XXIII.

RULE 16: MOTION TO DISMISS

Related Principles

- 271.) Barraza v. Campos, Jr., 120 SCRA 881 (1983) - LAWRENCE

- 272.) BA Finance v. Pineda, 119 SCRA 493 (1982) - LAWRENCE
- 273.) Conejos v. Bocanegra, G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009 - LAWRENCE
- 274.) Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Corp., 395 SCRA 624 - CHRISTIAN

Grounds

a) No jurisdiction over the person of the defending party

- 275.) US v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985 - CHRISTIAN

(b) MNo jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim

- 276.) Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013 - CHRISTIAN

(c) That venue is improperly laid

- 277.) Universal Robina Corp. v. Lim, GR. No. 154338, October 5, 2007 - CHRISTIAN

(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue

- 278.) Galindo v. Heirs of Roxas, G.R. No. 147969, January 17, 2005 - CHRISTIAN

(e) Litis pendentia

- 279.) Ramos v. Peralta, 203 SCRA 412 - SHAILAH

(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;

- 280.) Chu v. Sps. Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011 - SHAILAH
- 281.) Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corp. v. Aban, G.R. No. 175666, July 29, 2013 - SHAILAH

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

- 282.) Vitangcol v. New Vista Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 176014, September 17, 2009 - SHAILAH
- 283.) Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 110318, August 28, 1996 - SHAILAH
- 284.) Guerrero v. RTC of Ilocos, 229 SCRA 274 - JAYSON
- 285.) Magellan Aerospace vs. Philippine Air Force, G.R. No. 216566, February 24, 2016 - JAYSON

(h) claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;

- 286.) Cua v. Wallem Phils. Shipping, Inc., G.R. No. 171337, July 11, 2012 - JAYSON
- 287.) Caltex vs. Aguirre, March 9, 2016, G.R. Nos. 170746-47 - JAYSON

(i) Claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds

- 288.) Swedish Match v. CA, G.R. No. 128120, October 20, 2004 - JAYSON

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

- 289.) Guerrero v. RTC of Ilocos, 229 SCRA 274 (1994) - CONRAD

- 290.) Abagatnan vs. Sps. Clarito, G.R. No. 211966, August 7, 2017 - CONRAD

As Affirmative Defenses

- 291.) California and Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. C.F.Sharp & Co., G.R. No. 139273, November 28, 2000 - CONRAD
- 292.) Sps. Rasdas s. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605 December 13, 2005 - CONRAD
No motion to dismiss allowed

- 293.) Tan v. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010 - CONRAD
- 294.) Aldersgate College, Inc. v. Gauuan, G.R. No. 192951, November 14, 2012 - REJEAN

RULE 17: DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS

- 295.) Quintos v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014 - REJEAN
- 296.) Go vs. Cruz, 172 SCRA 247 - REJEAN
- 297.) Vallangca vs. CA, G.R. No. 55336, May 4, 1989 - REJEAN
- 298.) Executive Secretary vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 134171, Nov. 18, 1998 - REJEAN
- 299.) Samson vs. Fiel-Macaraig, G.R. No. 166356, February 2, 2010 - JOM
- 300.) Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. vs. Trebel International, Inc.,G.R. No. 192716, June 13, 2012 - JOM
- 301.) Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014 - JOM
- 302.) Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014 - JOM
- 303.) Blay vs. Bana, G.R. No. 232189, March 7, 2018 - JOM

RULE 18: PRE-TRIAL

- 304.) Paranaque Kings Enterprises v. Santos, G.R. No. 194638, July 2, 2014 - LAWRENCE

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, “Rule on Guidelines to be Observed By the Trial Court Judges and Clerk of Court in the conduct of
Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-discovery measures

- 305.) Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo, G.R. No. 109791, July 14, 2003 - LAWRENCE
- 306.) Alarcon v. CA, 323 SCRA 716 (200) - LAWRENCE
- 307.) Tiu v. Middleton, 310 SCRA 581 - LAWRENCE
- 308.) Tropical Homes, Inc. v. Villaluz, R. No. L-40628, February 24, 1989 - LAWRENCE
- 309.) Saguid v. CA, G.R. 150611, June 10, 2003 - CHRISTIAN
- 310.) Tolentino v. Laurel, G.R. No. 181368, February 22, 201 – CHRISTIAN
- 311.) on v. Son, G.R. No. 73077, December 29, 1995 - CHRISTIAN
- 312.) Corpuz v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 175677, July 31, 2009 - CHRISTIAN
- 313.) Kent v. Micarez, G.R. No. 185758, March 9, 2011 - CHRISTIAN
- 314.) Aguilar v. Lightbringers Credit Cooperative, G.R. No. 209605, 12 January 2015 - JAYSON
- 315.) Spouses Salvador v. Spouses Rabaja, G.R. No. 199990, February 4, 2015 - CONRAD
- 316.) Pascual va. First Consolidated Bank of Bohol, G.R. No. 202597, Feb. 8, 2017 - REJEAN
- 317.) Lara’s Gift and Decors vs. PNB General Insurers, G.R. No. 230429, Jan. 24, 2018 - JOM

RULE 19: INTERVENTION

- Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281. March 19, 1990

- Magsaysay-Labrador v. CA, G.R. No. 58168. December 19, 1989.
- Ordonez v. Gustilo, 192 SCRA 469
- Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, 189 SCRA 821
- Mactan v. Cebu International Airport, G.R. No. 186045, February 2, 2011
- Pulgar v. RTC of Mauban, Quezon, G.R. No. 157583, September 10, 2014

RULE 20: CALENDAR OF CASES

- Ang Kek Chen v. Bello, G.R. Nos. L-76344-46, June 30, 1988
 G.R. No. 169919 September 11, 2009
B. D. LONG SPAN BUILDERS, INC., vs R. S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC

The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the Court of Appeals Decision[2] dated 14 July 2005 and Resolution dated 30 September
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78259. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision[3] dated 14 January 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City, Branch 206 (RTC).

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner B. D. Long Span Builders, Inc. and respondent R. S. Ampeloquio Realty Development, Inc. are corporations duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

On 31 July 1999, petitioner and respondent entered into an Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to render rip rapping
construction services at respondents Ampeloquio International Resort in Ternate, Cavite, for the contract price of P50 million.
On the same day, the parties entered into a second Agreement for the same construction project, stipulating a contract price
of P30 million, hence bringing the total contract price of the project to P80 million. Both Agreements required petitioner to
deposit with respondent a cash bond of one percent (1%) of the contract price, to be returned to petitioner upon completion of
the project. In compliance, petitioner deposited with respondent a cash bond amounting to P800,000.

Respondent failed to fulfill its obligations under the Agreements, resulting in the cancellation of the project. Petitioner demanded
the return of the P800,000 cash bond, but respondent refused to do so. Petitioners legal counsel sent two (2) demand letters
dated 19 April 2002 and 10 May 2002 to respondent, but the latter still refused to return theP800,000 cash bond.

On 24 September 2002, petitioner (plaintiff) filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contract and damages against
respondent (defendant). On 17 October 2002, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on respondent, through its
staff member, Romel Dolahoy.[4]

Respondent failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the complaint. Upon motion of petitioner, the RTC issued an
Order dated 29 November 2002, declaring respondent in default, and allowing petitioner to present evidence ex parte.

The Trial Courts Ruling

On 14 January 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in support of the instant complaint, the same is granted.

Judgment is rendered declaring the aforesaid contracts entered into by plaintiff with defendant, both dated July 31, 1999 for
the rip rapping construction project at the Ampeloquio International Resort in Ternate, Cavite, as RESCINDED.

Moreover, defendant corporation is ordered to:

1) Return the amount of P800,000.00 posted by the plaintiff as cash bond with legal interest accruing thereto from the time of
its demand until fully paid;

2) Pay the plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 as nominal damages;

3) Pay the plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4) Pay the plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and

5) Pay the cost of suit in the amount of P10,539.00.

SO ORDERED.[5]

The Court of Appeals Ruling

Upon receipt of the RTC decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal dated 12 February 2003 with the Court of Appeals. After
considering the pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment [6] which reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated January 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 206, Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 02-217 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 30 September
2005.[8]

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was invalid service of
summons upon respondent, and hence the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over said respondent.

The Courts Ruling

We find the appeal without merit.

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants
in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and
their submission to its authority.[9] The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. [10] As a rule,
if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered
against them is null and void.[11]

Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 11 .Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may
be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel.

As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case of a domestic private juridical entity, the service of
summons must be made upon an officer who is named in the statute (i.e., the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel), otherwise, the service is insufficient.[12] The purpose is to render it
reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that
the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the
legal papers served on him.[13] However, if the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally within a reasonable
period of time, then substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7 of Rule 14 provides:

SEC. 7 .Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the
defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. [14] This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the
usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute.[15] The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully
and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.[16]

In Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc.,[17] this Court held that in case of substituted service, there should be a
report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendants behalf was one with whom the defendant had a
relation of confidence ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.

In this case, the Return by Process Server provides:

This is to certify that:
On October 17, 2002 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, undersigned tried to cause the service of the
Summons together with the attached complaint & its annexes in the above-entitled case to the defendant at his
given address on record. Mr Romel Dalahoy, a staff of said Realty received the said Summons with the attached
complaint & its annexes as evidenced by the former's signature as appearing on the original copy of the aforesaid
Summons.
Henceforth, the said Summons with the attached complaint & its annexes to Atty. Evangeline V. Tiongson, Clerk of Court V, this
Court, is respectfully returned, DULY SERVED, by substituted service.
October 17, 2002, Muntinlupa City
Angelito C. Reyes
Process Server [18]

Clearly, the summons was not served personally on the defendant (respondent) through any of the officers enumerated in
Section 11 of Rule 14; rather, summons was served by substituted service on the defendants staff member, Romel
Dolahoy. Substituted service was resorted to on the servers first attempt at service of summons, and there was no indication
that prior efforts were made to render prompt personal service on the defendant.

Moreover, nothing on record shows that Romel Dolahoy, the staff member who received the summons in respondents
behalf, shared such relation of confidence ensuring that respondent would surely receive the summons. Thus, following our
ruling in Orion, we are unable to accept petitioners contention that service on Romel Dolahoy constituted substantial compliance
with the requirements of substituted service.

Petitioners contention that respondents filing of Notice of Appeal effectively cured any defect in the service of summons
is devoid of merit. It is well-settled that a defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies, to wit: (1) he
may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on
the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious
defense; (2) if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has become final and
executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; (3) if he discovered the default after the judgment
has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and (4) he may also appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has
been presented by him.[19] Thus, respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a notice of appeal and question the
validity of the trial courts judgment without being considered to have submitted to the trial courts authority.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 July 2005 and Resolution dated 30
September 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78259.Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings upon valid
service of summons to respondent.