Datu Ampatuan, Jr. vs. Sec. Leila de Lima G.R. No.

197291, April 3, 2013

41 informations for murder were filed against Dalandag. He was admitted into the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order,
wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses. Petitioner, through
counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations
for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may compel the respondents through mandamus to
prosecute Dalandag
RULING: No
That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre
was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state
witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty.
Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the
Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he
later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became
the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it
is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted
to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take
action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to
be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the
exercise of judgment or discretion.
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request
of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny
such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied
the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Manila Electric Company G.R. No. 201715, December
11, 2013

RTC’s intervening rendition of the decision on the merits has rendered this appeal moot.
With the intervening rendition of the decision on the merits, the challenge against the
interlocutory orders of the RTC designed to prevent the RTC from proceeding with the
pre-trial and the trial on the merits was rendered moot and academic. In other words, any
determination of the issue on the interlocutory orders was left without any practical value.
A case that is moot and academic because of supervening events ceases to present any
justiciable controversy. The courts of law will not determine moot and academic
questions, for they should not engage in academic declarations and determine moot
questions.

CA correctly ruled that RTC Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed orders
The RTC’s proceeding with the pre-trial set on November 24, 2010 was entirely in accord
with the Rules of Court. While it is true that the OSG had filed on November 22, 2010 the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the CA did not restrain the RTC from
thus proceeding. Absent any TRO or WPI stopping the RTC from proceeding, the mere
filing or pendency of the special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition did
not interrupt the due course of the proceedings in the main case. This is quite clear from
the revised Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which mandated that the petition shall
not interrupt the course of the principal case. For the RTC not to proceed with the pre-trial
on its scheduled date of November 24, 2010 despite the absence of any TRO or WPI
enjoining it from doing so could have subjected its Presiding Judge to an administrative
charge.

Teodoro Reyes vs. Ettore Rossi G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013

Petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems

Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented· by its Executive Project Director,
respondent Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale. Reyes issued and
delivered the following nine post-dated checks in the aggregate sum of P7,125,000.00
drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank. Two of the checks were denied
payment ostensibly upon Reyes’ instructions to stop their payment, while the third was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Reyes commenced an action for rescission of
contract and damages in the RTC, sought judgment declaring the deed of conditional
sale “rescinded and of no further force and effect,” and ordering Advanced Foundation
to return the P3,000,000.00 downpayment. Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of
estafa and five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of Checks. Reyes argued that the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the
RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to
the criminal proceedings.
RULING: No
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and
a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must
first be determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale for the suspension on the
ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is,
therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be
without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundation’s
obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in
the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed material
breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such result would not necessarily
mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the
dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already
committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time
when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund
the checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied
up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale
through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a
worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal
proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the
pendency of the civil action for rescission of the conditional sale.
Civil action for the rescission of contract was not determinative of the guilt or innocence
of Reyes. In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the
continuation of the proceedings in the preliminary investigation on the ground that it
poses a prejudicial question. Considering that the contracts are deemed to be valid until
rescinded, the consideration and obligatory effect thereof are also deemed to have
been validly made, thus demandable. Consequently, there was no failure of
consideration at the time when the subject checks were dishonoured.

Rafael Consing Jr. vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does
not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal
prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the
result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of
the accused.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Judge Agaputo Hontanosas Jr, G.R. No.
157163, June 25, 2014

Respondents commenced Civil Case No. CEB-26468 against petitioner alleging

that the respondents had obtained a loan from the petitioner, and had executed
promissory notes binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the sum borrowed;
that as security for the payment of the loan, they had constituted real estate mortgages
on several parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had been made to sign a
continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their Mitsubishi Pajero.
The respondents’ obligation to the petitioner had reached P17,983,191.49, but
they had only been able to pay P13 Million because they had been adversely affected
by the economic turmoil in Asia in 1997. The petitioner required them to issue
postdated checks to cover the loan under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages.
Thus, the complaint sought a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the
threatened foreclosure.
On June 6, 2001, the petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaim, as well as its opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. Also on June 6, 2001 the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss reiterating its
affirmative defenses.
The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss for being
unmeritorious, but granted the respondents’ application for preliminary injunction.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner assailed the orders of the RTC by petition for certiorari in the
CA. The CA rendered the adverse decision under review affirming the decision rendered
by the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Civil Case No. CEB-26468 should be dismissed for improper
venue.
2. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the
petitioner, its agents and representatives, was in order.
RULING: 1. The CA and the RTC held that Civil Case No. CEB-26468, being for the
declaration of the nullity of a contract of loan and its accompanying continuing surety
agreement, and the real estate and chattel mortgages, was a personal action; hence, its
filing in Cebu City, the place of business of one of the plaintiffs, was correct under
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. We sustain the lower courts’ holdings.
2. Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the applicant has a
right in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of
such right. A preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or
decide controverted facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent
threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of
the parties can be settled.

Heirs of Marcelo Sotto vs. Matilde Palicte

For the ground to be effective, the insufficiency of the complaint must appear on the face
of the complaint, and nowhere else. It will be unfair to the plaintiff, indeed, to determine
the sufficiency of his cause of action from facts outside of those pleaded in the complaint.
The acts of a party or his counsel clearly constituting willful and deliberate
forum shopping shall be ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice,
and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative sanctions
against the lawyer. If the forum shopping is not willful and deliberate, the subsequent
cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above.
But if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than
two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice. In view of the foregoing, Atty. Mahinay
was guilty of forum shopping.

Herminia Acbang vs. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr, G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014

To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment case, the defendant must
perfect an appeal, file a supersedeas bond, and periodically deposit the rentals becoming
due during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, the writ of execution will issue upon
motion of the plaintiff.
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately
executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of
the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the
appeal is pending the law requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the
defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically
deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of
the defendant to comply with any of the conditions is a ground for the outright execution
of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative.
Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if
the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within
the period for the perfection of the appeal.
Thelma Aranas vs. Teresita Mercado et al G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014

The RTC in Cebu City granted Thelma’s application for the appointment of
Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate. Teresita submitted an inventory of
the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the
inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only
personal properties. Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were
excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the
inventory, and to be examined regarding it which was granted by the RTC. Teresita
complied and the Court approved her inventory.
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to
examine Teresita on the inventory. The RTC issued an order holding that the
inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included;
hence, it denied the administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory. Teresita, timely
sought the reconsideration of the said order on the ground that one of the real
properties affected, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the
adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition
for certiorari before the CA.
ISSUES: Whether or not certiorari was the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of
the RTC. RULING: The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy
depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature.
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. The
remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.