dated 12 September 2007.
1Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate
Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada,
concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-70; rollo, (G.R. No.
179474), pp. 156-161.
2 Records, p. 170.
3 Id.
4 Court;
Id. at 1-8.
5 (2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration
of the parties’ marriage, Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was
37.
6The Administrative complaint before the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman was
docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-258.
7 Id. at 257.
8 Id. at 313-323.
9 Id. at 323.
10
Id. at 321-322.
11
ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party
whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within
four years after attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as
the case may be; or by the parent or guardian or person having
legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age
of twenty or eighteen years;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse
who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse
of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane
spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any
relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time
before the death of either party;
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within
four years after the discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within
four years from the time the force or intimidation ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within
eight years after the marriage.
12
Records, p. 322.
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.
14 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute
fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
73
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting
parties;
(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a
crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was
imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune
or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
16
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
17 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination,
church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92;
and
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and
consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74
and 75.
18
ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious
sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered
with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written
authority granted him by his church or religious sect and provided
that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the
solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned
in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is
assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided
in Article 10.
26 377 Phil. 919 (1999).
27ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
28
ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the
Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or
justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of
marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
29
ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character.
30
People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G.
4079, 4082.
31The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires
the following essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of the
contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent.
32Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio
Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.
33 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
34Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984
Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-310.
35In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court
articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:
"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which
is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and
a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license
is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of
their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement."
36
The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage
license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years desire to marry
each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license
may discourage such persons from legalizing their status," Report
of the Code Commission, p. 80.
37Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as
an "Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between Man and Woman Who
Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband and Wife for at Least Five
Years."
38 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).
39Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363
Phil. 130, 137 (1999).
45
Id. at 159.
46First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No.
166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.
47
Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30
September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.
48
Id.
49 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).
50
Id.
51 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity
of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds,
the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression.
52
People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.
53
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).
54
Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998);
Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil.
96, 108 (2000).
55
Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on
the Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If
the parties falsify their affidavit in order to have an instant
marriage, although the truth is that they have not been cohabiting
for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage
license, and they will also be criminally liable." Article 76 of the Civil
Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

40 Id. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,

41Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
42 The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age
of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other
x x x." DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
43 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38. CARLOS II,
44Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B- Respondents. December 16, 2008
4143), 15 April 1999.

74

x-----------------------------------------------
---x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for
marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code,
except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the summary judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child,
recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled
as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left
six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case
No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is
specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159,
situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903,
approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B
[LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4
75
by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-
B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2
by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing
an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or
less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being
a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137),
situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by
Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B
of the subd. plan x x x containing an area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE
METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la
parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd.
De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la
parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan
y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate
to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment
of inheritance taxes.Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn
over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and
registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCTNo. 139058
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is
now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo
II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The
said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and
210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in
the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of
land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of
said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331
square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in
favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion
was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise
agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil
Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental
compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in
August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with
the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage;
(b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance;
and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to
Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his
late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view
of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise
maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor
the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he
entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject
real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued
that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including
the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They
denied the material averments of petitioners complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the
requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to
Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate
child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of
the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
76
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents
moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the
affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary
judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing
the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion
for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from
the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there
is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary
judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another
case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las
Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-
respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. [5]
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation, discounting
the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents)
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs
(petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval
and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962,
evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null
and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not
the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo
E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the
sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the
legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel
of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of
Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said
title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff
and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of
Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of
defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in
the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of
defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in
the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June
7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal,
respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling
the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo
II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment
by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced
in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who
first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify
the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to
recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on
summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage.
The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire
to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and
101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession
of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary
judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed
by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing
safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of
spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the
death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees
77
own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their
marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for
a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which
the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the
effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment
of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules
on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would
still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid
marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to
reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage
contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be.Aside from the dearth of evidence to
the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then
Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license
issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason
that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage
Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same.
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are
of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the
foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the
same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the
merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary
evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take
place, neither should appellants non-presentation of the subject
marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage,
it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who
disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said
of the trial courts rejection of the relationship between appellant
Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals
statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior
claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellees
brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of
the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same
or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We
find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was
merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be
a minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from his
putativefiliation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding
the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when
considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years
of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name
and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could
have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in
order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the
filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.[8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and
for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners
Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof,
with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code,
despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different
from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise
decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and,
in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules
of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule
35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and,
in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion,
disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed
misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the
facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may
be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or
a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there
are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who
is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
78
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 [10] of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules
of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within
the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In
disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules
on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would
still not be warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment
rendered by the trial court.Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment
of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of summary
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or
annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity.The
significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect
on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct
the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner
shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations
of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or
annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.[14] (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the
State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The
participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The
State should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. [15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court
should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for
the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it
that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if
there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to
make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before
the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits
to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring
supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the
Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity
of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.[16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any
party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right
of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or
the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. Therationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
79
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file
the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand,
the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek
its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the
sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are
the only ones who candecide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of
their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors
of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can
and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with
the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only
to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs
of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against
the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory
or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases
already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage
involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as
the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003[20] is
prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held inEnrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962.Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an
action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil
Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute
a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[25]Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or
an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. [27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court
Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time
the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there
is no specific provision as towho can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog,the Court held that the children have the personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence
of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then
the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the
instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that
petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not
petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died
intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law.[30]
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his
compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and
Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to
wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
of
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
Code.[31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory
heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does
not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of
the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with
the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or
illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding
to the estate of the decedent.The presence of legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes
succession by collateral relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the decedent.[33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would
then have apersonality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister,
acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
80
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II
is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the
estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the
widowpursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes
petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceasedbrother with respondent
Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner
to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or
illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to
ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper
interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to
be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This
is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,[34] or even an
adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting
from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the
merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is
called for. But the RTCis strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is
proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate,
or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother
of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of
respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need
to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other
causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling
of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of
respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave
the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically
raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. [36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been
conducted in the case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent
Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to
support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative
filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to
the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more
credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration
of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We
remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family
Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.(Underscoring supplied)
81
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate
status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167
of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid
marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for
causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property,
and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage
in controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard
to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II and the validity ornullity of marriage between respondent
Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate,
or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED toDISMISS the action for nullity of marriage
for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its
decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the
merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial
provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended
by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of
Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in
beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with
herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"),
declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial
Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On
18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was
bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over
a number of other things, like when and where the couple should
start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with
his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America
to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed
with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of
nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly
been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed
a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of
non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel
asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity."
The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an
insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
82
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice
(Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient
use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in
the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that
they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but
that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack
of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the
marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice
Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground
for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the
word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred.
Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the
Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law,
there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage
cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a
ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read
"even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the
phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one,
there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized
that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and
has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but
in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable
of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect
has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it
is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of
marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation
be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the
bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity
of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in
the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid
interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there
is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice
Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect
to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that
it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable"
has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is
enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already
he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage
is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in
divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage,
in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of
marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is
that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
83
obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity
become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him
to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create
the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they
have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological
incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity,
Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in
Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in
the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period
of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee
in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity
than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429,
13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for
its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of
the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict
and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf.SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the
pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae
psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause
of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder;
after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage.
84
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies
any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck,
the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render
what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the
crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John
Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage
is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved
not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but
that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of
giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful
or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined
in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between
a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article
XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic
nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt
the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can
come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
85
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a
marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the
works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against
her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November
29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court
and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as
follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at
the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at
the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations,
that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went
to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the
first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and
fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they
can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife,
they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother,
an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the same room
and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination
was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was
prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given
to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but
he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity,
the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not
be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse
with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses
her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant
claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but
he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like
it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate
their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His
penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there,
that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find
out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from
the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis
of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter.
Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which
is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further
erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of
having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID
the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May
22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr.
Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another
copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
86
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no
sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch
as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties
decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-
3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations
in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains
no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that
the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of
the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.
What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified
under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After
such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon
petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage
on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as
stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1,
Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want
their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he
and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact
with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-
Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is
not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the
appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of
a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court
clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding
that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court
to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why
private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage
void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record
to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal
may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have
discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her,
and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing
in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what
the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence
is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's
claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent
upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's
plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not
87
inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May
22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with
his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be
doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code,
at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering
from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and
seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage
were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the
innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate
testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence
proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the
sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can
be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months
of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes
to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery
of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and
private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage
is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view
the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its
value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail
the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity."
Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with
various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground.
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological
incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still
many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context
of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most
liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in
addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April
14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre
O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and
a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on
his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple
had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from
what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he
and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
88
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at
the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the
facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the
Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws
on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on
the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual
fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the
Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and
her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely,
the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C.
Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The
Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for
their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with
written memoranda.
89
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.
Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already
ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano
to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G.
MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio
sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the
marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
90
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B.
Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
initiopursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126
and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In
the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is
granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and
the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and
(2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1).Out of
their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and
F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the
Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in
1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge
from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No.
1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which
she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service
in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did
not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the
head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and
as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force
her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was
so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times
during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they
were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic
uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would
first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service,
she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up
a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16,
1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children
left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and
driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their
missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad.After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were
renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the
children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to
them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.
Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp.
207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of
his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had
not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It
ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root
cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also
be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts
and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth
in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings
about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based
only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them
was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her
x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial
evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not
alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a
psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly,
there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was
suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental -
not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,
ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside
the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity
of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
simply because the respondent did not subject himself to
psychological evaluation.
91
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for
a declaration of psychological incapacity.Nevertheless, the totality
of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various
tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have
been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that
the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she
had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order
to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code [9] were laid
down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of
more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and
even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
92
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law,
this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation
in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage
for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
[9]
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this
[12]"Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any
of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by
nature or by adoption."
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel
while he was working in the advertising business of his father. The
acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating
in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on
September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church
wedding on May 20, 1967.[2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on
September 18, 1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9,
1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born
on October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless,
acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be
an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-
marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security
Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for
treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
whom she married and with whom she had two children. However,
when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to
petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner
accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate
children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on
special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner
filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of
his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined
in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in
the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the
country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be
found in the Philippines.[7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she
conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him
to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who
wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and
who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant
display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and
had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity
and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts
of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-
Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. [8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church
marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ
celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
93
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between
the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete
separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code,
without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and
property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND
VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THEMOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the
trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.[10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1)
respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to
perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of
respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted
by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated.More specifically, does the
aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner
fall within the term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful
or even desirable.[13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a
personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon
which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case,
respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known
the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given a valid assumption thereof. [14] It appears that
respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of
the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful
marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations
of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds
for legal separation under Article 55[17] of the Family
Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article
36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short,
the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and
respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the
Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
appellate court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even
desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there
are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.[19] While we sympathize with petitioners marital
predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no
matter how harsh it may be.[20]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio,
JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
94
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect
of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two
were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain
Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas
a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage,
this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. 2 When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter,3Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the
accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for
the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he
requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes,
but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City,
Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment
of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED,
AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR
(sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in
which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes,
and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second
marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four
of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for
his acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract
between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986,
which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila
City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2)
a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally
married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner
presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office
dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City
Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record
of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda
B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
95
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the
full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification
issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and
that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997
would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather,
the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices
have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to
the absence of a record is quite different from documentary
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of
the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-
serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner
informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify
the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting
his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
significant to note that the certifications issued by the National
Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated
October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both
documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the
subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such,
he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently
declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. 21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to
realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated
on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind,
there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses,
and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent
character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner
has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing
officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 25 and 3826 may contract
marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity
of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were
over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence
of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime
of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record,
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is
irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes
of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate
disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy
step in.
96
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same
shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed
the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro
of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION>
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting,
while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his
second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void
ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he
should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage
and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of
the prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its
being bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage,
prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid
defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the
psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained),
the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is
required to establish their nullity.2 As early as the case of People
vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised
Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain,
require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage
before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for
bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an
express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted
in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the)
rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a
voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and,
therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage
were contracted prior to the decree of annulment) 4 the complete
nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void
ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an
indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a
person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is
ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second
marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of
nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this
ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed
that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked
"on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime
of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge
Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the
spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage)
void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been
abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of
Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the
Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say
that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There
is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has
amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to
abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. 8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by
itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to
reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with
those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply"
with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely
distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the
essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal
capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of
consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of
a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of
a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until
it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family
Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage
before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the
rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe
to assume, that the spouses’ rights and obligations, property
regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it
were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially
declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological
incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage
under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the
formal requisites of a valid marriages;10and second, unlike the
other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of
the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties)
which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological
incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be
as evident.11 It would have been logical for the Family Code to
consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it
were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the
Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears
to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter,
it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might
be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending
the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of
marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity
of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of
the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of
prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers
that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be
inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact
that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for
97
all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until
judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first
been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent
marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning
the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue
much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable"
marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial
question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than
the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line
of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The Court has
explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must,
even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has
all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the
subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the
second marriage has been contracted without the necessary
license and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to
enter into the second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for
the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances,
however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting
a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the
contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to
be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does
not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or
formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of
nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that
ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal
charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate
the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent
declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but,
being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the
marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of
the offender who had entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
Footnotes
24
Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993
Edition, pp. 119-120, citing the Family Code, Articles 2 and 3.
25Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and
void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full — or half-
blood.
26 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning
for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the
other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.
27Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R.
No. 122749, 31 July 1996.
DECISION
28 Family Code, Art. 54.

8 I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial PERALTA, J.:

declaration of nullity of a void marriage even for purposes of
remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said that
the marriage, at least ostensibly, has taken place. For instance, no This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required when of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision [1] of the Court of
either or both parties have not at all given consent thereto that Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2] dated July
verily results in a "no" marriage situation or when the prior 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
"marriage" is between persons of the same sex.
10Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
requisites are present: On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
and a female; and
INFORMATION
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
(53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S.
JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in

Chapter 2 of this Title; and That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo,
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo,
personal declaration that they take other as husband and wife in and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
55a) second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage
was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article Contrary to law.
35(2).
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n) The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are
as follows.
11One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than
psychological incapacity merely renders a marriage voidable, not On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married
void. in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C.
Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H,
H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
G.R. No. 164435 On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again
celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev.
Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN
Present: dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs.
F, R, R-1).
Petitioner,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at
Chairperson, the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge
Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
VELASCO, JR.,
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital
NACHURA, and vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).

PERALTA, JJ. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No.
99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
Respondent.

September 29, 2009

xxxx
x--------------------------------------------
------x

98
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on
October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil
Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby
finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this
case, such as the nullity of accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and
its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being
determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same
court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.[3]
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975
marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was
allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and
Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3)
the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In
its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner
committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel
Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo
had not yet been declared null and void by the court.This being so,
the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still
existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck
down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that
her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and
that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a
Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and
1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and
executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8,
2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4] denied
reconsideration and ruled that [t]he subsequent declaration of
nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences,
among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. [5]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
99
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER
TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND
VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF
BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF
VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO
VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED
AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall
be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the
prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the
proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which,
petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal,
she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension
of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension,
while the CA struck down her arguments.In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,[6] the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the
ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the
case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x[7]
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v.
People,[8] where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy
cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot
allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the
point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled.[9]
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases,
petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two
marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared
null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed
valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the
nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference. [10] As
held in Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of
this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance
of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizesthe mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.[11]
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is
punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of
said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years, while Article 91 states that [t]he period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents x x x .
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as
far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that
time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged
to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to
establish the same, it remains self-serving.[12] Thus, for petitioners
defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to
adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already
obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that
petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support her
allegation. Petitionerstestimony that her own mother told Uy in
1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not
inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating
evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person
who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to
100
Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony
of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she
allegedly did is hearsay.[13]
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] the prescriptive
period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the
day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their [agents], as opposed to being counted
from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. [15] Since
petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an
erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again,
petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves
it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the
minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which
it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.[16]
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on
petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty
next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and
1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by
the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration
of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty
of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is
from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years.Again, the trial court correctly
imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that
petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final
judgment[17] to be void ab initio on account of the latters
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was
subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to
reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21,
2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are
hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in
all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20,
2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August
28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring
as null and void the marriage contracted between herein
respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio
Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started
a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan
and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she
gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge
Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated
to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became
manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and
their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he
was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July
8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the
motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after
the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion
dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7,
1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a
report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He
prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter
offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between
petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics
Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the
afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
101
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses
failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and
father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such
indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior
could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of
entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on
hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their
daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and
returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months,
he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite
the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand,
exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to
his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically
asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling
party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable
institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage
where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without
even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the
upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be
equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone
assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to
prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform
his marital obligations, despite respondent’s failure to comply with
the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family
and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute
psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent,
reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of
the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 11 Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
102
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under
Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully
proved Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with,
care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month after
his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters
but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not
care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving
that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence
was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for
an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through
an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not
just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation.
We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of
the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.17 There
was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 18
According to the appellate court, the requirements
in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese
national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find
no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We
cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because
the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to
be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies
of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an
inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects.
While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage
to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad
truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any
sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is
always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the
following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale,
dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill
the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was
26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year
after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was
born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage
to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for
nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists
up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as
the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about
the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her
obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends
103
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was
neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated
with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single
member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities
with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon
show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and
even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel
that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez,
and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming
to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the
one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the
truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes
Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination
when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus,
she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher
income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing
money from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent
of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he
could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her
in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her
behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on
the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant
lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme
jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia
since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner
was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based
on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed
her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner
because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her
because she surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her
back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had
been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2)
years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an
executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-
cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was
not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon
show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel
on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by
her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto
of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband
but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter
if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not
to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she
supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a
child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was
that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a
finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr.
Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the
presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the
evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called
CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence
and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost
anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on
the part of the parties.37During the pendency of the appeal before
the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was
affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was
impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the
Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the
Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s
judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of
psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that
the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
104
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily
influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure
that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate
their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the
fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court
concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of
petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains
as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner
sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of
a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards
were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed
the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the
RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi
Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under
Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the
misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family
Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of
guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner
seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose
the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised
the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The
concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity
has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting
marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason
at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons
were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with
underage parties and persons already married, among others. A
party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of
unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce
on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under
the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by
a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the
Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack
thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for
declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the
marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family
Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice
of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given
which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of
consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have
opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling
such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the
1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article
36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined
that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article
45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause
for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino
noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this
would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These
concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court
of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized
that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological
incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same
time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the
intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than
in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it
is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is
under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that
the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been
105
consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably
useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in
adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each
situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case
shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first
in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law
experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but
unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity
was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted,
enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled
by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would
be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church
doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of
Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be
emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of
influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the
concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation
into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation
occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church
thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the
trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal
guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower
courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively
state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of
state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature
to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions
that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished
at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal
effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life,
as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and
those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be
the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in
resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as
the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for
the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote
family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of
their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the
present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently
recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its
promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
106
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor
General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement
or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was
dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48
of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent
vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before
the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed
binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes
her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines
in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which
disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing
career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field
of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any
event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as
credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the
action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity
has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
educational attainment, and family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were
further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses
from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed
the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided
to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly
wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of
which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these
actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards
another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person,
and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You
see, relationship is based on communication between individuals
and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings,
[you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly
lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship
is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of
the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is
then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who
is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent
has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic)
on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of
the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid,
which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that
her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the
extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel
jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she
persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with
different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid
jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be
considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only
the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent
107
"is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves
to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of
respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts.
However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of
petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial
court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from
her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies
about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health,
her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability
to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically
lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a
position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by
the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration
of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise,
she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the
exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance
speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports
the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by
the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life
was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the
truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic
nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory
of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent
allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the
essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering
that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to
adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code
which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the
previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under
Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and
does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case,
the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy
to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological
incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled
by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed
this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to
bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact,
respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave
that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without
the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial
consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore
judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in
possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from
the correct appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude
required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and
Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option
in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously
undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in
terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted
with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting
a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient
108
evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived
at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we
must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from
a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s
allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such
conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would
have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings
of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that
are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement
in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score
that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court,
the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not
testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage
work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the
conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded
that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition
as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’
taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and
the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These
events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and
made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any
other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in
January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations
of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal
definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice
Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any
reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological
incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before
the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on
whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of
the psychological incapacity be established in an action for
declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity
at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation
of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a
time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception
of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an
argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed
by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date
the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be
divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no
categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because
there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue
prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially
those presently on appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have
seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in
those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the
trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case
an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the
parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to
that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than
ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability
as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to
contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing
as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first
place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court
placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal
reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC
dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
93 "A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of
nullity to the effect that the respondent may not enter into another
marriage without the express consent of this Tribunal, in deference
to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament of matrimony, as well
as for the protection of the intended spouse."; rollo, p. 97.
101 "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than
109
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
"Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful
or even desirable." Santos v. Court of Appeals, id. at 39-41.
THIRD DIVISION
DIGNA A. NAJERA, G.R. No. 164
Petitioner, Present:
YNARES-SAN
- versus - Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZA
EDUARDO J. NAJERA, VELASCO, JR
Respondent. NACHURA, a
PERALTA, JJ
Promulgated
July 3, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated
February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A.
Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal
separation, but not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The facts are as follows:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative
Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains.[1]
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents
of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the
United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January
31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the
Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.[2] They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage,
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage as shown by the following
facts:
(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already
employed with the Special Services Division of the Provincial
Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did
not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on
petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder
brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as
a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give
petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her
own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from
nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when he came home
from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and
falsely accused her of having an affair with another man. He took
to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it.When she
refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words against
her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he
was always drunk.
(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in
April 1994, as had been happening every year, he quarreled with
petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and
he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling
with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence
upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to
parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical
injuries on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr.
Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police
Station.
110
(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their
personal belongings. He lived with his mother at Banaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was
anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued
appointing her as the sole administrator of their
conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be
rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance
with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing
legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title II of
the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in
favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties
pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and (4)
granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion
of petitioner to effect service by publication as provided under
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer [3] wherein he
denied the material allegations in the petition and averred that
petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very
low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject
house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As
counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of P200,000.00 as
moral damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P1,000.00 as
appearance fee for every scheduled hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice
of Appearance.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order[4] terminating the pre-
trial conference after the parties signed a Formal
Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to
dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their
conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar
filed a Compliance manifesting that after conducting an
investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the
parties.[5] The initial hearing of the case was held on November 23,
1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the
following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist Cristina R.
Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon,
Pangasinan.
Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was
working as an accounting clerk in a government agency in
Manila. She and respondentmarried on January 31, 1988 as
evidenced by their marriage contract.[6] At the time of their
marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed
as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial
Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of P5,000.00. It
was petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a
seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30,
1988, respondent was employed as a seaman, and he gave
petitioner a monthly allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at
work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three
months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled with
petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man.
Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and
every time he went out of the house and returned home, he was
drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that
respondent was involved in drugs.[7]
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out
of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house on the lot.[8]
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party
by the boyfriend of petitioners sister. Respondent, however, did
not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home
at around midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the
persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but he did
not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen. She
asked him again about what happened at the party. Respondent
quarreled with her and said that she was the one having an affair
and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be
bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent
holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able
to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries
on different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was
bloodied, he got nervous and went out. After 10 minutes, he turned
on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she
had gone out and was hiding from him. When she heard
respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place
and proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the
highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a
clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and
proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her
wounds. After a few hours, she went home.[9]
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called
for her parents who were residing about 300 meters away. She
then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in
order to open the door. She found that their personal belongings
were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card
and jewelry.[10]
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of
Bugallon, Pangasinan.[11]
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his
mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that
he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment
from him.[12]
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while
respondents parents were separated. Respondents brothers were
also separated from their respective wives.[13]
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment
of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of
Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity
of respondent.[14]
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed
petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She confirmed her
Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:
111
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE
INTERVIEWS:
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with
psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the kind of family
background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and
separated from Respondents father. This turn of events left an
irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and
marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double
bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.
His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior
towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-seated feelings and
recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve his
childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as
the scapegoat for all his troubles.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV),
Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder as
marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal
relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najeras
psychological impairment as traced to his parents separation,
aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult
life, antedates his marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and
marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage organically, and
the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across
time render his impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of
these findings, it is recommended that parties marriage be
annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of
Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and
responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.[15]
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability
of respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage
was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the
brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
whichpossibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality
disorder and uncontrollable impulses.[16]
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint
from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the
influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on
her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was
entered in the police blotter.[17]
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed
only the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not
the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna
Najera and respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;
2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the
petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant, and to divide the
same equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint
Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.[18]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in
Resolution[19] dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court
of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto.
No costs.[20]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary
to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the
psychological incapacity of respondent Eduardo Najera.
3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same set of facts established
by petitioners evidence submitted before the trial court and
therefore the same conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion
of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in Psychology.[21]
The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners
evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause
of the psychological incapacity of respondent which is his
dysfunctional family background. With such background,
respondent could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
The Court is not persuaded.
Republic v. Court of Appeals[23] laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family.Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
a
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
112
tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed A He is not in the country, sir.
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and

purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and which the respondent is allegedly affected, is this curable?
the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart
A The chances are nil.
from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
as the inviolable base of the nation.
Q But it is curable?
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No A It depends actually if the established organic damage is
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues minimal.
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the Q What is this organic damage?
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier seen him (respondent)?
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
the respondent with borderline personality disorder. This [is]
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." [24] The
based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
image and self-destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. [25] In fact, the
impulses.
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[26] What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.[29]
person concerned need not be resorted to.[27]

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to
satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates
conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated was
based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on
her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her
finding is unscientific and unreliable.[28] Moreover, the trial court
correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the
alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may
be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony:
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence
presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly
abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and
respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause
for more than one year are grounds for legal separation[30]only and
not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal which her
counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February
11, 2004, twelve days before the decision was promulgated on
February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed
to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:

Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a
borderline personality disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time
of the marriage of the respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents
family] background, there was strong basis that respondent
developed mal-adoptive pattern.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.

Q Did you interview the respondents family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).
xxxx
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

Q Have you [seen] the respondent?

113
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation
Petitioners argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals
apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial
Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004when it
resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the
said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very
same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that
petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It
stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated
July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February
11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear
before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial
in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to
believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the
husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered
from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was
dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the
marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering
mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for
advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs
and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar
kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but
later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of
his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a
policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and
alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat
up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led
to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered
the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation
of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show
that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies
of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-
appellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said
witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1,
1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the
life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the
Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and
friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said
Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latters testimonies,
this Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA
198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
114
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed
as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence
states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not
expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on
a different set of evidence of which We have no way of
ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be
based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs.
Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on
record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment
of the Trial Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to
provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It
stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph
of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration
of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the
pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and
conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x
x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered
the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation
of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar
to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming
the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on
the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore,
erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported
by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of
the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February 23, 2004,
and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma.
Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004
denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and
February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The
trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the
evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20,
2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence
that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that
115
he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed 3 in toto
the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record
did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and
already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of
Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish
the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she
failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the
respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to
clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's
character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and
complying with the essential marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied 6 for lack of
merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for
failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed
any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court
required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment 8 but failed to
comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the
OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. 9 Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of
the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which,
if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when
there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the
instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all people may
have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.14 It is
for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological
experts for its understanding of the human personality. However,
the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained, 15 which petitioner
failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of
marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here,
appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree.
Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at
the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence
showed that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called
marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-
seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To
be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even
during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad.
During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and
contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by
petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and
loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner
started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began
to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-
called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand
petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He
thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to
her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her
diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called
"schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In
fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed
personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks
specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical
speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had
extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably,
when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive
and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his
family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But
this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's
parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling
factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element"
in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital
obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that
respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed
even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up
against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus
of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the
"leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent
preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on
whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his
finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void
based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears
to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not
always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is
116
not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken
as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab
initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. 28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the
petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario,
J.J., concur.
FN:
21
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as
to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
22Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and
void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
23 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning
for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the
other, killed that other person's spouse or his or her own spouse.
24
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
25Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one,
and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Court’s ruling
that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition."2
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the (a)
Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated April
117
5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled
"Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras,
Defendant-Appellee."
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo
J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children,
namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City,
a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article
36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She
alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following
circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in
one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a
father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and
testimonial evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then
a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City.5He courted her,
frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964,
convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their
wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages
in Bindoy.7
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for
their honeymoon.8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at her
parents’ house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they
were able to build a house of their own.9 For the first five (5) years
of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children
because he shouldered his sister’s schooling. 10 Consequently,
she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using the
income from her "Botica" and store.11
Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend
time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning.
Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during
lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their children’s well-
being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was
afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her
medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while
Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed
her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has
the habit of climbing the rooftop.15
To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the
United States. Her sisters supported them throughout their two-
year stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned
them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines,
she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy
in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he
disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. 16 At other
times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline
from their gas station free of charge.
She endured all of Justo’s shortcomings, but his act of maintaining
a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that
prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving
their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their
cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter
Cindy Rose Paras.17
As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar
examinations in Manila.18 He frequently spent time in her
store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they
became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married.
However, it was postponed because her family demanded a
dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964 upon his mother’s
signing a deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut
land in favor of Rosa.20
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the
slump of the price of sugar and not to his alleged profligacy. 21 Due
to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-
room family house, expand their store, establish their gasoline
station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging
her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he
did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and
Rosapersonally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before
the bank’s authorized employee.22
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosa’s
attitude after her return from the United States. She became
detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the family’s
businesses.23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her
"new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely
pretended that their relationship was blissful.24
He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened
that they only had tourist visas. When they were there, their
children’s tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting
them to stay longer. For his part, he was granted only three (3)
months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately
returned to the Philippines.25
He spent for his children’s education. At first, he resented
supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and
besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide
for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed
to give them financial support because of his lack of income.26
What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of
embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did
not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that
she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her
lack of concern.27 This was further aggravated when she denied
his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area.28
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is
not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was
impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness.
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision
upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did
not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after
Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal
assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was
no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; 30 and (c) the
charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC observed that
the relationship between the parties started well, negating the
existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of
the celebration of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there
appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the
declaration of nullity of their marriage.33
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment
against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same
charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision
finding him guilty of falsifying Rosa’s signature in bank
documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He
was suspended from the practice of law, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife’s signature in
bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE
(1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges
of immorality andabandonment of his own family, the penalties
to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread
in respondent’s record as an attorney, and notice of the same
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office
118
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court
promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the
evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required
by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged
defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the
evidence," thus:
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record – first, the
income which supported their children came from the earnings of
their conjugal properties and not singularly from Rosa’s
industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to his
children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived
from the conjugal property; third, he was booted out from their
conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as such
did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although
unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality, Justo’s alleged
infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa’s inability to offer the
testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation
of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina.34 Thus, she failed
to substantiate her allegation that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.35
Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,
the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333
for disbarment are conclusive on the present case.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary
factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant
complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Court’s
pronouncement in Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She
states that she could have presented an expert to prove the root
cause of Justo’s psychological incapacity had she been required
to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be
annulled on the bases of the Court’s conclusive factual findings
in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this case to the
court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due
process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case
is a "new matter completely foreign and removed" from A.C.
No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not
conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in
A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings
and documents.
The parties’ opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3)
vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are
conclusive on the present case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of
expert testimony on the root cause of Justo’s alleged
psychological incapacity is necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
I
Whether the factual findings of this Court in
A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading
of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to
feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her
charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to
declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find
that even if we assume Justo’s alleged infidelity, failure to
support his family and alleged abandonment of their family
home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit
to become an ideal husband and father. However, by
themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage
void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds,
we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge
as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his
alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show
‘incurability’, such that while his acts violated the covenants of
marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an
irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which
prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in
the future.36
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying
Rosa’s motion for reconsideration, thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme
Court in the disbarment case appellant filed against her husband,
namely, appellee’s falsification of documents to obtain loans and
his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do not conclusively
establish appellee’s psychological incapacity as contemplated
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we already went as
far as to presume the existence of such seeming depravities
in appellee’s character in our earlier judgment. However, as
we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such
eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent
incapacity on the part of appellee to discern and perform the
rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article
36.37
Clearly, Rosa’s insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333
be considered "conclusive" on the present case is unmeritorious.
The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the
existence" of Justo’s depravities, however, even doing so could
not bring about her (Rosa’s) desired result. As Rosa’s prayer for
relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul her
marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333.38Obviously,
she is of the impression that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333
were found to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the
practice of law, the same charges are also sufficient to prove his
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the
disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third
and vice versa.39 The Court’s exposition in In re Almacen40 is
instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of
an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest
is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
119
Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does
not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice
versa.41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is
why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa’s
charges sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however,
they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to
protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of
the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the
question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a
grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders
him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is
to free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this
case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justo’s acts are
not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated,
albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological
incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One of the Guidelines set forth
therein states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the
above Guideline does not require that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
non for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important
is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided,
the Court backtracked a bit when it held inRepublic v.
Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed
complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on
the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared
towards the relaxation of the requirement of expert opinion.
Section 2, paragraph (d) states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or
both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations,
if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time
of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged.
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically
explained that under the New Rules, a petition for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert
opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What
must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of
said incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being
procedural in nature, apply to actions pending and unresolved at
the time of their adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine
in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is
no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should
be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is
no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the
totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v.
Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in
April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated November 15,
1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision, applying
theGuidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter was brought to this
Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have
retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and
not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper application
of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to the
trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court
declined to remandPesca51 on the premise that
the Santos and Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law
as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:
The ‘doctrine of stare decisis,’ ordained in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule
follows the settled legal maxim – ‘legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet’ that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as
so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine
and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of ‘lex prospicit, non replicit.’
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the
wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy,
and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to remand it to
the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient
evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.
III
Whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
The last issue left for this Court’s consideration is whether the
totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the
dissolution of the marriage in question.
120
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the
State’s policy on marriage. Article XV of the Constitution mandates
that:
SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been
enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which states that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union,
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law,
this Court has held fast to the position that any doubt as to the
validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its
validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in
heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and
renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse
under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the
interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under
Canon 1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements
mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to reiterate: psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and
documentary evidence, shows that Rosa’s main grounds in
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are
his infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification of her
signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the
children, andabandonment of the family. Both the courts below
found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this
Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the evidence
sufficient to support Rosa’s charges of sexual infidelity, falsification
of her signature, and abandonment of family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT’S
SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras
and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the questioned
signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan
documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument,
yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J.
PARAS were written by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP
PARAS were not written by one and the same person. (Annex "B",
Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent
forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the
above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned
or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were
authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same
as the sample signatures of respondent.
121
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to
negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank
of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of
the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to
obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his
wife’s signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an
SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and
on behalf of the principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-
statements of his children and three other persons who used to
work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his
infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed
from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose
Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child
(Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased
first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching
and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the
allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms.
Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo
by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her
signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children,
are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that
they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other
words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that
Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a
good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4) children. The early
days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was
deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading his mother to give her
a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and
acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to be
responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of
their children when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage
of time appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship. The
acts committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of
irreconcilable differences between them caused by the death of
their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to
win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice.
Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well as
the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego
and lowered his self-esteem.
There is no evidence that Justo’s "defects" were present at the
inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the latter
years when these events took place; their two children died; he
lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law
practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely,
these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only
after almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s
"defects" are incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the
marriage between Justo and Rosa should not be annulled.
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife
who left her family to live with one of her many paramours, this
Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment
do not constitute psychological incapacity absent a showing
of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the
marriage, thus:
x x x. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify
as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent that she could
not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears
that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the
records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later
affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wife’s inability to conceive
led her husband to other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish
to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that
this is not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in the
contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court
declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her
husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she
flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these acts,
while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not
satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or
mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of
marriage; and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from
the path of marriage because of a conflicting relationship with his
wife and her family and repeated life’s setbacks. While these do
not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is
psychologically incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 59 As this Court
repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.60
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment,
and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers
only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.61
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of
the Court of Appeals. While this Court commiserates with Rosa’s
plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed
lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chief Justice, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
60 Supra, footnote 2, citing:
Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support. (109a)
Article 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
122
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(110a)
Article 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of
the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the
absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate
properties. (111a)
Article 71. The management of the household shall be the right
and duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management
shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
61 Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
FIRST DIVISION
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
April 16, 2008
x----------------------------------------------
-----x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision[1] and
September 24, 2004 resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona M.
Santos-Halili[3] were only 21 and 19 years of age, respectively,
when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila.
After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective
parents and never lived together but maintained the relationship
nonetheless.
A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner
stopped seeing respondent and went on dates with other women.
It was at this time that he started receiving prank calls telling him
to stop dating other women as he was already a married man.
Thereafter, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 158 a petition for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage on the ground that he was psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill his essential marital obligations to respondent.[4] He
claimed that he thought that the wedding performed at the City Hall
of Manila was a joke and that the marriage certificate he signed
was fake. He also pointed out that he and respondent never lived
together as husband and wife and never consummated the
marriage.
The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital
obligations.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
held that, taken in totality, the evidence for petitioner failed to
establish his psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. The same was denied. Hence, this petition.
The question before us is whether or not the totality of evidence
presented is sufficient to prove that petitioner suffered from
psychological incapacity which effectively prevented him from
complying with his essential marital obligations.
We deny the petition.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with
respondent.[5] He failed to discharge the burden.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and a
psychological report written by Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., a
clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters contained
therein.
According to Dr. Dayan, petitioner was suffering from a personality
disorder characterized as a mixed personality disorder from self-
defeating personality to dependent personality disorder brought
about by a dysfunctional family background. Petitioner's father was
very abusive and domineering. Although petitioner and his siblings
were adequately supported by their father, a very wealthy man,
they lacked affirmation. Because of this, petitioner grew up without
self-confidence and very immature. He never really understood
what it meant to have a family, much less to be a husband.
According to Dr. Dayan, this was very much evident in petitioner's
123
impulsive decision to get married despite having gone steady with
respondent for only six months.
Moreover, she added that both petitioner and respondent were
psychologically incapacitated to perform their essential marital
obligations as they never lived together as husband and wife. They
also never consummated their marriage. Furthermore, they
constantly fought. Their separation was inevitable as they were
both immature. Dr. Dayan then abruptly concluded that petitioner's
psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.
In this case, although petitioner was able to establish his
immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological report and as
testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly constituted
sufficient cause for declaring the marriage null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. It had to be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. [6]
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[7] we ruled that the psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect
in the performance of some marital obligations. A mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
equate to psychological incapacity.[8] Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in
petitioner's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations, [9] had to be
shown. In this, petitioner failed.
The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and
respondent had difficulty getting along with each other as they
constantly fought over petty things.[10] However, there was no
showing of the gravity and incurability of the psychological
disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for the mere
statement or conclusion to that effect in the psychological report.
The report, and even the testimonies given by petitioner and his
expert witness at the trial, dismally failed to prove that petitioner's
alleged disorder was grave enough and incurable to bring about
his disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and respondent
never lived together as husband and wife. This, however, fails to
move us considering that there may be instances when, for
economic and practical reasons, a married couple might have to
live separately though the marital bond between them
remains.[11] In fact, both parties were college students when they
got married and were obviously without the financial means to live
on their own. Thus, their not having lived together under one roof
did not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of them was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. It is worth noting that petitioner himself admitted that
he and respondent continued the relationship after the marriage
ceremony. It was only when they started fighting constantly a year
later that he decided to file a petition to have the marriage
annulled. It appears that petitioner just chose to give up on the
marriage too soon and too easily.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 26,
2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CORONA,
- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
PERALTA,** JJ.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 9, 2009
x----------------------------------------------
----x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16,
2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for review
on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition
sought to set aside the January
2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court
of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his
marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on
the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was
a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband
and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started
fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to
stop seeing respondent and started dating other women.
Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop
dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only
upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was
not fake.
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed
personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating
personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr.
Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality
disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his
capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to
respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. [3]
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented
failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under
Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding
the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his
argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null
and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed
that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his
expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and
conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically
incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the
Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the
provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental disposition of the parties.[5]
In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert witness revealed
that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder.
Thus:
26,
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which
you conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings [and]
conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It
is a mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality
disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is brought
about by [a] dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also
suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage with
Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage,
sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from
psychological incapacity to handle the essential obligations of
marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very
questionable. It was a very impulsive decision. I dont think he
understood what it meant to really be married and after the
marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual
intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three
months he refused to see or talk with the respondent and
afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death, and he
never thought it was a really serious matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili
and respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary
judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they
had undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision that
they should get married xx xx I dont think they truly considered
themselves married.
xx xx xx
124
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you
able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and respondent are suffering
from psychological incapacity?
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality
disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. [16]
they never consummated the marriage. During the very short
relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so there
might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each other and
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
afterwards there was abandonment.
psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a
deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized
that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually
have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term.[17]Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing,
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental
disorders as dysfunctional styles of living.These disorders affect
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent
all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for
esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
others.[18]
and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually
bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make
declared null and void.
everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such
as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe
they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court and
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when the January 26, 2004 decision andSeptember 24, 2004 resolution
alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.

In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158
dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.
petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended
on them for decisions.[9] Petitioners mother even had to be the one
to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action SO ORDERED.
to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for
real.[10]

THIRD DIVISION
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering
from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in
a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793
attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take
Petitioner,
advantage of him.[11] This could be seen in the way petitioner
allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated his Present:
family like robots[12] and, later, by respondent who was as
domineering as his father.[13] When petitioner could no longer take
respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her
rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end - versus - YNARES-SANTIAG
their marriage.[14]
Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTIN
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, CHICO-NAZARIO,
dysfunctional family life, to wit:[15]
Respondent, NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological
incapacity? REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Oppositor. Promulgated:
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional.
The father was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has
been very unhappy and the children never had affirmation. They February 13, 2009
might [have been] x x x given financial support because the father
was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact family. x x x
The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and
somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a
husband, what [it] meant to have a real family life.

125
 but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be
disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. [8]

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle,

and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena
and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.[9]
DECISION

NACHURA, J.: In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by
his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that
it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted
ways.[10]
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological
incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd
subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective
Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form
Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]
and devoid of any definition.

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000,
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review
ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. [12] In
August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General
CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004
(OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear
Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the
on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
challenged decision.

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between
the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. [14]

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of

respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both
by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was
parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following
then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter
findings and conclusions:
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court
Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.[3]
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood

one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards
each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first
meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he
refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed
to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their
pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast
depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they
decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad,
and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she
would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her
uncles place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get
married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then
continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated
like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her
uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and
talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their
parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena
who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that
they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this,
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male
adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He
finished two years in college at AMAComputer College last 1994
and is currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office
for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of
psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon
Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and
one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business
world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the
family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and
simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of
Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate
himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only
loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a
lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not

126
finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner
and this became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After
a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is
having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted
that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get
out of their lives.From that [time on], respondent had insisted to
petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage
because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996,
respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already
bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly
agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they
were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an
apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any
so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and
seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the
house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country
so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime
while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of
separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when
he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to
why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and
even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he
went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and
then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to
do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case
against petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make
amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of
marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to
pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought
the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner
was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until
after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of
petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle
showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he
should persist in going home, they will commission their military
friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign
a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look
for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June
of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told
his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and
supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however,
did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for
counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home
of petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent
refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if
they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get
his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can
start a new life.Respondent demanded these not knowing [that]
the petitioner already settled his differences with his own
family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he
chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop
harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was
disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not
be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have
any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner
and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
127
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be
undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was
caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital
vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be
still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He
is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays
a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other
individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds
it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship
especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of
person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn
time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of
the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be
somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought
that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams
realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is
somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no
chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself
and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage
should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented
by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are
still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the
point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral
disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and
aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly
uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she
is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since
childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties
display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big
mistake for them to take.[15]

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring
the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both
parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic, represented by the
OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.[18]
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003
Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the
trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist
did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower
court for rendering the decision without the required certification of
the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement
with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. [23] The CA
later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for
review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course
to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits
that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both
parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that
there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the
actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the
trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial
court orders and notices.[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, [28] that the
annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of
the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise
not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the
OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina[29] were not
satisfied.[30]
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is
null and void.[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting
the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
128
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision
Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Code Revision Commission of the UP LawCenter, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the
present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new
Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between
the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree
of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is
one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even
the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent,
inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom
the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and,
instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code
and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation
of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes.
The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage
in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to
wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country
today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds
proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well
as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald
Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of lack
of due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be
clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly. [34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
129
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the session
was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage and to
mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer
to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the
idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There
being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there
are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable
. . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and
has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
psychological or mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
inclusion of the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that
it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after
the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to
allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
special cases and special situations, hence, its special treatment
in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground
for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time
of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is
capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices
of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of
causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes
only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and
void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal
annuls a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void,
i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics
can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails
a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal
hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law
as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter
lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law,
the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples
have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in
the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid
civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions,
some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent
from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity,
in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of
130
three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable
according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and
fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment
called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to
give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the
union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s
and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably
not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970.Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof
of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves
shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[37] The law is then
so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. [38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 [40] of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in
Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp
conceptual distinction must be made between the second and third
paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential
obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a
house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable
according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the
object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a
different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the
house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is
the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the
canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological
process of giving consent because it has been established a priori
that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know
well the object of their consent [the house and its
particulars].Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid
because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological
act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is
directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano
Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals
not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of
consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he
assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in
1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising
from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend
to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual
anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of
intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies
that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect
the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however,
so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The
evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person
towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect
to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However,
these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the
higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted
continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is
and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person
can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although
he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the
incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually
confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts
were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c.
Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning
supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these
circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely
the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always
and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would
seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think
that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would
be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the
object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a
normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct
to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically
ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he
cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani
seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled
mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between
the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to
fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have
no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent.However,
such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and
free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the
object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of
positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person
afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and
evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of
Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is
possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage
(that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same
person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The
decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed
that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person
in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal
obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in
understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the
weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was
not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic
impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity
rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These
anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is
qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the
impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable
of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the
anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition
of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either
or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or
maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those
cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin
a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such
a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that
the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is
unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party.The
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite
capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security
of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of
the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
detained and individual description.

131
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete
circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be
suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the
essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person
as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only
at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to
constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a
person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in
the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking
at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially atmatrimonium in
facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards
money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated.Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability
to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense
of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order
to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio
vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the
children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume
any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases
in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in
marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear
under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating
of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of
the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because
of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to
consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of
nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal
decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer
not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more
adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with
the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted
does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion
because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical,
volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person
is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is
unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other
words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as
in the defect of the object of consent.
132
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be
addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon:
causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion
that the clause is a reference to the personality of the
contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the
psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes
his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable
according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person
is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he
is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which
impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply
engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be
a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that
there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source
of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree
of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-
case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and
binding on the appellate courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi
v. Court of Appeals,[45]explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence
in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted,
as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
133
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from
each othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred in the result and another threeincluding, as aforesaid,
Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according
to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all
fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, [49] the Court
has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for
the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital
bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36
as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. [50] The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on
account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The Court should rather
be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse,
child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article
36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same
is void from the very beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should
not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost,
because it is none of its business. And second, because the
judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a
warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse
would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with
a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of
the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters
disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by
Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6)
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
134
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were
asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity
at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid
consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment,
but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the
concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry.
The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary
prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right
of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in
its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the
right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an
adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the
spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is
not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any
other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out
their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into.[58]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis,
that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the
Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge
to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an
independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state
of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the
field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense
with the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment,
which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both
parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder for respondent. We note that The
Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as
follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are
characteristic of a persons recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to
isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive
135
and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or
anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by
adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become
less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more
than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality
disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which
the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality
disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with
other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often
a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals
with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work
with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can
lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health
viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic
theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of
development led to certain personality types. Thus, some
disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity
and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the
anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to
shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate
relationships. However, later researchers have found little
evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages
of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a
genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline
personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies
suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic
factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline
personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide
attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low
platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth
pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph
(EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many years;
slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of
borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal
EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric
Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders
are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear to
have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and
passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not
otherwise specified, that can be used for other specific personality
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have
long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following
manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem
and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are
easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early
adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions
(such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they
believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.[65]
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is
intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or
criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly,
child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication
that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others
and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they
also may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or
politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was
referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral,
136
guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-
social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic.[66]
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders
considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of
both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the
trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when
alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the
respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder
makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society. [68] Moreover, as shown
in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and
of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the
January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
BENJAMIN G. TING, G.R. N
Petitioner,

- versus -
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R.
CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and
resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4]
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen
Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates
in medical school.[5]They fell in love, and they were wed on July
26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with
their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in
Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born, the
couple decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.[7] In
September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board
examinations[8] and thereafter proceeded to take a residency
program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after
two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship
program for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working
for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its
active staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.[11]
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on
December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes
Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21,
1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne,
born on June 16, 1991.[12]
137
Present:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years
to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., petition before the RTC of Cebu City
Carmen filed a verified
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
Chairperson,
Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered
from psychological
CARPIO MORALES,*incapacity even at the time of the celebration
of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
CHICO-NAZARIO,
thereafter. [13]
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she
was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble
occasionally with his friends.[14] But after they were married,
petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about
Promulgated:
midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and
violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically
assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also
March 31, 2009
instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
house.[15] Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as
anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to
refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task
to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling
him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be
unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the
latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the
same.[16]
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to
give financial support to their family and would even get angry at
her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of
providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking
and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his
hobby.[17] He rarely stayed home[18] and even neglected his
obligation to his children.[19]
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive
gambling.[20] He would gamble two or three times a week and
would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks
whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn
his wifes own jewelry to finance his gambling.[21] There was also
an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even
a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able
to pay off his gambling debts.[22] Benjamin only stopped going to
the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having
caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so
that he would be banned from the gambling establishments. [23]
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological
incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his
family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his
excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which
Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the
property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown
by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his
family.[24]
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically
incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as
his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of
social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social
reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person,
except when provoked by circumstances.[25] As for his alleged
failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it
was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees
from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.[26] In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that
he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he
could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending
his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.[27] He also pointed
out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their
children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
week.[28]
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking
and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by
Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses children
from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally
witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in
front of their children.[30]
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview, however,
Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because
the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a
hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins
compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a
personality disorder.[32]
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D.
Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of
Psychiatry in Don Vicente SottoMemorial Medical Center, as his
expert witness.[33] Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological
behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as
the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his
(Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr.
Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with
petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship
with his fellow doctors and his good track record as
anesthesiologist.[35]
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its
Decision[36] declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates
findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of
his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically,
the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive
gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his
family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits
find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage
to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant
null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[37]
138
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000,
the CA rendered a Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It
faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced
to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates
conclusion was based only on theories and not on established
fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and
Molina.[41]
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this
case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February
13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition
with the RTC.[42] She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be
made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle
of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed
period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining
compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise
denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition
for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated March 5,
2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve
Carmens motion for reconsideration.[45] On review, the CA decided
to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it
issued an Amended Decision[46] reversing its first ruling and
sustaining the trial courts decision.[47]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but
the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004
Resolution.[48]
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare
decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of
proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been
liberalized; and
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance
with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate
the same issues,[50] necessary for two simple reasons: economy
and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in
Article 8 of the Civil Code.[51]
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was
applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the United
States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in
his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections[52] is
enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand
by the thing and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with
the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of
the 18th century, it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents where the same points come again in litigation. As the
rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it
would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where
courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3)
the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or
principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning
used to reach the decision.
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by
the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict
rules and precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion
in the courts. Madison agreed but stressed that x x x once the
precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law,
it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and
Madison disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He added that
their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict between the
concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the
Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own
life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare
decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions
of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second,
known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must
follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing
choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the
precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
decisis. Constitutional stare decisisinvolves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare
decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare
decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the
binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds
sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is
not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare
decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed
from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which
is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In the
same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare
decisison judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As
Justice Stevens explains: after a statute has been construed,
either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other
federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be
139
as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress
itself. This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the
need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings;
(2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist
judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that
respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to
follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192
cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal
doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement
that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the
U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is
inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles
of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting,
this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by thestare
decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling
that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional.
Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first
ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private
respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will
show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be
considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact.
In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants:
closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow
the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court
should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule
is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship
to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have
so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant
of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so
changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification.[53]
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal
guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is
no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck
down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In
these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction
of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine
may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit.
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned
the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-
Te,[56] we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one
in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We
said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally
became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary
to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with
respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as
on all fours with another.[57]
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36,
it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits
of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any other given
case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely
on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize
in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36
must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation
of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules
on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root
cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely
affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there
are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a
party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the
court during the pre-trial conference.[60]
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to
present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing
the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be
presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding
whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence
adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
140
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen
(18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the
appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.[61] The psychological illness that
must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should
be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she is about to assume.[62]
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects
were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She
merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but
such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the
decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage
between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these experts
strengthened respondents allegation of psychological incapacity.
The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive
indication of a personality disorder, [63] while Dr. Obra maintained
that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality. Moreover,
there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because,
aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar
to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the
psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist
in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his
(Dr. Obras) personal interview with Benjamins
brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr.
Obras findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners
drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against
his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity
to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him.
Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as
the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too
inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article
36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor
of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.[65] In this case, the presumption has not been amply
rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009
MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,1 and its
Resolution dated November 20, 2007.2
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993.
Less than two months after their first meeting, they got married on
July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City. At
the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while
respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of
marriage. They have no children.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.
Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite
service of summons upon him. Because of this, the trial court
directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether
there was collusion between the parties. In a report dated August
16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no
collusion between the parties.
On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its
appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and submitted a
written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on
the State’s behalf under the supervision and control of the Solicitor
General.
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her
husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner,
Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually
failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential
responsibilities and duties of a husband.
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job
and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance.
When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found them
a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who
paid the monthly rental.
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her
husband to find employment. She even bought him a newspaper
every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most
jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job
interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and
a pair of shoes and even gave him money. Sometime later, her
husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner
was overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner was
informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his
parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner
discovered that her husband didn’t actually get a job and the
money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from
his mother. When she confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo
allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have
a job so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying for
a job. He also told her that his parents can support their needs.
Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother
and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in
conformity with those of his mother.
141
Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time
Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards her.
Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had
sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they
discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was
sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even
want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready.
Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to another
place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents,
Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave
their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.
During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfo’s first
cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece
of Rodolfo’s father, was living with Rodolfo’s family. She
corroborated petitioner’s testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not
gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely
relied on the allowance given by his mother. This witness also
confirmed that it was respondent’s mother who was paying the
rentals for the room where the couple lived. She also testified that
at one time, she saw respondent going to his mother’s house in
business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that
he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that
respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not
living together with petitioner.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist.
Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner for her
psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature,
independent, very responsible, focused and has direction and
ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for
what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based on the information
gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality
Disorder were those whose response to ordinary way of life was
ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this
psychological problem was a cross-identification with the mother
who was the dominant figure in the family considering that
respondent’s father was a seaman and always out of the house.
She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his
life but manifested only after the celebration of his marriage.
According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe
because he will not be able to make and to carry on the
responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable
because it started in early development and therefore deeply
ingrained into his personality.
Based on petitioner’s evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision
dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage between petitioner
and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the
court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and
obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement.
He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because
it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and
the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as
expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder
and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on
his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by
the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show
that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be
declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and
incurable psychological incapacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta
Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby declared null and void
abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.
The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of
Antipolo City are ordered to make proper entries into the records
of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and
the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.3
On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision 4 to
correct the first name of Rodolfo which was erroneously
typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original Decision.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that
(a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based solely on the
information provided by petitioner and was not based on an
examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the
alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of
marriage or that such defects were grave, permanent and
incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially
ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the psychological
incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder
existed prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable. In
setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:
The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondent’s
alleged irresponsibility and over-dependence on his mother is
symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellee’s failure to prove that
respondent’s supposed psychological malady existed even before
the marriage. Records however show that the parties were living
in harmony in the first few years of their marriage and were living
on their own in a rented apartment. That respondent often times
asks his mother for financial support may be brought about by his
feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the
family coffers, considering that it was his wife who is working for
the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that respondent
does not like to have a child on the pretense that respondent is not
yet ready to have one. However this is not at all a manifestation of
irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown that he
has a full grasp of reality and completely understands the
implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed. The
only problem besetting the union is respondent’s alleged
irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which
was not proven in this case to be psychological-rooted.
The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his
youth and emotional immaturity which by themselves, do not
constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals,
421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has
utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot
be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356
SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal
or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations, it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No.
162049, April 13, 2007).
xxx xxx xxx
142
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision
dated July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C.
Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains
VALID.5 (emphasis ours)
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not
the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
his essential marital obligations.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that
the appellate court correctly ruled that the "totality of evidence
presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouse’s psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and settled
jurisprudence.
We grant the petition.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.6 Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good,
solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our
social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the
concern alone of the family members.7
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals and Molina8 stringent guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.11 It should refer to "no
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage."12 The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.13
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that
notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36.14 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 15 With
the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court encourages a reexamination of
jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although
there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the
Molina doctrine.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that
there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the
annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the
psychological incapacity of her husband.
The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric
report, highlights the lack of personal examination of Rodolfo by
said doctor and the doctor’s reliance on petitioner’s version of
events. In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the
totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.
It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the
psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which
the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under
oath before the lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby
143
presented evidence in the form of testimony. 18 Significantly,
petitioner’s narration of facts was corroborated in material points
by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise
testified in court to elaborate on her report and fully explain the link
between the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 19 Since the trial court
itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there
is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity
drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witness.20
Second, the root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition,
sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in
the trial court’s decision.
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage,
Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas from
petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find
employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the
couple’s daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that
the couple’s inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfo’s refusal to
have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his
relationship to his mother.1avvphi1
These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his
marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical causes by an
expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field
of psychology in general and psychological incapacity, in
particular. In a portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas
elucidated the psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and
Rodolfo, thus:
Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited
education. Being the eldest, she is expected to be the role model
of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and
physically punished, in order to tow the line. But on the other hand,
she developed growing resentments towards her father and
promised herself that with the first opportunity, she’ll get out of the
family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 ½ months
after they met, without really knowing anything about him. Her
obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at that time
and she did not exercise good judgment in her decision making in
marriage. During their 4 years marital relationship, she came to
realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and
responsibilities, in terms of loving, caring, protection, financial
support and sex.
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father,
who was perceived to be weak, and his two elder brothers were all
working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his
mother’s needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her
system. The relationship became symbiotic, that led to a
prolonged and abnormal dependence to his mother. The mother,
being the stronger and dominant parent, is a convenient role
model, but the reversal of roles became confusing that led to
ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all
the boys were hooked up to his complexities, producing so much
doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically,
Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is
referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying the mother’s
love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife
and the mother, so that his continuous relationship with his wife
produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and
crippled him psychologically.
Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome
of their marriage, it is the opinion of the examiner, that Mrs.
Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible
and is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and
obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems
she has difficulty in handling her considerable anxiety, at present.
There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is
suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder associated with
severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong
and prolonged dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to a
period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation
crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self
confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed
prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration
due to marital stresses and demands. It is considered as
permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his
life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality
structure. It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and
interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustment.21
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr.
Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of which we
quote below:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what
was your psychological evaluation?
A: I’ve found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as
matured, independent, very responsible, focused, she has
direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she
wanted, ma’am, and therefore, I concluded that she is
psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the marriage, ma’am.
Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your
psychological evaluation with regards to the respondent?
A: Based on my interview, I’ve found out that the husband Mr.
Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric
classification as Dependent Personality Disorder associated with
severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings, ma’am.
Q: In layman’s language, Madame Witness, can you please
explain to us what do you mean by Dependent Personality
Disorder?
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in
which their response to ordinary way of life are ineffectual and
inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt with
himself and inability to make his own decision, quite dependent on
other people, and in this case, on his mother, ma’am.
Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological
problem of respondent, Rodolfo Azcueta?
A: Very much, ma’am.
Q: Why?
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his
duties and responsibilities as a husband and as a father, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root
cause of this psychological problem?
A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross
identification with the mother who is the dominant figure in the
family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family
while the father was a seaman and always out of the house, and if
present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very submissive
and passive to the authority of the wife, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what
circumstance this kind of psychological problem manifested?
A: This manifested starting his personality development and
therefore, during his early stages in life, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem
existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the respondent in this case, before the
celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, ma’am.
144
Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the
marriage?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became
manifested with the…that the manifestation came too late?
A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr.
Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no stresses, no demand on his
life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished college
degree of Computer Science, there is no demand on himself at
least to establish his own, and the mother always would make the
decision for him, ma’am.
Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem
severe?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe,
Madame Witness?
A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the
responsibility that is expected of a married person, ma’am.
Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
A: It is incurable because it started early in development and
therefore it became so deeply ingrained into his personality, and
therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?
A: It is permanent in nature, sir.
Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the
psychological problem as far as the marriage relationship of
Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?
A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship
because standard expectation is, the husband has to work, to feed,
to protect, to love, and of course, to function on (sic) the sexual
duties of a husband to the wife, but in this case, early in their
marriage, they had only according to the wife, experienced once
sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact that
because husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is a
result of the unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying the
mother’s love when they will be having heterosexual relationship
and therefore, at that point, he will not be able to distinguish
between the mother and the wife and therefore, sex relationship
will not be satisfactory according to expectation, ma’am.22
In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments
of the parties."23
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly
explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce here for
emphasis:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the
court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and
obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement.
He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because
it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and
the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as
expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder
and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on
his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by
the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show
that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be
declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and
incurable psychological incapacity.
Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. Contrary to the CA’s finding that the parties lived
harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage,
witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the
marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his
mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To
be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfo’s dependent personality
disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted
in his early development and a by product of his upbringing and
family life.
Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be
sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
The Court is wary of the CA’s bases for overturning factual findings
of the trial court on this point. The CA’s reasoning that Rodolfo’s
requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been
due to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family
coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his
"responsible" realization that he should not have a child since he
is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on
record to support these views. Again, we must point out that
appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of
the trial court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where
the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by
evidence.
We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfo’s
irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be
attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact
that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years
old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave
clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.
In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of
a dependent personality disorder and how one afflicted with such
a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital
obligations, to wit:
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when
alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated
to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive
self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. 24
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent
personality disorder is automatically deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We
realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the
medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same
disorder, may be different in their symptoms or manifestations and
in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation
of the facts, as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the
type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the
nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions
and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly
failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together, observe
mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is
unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot
145
independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and
ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot
contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his
spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital
obligations within the meaning of Article 36.
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition which has been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by
evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar
predicament it finds itself in those instances when it is tasked to
interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and
apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With
respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must
take into account not only developments in science and medicine
but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring
of traditional gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken
on increasingly important roles in the financial and material
support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal
that the family should be an "autonomous" social institution,
wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for
the support and well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the
spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a
cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to
the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.
This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is
void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)
In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of
the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is
proper under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision
dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or
her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove
that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave,
incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring
her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as
null and void.
Antecedents
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country
from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-
door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were
still in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda
College taking a business management course. After a month of
courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led
to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa
Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil
rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991,2 after which they
moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their
parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow
funds from petitioner’s best friend to settle the hospital bills. He
remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until
he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on
various jobs to meet the family’s needs, first as a part-time
aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time
employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one
with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s expenses
(i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational needs).
On his part, Dominic sold Collier’s Encyclopedia for three months
after his graduation from college before he started working as a
car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in
1994.3 Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a
celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all
the household expenses and their child’s schooling because his
irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994,
she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee
at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them
became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby
affecting their sexual relationship.4
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as
a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank
checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance coverage.
She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for
the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse,
she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her
to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving
her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment
after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He
was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After
petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner
discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom
were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister
themselves.5
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode
because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things
over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her
family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed
from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.
Ruling of the RTC
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with
a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites
Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and
presented no evidence.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between
petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity,6 holding in part:
xxx. The result of Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation as testified to
by her and per Psychiatric Report she issued together with one Dr.
Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature, strong
and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes
146
her vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also
believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse",
she gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent.
Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand,
respondent was found to have a personality that can be
characterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His
criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions of his
misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences of
separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to this
antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.
She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with
what is required of him as a husband and father. Besides from his
adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct
and lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man.7
The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological
incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and incurability, as set forth
in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant,
establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity, viz:
Gravity — from the evidence adduced it can be said that
respondent cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing
under ordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is
totally incapable of observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as
well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start
of the marriage respondent had left all the household concerns and
the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in
night outs with friends. This continued even when he finished his
studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary from the
petitioner and worse, had the gall to engage in sexual infidelity.
Likewise worthy of serious consideration is respondent’s
propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and
continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often than
not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.
Antecedence — Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of
respondent’s personality disorder and it was only after marriage
that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondent’s
behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His
dishonesty and lack of remorse are mere extensions of his
misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to
respondent’s childhood experiences of separation and emotional
deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a product
of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence of the
environment although its over manifestation appear only after the
wedding.
Incurability — Respondent’s personality disorder having existed in
him long before he contracted marriage with petitioner, there
appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary
means from such incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show
that he does not possess the proper outlook, disposition and
temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate
recourse of nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be
delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to be a
mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner. 9
Ruling of the CA
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no
showing that Dominic’s personality traits either constituted
psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or
were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code;
that the testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive, was not
conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties’
separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters
and the criminal cases brought against Dominic.10
On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision
reversing the judgment of the RTC.11 Specifically, it refused to be
bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioner’s expert
witness, holding:
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that
respondent’s condition, assuming it is serious enough, was
present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although
petitioner’s expert witness concluded that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated even before the parties’ marriage,
the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact
that the witness’ findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the
basis of information given by the petitioner herself, who, at the time
of the examination, interview, was already head strong in her
resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and
harbored ill-feelings against respondent throughout her
consultation with Dr. Samson.12
The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient
to establish Dominic’s psychological affliction to be of such a grave
or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying
on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag, 13 Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals14 and Pesca v. Pesca,15 the CA observed:
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature,
deceitful and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of
affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily
constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A person’s inability
to share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his
misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members,
are indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a medically
rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured.
Even the respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily
equivalent to psychological incapacity, although it may constitute
adequate ground for an action for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a
criminal suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to
petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation
provided the respondent is convicted by final judgment and
sentenced to imprisonment of more than six (6) years.16
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issues
Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert
testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had presented in the trial
of the case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements in
Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the
report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson
more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v.
Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA
20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied the
ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000,
343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal medical or
psychological examination was not a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the
psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted. The CA correctly
indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic,
which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson,
furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that
such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself
subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert;
and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the
findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert
were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and
characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her
to resort to other people in order to verify the facts derived from
petitioner about Dominic’s psychological profile considering the ill-
feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the
only people she interviewed about Dominic were those whom
petitioner herself referred, as the following testimony indicated:
Fiscal Zalameda
147
Q: So you’re saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards
the respondent? At the time you interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was
able to talk regarding her marital problems which is
uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to
condition herself regarding her problems, Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as
the respondent is concerned, would you say that the petitioner
would only tell you information negative against the respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people
the facts given to me by the petitioner, Sir.
Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the
name are given to you by the petitioner, Madame Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.17
In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself
naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samson’s findings. The CA
rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such
expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with the
requirements set in Santos and Molina for the establishment of
Dominic’s psychological incapacity.
The CA’s reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not
misplaced. It is easy to see why.
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline
No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified
as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband."18 But
here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did
not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological
incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person
before completing her report but simply relied on other people’s
recollection and opinion for that purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that:
xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the
precise cause of private respondent’s psychological incapacity, if
any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.19
but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the
precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of
Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed
at the inception of the marriage.
The Court in Pesca observed that:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in
the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the
time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration
of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot
be equated with psychological incapacity.20
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the
absence of the medical expert’s testimony alone that was crucial
but rather petitioners’ failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden
of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the
inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the
evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded
in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36,
it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits
of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on
the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality
of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Petitioner’s view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal
medical or psychological examination of respondent spouse
therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his
psychological incapacity22 is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the
statement in Marcos ran as follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical
examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality
of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his
psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation
of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the
psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the
granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What
was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition," as the Court said in Marcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present
the professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the
root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed
by the trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or not
to declare the nullity of the marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they
try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert
opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of their proceedings.23
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner
insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he
suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe
love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and support. We have
148
also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To
qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of
marriage, a person’s psychological affliction must be grave and
serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and
comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights
and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be
shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological
incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and
incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to
show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a
grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.
His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his
dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take
responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share
his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity,
was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that
was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not
equate with psychological incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed
sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of
psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground
only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code.
Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required, and
that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be
deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded.25
The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The
Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no
longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required
the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to
wit:
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to
the court proof of such service within the same period. 26
b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may
be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.27
c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally
or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation. 28
d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties.1âwphi1 Entry of judgment shall be
made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed
by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.29
e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice
of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse
parties.30
The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to
appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi
(i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to
appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the
meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based
on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by
gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on
certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 19,
2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND
EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the declaration
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan
of the nullity of the marriage between respondent Eduardo De
Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos
(Catalina) based on the latter's psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold
once again the validity of a marriage on the ground that the alleged
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.
Antecedents
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites
solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to
Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. 3
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage,4 citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity
to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not
interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her
share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon,
Pangasinan.5 After conducting an investigation, the public
prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between
Eduardo and Catalina.6
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his
consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she
constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent
most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the
household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she
squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker
in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home
in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.7
Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the
tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that
Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that
was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder
was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.9
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her
Answer/Manifestation,10 whereby she admitted her psychological
incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without
Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that
she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up
her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live
there or to receive her share should the residence be sold. 11
149
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this
Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and
Catalina delos Santos de Quintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended.
2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan
to cancel the marriage of the parties from the Civil Register of
Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time
with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant gambling
constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that
considering that the matter of determining whether a party was
psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like Dr.
Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes
was the best evidence of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. 13
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES’
MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS
SANTOS-DE QUINTOS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that Eduardo proved
Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results of
the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed
that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that
she could not have known her marital obligations;" and that
Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified,
sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly
explained by the trial court.
Issue
In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred because:
I
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINA’S ALLEGED
PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF
MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS
NOT SHOWN TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.
III
ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION.
IV
GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE
ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY.
V
THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY
OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
CAUSE OF CATALINA’S INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT
EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND
INCURABLE.14
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and
the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid down by the Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina);15 and that Catalina’s
refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her
husband and their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a
psychological nature warranting the declaration of nullity of their
marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect
to perform her marital obligations.
The OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits
and abandonment of the conjugal home were not grounds under
Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her
infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while
her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation
under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the neuro-psychiatric
evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s
psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have
exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life, attitudes, habits and
character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological
incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root cause of
her alleged psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to
be a collusion between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted
during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in
exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.
The OSG postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and
Eduardo’s overseas deployment that had required him to be away
most of the time created the strain in the couple’s relationship and
forced her to seek her friends’ emotional support and company;
and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter
was attributable to her inability to bear children of her own.
Issue
The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the
declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based
on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Ruling
We grant the petition for review.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty,
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and
education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to
a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet
his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not
enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. 16
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 we decreed that psychological
incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those
enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases
involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later
ruling in Molina,18 viz:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
150
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x. 19
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have
remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded
on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has
declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity
based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations. 20 Indeed, the
incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence
presented during trial,21 making it incumbent upon the petitioner to
sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.22
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that
they thereby explained the gravity and severity of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the
celebration of their marriage.23
We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a
compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the
gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported
psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their
appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to
establish the incapacity.
To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent
gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without Eduardo’s
consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of
their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established.
Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his
allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-
serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such
a serious matter that was submitted to a court of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results
of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the
paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the following
portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is
characterized, mainly by immaturity in several aspects of the
personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships,
where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in a
relationship that involves commitments. They are generally in and
out of relationships, as they do not have the patience to sustain
this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be
attended to as they might end up doing things which are often
regrettable. These people however usually do not feel remorse for
their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from their mistakes,
and they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to the
detriment of their own lives and that of their families. Owing to
these characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot be
expected to have lasting and successful relationships as required
in marriage. It is expected that even with future relationships,
things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship
are not also that ideal. If this be the background of the developing
child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as
such.
xxxx
With all these collateral information being considered and a
longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being concluded that
she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her as
a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the marriage is
highly indicative of a very immature and childish person, rendering
her psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet the
responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina
miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother, rendering her
incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in marriage. In the
same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and behavior of
defendant will still change because her traits have developed
through the years and already ingrained within her.24
Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity
and incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological incapacity.
Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital
information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a
brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline
personality disorder, both the report and court testimony of Dr.
Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have
brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not
specify which of Catalina’s various acts or omissions typified the
conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also
discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to
perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that
Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness and
immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already
reached an age "beyond maturity."25
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases
of declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.26We have explained this need in Lim v.
Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 stating:
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of
seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and
prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in
this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does
not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of his conclusion is founded.28
But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not
personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from
Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the
conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that
reason, Dr. Reyes’ report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness
that removed the necessary support for the conclusion that the
RTC and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological
incapacity to perform her marital duties.
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr.
Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence
showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality
disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage.
151
We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. 29
What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo
adduced was Catalina’s immaturity and apparent refusal to
perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did
not constitute psychological incapacity.30 To rule that such
immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered
personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was
merely due to her youth or immaturity.31
Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the
basic marital obligations, viz:
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral
element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the
spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only
be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in
her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live
with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds
for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also
constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for
legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the
other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering
that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such
evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual
and legal basis.
Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that
Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based on his
admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of
P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince
her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part, 34 to
wit:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG
Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your
wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos, has
been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed that she
is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to
your wife?
A No, sir.
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both
of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this case you filed
against her, is it not?
A No, sir. I did not.
Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an
agreement regarding this case?
A None, sir.
Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that
you will pay her an amount of P50,000.00, please tell us, what is
that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?
A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.
Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired
at the time of your marriage?
A Yes, sir.
Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?
A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat,
that is why I agreed, sir.
Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this
petition for declaration of marriage which you filed against her?
A She does not opposed [sic], sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about
this case is the division of your conjugal properties?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share
of your conjugal properties, so that she will not pursue whatever
she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed against
her, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr.
witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00
that is the reason why she is no longer around here?
A Yes sir, it could be.35
Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a
collusion between her and Eduardo.1âwphi1 To recall, she did not
interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her
psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear
enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal
house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount
of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his
recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share
was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage
her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing
the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of
any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between
the spouses.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the
psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.36
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari;
SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on July
30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.
Costs to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
152
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005
amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered
its March 22, 2004 decision3(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No.
75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002
decision4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47,
in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two
children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar went
to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986,
Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been
having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, 7 Lolita
allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with
Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June
16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s
psychological incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that
Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She
insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she
left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and
subsequent abandonment of the family home.10He testified that he
continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children
even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin. 11
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report 12 on Lolita
prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from
any form of major psychiatric illness," 13 but had been "unable to
provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other
depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as
her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go
with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
good marital and family relationship." 16
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage
to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not
serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita
merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she
was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity
is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the
nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due
course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original
decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision.
In its amended decision,20 the CA found two circumstances
indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted
in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform
her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report
did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological
illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal
separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her
marital obligations established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists
sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s
marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as
a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence
at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability
of the condition of the errant spouse.23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged
psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment
of their home,24 as well as his continued financial support to her
and their children even after he learned of the affair, 25 but he
merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and
her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring
spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No
evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that
Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any
psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation
report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The
psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not
suffer from any major psychiatric illness. 28 Dr. Flores’ observation
on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind,
does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was
– at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to
enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element
involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply
be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace
obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital
counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their
relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully
established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of
comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr.
Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr.
Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad
153
signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30 is a
mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash
conclusion that this Court cannot support.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s
psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible error
when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social
institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against
its dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of
the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other
during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar
Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita
Castillo-Encelan.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On September 19, 2011, this Court issued its Decision 1 denying
petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw's petition and affirming the appellate
court's determination that there is insufficient evidence of
psychological incapacity that would render the parties' marriage
null and void. The Court, in making its Decision, relied on the
experts' own proffered guideline for making their conclusions.
They said that actions, such as those allegedly performed by
respondent, "when performed constantly to the detriment of quality
and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife,
constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of [Narcissistic
Personality Disorder]."2 The Court, using the experts' own
guideline, reviewed the evidence to determine if there is indeed
proof, before the Court, that respondent engaged in the alleged
acts, that she performed them constantly, and to the detriment of
the quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother
and wife. Considering the opposing views of the trial and appellate
courts on the matter, the Court thoroughly reviewed the records of
the case, including the psychiatrists' reports. Despite the Court's
considerable effort to respect and accept the psychologists'
findings, we simply found no adequate evidence of the factual
premises of their diagnosis of Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Thus, we agreed with the Court of Appeals (CA) that the evidence
is insufficient for a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), 3 arguing
that the Court erred in finding the psychological experts'
conclusions (that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
understand the demands of a marriage) unsupported by the
available evidence.
The respondent, in lieu of a Comment,4 reiterated her earlier
Manifestation that she is now conceding that petitioner, not herself,
may actually be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
essential marital obligations.5
The Majority Opinion opines that the Court would be unjust to keep
the parties in a marriage despite their shared opinion that their
marriage is beyond repair.
However, under the law, the parties’ own desire to dissolve their
marriage is not a determining factor in assessing the existence of
a groundfor annulment or declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 48
of the Family Code mandates the court to guard against the
possibility of collusion between the parties:
ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
xxxx
The Court’s Decision should rely solely on the available evidence
and the law.
The Majority Opinion claims that our Decision failed to appreciate
the evidence, as found by the trial court andby the expert
psychologists and that the trial court’s ruling on the psychological
incapacity of the parties should be final and binding on the
appellate courts when such ruling is based on the facts and on
opinion of the qualified experts.
I agree that the ruling of a lower court should be given due respect
and finality when it is adequately explained, rests on established
facts, andconsiders the opinion of qualified experts. Unfortunately,
such kind of trial court ruling is not before us; hence, our
September 19, 2011 Decision did not see fit to adopt the findings
of the trial court.
The trial court summarized the parties’ respective evidence,
including the testimonies of their psychologists, inthe first six
pages of its decision.6 It then proceeded to quote Article 36 of the
Family Code and the definitions of psychological incapacity in
Santos v. Court of Appeals7 and in the Republic v. Court of
Appeals.8 Without any indication of which pieces of evidence it
found convincing, reliable, and overwhelming, much less a
discussion of how these evidence tend to prove the existence or
non-existence of psychological incapacity – ergo, without factual
findings whatsoever– the trial court ruled in a terse and
unsatisfying paragraph that:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties
entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it
entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential
obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their
children to become responsible individuals. Parties’psychological
incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The
incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be
pervasive, grave and incurable.9 (Emphases supplied)
The inadequacy of the trial court’s ruling and its understanding of
the concept of psychological incapacity
apparent.1âwphi1 Psychological incapacity, as a ground for the
declaration of nullity, is not a lack of understanding of what
marriage entails, nor is it a "failure to commit" one’s selfto the
essential marital and familial obligations.10 It is a downright inability
to understand, perform, or comply with, the said duties and
obligations.11 How can any appellate court rely on the trial court’s
assessment of whether the evidence constituted psychological
incapacity when there is none and its understanding of the concept
of psychological incapacity is doctrinally flawed?
The trial court then characterized the parties’ psychological
incapacity as grave and serious, without even going over the
evidence upon which it relied in making such conclusion. It
appears to the Court that the last sentence of the trial court’s
decision – that "the incapacity has been clinically established" --
encapsulates the process by which the trial court arrived at its
judgment. It relied merely and solely on the conclusions of the
psychological experts, without doing its duty to make an
independent assessment of the evidence.
To reiterate, while I agree that the trial court’s ruling on the
psychological incapacity of the parties should be final and binding
on the appellate courts when such ruling is based on the facts and
on the opinion of the experts, I believe that the trial court’s decision
in this case was not based on facts, but solely on the opinion of
the experts. Such blind reliance by the trial court was an abdication
of its duty to go over the evidence for itself.
While the courts may consider the assistance of the experts, the
courts are duty-bound to assess not only the correctness of the
experts’ conclusions, but also the factual premises upon which
such conclusions are based. The expert’s conclusions, like any
other opinion, are based on certain assumptions or premises. It is
the court’s job to assess whether those assumptions or premises
are in fact true or correct, and supported by evidence on record.
The soundness of experts’ conclusions lie in the quantity and
quality of the input they received in making their conclusions. This
is precisely where the courts take the reins from these experts.
The root cause of psychological incapacity must not only be
clinically identified by experts, it must also be sufficiently proven
and clearly explained in the decision.12
The expertise of courts lies in determining which facts are
admissible, which are relevant, which carry weight, which have
been proven, which have been debunked. In resolving legal
disputes, the courts have the expertise in evaluating the quantity,
quality, and relevance of the facts to the legal issue involved.
Courts have to conduct its independent assessment of the quality
of the facts that the psychologists relied upon in support of their
conclusion. It is only if, and when, the court is convinced that the
psychologists’ conclusions are strongly anchored on verifiable,
admissible, and relevant evidence that it can adoptthe
psychologists’ findings. Even petitioner’s expert witness, Fr. Healy,
acknowledged in his testimony that it is the court’s job, not that of
the expert, to verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations
regarding respondent’s alleged habits. Fr. Healy cautioned that his
opinion rests only on his assumption that the factual allegations
are true.13
It remains my opinion that the factual premises for the experts’
conclusions in this case werenot established in court. While the
experts testified that the alleged dysfunction in respondent’s family
and her subsequent actions within her marriage are indicative of a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, the court records themselves
reveal no credible and preponderant evidence of the supposed
family dysfunction in respondent’s childhood and of her supposed
narcissistic habits later in life. There was no independent witness
presented, who is knowledgeable of respondent’s upbringing and
of her actions before and after the celebration of marriage. This is
detrimental in proving that the cause ofher psychological
incapacity occurred before, or at the time of the celebration of, the
marriage,14 and renders the experts’ opinion on the root cause of
her psychological incapacity conjectural or speculative. Also there
was no evidence of respondent’s supposed obsessive desire for
attention and selfishness, which obsession, according to the
experts, indicates a narcissistic personality. The most that was
provenwas a single incident wherein she was found in a hotel room
is
with another man (after they have separated in fact), a penchant
for visiting salons and for meeting friends over a mahjonggame.
This can hardly be considered as a pattern, defined as "a reliable
sample of traits, acts or other observable features characterizing
an individual,"15much less an obsession.
Much is said about respondent’s undesirability as a mother for
supposedly exposing her children to the "culture of
gambling;"16 this, from the evidence that she brought her children
with her to their "aunt’s house" where she frequently played
mahjong. I find this judgment unsupported by the evidence and
irrelevant. While it has been proven that respondent played
mahjong, there is no evidence whatsoever that it involved
gambling, which is "the act of playing a game and consciously
risking money or other stakes on its outcome." 17 Without the
element of gambling, a mother’s act of bringing her kids with her
when she meets with friends (which is the most that can be saidof
this matter) can hardly be described as undesirable. Even Fr.
154
Healy acknowledged that playing mahjong and spending time with
friends are not disorders by themselves. They would only
constitute psychological incapacity if inordinate amounts of time
are spent on these activities to the detriment of one’s familial
duties.18 The Court, in our Decision, applied Fr. Healy’s standards.
We concluded that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated because there was no proof that she spent
inordinate amounts of time in these alleged activities or that her
kids were adversely affected.19 On the contrary, the records
revealed her efforts to maintain supervision of her kids, even when
she was among her friends. Further, the kids recalled that, after
respondent left the conjugal home, she would surreptitiously visit
them in their schools; and, once granted visitation rights, spent
weekends with them and tookcare of them at any time they got
sick.20 These are hardly the actions of a woman with an inability to
understand her filial duties and obligations.
It must be emphasized that the Court does not disrespect the
experts’ findings when it disagrees with them; nor does it assert
that it is wiser in analyzing human behavior. It is simply performing
its duty to go over the evidence independently, consider the
experts’ opinions, and apply the law and jurisprudence to the facts
of the case. The Court cannot simply adhere to the experts’ opinion
when there is an obvious dearth of factual evidence. The Court is
not a passive receptacle of expert opinions; otherwise, there would
be no need for psychological incapacity cases to betried before the
courts. Courts would be reduced to a mere rubber stamp for the
expert’s conclusions. That is not what the framers of Article 36
envisioned.
In the end, this is simply the sad story of two people who married
and started a family, but realized early on that they have made a
mistake. They both contributed to the demise of their marriage, as
hurt people often do. Despite their brokenness, they tried to make
the most of the situation, caring for their children while they try to
move on with their now separate lives. Now, in their advanced
years, they want a magical solution that would erase any trace of
their follies of youth; unfortunately, the provision for psychological
incapacity is not such a miraculous fix for dissolving the marriage
bond. The policy of our 1987 Constitution continues to be to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. 11,
Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) The existence of any doubt should still
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
I, therefore, submit that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration be
denied with finality.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015
GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-
VIÑAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and
Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the
Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP-
6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Viñas
(Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Viñas (Mary Grace) as null and
void.cralawred
Antecedents
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years
old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City,
Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant,
however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment.
Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s
heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
155
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a
bartender, while Mary Grace was a production engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she
shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace
went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed,
Mary Grace had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that Mary
Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to
regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house.
She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked
heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused
to perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning
and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited
the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind
courtship.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about
the death of the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she
were single and was unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was
self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her
about her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left
their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she
left for an overseas employment in
Dubai.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends.
They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family
and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The
foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of
insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married
life.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional
guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by
Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found
him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of
maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship.”9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality
through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin,
Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Grace way back in
college.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college
graduate. She belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an
overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the
time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in
Dubai and romantically involved with another
man.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically
harmed Glenn during the couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-
tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-
oriented.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag
concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded
on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each
other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring
the nullity of the couple’s marriage.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe,
serious, grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is
incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already
been deeply embedded within her system as it was found to
have started as early as her childhood years. Because of such, it
has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-
]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.

Such disorder of [Mary Grace] is mainly characterized by
grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with
her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,]
which utterly distorted her perceptions and views especially in
terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in
[Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement
and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has
exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her marked inability
to show proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too
headstrong that most of the time[,] she would do things her own
way and would not pay close attention to what her husband
needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled for power
and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being too
considerate to her, was often subjected to her control. x x x She is
into many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at night[,]
and she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still
going on up to the present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Grace’s] personality aberration can be
said to have emanated from the various forms of unfavorable
factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,]
which is the crucial stage in the life of a person as this is the time
when the individual’s character and behavior are shaped. [Mary
Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating
parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their
children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the
love and affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were
supposed to be the first to show concern [for] her. x x x She has
acquired a domineering character as she was not taught to have
boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had from her
caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest in the
brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with
regards to making decisions and always mandates people to
submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very essence of
morality [and] has certainly learned set of unconstructive traits that
further made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals and
values were not instilled in her young mind that as she went on
with her life, she never learned to restrain herself from doing ill-
advised things even if she is amply aware of the depravity of her
actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical
antecedence as it was already in her system even prior to the
solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x. 13 (Underlining
ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for
the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace
through her aunt, Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer
and did not attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito
were offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary
Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact
opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his
work.15 On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the
psychological report dated December 29, 2008.cralawred
Ruling of the RTC
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision 16 declaring
the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on
account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the
following as grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the]
grant of the petition.
Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil.
For the best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond
between them be severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the
miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic
Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who
156
does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are
separated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned
[Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for the
insistence of [Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of
his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are obliged
to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x
x x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a
quandary on what it really means. x x x.
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace]
failed to comply with the basic marital obligations of mutual love,
respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have
their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with
him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her marital obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a
clinical psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the
subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and
was able to gather sufficient data and information about [Mary
Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder of [Mary
Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so
permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this
personal incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already
pre-existing before the marriage and was only manifested after. It
has become grave, permanent and incurable. 17 (Underlining ours
and italics in the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Order 18 dated
December 1, 2010.cralawred
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent
evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling
her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite
the root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not
state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s statements
anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The
RTC resorted to mere generalizations and
conclusions sans details. Besides, what psychological incapacity
contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital
obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown,
but these do not warrant the grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace
may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not
translate into a psychological
illness.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s
appeal.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed
decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage
between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA
stated the reasons below:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that
“psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the mostserious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace]
was carefree, outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made
her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He
likewise alleged that she refused to communicate with him to save
the marriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To Our mind,
the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case of
psychological incapacity on her part.
While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr.
Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a psychological
examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was
conducted only on him and no evidence was shown that the
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive
value in determining the psychological incapacity of a person as
she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate the
psychological condition of the couple, she being an expert in this
field of study of behavior. Although the psychologist stated that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she
make a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she
admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,]
hence, the information provided to her may be subjective and self-
serving.
Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root cause of the
spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also be medically
or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly
explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to
beexisting at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
shown to be medically orclinically permanent or incurable. It
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth
in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did
not establish the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
[Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We
reiterate the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently
proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to
say:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
“Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
bepsychological – not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis
x x x[,] nevertheless[,] such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.”
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that “Article 36 of
the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves”. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.” Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage of the parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show
157
that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;
and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined in the afore-
cited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis
and italics in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7,
2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration22 filed by
Glenn.cralawred
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of
whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage should be judged according to its
own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections
or generalizations. The RTC judge should painstakingly examine
the factual milieu, while the CA must refrain from substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court. 23 Further, Glenn argues
that inMarcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua
non requirement for the respondent spouse to be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage could
be declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is
sought, his or her testimony should be considered as decisive
evidence.26 Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding the
credibility of the witnesses should be
respected.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes
that the arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere
reiterations of the matters already resolved by the
CA.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent
by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.”29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of
Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence
offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The evidence merely shows
that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to
perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and
is romantically-involved with another man. She has not been
maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the latter
filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is
conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary
Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible
personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily indicate
psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30is emphatic
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
– an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown
in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit
with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never
proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise,
the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into
the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was
caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after
their marriage; their problems only came in later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v.
Navales:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
“difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital
obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from
“incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule.31 (Citations omitted,
underlining ours and emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other
for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing
established fact shows that living together as spouses under one
roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their
home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not
absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her
husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined
by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more
convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in
this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in material details.
Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s
statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito
both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited
during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the
antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even
testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each
other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw “a loving[,] caring and well[-
]educated person”33 in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the
Court finds the same as unfounded.Rumbaua34 provides some
guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of
psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the
respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose
bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the
manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account;
she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a
self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who “believes
that the world revolves around him”; and who “used love as
a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner]
extended towards him.” x x x.
158
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth
and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the
root cause of the respondent’s narcissistic personality disorder
and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither
did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor
show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s
conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered
“Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable” – is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various
tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s
condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed
by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.
x x x x
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed
to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married,
respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and
responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain
how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition was
grave and incurable. x x x
x x x x
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In
short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but
disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the
respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality
disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and
incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the
marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s
awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of
the petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis
because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her.
x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence,
however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case,
particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and
about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately
thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no
more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and
meagre facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to
support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the
nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser
qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus;
none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better
qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to
improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first
six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to
mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought
into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family
opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to
blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is
at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few
marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of
either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to
psychological incapacity. x x x.35 (Citations omitted and
underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary
Grace’s status as the eldest among her siblings, 36 her father’s
being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a
housewife.37 These, however, are not sufficient to establish and
explain the supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace
warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to
obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the
antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such
difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what
the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s
marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is
indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, v. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court assailing the November 20, 2009
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010
Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and
set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br. 37), declaring
the marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and
private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.
The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot
three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro
City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the
petition. Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999, the
CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision “due to lack of participation
of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family Code.”3 The
case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its
records were thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br.
37, as the latter was designated as Family Court pursuant to the
Family Code Act of 1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration
of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental
incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and
to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such
incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage
when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and
inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding
obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint.
She averred that it was Robert who manifested psychological
incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did
not appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor
IsabeloSabanal appeared for the State.
159
When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in
California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed
that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and
dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that
from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife
and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it
was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know
how to keep order; (2)it was her mother who prepared their meal
while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because
she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3)it was also her
sister who took care of their children while she spent her time
sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her
schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous
letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was
not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy
Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would
contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes
Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of Northern
Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court,
Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan
Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of
Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a
decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground
of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as
contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon 1095. This
decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the RTC had rendered a
decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA. The OSG argued that
Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital
discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG
contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage
under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition
and reversed the RTC decision. The decision, including the
decretal portion, partially reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer
scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor
General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. x xx.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the
evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the fact that
at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a
psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital
plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply the
law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called
upon to bear its unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September
20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution,6stating that the arguments of
Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments and
discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new
substance was brought out to warrant the reconsideration or
reversal of its decision.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT
THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF
THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO
SUSTAIN THE DECISION OF THE RTC DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND
VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE
NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE
CATHOLIC BISHOP’S CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACK OF DUE DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER
COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his
marriage even in the absence of any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified
professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan
Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of
discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and
obligations mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said
decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with
different men coupled with the fact that she failed to function as a
home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated
her from accepting and complying with her essential marital
obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was
not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which
incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a married
woman. Robert avers that a sexmaniac is not just a mere sexual
infidel but one who is suffering from a deep psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of
evidence presented by Robert was not sufficient to support a
finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence
fell short of establishing his assertion that at the time of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which
deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the
NAMT, the OSG claims that the same were only given persuasive
value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of
marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and
160
obligations due to outside factors other than psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The
OSG also raises the strong possibility of collusion between the
parties as shown by the events that took place after the issuance
of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG
wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its
March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show the collusion between
the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others,
respondent’s Retraction of Testimony was executed without the
presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she
married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
cralawred
xxxx
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General
became indispensable, in the present recourse, when, in a
whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE
FACE executed a “Retraction of Testimony” and a “Waiver of
Custody” waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor,
her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in
the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the
Appellant’s complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who
was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of
the appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent of
disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying
for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly
suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a modus
vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of
the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x
The Court’s Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced
proves that Luzwas psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on
Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
“Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under
Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental
– not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed in Article 68of the Family Code, among others,
include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love,
respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly
a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.7cralawlawlibrary
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.8cralawlawlibrary

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos,
Jr.,9the Court reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,10 based on Article 36
of the Family Code.Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.cralawred
x x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. x xx.cralawred
x x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. x x x.cralawred
x x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. x xx.cralawred
x x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x
x.cralawred
x x x x
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x xx.cralawred
x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered
view that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the psychological
incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-
serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the
alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to
corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony
was self-serving and hadno serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of
Luz was not medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently
proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to
prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their
meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving
different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable
within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological
161
incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a
mother, as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity,cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.11Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is
one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is
another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.12cralawlawlibrary
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Robert arguesthat the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were
external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was
suffering within her person, which could be considered as
nymphomania or “excessive sex hunger.” Other than his
allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced
to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as
nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable
within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36.
To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient to prove the
existence of psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the
Republic of the Philippines,13 the Court ruled that the
respondent’s act ofliving an adulterous life cannot
automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity
was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The
petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent’s
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality,
which made her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance
Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center,
Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that would
indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to
a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological
incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving
information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to
prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that
in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,14 the Court
stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on
evidence. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x xx.
(Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT
cannot be given value since it was not offered during the trial, and
the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered
by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out
that the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT
was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family
Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers
to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions
of the NAMT decision are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the deposition of the petitioner – the respondent
understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she
was duly cited for Contempt of Court – and premised on the
substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman
Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action
and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact,
her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for marriage
intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of
judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having
invoked the Divine Name and having in mind the Law, the
Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby
declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision
rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN –
JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by
Canon 1095 par. 2 CIC on the part of the woman Respondent –
but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)15
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Santos v. Santos,16the Court referred to the deliberations during
the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which
drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36
of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the
provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the
Code of Canon Law, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
cralawred
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In Najera v. Najera,17the Court was also confronted with a similar
issue of whether to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also
covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in
our law.In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on
the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it
was not similar to, and only annulments under the third
paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating,
the Court wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals
apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial
Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it
resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In the said
Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same
issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It
stated:
162
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated
July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February
11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear
before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial
in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to
believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the
husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered
from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was
dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the
marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering
mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for
advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs
and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar
kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but
later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of
his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a
policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and
alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat
up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led
to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered
the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation
of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show
that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies
of the following persons only, to wit: AldanaCeledonia (petitioner-
appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said
witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1,
1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the
life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the
Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and
friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said
Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latter’s testimonies,
this Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA
198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
expounded as follows:
cralawred
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void xxx.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence
states:
cralawred
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not
expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on
a different set of evidence of which We have no way of
ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be
based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs.
Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on
record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment
of the Trial Court.31cralawlawlibrary
Santos v. Santos18cited the deliberations during the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to
provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It
stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph
of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration
of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which
mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer
from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and
conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x
x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered
the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation
of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law.x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to
the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming
the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on
the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore,
erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported
by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of
the RTC. (Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To
repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer
from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under
Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature
similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon
1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos19), which for
ready reference reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
163
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
x x x x
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under
the second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered
would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include.
What would prevent members of other religious groups from
invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity?
Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for
annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the bench.
As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they
are not controlling or decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21it was written that the Constitution set out
a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic
social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the
family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State,
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence
presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of
them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of
a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was
celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of
the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner
Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to
prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a
case for legal separation. Hence, this decision is without prejudice
to an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue
such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a
legal separation because in such proceedings, there are matters
and consequences like custody and separation of properties that
need to be considered and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20,
2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are
herebyAFFIRMED, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among
others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA
Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry
No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with
one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid
and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only
sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in
Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when
she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted
by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration
of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she
confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother
Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her
properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact;
and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration
and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared
null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at
the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under
the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition
stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an
Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She
explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first
marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing
the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033;
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case
there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the
second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not
an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS,
the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to
be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity.
(37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the
previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza.
164
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no
property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only
after trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous
application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the
petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by petitioner
and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do
not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of
facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the
second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that
the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship between said
parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and
multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52
of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
together with other incidents of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court
has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to
dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of
an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are
the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People
v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private
respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article
40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition
should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of
a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for
purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of the properties acquired during
coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with
one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such,
it is from the beginning. 8Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied
upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was
void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses
to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is
reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's
order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property
acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application
of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof,
which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
"although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and
applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting
the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that
he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and
effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the
Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no
need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such
a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. 14Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is
borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present
Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include
not only void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that
the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
165
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot
determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that
a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that
the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question.
Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of
annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided
in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared
invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage and the
declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in
the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if
the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno
suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to
require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not
annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred.
Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid
until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase
"absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they
change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the
provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with
collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa
explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a
final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not
declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the
other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are,
therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof.
Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no
liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista
added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in
the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it
is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista
and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then
proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may
be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad
and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that
they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided
in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is
that if one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said
subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go
back to the original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that
his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that
there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case
of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the
latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be
maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to
allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant
dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in
the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows
that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly
qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have
been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus
rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party
might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of
the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence,
in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a
marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he
may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
166
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words,
for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable
basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas,
for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as
an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as
such, it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms,
the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family
life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and
peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on
the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union
is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract
of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect —
and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution
would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would
be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy
the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and
public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no
impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the
parties may be gleaned from new information required in the
Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage
license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art.
40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that
the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal
of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40
resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in
fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to
refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only"
refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say
"on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the
Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute
nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private
respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the
recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during
their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be
acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with
jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In
addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate
or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were
acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded
that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as
the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated,
but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or
her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by
a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that
if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations
made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other
spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad
faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad
faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in
favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate
prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order
for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to
be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the
lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the
lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De
Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which
he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw
respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he
was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting
167
with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent
and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy
to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children
and even alienated the affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986
and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992,
after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's
office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married
to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was
related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and
claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the
complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who
called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko,
although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that
while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a
Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a
valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of
the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another
marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again,
neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in
Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all
good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into
a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family
Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took
place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article
40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any
vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to
his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He
made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit
to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was
admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through
the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a
lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law
student would know that a marriage license is necessary before
one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to
correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were
married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage
license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his
appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal
act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he
was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a
private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is
also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial
duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too
self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690
[1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1
168
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist
the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued,
first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's
attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was
a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman
and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in
a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19
November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San
Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg
in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage
celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent
received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet
Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately
asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in
Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also
stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the
bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him.
He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too
had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with
and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of
knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife
continued to refuse to give him such information even after they
were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of
Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his
witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had
expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her
daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's
mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way
of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had
tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth
to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to
do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before
she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed
that she had no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12
October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as
amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court
hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker
Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the
trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there
existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding
that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief
that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this
Court on a Petition for Review where the following allegations are
made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding
that there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that
Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's
declaration that the petition was a proper case of the declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is
"[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is
already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article
41 of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil
Code, which it superseded, 7 the following crucial differences
emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to
arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes
a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code
merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is
still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be
dead andbelieved to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. 9 The Family
Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4)
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that
respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the third
requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the
absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a
search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a
"well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence
required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant
169
Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up
the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already
died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due
diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries
concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom
he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his
first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose
of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits
that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits
that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been
absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already
dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet
Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities
or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's
contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to
inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to
London and I went to London to look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused
London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts
to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of
the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the
geographical difference between London and Liverpool, for a
humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one —
place in England, the port where his ship docked and where he
found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home
to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would
announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This
apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear
to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its
neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the
other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around
three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that
walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple
hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there —
which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as
a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica
declined to give any information as to her personal background
even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of
the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which
respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he
had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare
assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those
friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the
prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good
evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with
credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence,
said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had
chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and
and not that she was dead. both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against respondent.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's
letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not
explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when
be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he
married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents # Footnotes
and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain
why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other 1 Petition, p. 2; Record, p. 7.
authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The
2 Records, p. 13.
circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed 3 Records, p. 14.
belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
4 Trial Court Decision, p. 4; Records, p. 39.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
5 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 13.
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity
the public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the 6 Id.
parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied) 7 Pertinent portions of Article 83 of the Civil Code reads:

By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the
simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal
abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the
laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to
have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion
between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the
marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son,
Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law
must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view
marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code
emphasizes that.
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any other
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of the contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.

. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a

man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
familyand an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly

the need to protect.

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the

preservation of which the State bas the strongest interest; the
public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
...
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of
the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded
belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that
would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
CALISTERIO, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving
several parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00.
Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Calisterio. Esm
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had
previously been married to James William Bounds on 13 January
1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace
on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven
years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly
secured a court declaration that James was presumptively
dead. Esmsc

170
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio,
a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the
Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter
alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage
between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio
being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed
that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator,
without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the
estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her
first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the
latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than
eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico,
she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the
decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing
jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta
administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate
estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in
favor of petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the
petitioner and against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner,
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the
estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the
Court of Appeals, formulating that-
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family
Code in the instant case despite the fact that the controversy arose
when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between
oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is
bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the
presumptive death of her first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at
No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is
the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a
legal heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration
should be granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision,
thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring
as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal
partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the
partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate as of
the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is
entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister,
herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the other
half; Msesm
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of
Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's estate,
and if so found competent and willing, that she be appointed as
171
such; otherwise, to determine who among the deceased's next of
kin is competent and willing to become the administrator of the
estate."[3]
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present
appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court
is not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court."[4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the
marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a
surviving spouse. Exsm
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that
time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect
only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code[5] itself
limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby
would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy
is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab
initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved.
Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For
the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases
therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the
absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have
done so in good faith.[6] Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of
the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive
of interest or ill will.[7] The Court does not find these circumstances
to be here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary[8] as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It
is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases
are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until
declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the
burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing
the second marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered
valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death
under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c)
there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so
provided in Article 41[9], in relation to Article 40,[10] of the Family
Code. Mesm
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent
Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent
or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered
into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during
the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence
having been adduced to indicate another property regime between
the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with
the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in
two equal portions -- one portion going to the surviving spouse and
the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The
successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
estate[11] of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half.
Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of
representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon
the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right
which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and
nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents
who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate
court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive
portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children,
along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it
decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the
children of petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her, to the
other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate
pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005
172
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal
Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on
November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then
previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not
know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P.
MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo
was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in
Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of
Rizal.[4] He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in
Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan,
Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21
years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.
Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually,
as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite
Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her.
Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her
that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio
City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their
son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of
March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge
Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City,
Branch 61.[5] It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo
was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married
life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home
in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999,
Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only
twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked
money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse,
he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made
inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where
she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She
secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.[7] She
was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their
own vows.[8]
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995
in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO).
He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his
previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed
to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one
time when he noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then
abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was
single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in
good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that
he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage
before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first
wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so.
Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw
her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from
Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and
ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and
directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the
amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of
suit.[9]
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his
first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year
absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for
bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial
court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known
that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be
criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was
not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the
private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the
private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one
to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice
in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of
his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that
the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the
New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings
of this Court in United States v. Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals.[12]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos
defense of good faith and reliance on the Courts ruling in United
States v. Enriquez[13]were misplaced; what is applicable is Article
41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil
Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41
of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present
spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void,
the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves
the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution.
Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private complainants
knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since
bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the
private complainant.
173
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty
imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the
affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the
accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant,
Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could
lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a
judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent
spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court
in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to
support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it
hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE
CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE
390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR
UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00
AS MORAL DAMAGES AS ITHAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN
LAW.[18]
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the
second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He
avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been
absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code,
she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that,
under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who
has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still
alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal
presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent
spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two
requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that
the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he
had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no
knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive;
hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death
of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of
Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes
that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences
provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on
legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under
Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be
a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death
would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the
trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a
requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred
in awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant.
The private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and
even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and
took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed
out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she
brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the
decision of the CA affirming the petitioners conviction is in accord
with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster
its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco.[19]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and
penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal
Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse
legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la pena de
prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and
ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. [20] The
phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in
consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption
of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial
declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy.[21]
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married;
and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former
marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
174
first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is
that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent
intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a
felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view
that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a
marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the
celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the
first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have
juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the
Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the
same view as Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements
of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and
(3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. [28] He
explained that:
This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is
undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all codes,
and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no
willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this
must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this be
produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus,
a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and
well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her
whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be
deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no
fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the
crime.[29]
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is
charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a
felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is
classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary.[30] Although the words with malice do not appear in
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the
word voluntary.[31]
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an
overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another
suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a
felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused,
the law presumes it to have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal
presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable
consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the
contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable
doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. [34]
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a
confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was
married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially
declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married
the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the
Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
when he married the private complainant. As a general rule,
mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when
he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-
grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her
for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in
evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner
acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence,
he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner,
however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the
proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she
could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the
State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the State
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest
importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society
require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every
safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and
the causes specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil marriages
are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive
nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage
anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships
over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two
willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties
assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly
on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid
marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so
serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first
spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse [38] after
the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court
of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-
grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, men
readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old
jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because
one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain
extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof,
but by the subjective condition of individuals. [39] Only with such
proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second
marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has
made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the
personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily
capable of accurate judicial cognizance, [41] namely, a judgment of
the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as
basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war,
and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for
seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial
declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years
under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was
reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to
the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered
valid, the following conditions must concur,viz.: (a) The prior
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death
under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at

175
the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well- court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) maintains that the supposition is not true.[53] A second marriage is
there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.[54] Former Senator
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good
provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code. faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage,
if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to
bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was
of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present
instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she
Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the
contracts a second marriage.[56]
spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the
acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was
designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the
of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform
Law. to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where
a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v.
avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse
Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
the absent spouse was already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof of
absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent
the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in
marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted
purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the
of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is Code providing that the present spouse must first ask for a
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a
person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage,
finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person
he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code
presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to
for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee,
be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This provision is
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a
intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution
person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard
for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with
from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after
the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively
the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may
dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second
be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
marriage is already established.[58]
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable
time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless
act.[50] The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now
the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in
Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified.
collusion with the other spouse.
He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now
authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
the words proper proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed.
Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of
390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts.
settlement of the estate of a deceased person. InGue v. Republic The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is
of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the contention of the without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said
petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the absentee.
courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person
after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings
in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is
that the clause before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of Article
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a
provision of Article 349 or before the absent spouse has been need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.[59]
the proper proceedings is erroneous and should be considered as
not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the
prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first
spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper

176
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an
absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only
in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. [60] Before such
declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is
bigamous even if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined
that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and
the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however,
appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code,
which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse
can remarry.
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration
of the presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same
Code.[62]
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court
and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be
awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts
that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v.
Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private
complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private
complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the
same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included
in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is
not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the
petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the
following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas
autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro,
rapto, violacin, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin
incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe, por
consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00
arriba mencionados.[64]
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based
on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA
was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.[65] An award for moral damages requires the confluence
of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. [66]
177
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only
in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4,
5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order
named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be
awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered
mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there
would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts
in Article 2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or
resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation,
etc.)[68]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article
2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay
moral damages to the private complainant/offended party.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for
moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision
contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The
elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty;
(b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.[69]
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions
of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible.[70] If the provision does not
provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter
for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically
in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has
been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21
of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends
upon the circumstances of each case.[71]
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant
and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He
even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant
where he and his parents made the same assurance that he was
single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he
was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed
her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful
husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly
abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was
already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting
not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by
day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to
the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost
the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could
have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation,
being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful
husband.[72]
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and
deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private
complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is
not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, inMorris v.
Macnab,[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent
physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent.
See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031
(1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is
willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary,
natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma
v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99
A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the
defendants conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and
maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation,
and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did
ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but
also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery
Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF.
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev.
517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendants
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only
was embarrassed and ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but
couldnt eat, had terrific headaches and lost quite a lot of weight.
No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys
reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first
count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298
(App. Div.[74] 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public
policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of
society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.
Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent
her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]
178
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of
another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral,
but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action
against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him
in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes,
[1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E.
892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation
by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife,
whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy
in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that
she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a
crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but
rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The
injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise
to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not
her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that
proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury
were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass.
395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her
cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself but
upon the defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations
which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the
incidental results of the defendants fraud for which damages may
be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter
into the marriage relation have been maintained in other
jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17
L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324;
Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v.
Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of
public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances
are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that
her illegal action was induced solely by the defendants
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action
upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to
lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to
one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an
illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v.
Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.[76]
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court
finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and
reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159614
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF TINGA, and
APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
and ALAN B. ALEGRO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 9, 2005
x-----------------------------------------------
---x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A.
Julaton.
In an Order[1] dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for
hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of
the said order be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation
in the Province of Samar, and
that a copy be posted in the courts bulletin board for at least three
weeks before the next scheduled hearing. The court also directed
that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor General, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and
that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with
all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements.[2]
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to
Dismiss[3] the petition, which was, however, denied by the court for
failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. [4]
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were
married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.[5] He testified
that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening
and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her
that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for
her to go back to her parents.[6] Lea did not reply. Alan narrated
that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in
the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was
nowhere to be found.[7] Alan thought that Lea merely went to her
parents house in Bliss, Sto. Nio, Catbalogan, Samar. [8] However,
Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he
went to the house of Leas parents to see if she was there, but he
was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of Leas
friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was
informed by Janettes brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth
had left for Manila.[9] When Alan went back to the house of his
parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been
to their house but that she left without notice. [10] Alan sought the
help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him
locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Leas
whereabouts but to no avail.[11]
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea,
but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of
Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan
agreed.[12] However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila
on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth,
Leas friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told
him that she had not seen her.[13] He failed to find out Leas
whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided
to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look
for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan
in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.[14]
179
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local
police station.[15] The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on
July 4, 2001.[16]Alan also reported Leas disappearance to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001. [17]
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan.
He declared that on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired
from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did
not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen
Lea in the barangay ever since.[18] Leas father, who was
his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did
not know where Lea was.[19]
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in
opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the
petition. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioners absent
spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared
PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioners
subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
said absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA)
which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the
decision of the RTC.[21] The CA cited the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Nolasco.[22]
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CAs
decision alleging that respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove
that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.[23] It
averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and
diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted
that Leas father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been
to their house but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the
respondent reported his wifes disappearance to the local police
and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the
evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea.
Finally, the petitioner averred:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of
the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of ones
spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in
the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a
missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been
times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by
parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged
missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those
who cannot have their marriages x x x
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort
to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x
summary nature of its proceedings.
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family.
Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987
Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. For respondents failure to prove that he had a well-
founded belief that his wife is already
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in
searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of
presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and
the Honorable Court of Appeals.[24]
The petition is meritorious.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[25]
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos
racionales.[26]
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an
overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial
evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any
fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions,
attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control
the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so
far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or
throw light on their intentions,[27] competence evidence on the
ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse
is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse.[28]
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-
founded belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is
already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,[29] the Court warned against
collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also
the maxim that men readily believe what they wish to be true.
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other
than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed
to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person
180
from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate
his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent admitted that
when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February
14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there
but that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7,
1995 after he chided her for coming home late and for being
always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for
her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single
person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned.
Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the
conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement
she received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is
so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from
his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his
petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the
respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about
Leas whereabouts considering that Leas father was the owner of
Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police
authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an
afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss
his petition in the RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to
prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already
dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749
is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27,
is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondents petition.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and
Resolution dated September 28, 20043 reversing the Resolution
dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are
challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz
(Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition 7 to
declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition
notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is
hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for
those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively
dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with
Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social
Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof
effective July 1994, died.11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was
granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death
benefits13 which was also granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of
Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the
release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She
claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the
first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with
respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her
siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all
the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of
her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon
Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13,
199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and
Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and
they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to
contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they
personally know that Alice is "still very much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz,
claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed
before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s
death,17 he further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was
Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for
death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before the SSS. 20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol
Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment of
death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order
for the refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May
1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on
the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support
during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year
guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to the
order of preference provided under the law, after the amount
erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent
portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been
misled by misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic]
Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz
Presumptively Dead," did not become final. The presence of Aliz
[sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic]
Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the deserting spouse, his
remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting
spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita Jarque,
for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require
affidavit of reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not
necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first
181
wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of. 21 (Underscoring
supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August
16, 2000,22 advised respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were
the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should
return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, 23 the SSS advised
respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death
benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that
her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the
latter’s marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the December
10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not
become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the
validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to return the
amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly
pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to
May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12, 1999. 24 In a
subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension,
asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before
any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained
valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact
Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21,
2000,26 maintained the denial of her claim for and the
discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her,
however, that she was not deprived of her right to file a petition
with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC
for the restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was
returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing the
funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her
siblings "forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any
amount during Bailon’s wake."28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the
parties filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz
filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga
Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only
recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her
presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon
could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents’
residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon
was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even
after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of
respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was "just a
common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that
petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse and
primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS
the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death benefit she
received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as
well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-
Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the demise of
SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e)
and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its
prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of
its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this
Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that the petitioner
is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to
the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th Judicial District),
the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member
represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to
the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum dated
August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left
Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x
x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the
deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud upon the
unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the
deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the
marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage
on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled,
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties
thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation conducted
by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not
Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the
petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased member, it
necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary,
to the latter’s death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the
legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of Clemente
Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit
she received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until
May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually
defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente Bailon, she
must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to
her by the SSS as funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34having been denied
by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for review35 before
the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the
April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and
thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits
due her. Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of
whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now RTC, declaring
Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission
can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own,
declare the latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar
import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the
first marriage subsisting and the second marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person
presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that "the
person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris
tantum," the second marriage contracted by a person with an
absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent
court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of
the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse,
which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law
contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly
declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its
own investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC
declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to
review the decision of the regular courts under the pretext of
182
determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of
the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the RTC
absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually
possesses the authority to declare the decision of the RTC to be
without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the
principle of fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality
considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample
opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit
of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no longer practical
under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to
restore as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente
Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is
there a second marriage to terminate because the second
marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing
of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry where
parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of
the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and
void.36(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for
Reconsideration37 which were both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on
certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS
CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the
findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage
between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC
to determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death
benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 5 40 of the Social
Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give
respondent due process or ample opportunity to present evidence
in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the
CFI proceedings are of no moment to the present controversy, as
the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the
SSC’s finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage
between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a better right
to the death benefits."41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to
SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In so
exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case
at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was
obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and
Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and
respondent’s marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC
virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not give the
SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in
the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the
SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior
to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the
three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent
marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal
and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional
circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these
exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by
a competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases
rests on the party assailing the second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for
15 consecutive years45 when Bailon sought the declaration of her
presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage. 46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a
presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage,
and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it
is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown
that it had not ended when the second marriage was
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the
defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second
marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of
life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation
with such first spouse.47(Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, 48 it
is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted
by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses
in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a
subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall be automatically terminated by therecording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance
shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties
to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being
judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided
by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not
preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance
of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage.49
183
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an
affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of
either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death
of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall
arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the
marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for
annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab
initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil
Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the
first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or
when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for
annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three
persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2,
of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that
might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried
out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule
73, and not in the annulment proceeding.54 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance
with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s
death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other
issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. – (a) Any dispute arising under
this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and
penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be
cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with respect
thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members,
or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and
decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the
submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and
settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission.
xxxx
41
Rollo, p. 28.
42
Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive
governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.
43 Article 41 of the Family Code now provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
47I A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines 282 (1999 ed.). (Citations omitted)
48
Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the
former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and
the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced
by the parties and within the periods as follows:
xxxx
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse
who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse
of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;
xxxx
THIRD DIVISION
ANGELITA VALDEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
184
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007
dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On
December 13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child,
Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly
because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner
and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972,
petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in Bancay 1 st,
Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio.
In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1 st. He and petitioner
talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They
executed a document to that effect. [1] That was the last time
petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of
Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not. [2]
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio
Reyes on June 20, 1985.[3] Subsequently, however, Virgilios
application for naturalization filed with the United States
Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners
marriage to Sofio was subsisting.[4] Hence, on March 29, 2007,
petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac
seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision[5] on November 12, 2007,
dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita
was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband
Sofio Polborosa was already dead. It said that under Article 41 of
the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her
spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief
G.R. No. 180863
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said,
must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
The RTC found that, byJ., petitioners own admission, she did not try
to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to
Chairperson,
live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter testified that her
mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also
CHICO-NAZARIO,
said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering
that he would
VELASCO, JR., have been only 61 years old by then, and people
who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in
NACHURA,
health andandspirits, and, even assuming as true petitioners
testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is
PERALTA, JJ.
no evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.
Promulgated:
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. [6] She argued that it is
the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the Family Code
since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11,
1971, long8,before
September 2009 the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further
argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions
of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code
should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil
Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and
presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not
expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter
provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had
acquired under the Civil Code.

The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution
dated December 10, 2007.[7]
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the
RTC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,[8] the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) recommended that the Court set aside the
assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of well-
founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to
comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence
during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further
argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner
already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to
Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under the
Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofios death,
the OSG posits, could not be affected by the obligations created
under the Family Code.[9]
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not
repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code.[10] Title XIV of the Civil
Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by
the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code
provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they
will prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.[11]
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed.
However, we must state that we are denying the Petition on
grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court,
a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial
court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one
hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy
merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence
to the undisputed facts.[12]
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and
holding that petitioner needed to prove a well-founded belief that
Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to
Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985,
185
respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-
quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to
have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and
the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.[13]
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be
the subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of
the absentees estate.
In re Szatraw[14] is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted
marriage with a Polish national in 1937. They lived together as
husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband,
on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with
their child and never returned. After inquiring from friends,
petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China.
However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the
husband was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that
since the latter had been absent for more than seven years and
she had not heard any news from him and about her child, she
believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai
Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property
brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property
during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the
latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume
that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been
unheard from in seven years had been established. This
presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either
in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by,
and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently
of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of
death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an
action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be
enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against
her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a
particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition
does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any
pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if
judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation,
because such a presumption is already established by law. A
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is
still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the
only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the
controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or
status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which
certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such
controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree,
then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree
upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a
particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral
attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law.
It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in
seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject
to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become
final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because
he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made
in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively
dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot
become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary
proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.[15]
other hand, the antecedents in Gue v. Republic[17] are similar
to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gues husband
left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China.
From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to her,
nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts.
Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11
years, she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of
death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that
a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is
presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not
authorized by law.[18]
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code,
the presumption of death is established by law[19] and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of
absence,[20] Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there
existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the
marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of
well-founded belief is not required. Petitioner could not have been
expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code
was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The
enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this
conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring
petitioner to exhibit well-founded belief will, ultimately, result in the
invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it
was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would
go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no
decree on the presumption of Sofios death can be granted under
the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation
of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to
marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985
and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition
is DENIED.

In Lukban v. Republic,[16] petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted SO ORDERED.

marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few
days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent
quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent
SECOND DIVISION
search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his
last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband was G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty
years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T.
is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has SANTOS, Respondent.
no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the

186
DECISION and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies
of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
LEONEN, J.:
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28,
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for
obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An
being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Article 42 of the Family Code.28chanrobleslaw
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos,
assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated November 28,
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
resolution dated November 28, 2008.29 The Court of Appeals
petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her
denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated
presumptively dead.
March 5, 2009.30chanrobleslaw
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared
Hence, this petition was filed.
petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after
her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on
a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
September 17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw
presumptive death.
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death,
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under
Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment
Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse
somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten
is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City.
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the
They were engaged in the buy and sell business. 4chanrobleslaw
spouse's death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file
an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. 5 As a result,
place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is
Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper
proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's
fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
insistence, he allowed her to work abroad. 7 She allegedly applied
in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance
left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient
again.8chanrobleslaw
remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the
judgment declaring her presumptive death.34chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate
Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City,
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of
but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also
judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be availed
inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one
when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always
gave him any information.11chanrobleslaw
file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent
marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his
remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is
Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that
the appropriate remedy.
she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
The petition is meritorious.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only
sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw
"remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud
residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of
in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. 16 This For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to
residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain
1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of Ricardo's to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is
opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the
dead.18chanrobleslaw trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. 20 Neither did she go
to an employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed
that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that
was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations
City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to in the court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely
cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no
executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a
made false allegations in his petition.24chanrobleslaw newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because
of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively
Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a dead.42chanrobleslaw
newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General

187
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for
declaration of presumptive death were false.43 Celerina further
claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient
ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on
November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the July
27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a
month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The
petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by
law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by
laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of
jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at
the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with
them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a
spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded
belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already
dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during
the subsistence of another marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in
danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse
when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance
shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties
to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage
and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead
spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage
by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the
part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present
spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the
termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is
subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2)
recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of
the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the
fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does
not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead
spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only
when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are
present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the
188
absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first
marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity;
(2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in
the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there
is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no
judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the
first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal.
This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the
marital relations with the first spouse. 48 The second marriage, as
with all marriages, is presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to
show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on
the person assailing the validity of the second
marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a
cause for terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security
System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere
reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if
the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was
"no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
[filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]" 53 "Since
the second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and
by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided
by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of
determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of
the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was
absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However,
a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when
the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was
contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the
requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already
dead. The first marriage will not be considered as. validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a
subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in
bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his
subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition
against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his
petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted
the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void
for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is
because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded
belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for
the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to
apply.59chanrobleslaw
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to
effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not
preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact,
recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by
filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage."60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage
under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
"children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the
property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the
same as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived
before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is
a defense against prosecution for bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the
subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent
marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the
prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." 64 This
means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands
to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the
second marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent
marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file
an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for
nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the
petition.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171247, July 22, 2015
ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR., Petitioner, v. HON. AMELIA C.
MANALASTAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 268, AND LEONARDO S. UMALE [DECEASED]
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SPOUSE, CLARISSA VICTORIA
UMALE, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing
the January 31, 2006 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91940.
Factual Antecedents
This case stemmed from the complaint3 filed by Leonardo S.
Umale4 (respondent) against Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr. (petitioner)
and others5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The
complaint sought to compel the petitioner to account for, pay, and
deliver to the respondent the rental payments allegedly in the
petitioner's possession.6chanrobleslaw
189
The case was originally raffled to Branch 155 presided over by
Judge Luis R. Tongco, who voluntarily inhibited from hearing the
case upon the respondent's motion.7 The case was later re-raffled
to Branch 268 in the sala of Judge Amelia C. Manalastas (Judge
Manalastas).8chanrobleslaw
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Inhibition,9 Supplemental Motion for Inhibition,10 and Second
Supplemental Motion for Inhibition,11 (collectively, Motions for
Inhibition) to disqualify Judge Manalastas, on the following
grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(i) That defendant Villamor [petitioner] has obtained information
that the presiding Judge [Judge Manalastas] has stood,
together with plaintiff [respondent], as godparents to a child of
common friend; and
(ii) That the Law Firm of Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas, for
and in behalf of their client Mr. Hernando Balmores, wrote
defendant Villamor [petitioner] on a purported claim which
appears to be the very same claims asserted by plaintiff
[respondent].12
Judge Manalastas issued Omnibus Order13 dated October 17,
2005, which denied, among others, the Motions for Inhibition,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The allegations of defendant-movant [petitioner] in seeking
inhibition of the presiding Judge fall short of the proof required to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake her noble
role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear
and favor.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On November 7, 2005, the petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the
Omnibus Order insofar as it denied his Motions for
Inhibition.14chanrobleslaw
The petitioner claimed that Judge Manalastas's
resolutions,15not pertaining to his Motions for Inhibition, were not
included in the Petition for Certiorari as they were the subject of
a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Order of
Default (MR with Motion to Lift Default Order)16 filed with the RTC
on November 3, 2005.
On November 16, 2005, the CA issued a resolution requiring
respondent to comment on the petition. The respondent filed his
comment on December 14, 2005.17chanrobleslaw
The parties, however, had already filed with the CA the following
manifestations and motions before the issuance of the November
16, 2005 resolution:
1. On November 11, 2005, the respondent filed a
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss Petition on the
ground of forum shopping, pointing out the pendency of
the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order filed by the
petitioner with the RTC assailing Judge Manalastas's
Omnibus Order.
2. The petitioner filed his comment in opposition to the
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss Petition. He argued
that the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order did not
include the subject matter of the Petition for Certiorari,
i.e., the refusal of Judge Manalastas to inhibit from
hearing the civil case.18chanrobleslaw
3. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Inhibition of Presiding Judge on Account of
Institution of Administrative Case (Motion for Inhibition
on Account of Administrative Case)19 on November 12,
2005, on the basis of an Administrative Complaint for
Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure and for Bias
and Partiality (administrative complaint)20 filed with this
Court through the Office of the Court Administrator on
November 11, 2005. In this regard, the petitioner filed
with the CA a Manifestation of Filing of Administrative
 Complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure Respondent's Comment23
and for Bias and Partiality on November 14, 2005.

Subsequently, on November 18, 2005, the respondent filed a
Supplemental Manifestation/Motion to Dismiss Petition (reiterating
his claim that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping and
praying for the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari) since Judge
Manalastas's inhibition had also been raised as an issue in the
Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case filed with
the RTC.
The petitioner later filed with the CA a Manifestation dated
November 22, 2005, to the effect that in view of his filing of an
administrative complaint against Judge Manalastas, he filed with
the RTC a Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case.
On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed another Manifestation
with the CA stating that he had filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Manalastas with the Office of the Court
Administrator.
The respondent raises the sole issue of whether the petitioner
engaged in forum shopping.
The respondent argues that the petitioner engaged in forum
shopping when he availed of three separate remedies, namely: (1)
the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order filed with the RTC; (2) the
Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA; and (3) the Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case, also filed with the
RTC; praying for the same relief, i.e., the inhibition of Judge
Manalastas from hearing the case.
The respondent asserts that a party is guilty of forum shopping
when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court.24chanrobleslaw

The CA Resolution21 Petitioner's Reply25

The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping. It The petitioner reiterates in his reply all the arguments he raised in
noted that contrary to the petitioner's claim, the MR with Motion to the petition.
Lift Default Order prayed that the entire Omnibus Order be
reconsidered and set aside without excluding the issue of Judge Additionally, he wants this Court to rule on the propriety of Judge
Manalastas's inhibition. Manalastas's refusal to inhibit herself from hearing the RTC case.
He points out that considerable time has already elapsed, and to
Moreover, the petitioner later filed with the RTC the Motion for serve the ends of justice, the controversy must finally and totally
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case. The CA observed be laid to rest.26chanrobleslaw
that the administrative case referred to by the petitioner in support
of the motion was based on the very same grounds he raised in Issues
his previous motions for inhibition.
Two issues thus arise for this Court'
The CA also found that the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA
resolution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
and the pending motions in the RTC prayed for the same relief;
this, to the CA, was a plain and simple case of forum shopping. I. Whether the petitioner engaged in forum shopping; and

The dispositive portion of the CA resolution II. Whether Judge Manalastas's decision to continue
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary hearing the civil case was improper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the private respondent's Our Ruling

motion and supplemental motion to dismiss the petition
are GRANTED. The instant petition is herebyDISMISSED.
The petition is without merit.
SO ORDERED.
We rule that (1) the petitioner engaged in forum shopping, and (2)
The Petition Judge Manalastas's decision to continue hearing the civil case
is not improper.

The petitioner seeks the reversal of the CA resolution on the The Petitioner Engaged in Forum Shopping
following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a rule, forum shopping is committed by a party who, having
1. "THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ITS RESOLUTION
received an adverse judgment in one forum, seeks another opinion
DATED JANUARY 31, 2006, xxx HAS DEPARTED
in another court other than by appeal or the special civil action
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
ofcertiorari. Conceptually, forum shopping is the institution of two
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, WHEN IT ACTED UPON
or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FILED, WITHOUT LEAVE OF
successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or
COURT, BY RESPONDENT IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 5,
related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same
RULE 46, AND ITS OWN RESOLUTION DATED
reliefs.27chanrobleslaw
NOVEMBER 16, 2005 REQUIRING PETITIONER [sic]
TO FILE A COMMENT TO THE PETITION AND NOT A
Forum shopping also exists when, as a result of an adverse
MOTION TO DISMISS, AND THEREAFTER,
decision in one forum or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a
DISMISSING THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. S.P. NO.
favorable opinion in another forum through means other than an
91940 ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING; AND
appeal orcertiorari.28chanrobleslaw
2. "THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS, BY ITS
RESOLUTION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED HEREIN, There is likewise forum shopping when the elements of litis
SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE BY THE TRIAL pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
COURT, MORE PARTICULARLY ITS PRESIDING amount to res judicata in another.29chanrobleslaw
JUDGE AMELIA C. MANALASTAS, FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL Litis pendentia is a Latin term meaning "a pending suit" and is
PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF INHIBITION, SO variously referred to in some decisions as Lis pendens and auter
AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE BY THIS action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it
HONORABLE COURT OF ITS POWER OF refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the
SUPERVISION OVER THE COURT OF APPEALS AND same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
THE TRIAL COURT."22 becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy

190
against multiplicity of suits.30chanrobleslaw the reversal and setting aside of the Omnibus Order in its entirety.
For all intents and purposes, the MR with Motion to Lift Default
There is litis pendentia when the following requisites are present: Order necessarily included the relief also prayed for in the Petition
identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the for Certiorari.
causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the
identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment Even if we accept the petitioner's explanation that the MR with
that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is Motion to Lift Default Order did not raise the issue of Judge
successful, would amount to res judicata in the Manalastas's inhibition, and that it was meant to be a partial
other.31chanrobleslaw reconsideration of the Omnibus Order, the petitioner still cannot
deny that he engaged in forum shopping.
Otherwise stated, the test is whether the two (or more) pending
cases have identity of parties, of rights or causes of action, and of We find it undisputed that during the pendency of the Petition
the reliefs sought. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against for Certiorari in the CA and the MR with Motion to Lift Default
it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also Order in the RTC, the petitioner filed with the RTC his Motion
constitute direct contempt.32chanrobleslaw for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case.

Appeals and petitions for certiorari are normally outside the scope
of forum shopping because of their nature and purpose; they grant
a litigant the remedy of elevating his case to a superior court for
review.
It is assumed, however, that the filing of the appeal or petition
for certiorari is properly or regularly invoked in the usual
course of judicial proceedings, and not when the relief sought,
through a petition for certiorari or appeal, is still pending with or
has yet to be decided by the respondent court or court of origin,
tribunal, or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial authority,e.g.,
a still pending motion for reconsideration of the order assailed via
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.33chanrobleslaw
Forum Shopping at the Court of Appeals
We agree with the CA that the petitioner engaged in forum
shopping.
At the time the petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the
CA, the RTC had yet to resolve the MR with Motion to Lift Default
Order earlier filed with the RTC.34chanrobleslaw
The petitioner took pains to explain that the MR with Motion to Lift
Default Order did not include Judge Manalastas's denial of his
Motions for Inhibition.
The petitioner fails to convince us of the merits of this claim.
Although the arguments supporting the MR with Motion to Lift
Default Order pertained solely to the issue of declaration of default,
the prayer was direct and plain.
It read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that the Omnibus Order dated October 17, 2005, be
RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE, and that defendant
Villamor's Motion to Dismiss dated February 18, 2005, and
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated February 18, 2005, BE
GRANTED. It is further prayed that the order of default issued
against Villamor be lifted or set aside.35
The petitioner prayed that the Omnibus Order be reconsidered and
set aside, period. He did not pray that it be partially reconsidered
and set aside only insofar as the order of default was concerned.
With respect to the "order of default," the petitioner further prayed
that this order "be lifted or set aside," thus implying that the
petitioner asked for more than the lifting of this order.
Notably, the motion's preliminary statements were also
unambiguous. The petitioner stated in clear terms that he was
moving for the reconsideration of the Omnibus Order; again,
without qualification. Nowhere in the preliminary statements did
the petitioner indicate that he was only moving for a partial
reconsideration of the Omnibus Order.
The petitioner's claim that he did not engage in forum shopping
completely crumbles when this new Motion is considered. Three
remedies were then pending in two separate tribunals, all
praying for the same relief: the inhibition of Judge
Manalastas.
First, the Petition for Certiorari, prayed among others, that
xxx after proceedings duly had, render
judgment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(i) ANNULLING the Omnibus Order dated October 17, 2005
insofar as public respondent judge therein denied petitioner's
Motion For Inhibition dated March 1. 2005, Supplemental
Motion For Inhibition dared April 12, 2005 and Second
Supplemental Motion For Inhibition dated June 21, 2005;
(ii) ORDERING the inhibition of public respondent judge in
Civil Case No. 70251 xxx36
Second, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative
Case prayed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the Honorable Presiding
Judge inhibit herself from further proceeding with the instant
case.37
Third (and as already explained), the MR with Motion to Lift Default
Order prayed that Judge Manalastas set aside the Omnibus Order
in its entirety, which would logically result in her inhibition from
hearing the case.
The petitioner, however, insists that the filing of the Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case was the necessary
consequence of the administrative complaint. The petitioner
argues that the pendency of the administrative complaint should
result in Judge Manalastas's inhibition. 38chanrobleslaw
He asserts that the basis of the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative Case was Judge Manalastas's gross ignorance of
the law, and bias and partiality while the basis of the Motions for
Inhibitions — denied by Judge Manalastas and later the subject of
the Omnibus Order elevated to the CA through the Petition
for Certiorari — was Judge Manalastas's grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to inhibit from hearing the civil case because of bias
and prejudice.
The petitioner argues that the grounds relied upon in the Petition
for Certiorari were different and distinct from those in support of
the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case. 39 In
sum, the petitioner claims that the remedies were based on
different grounds and that they should not be treated as praying
for the same relief.
We do not find the petitioner's position persuasive.

The petitioner's failure to state in unequivocal terms that he was A perusal of the administrative complaint40 would show that the
only moving for the partial reconsideration of the Omnibus Order petitioner raised, as one of the grounds for imputing gross
may or may not have been intentional. But, regardless of the ignorance of the law to Judge Manalastas, her refusal to inhibit. In
petitioner's intention, the result is the same: the motion prayed for fact, the petitioner copied the allegations from the Motions for

191
Inhibitions and generally pasted them on the administrative petition when the administrative complaint, and very likely, the
complaint.41chanrobleslaw Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case were both
pending.
Glaringly, the petitioner used the same ground to support the
Petition for Certiorari and the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Again, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case
Administrative Case. As earlier stated, the petitioner likewise and the present petition prayed for the same relief.
prayed for the same relief in both of these remedies.
We note that the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative
These only lead to one inevitable conclusion: the petitioner Case prays "that the Honorable Presiding Judge inhibit herself
engaged in forum shopping by simultaneously raising the same from further proceeding with the instant case,"46 while the
issues in different tribunals, relying on the same ground founded present petition prays that -
on the same facts, hoping that both or either court would grant his
prayer. xxx (b) after proceeding duly had, render
judgment:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, in anticipation of an adverse ruling in the MR with Motion
(i) SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated January 31, 2006 x x x
to Lift Default Order, the petitioner, without waiting for Judge
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 91940...
Manalastas's resolution, filed the Petition for Certiorari with the CA
hoping to obtain a favorable ruling.

To reiterate, the petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari while the (ii) <B>ORDERING the inhibition of Presiding Judge Amelia C.
MR with Motion to Lift Default Order was pending. This violates Manalastas</B> of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 268, Pasig
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the City, in Civil Case No. 70251 xxx47
availability of a remedy in the ordinary course of law precludes the
Plainly, the petitioner, in an attempt to increase the chances of
filing of a petition for certiorari; under this rule, the petition's
preventing Judge Manalastas from hearing the case, successively
dismissal is the necessary consequence if recourse to Rule 65 is
filed the administrative complaint, the Motion for Inhibition on
prematurely taken.42chanrobleslaw
Account of Administrative Case, and the present action.
Had the petitioner waited for the resolution of the MR with Motion
Significantly, this Court's First Division in its Resolution48 dated
to Lift Default Order, the Petition forCertiorari would have been
July 5, 2006, dismissed the administrative complaint against
regularly and properly invoked in the usual course of judicial
Judge Manalastas.
proceedings and should not have been dismissed by the CA.
With respect to the petitioner's claim that Judge Manalastas's
In fact, if the CA had strictly applied Rule 65, it could have
refusal to inhibit herself from hearing the civil case constitutes
summarily dismissed the Petition forCertiorari on another
gross ignorance of the law, we emphasize that judges must be free
ground in addition to forum shopping.
to judge, without pressure or influence from external sources or
factors; they should not be subject to intimidation or to the fear of
One of the essential requisites of a petition for certiorari is that
civil, criminal, or administrative sanctions for acts they do and
there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
dispositions they make in the performance of their duties and
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose annulling or
functions.
modifying the questioned proceeding.43chanrobleslaw
Try as the petitioner might to characterize and label these
There was a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to annul or
remedies as separate, independent, and distinct from each other,
modify the Omnibus Order. The petitioner should have expressly
the unavoidable reality is that their ultimate aim is the same, they
included in the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order the denial of
involve the same parties, and they rely on the same grounds. In
his Motions for Inhibition so that Judge Manalastas could have
short, all the badges of forum shopping are present.
properly reconsidered her Omnibus Order in its entirety.
In Montes v. Court of Appeals,49 we found that the petitioner
In the end, it was the petitioner's precipitate resort to the
therein engaged in forum shopping when he filed with this Court a
extraordinary remedy of certiorari that was his own undoing.
petition for prohibition while his motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending in the CA.
Forum Shopping in this Court
Although the purpose of a petition for prohibition is different from
that of a petition for certiorari, we ruled that there was forum
The petitioner likewise committed forum shopping when he
shopping because the reliefs sought were the same — to restrain
submitted for this Court's resolution an issue still pending with the
a government official from implementing the same order.
RTC.
In like manner, it does not matter that the apparent purpose of the
We do not know if the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
administrative complaint (the source of the Motion for Inhibition on
Administrative Case was still pending with or had been resolved
Account of Administrative Case) is distinct from that of the Petition
by the RTC when the petitioner filed the present petition. The
for Certiorari (the source of the present petition). The controlling
petitioner kept silent on its status, in violation of his commitment
consideration is that they are both geared towards achieving the
under the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping he
same goal: the inhibition of Judge Manalastas from hearing the
had filed.44chanrobleslaw
civil case.
What we know is that the administrative complaint, the basis of the
The petitioner cannot hide under the cloak of characterization and
said motion, was still pending when the present petition was
labels to escape from the consequences of his actions. If we allow
filed.45chanrobleslaw
this, the evil sought to be prevented by the rule against forum
shopping would result.
To recap, the petitioner anchored his administrative complaint on
Judge Manaiastas's gross ignorance of the law. Among the
We remind the petitioner and his lawyer that forum shopping
grounds relied upon was Judge Manaiastas's bias and partiality,
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade
the same ground used in the Motions for Inhibition, which later
the administration of justice, to wreak havoc upon orderly
became the subject of the Petition for Certiorari(the CA's
juridical procedure, and to add to the congestion of the
resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari is now subject of
already burdened dockets of the courts.50chanrobleslaw
the present petition). The petitioner subsequently filed with the
RTC the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case.
Further, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to foster candor
and transparency between lawyers and their clients in appearing
The series of events shows that the petitioner filed the present

192
before the courts — to promote the orderly administration of
justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and
save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the
embarrassing possibility of two or more courts or agencies
rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same
issue.51chanrobleslaw
Judge Manalastas's Decision to Continue Hearing the Case
was Not Improper
Although we hold that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping
for reasons already explained, we nevertheless consider the issue
of Judge Manalastas's refusal to inhibit from hearing the case to
finally settle the matter.
First, Judge Manalastas's inhibition from the civil case
is discretionary. The grounds relied upon by the petitioner do not
fall under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court which enumerates the grounds for compulsory inhibition. We
have held that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter
of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge
based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the
case.52chanrobleslaw
Second, bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough, in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence, to overcome the
presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense
justice according to law and evidence without fear or
favor.53 Nothing on record shows that the petitioner ever submitted
evidence of bias and prejudice.
Villamor's claims that Judge Manalastas's impartiality was
allegedly compromised because (1) she and the respondent stood
as godparents to a child of a common friend, and (2) that her
husband was a partner of a law firm which represented a client
whose claim against the petitioner was similar to the respondent's,
do not suffice to overthrow the presumption that Judge Manalastas
will dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or
favor.
Because this act is discretionary, Judge Manalastas is in the best
position to determine whether or not there was a need to inhibit
from the case; thus, her decision to hear the case, in the higher
interest of justice, equity, and public interest, should be respected.
While a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification
of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
impartial, and independent in handling the case, this right must be
weighed with her duty to decide cases without fear or
pressure.54chanrobleslaw
In these lights, we see no reason to reverse Judge Manalastas's
decision to proceed with hearing the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the January 31, 2006 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R.SP No. 91940.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE B.
SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the proper remedy to challenge a trial court''s declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of The Family Code of the
Philippines1(Family Code).2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
193
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assails the October 24,
2011 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No.
04158-MIN dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
Factual Antecedents
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose)
filed a Petition5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ozamiz6 City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of
his wife, Netchie S.7 Sareñogon
(Netchie).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the
Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the
publication of said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in
the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of
Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition.9 Trial then
followed.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis
Occidental in 1991,11 They later became sweethearts and on
August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City
Hall.12 However, they lived together as husband and wife for a
month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie
went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. 13 For three months, he
did not receive any communication from Netchie.14 He likewise
had no idea about her whereabouts.15 While still abroad, he tried
to contact Netchie''s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly
left Clarin, Misamis Occidental.16 He returned home after his
contract expired.17 He then inquired from Netchie''s relatives and
friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where
she was.18 Because of these, he had to presume that his wife
Netchie was already dead.19 He filed the Petition before the RTC
so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose''s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel
Sareñogon, and by Netchie''s aunt, Consuelo Sande. 21 These two
witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as
husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the
Philippines for separate destinations abroad. 22These two added
that they had no information regarding Netchie''s
location.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision24 dated January 31,2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-
08, the RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of
evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41
of the Family Code.25 The RTC found that Netchie had
disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to
conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. 26 The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring respondent presumptively dead for
purposes of remarriage of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On April 19,2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari28, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic
used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA
perceived no error at all in the RTC''s judgment granting Jose''s
Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his wife,
Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic''s appeal
sought to correct or review the RTC''s alleged misappreciation of
evidence which could not translate into excess or lack of
jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of discretion. 30 The CA
noted that the RTC properly caused the publication of the Order
setting the case for initial hearing.31 The CA essentially ruled that,
"[a] writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower court''s
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it
is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible
by an appeal,"32 The CAthendisposed of the case in this
wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Issues
The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following
issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION
BECAUSE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I the proper remedy to question the RTC''s Decision in a
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON
A QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC''S
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65,
ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD
HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC DECISION, BECAUSE
IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR
DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS
PROVISION OF LAW.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS
MISSING WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-
FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT''S ABSENT WIFE X X
X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner''s Arguments
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge an
RTC''s immediately final and executory Decision on a presumptive
death.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose''s alleged
efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-
founded belief that the latter is probably dead. 37 It maintains that
even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate
Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the assistance of the
relevant government agencies like the Philippine National Police,
the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration.38 It likewise points out that Jose did not present
any disinterested person to corroborate his allegations that the
latter was indeed missing and could not be found. 39 It also
contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events,
occasions, or situations that would prove that he did in fact make
a comprehensive search for Netchie.40 The Republic makes the
plea that courts should ever be vigilant and wary about the
propensity of some erring spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the
Family Code for the purpose of terminating their
marriage.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert
that he wanted to have Netchie declared presumptively dead
because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of
Article 41 of the Family Code.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent''s Arguments
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic''s
Petition because the latter''s petition is erected upon the ground
194
that the CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on
record, or assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or
significance; and that such a ground does not avail in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose
also contends that the Republic should have instead filed a motion
for reconsideration44 of the RTC''s Decision of January 31, 2011,
reasoning out that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in law. Jose furthermore submits that the
RTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting his petition
because it even dutifully complied with the publication
requirement.45 He moreover argues that to sustain the present
petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make inroads
into judicial territory.46 Finally, he insists that the trial court''s
factual findings are entitled to great weight and respect as these
were arrived after due deliberation.47chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Court''s Ruling
This Court finds the Republic''s petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death
In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that
the RTC''s Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive
death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final
and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a
notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment.49 Concurring in the
result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban further
therein pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC
Decision was to institute a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65, and
not a petition for review under Rule
45.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v.
Tango:51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on
appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the
Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon,
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the
rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family
Code:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered
by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall
likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As
a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court''s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court''s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs
and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does
not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, x x
x52 (Citation omitted; Underscoring supplied)
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may
file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision
of the C A, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court."53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of
the wrong remedy when it filed a notice of appeal under Rule 42
with the CA to question the RTCs Decision declaring the
presumptive death of Marina B.
Narceda.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Above all, this Court''s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal
clear that the OSG properly availed of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 to challenge the RTCs Order therein declaring Jerry
Cantor as presumptively dead.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly
availed of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTCs Decision.
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the
Family Code is complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to
ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead
We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted
Jose''s Petition. Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained,
it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under
Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites
for the declaration of presumptive
death:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years,or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and,
195
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.58 (Underscoring
supplied)
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element
that in this case invites extended discussion), the holding is that
the -
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the
law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the]
general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not
suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41
of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of
proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-
founded belief which can only be discharged upon a due showing
of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse''s whereabouts but, more importantly,
that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.
xxxx
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It
depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To
be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). 59 (Emphasis
omitted; underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms "well-founded
belief that Netchie was already dead upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie''s parents while he was
still out of the country, but did not reach them as they had allegedly
left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead
because when he returned home, he was not able to obtain any
information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie''s relatives and
friends;
(3) Jose''s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive,
hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose''s older
brother, and by Netchie''s aunt, both of whom testified that he
(Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one
month and that after this, there had been no information as to
Netchie''s whereabouts.
In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held
that the present spouse (Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor) merely
conducted a "passive search" because she simply made
unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and
friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the degree of
diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1)
when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present
spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse''s
relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report
the missing spouse''s purported disappearance or death to the
police or mass media, and (3) when the present spouse''s
evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose
not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed
dead.61 The rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous
requirement has been marked out
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx [T]he Court fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in
nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strict
standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not
used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should
never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the
stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. xxx
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more
imperative if we consider the State''s policy to protect and
strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as
the family''s foundation and since it is the state''s policy to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic social institution, marriage
should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties.
xxx
xxx [I]t has not escaped this Court''s attention that the strict
standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death
has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to
cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently
ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less
than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify
this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the
strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the
Family Code." (Citations omitted)62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC''s
finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article
41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief
standard. If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate
the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of
stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his
bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives
as to Netchie''s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand
specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in
the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie.
Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat
he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for
Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were),
and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or
municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific
persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, The Decision dated
October 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No.
04158-MN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent''s
Petition in said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is
accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails
the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated
January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing
petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private
respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5,
1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
196
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the
trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that
threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who
was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the
marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and
that he later learned that private respondent's child died during
delivery on August 29, 1988.4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the
dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan
for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters
to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent
visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress
of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.
Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced
the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review
based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE
PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND
INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS
NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may
be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether
petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide
with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally
binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private
respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence
compelled him to do so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that
despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly
characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only
on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4)
years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to
have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged
inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this
annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a
favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not
altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy
which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately,
however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly
decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x
x even the very outcome of the present case disappointed his
expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still
pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope
that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may
yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this
perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage
on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from
the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three
men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes
thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a
supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant
claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him
in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed
that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked
as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time,
it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself
out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were
indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he
never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school
nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was
made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his
child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not
have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the
lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the
appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January
1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act
was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his
wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter
by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August
29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death
as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because
it is inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the date
of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation
of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her
child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date
in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not
prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire
testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date
of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had
presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the
date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the
appellee’s evidence continues in his argument that if indeed there
is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in
December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on
August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the
35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether
the appellee’s impression that she had delivered prematurely is
correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus
on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he
had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his
197
failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man,
appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee
into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the
letters allegedly written by him to the appellee. During his cross-
examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant
identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but
denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the
appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife,
and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct
examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and
denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was
forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by the
appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the
admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement
with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be
motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the
evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that
his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per
se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a
marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure
to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such
as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue
influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to
cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of
his marriage must be upheld.9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees.
Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s may be
awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the
circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages
for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in the records
or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral
damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said
thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the
baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as the perpetrator of
fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no
reference to any testimony of private respondent detailing her
alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral
damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be
pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and
the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral
shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent
should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on
the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other
emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain
his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they
must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other
person could have proven such damages except the respondent
himself as they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori,
she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in Article
2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not
be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed
upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such
liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the
court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition
to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would
be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it
not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral
damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded
unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral
damages.12 In the instant case, private respondent failed to
satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is
not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January
26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for
the annulment of his marriage with private respondent,
is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary
damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY,
BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the
community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true
intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of
judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright
the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida
Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila
Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina
Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on
August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4,
1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an
anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with
the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground
that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled
off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981
at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student
clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful
person who got along well with other people. They soon became
sweethearts. Three years after, they got married. 6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not
last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect
husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At
home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian,
unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable
198
way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in
stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his
mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his
dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to
Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his
homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she
noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For
instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation
manifesting his affection for a male caller.9She also found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession.10 Her
worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another
man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida
took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel
stopped giving support to their children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was
presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified
that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of
psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview
with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne
(the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated.14Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it
existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty
arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their
marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against
him was their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to
heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The
memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-
in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital. 16 Leonida's family
owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same
subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence. 17 In other words, he
and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same
vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their
children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed
the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said
there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of
the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This
is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight
years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this
otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and
possessive nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to
avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any
further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead
conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also
fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his
possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G.
Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's house
during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness
to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother
Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels
typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing
similar to what Leonida described in her testimony. 21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day
Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that
such an incident occurred. On that particular date, 22 he and
Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other
person with them at that time, except their driver. 23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's
findings by presenting his own expert witness. However, no
psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the
petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29
January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void from
the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same
parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor of the
same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff
with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all
the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment
upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an
Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila
City to cause the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their
respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article
36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding
circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the
evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case
(sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed,
generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason
enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as
a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x
x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage,
the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation
[Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family
Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no
matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and
forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely
come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual
shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity,
honor, and welfare of his own family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due
course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment
with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess
of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve
the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share
in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is
hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated
November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in
Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing
the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment.
Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the
decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming
there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
199
but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or
corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he
claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there
was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the
exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45,
assigning to the CA the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS
NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF
PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve
the demands of substantial justice and in the Court's exercise
of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA
by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.30 This is
to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain
exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of
procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not
be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer
available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v.
Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for
technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat,
substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied
in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while
the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect
to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals
are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these
rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has
given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and
in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.34(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed
exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals. 35 It has, in the
past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality. 36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks
the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA
instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave
abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on
account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that
this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service
Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a
Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six
(6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is
deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during
the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated
without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter
alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-
95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition
with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme
Court.38(Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the
wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal. 39 The CA
opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or
resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review." 40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had
substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court
stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not
fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed
with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked
the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice
to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct
about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the
rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a
legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring
supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner
Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review
on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal.
In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac
vice, as a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court
prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a
judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great
injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave
miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the
Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served
by giving due course to the present petition and treating
petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65,
considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a
marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of
Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural
right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of
the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.45
200
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the
merits to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's
counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty.
Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies.
After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for
reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also
erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than
pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's
incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuel's
appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the
interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions.
Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's former
counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be
made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests
of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his
case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained
thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is
based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the
scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of
his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance,
negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's
being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is
deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on
such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and
equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on
their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the
lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant
relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless
inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which
has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in
court.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from
the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require
it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case
involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is
guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence
in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial
Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the
Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance
and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the
court has the power to except a particular case from the operation
of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. 53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to
annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains
of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the
heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity
thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no
basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not
legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It
went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable
differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable
mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty,
neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations
do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity. 55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition
for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida
attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual
tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential
marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the
marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated
consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower
court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when
there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by
defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish
with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the
fact that can bededuced from the totality of the marriage life
scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around
him even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual
preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15
December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told
defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do
anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of
all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but
nothing happened after that. There may have been more important
matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases
against and be effected by these people and so, putting more
premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married
him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate
or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his
homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain
- even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about
his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why
obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family;
and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent
and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant,
he is meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like
wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in
knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN,
15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in
the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had
extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on
separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was
allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the
homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered
underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real
sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus
thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case;
but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the
defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the
question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward
infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family
as a whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed
this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference
without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual,
the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his
marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be
annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud,58 such as concealment of homosexuality.59Nowhere in the
said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that
Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that
201
he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of
homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes
bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to
the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid,
it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of
circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not
among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the
deliberations62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family
Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in
the provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit,
however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of
"concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is
actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground
existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed
at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for
clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage"
at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the
suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal
separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to
annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a
blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this
fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a
basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike
so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the
exclusive sexual bond between the spouses. 65 In Crutcher v.
Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous
indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage relation
so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to
discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose
of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause
mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the
Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce
is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged
incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as
grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it
is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful
marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced
three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this
onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a
vitiated marital consent was found inVillanueva v. Court of
Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent,
appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a
perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide
with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally
binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private
respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence
compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage
on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed
that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked
as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense,
or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's
way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was
made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his
child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not
have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to
justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not
only by solely taking into account petitioner's homosexuality per se
and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from
its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basicautonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of
these social institutions against desecration by fabricated
evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer
and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community
property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration
and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid
marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of
the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the
community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath,
the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children.
Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the
dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime
is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the
community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand the petition in the trial court to
annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
202
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the
petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure to annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic,
Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying
the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S.
Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the
motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the
respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight
children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births
are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 19703
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and
abandoned the petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994,
petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of
property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. The
case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the
petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. 4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise
Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were
adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the
following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos.
120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood
Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort
Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion,
swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks
of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3)
to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise
agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on
June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and
improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the
respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June
5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic,
Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The case
was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent
knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting
Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in
his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue
corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila, "where she may be served with summons." 7 The clerk of
court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the
petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the
petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner’s
son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a
Return of Service to the court stating that the summons and a copy
of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the
complaint and its annexes was received by the herein defendant
thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the
signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June
6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22,
1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at
8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was no
appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for
the State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent
who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to
adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf
and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial
court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the
marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a
Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996. 12
On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and
Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the municipal
mayor of Indang, Cavite.13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the
respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC
of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter
alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by
making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she
was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in
fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at
Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the
petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be
heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment
without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the
respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her
by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano
B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the
respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta
III failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons.
Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor
of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over
her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the
respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis
203
for the trial court’s finding that she was suffering from
psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she
learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000.
Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the
petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court
to render Judgment granting the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for
every hearing;
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the
petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in
the absence of any clear and specific averment by petitioner that
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the
present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic
fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or
could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition
for relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said
resolution, appending thereto an amended petition in which she
alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year
period after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could
not have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or
estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies were no longer available through no
fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said
remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her. 16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court
nullifying her and the respondent’s marriage was null and void for
the court a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct
an investigation on whether there was collusion between the
parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the
said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court
alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was
sought to be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit
the Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality. 17
The petition is meritorious.
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or final order or
resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two
grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on
extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent,
namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in
the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are
no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition
will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of
new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or
negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she
cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise,
she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were
no longer available through no fault of her own. The petitioner must
also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The
safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of
the remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must
be limits thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in
a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be
granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party
should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for
relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She
merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order of the
trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioner’s amended petition
did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because
although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the
remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment,
she did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the original petition and denying admission of the amended
petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed
to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that the
petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the
summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662
were not served on her. While the original petition and amended
petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the
assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however,
that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the
assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over
the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any
allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final
order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action,
the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no
fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final
order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and
may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or
by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the
Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, were
based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of
204
the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the
failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of
the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were
served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who,
however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original
petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima facie meritorious;
hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of
Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that
jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the
defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service
of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him
that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to
defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the
plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a
valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person
of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless
he is validly served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either
by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there is
impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on the
defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the
summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in
Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
by leaving the copies of defendant’s office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of
service should be strictly followed in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is
only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating
the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the
summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This
statement should be made in the proof of service to be
accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary
because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of
service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a
method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA
and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662
was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons
was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta
III,33 the petitioner’s son. When the return of summons was
submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no
statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant
therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by
the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein
that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM
Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas,
where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It
turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing
at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed
him the summons and the complaint and was made to affix his
signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with
a copy of the said summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso,
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining
land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his
share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residing
therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence
situated on my father’s lot), my father came to see me and then
asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and
the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are
for the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of
marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy
of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in
dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the amended
petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the
merits of the final order of the trial court. However, we cannot but
express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by
the records. The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file
an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of
the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public
prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed
no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court
forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of
protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court
and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family
Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18,
Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well.42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is
fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for
annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation,
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the
parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint,
the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists
between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may
oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through
the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
adduced is dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence,
their preservation is not the concern of the family members
alone.43 Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a
family should stay together must not depend on the whims and
caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers
psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or
her marital duties and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and
September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET
ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550
be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings
conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal

separation.— If the defendant in an action for annulment of SECOND DIVISION
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.36

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down

the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the
Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.38

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its

pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals,40regarding the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the
ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid
the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of
this Court.

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution

requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution

205
MARIO SIOCHI, G.R. No. 169900 on 31 august 1993, while the legal separation case was still
pending, alfredo and mario siochi (mario) entered into an
Petitioner, agreement to buy and sell[5] (agreement) involving the property for
the price of p18 million. among the stipulations in the agreement
were that alfredo would: (1) secure an affidavit from elvira that the
property is alfredos exclusive property and to annotate the
agreement at the back of tct no. 5357; (2) secure the approval of
- versus - the cavite rtc to exclude the property from the legal separation
case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice oflis
pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated on tct no. 5357.
however, despite repeated demands from mario, alfredo failed to
comply with these stipulations. after paying the p5 million earnest
ALFREDO GOZON, money as partialpayment of the purchase price, mario took
possession of the property in september 1993. on 6 september
WINIFRED GOZON, GIL 1993, the agreement was annotated on tct no. 5357.
TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL
REALTY, INC., and ELVIRA meanwhile, on 29 june 1994, the cavite rtc rendered a
GOZON, decision[6] in the legal separation case, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Respondents.

wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal

x----------------------- separation between petitioner and respondent. accordingly,
x petitioner elvira robles gozon is entitled to live separately from
respondent alfredo gozon without dissolution of their marriage
bond. the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby
G.R. NO. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL declared dissolved and liquidated. being the offending spouse,
REALTY, Present: respondent is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same
is awarded to their child winifred r. gozon whose custody is
INC., awarded to petitioner.
Petitioner, CARPIO, J., CHAIRPERSON,

BRION, furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their

child winifred r. gozon as her needs arises.
- versus- DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD, AND
so ordered.[7]
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA PEREZ, JJ.
GOZON,

ALFREDO GOZON, AND as regards the property, the cavite rtc held that it is deemed
Promulgated: conjugal property.
WINIFRED GOZON,
MARCH 18, 2010
Respondents.
on 22 august 1994, alfredo executed a deed of donation over the
X----------------------------------------------
property in favor of their daughter, winifred gozon (winifred). the
----X
register of deeds of malabon, gil tabije, cancelled tct no. 5357 and
issued tct no. m-10508[8] in the name of winifred, without
annotating the agreement and the notice of lis pendens on tct
RESOLUTION no. m-10508.

CARPIO, J.: on 26 october 1994, alfredo, by virtue of a special power of

attorney[9] executed in his favor by winifred, sold the property to
inter-dimensional realty, inc. (idri) for p18 million.[10] idri paid
alfredo p18 million, representing full payment for the
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for
property.[11] subsequently, the register of deeds of malabon
review,[1] assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision[2] and the 30
cancelled tct no. m-10508 and issuedtct no. m-10976[12] to idri.
September 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74447.

mario then filed with the malabon regional trial court (malabon rtc)
a complaint for specific performance and damages, annulment of
this case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered
donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
by tct no. 5357.[4] the property is situated inmalabon, metro manila
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
and is registered in the name of alfredo gozon (alfredo), married
to elvira gozon (elvira).

on 3 april 2001, the malabon rtc rendered a decision, [13] the

dispositive portion of which reads:
on 23 december 1991, elvira filed with the cavite city regional trial
court (cavite rtc) a petition for legal separation against her
husband alfredo. on 2 january 1992, elvira filed a notice of lis
pendens, which was then annotated on tct no. 5357. wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:

01. on the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:

206
1.1 the same is hereby made permanent by:
1.1.1 enjoining defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon, inter-
dimensional realty, inc. and gil tabije, their agents, representatives
and all persons acting in their behalf from any attempt of
commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of further
alienating or disposing of the subject property;
1.1.2. enjoining defendant inter-dimensional realty, inc. from
entering and fencing the property;
1.1.3. enjoining defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon, inter-
dimensional realty, inc. to respect plaintiffs possession of the
property.
02. the agreement to buy and sell dated 31 august 1993, between
plaintiff and defendant alfredo gozon is hereby approved,
excluding the property and rights of defendant elvira robles-gozon
to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property subject of
this case.
03. the deed of donation dated 22 august 1994, entered into by
and between defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon is
hereby nullified and voided.
04. the deed of absolute sale dated 26 october 1994, executed by
defendant winifred gozon, through defendant alfredo gozon, in
favor of defendant inter-dimensional realty, inc. is hereby nullified
and voided.
05. defendant inter-dimensional realty, inc. is hereby ordered to
deliver its transfer certificate of title no. m-10976 to the register of
deeds of malabon, metro manila.
06. the register of deeds of malabon, metro manila is hereby
ordered to cancel certificate of title nos. 10508 in the name of
winifred gozon and m-10976 in the name of inter-dimensional
realty, inc., and to restore transfer certificate of title no. 5357 in the
name of alfredo gozon, married to elvira robles with the agreement
to buy and sell dated 31 august 1993 fully annotated therein is
hereby ordered.
07. defendant alfredo gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a deed of
absolute sale in favor of plaintiff over his one-half undivided share
in the subject property and to comply with all the requirements for
registering such deed.
08. ordering defendant elvira robles-gozon to sit with plaintiff to
agree on the selling price of her undivided one-half share in the
subject property, thereafter, to execute and deliver a deed of
absolute sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff and to comply
with all the requirements for registering such deed, within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of this decision.
09. thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant alfredo
gozon the balance of four million pesos (p4,000,000.00) in his one-
half undivided share in the property to be set off by the award of
damages in plaintiffs favor.
10. plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant elvira robles-
gozon the price they had agreed upon for the sale of her one-half
undivided share in the subject property.
11. defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon and gil tabije are
hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
following:
11.1 two million pesos (p2,000,000.00) as actual and
compensatory damages;
11.2 one million pesos (p1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
11.3 five hundred thousand pesos (p500,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
11.4 four hundred thousand pesos (p400,000.00) as attorneys
fees; and
11.5 one hundred thousand pesos (p100,000.00) as litigation
expenses.
207
11.6 the above awards are subject to set off of plaintiffs obligation
in paragraph 9 hereof.
12. defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon are hereby
ordered to pay inter-dimensional realty, inc. jointly and severally
the following:
12.1 eighteen million pesos (p18,000,000.00) which constitute the
amount the former received from the latter pursuant to their deed
of absolute sale dated 26 october 1994, with legal interest
therefrom;
12.2 one million pesos (p1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
12.3 five hundred thousand pesos (p500,000.00) as exemplary
damages; and
12.4 one hundred thousand pesos (p100,000.00) as attorneys
fees.
13. defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon are hereby
ordered to pay costs of suit.
so ordered.[14]
on appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the malabon rtcs decision
with modification. the dispositive portion of the court of appeals
decision dated 7 july 2005 reads:
wherefore, premises considered, the assailed decision dated april
3, 2001 of the rtc, branch 74, malabon is hereby affirmed with
modifications, as follows:
1. the sale of the subject land by defendant alfredo gozon to
plaintiff-appellant siochi is declared null and void for the following
reasons:
a) the conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-
appellee elvira gozon;
b) defendant alfredo gozons one-half () undivided share has been
forfeited in favor of his daughter, defendant winifred gozon, by
virtue of the decision in the legal separation case rendered by the
rtc, branch 16, cavite;
2. defendant alfredo gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant
siochi the amount of p5 million which the latter paid as earnest
money in consideration for the sale of the subject land;
3. defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon and gil tabije are
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant siochi jointly and
severally, the following:
a) p100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) p100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) p50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
d) p20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
e) the awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby
ordered deleted for lack of basis.
4. defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon are hereby
ordered to pay defendant-appellant idri jointly and severally the
following:
a) p100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) p100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c) p50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
defendant winifred gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of
defendant alfredo gozon was awarded, is hereby given the option
whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject
land.
the rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.
so ordered.[15]
only mario and idri appealed the decision of the court of appeals.
in his petition, mario alleges that the agreement should be treated
as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of
the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. since elviras
conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, mario prays for the
court to direct alfredo and elvira to execute a deed of absolute sale
over the property upon his payment of p9 million to elvira.
on the other hand, idri alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and
for value. thus, idri prays that the court should uphold the validity
of idris tct no. m-10976 over the property.
we find the petitions without merit.
this case involves the conjugal property of alfredo and elvira. since
the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the
family code, the applicable law is the family code. article 124 of the
family code provides:
art. 124. the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. in case
of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
the recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. these powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. in the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. however, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(emphasis supplied)
in this case, alfredo was the sole administrator of the property
because elvira, with whom alfredo was separated in fact, was
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
however, as sole administrator of the property, alfredo still cannot
sell the property without the written consent of elvira or the
authority of the court. without such consent or authority, the sale is
void.[16] the absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders
the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.[17] even if the
other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the
208
property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still
required by law for its validity.[18] the agreement entered into by
alfredo and mario was without the written consent of elvira. thus,
the agreement is entirely void. as regards marios contention that
the agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by
elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the
property was subsequently donated by alfredo to winifred and then
sold to idri clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
however, we disagree with the finding of the court of appeals that
the one-half undivided share of alfredo in the property was already
forfeited in favor of his daughter winifred, based on the ruling of
the cavite rtc in the legal separation case. the court of appeals
misconstrued the ruling of the cavite rtc that alfredo, being the
offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and the
same is awarded to winifred.
the cavite rtc ruling finds support in the following provisions of the
family code:
art. 63. the decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
(1) the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
(2) the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall
be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall
be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article 43(2);
(3) the custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of article 213 of this
code; and
the offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession. moreover, provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
art. 43. the termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in
the preceding article shall produce the following effects:
xxx
(2) the absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership,
as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of
the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by
a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(emphasis supplied)
thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the
conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending
spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership. it is only alfredos share in the net
profits which is forfeited in favor of winifred. article 102(4) of the
family code provides that [f]or purposes of computing the net
profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with article 43, no. (2)
and 63, no. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of
its dissolution. clearly, what is forfeited in favor of winifred is not
alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in
the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
with regard to idri, we agree with the court of appeals in holding
that idri is not a buyer in good faith. as found by the rtc malabon
and the court of appeals, idri had actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person
to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property. the
representative of idri testified that he knew about the existence of
the notice of lis pendens on tct no. 5357 and the legal separation
case filed before the cavite rtc. thus, idri could not feign ignorance
of the cavite rtc decision declaring the property as conjugal.
furthermore, if idri made further inquiries, it would have known that
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was highly
irregular. under section 77 of presidential decree no. 1529,[19] the
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of the court,
or (b) by the register of deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration of the lis pendens. in this case,
the lis pendens was cancelled by the register of deeds upon the
request of alfredo. there was no court order for the cancellation of
the lis pendens. neither did elvira, the party who caused the
registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its
cancellation.
besides, had idri been more prudent before buying the property, it
would have discovered that alfredos donation of the property to
winifred was without the consent of elvira. under article 125[20] of
the family code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one
spouse without the consent of the other spouse.clearly, idri was
not a buyer in good faith.
nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of
the malabon rtc for the reimbursement of the p18 million paid by
idri for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in
the dispositive portion of the court of appeals decision.
wherefore, we deny the petitions. we affirm the 7 july 2005
decision of the court of appeals in ca-g.r. cv no. 74447 with the
followingmodifications:
(1) we delete the portions regarding the forfeiture of
alfredo gozons one-half undivided share in favor of
winifred gozon and the grant of option to winifred gozon whether
or not to dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
(2) we order alfredo gozon and winifred gozon to pay inter-
dimensional realty, inc. jointly and severally the eighteen million
pesos (p18,000,000) which was the amount paid by inter-
dimensional realty, inc. for the property, with legal interest
computed from the finality of this decision.
so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, G.R. No 176556
Petitioner,
Present:
209
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.
QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO,
PETCHIE C. QUIAO,
represented by their mother
Promulgated:
RITA QUIAO,
July 4, 2012
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of
society. It is in the family where children are born and molded
either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in
the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to
separate and fight over properties, without regard to the message
they send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk
from our obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation
escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review
on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner
seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order [2] dated January 8,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In
lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution defining
the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of
legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4)
of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed
a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido
B. Quiao (Brigido).[3]Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
Decision[4] dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of
plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao
pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from
each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor
children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao
shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent
spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already
foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located
in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares
located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and
[petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the children and
the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of
[P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
[P]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.[5]
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within
the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on
Legal Separation.[6]
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for
execution[7] which the trial court granted in its Order dated
December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby
granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate
enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of
Execution[9] which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the
[petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums
210
stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your
lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to
satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then we command you
that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make
the said sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to
strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full
in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.[10]
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner
paying the respondents the amount of P46,870.00, representing
the following payments:
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal
share;
(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the
promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Clarification,[12]asking the RTC to define the term Net
Profits Earned.
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued
an Order[13] dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase
NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts.[14] The Order further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children because the offending spouse does
not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.[15] The
dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff
intends to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting the
payments of the debts for only separate properties of the
defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has
none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the
Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[17] on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the
RTC issued another Order[18] dated November 8, 2006, holding
that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become
final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification
because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net
profit earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby
ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of
forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to
be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the
Family Code.[20]
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[21] praying for the correction and reversal of the
Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8,
2007,[22] the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted
the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order
dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order
dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on
February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
I to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION
OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND
WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF
EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER
ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN
1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE
GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE
AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN
THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?[23]
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the
applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the
respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for
Clarification was filed.[24] Thus, we are constrained to resolve first
211
the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and
subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and
executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed on
July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file
a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize
the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that it would be practical
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [26]
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also
apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals bycertiorari to
the Supreme Court. We also said, The new rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.[27] In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of
appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial
court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day
period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the
decision or final order in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October
10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration
nor a notice of appeal.On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days
had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the
respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or
after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of
execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially
executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had
lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net
profits earned. From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept
on his right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10,
2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until
the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time
the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts
decision has become final and executory. A judgment becomes
final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses
and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no
court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate
jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became
final.[28]
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void (c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; [40]
judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be
disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the
decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that a
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net
void judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and
profits earned by the conjugal partnership;[41]
cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation.[29] But what
precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a
judgment becomes void?
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's
custody;[42]
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had
no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or over the parties or both.[30] In other words, a court, which (f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from
does not have the power to decide a case or that has no the innocent spouse by intestate succession;[43]
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void
judgment or a coram non judice.[31]
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made in the will of the innocent spouse;[44]
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void
judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case
involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers (h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal
upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the partnership of gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether
complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
relations of the husband and wife or those living together. [32] The unless the contrary is proved;[45]
Rule on Legal Separation[33] provides that the petition [for legal
separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at
least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non- (i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at properties while they were living together;[46]
the election of the petitioner.[34] In the instant case, herein
respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more
than six months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the (j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking
RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's petition Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;[47]
below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of both parties, considering that summons and a copy of
the complaint with its annexes were served upon the herein
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must
petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed
his Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001. [35] Thus, without be dissolved and liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was
doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has the one who took charge of the administration of these
jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties. properties;[48]

(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to

From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005
judgment of the trial court is clearly not void ab initio, since it was matters included under Article 121 of the Family Code and the
conjugal liabilities totalingP503,862.10 shall be charged to the
rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such,
income generated by these properties;[49]
the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is
meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law.[36] In fact, we have ruled that for [as] long as the
public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by (m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the
him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than petitioner had separate properties which can satisfy his share for
an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by the support of the family;[50]
appeal.[37] Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment
dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy
should be an appeal filed within the reglementary
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article
period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has
129(7);[51]
already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which
has become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is
to clarify the very question raised below and nothing more.
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any
encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally between the
petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be
legitime;[52]
disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has already
become immutable and unalterable, to wit:

(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he
children;[53] and
cohabited with a woman who is not his wife;[38]

(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the

(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of
sum of P19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses
respondent Rita;[39]
of P5,000.00.[54]

212
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated
October 10, 2005, we will discuss the following issues for the
enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case
since the parties' property relation is governed by thesystem
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied
Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He
confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no
other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that
Article 129(7) of the Family Code applies in this case. We agree
with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property
relation. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and
the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at
the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was
the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did
not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between
the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains. [55] Article 119 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs
the property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is
conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, the
husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or
industry.[56] The husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.[57]
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and
the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law
in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code
[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other law.[58]
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the
common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the
trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles
63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
213
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been
impaired, arguing: As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired
vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being
owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family
Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of
authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs
his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.[59] In
other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property
relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is
owned in common by the husband and wife. [60]Thus, since he is
one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal
partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said
properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he
insisted that no provision under the Family Code may deprive him
of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will
prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is
written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define and
explained vested right in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term
vested right expresses the concept of present fixed interest which,
in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto
the present or future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA
Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon.
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of
the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions
from new obligations created after the right has become
vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment
is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed
and irrefutable.[64] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived
of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process
and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and
her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by
her.[65] In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial this Court.[71]
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly
parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005
applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's
governed by the system of relative community or conjugal
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant
partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has
to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner cannot
attained finality and immutability.
claim being deprived of his right to due process.

The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the
fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the
petitioner's vested right is one founded, not only in the provisions
products of their labor and industry.
of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership
profits. The said provision says: The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture
authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that
since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be
separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty
spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation
partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same
industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute
separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not community?
apply.

Now, we clarify.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled
to all the net profits.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable
law as to the property relations between the parties and the
applicable law as to the definition of net profits. As earlier
discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no
property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation
basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his
and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is
Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of net
the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after
profits, we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code,
the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the
since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net
petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the
profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63,
Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long- market value at the time of its dissolution.[72] Thus, without any iota
standing ruling that: of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the
absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code,
and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under
Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of
earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes used under the
each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution
estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are
of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
Code.
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from
the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the
conjugal assets does not vest until the absolute community regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which
On Absolute Community Regime:
can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.[69] (Citations omitted)

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the

husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in
the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
its Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[70] The petitioner did not
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the
mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage
petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's
or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between
decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of

214
the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion
the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one
may have originally owned.[73]
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of
marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties
of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community
are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the
community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties of
each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance.
Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to each
of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net
assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife;
and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture,
said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value
of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. [74]
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires
that we first find the market value of the properties at the time of
the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value
of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the
absolute community and this result to the net assets or net
remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from which
we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of
marriage, which then results to the net profits.[75]
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant
case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and
wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in
the list above are all part of the absolute community. And its
market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute
community constitutes the market value at dissolution.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were
legally separated, all the properties which remained will be liable
for the debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and
obligations will be subtracted from the market value at dissolution.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid
from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net
remainder or net asset.And from such net asset/remainder of the
petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value
at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality
constitutes the net profits.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate
properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what
will be divided equally between them is simply the net
profits. However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial
court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his
children.Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which
should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both
parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any
property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership
Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code
applies in the instant casefor purposes only of defining net
profit. As earlier explained, the definition of net profits in Article
102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute community
regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for under
215
Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on
Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the
husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage. [76] From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and
debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of
those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
establishes a complete separation of capitals.[77]
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under
the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the
liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal
partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties
of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of
personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited
to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his
or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested
by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be
paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source,
the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the
family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event,
shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been
a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this
Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by
the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age
of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of
said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the
liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,
separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their
separate properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial court found
that the couple has no separate properties when they
married.[79] Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal
properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located
in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80]
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal
partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the
assets of the conjugal partnership;[81] and if the community is
enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either
spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their
respective owners shall be made.[82]
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the
debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of
each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate
properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all
its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate
properties shall be solidarily liable.[83]
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of
the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them.[84] In
the instant case,since it was already established by the trial
court that the spouses have no separate properties,[85] there
is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily,
what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective
heirs.[86] However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused,
like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to
the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there
is no separate property which may be accounted for in the
guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances,
the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot
but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial
court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the
Order dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City
is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7,
2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007
of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance
with the above discussions.
216
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER
and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE
DOE, respondents. Mesm
[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and
SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband
to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights
including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention,[1] or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto.[2] Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture
and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court
or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." [3]
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the
great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause.[4] It is issued when one is
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal
custody over another person.[5]
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio[6] is to reverse the decision[7] of
the Court of Appeals and its resolution[8] dismissing the application
for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio[9] is to annul
that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda
K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and
the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of
extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years,
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio
contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30)
years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed
reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave.,
Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely:
Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo
(age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United
States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo
City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this
time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead
of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor
in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health
deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Antipolo City a petition[10] for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age,
frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio
City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead
lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents [11]refused
petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
judgment is hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners
manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia
Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or
anywhere in its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorios staff
especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to
Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children,
notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of
contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued
be recalled and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED
DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful
restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."[12]
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein
jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention,[13] or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is
available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one
or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid
has later become arbitrary.[14] It is devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. [15] Jksm
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.[16]
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. [17] The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral.[18]
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective
detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that
would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication
does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but
on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was
no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland
Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing
or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing
them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of
Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having
answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.
217
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to
make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices
he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these
are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it
clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and
absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right
to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental
constitutional right. Es m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never
even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the
finding of subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also
emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of
contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion
of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve
the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to
visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any
penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband
to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion
of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and womans free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the
petition for lack of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies
the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation
rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001]
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA.
DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C.
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A.
COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593,
declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the
late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent
resolution[3] denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima
Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A
located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street)
and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga
del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters.[4] After
the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his
mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter
waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to
Francisco.[5] On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his
name with the Registry of Deeds.[6]
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement,
Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, [7] the latters cousin,
Luzviminda Paghacian,[8] and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a
widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside.[9]
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the
relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said
Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same
room,[10] while Erlinda Tabancura,[11] another niece of Francisco,
claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his
mistress.[12] On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper
who could enter the masters bedroom only when the old man
asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for
her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.[13]
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only
Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. [14] Cirila testified that she
was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old
widower when she began working for the latter; that he could still
walk with her assistance at that time;[15] and that his health
eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden.[16]Erlinda
Tabancura testified that Franciscos sole source of income
consisted of rentals from his lot near the public streets. [17] He did
not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper, though he
provided her family with food and lodging. [18]
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco
executed an instrument denominated Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos, in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150
square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the
donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion
of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of the faithful services
[Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years. The
deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. [19] and later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.[20]
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993,
the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a market value
of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.[21]
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the
decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate
succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her
favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor
of respondents, holding the donation void under this provision of
the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on
the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents bearing
the signature of one Cirila Comille. The documents were (1) an
application for a business permit to operate as real estate lessor,
dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature Cirila
Comille;[22] (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor
with a health certificate showing the signature Cirila Comille in
black ink;[23] and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the
signature Cirila A. Comille written in black ink. [24] The dispositive
portion of the trial courts decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late
Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No.
V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T.
Lacaya (Annex A to the Complaint) null and void;
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2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and
lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after
finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the sum
of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on
June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal. As already
stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion
was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2)
the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirilas use of
Franciscos surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case
mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Franciscos common-law
wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash
wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed
by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the
common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is not correct and
is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of
facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by
the totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally
incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere
speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts
and their Jurisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence
from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504;
Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not
in accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence in
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil.
577, 584.[26]
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly
applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this
case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject only
to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[27] It appearing that the Court of Appeals
based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the
general rule should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,[28] we held that the term cohabitation or living
together as husband and wife means not only residing under one
roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.Cohabitation, of
course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one
of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in
sex. At the very least, cohabitation is thepublic assumption by a
man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as
such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even
if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they
are merely meretricious.[29] In this jurisdiction, this Court has
considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the
stipulations between the parties,[30] a conviction of
concubinage,[31] or the existence of illegitimate children.[32]

Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila

admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long
time. It is very possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and
Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their
public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of
caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to
husband and wife.

Aside from Erlinda Tabancuras testimony that her uncle told her
that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila
and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the
surname Comille. As previously stated, these are an application
for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, [33] a
sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health
certificate,[34] and the death certificate of Francisco.[35] These
documents show that Cirila saw herself as Franciscos common-
law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last
name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Franciscos lessees in
Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy,
RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees
referred to Cirila as the common-law spouse of Francisco. Finally,
the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash
wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-
employee, but Franciscos common law spouse. She was, after all,
entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. [36] It is difficult to
believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure
beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that
she was Franciscos common-law spouse.

Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that

Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation
made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the

decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

219