In “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding”, David Hume notes that

we derive knowledge about the unobserved through the process of induction, and

argues that our beliefs formed through inductive processes are not justifiable

through reason. For instance, we believe that the sun will rise tomorrow because it

has done so up till this day without fail. Hume would say that we have no reason-

based justification to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, even though it has

risen every day in the past. In this paper, I will first explain Hume’s argument on

induction, and show how his philosophy allows us to believe that the sun will rise

tomorrow.

Hume first draws a distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact. A

proposition is a relation of ideas if and only if its denial is self-contradictory; an

example being “Every triangle has three sides”. Propositions of this nature are true

in virtue of their meaning, and can be proved a priori and justified independently of

experience. A matter of fact, on the other hand, is a proposition whose denial is not a

contradiction; propositions of this nature are justified on the basis of experience, and

are proven a posteriori. The statement of the question, “The sun will rise tomorrow”,

is an example of a matter of fact.

Consider the following argument:

(1) We observe that the sun has risen every day without fail.

(2) ∴ The sun will rise tomorrow.

In arriving at (2) from (1), we make an inference from the observed to the

unobserved; namely, because we have observed the sun rising every morning, we

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arrive at a conclusion about the unobserved future, i.e., that the sun will rise

tomorrow morning. Whilst the above inductive argument seems to provide good

reason to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, the argument is not deductively

valid – it is possible that (1) is true, and that (2) does not follow. Hume examines our

inferences from the observed to the unobserved, and points towards causation as the

relation between matters of fact.

Hume then examines two possibilities that provide the basis of the relation of

causation and our inductive practices. Firstly, Hume asserts that knowledge of

causation cannot arise through pure reason, a priori. To support this assertion, he

cites the Conceivability Principle – anything that can be conceived is

(metaphysically) possible. From the same cause, we can conceive of different effects

resultant from that cause; no one effect is more conceivable than the rest. Hence,

every effect is distinct from its cause, and any conception of a relation between cause

and a particular effect a priori must be arbitrary. Hence, knowledge of causation

cannot be derived from pure reason, but through experience. Secondly, Hume

asserts that causation and our inductive practices, which are not derived from pure

reason, cannot be justified through experience. Hume states that through experience,

we can only derive knowledge concerning the behaviour of particular objects we

observed, at the particular time we observed them. One cannot derive knowledge of

future states through experience. Our inferences from the observed to the

unobserved thus cannot be justified through experience. We do not have reason to

believe that the sun will rise for all mornings in the future just because we have

experienced the sun to rise every morning thus far.

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 The missing premise in the argument above, is a proposition that states that

the future resembles the past, or that from similar causes we expect similar effects.

Hume explicitly states this in his “Treatise of Human Nature” (THN 1.3.6.4):

“If reason determin’d us, it wou’d process upon that principle, that instances,

of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience,

and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.”

This is Hume’s Uniformity Principle (UP). With the Uniformity Principle, our

argument is valid:

(1) We observe that the sun has risen every day without fail.

(2) The future resembles that past. (UP)

(3) ∴ The sun will rise tomorrow.

Hume then analyses the basis on which UP is justified. However, he finds that

UP cannot be justified through reason. Firstly, Hume argues that UP is not intuitive

– that we expect a cause to produce similar effects in the future because it has done

in the past is not intuitive. Secondly, UP cannot be proven a priori since we can

conceive of its negation, i.e., that the future does not resemble the past, and that from

similar causes we cannot expect similar effects. Thirdly, sensation cannot reveal to us

causal relationships, and can only inform us of the observed but not the unobserved.

Lastly, UP cannot be justified through probable argument; if we justified UP through

probable argument, we would reference the fact that UP has always held in the past,

and thus will also hold in the future. This, however, is a circular argument, and

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cannot be used to justify UP. Following this, Hume makes the following argument

against the justification of inductive inferences:

(4) The only possible ways of justifying a proposition is through

demonstrative reasoning or probable arguments.

(5) Neither demonstrative reasoning or probable arguments serve as

justification for the UP.

(6) There is no justification for UP.

(7) There is no chain of premises that may lead us to inductive inferences.

(8) Inductive inferences are not justified.

From this argument, then, premise (2) does not hold, and hence (3) does not

follow. We cannot produce a chain of reasoning for our inductive inferences from

the observed to the unobserved. Therefore, our inductive inferences are not justified.

Hence, for the above argument, we have no justification for our inductive inference

that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is Hume’s problem of induction – that there is

no reason-based justification for our inference from the observed to the unobserved.

In the following section, Hume then proposes a solution to the problem of

induction – he states that it is custom or habit – and not reason – that justifies our

inductive inferences. Hume describes custom as a fundamental feature of human

nature, a natural instinct, not involving reason; when we observe cause and effect,

sheer habit makes us expect the effect when we experience the cause. Hume

expounds on this, again in his Treatise (THN 1.3.14.1):

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 “For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the

objects, the mind is determin’d by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to

consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object.”

Hume here makes the point that through repeated experience of constant

conjunction between two objects (e.g., morning, and the rising of the sun), the

association of these two objects in our minds is strengthened, and we more so expect

the effect to follow from the cause. Hume states that when we observe the constant

conjunction of two objects, it is not the qualities of the objects themselves that are

necessarily connected; rather it is a quality of the mind, that has “a great propensity

to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal

impressions… we naturally imagine a conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects

and qualities, tho’ the qualities be of such a nature as to admit of no such

conjunction, and really exist no where” (THN 1.3.14.25).

Hume then gives rules to infer cause and effect, “by which we may know

when they really are so” (THN 1.3.15.2). This statement implies a certainty in the

formation of our beliefs, regardless of whether we are justified in our inductive

inferences. Hume states that through a constant union between cause and effect, we

may know of the relation between the two. It may be said, with regards to the rising

of the sun, that there are certain times where the sun does not rise, even though the

length of a day has elapsed (i.e., Polar nights). We then appeal to the underlying

cause, i.e., the rotation of the Earth on its axis, which creates the apparent rising (and

setting) of the sun in relation to one’s latitude on Earth. Thus, with reasonable

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certainty, and under “normal circumstances”, we can expect the sun to rise

tomorrow.

Hence, Hume arrives at the conclusion that our knowledge of matters of fact

are derived from our experience and constant conjunction, and through customary

association between two different things. While we are unjustified in arriving at laws

of nature (e.g., that the sun rises every day) through our inferences from the

unobserved to the observed, Hume still believes that custom is “a great guide of

human life”. In fact, Hume contrasts the operations of custom with reason – he

states that the operation of the mind, through custom, may be “infallible in its

operations” whilst we cannot rely on the “fallacious deductions of our reason, which

is slow in its operations” (EHU 5.22). Thus, it is not through a reason-based

justification, but through a customary association of morning and the rising of the

sun, that leads us to expect the rising of the sun tomorrow.

While Hume advances the claim that there is no reason-based justification for

the Uniformity Principle, and thus inductive inferences, custom, as he proposes, is a

reliable and truth-conducive source of our knowledge of the future. Reason, then, is

not the only means by which we may “justify” a proposition – we may also do so by

appealing to Humean custom. Through custom, we are justified in believing that the

sun will rise tomorrow.

References

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Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748, 1777). Retrieved from

https://davidhume.org/texts/e/

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40). Retrieved from

https://davidhume.org/texts/t/