representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the

Republic of the Philippines discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the
SUPREME COURT members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other
Manila Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice’s directive members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of
EN BANC as follows: record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs.
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987 RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. — The Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice’s previous and salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment
MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners, standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget of the income tax and considered such payment as a
vs. Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the diminution of their salaries during their continuance in
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of
FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general
PHILIPPINES, respondents. members of the judiciary. income tax law applicable to all income earners and that
That should have resolved the question. However, with the the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges
RESOLUTION filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle does not fall within the constitutional protection against
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. decrease of their salaries during their continuance in
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the office.
presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:
with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually members of the Judiciary, so as to “give substance to … (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue equality among the three branches of Government” in the inferior courts) shall receive such compensation as may be
and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially continuance in office … 1 (Emphasis supplied).
salaries. with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas’ accepted Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
In a nutshell, they submit that “any tax withheld from their amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
emoluments or compensation as judicial officers that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set be decreased during their continuance in office.
1987 Constitution mandating that “(d)uring their forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and … 2 (Emphasis ours).
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased,” ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision
even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in in the same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated:
judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution.” the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt any public officer or employee, including constitutional employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt
3
with the matter administratively in response to officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then from payment of income tax.
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners
rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis
supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar
to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which
reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of “non-diminution “of salaries
of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of
the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished
nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an
annual salary of _____________ and each Associate
Justice ______________ pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report
No. 18), two Commissioners presented their objections to
the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax
of the salary of justices, does this not violate the principle
of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal
protection of the law? After all, tax is levied not on the
salary but on the combined income, such that when the
judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other
income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we
have to give special privileges to the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the
judiciary. We prohibit the increase or decrease of their
salary during their term. This is an indirect way of
decreasing their salary and affecting the independence of
the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a
clause to respect tenure, but the special privilege on
taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of
uniformity in taxation and the equal protection clause. 6
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the
sponsor, Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for whom we
have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court
and the judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of
defense against the executive and legislative invasion of
their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens
outside, especially the humble government employees,
might say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we
might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of
extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines,
because a good number of powers and rights accorded to
the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest
degree by other employees of the government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a
kind of economic immunity, which is, of course, denied to
7
the entire executive department and the legislative.
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article,
on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed
that the term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and
that the words “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted so
as to “give substance to equality among the three
branches in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the
Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original draft
and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs.
Meer 8 that “the independence of the judges is of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries.” Commissioner Rigos then moved
that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G.
Bernas stood up “in support of an amendment to the
amendment with the request for a modification of the
amendment,” as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment
to the amendment saying that it is not enough to drop the
phrase “shall not be subjected to income tax,” because if
that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall
back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia
vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93
Phil. 696] which excludes them from income tax, but rather
I would propose that the statement will read: “During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished
BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX.”IN
support of this position, I would say that the argument
seems to be that the justice and judges should not be
subjected to income tax because they already gave up the
income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees. And I know right now,
for instance, there are many people who have accepted
employment in the government involving a reduction of
income and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are
not the only citizens whose income is reduced by
accepting service in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment tax? The amendment proposed herein and accepted by would be a strained construction to read into the provision
to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, the Committee now reads as follows: “During their an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in
Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon continuance in office, their salary shall not be the Constitutional Commission.
resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced: DECREASED”; and the phrase “nor subjected to income With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore,
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with tax” is deleted.9 the ruling that “the imposition of income tax upon the
the original proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the
amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: “During their regarding the constitutional provision in question until it Constitution” in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed
14
continuance in office, their salary shall not be was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The
DECREASED.”But this is on the understanding that there true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the
will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms
Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the
Constitution, which says: keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or construction that the intent of the framers of the organic Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of
employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt law and of the people adopting it should be given the people, through the discussions and deliberations of
10
from payment of income tax. effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should
So, we put a period (.) after “DECREASED” on the ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the
understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of government and should share the burden of general
11
When queried about the specific Article in the General the Constitution. it may also be safely assumed that the income taxation equitably.
Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of public people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is
12
officers, Commissioner Bernas replied: the explanation offered by the framers. hereby DISMISSED.
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987
found in the General Provisions. But at any rate, when we Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced
JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
put a period (.) after “DECREASED,” it is on the hereunder: and THE PEOPLE OF THE
understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore. Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
DECISION
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in
understood, was finally approved without objection. office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis PANGANIBAN, J.:
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The supplied).
A person under investigation for the commission of
understanding, therefore, is that there will be a provision it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass
an offense is constitutionally guaranteed certain
under the Article on General Provisions. Could a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and rights. One of the most cherished of these is the right “to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they
choice”. The 1987 Constitution, unlike its predecessors,
salaries of officials of the government including are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would expressly covenants that such guarantee “cannot be
constitutional officers shall not be exempt from income be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel”. In the present case, petitioner claims that such
proscription against an uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his
custodial investigation took place in 1983 -- long before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. He also alleges that his
arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was
extracted through torture, and that the prosecution’s
evidence was insufficient to convict him. Finally, though
not raised by petitioner, the question of what crime --
brigandage or robbery -- was committed is likewise motu
propio addressed by the Court in this Decision.
Challenged in the instant amended petition is the
Decision[1] of respondent Sandiganbayan[2] in Criminal
Case No. 8496 promulgated on June 19, 1987 convicting
petitioner of brigandage, and the Resolution[3] promulgated
on July 27, 1987 denying his motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police
investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila,
an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A
recipient of various awards and commendations attesting
to his competence and performance as a police officer, he
could not therefore imagine that one day he would be
sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the
suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal
delivery van.
Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo,
Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC
Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo
Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez,
Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino
Castro and Gerardo Escalada, petitioner Filoteo was
charged in the following Information:[4]
“That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the
municipality of Meycauyan, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, two of whom were armed with
guns, conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence,
threat and intimidation, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of
the Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the
MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the point of
their guns, and then take, rob and carry away with them
the following, to wit:
1) Postal Delivery Truck
2) Social Security System Medicare Checks
and Vouchers
3) Social Security System Pension Checks
and Vouchers
4) Treasury Warrants
5) Several Mail Matters from abroad
in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging
to US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS
Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from
Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales
andOlongapo City, to the damage and prejudice of the
owners in the aforementioned amount.
Contrary to law.”
On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo,
Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles, assisted by their
respective counsel, pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused
Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada
were never arrested and remained at large. Accused
Mateo escaped from police custody and was
tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19
of the 1973 Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator
failed to appear during the trial on February 21, 1985 and
on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were thus ordered
arrested but remained at large since then. Like in the case
of Mateo, proceedings against them were held in
absentia.[5] Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the
respondent Court rendered its assailed Decision and
Resolution.
Before trial commenced and upon the instance of
the prosecution for a stipulation of facts, the defense
admitted the following:[6]
“The existence of the bound record of Criminal Case No.
50737-B-82, consisting of 343 pages from the Bulacan CFI
(Exhibit A); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Bernardo
Relator was a PC Sergeant at Camp Bagond Diwa,
Bicutan, Metro Manila; as such PC Sergeant, accused
Relator was issued a service revolver, Smith & Wesson
Revolver, 32 (sic), with Serial No. 11707 (Exhibit B) and
holster (Exhibit B-1) with six (6) live ammo (Exhibit B-2); in
1982 or thereabouts, accused Eddie Saguindel was a PC
Constable First Class; on May 30, 1982, accused
Saguindel, together with accused Relator and Danilo
Miravalles, a former PC Sergeant, was invited for
investigation in connection with the hijacking of a delivery
van by the elements of the Special Operations Group, PC,
and the three availed of their right to remain silent and to
have counsel of their choice, as shown by their Joint
Affidavit (Exhibit A-20); and the existence of the sworn
statement executed by accused Martin Mateo (Exhibit A-
11) as well as the Certification dated May 30, 1982,
subject to the qualification that said document was made
under duress.”
The prosecution sought to prove its case with the
testimonies of Bernardo Bautista, Rodolfo Miranda, Capt.
Rosendo Ferrer, M/Sgt. Noel Alcazar and Capt. Samuel
Pagdilao, Jr.6-a and the submission of Exhibits A to K. In
their defense, accused Filoteo and Miravalles presented
their respective testimonies plus those of Gary Gallardo
and Manolo Almogera. Filoteo also submitted his Exhibits
1-14-Filoteo, but Miravalles filed no written
evidence. Thereafter, the prosecution proffered rebuttal
evidence and rested with the admission of Exhibits A-16-a,
A-31 and L.
Evidence for the Prosecution
At about 6:30 in the morning of May 3, 1982, Bureau
of Post mail van no. MVD 02 left San Fernando,
Pampanga to pick up and deliver mail matters to and
from Manila. On board the vehicle were Nerito Miranda,
the driver, and two couriers named Bernardo Bautista and
Eminiano Tagudar who were seated beside the
driver. They arrived at around 9:40 that morning at
the AirmailDistribution Center of
the Manila International Airport where they were issued
waybills[7] for the sacks of mail they collected. They then
proceeded to the Central Post Office where they likewise
gathered mail matters including 737 check letters[8] sent by
the United States Embassy. All the mail matters were
placed inside the delivery van, and its door padlocked.
As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns
of Bulacan, they took the MacArthur Highway on the return
trip to Pampanga. When they reached Kalvario,
Meycauayan, Bulacan at about4:30 in the afternoon, an
old blue Mercedes Benz sedan[9] overtook their van and
cut across its path. The car had five (5) passengers --
three seated in front and two at the back. The car’s driver
and the passenger beside him were in white shirts; the
third man in front and the person immediately behind him
were both clad in fatigue uniforms, while the fifth man in
the back had on a long-sleeved shirt.[10]
Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a
hand gun at driver Nerito Miranda as someone uttered,
“Are you not going to stop this truck?”[11] Frightened,
Miranda pulled over and stopped the van’s
engine. Alighting from the car, the armed group identified
themselves as policemen.[12] They ordered the postal
employees to disembark from the van. As he stepped out
of the van, Miranda took the ignition key with him, but
when threatened, he surrendered it to one of the car
passengers.[13] The three postal employees were then
ordered to board the Benz.
As he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked
back and saw one of the malefactors, who turned out to be
Reynaldo Frias, going up the van. Inside the car, the three
delivery employees were ordered to lower their
heads. They sat between two of their captors at the back
of the car while two others were in front. Later, Nerito
Miranda asked permission to straighten up as he was
feeling dizzy for lack of air. As he stretched, he caught a
glimpse of the pimply face of the man to his left. He also
recognized the driver who had glanced back. These men
turned out to be Angel Liwanag and Reynaldo Frias,
respectively.[14]
As the car started moving, Bautista complained
about feeling “densely confined”. He was allowed to raise
his head but with eyes closed. However, he sneaked a
look and recognized the driver of the car as Raul Mendoza
and the fellow beside him who poked a “balisong” at him
as Angel Liwanag. The man in uniform on the front seat
was Eddie Saguindel. Earlier, as he was about to enter
the car, Bautista looked back and recognized
Frias.[15] These incidents yielded the pieces of information
critical to the subsequent identification of Mendoza,
Liwanag, Saguindel and Frias in the line-up of suspects at
Camp Crame later on.
The car seemed to move around in circles. When it
finally came to a stop, the captured men discovered that
they were along Kaimito Road in Kalookan City. They
were made to remove their pants and shoes and then told
to run towards the shrubs with their heads lowered. Upon
realizing that the hijackers had left, they put on their pants
and reported the incident to the Kalookan Police Station.
The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of
Posts recovered the postal van at the corner of Malindang
and Angelo Streets, La Loma, Quezon City on May 4,
1982. Discovered missing were several mail
matters,[16] including checks and warrants, along with the
van’s battery, tools and fuel.[17]
In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col.
Ramon Montaño, then Postmaster General Roilo S. Golez
sought the assistance of the Special Operations Group
(SOG) of the Philippine Constabulary in the investigation
of the hijacking incident.[18] Responding to the request, the
SOG, which was tasked to detect, investigate and
“neutralize” criminal syndicates in Metro Manila and
adjacent provinces, organized two investigative
teams. One group was led by Capt. Rosendo Ferrer and
st
the other by 1 Lt. Samuel Pagdilao. Initially, they
conducted a “massive intelligence build-up” to monitor the
drop points where the stolen checks could be sold or
negotiated.
On May 28, 1982, the SOG received a tip from a
civilian informer that two persons were looking for buyers
of stolen checks. Capt. Ferrer requested the informer to
arrange a meeting with them. The meeting materialized at
about 9:00 P.M. of May 29, 1982 at the Bughaw
Restaurant in Cubao, Quezon City. With cash on hand,
Capt. Ferrer posed as the buyer. The informer introduced
him to Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara. Frias in turn
showed Capt. Ferrer a sample Social Security System
(SSS) pension check and told him that the bulk of the
checks were in the possession of their companions in
Obrero, Tondo, Manila. After some negotiations, they
agreed to proceed to Tondo. Then as they boarded a car,
Capt. Ferrer introduced himself and his companions as
lawmen investigating the hijacking incident. Shocked and
distressed, Frias calmed down only when assured that his
penalty would be mitigated should he cooperate with the
authorities. Frias thus volunteered to help crack the case
and lead the SOG team to Ricardo Perez and Raul
Mendoza.
Capt. Ferrer instructed Lt. Pagdilao, his assistant
operations officer who was in another car during the
mission, to accompany Frias to Obrero, Tondo while he
escorted Alcantara to their headquarters at Camp
Crame. On the way to the headquarters, Alcantara denied
participation in the hijacking although he admitted living
with Martin Mateo who allegedly was in possession of
several checks. Alcantara was turned over to the
investigation section of the SOG for further questioning.
Meanwhile, Lt. Pagdilao’s group was able to corner
Ricardo Perez in his house in Tondo. Confronted with the
hijacking incident, Perez admitted participation therein and
expressed disappointment over his inability to dispose of
the checks even after a month from the hijacking. He
surrendered the checks in his possession to Lt.
Pagdilao.[19]
An hour and a half later, Capt. Ferrer received
information over their two-way radio that Ricardo Perez
and Raul Mendoza were in Lt. Pagdilao’s custody. Capt.
Ferrer ordered that, instead of returning to headquarters,
Lt. Pagdilao and his companions should meet him in
Quirino, Novaliches to apprehend Martin Mateo. They met
at the designated place and proceeded to Gulod,
Novaliches arriving there at about 10:30 P.M. of May 29,
1982.
Walking atop a ricefield dike to the house of Mateo,
they noticed two men heading in their direction. Perez
identified them as Martin Mateo and Angel Liwanag. The
latter threw something into the ricefield which, when
retrieved, turned out to be bundles of checks wrapped in
cellophane inside a plastic bag.[20] As the two were about
to board the SOG teams's car, Mateo said, “Sir, kung baga
sa basketball, talo na kami. Ibibigay ko yong para sa
panalo. Marami pa akong tseke doon sa bahay ko, sir,
kunin na natin para di na natin babalikan.”[21] Capt. Ferrer
accompanied Mateo to his house where they retrieved
several other checks in another plastic bag.
 On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp b. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang Ssg., PC C1C
Crame, Mateo and Liwanag admitted participation in the abugadong sarili mong pili upang may WAC (PC)"
postal hijacking. At a confrontation with Perez and magpapayo sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat;
Mendoza, all four of them pointed to petitioner, Jose D.
3. T:- Maari bang sabihin mong muli ang
Filoteo, Jr., as the mastermind of the crime.
c. Na ikaw ay may karapatang huwag sumagot sa iyong buong pangalan, edad at iba pang
Consequently, Capt. Ferrer directed Lt. Pagdilao to mga katanungang maaring makasira sa iyo sa bagay-bagay na maaring
accompany Mateo to the house of petitioner in Tondo, dahilang anumang iyong isalaysay ay maaaring mapagkakikilalanan sa iyo?
Manila. The lawmen found petitioner at home. Upon gamitin pabor or laban sa iyo sa kinauukulang
hukuman; S:- Jose Filoteo y Diendo, 30-anyos, may
being invited to Camp Crame to shed light on his
asawa, isang Patrolman ng Western
participation in the hijacking, petitioner was dumbfounded
Police District, Metropolitan Police Force
(“parang nagulat”). Pursuant to standard operating d. Na ikaw ay walang maibabayad sa isang abugado, na kasalukuyang nakatalaga sa General
procedure in arrests, petitioner was informed of his ako mismo ang makipag-ugnayan sa CLAO-IBP Assignment Section, Investigation
constitutional rights,[22] whereupon they proceeded to upang ikaw ay magkaroon ng isang abugadong Division ng naturang Distrito ng Pulisya
Camp Crame. However, the group, including petitioner, walang bayad. at kasalukuyang nakatira sa No. 810
returned to the latter’s place to recover the loot. It was “in
Cabesas St., Dagupan, Tondo, Manila.
the neighborhood,” not in petitioner’s house, where the
authorities located the checks.[23] 1. TANONG:- Ang mga bagay-bagay bang
4. T:- Kailan ka pa na-appoint sa service
akin nang naipaliwanag sa iyo ay iyong
bilang isang Kabatas?
The authorities confronted Filoteo about his lubos na naiintindihan at nauunawaan?
participation in the hijacking, telling him that Frias, S:- Noon pong October 1978, hindi ko
Mendoza and Perez had earlier volunteered the SAGOT:- Opo.
maalaala ang exactong petsa, noong
information that petitioner furnished the Benz used in the ako ay mapasok sa serbisyo.
hijacking. Thereupon, Filoteo admitted involvement in the 2. T:- Handa mo bang lagdaan ang ilalim ng
katanungan at sagot na ito bilang
crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie 5. T:- Kailan ka pa naman na-assign sa
Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who katibayan na iyo ngang naiintindihan
GAS, WPD, MPF?
turned out to be a discharged soldier), as his ang iyong mga karapatan at gayun na
rin sa dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito, at S:- Noon lamang pong January 1982.
confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982,
petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before ikaw din ay nakahanda ngang magbigay
M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero ng isang malaya at kusang-loob na 6. T:- Patrolman Filoteo, ikaw ba ay tubong
which, quoted in full, reads as follows: salaysay, sumagot sa mga katanungan saang bayan, lungsod or lalawigan?
at sumusumpang lahat ng iyong
isasalaysay ay pawang mga S:- Pagkakaalam ko sa tatay ko ay Bulacan
“BABALA: -- Nais kong ipaalam sa iyo, Patrolman Filoteo, katotohanan lamang? samantalang ang aking ina naman ay
na ang dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito ay tungkol sa isang Bisaya, pero ako ay ipinanganak na sa
kasong Robbery-in-Band/Hi-Jacking na naganap noong S:- Opo, pipirma ako Ser. Maynila noon July 17, 1951.
ika-3 ng Mayo 1982 doon sa Meycauyan, Bulacan, mga
bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon, humigit-kumulang, kung (Sgd.) 7. T:- Ano naman ang natapos mong kurso
saang maraming tsekeng US, tseke ng BIR at iba pang JOSE D. FILOTEO sa pag-aaral?
mga personal na tseke ang nabawi mula sa iyo. Nais ko (Affiant)
S:- Undergraduate ako ng BS Criminology sa
ring ibigay sa iyo ang babala alinsunod sa mga isinasaad
PCCr, dahil hindi ko natapos ang
ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng MGA SAKSI: second semester ng 4th year ko.
Republika ng Pilipinas, kagaya ng mga sumusunod:
(Sgd.) 8. T:- Ano naman ang iyong specific
a. Na ikaw ay may karapatang tumahimik; (Sgd.) designation sa GAS, ID, WPD-MPF?
ROMEO P. S:- Sa Follow-Up Unit ako.
ESPERO THERE
SA L. TOLENTINO
9. T:- At bilang miyembro ng follow-up unit
ng GAS, ano naman ang iyong mga
specific duties?
S:- Kami po ang magsasagawa ng follow-up
kung may mga at large sa mga suspects
namin sa mga kasong hawak ng
investigation.
10. T:- Noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982, mga
bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon humigit
kumulang, saan ka naroroon at ano ang
iyong ginagawa?
12. T:- Anong oras naman noong umalis ang
S:- Nasa Plaza Lawton ho kami, eh, at
inaantay na namin iyong hinayjack
namin na Philippine Mail delivery van.
S:- Kung hindi ako nagkakamali ay nasa
11. T:- Wika mo’y kami, sinu-sino ang
tinutukoy mong mga kasamahan?
S:- Si Carding Perez, ho; si Junior ho (Affiant
13. T:- Isalaysay mo nga ng buong-buo kung
pointed to Martin Mateo, Jr. who was
seated in the investigation room and
asked the name and was duly
answered: Martin Mateo, Jr.); si Rey
S:- Noon pong lumakad na ang delivery van
Frias; Raul Mendoza; Angelo Liwanag at
ang mga taga LRP ng PC Brigade na
sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan
Miravales at isa pang Sergeant na ang
alam ko lang sa kanya ay JUN ang
tawag namin. Walo (8) (corrected and
initialled by affiant to read as ‘SIYAM
[9]’) kaming lahat doon noon at ang mga
gamit naman naming kotse noon ay ang
kotse ng kumpare kong si Rudy Miranda
na isang Mercedes Benz na may
plakang NMJ-659 kung saang ang driver
namin noon ay si Raul Mendoza
(corrected and initialled by affiant to
read as ‘AKO’) at ang mga kasama
naman naming sakay ay sina Angelo
Liwanag, Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun
na parehong taga-LRP (affiant added
and initialled this additional fact: ‘AT
RAUL MENDOZA’). Ang isang kotse
namang gamit namin ay pag-aari daw
ng pinsan ni Carding Perez na kanya na
rin mismong minamaneho na isang
Lancer na dirty-white ang kulay at ang
mga sakay naman ni Carding Perez ay
sina Junior Mateo, Rey Frias at Sgt. Dan
Miravalles ng LRP rin. Pero may
kasama pa kaming contact ni Carding
Perez na taga-loob ng Post Office na
sina Alias NINOY na isang dispatcher at
Alias JERRY, dahil ang mastermind dito
sa trabahong ito ay si Carding PEREZ at
kami naman ng mga sundalong taga-
LRP ay kanila lamang inimporta upang
umeskort sa kanila sa pag-hijack ng
delivery van.
delivery van ng Post Office patungong
norte?
pagitan na noon ng alas-4:00 hanggang
alas-5:00 ng hapon.
ano ang mga naganap noong hapon na
iyon?
ng Central Post Office, sinundan na
namin, una ang van, sumunod ang
Lancer at huli ang Mercedes Benz
namin. Pagdating namin sa Malinta,
Valenzuela Metro Manila ay nagpalit
kami ng puwesto sa pagsunod, van
naman ngayon, sunod ang Mercedes
Benz at huli na ang Lancer. Noong
makapasok na kami ng boundary ng
Meycauyan, Bulacan ay kumuha na
kami ng tiyempo at noon makatiyempo
kami ay kinat namin ang delivery
van. Tumigil naman ito at bumaba
kaagad sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt.
Jun ng LRP dahil sila noon ang may
hawak ng kanilang Armalite Rifle pero
may service pa silang maiksing
baril. Pinababa nila ang tatlong
maydala ng delivery van at pinasakay sa
Mercedes Benz, habang nakatutok ang
kanilang mga baril sa kanila. Ako
naman ay bumaba na sa aming kotse at
sumakay ng delivery van at ako na
mismo ang nagmaneho at sinamahan
naman ako nina Junior Mateo at si Rey
Frias, tatlo (3) rin kaming pumalit sa
puwesto noong tatlong (3) taga-Post
Office na maydala ng delivery
van. Nag-Utturn (sic) kami ngayon at
ibinalik na namin sa Manila ang
van. Iyong Mercedes Benz na
minamaneho pa rin ni Raul Mendoza ay
dumeretso pa norte samantalang ang
Lancer naman ay nag-U-turn din at
sumunod sa amin. Noong makarating
na kami sa Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila ay inunahan na kami ng Lancer
at iyon na nga, parang follow the leader
na dahil siya na noon ang aming guide.
14. T:- Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong
pagsasalaysay?
S:- Dumeretso kami ngayon sa may Obrero,
sa bahay mismo nina Carding Perez, at
noong nakarating ng kami roon ay
iniyatras ko na ang van sa kanilang
garahe at doon ay ibinaba namin lahat
ang mga duffle bag, hindi ko na po alam
kung ilan lahat iyon, na siyang laman ng
delivery van at pagkatapos ay umalis
kaming muli ng mga kasama ko rin sa
van papuntang Quezon City kung saan
namin inabandon ang delivery van. Sa
Retiro ho yata iyong lugar na iyon, kung
hindi ako nagkakamali.
15. T:- Ano ang mga sumunod na nangyari?
S:- Sumakay kami ngayon ng taksi at bumalik
na kami kina Carding Perez sa may
bahay nila sa Obrero, Tondo, Manila at
inabutan na namin sila na nagkakarga
na noong mga duffle bag sa (sic),
madilim na ho noon, sa isang kotseng
mamula-mula o orange na Camaro at
isa pang Mercedes Benz na brown,
dahil ang Lancer ay isinoli na raw nila sa
may-ari. Dinala nila ngayon ang mga
duffle bag sa Bocaue, Bulacan, iyon kasi
ang usapan namin noon dahil sumilip
lamang ako noon at kasama ko si
Carding Perez, kami naman ngayon ay
pumunta sa bahay nina Rudy Miranda
sa San Marcelino, Malate, Manila na
sakay ng isang Toyota Corona na brown
na si Carding Perez ang
nagmaneho. Pagdating namin doon sa
kina Rudy Miranda ay naroon na rin
noon ang Mercedes Benz na ginamit
namin, pero wala na ang crew ng
delivery van dahil ibinaba at iniwanan
daw nila sa Caloocan City. Ang
naroroon na lamang noon ay sina
Angelo Liwanag, si Raul Mendoza, si
Sgt. Ed Saguindel at si Sgt. Jun na
parehong taga-LRP. Naiwan na noon
ang Mercedes Benz namin doon kina
Rudy Miranda at iniwan na rin ang susi
doon sa kamag-anak, dahil hindi nila
alam ang trabahong ito. Sumakay na
iyong apat naming kasama sa Toyota
Corona na sakay namin at inihatid
namin sina Sgt. Saguindel at Sgt. Jun
doon sa tinitirhan nitong huling
nabanggit na sundalo doon sa malapit
sa Del Pan Bridge sa may Recto
Avenue sa San Nicolas yata iyon sa
Manila. Kami naman ngayong apat,
sina Carding Perez, Angelo Liwanag at
si Raul Mendoza ay tumuloy na sa
Bocaue, Bulacan. Dumaan kami sa
North Diversion Road at paglabas namin
sa exit papuntang Bocaue, Bulacan ay
hindi na kalayuan doon, hindi ko alam
ang lugar pero alam kong
puntahan. Bahay daw yata ng kamag-
anak ni Carding Perez iyon pero hindi ko
alam ang pangalan. Naroon na ngayon
ang buong tropa, maliban sa mga
dalawang sundalong naihatid na namin
sa may Manila, at may mga nadagdag
pang ibang mukha pero hindi ko ito mga
kakilala. Si JACK o Sgt. Dan Miravalles
ay naroon din noon. Kumain kami,
pagkatapos ay nagbukasan na ng mga
duffle bag. Iyon na nga,nakita na namin
ang mga tsekeng ito, (Affiant pointed to
the checks he voluntarily surrendered)
at aming inihiwalay ngayon sa mga sulat
na naroon na sinunog lahat pagkatapos
doon sa bahay ni Junior Mateo sa
Novaliches. Di magdamag ngayon ang
trabaho namin, kinabukasan ay kanya-
kanyang uwian na, pagkatapos ay
pahinga. Kinabukasan muli, gabi, inilipat
na namin doon sa bahay ni Junior
Mateo ang mga tsekeng ito (Affiant
again referred to said checks). Isinakay
namin noon sa isang cargo truck na
pag-aari din daw nina Carding. Iyong
mga tsekeng iyan ngayon ay nakalagay
noon doon sa isang sikretong
compartment sa gitna ng truck, doon ba
sa may chassis. Sikretong compartment
iyon, na mahirap mahalata.
16. T: Ikaw ba naman ay mayroong dalang
baril noon at kung ganoon, sabihin mo
nga kung anong uring baril iyon?
S:- Wala po akong baril, Ser.
17. T:- Paano naman napunta ang mga
tsekeng ito (the checks recovered from
the Affiant was referred to) sa iyo?
S:- E, di ganoon na nga ho, habang
tumatagal ay umiinit ang situwasyon sa
aming grupo, dahil iyong partehan sana
namin ay puro pangako ang
nangyari. Kaya napagpasiyahan namin
na hatiin na lamang iyong mga tseke
upang walang onsehan sa amin. Ito
ngayon ay parte namin nina Sgt. Ed
Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravalles Alias
JACK at ni Sgt. Jun, dahil noong una ay
doon muna sa amin ito nakatago (The
checks recovered from the Affiant was
referred to). Pero habang tumatagal ay
umiinit at nalaman namin pati na may
alarma na, kaya’t inilipat namin doon sa
may Raxa Bago sa may likod ng
Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Factory sa
Tondo, Manila at akin munang ipinatago
sa isang kumare ko doon,
pansamantala, pero hindi alam nitong
kumare ko ang laman noon dahil
mahigpit kong ipinagbilin na huwag
nilang bubuksan. Doon na rin namin
kinuha iyon noong isurender ko ang
mga tsekeng ito kagabi, at hanggang sa
kinuha na namin ang supot na ito (the
checks placed in a plastic bag was
again referred to) ay wala pa rin
kamalay-malay ang kumare ko.
18. T:- Iyong sinasabi mong mga kontak
nina Carding Perez sa Central Post
Office, mga kakilala mo rin ba ang mga
ito?
S:- Iyong araw na lamang na iyon ko sila
nakita, dahil maghapon ko noon silang
nakikita, itong si Alias NINOY lamang
ang dispatcher, dahil palabas-labas siya
noon at nakikipag-usap kina Carding
Perez, Raul Mendoza at saka si Rey
Frias. Makikilala ko itong si Alias
NINOY kung makita ko siyang muli.
19. T:- Sino naman ang kumontak sa iyo
upang sumama sa trabahong ito?
S:- Si Junior Mateo po, ipinakilala niya ako
kina Carding at sa buong tropa na
namin.
20. T:- Pansamantala ay wala na muna
akong itatanong pa sa iyo, mayroon ka
bang nais na idagdag, bawasin o palitan
kaya sa salaysay na ito?
S:- Wala na po.
21. T:- Handa mo bang lagdaan ang iyong
salaysay na ito bilang patotoo sa
katotohanan nito nang hindi ka pinilit,
sinaktan or pinangakuan kaya ng
anuman upang lumagda lamang?
S:- Opo.
WAKAS NG SALAYSAY: . . . . . /ac

MGA SAKSI SA LAGDA:
(Sgd.)
SSG ROMEO P. ESPERO PC
(Sgd.)
CIC THERESA TOLENTINO
WAC (PC)”[24]
Petitioner executed two other documents on the
same day, May 30, 1982. One was a certification stating
that he voluntarily surrendered “voluminous assorted US
checks and vouchers,” that because of the “large number
of pieces” of checks, he affixed his signature upon the
middle portion of the back of each check “to serve as
identification in the future, prior to the completion of its
proper inventory and listing conducted by elements of
SOG” in his presence, and that he “guided the elements of
SOG” to the residence of Rodolfo C. Miranda, the owner of
the sky-blue Mercedes Benz car which was surrendered to
the SOG Headquarters.[25] The other document was a
sworn statement wherein petitioner attested to his waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
and the following facts: (a) that he was apprised of his
constitutional rights under Section 20, Article IV of the
(1973) Constitution, that he understood all his rights
thereunder, and that the investigators offered him counsel
from the CLAO-IBP but he refused to avail of the privilege;
(b) that he was arrested by SOG men in his house at
around 11:00 p.m. of May 29, 1982 “sa dahilang ako ay
kasangkot sa. pagnanakaw ng mga US Treasury Warrants,
SSS Pension ) Checks and Vouchers at SSS Medicare
Checks and JVouchers mula sa delivery van ng Philippine
Mail;” (c) that
O the SOG men confiscated from him
numerous checks
S and a Mercedes Benz 200 colored sky-
blue, and (d)E that he was not hurt or maltreated nor was
anything taken from him which was not duly receipted
for.[26] D executed sworn statements.[34] Prior to doing so, they
. waived their right to counsel. Liwanag and Mateo admitted
As certified to by petitioner (in the above described
document), F he led the SOG operatives to the house of
Rodolfo Miranda
I on Singalong where the latter admitted
that petitioner
L was his friend. He denied, however, having
knowledge thatO his car was used in the hijacking until the
authorities came
T to his house. According to Miranda, he
was made E to believe that his car would be used for
surveillance Opurposes because petitioner’s jeep was not
available. The car was not returned until the evening
following that when it was borrowed.[27] After the trip to
Miranda’s house, petitioner informed the investigators that
some more checks could be recovered from
his kumare. Said checks were retrieved and turned over to
headquarters along with the car surrendered by Miranda
who later executed a sworn statement dated May 31, 1992
at the SOG.[28]
Upon learning of the whereabouts of Miravalles,
Eddie Saguindel and Bernardo Relator, the team of Capt.
Ferrer proceeded to Taguig, Metro Manila in the afternoon
of May 30, 1982. They met Miravalles along the way to his
house. Informed by Capt. Ferrer that six of his
companions were already under custody and that they
implicated him as one of their confederates, Miravalles
reacted by saying, “Sir, ang hihina kasi ng mga loob niyan,
eh.”[29]
Capt. Ferrer later asked Miravalles to bring him to
Eddie Saguindel. At the barracks of the Long Range
Patrol in Bicutan, Metro Manila, Saguindel voluntarily
accepted the invitation to proceed to the SOG
headquarters, after Miravalles initially informed him of the
facts obtained during the investigation. Saguindel was
heard saying, “Hindi na kami interesado, sir, sa mga
tsekeng iyan kasi isang buwan na hindi pa
nabebenta.”[30] With Miravalles and Saguindel, Capt. Ferrer
and his team moved on to Binondo, Manila to look for
Bernardo Relator. When they found him at home, Relator
excused himself, went upstairs, returned with a .32 caliber
revolver with six bullets[31] and said, “Sir, ito yong baril na
nagamit.”[32] The three suspects were brought to Camp
Crame for further investigation. Thereafter, Capt. Ferrer
submitted an after-operations report about their mission
and executed jointly with Lt. Pagdilao on affidavit on the
same matter.[33]
Aside from petitioner, Liwanag, Mateo and Perez
their participation and implicated petitioner in the
crime. Perez, on the other hand, denied having driven a
Lancer car in the hijacking and stated that he was
implicated in the crime only because in one drinking spree
with petitioner, Mateo and one alias “Buro” during that
month of May, they had a heated altercation. Like
petitioner, Liwanag and Mendoza certified that they
voluntarily surrendered vouchers and checks which were
part of their loot in the hijacking; they also executed
waivers under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For
his part, Relator executed a certification to the effect that
he voluntarily surrendered his .32 caliber Smith & Wesson
service revolver used in the commission of the crime. In
spite of the fact that his father-in-law was a lawyer,
petitioner did not manifest that he needed the assistance
of counsel. During the taking of his statement, petitioner
was visited by Jimmy Victorino and another comrade from
the General Assignment Section of the WPD.
For their part, Relator, Saguindel and Miravalles
executed a joint affidavit[35] manifesting their option to avail
of their right to remain silent until such time as they would
have retained a counsel of their choice. Frias and
Mendoza executed a similar joint affidavit.[36] Severino
Castro, the postal employee implicated, also chose to
remain silent as he wanted to testify in court. However, he
linked to the crime a certain Gerardo Escalada, a former
clerk of the Central Post Office and son of a director of the
Bureau of Posts in Region I.[37]
On May 31, 1982, then Postmaster General Golez
summoned postal employees Miranda, Bautista and
Tagudar and directed them to proceed to Camp Crame. At
the office of the SOG, they were told to go over some
pictures for identification of the culprits. The three
recognized and pointed to the suspects in a line-
up. Tagudar identified Saguindel and Liwanag.[38] Miranda
pointed at Frias and Liwanag[39] while Bautista identified
Frias, Mendoza and Liwanag .[40] Petitioner himself, when
told to identify his alleged cohorts, pointed to Severino
Castro as their contact at the post office. [41] Five of the
suspects who were not identified in the line-up were
however implicated by Liwanag, Mateo and petitioner.
SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a
complaint for robbery-in-band (hijacking) before the
Municipal Court of Meycauyan, Bulacan against petitioner
and ten (10) others, namely, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator,
Miravalles, Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and
Escalada (Criminal Case No. 7885).[42]
On August 8, 1983, the Information previously
referred to and aforequoted was filed with the
Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8496.
On September 20, 1983, Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Romeo M. Escareal issued orders for the arrest of
the accused[43] and fixed bail at P13,000.00
each. Saguindel and Relator filed a motion to quash the
Information asserting that under the Articles of War and
Section 1 of P.D. 1850, they should be tried by a court
martial.[44] The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on
January 3, 1984[45] on the ground that courts martial could
no longer exercise jurisdiction over them by virtue of their
separation from military service.
Evidence for the Defense
Testifying in his own defense, petitioner alleged that
as a patrolman since August 21, 1978 assigned to the
Investigation Division or the Detective Bureau of the WPD
to which the General Assignment Section belonged, he
was the recipient of several awards and recognitions
starting with ranking fifth in the Final Order of Merit in the
basic course for police officers.[46] He also claimed to have
received a loyalty medal for meritorious service above the
call of duty[47] and several commendations[48] for the
distinguished performance of his duties. On that fateful
date of May 3, 1982, he was a member of the Special Task
Force Unit covering the tourist belt area.
Of the ten other accused in this case, petitioner
admitted knowing only Martin Mateo whose name
appeared in the initial follow-up operation he allegedly
participated in regarding a P250,000 qualified theft case
on May 16, 1980 at the Shemberg Marketing
Corporation.[49] Although a suspect, Mateo was not
charged in the information subsequently filed in that
case. Sometime in March 1981, Mateo visited petitioner at
the police headquarters seeking assistance in his bid to
lead a new life. Considering Mateo’s familiarity with
underworld characters, petitioner readily made him an
informer who was paid from time to time out of the police
intelligence fund. Mateo proved to be an effective
informer. In fact, he allegedly supplied vital information on
the identities and whereabouts of suspects in robbery
cases at the La Elegancia Jewelry Store, at the Likha
Antique and Crafts,[50] and in an alleged racket in Aranque
Market in Manila involving jewelries.
As such informer, Mateo became accustomed to
borrowing petitioner’s owner-type jeep whenever he was
given an assignment. In one instance however, petitioner
saw Mateo using his jeep with some male
companions. Because Mateo denied the occurrence of
the incident, petitioner from then on refused to lend his
jeep to Mateo. Instead, Mateo was given an allowance to
cover his travelling expenses.
About a month prior to May 3, 1982, petitioner met
Mateo and requested the latter to give him a good project
as he was working for his transfer to the Metrocom
Intelligence Security Group (MISG). On May 2, 1982,
Mateo urged petitioner to lend him his jeep in order that he
could follow-up a bank robbery case. That same evening,
petitioner approached his kumpare, accused Rodolfo
Miranda, to borrow the latter’s old Mercedes Benz since, if
the jeep was used, Mateo could be identified as an
informer. Petitioner left his jeep with Miranda and “went
around boasting of the Mercedes Benz.”[51]
Mateo took the Benz in the morning of May 3,
1982. Petitioner advised him to return the car between the
hours of two and three in the afternoon at the Lakan Beer
House at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Zurbaran Streets
in Sta. Cruz, Manila where petitioner was to meet his friend
Manolo Almoguera who would be celebrating his birthday
there. Petitioner met Almoguera and company at around
3:30 in the afternoon. He waited for Mateo until shortly
before 5:00 in the afternoon when he was constrained to
leave without seeing Mateo because he had to attend a
mandatory regular troop formation at 5:00 P.M. at the
police headquarters. From there, petitioner proceeded to
his area of responsibility in the tourist belt. He returned to
the beer house at about 6:00 in the evening hoping to find
Mateo and the automobile. A little before 8:00 o’clock,
someone informed him that Mateo had finally
arrived. Petitioner went out and scolded Mateo for being
late; the latter apologized and said that his surveillance
bore good results. Petitioner then returned the car to
Miranda, through the latter’s cousin.
At around 11:00 in the evening of May 29, 1982,
Mateo, escorted by a group of military men, went to
petitioner’s house at 810 Cabezas St., Tondo, Manila. The
group refused to give any reason for their visit but arrested
him. Wearing only short pants, petitioner was made to
board a car where he was handcuffed. The men asked
him about the Benz and the identities of his companions in
an alleged hijacking incident. Petitioner admitted having
knowledge of the exact location of the car but denied
participation in the crime. Nobody apprised him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by
counsel.[52]
Petitioner was then instructed to accompany Lt.
Pagdilao to the residence of Miranda to get the
Benz. They were on board two cars. When petitioner
noticed that they were not heading for Miranda’s place, he
clutched the hand of Lt. Pagdilao, pleading for pity and
thinking that he was about to be “salvaged”. Lt. Pagdilao
however informed him that they would be dropping by
petitioner’s house first per the investigator’s information
that more checks could be recovered thereat. A
warrantless search was then allegedly conducted in
petitioner’s house but nothing was found. Suddenly,
someone from the other car came out of a nearby house
owned by Mateo and reported that they had recovered
some checks. Thereafter, they proceeded to the house of
Miranda who was also invited for questioning. The latter
surrendered his Benz to the group.
At the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, petitioner
repeatedly coaxed to admit participation in the
hijacking. As he vehemently denied the accusation
against him, someone blindfolded him from behind, led
him outside and loaded him in a car. He was taken to an
unidentified place and made to lie flat on his back. An
object was tied to his small finger to electrocute
him. While a wet handkerchief was stuffed in his mouth,
someone mounted his chest and applied the “water cure”
(“tinutubig”) through his nose. Because these ordeals
were simultaneously carried out, petitioner felt unbearable
pain. He sought permission to get in touch with his father-
in-law, Atty. Felix Rosacia, but his request was
denied. They urged him to cooperate otherwise something
terrible would happen to him.
Meanwhile, petitioner’s wife reported to the WPD
General Assignment Section her husband’s forcible
abduction by armed men whom she mistook for CIS
agents. A check with the CIS yielded negative
results. Thereafter, Lt. Reynaldo Dator went to the SOG
where he was informed that petitioner was being
investigated but no details were given thereon pending
clearance with superior officers.[53] Consequently, a
newspaper carried an item on the SOG’s refusal to allow
petitioner’s co-police officers to see him in his detention
cell.[54]
Among his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino, formerly
of the WPD who was transferred to the SOG, was able to
visit him. Petitioner revealed to Victorino the maltreatment
done him but the latter expressed helplessness about
it. In fact, Victorino advised him to just cooperate so that
the SOG would not incriminate him (“para hindi ka pag-
initan dito”).[55] The advice came after petitioner was
warned that he, like Pat. Serrano of the WPD, would be
liquidated by the SOG,[56] should he refused to
cooperate. Later, Mateo came to petitioner’s cell and
confided that he had been similarly maltreated and forced
to implicate petitioner.
After Mateo left, a prepared statement was shown
and read to petitioner. Because its contents were false,
petitioner refused to sign it. Placing his arm around
petitioner, a certain Capt. Lagman told petitioner that he
thought they had an understanding already. Petitioner
later discovered that Lagman was not member of the
military but an “agent” of the SOG, and a member of the
“Contreras gang”. Petitioner was therefore constrained to
sign the statement because of his excruciating experience
(“hirap na hirap”). He however admitted having read the
document before affiixing his signature thereto and
initialing the corrections therein. The waiver under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code and the certification he
executed were allegedly also obtained by
duress. Although he picked out one Severino Castro in a
police line-up, he did not even know Castro. He implicated
Castro because he was threatened by a certain Boy
Zapanta.
Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and
maltreatment against Lt. Rosendo Ferrer and several John
Does. On August 4, 1982, Asst. City Fiscal Emelita H.
Garayblas recommended its dismissal for petitioner’s
failure to appear despite subpoenas and to answer
clarificatory questions as well as to authenticate his
statement.[57] However, petitioner swore that he never
received the subpoenas.
Petitioner’s alibi was supported by Manolo
Almoguera whose birthday on May 3, 1995 was the reason
for the celebration at the Lakan Beer House. While his
baptismal certificate indicated that he was born on May 4,
1956,[58] a joint affidavit[59] also attested that his birth date
was actually May 3, 1956. Gary Gallardo, the owner of the
beer house, corroborated Almoguera’s testimony as to
petitioner’s alleged presence during the birthday
celebration.
The Respondent Court’s Decision
On June 18, 1987, the Sandiganbayan rendered the
herein questioned 51-page Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo, Martin Mateo, Jr. y
Mijares, Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino and Eddie
Saguindel y Pabinguit GUILTY as co-principals beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 2 (e), in
relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974 and hereby sentences each of said
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to
THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN
(11) DAYS as maximum, both ofreclusion temporal, and to
pay their proportionate share of the costs of the
action. Accused Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo is hereby
acquitted, with costs de oficio, for insufficiency of evidence.
No civil indemnity is hereby awarded due to the complete
dearth of any proof as to the actual damages suffered by
the Bureau of Posts or the owners of the pilfered mail
matters, and it further appearing that the mail van which
was hijacked had been recovered, as well as most of the
checks and warrants which were surrendered by some of
the accused, without prejudice to the institution of the
proper civil action to recover damages should proof thereof
be available.
Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-1 and
B-2, which are the .32 Cal. Revolver, Smith and Wesson,
Serial No. 11707, its holster and six (6) live ammunition
respectively, which were surrendered by accused Relator,
and Exhibits J, J-1 to J-5, consisting of 187, 222, 215, 197,
194 and 22 pieces, respectively, of Social Security System
and Medicare checks and vouchers, be returned to the
Firearm and Explosive Unit (FEU), PC, Camp Crame,
Quezon City and the Social Security System, respectively,
upon proper receipts.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-
General, Central Post Office, Liwasang Bonifacio, Metro
Manila and the Commanding General and Chief, PC-INP,
Camp Crame, Quezon City for their information and
guidance with respect to the other accused who are still at-
large.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said
Decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
challenged Resolution of July 27, 1987. Hence, the instant
alternative petition for certiorariand/or review
on certiorari charging the Sandiganbayan with having
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and with reversible error in arriving at said
Decision.
The Issues
The amended petition raises the following:
“Assignments of Error
and / or
 Excess of Jurisdiction / Grave Abuse of Discretion
xxx xxx xxx
First
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction when it made
its determination of the alleged guilt of petitioner on the
basis of mere preponderance of evidence and not proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Second
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that
petitioner’s having borrowed the Mercedes Benz car
utilized by the other accused in the hijacking of the mail
van idubitably established his direct participation and/or
indispensable cooperation in the said hijacking, the same
being in gross disregard of basic Rules of Law.
Third
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that
the voluminous SSS Medicare and Pension Checks were
confiscated from and surrendered by petitioner and three
of the other accused and in finding the testimonies and
investigation reports relative thereto, ‘credible and
unrefuted’, said findings being, insofar as petitioner is
concerned, absolutely without any basis in the evidence
and in fact contrary to the prosecution’s only evidence that
has some measure of competency and admissibility.
Fourth
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its
discretion in finding that dorsal portions of the checks and
warrants allegedly taken from petitioner were signed by
him to indicate his admission of accountability therefor and
that his signatures thereon confirm the confiscation from
and/or surrender by him of said checks, said findings being
absolutely without any support in the evidence.
Fifth petitioner’s alleged possession not being borne out but
disputed by the prosecution’s own evidence.
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in admitting Ninth
and considering against petitioner his alleged extra judical
confession, despite petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its
and documentary proof that he was made to give or sign
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that
the same through torture, maltreatment, physical
‘accused Filoteo’s denials and alibi cannot be entertained
compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the
for being quite weak and implausible’. The truth of the
presence and assistance of counsel, his request for which
matter being that they should have been sustained since
was refused, in gross violation of Constitutional Provisions
petitioner was not identified by the direct victims-
and the prevailing jurisprudence.
eyewitnesses as among those who participated in or were
present at the hijack and none of the checks and treasury
Sixth warrants were found in his possession or retrieved from
him.
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that Tenth
petitioner’s participation in the hijacking of the mail van is
indubitably established ‘by the manner by which the SOG
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its
operatives succeeded in ferreting out the members of the
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that
hijacking syndicate one by one through patient sleuthing’
the participation of petitioner in the criminal conspiracy has
and in finding that they did so ‘without resorting to extra-
been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of
legal measures’ and that ‘no evidence having been
record and that said evidence ‘not only confirms the
adduced to show that they were actuated by improper
conspiracy between [him and the other accused] as easily
motives to testify falsely against the herein accused, then
discernible from their conduct before, during and after the
their testimonies should be accorded full credence’.
commission of the offense; but also their participation
therein as co-principals by direct participation and/or
Seventh indispensable cooperation’.
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its Eleventh
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that
‘even setting aside the inter-locking confessional
The respondent Court erred and gravely abused its
statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, x x x
discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in cavalierly
substantial and sufficient evidence exist which indubitably
rejecting, through the use of pejorative words, and without
prove the guilt of Filoteo’ (Petitioner).
stating the legal basis of such rejection, the various vital
factual points raised by petitioner, in gross violation of the
Eight express mandate of the 1987 Constitution.”
Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the respondent court The Court believes that the above “errors” may be
erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as condensed into four:
exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that ‘accused Filoteo’s
(petitioner’s) and Mateo’s [alleged] unexplained (1) Are the written statements,
possession of the stolen checks raised the presumption particularly the extra-judicial confession
that ‘they were responsible for the robbery in question’, executed by the accused without the
 presence of his lawyer, admissible in
evidence against him?
(2) Were said statements obtained
through torture, duress, maltreatment and
intimidation and therefore illegal and
inadmissible?
(3) Was petitioner’s warrantless arrest
valid and proper?
(4) Is the evidence of the prosecution
sufficient to find the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt?
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminary Issue: Rule 45 or Rule 65?
Before ruling on the foregoing issues, it is necessary
to dwell on the procedural aspects of the case. Petitioner,
a “segurista”, opted to file an (amended) “alternative
petition” for certiorariunder Rule 65 and for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We
however hold that the instant petition must be considered
as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45. InJariol, Jr.
vs. Sandiganbayan,[60] this Court clearly ruled:
“Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No.
1606, which created the Sandiganbayan, specified that
decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
subject to review on certiorari by this Court in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. And Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides, in Section 2, that only
questions of law may be raised in the Petition for Review
and these must be distinctly set forth. Thus, in principle,
findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are not to be
reviewed by this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari. There are, of course, certain exceptions to this
general principle. Here, reading petitioner’s Petition for
Review and Memorandum in the most favorable possible
light, petitioner may be seen to be in effect asserting that
the Sandiganbayan misapprehended certain (f)acts in
arriving at its factual conclusions.”
As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of
P.D. No. 1606 expressly provides that “(d)ecisions and
final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to
the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.” However, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of
questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where
there was palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts
by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted
public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same
thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases
involving ordinary citizens simply because the
constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a
person’s life and liberty are at stake.[61]
As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the
available remedy, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
would not prosper. Basic it is that certiorari is invocable
only where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy. For waffling on procedural matters, petitioner
could have lost this battle through a summary dismissal of
his “alternative” petition. But in view of the importance of
the issues raised, the Court decided to take cognizance of
the matter.
First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver
On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal
issue here is the admissibility of petitioner’s extrajudicial
confession which lays out in detail his complicity in the
crime. Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in
admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding
uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he
was made to sign the same through torture, maltreatment,
physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without
the presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims
that in executing the extrajudicial confession, he was
denied the right to counsel in the same way that his waiver
of the said right was likewise without the benefit of
counsel. Petitioner therefore questions the respondent
Court’s admission in evidence of his extrajudicial
confession on the strength of cases[62] upholding the
admissibility of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding
the absence of counsel “especially where the statements
are replete with details and circumstances which are
indicative of voluntariness.” We shall first tackle the issue
of his uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel.
The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of
the 1973 Constitution reads as follows:
“No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.”
In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused
under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
are, inter alia, as follows:
“(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and
their families.” (underscoring supplied. Obviously, the
1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an
uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is
provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, above underscored.)
In the landmark case of Magtoto vs.
Manguera,[63] the Court categorically held that the
aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution (which
were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be
prospectively applied. This Court said:
“We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional
mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a
retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained
from a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence
and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same
had been obtained after the effectivity of the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such
confession is admissible in evidence against the accused,
if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the
New Constitution, even if presented after January 17,
1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to
counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so
informed before that date.”
By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the
1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of
his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be
made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied
retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession
was made prior to the effectivity of said
Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel
during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by
such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of
cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the
1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have
been made with the assistance of counsel, [64] the definitive
ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this
Court, through Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile,[65] issued the
guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during
custodial investigation. The court specifically ruled that
“(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel.”[66] Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino,[67] the
Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
vigorously taught:
“x x x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the
right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a
judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983
in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985
in People vs. Galit. x x x.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of
Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine
affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the
requirements and restrictions outlined
in Morales andGalit have no retroactive effect and do not
reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of
promulgation of Morales.”
Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not
claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings because
he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to
the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26,
1983. The prospective application of “judge-made” laws
was underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals[68] where the
Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in
accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides
that “(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines,” and Article 4 of the same Code which states
that “(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided,” the principle of prospectivity of
statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial
decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the law means.[69]
Petitioner’s contention that Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for
being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be
sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that “(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is
not a habitual criminal,” what is being construed here is a
constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of
Rights which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of
rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual
rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to
protect against violations by the government, or by
individuals or groups of individual. It is a charter of
liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power
of the state.[70] Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and
properly are those imposing punishment for an offense
committed against the state which the executive of the
state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law
denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for
a crime or offense against its law.[71]
Hence, petitioner’s vigorous reliance on People vs.
Sison[72] to make his extrajudicial confession inadmissible
is misplaced. In that case, the extrajudicial confession was
executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after the promulgation
of Morales on April 26, 1983.
The admissibility of petitioner’s uncounselled waiver
of the right to counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still
to determine whether such waiver was made voluntarily
and intelligently.[73] The waiver must also be categorical
and definitive,[74] and must rest on clear evidence.[75]
In his affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code,[76] petitioner stated that:
“x x x matapos akong mapagpaliwanagan ng mga
imbestigador ng Special Operations Group, PC/INP
Central Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame,
Quezon City ng aking mga karapatan alinsunod sa mga
isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang
Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas ay malaya at kusang-loob
na nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod kahit na walang
abugadong magpapayo sa akin sa pagsasagawa nito sa
dahilang alam at nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa at
wala naman akong isasalaysay kung hindi mga
katotohanan lamang, bagama’t ako ay inalok ng mga
imbestigador na ikuha ng isang abugadong walang bayad
mula sa CLAO-IBP na akin namang tinanggihan:
xxx xxx xx
x;
Na ako ay hindi sinaktan o minaltrato gayunding walang
kinuha mula sa akin na hindi niresibohan;
xxx xxx xx
x.”
 Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified
that he apprised petitioner of his right to counsel even in
waiving the same right[77] but petitioner did not even inform
him that his father-in-law was a lawyer. Although allowed
to talk for thirty minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his
comrade at the WPD General Assignment Section,[78] still,
petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel.
It should be emphasized that petitioner could not
have been ignorant of his rights as an accused. He was a
fourth year criminology student and a topnotch student in
the police basic course.[79] Having been in the police force
since 1978, with stints at the investigation division or the
detective bureau, he knew the tactics used by
investigators to incriminate criminal suspects.[80] in other
words, he was knowledgeable on the matter of
extrajudicial confessions.
The Second Issue: Confession Extracted Through
Torture?
Petitioner’s claim that he was tortured into signing
the confession appears incredible, or at least susceptible
to serious doubts. The allegation of torture was negated
by the medical report[81]showing no evidence of physical
injuries upon his person. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, there is no reason to maltreat him in
particular when the record shows that the investigating
team respected the right of the other suspects to remain
silent. When he was presented before Judge Mariano
Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan, petitioner
even waived his right to present evidence[82] instead of
impugning his confession on account of the torture
allegedly inflicted upon him. If indeed he had been
tortured, he would have revived the case he filed against
his alleged torturers upon learning of its dismissal.
Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the
different documents on record bearing the same discloses
an evenness of lines and strokes in his penmanship which
is markedly consistent in his certification, extrajudicial
confession and waiver of detention. Human experience
has proven that the lines and strokes of a person’s
handwriting reflect his disposition at a certain given
time. In the present case, no handwriting expert is needed
to declare that petitioner’s signatures were written
voluntarily and not under compulsion of fear immediately
after he had been subjected to maltreatment. In view of
the foregoing, his extrajudicial confession is presumed to
have been voluntarily made, in the absence of conclusive
evidence showing that petitioner’s consent in executing the
same had been vitiated.[83]
Besides, the question of whether petitioner was
indeed subjected to torture or maltreatment is a factual
question addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings of
which are binding on this Court whose function, as afore-
discussed, is principally to review only of questions of
law. Moreover, we have pored over the assailed Decision
and we are satisfied that respondent Court performed its
duty in evaluating the evidence. More on this later.
The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?
Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating
that the arresting officers “invited” him without a warrant of
arrest and brought him to Camp Crame where he was
allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the
commission of the crime.[84] Petitioner’s claim is belatedly
made. He should have questioned the validity of his arrest
before he entered his plea in the trial court. On this point,
this Court explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.:[85]
“Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the
question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-
appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him,
he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the
trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus
estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. It is
well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest
or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time
by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the
information before the trial court on this
ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his
arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of not guilty and by participating in the
trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.”
The only move petitioner made in regard to his
arrest was to file a complaint for “grave coercion, grave
threat & maltreatment” which was docketed as I.S. No. 82-
12684 before the Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City.[86] The
complaint was an offshoot of his alleged maltreatment in
the hands of the SOG upon his arrest. However, as stated
above, he did not lift a finger to revive it upon its dismissal.
The Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s
Evidence
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, his culpability has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He borrowed a
car to use in the hijacking knowing fully well that his owner-
type jeep would give away his identity. He could not be
identified by the postal employees in the postal van simply
because after overtaking said vehicle and forcing its driver
to pull over, he gave up driving the Mercedes Benz where
the postal employees were made to ride, and
commandeered the van. That the checks were not found
in his own home is of no moment. Before the arrest and
upon learning that the authorities had begun to nail down
the identities of the malefactors, he had entrusted them to
his “kumare”. It was petitioner himself who led the team of
Lt. Pagdilao back to his place after he had admitted to Sgt.
Arsenio Carlos that his share of the checks were in the
possession of his “kumare” in the neighborhood.[87]
In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that
petitioner was a direct participant in the commission of the
crime. His alibi has been correctly considered by the
Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. The distance
between Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan and downtown
Manila where petitioner claimed to have been at the crucial
time was between fifteen (15) to twenty (20) kilometers,
which, through first-class roads, could be negotiated
during that time in approximately thirty (30) minutes. It
could not therefore have been physically impossible for
him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity when
the crime was committed.[88]
 Having already ruled on the admissibility of
petitioner’s confession, this Court holds that the full force
of the totality of the prosecution’s evidence proves his guilt
well beyond reasonable doubt. Weighing heavily against
the defense is the well-settled doctrine that findings of
facts of the trial courts -- in this case, the Sandiganbayan
itself -- particularly in the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any
arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.
“x x x It is well-settled that this Court will not interfere with
the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility
of the witnesses, unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has
been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misapprehended or misinterpreted. The reason for this is
that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial.”[89]
“The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial court’s
conclusion on issues of credibility is accorded with highest
respect by the appellate courts (People vs. Dominguez,
217 SCRA 170). Appellate courts will generally respect
the findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses
since trial courts are in a better position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. They heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. x x
x.”[90]
So overwhelming is the prosecution’s evidence that
respondent Court opined that even without the “inter-
locking confessions of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag” the
remaining evidence would still be sufficient for
conviction.[91] Said the respondent tribunal:
“However, even setting aside the inter-locking confessional
statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, we are of the
considered opinion that substantial and sufficient evidence
exist which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo, Relator,
Mateo and Saguindel who had submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of this Court. As above-stated, Filoteo was
responsible for securing the use of the Mercedes Benz car
used by the co-conspirators in the hi-jacking. Together
with Mateo, Liwanag and Mendoza, he surrendered
voluminous assorted checks which were part of the through said witnesses that he tried to establish his
loot. Relator admitted that his service firearm was used by whereabouts between 4:30 o’clock to 7:30 o’clock p.m. of
him in the hi-jacking, which firearm was identified by May 2, 1982, the period from the time the mail van was hi-
prosecution witnesses Miranda and Bautista. Saguindel jacked up to when postal employees Bautista, Miranda
was identified in line-ups at the SOG office as the suspect and Tagudar were brought to Caloocan City and freed by
clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an Armalite rifle by their captors. Such alibi, however, fails to show that it was
prosecution witnesses Tagudar and Bautista. All three (3) physically impossible for him to be present at the scene of
accused, namely, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel also the hi-jacking. We take judicial notice that the distance
jumped bail during the trial and did not offer any evidence between the crime scene and downtown Manila is some
to refute the evidence presented by the prosecution 15-20 kilometers and negotiable over first-class roads in
against them. Such flight to evade prosecution constitutes some thirty (30) minutes.”
an implied admission of guilt.
We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient
Moreover, accused Filoteo’s and Mateo’s unexplained evidence of conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of
possession of the stolen checks raises the presumption the participation of each of the accused. As ratiocinated in
that they were responsible for the robbery in question. It is the assailed Decision:[92]
a rule established by an abundance of jurisprudence that
when stolen property is found in the possession of one, not
“The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and
the owner, without a satisfactory explanation of his
Saguindel in the criminal conspiracy have (sic) been
possession, he will be presumed the thief. This rule is in
proved beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on
accordance with the disputable presumption “that a person
record and which evidence not only confirms the existence
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
of the conspiracy between them as easily discernible from
recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole
their conduct before, during and after the commission of
act.” In the instant case, said accused has not given such
the offense, but also their participation therein as co-
satisfactory explanation, much more so when their
principals by direct participation and/or indispensable
possession had been positively established by the
cooperation. Their concerted efforts were performed with
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Capt. Ferrer and Sgt.
closeness and coordination indicating their common
Carlos and by accused’s own signatures at the back of
purpose. Hence, there being collective criminal
said checks.
responsibility, the act of one is the act of all, and each of
the participants are responsible for what the others did in
Furthermore, accused Filoteo’s denials and alibi cannot be all the stages of execution of the offense.”
entertained for being quite weak and implausible. His
claim that he merely borrowed the Mercedes Benz car
from Rodolfo Miranda to help out his co-accused Mateo,
who had been utilized by the police as an “informer” and Final Question: Brigandage or Robbery?
was following up tips in certain unsolved cases, appears to
be incredible and fantastic. He also claimed that he could
not have participated in the hi-jack because after giving the
The Court believes that, though not raised as an
car to Mateo in the morning of May 2, 1982, he waited at
issue and though not argued by the parties in their
the corner of Zurbaran St. and Avenida Rizal between 2-
pleadings, the question of which law was violated by the
3:00 o’clock p.m. of the same day and then went to the
accused should be discussed and passed upon. In fact,
WPD headquarters to attend the police formation at
petitioner should have brought up such question as it may
around 5:00 o’clock p.m. when Mateo failed to show
benefit him with a reduced penalty.
up. Thereafter, he tried to show through his witnesses
Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera that he was with The respondent Court convicted the accused of
them between 3:00 o’clock to 4:45 o’clock p.m., then from brigandage punishable under Presidential Decree No.
6:00 o’clock to 8:30 o’clock p.m. and, finally, from 10:45 532. [93]
o’clock p.m. to 11:00 o’clock of the same date. It was
 Justifying the above disposition, the assailed
Decision ratiocinates:
“Accused herein are charged with the violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. Under
said decree, with respect to the highway robbery aspect,
the offense is committed on a “Philippine Highway” which
under Section 2 (c) thereof has been defined as “any road,
street, passage, highway and bridges or any part thereof,
or railway or railroad within the Philippines, used by
persons or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the
movement or circulation of persons or transportation of
goods, articles or property or both”, while under Section 2
(e) thereof “Highway Robbery/Brigandage” has been
defined as the “the seizure of any person for ransom,
extortion or other unlawful purposes or the taking away of
property of another by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things or other
unlawful means, committed by any person on any
Philippine Highway”. (Underscoring supplied)
The offense described in the information and established
by the evidence presented by the prosecution properly
falls within the ambit of the aforesaid special law. Therein,
it was conclusively proven that a postal van containing mail
matters, including checks and warrants, was hi-jacked
along the national highway in Bulacan by the accused,
with the attendant use of force, violence and intimidation
against the three (3) postal employees who were
occupants thereof, resulting in the unlawful taking and
asportation of the entire van and its contents consisting of
mail matters. Also the evidence further showed that the
crime was committed by the accused who were PC
soldiers, policeman (sic) and private individuals in
conspiracy with their co-accused Castro and Escalada who
were postal employees and who participated in the
planning of the crime. Accordingly, all the essential
requisites to constitute a consummated offense under the
law in point are present.” (Underscoring in the original
text.)
Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief
that because the taking or robbery was perpetrated on
a national highway (McArthur Highway), ergo, Presidential
Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the
statute violated. Such reasoning has already been Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as
debunked by this Court in the case of People vs. Isabelo highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery
Puno,[94] where it was ruled in unmistakable language that perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person
it takes more than the situs of the robbery to bring it within or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and
the ambit of PD 532. Said the Court through Mr. Justice not acts of robbery committed against only a
Florenz D. Regalado: predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the
preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
“The following salient distinctions between brigandage and
robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the “WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies
subject and are of continuing validity: reveal that lawless are still committing acts of depredation
upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
‘The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the
another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility
formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense
of the nation and stunting the economic and social
consists in the formation of a band by more than three
progress of the people:
armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such
formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It
would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, “WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute x x x
that a member or members of the band actually committed highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
violent means. The crime is proven when the organization all countries:
and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is
‘WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or
by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end
kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but
in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social,
only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by
educational and community progress of the
a band of more than three armed persons, it would not
people; (Emphasis supplied.)
follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the
Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band ‘sala a
los campos para dedicarse a robar.’ (Italics ours.) Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery
against a particular person chosen by the accused as their
specific victim could be considered as committed on the
In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia,
“innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
place to another,” and which single act of depredation
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in
would be capable of “stunting the economic and social
band if there are at least four armed participants. The
progress of the people” as to be considered “among the
martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced
statutes of all countries,” and would accordingly constitute
therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction
an obstacle “to the economic, social, educational and
and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being
community progress of the people,” such that said isolated
no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed
act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage
by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is
contemplated and punished is said decree. This would be
one drawn from the time when and the circumstances
an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.”
under which the decree to be construed
originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is
the best and strongest in the law. From the above, it is clear that a finding of
brigandage or highway robbery involves not just
the locus of the crime or the fact that more than three (3)
persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the
outlaws were purposely organized not just for one act of
robbery but for several indiscriminate commissions
thereof. In the present case, there had been no evidence
presented that the accused were a band of outlaws
organized for the purpose of “depredation upon the
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another.” What
was duly proven in the present case is one isolated
hijacking of a postal van. There was also no evidence of
any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused
to show the “indiscriminate” commission thereof.[95]
Upon the other hand, the Information did not
specifically mention P.D. 532.[96] The facts alleged therein
and proven by the evidence constitute the offense of
robbery defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and
punished by Art. 294, par. 5, all of the Revised Penal
Code.[97] From the facts, it was duly proven that:
personal property (treasury warrants, checks,
mail, van, tools, etc.)
belonging to another were
unlawfully taken by the accused
with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)
with intimidation against three persons (Art.
293)
in an uninhabited place, or
by an band, or
by attacking a moving motor vehicle
on a highway; and
the intimidation was made with the use of
firearms (Art. 295)
Hence, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty provided under paragraph
5 of Art. 294, which is, “prision correctional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period”.
Effectively, the penalty imposed by the Court a
quo should be lightened. However, such lighter penalty
shall benefit only herein petitioner and not his co-accused
who did not contest or appeal the Sandiganbayan’s
Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision is partially MODIFIED to read as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of robbery as
defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized under Art. 294,
paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING
on him an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correctional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay his
proportionate share of the costs of the action.”
All other parts of the disposition are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18128 December 26, 1961
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., HON. HERMOGENES
CALAUAG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Quezon City, Branch IV) and HON. NICASIO YATCO,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City
Branch V), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), THE
CHAIRMAN-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND TENURE
ADMINISTRATION, BRUNA ROSETE and
BUENAVENTURA DIZON, respondents.
---------------------------------
G.R. No. L-18672 December 26, 1961
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the
Land Tenure Administration), petitioner,
vs.
J. M. TUAZON & CO., ET AL., respondents.
Araneta and Araneta for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General and Legal Staff, LTA for
respondents.
Legal Staff, LTA for petitioner.
Araneta and Araneta and A. M. Tolentino for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The record shows that the judgments rendered in 1955 by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in its ejectment cases
Q-1401 and Q-1402, were, upon regular appeal, sequently
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in its cases CA-
G.R. Nos. 16265-66-R, "Tuason & Company, Inc. vs.
Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon". The Court of First
Instance, after the appellate court's decision became final
and upon return of the records in due course, issued writ
of execution of the judgment against Rosete and Dizon, as
prayed for by the landowner Tuason & Company.
Subsequently, on November 19, 1960, the Court of First
Instance issued orders of demolition of the houses of the
evictees or judgment debtors.
A few days previously, on November 16, 1960, the land-
owner J. M. Tuason & Company had also applied for a writ
of prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
(Case No. Q-5527) against the Land Tenure
administration, the Auditor General, and the Solicitor
General, to restrain them from instituting expropriation
proceedings of the petitioner Company's land in Quezon
City, generally known as the "Tatalon Estate", as expressly
and specifically authorized by Republic Act No. 2616, that
became law, without executive approval, on August 3,
1959; the Company claiming mainly that the Republic Act
was unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at
depriving it of its property for the benefit of squatters and
occupants, even if the property had been actually
subdivided, and its lots were being sold to the public; and
that respondent officers threatened to enforce said law by
initiating expropriation proceedings. At petitioner's request,
Judge Hermogenes Caluag of the Quezon City Court of
First Instance (to whom the prohibition case was assigned)
issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction on
November 18, 1960, upon the filing of a bond of P20,000.
After injunction was issued, the evictees in Quezon City
cases Q-1401 and 1402, Bruna Rosete and Tranquilino
Dizon, petitioned the Court of First Instance to suspend the
order of demolition of their houses, on the ground that they
were tenants of the Tatalon Estate; that Republic Act No.
2616, after specifically authorizing the expropriation of the
Tatalon Estate, in its section 4, prescribes as follows:
Section 4. After the expropriation proceedings
mentioned in section two of this Act shall have
been initiated and during the pendency of the
same, no ejectment proceedings shall be
instituted or prosecuted against the present
occupant of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and
no ejectment proceedings already commenced
shall be continued and such lot or any portion
thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said
estate to any person other than the present
occupant without the consent of the latter given
in a public document.
However, Judge Nicasio Yatco of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City denied the suspension because
no expropriation proceedings had been actually filed.
Thereupon, the evictees Rosete and Dizon recoursed to
the Court of Appeals, and there instituted, on February 4,
1961, certiorari proceedings (C.A.-G.R. No. 28842-R)
against Judge Yatco and Caluag, J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc.,
and the Land Tenure Administration. They averred, after
recital of the facts, that Judge Caluag, gravely abused his
discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction in the
prohibition case No. Q-5527 to restrain the initiation of
condemnation proceedings over the Tatalon Estate; that
as beneficiaries under section 4 of Republic Act No. 2616,
they were entitled to a stay of the demolition proceedings
against them; and that Judge Yatco abused his discretion
in refusing to suspend the same until the expropriation
case was terminated. The petitioners prayed that —
(1) Judge Yatco be enjoined from issuing orders
of demolition in Cases Nos. Q-1401 and 1402;
(2) Judge Caluag be enjoined from enforcing the
preliminary injunction he had issued in Case No.
Q-5527; and
(3) That the Land Tenure Administrator be
commanded to institute the expropriation
proceedings authorized by Republic Act No.
2616.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to
the certiorari petition, and on February 9, 1961 ordered the
issuance ex parte of the preliminary injunction prayed for,
upon the filing of a P1,000 bond, which was done.
Respondent Tuason & Company, Inc., moved to dissolve
the preliminary injunction of the Court of Appeals, pointing
out that said Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance
of certiorari proceedings and to issue injunction was only
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; that the orders of
execution issued by the Quezon City Court are not
appealable; that the prohibition proceedings in case No. Q-
5527, involving (as they did) a question of constitutionality
of a statute, were likewise not appealable to the Court of
Appeals; and that said Court, therefore, was without
jurisdiction to pass over the questioned orders and that its
injunction was improperly issued, not being in aid of the
appellate jurisdiction the Court of Appeals. These points
were reiterated in the Company's answer to the petition
forcertiorari. The Court of Appeals (Second Division)
refused to lift the preliminary injunction; on the contrary, on
February 26, upon motion of one of the respondents, the
Land Tenure Administration, it clarified the previous writ of
preliminary injunction.
in the sense that said Writ lifts, quashes or
dissolves writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the Hon. Judge Hermogenes Caluag, in Civil
Case No. 5527, CFI, Rizal, so that respondent
Land Tenure Administration may thus properly
file the complaint for expropriation as authorized
by Republic Act No. 2616.
Thereupon, Tuason & Company instituted in this Supreme
Court certiorari proceedings (G.R. No. L-18128). We gave
it due course and enjoined enforcement of orders of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 28842, and order the
Land Tenure Administration to the defer the filing of the
expropriation proceedings until further orders.
The sequel to the events narrated can be gleaned from the
record of case G.R. No. L-18672, a certiorariproceeding
filed by the Land Tenure Administration against Judge
Hermogenes Caluag and Tuason & Company, Inc. The
motion of the Land Tenure Administration and its
correspondents to dismiss the prohibition case in the
Quezon City Court (Case No. Q-5527), as well as their
motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction issued by
Judge Caluag, was denied by him; and when the Second
Division of the Court of Appeals issued its resolution of
February 26, 1961, quashing Judge Caluag's preliminary
injunction, the Land Tenure Administration attorneys
attempted to file the complaint for the expropriation of 93
hectares of the Tatalon Estate in the Quezon City court,
but said complaint could not be docketed because the
Judge had forbidden the Court Clerk to do so. Despite
entreaties, Judge Caluag refused to allow the
expropriation complaint to be docketed, claiming that he
had no official knowledge of the resolution of the Court of
Appeals, even after he was served with a certified copy
thereof.
The Land Tenure Administration avers that the issuance of
the injunction in the prohibition case (Q-5527), the denial
of the motion to dismiss the case, the refusal to dissolve
the injunction, and the refusal to have the complaint for
expropriation docketed were all in abuse of discretion and
excess of jurisdiction; that furthermore, venue was
improperly laid, because an action for prohibition is
personal in character, and neither petitioner nor any of the
respondents in said prohibition case were domiciled in
Quezon City. Petitioner Land Tenure Administration,
therefore, prayed that Judge Caluag be ordered by this
Court to refrain from proceeding with the prohibition case,
from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued
therein, from issuing orders of demolition of the tenant's
houses, and to allow the expropriation case to be docketed
and regularly proceeded with.
As we view it, two main questions are involved in these
cases:
(1) In G.R. L-18128: Did the Court of Appeals have
jurisdiction to lift, quash, and dissolve the preliminary writ
of injunction issued by Judge Caluag in the prohibition
case No. Q-5527 pending in his court?
(2) In G.R. L-18672: Did Judge Caluag act without or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the preliminary injunction in
the prohibition case?
As to the first issue, we are satisfied that the writ of
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
28842-R is null and void for want of jurisdiction. The
authority of said Court to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, injunction, certiorari and habeas corpus is
expressly limited by statute to their issuance in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction (Judiciary Act, sec. 30), and it has
been repeatedly ruled by us that the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to issue such writs must be based on the
existence of a right to appeal to it from the judgment on the
merits in the main case. Without such right of appeal, the
Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to interfere, for that
Court is purely a creature of statute.1 Since the issuance of
orders for execution after the judgment of ejectment had
become final are not appealable, as the Court of Appeals
itself has ruled,2 otherwise litigations would never end, and
since the prohibition case No. Q-5527 involved the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2616, an issue of
which the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance,
said Court clearly had no authority to interfere by
prerogative writ in either litigation, for lack of appellate
jurisdiction Judge Caluag of Quezon City was, therefore,
not bound by the writs so issued by the Court of Appeals.
On the second question, the preliminary injunction issued
by Judge Caluag was merely an incident to the main
(prohibition) case, and evidently had for its object to
prevent that the principal case and any remedy to be
granted therein should be rendered moot and nugatory by
the filing of the condemnation proceedings sought to be
prohibited. Issuance of the injunction was authorized by
section 7 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, dealing with
writs, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
SEC. 7. Expediting proceedings. Preliminary
injunction.
The court in which the petition is filed, or a judge
thereof, may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant a preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings.
Authority is likewise derived from section 6 of Rule 124,
concerning the powers and duties of courts.
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court
or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes
and other means necessary to carry into effect
may be employed by such court or officer.
That the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
2616 could be invoked as a defense in the expropriation
proceedings does not alter the right of respondent Tuason
& Company to invoke it in the prohibition case, without
awaiting the initiation of the condemnation case. In any
event, the issue of constitutionality would be like a
prejudicial question to the expropriation, as it would be a
waste of time and effort to appoint evaluation
commissioners and debate the market value of the
property sought to be condemned if it turned out that the
condemnation was illegal.
It is urged by amicus curiae that Courts of First Instance
have no jurisdiction to entertain actions assailing the
constitutionality of statutes or treaties, because section 10
of Article VIII of the Constitution prescribes that —
No treaty or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the members of the (Supreme)
Court.
This contention is, however, destroyed by the terms of
section 2 of Article VIII, wherein the Constitution itself
inhibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court —
of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of
error, as the law or the rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in —
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or executive
orders or regulations is in question (Emphasis
supplied).
Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior
courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in
cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.
Construing both provisions together, it is readily discerned
that the two-third vote of the Supreme Court, required by
section 10 of Article VIII, conditions only the decisions of
the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
It is true that, as argued by the petitioner Land Tenure
Administration, the mere fact that a statute is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its
enforcement enjoined. But the rule is not without
exceptions. In Cochiong vs. Dinglasan, 79 Phil. 125, this
Court quoted with approval from 28 Am. Jur. 369-371 the
rule that —
It is recognized, however, that an injunction will
lie to restrain the threatened enforcement of an
invalid law where the lawful use and enjoyment
of private property will be injuriously affected by
its enforcement ...,
and the petition for a writ of prohibition in Q-5527 Court of
First Instance of Quezon City pleads precisely this
threatened injury to the proprietary rights of Tuason &
Company, Inc., as owners of the Tatalon Estates. Whether
this injury is real or not must be decided on the evidence
submitted in that case, and we are in no position to resolve
it in the certiorari proceedings now before us. Our task
here is merely to determine absence or excess of
jurisdiction: and on the facts and applicable law we cannot
say that in the issuance of the preliminary injunction by the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City there was such
grave abuse of discretion as would constitute excess of
jurisdiction.
It may be added that the maintenance of the injunction
issued by Judge Caluag works no real prejudice at
present, not only because we cannot anticipate the final
decision of Judge Caluag on the issue of constitutionality,
but also because the Land Tenure Administration
confesses that it has only two million pesos available to
pay for property that, according to the proposed complaint
for expropriation, has an area of 1,096,849.50 square
meters with a reasonable assessed value of
P6,034,865.95. Plainly, the government is not now in a
position to take over the possession of the land since it
does not have the money that it must deposit as a
prerequisite to its entry (section 3 of Rule 69 on Eminent
Domain).
In moving for the lifting of the preliminary injunction and for
a stay of the ejectment proceedings, the Land Tenure
Administration and the other movants assume that, upon
filing of the condemnation petition, the land owner will be
barred from enforcing its final judgments of ejectment
against the possessors of the land, even if the
Government should not take over the possession of the
property involved. This view, in our opinion, is not
warranted. We see nothing in the terms of Republic Act
No. 2616 to justify the belief that the Legislature intended a
departure from the normal course prescribed for eminent
domain cases, where the rights of the owner of the land
may not be disturbed without previous deposit of the
provisional value of the property bought to be condemned.
The effectivity of section 4 of Republic Act 2616,
discontinuing ejectment proceedings against the present
occupants, and restraining any act of disposition of the
property, is justifiable only if the Government takes
possession of the land in question by depositing its value.
It needs no argument to show that by restraining the land
owner from enforcing even final judgments in his favor to
recover possession of his property, as well as from
disposing of it to persons of his choice, he is deprived of
the substance of ownership, and his title is left as an
empty shell. The land owner would then be deprived of
those attributes of ownership that give it value, and his
property is virtually taken from him without compensation
and in violation of the Constitution, particularly in view of
the fact that R.A. 2616 (unlike previous Acts of similar
character) does not even provide for a deposit of the
EN BANC
current rentals by the tenants during the pendency of the
proceedings (Cf. R.A. No. 1126, section 5). The Bill of
Rights, in requiring that "private property shall not be taken G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991
for public use without just compensation," and Article XIII,
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
section 4 in prescribing that "Congress may
authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the vs.
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
conveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit any disturbance
of proprietary rights without coetaneous payment of just
indemnity. Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991
proceedings for the benefit of tenants cannot, by itself
alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and
whether of possession, enjoyment, or disposition. And this
CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
is especially the case where final and executory judgments
of ejectment have been obtained against the occupants of vs.
the property.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform;
CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture;
Whether or not venue was correctly laid in the prohibition
case now pending in the Court of First Instance of Quezon LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education,
City is a question of law that does not affect jurisdiction,
Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as
and any resolution of the trial Court thereon is reviewable
by appeal and not by certiorari. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources;
VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: ORDOÑEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N.
DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS
(a) In Case G.R. No. L-18128, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
SANTOS, as Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V.
Court of Appeals et al., setting aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals in its case CA- RAMOS, as Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F.
G.R. No. 28842-R, the same being null andvoid for lack of
BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as
jurisdiction on the part of the Court to take cognizance of
said case; Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO
ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology;
(b) In Case G.R. No. L-18672, Republic of the Philippines
vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. et al., dismissing the petition JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry;
for certiorari, and denying the writs of certiorari and JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism;
injunction applied for.lawphil.net
ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health;
REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City is directed to
hear and resolve the prohibition case No. Q-5527 with all Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as
practicable dispatch. Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as
Head of the National Economic Development
Without costs. So ordered.
Authority, respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos
and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J.:p
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution
dated August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly as
both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the
assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions
of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees,
or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is
the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive official of the
Executive Department holds more positions than what is
allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more
than two positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the
government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the
boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in
effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed,
runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, 2 which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII
prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet,
along with the other public officials enumerated in the list
attached to the petitions as Annex “C” in G.R. No.
83815 and as Annex “B” in G.R. No. 83896 from holding
3 4
any other office or employment during their tenure. In
addition to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of
the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition
and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order
directing public respondents therein to cease and desist
from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or
multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987
Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances,
per diems and other forms of privileges and the like
appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling
public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and
all amounts or benefits that they may have received from
such positions.
Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines
charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted “absolute
and self-executing” provision of the 1987 Constitution, then
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing Section
13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B,
rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of
1987, 5 declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies
(undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold
other public office, including membership in the boards of
government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in
the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice
who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if
allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of
their respective positions; and that on the basis of this
Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987
or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27,
1987: promulgated Executive Order No. 284. 6
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to
both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as
they allegedly “lumped together” Section 13, Article VII and
the general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2),
Article I-XB. This “strained linkage” between the two
provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate
group of public officers –– one, the President and her
official family, and the other, public servants in general ––
allegedly “abolished the clearly separate, higher,
exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to
the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the
Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of
government expected to lead by example.” Article IX-B,
7
Section 7, par. (2) 8 provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice
DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated
9
and clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and
DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988, 10 being the first
official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of
Justice of Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7,
Article I-XB of the Constitution, involving the same subject
of appointments or designations of an appointive executive
official to positions other than his primary position, is
“reasonably valid and constitutionally firm,” and that
Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ
Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently
constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129,
series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988
construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not
applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which,
although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the
primary functions of the public official, but only to the
holding of multiple positions which are not related to or
necessarily included in the position of the public official
concerned (disparate positions).
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is
being challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article
VII other than those provided in the Constitution.
According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase “unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment
in Government are those provided in the Constitution,
namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII
thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the
prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil
Service Commission applies to officers and employees of
the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not
apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII
which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the
President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and
their deputies or assistants from holding dual or multiple
positions in the Government admits of certain exceptions.
The disagreement between petitioners and public
respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the
exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase
“unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” used in
Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly
provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-
President being allowed to become a Member of the
Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article
VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under
Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other
hand, maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII makes
reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as
Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2),
Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew,
thus: “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries.”
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought
to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose. 11
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants as members of the governing
bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time
legislative powers in this country were exercised by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law
authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created
agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and
controlled corporations created by presidential decrees
and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants were designated to
head or sit as members of the board with the
corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems,
allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these
instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public
officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes
of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in
government was strongly denounced on the floor of the
Batasang Pambansa. 12 This condemnation came in
reaction to the published report of the Commission on
Audit, entitled “1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on:
Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations, Self-
Governing Boards and Commissions” which carried as its
Figure No. 4 a “Roaster of Membership in Governing
Boards of Government-Owned and Controlled
Corporations as of December 31, 1983.”
Particularly odious and revolting to the people’s sense of
propriety and morality in government service were the data
contained therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member
of the governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental
agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R.
Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-
two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S.
Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14);
Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta and
Jose A. Roño of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto
O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven (11) each;
13
and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Peña of ten (10) each.
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the
serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It
was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the
overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986
Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the
people successfully unseated former President Marcos,
should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions
under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not
correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly
observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the
deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling
points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its
ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that
the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding
multiple positions in the government and collecting
unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would
be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although
Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different
phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question,
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family
in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of
Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the
Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public
officials or employees from holding other offices or
employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, “(N)o Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government . . .”. Under
Section 5(4), Article XVI, “(N)o member of the armed
forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed
in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries.” Even Section 7
(2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides
“(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government.”
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on
disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the
government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the
wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that “(T)he
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure.” In the latter provision, the
disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the
phrase “in the Government.” The prohibition imposed on
the President and his official family is therefore all-
embracing and covers both public and private office or
employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second
sentence provides: “They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.” These
sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not
similarly imposed on other public officials or employees
such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil
service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be
stricter with the President and his official family was also
succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after
Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor
deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry
between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in
the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the
Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented,
“We actually have to be stricter with the President and the
members of the Cabinet because they exercise more
powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on
them are called for because there is more possibility of
abuse in their case.” 14
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service
are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so
only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII
is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase “unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution” in Section 13,
Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987
Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as
respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the
framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other
offices or employment in the government during their
tenure. Respondents’ interpretation that Section 13 of
Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par.
(2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so
carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when
the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the
President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the
generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below
Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold
any other office or position in the government during their
tenure.
Moreover, respondents’ reading of the provisions in
question would render certain parts of the Constitution
inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the
Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is
allowed to hold other office or employment when so
authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective
public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is
absolutely ineligible “for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.”
Surely, to say that the phrase “unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution” found in Section 13, Article VII has
reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB would render
meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the
Cabinet, 15 and to act as President without relinquishing the
Vice-Presidency where the President shall not have been
chosen or fails to qualify. 16 Such absurd consequence can
be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under
consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB
providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13,
Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the
same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be
construed vis-à-vis Section 13, Article VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction
that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. 17 Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
18
the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together. 19
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which
20
may make the words idle and nugatory.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during their
tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with
equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13,
Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or
employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as
21
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The
phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution”
must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit:
the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7,
pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying
to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as required 22 by
the primary functions of said officials’ office. The reason is
that these posts do no comprise “any other office” within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on
said officials. 23 To characterize these posts otherwise
would lead to absurd consequences, among which are:
The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National
Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No.
115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President,
the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National
Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local
Government sit in this Council, which would then have no
reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The
respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries,
would also be prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the
Board of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth
Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), both of which are attached to his
department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither
can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair
these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the
Monetary Board. 24 Neither can their respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central
Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower ranking
employees in providing policy direction in the areas of
money, banking and credit. 25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have
intended such absurd consequences. A Constitution,
viewed as a continuously operative charter of government,
is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the
impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences,
if possible, should be avoided. 26
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is
not to be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of the concerned official’s office. The term ex-officio means
“from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority
derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position.” Ex-officio likewise denotes
an “act done in an official character, or as a consequence
of office, and without any other appointment or authority
than that conferred by the office.” 27 An ex-officio member
of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a
certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment. 28 To illustrate, by express provision of law,
the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is
the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports
Authority, 29 and the Light Rail Transit Authority. 30
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-
officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board, 31 thus: “An examination of
section 2 of the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that
for the chairman and members of the Board to qualify they
need only be designated by the respective department
heads. With the exception of the representative from the
private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to be designated
they must already be holding positions in the offices
mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does
not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs,
cannot, under the act, be designated a representative from
that office. The same is true with respect to the
representatives from the other offices. No
appointments are necessary. This is as it should be,
because the representatives so designated merely perform
duties in the Board in addition to those already performed
32
under their original appointments.”
The term “primary” used to describe “functions” refers to
the order of importance and thus means chief or principal
function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may
refer to the plural. 33 The additional duties must not only be
closely related to, but must be required by the official’s
primary functions. Examples of designations to positions
by virtue of one’s primary functions are the Secretaries of
Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary
Board, and the Secretary of Transportation
Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime
34
Industry Authority and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
If the functions required to be performed are merely
incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or
otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official,
such additional functions would fall under the purview of
“any other office” prohibited by the Constitution. An
example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a
member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to such
positions which confer on the cabinet official management
functions and/or monetary compensation, such as but not
limited to chairmanships or directorships in government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President,
Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their deputies or
assistants which are not inconsistent with those already
prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of
their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their
new respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized
in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the
demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and
coordination among the different offices in the Executive
Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of
executing and implementing laws affecting national
interest and general welfare and delivering basic services
to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the
President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. 35 Without these additional duties and functions
being assigned to the President and his official family to sit
and in the governing bodies or boards of governmental
agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by their primary functions,
they would be supervision, thereby deprived of the means
for control and resulting in an unwieldy and confused
bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional
duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition
embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, such additional duties or functions must
be required by the primary functions of the official
concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law, without receiving any
additional compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of
Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as
an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his
principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking
matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not
entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in
the form of a per them or an honorarium or an allowance,
or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is
designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on
the proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section
3 of the General Provisions, the exception “unless required
by the functions of his position,” 36 express reference to
certain high-ranking appointive public officials like
37
members of the Cabinet were made. Responding to a
query of Commissioner Blas Ople, Commissioner Monsod
pointed out that there are instances when although not
required by current law, membership of certain high-
ranking executive officials in other offices and
corporations is necessary by reason of said officials’
primary functions. The example given by Commissioner
38
Monsod was the Minister of Trade and Industry.
While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and
Ople may be used as authority for saying that additional
functions and duties flowing from the primary functions of
the official may be imposed upon him without offending the
constitutional prohibition under consideration, it cannot,
however, be taken as authority for saying that this
exception is by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB.
This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place
in the plenary session of September 27, 1986. Under
consideration then was Section 3 of Committee Resolution
No. 531 which was the proposed article on General
Provisions. 39 At that time, the article on the Civil Service
Commission had been approved on third reading on July
22, 1986, 40 while the article on the Executive Department,
containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had
also been earlier approved on third reading on August 26,
1986. 41It was only after the draft Constitution had
undergone reformatting and “styling” by the Committee on
Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became
Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded “Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position. . . .”
What was clearly being discussed then were general
principles which would serve as constitutional guidelines in
the absence of specific constitutional provisions on the
matter. What was primarily at issue and approved on that
occasion was the adoption of the qualified and delimited
phrase “primary functions” as the basis of an exception to
the general rule covering all appointive public officials. Had
the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the
specific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it could
have re-worded said Section 13 to conform to the wider
exceptions provided in then Section 3 of the proposed
general Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par. (2) of
Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to
the President and his official family is by reason of the
legal principles governing additional functions and duties
of public officials rather than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2,
Article IX-B At any rate, we have made it clear that only the
additional functions and duties “required,” as opposed to
“allowed,” by the primary functions may be considered as
not constituting “any other office.”
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention
in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail 42 as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes
at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.” 43
The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding
thereof. 44
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points,
that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices
or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation
of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid
down for all appointive officials should be considered as
mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’
understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article
VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987
is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations, Executive
Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided
in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical
consequences that will result from a strict application of the
prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the
operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet
members would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-
officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by
virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-
officio posts held by the executive official concerned
without additional compensation as provided by law and as

required by the primary functions of his office do not fall
under the definition of “any other office” within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With
respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of
legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical
consequences are more apparent than real. Being head of
an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a
full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge,
skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived
from a department head’s ability and expertise, he should
be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other governmental offices or
employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his
efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and
inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from this
concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise,
particularly at this stage of our national and economic
development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be
gained from a department head spreading himself too thin
and taking in more than what he can handle.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally
infirm, the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran,
Jr., Secretary of Local Government 45 Luis Santos,
Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary
of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the
Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their
other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,
other named respondents, the petitions have become
represented by its Chairman F’LONG MIGUEL
moot and academic as they are no longer occupying the M. LUMAYONG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA,
positions complained of. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, JAIME TADEO,
RENATO R. CONSTANTINO, JR., F’LONG
During their tenure in the questioned positions, AGUSTIN M. DABIE, ROBERTO P. AMLOY,
respondents may be considered de facto officers and as RAQIM L. DABIE, SIMEON H. DOLOJO,
IMELDA M. GANDON, LENY B. GUSANAN,
such entitled to emoluments for actual services MARCELO L. GUSANAN, QUINTOL A.
rendered. 46
It has been held that “in cases where there is LABUAYAN, LOMINGGES D. LAWAY, BENITA
P. TACUAYAN, minors JOLY L. BUGOY,
no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has represented by his father UNDERO D. BUGOY,
had possession of the office and has discharged the duties ROGER M. DADING, represented by his father
ANTONIO L. DADING, ROMY M. LAGARO,
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of represented by his father TOTING A. LAGARO,
the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the MIKENY JONG B. LUMAYONG, represented by
his father MIGUEL M. LUMAYONG, RENE T.
salary, fees and other compensations attached to the MIGUEL, represented by his mother EDITHA T.
office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on MIGUEL, ALDEMAR L. SAL, represented by his
father DANNY M. SAL, DAISY RECARSE,
equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public
represented by her mother LYDIA S. SANTOS,
should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and EDWARD M. EMUY, ALAN P. MAMPARAIR,
MARIO L. MANGCAL, ALDEN S. TUSAN,
then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
AMPARO S. YAP, VIRGILIO CULAR, MARVIC
services. 47 Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments M.V.F. LEONEN, JULIA REGINA CULAR, GIAN
received by the respondents by virtue of actual services CARLO CULAR, VIRGILIO CULAR, JR.,
represented by their father VIRGILIO CULAR,
rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be PAUL ANTONIO P. VILLAMOR, represented by
retained by them. his parents JOSE VILLAMOR and ELIZABETH
PUA-VILLAMOR, ANA GININA R. TALJA,
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, represented by her father MARIO JOSE B.
the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is TALJA, SHARMAINE R. CUNANAN,
represented by her father ALFREDO M.
hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside. CUNANAN, ANTONIO JOSE A. VITUG III,
SO ORDERED. represented by his mother ANNALIZA A. VITUG,
LEAN D. NARVADEZ, represented by his father
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, MANUEL E. NARVADEZ, JR., ROSERIO
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado MARALAG LINGATING, represented by her
father RIO OLIMPIO A. LINGATING, MARIO
and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. JOSE B. TALJA, DAVID E. DE VERA, MARIA
MILAGROS L. SAN JOSE, SR., SUSAN O.
BOLANIO, OND, LOLITA G. DEMONTEVERDE,
EN BANC BENJIE L. NEQUINTO,[1] ROSE LILIA S.
ROMANO, ROBERTO S. VERZOLA,
EDUARDO AURELIO C. REYES, LEAN LOUEL
A. PERIA, represented by his father ELPIDIO V.
PERIA,[2] GREEN FORUM PHILIPPINES,
[G.R. No. 127882. January 27, 2004] GREEN FORUM WESTERN VISAYAS, (GF-
WV), ENVIRONMETAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
 CENTER (ELAC), PHILIPPINE KAISAHAN accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign- cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements
TUNGO SA KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or and permits.[32]
REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN agreements involving either technical or financial
(KAISAHAN),[3] KAISAHAN TUNGO SA assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on
KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two
REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN), recommendation of the Secretary, the President may newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took
PARTNERSHIP FOR AGRARIAN REFORM and execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such effect.[33]
RURAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC. proposals, the President shall consider the real
(PARRDS), PHILIPPINE PART`NERSHIP FOR contributions to the economic growth and general welfare Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN of the country that will be realized, as well as the however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into
an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in
RESOURCES IN THE RURAL AREAS, INC. development and use of local scientific and technical
(PHILDHRRA), WOMEN’S LEGAL BUREAU resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
(WLB), CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, Cotabato.[34]
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, INC. (CADI), large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O.
UPLAND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (UDI), those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-
KINAIYAHAN FOUNDATION, INC., SENTRO resources exploration, development, and utilization 23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules
NG ALTERNATIBONG LINGAP PANLIGAL involving a committed capital investment in a single mining and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed
(SALIGAN), LEGAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on
RESOURCES CENTER, INC. Currency (US $50,000,000.00).[7] December 20, 1996.
(LRC), petitioners, vs. VICTOR O. RAMOS,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR
approved R.A. No. 7942 to “govern the exploration,
(DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR, stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No.
development, utilization and processing of all mineral
MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB- 96-40,[35] giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt[36] to
resources.”[8] R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral
DENR), RUBEN TORRES, EXECUTIVE act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or
agreements for mining operations,[9] outlines the procedure
SECRETARY, and WMC (PHILIPPINES),
for their filing and approval,[10] assignment/transfer[11] and act on petitioners’ letter.[37]
[4]
INC. respondents.
withdrawal,[12] and fixes their terms.[13] Similar provisions Petitioners thus filed the present petition for
govern financial or technical assistance agreements.[14] prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary
DECISION restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing
The law prescribes the qualifications of
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: contractors[15] and grants them certain rights, including of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been
timber,[16] water[17] and easement[18] rights, and the right to filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares,[38] 64 of
possess explosives.[19] Surface owners, occupants, or which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations
The present petition for mandamus and prohibition concessionaires are forbidden from preventing holders of covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by
assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. mining rights from entering private lands and concession a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore
7942,[5] otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT areas.[20] A procedure for the settlement of conflicts is areas.[39]
OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and likewise provided for.[21]
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) The Act restricts the conditions for without or in excess of jurisdiction:
Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and exploration,[22] quarry[23] and other[24] permits. It regulates I
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on the transport, sale and processing of minerals,[25] and
March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and promotes the development of mining communities, science
WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized and mining technology,[26] and safety and environmental x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative
under Philippine laws. protection.[27] Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it allows fully foreign
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino The government’s share in the agreements is owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit
issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279[6] authorizing the spelled out and allocated,[28] taxes and fees are mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section 2,
DENR Secretary to imposed,[29] incentives granted.[30] Aside from penalizing paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution;
certain acts,[31] the law likewise specifies grounds for the
 II
x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it allows the taking of
private property without the determination of public use
and for just compensation;
III
x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it violates Sec. 1, Art. III
of the Constitution;
IV
x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it allows enjoyment by
foreign citizens as well as fully foreign owned corporations
of the nation’s marine wealth contrary to Section 2,
paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
V transfer and registration of the FTAA to Sagittarius were
x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it allows priority to
foreign and fully foreign owned corporations in the
exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources contrary to Article XII of the Constitution;
VI
x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it allows the inequitable
sharing of wealth contrary to Sections [sic] 1, paragraph 1,
and Section 2, paragraph 4[,] [Article XII] of the
Constitution;
VII
x x x in recommending approval of and implementing the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between
the President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. because the
same is illegal and unconstitutional.[40]
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on
any application for Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or
Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and
void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar
administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and
void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as
unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.[41]
Impleaded as public respondents are Ruben Torres,
the then Executive Secretary, Victor O. Ramos, the then
DENR Secretary, and Horacio Ramos, Director of the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the DENR. Also
impleaded is private respondent WMCP, which entered
into the assailed FTAA with the Philippine
Government. WMCP is owned by WMC Resources
International Pty., Ltd. (WMC), “a wholly owned subsidiary
of Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited, a publicly
listed major Australian mining and exploration
company.”[42] By WMCP’s information, “it is a 100% owned
subsidiary of WMC LIMITED.”[43]
Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners’
contentions, argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry
have not been met and that the petition does not comply
with the criteria for prohibition and
mandamus. Additionally, respondent WMCP argues that
there has been a violation of the rule on hierarchy of
courts.
After petitioners filed their reply, this Court granted
due course to the petition. The parties have since filed
their respective memoranda.
WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated
September 25, 2002 alleging that on January 23, 2001,
WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines,
Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine
laws.[44] WMCP was subsequently renamed “Tampakan
Mineral Resources Corporation.”[45] WMCP claims that at
least 60% of the equity of Sagittarius is owned by Filipinos
and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is
owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian
company.[46] It further claims that by such sale and transfer
of shares, “WMCP has ceased to be connected in any way
with WMC.”[47]
By virtue of such sale and transfer, the DENR
Secretary, by Order of December 18, 2001,[48] approved
the transfer and registration of the subject FTAA from
WMCP to Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was appealed
by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto) to the
Office of the President which upheld it by Decision of July
23, 2002.[49] Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the Office of the President by Resolution of
November 12, 2002,[50] Lepanto filed a petition for
review[51] before the Court of Appeals. Incidentally, two
other petitions for review related to the approval of the
recently resolved by this Court.[52]
It bears stressing that this case has not been
rendered moot either by the transfer and registration of the
FTAA to a Filipino-owned corporation or by the non-
issuance of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction to stay the above-said July 23, 2002 decision of
the Office of the President.[53] The validity of the transfer
remains in dispute and awaits final judicial
determination. This assumes, of course, that such transfer
cures the FTAA’s alleged unconstitutionality, on which
question judgment is reserved.
WMCP also points out that the original claimowners
of the major mineralized areas included in the WMCP
FTAA, namely, Sagittarius, Tampakan Mining Corporation,
and Southcot Mining Corporation, are all Filipino-owned
corporations,[54] each of which was a holder of an approved
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement awarded in 1994,
albeit their respective mineral claims were subsumed in
the WMCP FTAA;[55] and that these three companies are
the same companies that consolidated their interests in
Sagittarius to whom WMC sold its 100% equity in
WMCP.[56]WMCP concludes that in the event that the
FTAA is invalidated, the MPSAs of the three corporations
would be revived and the mineral claims would revert to
their original claimants.[57]
These circumstances, while informative, are hardly
significant in the resolution of this case, it involving the
validity of the FTAA, not the possible consequences of its
invalidation.
Of the above-enumerated seven grounds cited by
petitioners, as will be shown later, only the first and the last
need be delved into; in the latter, the discussion shall dwell
only insofar as it questions the effectivity of E. O. No. 279
by virtue of which order the questioned FTAA was forged.
I result of the governmental act that is being
Before going into the substantive issues, the
procedural questions posed by respondents shall first be
tackled.
REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present:
(1) The existence of an actual
appropriate case;
(2) A personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded
at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) The constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case. [58]
Respondents claim that the first three requisites are
not present.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that
“(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.” The power of judicial
review, therefore, is limited to the determination of actual
cases and controversies.[59]
An actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,[60] lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.[61] The power does not extend to hypothetical
questions[62] since any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.[63]
“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
challenged,[64] alleging more than a generalized
grievance.[65] The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”[66] Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation
of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.[67]
Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among
them are La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, Inc., a
farmers and indigenous people’s cooperative organized
under Philippine laws representing a community actually
and affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of
said cooperative,[68] as well as other residents of areas
also affected by the mining activities of WMCP.[69] These
petitioners have standing to raise the constitutionality of
the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and
substantial injury. They claim that they would suffer
“irremediable displacement”[70] as a result of the
implementation of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct
mining activities in their area of residence. They thus meet
the appropriate case requirement as they assert an
interest adverse to that of respondents who, on the other
hand, insist on the FTAA’s validity.
In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners
also have standing to assail the validity of E.O. No. 279, by
authority of which the FTAA was executed.
Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being
strangers to the FTAA, cannot sue either or both
contracting parties to annul it.[71] In other words, they
contend that petitioners are not real parties in interest in an
action for the annulment of contract.
Public respondents’ contention fails. The present
action is not merely one for annulment of contract but for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioners allege that public
respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the FTAA, which they submit is
unconstitutional. As the case involves constitutional
questions, this Court is not concerned with whether
petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether
they have legal standing. As held in Kilosbayan v.
Morato:[72]
x x x. “It is important to note . . . that standing because of
its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the
merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas.[”] (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 328 [1985])
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because
in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or by
official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers
or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence,
the question in standing is whether such parties have
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633
[1962].)
As earlier stated, petitioners meet this requirement.
 The challenge against the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 likewise fulfills the requisites
of justiciability. Although these laws were not in force
when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as
to their validity is ripe for adjudication.
The WMCP FTAA provides:
14.3 Future Legislation
Any term and condition more
favourable to Financial &Technical
Assistance Agreement contractors
resulting from repeal or amendment of
any existing law or regulation or from
the enactment of a law, regulation or
administrative order shall be
considered a part of this Agreement.
It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40
contain provisions that are more favorable to WMCP,
hence, these laws, to the extent that they are favorable to
WMCP, govern the FTAA.
In addition, R.A. No. 7942 explicitly makes certain
provisions apply to pre-existing agreements.
SEC. 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying
Rights. – x x x That the provisions of Chapter XIV on
government share in mineral production-sharing
agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act
shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or
contractor unless the mining lessee or contractor indicates
his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of said
provisions x x x Provided, finally, That such
leases, production-sharing agreements, financial or
technical assistance agreements shall comply with the
applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.
As there is no suggestion that WMCP has indicated its
intention not to avail of the provisions of Chapter XVI of
R.A. No. 7942, it can safely be presumed that they apply
to the WMCP FTAA.
Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for
judicial review – that the exercise of the review is pleaded
at the earliest opportunity – WMCP points out that the
petition was filed only almost two years after the execution
of the FTAA, hence, not raised at the earliest opportunity.
The third requisite should not be taken to mean that
the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately
after the execution of the state action complained of. That
the question of constitutionality has not been raised before
is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised
later.[73] A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise
unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the
mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to
challenge the same.
PROPRIETY OF PROHIBITION
AND MANDAMUS
Before the effectivity in July 1997 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 65 read:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings
of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant to desist from further proceeding in the action or
matter specified therein.
Prohibition is a preventive remedy.[74] It seeks a
judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing
with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.[75]
The petition for prohibition at bar is thus an
appropriate remedy. While the execution of the contract
itself may be fait accompli, its implementation is not. Public
respondents, in behalf of the Government, have
obligations to fulfill under said contract. Petitioners seek to
prevent them from fulfilling such obligations on the theory
that the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.
The propriety of a petition for prohibition being
upheld, discussion of the propriety of the mandamus
aspect of the petition is rendered unnecessary.
HIERARCHY OF COURTS
The contention that the filing of this petition violated
the rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The
rule has been explained thus:
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is
the lower court that should initially pass upon the issues of
a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the
hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal
issues or those of first impression, which are the proper
subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a
procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to
improve the administration of justice.
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the
hierarchy of courts. Although this Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give a party
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort
to this Court’s primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall
be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify such invocation. We
held in People v. Cuaresma that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only where there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s
time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Court’s docket x x
x.[76] [Emphasis supplied.]
The repercussions of the issues in this case on the
Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as
well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and
compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in
the first instance.
In all events, this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case or legal standing when
paramount public interest is involved.[77]When the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public, this
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.[78]
II
Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 did not take
effect because its supposed date of effectivity came after
President Aquino had already lost her legislative powers
under the Provisional Constitution.
And they likewise claim that the WMC FTAA, which
was entered into pursuant to E.O. No. 279, violates
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution because, among
other reasons:
(1) It allows foreign-owned companies to
extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to
the State in the exploitation, development, and utilization
of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, and even
permits foreign owned companies to “operate and
manage mining activities.”
(2) It allows foreign-owned companies to
extend both technical and financial assistance, instead of
“either technical or financial assistance.”
To appreciate the import of these issues, a visit to
the history of the pertinent constitutional provision, the
concepts contained therein, and the laws enacted
pursuant thereto, is in order.
Section 2, Article XII reads in full:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State. The State may directly undertake such activities
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by
law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements,
the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
THE SPANISH REGIME
AND THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE
The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the
Regalian doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into
these Islands, this feudal concept is based on the State’s
power of dominium, which is the capacity of the State to
own or acquire property.[79]
In its broad sense, the term “jura regalia” refers to royal
rights, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his
prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the
sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right
of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed
during feudal times by the king as the sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands
was originally held by the King, and while the use of lands
was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them
under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the
title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the
original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source
of title, and from him all lands were held. The theory
of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural
fruit of conquest.[80]
The Philippines having passed to Spain by virtue of
discovery and conquest,[81] earlier Spanish decrees
declared that “all lands were held from the Crown.”[82]
The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but
also to “all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels
of the earth.”[83] Spain, in particular, recognized the unique
value of natural resources, viewing them, especially
minerals, as an abundant source of revenue to finance its
wars against other nations.[84] Mining laws during the
Spanish regime reflected this perspective.[85]
THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND
THE CONCESSION REGIME
By the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain
ceded “the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands” to
the United States. The Philippines was hence governed
by means of organic acts that were in the nature of
charters serving as a Constitution of the occupied territory
from 1900 to 1935.[86] Among the principal organic acts of
the Philippines was the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
more commonly known as the Philippine Bill of 1902,
through which the United States Congress assumed the
administration of the Philippine Islands.[87] Section 20 of
said Bill reserved the disposition of mineral lands of the
public domain from sale. Section 21 thereof allowed the
free and open exploration, occupation and purchase of
mineral deposits not only to citizens of the Philippine
Islands but to those of the United States as well:
Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands
in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed,
are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase, and the land in which they are
found, to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the
United States or of said Islands: Provided, That when on
any lands in said Islands entered and occupied as
agricultural lands under the provisions of this Act, but not
patented, mineral deposits have been found, the working
of such mineral deposits is forbidden until the person,
association, or corporation who or which has entered and
is occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government
of said Islands such additional sum or sums as will make
the total amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in
which said deposits are located equal to the amount
charged by the Government for the same as mineral
claims.
Unlike Spain, the United States considered natural
resources as a source of wealth for its nationals and saw
fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore
and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to
private mineral lands.[88] A person who acquired
ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to
the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even
the State, from exploiting minerals within his
property.[89] Thus, earlier jurisprudence[90] held that:
A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and
kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of
the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United
States of the present and exclusive possession of the
lands located, and this exclusive right of possession and
enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. x
x x.
x x x.
The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a
valid mineral location perfects his claim and his location
not only against third persons, but also against the
Government. x x x. [Italics in the original.]
The Regalian doctrine and the American system,
therefore, differ in one essential respect. Under the
Regalian theory, mineral rights are not included in a grant
of land by the state; under the American doctrine, mineral
rights are included in a grant of land by the government.[91]
Section 21 also made possible the concession
(frequently styled “permit”, license” or
“lease”)[92] system.[93] This was the traditional regime
imposed by the colonial administrators for the exploitation
of natural resources in the extractive sector (petroleum,
hard minerals, timber, etc.).[94]
Under the concession system, the concessionaire
makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given
area.[95] Thus, the concession amounts to complete control
by the concessionaire over the country’s natural resource,
for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a
particular resource at the point of extraction.[96] In
consideration for the right to exploit a natural resource, the
concessionaire either pays rent or royalty, which is a fixed
percentage of the gross proceeds.[97]
Later statutory enactments by the legislative bodies
set up in the Philippines adopted the contractual
framework of the concession.[98] For instance, Act No.
2932,[99] approved on August 31, 1920, which provided for
the exploration, location, and lease of lands containing
petroleum and other mineral oils and gas in the
Philippines, and Act No. 2719,[100] approved on May 14,
1917, which provided for the leasing and development of
coal lands in the Philippines, both utilized the concession
system.[101]
THE 1935 CONSTITUTION AND THE
NATIONALIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
By the Act of United States Congress of March 24,
1934, popularly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the
People of the Philippine Islands were authorized to adopt a
constitution.[102] On July 30, 1934, the Constitutional
Convention met for the purpose of drafting a constitution,
and the Constitution subsequently drafted was approved
by the Convention on February 8, 1935.[103] The
Constitution was submitted to the President of the United
States on March 18, 1935.[104] On March 23, 1935, the
President of the United States certified that the
Constitution conformed substantially with the provisions of
the Act of Congress approved on March 24, 1934.[105] On
May 14, 1935, the Constitution was ratified by the Filipino
people.[106]
The 1935 Constitution adopted the Regalian
doctrine, declaring all natural resources of the Philippines,
including mineral lands and minerals, to be property
belonging to the State.[107] As adopted in a republican
system, the medieval concept of jura regalia is stripped of
royal overtones and ownership of the land is vested in the
State.[108]
Section 1, Article XIII, on Conservation and
Utilization of Natural Resources, of the 1935 Constitution
provided:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.
The nationalization and conservation of the natural
resources of the country was one of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention.[109] One delegate relates:
There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention
in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural
resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen
as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the
state’s power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates of the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept
of State ownership of land and natural resources was
introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not
certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the
Regalian doctrine.
The adoption of the principle of state ownership of the
natural resources and of the Regalian doctrine was
considered to be a necessary starting point for the plan of
nationalizing and conserving the natural resources of the
country. For with the establishment of the principle of state
ownership of the natural resources, it would not be hard to
secure the recognition of the power of the State to control
their disposition, exploitation, development or
utilization.[110]
The nationalization of the natural resources was
intended (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino
posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense,
helping prevent the extension to the country of foreign
control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to
avoid making the Philippines a source of international
conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security
and independence.[111]
The same Section 1, Article XIII also adopted the
concession system, expressly permitting the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources. Grants, however, were limited to Filipinos or
entities at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipinos.
The swell of nationalism that suffused the 1935
Constitution was radically diluted when on November
1946, the Parity Amendment, which came in the form of an
“Ordinance Appended to the Constitution,” was ratified in a
plebiscite.[112] The Amendment extended, from July 4,
1946 to July 3, 1974, the right to utilize and exploit our
natural resources to citizens of the United States and
business enterprises owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by citizens of the United States:[113]
Notwithstanding the provision of section one, Article
Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the
foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the
Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the
Philippines with the President of the United States on the
fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven
hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond
the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the
disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines, and the
operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be
open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of
business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same
manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed
upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the
Philippines.
The Parity Amendment was subsequently modified
by the 1954 Revised Trade Agreement, also known as the
Laurel-Langley Agreement, embodied in Republic Act No.
1355.[114]
THE PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949
AND THE CONCESSION SYSTEM
In the meantime, Republic Act No. 387,[115] also
known as the Petroleum Act of 1949, was approved on
June 18, 1949.
The Petroleum Act of 1949 employed the
concession system for the exploitation of the nation’s
petroleum resources. Among the kinds of concessions it
sanctioned were exploration and exploitation concessions,
which respectively granted to the concessionaire the
exclusive right to explore for[116] or develop[117] petroleum
within specified areas.
Concessions may be granted only to duly qualified
persons[118] who have sufficient finances, organization,
resources, technical competence, and skills necessary to
conduct the operations to be undertaken.[119]
Nevertheless, the Government reserved the right to
undertake such work itself.[120] This proceeded from the
theory that all natural deposits or occurrences of petroleum
or natural gas in public and/or private lands in the
Philippines belong to the State.[121] Exploration and
exploitation concessions did not confer upon the
concessionaire ownership over the petroleum lands and
petroleum deposits.[122] However, they did grant
concessionaires the right to explore, develop, exploit, and
utilize them for the period and under the conditions
determined by the law.[123]
Concessions were granted at the complete risk of
the concessionaire; the Government did not guarantee the
existence of petroleum or undertake, in any case, title
warranty.[124]
Concessionaires were required to submit information
as maybe required by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, including reports of geological and
geophysical examinations, as well as production
reports.[125] Exploration[126] and
exploitation[127] concessionaires were also required to
submit work programs.
Exploitation concessionaires, in particular, were
obliged to pay an annual exploitation tax,[128] the object of
which is to induce the concessionaire to actually produce
petroleum, and not simply to sit on the concession without
developing or exploiting it.[129] These concessionaires were
also bound to pay the Government royalty, which was not
less than 12½% of the petroleum produced and saved,
less that consumed in the operations of the
concessionaire.[130] Under Article 66, R.A. No. 387, the
exploitation tax may be credited against the royalties so
that if the concessionaire shall be actually producing
enough oil, it would not actually be paying the exploitation
tax.[131]
Failure to pay the annual exploitation tax for two
consecutive years,[132] or the royalty due to the
Government within one year from the date it becomes
due,[133] constituted grounds for the cancellation of the
concession. In case of delay in the payment of the taxes
or royalty imposed by the law or by the concession, a
surcharge of 1% per month is exacted until the same are
paid.[134]
As a rule, title rights to all equipment and structures
that the concessionaire placed on the land belong to the
exploration or exploitation concessionaire.[135] Upon
termination of such concession, the concessionaire had a
right to remove the same.[136]
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
was tasked with carrying out the provisions of the law,
through the Director of Mines, who acted under the
Secretary’s immediate supervision and control.[137] The Act
granted the Secretary the authority to inspect any
operation of the concessionaire and to examine all the
books and accounts pertaining to operations or conditions
related to payment of taxes and royalties.[138]
The same law authorized the Secretary to create an
Administration Unit and a Technical Board.[139] The
Administration Unit was charged, inter alia, with the
enforcement of the provisions of the law.[140] The Technical
Board had, among other functions, the duty to check on
the performance of concessionaires and to determine
whether the obligations imposed by the Act and its
implementing regulations were being complied with.[141]
Victorio Mario A. Dimagiba, Chief Legal Officer of
the Bureau of Energy Development, analyzed the benefits
and drawbacks of the concession system insofar as it
applied to the petroleum industry:
Advantages of Concession. Whether it emphasizes
income tax or royalty, the most positive aspect of the
concession system is that the State’s financial involvement
is virtually risk free and administration is simple and
comparatively low in cost. Furthermore, if there is a
competitive allocation of the resource leading to bedrock of the colonial system in the exploitation of natural
substantial bonuses and/or greater royalty coupled with a resources.[143]
relatively high level of taxation, revenue accruing to the
State under the concession system may compare
Eventually, the concession system failed for reasons
favorably with other financial arrangements.
explained by Dimagiba:
Disadvantages of Concession. There are, however, major
Notwithstanding the good intentions of the Petroleum Act
negative aspects to this system. Because the
of 1949, the concession system could not have properly
Government’s role in the traditional concession is passive,
spurred sustained oil exploration activities in the country,
it is at a distinct disadvantage in managing and developing
since it assumed that such a capital-intensive, high risk
policy for the nation’s petroleum resource. This is true for
venture could be successfully undertaken by a single
several reasons. First, even though most concession
individual or a small company. In effect, concessionaires’
agreements contain covenants requiring diligence in
funds were easily exhausted. Moreover, since the
operations and production, this establishes only an indirect
concession system practically closed its doors to
and passive control of the host country in resource
interested foreign investors, local capital was stretched to
development. Second, and more importantly, the fact that
the limits. The old system also failed to consider the highly
the host country does not directly participate in resource
sophisticated technology and expertise required, which
management decisions inhibits its ability to train and
would be available only to multinational companies.[144]
employ its nationals in petroleum development. This factor
could delay or prevent the country from effectively
engaging in the development of its resources. Lastly, a A shift to a new regime for the development of
direct role in management is usually necessary in order to natural resources thus seemed imminent.
obtain a knowledge of the international petroleum industry
which is important to an appreciation of the host country’s
resources in relation to those of other countries.[142]
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 87, THE 1973
CONSTITUTION AND THE SERVICE CONTRACT
Other liabilities of the system have also been noted:
SYSTEM
x x x there are functional implications which give the
concessionaire great economic power arising from its
The promulgation on December 31, 1972 of
exclusive equity holding. This includes, first, appropriation
Presidential Decree No. 87,[145] otherwise known as THE
of the returns of the undertaking, subject to a modest
OIL EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
royalty; second, exclusive management of the project;
1972 signaled such a transformation. P.D. No. 87
third, control of production of the natural resource, such as
permitted the government to explore for and produce
volume of production, expansion, research and
indigenous petroleum through “service contracts.”[146]
development; and fourth, exclusive responsibility for
downstream operations, like processing, marketing, and “Service contracts” is a term that assumes varying
distribution. In short, even if nominally, the state is the meanings to different people, and it has carried many
sovereign and owner of the natural resource being names in different countries, like “work contracts” in
exploited, it has been shorn of all elements of control over Indonesia, “concession agreements” in Africa, “production-
such natural resource because of the exclusive nature of sharing agreements” in the Middle East, and “participation
the contractual regime of the concession. The concession agreements” in Latin America.[147] A functional definition of
system, investing as it does ownership of natural “service contracts” in the Philippines is provided as follows:
resources, constitutes a consistent inconsistency with the
principle embodied in our Constitution that natural
resources belong to the state and shall not be alienated, A service contract is a contractual arrangement for
not to mention the fact that the concession was the engaging in the exploitation and development of
petroleum, mineral, energy, land and other natural
resources by which a government or its agency, or a
private person granted a right or privilege by the
government authorizes the other party (service contractor)
to engage or participate in the exercise of such right or the
enjoyment of the privilege, in that the latter provides
financial or technical resources, undertakes the
exploitation or production of a given resource, or directly
manages the productive enterprise, operations of the
exploration and exploitation of the resources or the
disposition of marketing or resources.[148]
In a service contract under P.D. No. 87, service and
technology are furnished by the service contractor for
which it shall be entitled to the stipulated service
fee.[149] The contractor must be technically competent and
financially capable to undertake the operations required in
the contract.[150]
Financing is supposed to be provided by the
Government to which all petroleum produced
belongs.[151] In case the Government is unable to finance
petroleum exploration operations, the contractor may
furnish services, technology and financing, and the
proceeds of sale of the petroleum produced under the
contract shall be the source of funds for payment of the
service fee and the operating expenses due the
contractor.[152] The contractor shall undertake, manage and
execute petroleum operations, subject to the government
overseeing the management of the operations.[153] The
contractor provides all necessary services and technology
and the requisite financing, performs the exploration work
obligations, and assumes all exploration risks such that if
no petroleum is produced, it will not be entitled to
reimbursement.[154] Once petroleum in commercial
quantity is discovered, the contractor shall operate the field
on behalf of the government.[155]
P.D. No. 87 prescribed minimum terms and
conditions for every service contract.[156] It also granted the
contractor certain privileges, including exemption from
taxes and payment of tariff duties,[157] and permitted the
repatriation of capital and retention of profits abroad.[158]
Ostensibly, the service contract system had certain
advantages over the concession regime.[159] It has been
opined, though, that, in the Philippines, our concept of a
service contract, at least in the petroleum industry, was
basically a concession regime with a production-sharing
element.[160]
On January 17, 1973, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new
Constitution.[161] Article XIV on the National Economy and
Patrimony contained provisions similar to the 1935
Constitution with regard to Filipino participation in the
nation’s natural resources. Section 8, Article XIV thereof
provides:
SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power,
in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.
While Section 9 of the same Article maintained the
Filipino-only policy in the enjoyment of natural resources, it
also allowed Filipinos, upon authority of the Batasang
Pambansa, to enter into service contracts with any person
or entity for the exploration or utilization of natural
resources.
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of
the Philippines shall be limited to citizens, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang
Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such
citizens, corporations or associations to enter into service
contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance with any person or entity for the
exploration, or utilization of any of the natural
resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance are hereby recognized as such. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The concept of service contracts, according to one
delegate, was borrowed from the methods followed by
India, Pakistan and especially Indonesia in the exploration
of petroleum and mineral oils.[162] The provision allowing
such contracts, according to another, was intended to
“enhance the proper development of our natural resources
since Filipino citizens lack the needed capital and technical
know-how which are essential in the proper exploration,
development and exploitation of the natural resources of
the country.”[163]
The original idea was to authorize the government,
not private entities, to enter into service contracts with
foreign entities.[164] As finally approved, however, a citizen
or private entity could be allowed by the National Assembly
to enter into such service contract.[165] The prior approval of
the National Assembly was deemed sufficient to protect
the national interest.[166] Notably, none of the laws allowing
service contracts were passed by the Batasang
Pambansa. Indeed, all of them were enacted by
presidential decree.
On March 13, 1973, shortly after the ratification of
the new Constitution, the President promulgated
Presidential Decree No. 151.[167] The law allowed Filipino
citizens or entities which have acquired lands of the public
domain or which own, hold or control such lands to enter
into service contracts for financial, technical, management
or other forms of assistance with any foreign persons or
entity for the exploration, development, exploitation or
utilization of said lands.[168]
Presidential Decree No. 463,[169] also known as THE
MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT DECREE OF
1974, was enacted on May 17, 1974. Section 44 of the
decree, as amended, provided that a lessee of a mining
claim may enter into a service contract with a qualified
domestic or foreign contractor for the exploration,
development and exploitation of his claims and the
processing and marketing of the product thereof.
Presidential Decree No. 704[170] (THE FISHERIES
DECREE OF 1975), approved on May 16, 1975, allowed
Filipinos engaged in commercial fishing to enter into
contracts for financial, technical or other forms of
assistance with any foreign person, corporation or entity
for the production, storage, marketing and processing of
fish and fishery/aquatic products.[171]
Presidential Decree No. 705[172] (THE REVISED
FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES), approved on
May 19, 1975, allowed “forest products licensees, lessees,
or permitees to enter into service contracts for financial,
technical, management, or other forms of assistance . .
. with any foreign person or entity for the exploration,
development, exploitation or utilization of the forest
resources.”[173]
Yet another law allowing service contracts, this time
for geothermal resources, was Presidential Decree No.
1442,[174] which was signed into law on June 11,
1978. Section 1 thereof authorized the Government to
enter into service contracts for the exploration, exploitation
and development of geothermal resources with a foreign
contractor who must be technically and financially capable
of undertaking the operations required in the service
contract.
Thus, virtually the entire range of the country’s
natural resources –from petroleum and minerals to
geothermal energy, from public lands and forest resources
to fishery products – was well covered by apparent legal
authority to engage in the direct participation or
involvement of foreign persons or corporations (otherwise
disqualified) in the exploration and utilization of natural
resources through service contracts.[175]
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND TECHNICAL
OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS
After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, Corazon
C. Aquino took the reins of power under a revolutionary
government. On March 25, 1986, President Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 3,[176]promulgating the Provisional
Constitution, more popularly referred to as the Freedom
Constitution. By authority of the same Proclamation, the
President created a Constitutional Commission
(CONCOM) to draft a new constitution, which took effect
on the date of its ratification on February 2, 1987.[177]
The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian
doctrine. The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII
states: “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State.”
Like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, the
1987 Constitution, in the second sentence of the same
provision, prohibits the alienation of natural resources,
except agricultural lands.
The third sentence of the same paragraph is new:
“The exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.” The constitutional policy of the State’s “full
control and supervision” over natural resources proceeds
from the concept of jura regalia, as well as the recognition
of the importance of the country’s natural resources, not
only for national economic development, but also for its
security and national defense.[178] Under this provision, the
State assumes “a more dynamic role” in the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources.[179]
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to
grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural
resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable
lands of public domain through “license, concession or
lease” is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.[180]
Having omitted the provision on the concession
system, Section 2 proceeded to introduce “unfamiliar
language”:[181]
The State may directly undertake such activities or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens.
Consonant with the State’s “full supervision and
control” over natural resources, Section 2 offers the State
two “options.”[182] One, the State may directly undertake
these activities itself; or two, it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or entities at least 60%
of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
A third option is found in the third paragraph of the
same section:
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
While the second and third options are limited only
to Filipino citizens or, in the case of the former, to
corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos, a fourth allows the
participation of foreign-owned corporations. The fourth
and fifth paragraphs of Section 2 provide:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements,
the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
Although Section 2 sanctions the participation of
foreign-owned corporations in the exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources, it
imposes certain limitations or conditions to agreements
with such corporations.
First, the parties to FTAAs. Only the President, in
behalf of the State, may enter into these agreements, and
only with corporations. By contrast, under the 1973
Constitution, a Filipino citizen, corporation or association
may enter into a service contract with a “foreign person or
entity.”
Second, the size of the activities: only large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization is allowed.
The term “large-scale usually refers to very capital-
intensive activities.”[183]
Third, the natural resources subject of the
activities is restricted to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the intent being to limit service contracts to
those areas where Filipino capital may not be sufficient. [184]
Fourth, consistency with the provisions of
statute. The agreements must be in accordance with the
terms and conditions provided by law.
Fifth, Section 2 prescribes certain standards for
entering into such agreements. The agreements must
be based on real contributions to economic growth and
general welfare of the country.
Sixth, the agreements must contain rudimentary
stipulations for the promotion of the development and use
of local scientific and technical resources.
Seventh, the notification requirement. The President
shall notify Congress of every financial or technical
assistance agreement entered into within thirty days from
its execution.
Finally, the scope of the agreements. While the
1973 Constitution referred to “service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance” the 1987 Constitution provides for
“agreements. . . involving either financial or technical
assistance.” It bears noting that the phrases “service
contracts” and “management or other forms of assistance”
in the earlier constitution have been omitted.
By virtue of her legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution,[185] President Aquino, on July 10,
1987, signed into law E.O. No. 211 prescribing the interim
procedures in the processing and approval of applications
for the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals. The omission in the 1987 Constitution of the
term “service contracts” notwithstanding, the said E.O. still
referred to them in Section 2 thereof:
SEC. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, including renewal
applications and applications for approval of operating
agreements and mining service contracts, shall be
accepted and processed and may be approved x x
x. [Emphasis supplied.]
The same law provided in its Section 3 that the
“processing, evaluation and approval of all mining
applications . . . operating agreements and service
contracts . . . shall be governed by Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations. . . .”
As earlier stated, on the 25th also of July 1987, the
President issued E.O. No. 279 by authority of which the
subject WMCP FTAA was executed on March 30, 1995.
On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law
R.A. No. 7942. Section 15 thereof declares that the Act
“shall govern the exploration, development, utilization, and
processing of all mineral resources.” Such declaration
notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942 does not actually cover all
the modes through which the State may undertake the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources.
The State, being the owner of the natural resources,
is accorded the primary power and responsibility in the
exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such,
it may undertake these activities through four modes:
The State may directly undertake such activities.
(2) The State may enter into co-production,
joint venture or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.
(3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens.
(4) For the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils, the President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
technical or financial assistance.[186]
Except to charge the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau of the DENR with performing researches and
surveys,[187] and a passing mention of government-owned
or controlled corporations,[188]R.A. No. 7942 does not
specify how the State should go about the first mode. The
third mode, on the other hand, is governed by Republic Act
No. 7076[189] (the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991)
and other pertinent laws.[190] R.A. No. 7942 primarily
concerns itself with the second and fourth modes.
Mineral production sharing, co-production and joint
venture agreements are collectively classified by R.A. No.
7942 as “mineral agreements.”[191] The Government
participates the least in a mineral production sharing
agreement (MPSA). In an MPSA, the Government grants
the contractor[192] the exclusive right to conduct mining
operations within a contract area[193] and shares in the
gross output.[194] The MPSA contractor provides the
financing, technology, management and personnel
necessary for the agreement’s implementation.[195] The
total government share in an MPSA is the excise tax on
mineral products under Republic Act No.
7729,[196] amending Section 151(a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended.[197]
In a co-production agreement (CA),[198] the
Government provides inputs to the mining operations other
than the mineral resource,[199] while in a joint venture
agreement (JVA), where the Government enjoys the
greatest participation, the Government and the JVA
contractor organize a company with both parties having
equity shares.[200] Aside from earnings in equity, the
Government in a JVA is also entitled to a share in the
gross output.[201] The Government may enter into a
CA[202] or JVA[203] with one or more contractors. The
Government’s share in a CA or JVA is set out in Section
81 of the law:
The share of the Government in co-production and joint
venture agreements shall be negotiated by the
Government and the contractor taking into consideration
the: (a) capital investment of the project, (b) the risks
involved, (c) contribution of the project to the economy,
and (d) other factors that will provide for a fair and
equitable sharing between the Government and the
contractor. The Government shall also be entitled to
compensations for its other contributions which shall be
agreed upon by the parties, and shall consist, among other
things, the contractor’s income tax, excise tax, special
allowance, withholding tax due from the contractor’s
foreign stockholders arising from dividend or interest
payments to the said foreign stockholders, in case of a
foreign national and all such other taxes, duties and fees
as provided for under existing laws.
All mineral agreements grant the respective
contractors the exclusive right to conduct mining
operations and to extract all mineral resources found in the
contract area.[204] A “qualified person” may enter into any of
the mineral agreements with the Government.[205] A
“qualified person” is
any citizen of the Philippines with capacity to contract, or a
corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative
organized or authorized for the purpose of engaging in
mining, with technical and financial capability to undertake
mineral resources development and duly registered in
accordance with law at least sixty per centum (60%) of the
capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines x x
x.[206]
The fourth mode involves “financial or technical
assistance agreements.” An FTAA is defined as “a
contract involving financial or technical assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources.”[207] Any qualified person with technical
and financial capability to undertake large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources in the Philippines may enter into such
agreement directly with the Government through the
DENR.[208] For the purpose of granting an FTAA, a legally
organized foreign-owned corporation (any corporation,
partnership, association, or cooperative duly registered in
accordance with law in which less than 50% of the capital
is owned by Filipino citizens)[209] is deemed a “qualified
person.”[210]
Other than the difference in contractors’
qualifications, the principal distinction between mineral
agreements and FTAAs is the maximum contract area to
which a qualified person may hold or be
granted.[211] “Large-scale” under R.A. No. 7942 is
determined by the size of the contract area, as opposed to
the amount invested (US $50,000,000.00), which was the
standard under E.O. 279.
Like a CA or a JVA, an FTAA is subject to
negotiation.[212] The Government’s contributions, in the
form of taxes, in an FTAA is identical to its contributions in
the two mineral agreements, save that in an FTAA:
The collection of Government share in financial or
technical assistance agreement shall commence after the
financial or technical assistance agreement contractor has
fully recovered its pre-operating expenses, exploration,
and development expenditures, inclusive.[213]
III
Having examined the history of the constitutional
provision and statutes enacted pursuant thereto, a
consideration of the substantive issues presented by the
petition is now in order.
THE EFFECTIVITY OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 279
Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 279, the law in force
when the WMC FTAA was executed, did not come into
effect.
E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President
Aquino on July 25, 1987, two days before the opening of
Congress on July 27, 1987.[214] Section 8 of the E.O.
states that the same “shall take effect immediately.” This
provision, according to petitioners, runs counter to Section
1 of E.O. No. 200,[215] which provides:
SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.[216] [Emphasis supplied.]
On that premise, petitioners contend that E.O. No.
279 could have only taken effect fifteen days after its
publication at which time Congress had already convened
and the President’s power to legislate had ceased.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the
validity of E.O. No. 279 was settled in Miners Association
of the Philippines v. Factoran, supra. This is of course
incorrect for the issue inMiners Association was not the
validity of E.O. No. 279 but that of DAO Nos. 57 and 82
which were issued pursuant thereto.
Nevertheless, petitioners’ contentions have no merit.
It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200
that prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than
– even before – the 15-day period after its
publication. Where a law provides for its own date of
effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O.
No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence of the phrase
“unless it is otherwise provided” in Section 1
thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only
when a statute does not provide for its own date of
effectivity.
What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what
due process requires, as this Court held in Tañada v.
Tuvera,[217] is the publication of the law for
without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis
n[eminem] excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not
require its publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation
since the Constitution, being “the fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the nation,” is deemed written in the
law.[218] Hence, the due process clause,[219] which,
so Tañada held, mandates the publication of statutes, is
read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section
1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication “either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines,” finds suppletory
application. It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was
actually published in the Official Gazette[220] on August 3,
1987.
From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279,
Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Tañada v. Tuvera, this
Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became
effective immediately upon its publication in the Official
Gazette on August 3, 1987.
That such effectivity took place after the convening
of the first Congress is irrelevant. At the time President
Aquino issued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still
validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution.[221] Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the
1987 Constitution explicitly states:
SEC. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to
exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is
convened.
The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the
exercise of legislative powers by President Aquino; it did
not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously
enacted.
There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No.
279 is an effective, and a validly enacted, statute.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE WMCP FTAA
Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the text of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, FTAAs should be
limited to “technical or financial assistance” only. They
observe, however, that, contrary to the language of the
Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully
foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than
mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it
permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the
mining activity. [222]
Petitioners’ submission is well-taken. It is a cardinal
rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument
must be so construed as to give effect to the intention of
the people who adopted it.[223] This intention is to be
sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning
of the words is to be taken as expressing it, except in
cases where that assumption would lead to absurdity,
ambiguity, or contradiction.[224] What the Constitution says
according to the text of the provision, therefore, compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say.[225] Accordingly, following the literal
text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-
owned corporations in the large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and
mineral oils should be limited to “technical” or “financial”
assistance only.
WMCP nevertheless submits that the word
“technical” in the fourth paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. No.
279 encompasses a “broad number of possible services,”
perhaps, “scientific and/or technological in basis.”[226] It
thus posits that it may also well include “the area
of management or operations . . . so long as such
assistance requires specialized knowledge or skills, and
are related to the exploration, development and utilization
of mineral resources.”[227]
This Court is not persuaded. As priorly pointed out,
the phrase “management or other forms of assistance” in
the 1973 Constitution was deleted in the 1987
Constitution, which allows only “technical or financial
assistance.” Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. A
person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted intentionally.[228] As will be
shown later, the management or operation of mining
activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary
feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the
drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.
Respondents insist that “agreements involving
technical or financial assistance” is just another term for
service contracts. They contend that the proceedings of
the CONCOM indicate “that although the terminology
‘service contract’ was avoided [by the Constitution], the
concept it represented was not.” They add that “[t]he
concept is embodied in the phrase ‘agreements involving
financial or technical assistance.’”[229] And point out how
members of the CONCOM referred to these agreements
as “service contracts.” For instance:
SR. TAN. Am I correct in thinking that the only difference
between these future service contracts and the past
service contracts under Mr. Marcos is the general law to
be enacted by the legislature and the notification of
Congress by the President? That is the only difference, is
it not?
MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.
SR. TAN. So those are the safeguards[?]
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. There was no law at all governing
service contracts before.
SR. TAN. Thank you, Madam President.[230] [Emphasis
supplied.]
WMCP also cites the following statements of
Commissioners Gascon, Garcia, Nolledo and Tadeo who
alluded to service contracts as they explained their
respective votes in the approval of the draft Article:
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, I vote no primarily
because of two reasons: One, the provision on service
contracts. I felt that if we would constitutionalize any
provision on service contracts, this should always be with
the concurrence of Congress and not guided only by a
general law to be promulgated by Congress. x x
x.[231] [Emphasis supplied.]
x x x.
MR. GARCIA. Thank you.
I vote no. x x x.
Service contracts are given constitutional legitimization in
Section 3, even when they have been proven to be
inimical to the interests of the nation, providing as they do
the legal loophole for the exploitation of our natural
resources for the benefit of foreign interests. They
constitute a serious negation of Filipino control on the use
and disposition of the nation’s natural resources,
especially with regard to those which are
nonrenewable.[232] [Emphasis supplied.]
xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. While there are objectionable provisions
in the Article on National Economy and Patrimony, going
over said provisions meticulously, setting aside prejudice
and personalities will reveal that the article contains a
balanced set of provisions. I hope the forthcoming
Congress will implement such provisions taking into
account that Filipinos should have real control over our
economy and patrimony, and if foreign equity is permitted,
the same must be subordinated to the imperative demands
of the national interest.
x x x.
It is also my understanding that service contracts involving
foreign corporations or entities are resorted to only when
no Filipino enterprise or Filipino-controlled enterprise could
possibly undertake the exploration or exploitation of our
natural resources and that compensation under such
contracts cannot and should not equal what should pertain
to ownership of capital. In other words, the service
contract should not be an instrument to circumvent the
basic provision, that the exploration and exploitation of
natural resources should be truly for the benefit of
Filipinos.
Thank you, and I vote yes.[233] [Emphasis supplied.]
x x x.
MR. TADEO. Nais ko lamang ipaliwanag ang aking boto.
Matapos suriin ang kalagayan ng Pilipinas, ang saligang
suliranin, pangunahin ang salitang “imperyalismo.” Ang
ibig sabihin nito ay ang sistema ng lipunang pinaghaharian
ng iilang monopolyong kapitalista at ang salitang
“imperyalismo” ay buhay na buhay sa National Economy
and Patrimony na nating ginawa. Sa pamamagitan ng
salitang “based on,” naroroon na ang free trade sapagkat
tayo ay mananatiling tagapagluwas ng hilaw na sangkap
at tagaangkat ng yaring produkto. Pangalawa, naroroon
pa rin ang parity rights, ang service contract, ang 60-40
equity sa natural resources. Habang naghihirap ang
sambayanang Pilipino, ginagalugad naman ng mga
dayuhan ang ating likas na yaman. Kailan man ang Article
on National Economy and Patrimony ay hindi nagpaalis sa
pagkaalipin ng ating ekonomiya sa kamay ng mga
dayuhan. Ang solusyon sa suliranin ng bansa ay dalawa
lamang: ang pagpapatupad ng tunay na reporma sa lupa
at ang national industrialization. Ito ang tinatawag naming
pagsikat ng araw sa Silangan. Ngunit ang mga landlords
and big businessmen at ang mga komprador ay nagsasabi
na ang free trade na ito, ang kahulugan para sa amin, ay
ipinipilit sa ating sambayanan na ang araw ay sisikat sa
Kanluran. Kailan man hindi puwedeng sumikat ang araw
sa Kanluran. I vote no.[234] [Emphasis supplied.]
This Court is likewise not persuaded.
As earlier noted, the phrase “service contracts” has
been deleted in the 1987 Constitution’s Article on National
Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to
retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973
Constitution, it could have simply adopted the old
terminology (“service contracts”) instead of employing new
and unfamiliar terms (“agreements . . . involving either
technical or financial assistance”). Such a difference
between the language of a provision in a revised
constitution and that of a similar provision in the preceding
constitution is viewed as indicative of a difference in
purpose.[235] If, as respondents suggest, the concept of
“technical or financial assistance” agreements is identical
to that of “service contracts,” the CONCOM would not have
bothered to fit the same dog with a new collar. To uphold
respondents’ theory would reduce the first to a mere
euphemism for the second and render the change in
phraseology meaningless.
An examination of the reason behind the change
confirms that technical or financial assistance agreements
are not synonymous to service contracts.
[T]he Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in light of
the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.[236]
As the following question of Commissioner Quesada
and Commissioner Villegas’ answer shows the drafters
intended to do away with service contracts which were
used to circumvent the capitalization (60%-40%)
requirement:
MS. QUESADA. The 1973 Constitution used the words
“service contracts.” In this particular Section 3, is there a
safeguard against the possible control of foreign interests
if the Filipinos go into coproduction with them?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. In fact, the deletion of the phrase
“service contracts” was our first attempt to avoid some of
the abuses in the past regime in the use of service
contracts to go around the 60-40 arrangement. The
safeguard that has been introduced – and this, of course
can be refined – is found in Section 3, lines 25 to 30,
where Congress will have to concur with the President on
any agreement entered into between a foreign-owned
corporation and the government involving technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of natural
resources.[237] [Emphasis supplied.]
In a subsequent discussion, Commissioner Villegas
allayed the fears of Commissioner Quesada regarding the
participation of foreign interests in Philippine natural
resources, which was supposed to be restricted to
Filipinos.
MS. QUESADA. Another point of clarification is the phrase
“and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State.” In the 1973
Constitution, this was limited to citizens of the
Philippines; but it was removed and substituted by “shall
be under the full control and supervision of the
State.” Was the concept changed so that these particular
resources would be limited to citizens of the
Philippines? Or would these resources only be under the
full control and supervision of the State; meaning,
noncitizens would have access to these natural
resources? Is that the understanding?
MR. VILLEGAS. No, Mr. Vice-President, if the
Commissioner reads the next sentence, it states:
Such activities may be directly undertaken by the State, or
it may enter into co-production, joint venture, production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens.
So we are still limiting it only to Filipino citizens.
x x x.
MS. QUESADA. Going back to Section 3, the section
suggests that:
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources… may be directly undertaken by the State, or it
may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreement with . . . corporations or associations at
least sixty per cent of whose voting stock or controlling
interest is owned by such citizens.
Lines 25 to 30, on the other hand, suggest that in the
large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources, the President with the concurrence of
Congress may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations even for technical or financial assistance.
I wonder if this part of Section 3 contradicts the second
part. I am raising this point for fear that foreign investors
will use their enormous capital resources to facilitate the
actual exploitation or exploration, development and
effective disposition of our natural resources to the
detriment of Filipino investors. I am not saying that we
should not consider borrowing money from foreign
sources. What I refer to is that foreign interest should be
allowed to participate only to the extent that they lend us
money and give us technical assistance with the
appropriate government permit. In this way, we can insure
the enjoyment of our natural resources by our own people.
MR. VILLEGAS. Actually, the second provision about the
President does not permit foreign investors to
participate. It is only technical or financial assistance –
they do not own anything – but on conditions that have to
be determined by law with the concurrence of
Congress. So, it is very restrictive.
If the Commissioner will remember, this removes the
possibility for service contracts which we said yesterday
were avenues used in the previous regime to go around
the 60-40 requirement.[238][Emphasis supplied.]
The present Chief Justice, then a member of the
CONCOM, also referred to this limitation in scope in
proposing an amendment to the 60-40 requirement:
MR. DAVIDE. May I be allowed to explain the
proposal?
MR. MAAMBONG. Subject to the three-minute rule,
Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. It will not take three minutes.
The Commission had just approved the Preamble. In the
Preamble we clearly stated that the Filipino people are
sovereign and that one of the objectives for the creation or
establishment of a government is to conserve and develop
the national patrimony. The implication is that the national
patrimony or our natural resources are exclusively
reserved for the Filipino people. No alien must be allowed
to enjoy, exploit and develop our natural resources. As a
matter of fact, that principle proceeds from the fact that our
natural resources are gifts from God to the Filipino people
and it would be a breach of that special blessing from God
if we will allow aliens to exploit our natural resources.
I voted in favor of the Jamir proposal because it is not
really exploitation that we granted to the alien corporations
but only for them to render financial or technical
assistance. It is not for them to enjoy our natural
resources. Madam President, our natural resources are
depleting; our population is increasing by leaps and
bounds. Fifty years from now, if we will allow these aliens
to exploit our natural resources, there will be no more
natural resources for the next generations of Filipinos. It
may last long if we will begin now. Since 1935 the aliens
have been allowed to enjoy to a certain extent the
exploitation of our natural resources, and we became
victims of foreign dominance and control. The aliens are
interested in coming to the Philippines because they would
like to enjoy the bounty of nature exclusively intended for
Filipinos by God.
And so I appeal to all, for the sake of the future
generations, that if we have to pray in the Preamble “to
preserve and develop the national patrimony for the
sovereign Filipino people and for the generations to come,”
we must at this time decide once and for all that our
natural resources must be reserved only to Filipino
citizens.
Thank you.[239] [Emphasis supplied.]
The opinion of another member of the CONCOM is
persuasive[240] and leaves no doubt as to the intention of
the framers to eliminate service contracts altogether. He
writes:
Paragraph 4 of Section 2 specifies large-scale, capital-
intensive, highly technological undertakings for which the
President may enter into contracts with foreign-owned
corporations, and enunciates strict conditions that should
govern such contracts. x x x.
This provision balances the need for foreign capital and
technology with the need to maintain the national
sovereignty. It recognizes the fact that as long as Filipinos
can formulate their own terms in their own territory, there is
no danger of relinquishing sovereignty to foreign interests.
Are service contracts allowed under the new
Constitution? No. Under the new Constitution, foreign
investors (fully alien-owned) can NOT participate in Filipino
enterprises except to provide: (1) Technical Assistance for
highly technical enterprises; and (2) Financial Assistance
for large-scale enterprises.
The intent of this provision, as well as other provisions on
foreign investments, is to prevent the practice (prevalent in
the Marcos government) of skirting the 60/40 equation
using the cover of service contracts.[241] [Emphasis
supplied.]
Furthermore, it appears that Proposed Resolution
No. 496,[242] which was the draft Article on National
Economy and Patrimony, adopted the concept of
“agreements . . . involving either technical or financial
assistance” contained in the “Draft of the 1986 U.P. Law
Constitution Project” (U.P. Law draft) which was taken into
consideration during the deliberation of the
CONCOM.[243] The former, as well as Article XII, as
adopted, employed the same terminology, as the
comparative table below shows:
PROPOSED ARTICLE XII OF
RESOLUTION THE 1987
NO. 496 OF THE CONSTITUTION
 CONSTITUTION or associations least sixty per least sixty per The National The Congress The Congress
AL sixty per cent of cent of whose centum of whose Assembly may may by law allow may, by law,
COMMISSION whose voting voting stock or capital is owned by law allow small-scale allow small-scale
DRAFT OF THE
stock or controlling by such small scale utilization of utilization of
UP LAW
controlling interest is owned citizens. Such utilization of natural resources natural resources
CONSTITUTION
interest is owned by such agreements may natural resources by Filipino by Filipino
PROJECT
by such citizens citizens. Such be for a period by Filipino citizens, as well citizens, as well
SEC. 1. All lands SEC. 3. All lands SEC. 2. All lands
for a period of agreements shall not exceeding citizens. as cooperative as cooperative
of the public of the public of the public
not more than be for a period of twenty-five years, fish farming in fish farming, with
domain, waters, domain, waters, domain, waters,
twenty-five years, twenty-five years, renewable for not rivers, lakes, priority to
minerals, coal, minerals, coal, minerals, coal,
renewable for not renewable for not more than bays, and subsistence
petroleum and petroleum and petroleum, and
more than more than twenty-five years, lagoons. fishermen and
other mineral other mineral other mineral
twenty-five years twenty-five years, and under such fish-workers in
oils, all forces of oils, all forces of oils, all forces of
and under such and under such terms and rivers, lakes,
potential energy, potential energy, potential energy,
terms and term and conditions as bays, and
fisheries, flora fisheries, forests, fisheries, forests
conditions as conditions as may be provided lagoons.
and fauna and flora and fauna, or timber, wildlife,
may be provided may be provided by law. In case
other natural and other natural flora and fauna,
by law. In case by law. In cases of water rights for
resources of the resources are and other natural
as to water rights of water rights for irrigation, water
Philippines are owned by the resources are The National The President The President
for irrigation, irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
owned by the State. With the owned by the Assembly, may, with the may enter into
water supply, supply, fisheries or industrial uses
State. With the exception of State. With the by two-thirds concurrence of agreements with
fisheries, or or industrial uses other than the
exception of agricultural exception of vote of all its Congress, by foreign-owned
industrial uses other than the development of
agricultural lands, all other agricultural members by special law, shall corporations
other than the development for water power,
lands, all other natural resources lands, all other special law provide the terms involving either
development of water power, beneficial use
natural resources shall not be natural resources provide the terms and conditions technical or
water power, beneficial use may be the
shall not be alienated. The shall not be and conditions under which a financial
beneficial use may be the measure and
alienated. The exploration, alienated. The under which a foreign-owned assistance for
may be the measure and limit of the grant.
exploration, development, exploration, foreign-owned corporation may large-scale
measure and limit of the grant.
development and and utilization of development, corporation may enter into exploration,
limit of the grant.
utilization of natural resources and utilization of enter into agreements with development,
natural resources shall be under natural resources agreements with the government and utilization of
shall be under the full control shall be under the government involving either minerals,
the full control and supervision the full control The State shall involving either technical or petroleum, and
and supervision of the and supervision protect the technical or financial other mineral oils
of the State. Such of the State. The nation’s marine financial assistance for according to the
State. Such activities may be State may wealth in its assistance for large-scale general terms
activities may be directly directly archipelagic large-scale exploration, and conditions
directly undertaken by undertake such waters, territorial exploration, development, provided by law,
undertaken by the State, or it activities or it sea, and development, or and utilization of based on real
the state, or it may enter into may enter into exclusive utilization of natural contributions to
may enter into co-production, co-production, economic zone, natural resources. [Emp the economic
co-production, joint venture, joint venture, or and reserve its resources. [Emp hasis supplied.] growth and
joint venture, production- production- use and hasis supplied.] general welfare
production sharing sharing enjoyment of the country. In
sharing agreements with agreements with exclusively to such
agreements with Filipino citizens Filipino citizens, Filipino citizens. agreements, the
Filipino citizens or corporations or corporations State shall
or corporations or associations at or associations at promote the
 development and
use of local
scientific and
technical
resources. [Emp
hasis supplied.]
The President
shall notify the
Congress of
every contract
entered into in
accordance with
this provision,
within thirty days
from its
execution.
The insights of the proponents of the U.P. Law draft
are, therefore, instructive in interpreting the phrase
“technical or financial assistance.”
In his position paper entitled Service Contracts: Old
Wine in New Bottles?, Professor Pacifico A. Agabin, who
was a member of the working group that prepared the U.P.
Law draft, criticized service contracts for they “lodge
exclusive management and control of the enterprise to the
service contractor, which is reminiscent of the old
concession regime. Thus, notwithstanding the provision of
the Constitution that natural resources belong to the State,
and that these shall not be alienated, the service contract
system renders nugatory the constitutional provisions
cited.”[244]He elaborates:
Looking at the Philippine model, we can discern the
following vestiges of the concession regime, thus:
1. Bidding of a selected area, or leasing the choice of
the area to the interested party and then negotiating the
terms and conditions of the contract; (Sec. 5, P.D. 87)
2. Management of the enterprise vested on the
contractor, including operation of the field if petroleum is
discovered; (Sec. 8, P.D. 87)
3. Control of production and other matters such as
expansion and development; (Sec. 8)
4. Responsibility for downstream operations –
marketing, distribution, and processing may be with the
contractor (Sec. 8);
5. Ownership of equipment, machinery, fixed assets,
and other properties remain with contractor (Sec. 12, P.D.
87);
6. Repatriation of capital and retention of profits abroad
guaranteed to the contractor (Sec. 13, P.D. 87); and
7. While title to the petroleum discovered may
nominally be in the name of the government, the
contractor has almost unfettered control over its disposition
and sale, and even the domestic requirements of the
country is relegated to a pro rata basis (Sec. 8).
In short, our version of the service contract is just a rehash
of the old concession regime x x x. Some people have
pulled an old rabbit out of a magician’s hat, and foisted it
upon us as a new and different animal.
The service contract as we know it here is antithetical to
the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources
restated in the same article of the [1973] Constitution
containing the provision for service contracts. If the
service contractor happens to be a foreign corporation, the
contract would also run counter to the constitutional
provision on nationalization or Filipinization, of the
exploitation of our natural resources.[245] [Emphasis
supplied. Underscoring in the original.]
Professor Merlin M. Magallona, also a member of
the working group, was harsher in his reproach of the
system:
x x x the nationalistic phraseology of the 1935
[Constitution] was retained by the [1973] Charter, but the
essence of nationalism was reduced to hollow
rhetoric. The 1973 Charter still provided that the
exploitation or development of the country’s natural
resources be limited to Filipino citizens or corporations
owned or controlled by them. However, the martial-law
Constitution allowed them, once these resources are in
their name, to enter into service contracts with foreign
investors for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance. Since foreign investors have the
capital resources, the actual exploitation and development,
as well as the effective disposition, of the country’s natural
resources, would be under their direction, and control,
relegating the Filipino investors to the role of second-rate
partners in joint ventures.
Through the instrumentality of the service contract, the
1973 Constitution had legitimized at the highest level of
state policy that which was prohibited under the 1973
Constitution, namely: the exploitation of the country’s
natural resources by foreign nationals. The drastic impact
of [this] constitutional change becomes more pronounced
when it is considered that the active party to any service
contract may be a corporation wholly owned by foreign
interests. In such a case, the citizenship requirement is
completely set aside, permitting foreign corporations to
obtain actual possession, control, and [enjoyment] of the
country’s natural resources.[246] [Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, Professor Agabin recommends that:
Recognizing the service contract for what it is, we have to
expunge it from the Constitution and reaffirm ownership
over our natural resources. That is the only way we can
exercise effective control over our natural resources.
This should not mean complete isolation of the country’s
natural resources from foreign investment. Other contract
forms which are less derogatory to our sovereignty and
control over natural resources – like technical assistance
agreements, financial assistance [agreements], co-
production agreements, joint ventures, production-sharing
– could still be utilized and adopted without violating
constitutional provisions. In other words, we can adopt
contract forms which recognize and assert our sovereignty
and ownership over natural resources, and where the
foreign entity is just a pure contractor instead of the
beneficial owner of our economic resources.[247] [Emphasis
supplied.]
 Still another member of the working group, Professor
Eduardo Labitag, proposed that:
2. Service contracts as practiced under the 1973
Constitution should be discouraged, instead the
government may be allowed, subject to authorization by
special law passed by an extraordinary majority to enter
into either technical or financial assistance. This is justified
by the fact that as presently worded in the 1973
Constitution, a service contract gives full control over the
contract area to the service contractor, for him to work,
manage and dispose of the proceeds or production. It was
a subterfuge to get around the nationality requirement of
the constitution.[248] [Emphasis supplied.]
In the annotations on the proposed Article on
National Economy and Patrimony, the U.P. Law draft
summarized the rationale therefor, thus:
5. The last paragraph is a modification of the service
contract provision found in Section 9, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution as amended. This 1973 provision
shattered the framework of nationalism in our fundamental
law (see Magallona, “Nationalism and its Subversion in the
Constitution”). Through the service contract, the 1973
Constitution had legitimized that which was prohibited
under the 1935 constitution—the exploitation of the
country’s natural resources by foreign nationals. Through
the service contract, acts prohibited by the Anti-Dummy
Law were recognized as legitimate arrangements. Service
contracts lodge exclusive management and control of the
enterprise to the service contractor, not unlike the old
concession regime where the concessionaire had
complete control over the country’s natural resources,
having been given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a
particular resource and, in effect, having been assured of
ownership of that resource at the point of extraction (see
Agabin, “Service Contracts: Old Wine in New
Bottles”). Service contracts, hence, are antithetical to the
principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, as well
as the constitutional provision on nationalization or
Filipinization of the exploitation of our natural resources.
Under the proposed provision, only technical assistance or
financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and
only for large-scale activities. These are contract forms
which recognize and assert our sovereignty and ownership
over natural resources since the foreign entity is just a
pure contractor and not a beneficial owner of our economic
resources. The proposal recognizes the need for capital
and technology to develop our natural resources without
sacrificing our sovereignty and control over such resources
by the safeguard of a special law which requires two-thirds
vote of all the members of the Legislature. This will ensure
that such agreements will be debated upon exhaustively
and thoroughly in the National Assembly to avert prejudice
to the nation.[249] [Emphasis supplied.]
The U.P. Law draft proponents viewed service
contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of
beneficial ownership of the country’s natural resources to
foreign owned corporations. While, in theory, the State
owns these natural resources – and Filipino citizens, their
beneficiaries – service contracts actually vested foreigners
with the right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and
utilize the same. Foreigners, not Filipinos, became the
beneficiaries of Philippine natural resources. This
arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional
ideal of nationalization of natural resources, with the
Regalian doctrine, and on a broader perspective, with
Philippine sovereignty.
The proponents nevertheless acknowledged the
need for capital and technical know-how in the large-scale
exploitation, development and utilization of natural
resources – the second paragraph of the proposed draft
itself being an admission of such scarcity. Hence, they
recommended a compromise to reconcile the nationalistic
provisions dating back to the 1935 Constitution, which
reserved all natural resources exclusively to Filipinos, and
the more liberal 1973 Constitution, which allowed
foreigners to participate in these resources through service
contracts. Such a compromise called for the adoption of a
new system in the exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources in the form of technical
agreements or financial agreements which, necessarily,
are distinct concepts from service contracts.
The replacement of “service contracts” with
“agreements… involving either technical or financial
assistance,” as well as the deletion of the phrase
“management or other forms of assistance,” assumes
greater significance when note is taken that the U.P. Law
draft proposed other equally crucial changes that were
obviously heeded by the CONCOM. These include the
abrogation of the concession system and the adoption of
new “options” for the State in the exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources. The
proponents deemed these changes to be more consistent
with the State’s ownership of, and its “full control and
supervision” (a phrase also employed by the framers) over,
such resources. The Project explained:
3. In line with the State ownership of natural resources,
the State should take a more active role in the exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources, than the
present practice of granting licenses, concessions, or
leases – hence the provision that said activities shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. There
are three major schemes by which the State could
undertake these activities: first, directly by itself; second,
by virtue of co-production, joint venture, production sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or
associations sixty per cent (60%) of the voting stock or
controlling interests of which are owned by such citizens;
or third, with a foreign-owned corporation, in cases of
large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of
natural resources through agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance only. x x x.
At present, under the licensing concession or lease
schemes, the government benefits from such benefits only
through fees, charges, ad valorem taxes and income taxes
of the exploiters of our natural resources. Such benefits
are very minimal compared with the enormous profits
reaped by theses licensees, grantees,
concessionaires. Moreover, some of them disregard the
conservation of natural resources and do not protect the
environment from degradation. The proposed role of the
State will enable it to a greater share in the profits – it can
also actively husband its natural resources and engage in
developmental programs that will be beneficial to them.
4. Aside from the three major schemes for the
exploration, development, and utilization of our natural
resources, the State may, by law, allow Filipino citizens to
explore, develop, utilize natural resources in small-
scale. This is in recognition of the plight of marginal
fishermen, forest dwellers, gold panners, and others
similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their
daily sustenance and survival.[250]
 Professor Agabin, in particular, after taking pains to
illustrate the similarities between the two systems,
concluded that the service contract regime was but a
“rehash” of the concession system. “Old wine in new
bottles,” as he put it. The rejection of the service contract
regime, therefore, is in consonance with the abolition of
the concession system.
In light of the deliberations of the CONCOM, the text
of the Constitution, and the adoption of other proposed
changes, there is no doubt that the framers considered
and shared the intent of the U.P. Law proponents in
employing the phrase “agreements . . . involving either
technical or financial assistance.”
While certain commissioners may have mentioned
the term “service contracts” during the CONCOM
deliberations, they may not have been necessarily
referring to the concept of service contracts under the
1973 Constitution. As noted earlier, “service contracts” is
a term that assumes different meanings to different
people.[251] The commissioners may have been using the
term loosely, and not in its technical and legal sense, to
refer, in general, to agreements concerning natural
resources entered into by the Government with foreign
corporations. These loose statements do not necessarily
translate to the adoption of the 1973 Constitution provision
allowing service contracts.
It is true that, as shown in the earlier quoted portions
of the proceedings in CONCOM, in response to Sr. Tan’s
question, Commissioner Villegas commented that, other
than congressional notification, the only difference
between “future” and “past” “service contracts” is the
requirement of a general law as there were no laws
previously authorizing the same.[252] However, such remark
is far outweighed by his more categorical statement in his
exchange with Commissioner Quesada that the draft
article “does not permit foreign investors to participate” in
the nation’s natural resources – which was exactly what
service contracts did – except to provide “technical or
financial assistance.”[253]
In the case of the other commissioners,
Commissioner Nolledo himself clarified in his work that the
present charter prohibits service
contracts.[254] Commissioner Gascon was not totally averse
to foreign participation, but favored stricter restrictions in
the form of majority congressional concurrence.[255] On the
other hand, Commissioners Garcia and Tadeo may have
veered to the extreme side of the spectrum and their
objections may be interpreted as votes against any foreign
participation in our natural resources whatsoever.
WMCP cites Opinion No. 75, s. 1987,[256] and
Opinion No. 175, s. 1990[257] of the Secretary of Justice,
expressing the view that a financial or technical assistance
agreement “is no different in concept” from the service
contract allowed under the 1973 Constitution. This Court
is not, however, bound by this interpretation. When an
administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or
issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the
law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.[258]
In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the
President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned
corporations is an exception to the rule that participation in
the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. As
Commissioner Villegas emphasized, the provision is “very
restrictive.”[259] Commissioner Nolledo also remarked that
“entering into service contracts is an exception to the rule
on protection of natural resources for the interest of the
nation and, therefore, being an exception, it should be
subject, whenever possible, to stringent rules.”[260] Indeed,
exceptions should be strictly but reasonably
construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provision rather than the exception.[261]
With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court
finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act
authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs
the phrase “financial and technical agreements” in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats
these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the
fundamental law.
Section 33, which is found under Chapter VI (Financial or
Technical Assistance Agreement) of R.A. No. 7942 states:
SEC. 33. Eligibility.—Any qualified person with technical
and financial capability to undertake large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources in the Philippines may enter into a financial or
technical assistance agreement directly with the
Government through the Department. [Emphasis
supplied.]
“Exploration,” as defined by R.A. No. 7942,
means the searching or prospecting for mineral resources
by geological, geochemical or geophysical surveys, remote
sensing, test pitting, trending, drilling, shaft sinking,
tunneling or any other means for the purpose of
determining the existence, extent, quantity and quality
thereof and the feasibility of mining them for profit.[262]
A legally organized foreign-owned corporation may be
granted an exploration permit,[263] which vests it with the
right to conduct exploration for all minerals in specified
areas,[264] i.e., to enter, occupy and explore the
same.[265] Eventually, the foreign-owned corporation, as
such permittee, may apply for a financial and technical
assistance agreement.[266]
“Development” is
the work undertaken to explore and prepare an ore body
or a mineral deposit for mining, including the construction
of necessary infrastructure and related facilities.[267]
“Utilization” “means the extraction or disposition of
minerals.”[268] A stipulation that the proponent shall dispose
of the minerals and byproducts produced at the highest
price and more advantageous terms and conditions as
provided for under the implementing rules and regulations
is required to be incorporated in every FTAA.[269]
A foreign-owned/-controlled corporation may
likewise be granted a mineral processing
permit.[270] “Mineral processing” is the milling, beneficiation
or upgrading of ores or minerals and rocks or by similar
means to convert the same into marketable products.[271]
An FTAA contractor makes a warranty that the
mining operations shall be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of R.A. No. 7942 and its implementing
rules[272] and for work programs and minimum expenditures
and commitments.[273] And it obliges itself to furnish the
Government records of geologic, accounting, and other
relevant data for its mining operation.[274]
“Mining operation,” as the law defines it,
means mining activities involving exploration, feasibility,
development, utilization, and processing.[275]
The underlying assumption in all these provisions is
that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources,
just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
Furthermore, Chapter XII of the Act grants foreign
contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining rights that
it grants contractors in mineral agreements (MPSA, CA
and JV).[276]Parenthetically, Sections 72 to 75 use the term
“contractor,” without distinguishing between FTAA and
mineral agreement contractors. And so does “holders of
mining rights” in Section 76. A foreign contractor may
even convert its FTAA into a mineral agreement if the
economic viability of the contract area is found to be
inadequate to justify large-scale mining
operations,[277] provided that it reduces its equity in the
corporation, partnership, association or cooperative to forty
percent (40%).[278]
Finally, under the Act, an FTAA contractor warrants
that it “has or has access to all the financing, managerial,
and technical expertise. . . .”[279] This suggests that an
FTAA contractor is bound to provide
some management assistance – a form of assistance that
has been eliminated and, therefore, proscribed by the
present Charter.
By allowing foreign contractors to manage or
operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the above-
cited provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed
beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to
these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare
title thereto.
Moreover, the same provisions, whether by design
or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally ordained 60%-40% capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations engaged in
the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.
In sum, the Court finds the following provisions of
R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which
defines “qualified person,” to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned
corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for
purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or
technical assistance agreement or mineral processing
permit.
(2) Section 23,[280] which specifies the rights
and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said
section applies to a financial or technical assistance
agreement,
(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility
of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance
agreement;
(4) Section 35,[281] which enumerates the
terms and conditions for every financial or technical
assistance agreement;
(5) Section 39,[282] which allows the contractor
in a financial and technical assistance agreement to
convert the same into a mineral production-sharing
agreement;
[283]
(6) Section 56, which authorizes the
issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in
a financial and technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise
void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions
and cannot stand on their own:
(1) Section 3 (g),[284] which defines the term
“contractor,” insofar as it applies to a financial or technical
assistance agreement.
Section 34,[285] which prescribes the maximum
contract area in a financial or technical assistance
agreements;
Section 36,[286] which allows negotiations for financial
or technical assistance agreements;
Section 37,[287] which prescribes the procedure for
filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance
agreement proposals;
Section 38,[288] which limits the term of financial or
technical assistance agreements;
Section 40,[289] which allows the assignment or
transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 41,[290] which allows the withdrawal of the
contractor in an FTAA;
The second and third paragraphs of Section
81,[291] which provide for the Government’s share in a
financial and technical assistance agreement; and
Section 90,[292] which provides for incentives to
contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said
contractors;
When the parts of the statute are so mutually
dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the
legislature would not pass the residue independently, then,
if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which
are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall
with them.[293]
There can be little doubt that the WMCP FTAA itself
is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP “the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilise[,] process and
dispose of all Minerals products and by-products thereof
that may be produced from the Contract Area.”[294] The
FTAA also imbues WMCP with the following rights:
(b) to extract and carry away any Mineral samples from
the Contract area for the purpose of conducting tests and
studies in respect thereof;
(c) to determine the mining and treatment processes to
be utilised during the Development/Operating Period and
the project facilities to be constructed during the
Development and Construction Period;
(d) have the right of possession of the Contract Area,
with full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy
the same, subject to the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 512 (if applicable) and not be prevented from entry
into private ands by surface owners and/or occupants
thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting for
minerals therein;
xxx
(f) to construct roadways, mining, drainage, power
generation and transmission facilities and all other types of
works on the Contract Area;
(g) to erect, install or place any type of improvements,
supplies, machinery and other equipment relating to the
Mining Operations and to use, sell or otherwise dispose of,
modify, remove or diminish any and all parts thereof;
(h) enjoy, subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations
and the rights of third Parties, easement rights and the use
of timber, sand, clay, stone, water and other natural
resources in the Contract Area without cost for the
purposes of the Mining Operations;
xxx
(l) have the right to mortgage, charge or encumber all
or part of its interest and obligations under this Agreement,
the plant, equipment and infrastructure and the Minerals
produced from the Mining Operations;
x x x. [295]
All materials, equipment, plant and other installations
erected or placed on the Contract Area remain the
property of WMCP, which has the right to deal with and
remove such items within twelve months from the
termination of the FTAA.[296]
Pursuant to Section 1.2 of the FTAA, WMCP shall
provide “[all] financing, technology, management and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.” The
mining company binds itself to “perform all Mining
Operations . . . providing all necessary services,
technology and financing in connection therewith,”[297] and
to “furnish all materials, labour, equipment and other
installations that may be required for carrying on all Mining
Operations.”[298] WMCP may make expansions,
improvements and replacements of the mining facilities
and may add such new facilities as it considers necessary
for the mining operations.[299]
These contractual stipulations, taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that
properly belong to the State and are intended for the
benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to
the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that
the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to
suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they
spring must be struck down.
In arguing against the annulment of the FTAA,
WMCP invokes the Agreement on the Promotion and
Protection of Investments between the Philippine and
Australian Governments, which was signed in Manila on
January 25, 1995 and which entered into force on
December 8, 1995.
x x x. Article 2 (1) of said treaty states that it applies to
investments whenever made and thus the fact that
[WMCP’s] FTAA was entered into prior to the entry into
force of the treaty does not preclude the Philippine
Government from protecting [WMCP’s] investment in [that]
FTAA. Likewise, Article 3 (1) of the treaty provides
that “Each Party shall encourage and promote investments
in its area by investors of the other Party and shall [admit]
such investments in accordance with its Constitution,
Laws, regulations and investment policies” and in Article 3
(2), it states that “Each Party shall ensure that investments
are accorded fair and equitable treatment.” The latter
stipulation indicates that it was intended to impose an
obligation upon a Party to afford fair and equitable
treatment to the investments of the other Party and that a
failure to provide such treatment by or under the laws of
the Party may constitute a breach of the treaty. Simply
stated, the Philippines could not, under said treaty, rely
upon the inadequacies of its own laws to deprive an
Australian investor (like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable
treatment by invalidating [WMCP’s] FTAA without likewise
nullifying the service contracts entered into before the
enactment of RA 7942 such as those mentioned in PD 87
or EO 279.
This becomes more significant in the light of the fact that
[WMCP’s] FTAA was executed not by a mere Filipino
citizen, but by the Philippine Government itself, through its
President no less, which, in entering into said treaty is
assumed to be aware of the existing Philippine laws on
service contracts over the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources. The execution of the FTAA
by the Philippine Government assures the Australian
Government that the FTAA is in accordance with existing
Philippine laws.[300] [Emphasis and italics by private
respondents.]
The invalidation of the subject FTAA, it is argued,
would constitute a breach of said treaty which, in turn,
would amount to a violation of Section 3, Article II of the
Constitution adopting the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. One of
these generally accepted principles is pacta sunt
servanda, which requires the performance in good faith of
treaty obligations.
Even assuming arguendo that WMCP is correct in its
interpretation of the treaty and its assertion that “the
Philippines could not . . . deprive an Australian investor
(like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable treatment by
invalidating [WMCP’s] FTAA without likewise nullifying the
service contracts entered into before the enactment of RA
7942 . . .,” the annulment of the FTAA would not
constitute a breach of the treaty invoked. For this decision
herein invalidating the subject FTAA forms part of the legal
system of the Philippines.[301] The equal protection
clause[302] guarantees that such decision shall apply to all
contracts belonging to the same class, hence, upholding
rather than violating, the “fair and equitable treatment”
stipulation in said treaty.
One other matter requires clarification. Petitioners
contend that, consistent with the provisions of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, the President may enter into
agreements involving “either technical or financial
assistance” only. The agreement in question, however, is
a technical and financial assistance agreement.
Petitioners’ contention does not lie. To adhere to the
literal language of the Constitution would lead to absurd
consequences.[303] As WMCP correctly put it:
x x x such a theory of petitioners would compel the
government (through the President) to enter into contract
with two (2) foreign-owned corporations, one for financial
assistance agreement and with the other, for technical
assistance over one and the same mining area or land; or
to execute two (2) contracts with only one foreign-owned
corporation which has the capability to provide both
financial and technical assistance, one for financial
assistance and another for technical assistance, over the
same mining area. Such an absurd result is definitely not
sanctioned under the canons of constitutional
construction.[304] [Underscoring in the original.]
Surely, the framers of the 1987 Charter did not
contemplate such an absurd result from their use of
“either/or.” A constitution is not to be interpreted as
demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and
unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should
be avoided.[305] Courts are not to give words a meaning
that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences
and a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be
unjust or lead to absurd results.[306] That is a strong
argument against its adoption.[307] Accordingly, petitioners’
interpretation must be rejected.
The foregoing discussion has rendered unnecessary
the resolution of the other issues raised by the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court
hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
(1) The following provisions of Republic Act No.
7942:
(a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq),
(b) Section 23,
(c) Section 33 to 41,
(d) Section 56,
(e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and
(f) Section 90.
(2) All provisions of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996
which are not in conformity with this Decision, and
(3) The Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Carpio,
Corona, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga. JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see Separate Opinion.
Panganiban, J., see Separate Opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Austria-
Martinez, JJ., joins J. Panganiban’s separate opinion.
Azcuna, no part, one of the parties was a client.
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G.
ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER
OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate
constitutional boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the
petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador
Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in
payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the
ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison’s
appointment without the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the
need for stability in the public service, the Court resolved
to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside
the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the
proper remedy to test respondent Mison’s right to the
Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of
whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court
allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene and
file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of
respondents on said petition. The comment was filed,
followed by intervenor’s reply thereto. The parties were
also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom
line, it involves a conflict between two (2) great
departments of government, the Executive and Legislative
Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987
Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence
of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases
like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated
in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is
to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force
is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in
the constitutional provisions themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or
the legislative department may want them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions
or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4)
groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time,
are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
2
in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint;
4
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination
and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the
present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by
the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments? By following the
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction
that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation)
Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely
on this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can
refer to historical background as well as to the records of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with
more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on
whether the appointments by the President, under the
second, third and fourth groups, require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Again,
in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J.
Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a
constitutional provision must be presumed to have been
framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior
3
and existing laws and with reference to them. “Courts are
bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution
are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which
they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption.”
(Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A.,
762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the
1935 Constitution, it is provided that —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads
of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the
army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
those herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law
of the vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
(4) The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) …, and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls …
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of
bureaus and offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or
Commodore, and all other officers of The government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the
Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive
Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and
Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their
respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential
appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our
political history that the power of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, under the 1935
Constitution, transformed that commission, many times,
into a venue of “horse-trading” and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with
the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and
remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute
power of appointment in the President with hardly any
check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935
Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is
not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a
“middle ground” by requiring the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments for the first group of
appointments and leaving to the President, without such
confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those
in the second and third groups as well as those in the
fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission
support this conclusion. The original text of Section 16,
Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the
consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint
the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart
provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the frames
discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed
text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was manifestly
expressed to make the power of the Commission on
Appointments over presidential appointments more limited
than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution.
Thus-
Mr. Rama: … May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be
recognized
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair’s indulgence, I just want to
take a few minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of
the amendments that I would like to propose to the
Committee this morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of
the Commission on Appointments be limited to the
department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but
not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16,
there were two (2) major changes proposed and approved
by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the
appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2)
the exclusion of appointments made under the second
sentence 9 of the section from the same requirement. The
records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission show the following:
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be
recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is
on page 7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words
“and bureaus,” and on line 28 of the same page, to change
the phrase ‘colonel or naval captain to MAJOR GENERAL
OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is co-
authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.)
after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page,
start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et
cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by
one. The first proposed amendment is to delete the words
“and bureaus” on line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other
Commissioners, what would be the justification of the
proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite
low in the executive department, and to require further
confirmation of presidential appointment of heads of directors no longer need confirmation by the Commission the President, as a matter of fact like those of the different
bureaus would subject them to political influence. on Appointment. constitutional commissions.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner’s proposed Section 16, therefore, would read: ‘The President shall FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in
amendment by deletion also includes regional directors as nominate, and with the consent of a Commission on Section 16 is not an exclusive list of those appointments
distinguished from merely staff directors, because the Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive which constitutionally require confirmation of the
regional directors have quite a plenitude of powers within departments, ambassadors. . . . Commission on Appointments,
the regions as distinguished from staff directors who only THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation
stay in the office. phrase ‘and bureaus’ on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The of the words I proposed.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the Chair hears none; the amendments is approved. FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his
supervision of the staff bureau directors. xxx xxx xxx proposed amendment?
xxx xxx xxx MR. ROMULO: Madam President. MR. DAVIDE: After ‘captain,’ add the following: AND
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized. OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE
Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner proposed an THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION.
amendment to delete ‘and bureaus on Section 16. Who MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed FR. BERNAS: How about:”AND OTHER OFFICERS
will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the amendment on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION
President? (.) after ‘captain’ and on line 29, delete ‘and all’ and UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION”?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY. MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by
their appointment shall no longer be subject to MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee the Committee.
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
same answer of Commissioner de Castro? have to be confirmed by the Commission on MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that
MR. FOZ: Yes. Appointments. excludes those officers which the Constitution does not
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. MR. DAVIDE: Madam President. require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized. like the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman.
of the Committee? xxx xxx xxx MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the
xxx xxx xxx MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an modification made by Commissioner Bernas.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels amendment to his amendment, so that after “captain” we THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed
that this matter should be submitted to the body for a vote. insert the following words: AND OTHER OFFICERS amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you. WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by CONSTITUTION? THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed
one. We will first vote on the deletion of the phrase ‘and FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague. amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as
bureaus on line 26, such that appointments of bureau MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided accepted by the Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears
for in the Constitution whose appointments are vested in
none; the amendment, as amended, is
approved 10
(Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and
third groups of officers can be made by the President
without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali
Gonzales, that the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word “also,” implies that the
President shall “in like manner” appoint the officers
mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the
President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said
second sentence in the same manner as he appoints
officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by
nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
Amicus curiae’s reliance on the word “also” in said second
sentence is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he
arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word
“also” could mean “in addition; as well; besides, too”
(Webster’s International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition)
which meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the
word “also” in said second sentence means that the
President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the
officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint
(without such consent (confirmation) the officers
mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible
meanings of the word “also” as used in the context of said
second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive
significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of
nomination by the President and appointment by the
President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only
of appointment by the President. And, this use of different
language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other
underscores a difference in message conveyed and
perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned Hand’s
observation that “words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition” but, more so, because the recorded
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly
and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose
appointments require no confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in
rank, compared to some officers whose appointments
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.
Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank
Governor requires no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the
Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely
underscore the purposive intention and deliberate
judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that,
except as to those officers whose appointments require
the consent of the Commission on Appointments by
express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII,
appointments of other officers are left to the President
without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to
presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987
Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing
and of the foreseeable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive
or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications
of such power should be strictly construed against them.
Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in
order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that
appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can
appoint, the intervenor Commission on Appointments
underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a
law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the
President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers,
it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed
by the President, subject also to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely
declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress
may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the
courts, or in the heads of the various departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No
reason however is submitted for the use of the word
“alone” in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the
considered opinion, after a careful study of the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that
the use of the word alone” after the word “President” in
said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than
anything else, a slip or lapses in draftsmanship. It will be
recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following
provision appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article
VII thereof —
…; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears
immediately after the provision which makes practically all
presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads
of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the
Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
herein provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; …
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a
general rule, presidential appointments to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935
Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to
provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers
lower in rank” referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out,
the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, except appointments to
offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use
in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word “alone”
after the word “President” in providing that Congress may
by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers whom
he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is
already vested in the President, without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the
second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could
have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked
officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment
in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various
departments of the government. In short, the word “alone”
in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3,
section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to
be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over
the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are
not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it
is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
first group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of
fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
includes “heads of bureaus” among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand,
deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus”
from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to
appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The
original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937,
otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs
shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as
the ‘Commissioner’) and Assistant Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation
in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws.
The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be
appointed by the proper department head.

Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27
October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601,
as thus amended, now reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The
Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant
chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner
(hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy
Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an
annual compensation in accordance with the rates
prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34)
were approved during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate
and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep.
Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony
with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the
appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorized by law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines
acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is
thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of
the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention
should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN.
PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B.
AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO
REYES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional
grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the
“Marines”) to join the Philippine National Police (the “PNP”)
in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in
Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered
the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols
for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (the “AFP”), the Chief of
the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government were tasked to execute and implement the
said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate,
the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar
B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000[1] (the
“LOI”) which detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols, called Task ForceTulungan, would be
conducted.[2] Task Force Tulungan was placed under the
leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous
directive on the deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the
Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. [3] In the
Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to
improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila
through a more effective crime prevention program
including increased police patrols.[4] The President further
stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis,
augmentation from the AFP is necessary.[5] Invoking his
powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence.[6] Finally, the President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved.[7]
The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine
Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:
xxx
2. PURPOSE:
The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between
the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in
the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the
suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats
to national security.
3. SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated
not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized
syndicates whose members include active and former
police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline
and firepower prove well-above the present capability of
the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint
PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police
visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of
crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former
police/military personnel.
4. MISSION:
The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to
conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro
Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street
patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile
crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime
syndicates whose members include those that are well-
trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former
PNP/Military personnel.
5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL
OPERATIONS:
a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the
NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the
Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and
to preserve the internal security of the state against
insurgents and other serious threat to national security,
although the primary responsibility over Internal Security
Operations still rests upon the AFP.
b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to
eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by
organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This
concept requires the military and police to work cohesively
and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic
approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line,
the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing
crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere
wherein delivery of basic services to the people and
development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint
NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police
Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and
order in their locality.
c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a
provisional Task Force “TULUNGAN” shall be organized to
provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the
integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and
assessing the security situation.
xxx.[8]
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI
are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta
Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati
Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and
Domestic Airport.[9]
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (the “IBP”) filed the instant petition to annul LOI
02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN
METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO
MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY,
THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT
IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS
INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN
FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT)
IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF
THE CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS
TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM
THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO
MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY
MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN
WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.[10]
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino
lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of
law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of
the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the
Court in a Resolution,[11] dated 25 January 2000, required
the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the
petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General
submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the
constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the
legal standing; that the question of deployment of the
Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same
involves a political question; that the organization and
conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-
up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier,
does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1)
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether
or not the President’s factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed
forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in
possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues
in the petition. Second, the President did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only if the following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[12]
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of
standing in this case.
“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined
as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.[13] The term “interest” means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest.[14] The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”[15]
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its
standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of
law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration,
however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of
its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty
to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing
in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared
by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the
standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a
specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the
case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the
standards of the law profession and to improve the
administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected
by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted
that the interest of the National President of the IBP who
signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board
resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be
sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included,
have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP,
assuming that it has duly authorized the National President
to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which
it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned
governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the
IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of
injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has
been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated
by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects
as injurious is the supposed “militarization” of law
enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic
institutions and may cause more harm than good in the
long run. Not only is the presumed “injury” not personal in
character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and
uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since
petitioner has not successfully established a direct and
personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it
does not possess the personality to assail the validity of
the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does
not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no
standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the
future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof,
satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain
judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized
that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a
suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal
standing when paramount interest is involved.[16] In not a
few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able
to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people.[17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure.[18] In this case, a reading of the
petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are
under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in
increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the
Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy
raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It
will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issue now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns
the factual determination of the President of the necessity
of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid
the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits
that the deployment of the military personnel falls under
the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated
in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically,
the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the
IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the
Marines under the aforestated provision. According to the
IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for
the calling of the military to assist the police force. It
contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP
prays that this Court “review the sufficiency of the factual
basis for said troop [Marine] deployment.”[19]
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends
that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the
armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it
involves a political question and the resolution of factual
issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are
the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent
of judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable
weight to the parties’ formulation of the issues, the
resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative
approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the
issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement
that the power exercised by the President is the power to
call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the
power involved may be no more than the maintenance of
peace and order and promotion of the general
welfare.[20] For one, the realities on the ground do not show
that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest
or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not
brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter
part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene
Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the
President’s powers as protector of the
peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power
of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency,
but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring
domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears
on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law,
in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in
any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration
of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers
short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial
law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order
and security.
xxx[21]
Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power
involved is the President’s power to call out the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a
similar result.
We now address the Solicitor General’s argument
that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the
judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus,
not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable
if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court
review.[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently
susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by
law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically
assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases
brought before it even in instances that are ripe for
resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates
to rule on are “political questions.” The reason is that
political questions are concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or
measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question
being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will
not normally interfere with the workings of another co-
equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the
courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Tañada v. Cuenco[23] puts it, political questions
refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government.” Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the
text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action
by a particular branch of government or to the people
themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the
classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v.
Carr,[24] “[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
the one question.”
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of
judicial review by providing that “(T)he Judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”[25] Under this definition,
the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the
issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction
of this Court to review. When the grant of power is
qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have
been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its
wisdom.[26] Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this
Court.[27] When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official
whose action is being questioned.[28]
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility.[29] Under this definition, a court is
without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this
Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of
Congress or of the President, it may look into the question
of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse
of discretion.[30] A showing that plenary power is granted
either department of government, may not be an obstacle
to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse
thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.[31]
When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the
framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The
Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to
give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exist no justification for
calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on
civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of
this Court’s duty of “purposeful hesitation”[32] before
declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
shall the Court interfere with the President’s judgment. To
doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the
Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers
of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
xxx
The full discretionary power of the President to
determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling
out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest
of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
xxx
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only
to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may
revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court
may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power
to declare martial law and the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the three powers and provided for their revocation
and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters.[33] That the
intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e.,
that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President,
is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission, to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add
that there is a graduated power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed
Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence;
then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a
graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his
judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to
review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence
by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this
lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he
says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment
cannot be reviewed by anybody.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have
imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first
sentence: “The President may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.” So we feel that that is sufficient for handling
imminent danger.
MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that
there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by
the First Sentence: “The President....may call out such
Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” So we feel that that is sufficient for
handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead
of imposing martial law or suspending the writ ofhabeas
corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces
of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the
idea?
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence
by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.[34]
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the
aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in
using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial
law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an
actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must
require it. These conditions are not required in the case of
the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is
that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may
call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the
President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the
exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other
powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the
assertion that the President acted without factual basis,
then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity
of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable
and cannot be objectively established since matters
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the
court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to
arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable
for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In
many instances, the evidence upon which the President
might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-
Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it
were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not
farfetched when we consider the present situation in
Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over
the other parts of the country. The determination of the
necessity for the calling out power if subjected to
unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription
for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed
by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every
time it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to
vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when
in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless
the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion
was gravely abused, the President’s exercise of judgment
deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity
and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, “[V]iolent
crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and
carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila...”[35] We do
not doubt the veracity of the President’s assessment of the
situation, especially in the light of present
developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the
recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the
shopping malls, public utilities, and other public
places. These are among the areas of deployment
described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we
hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call
for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of
this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character
of the police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency
situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP
asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of
Section 3, Article II[36] of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does
not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is
evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently
provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’
authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are
the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the
real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro
Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-
Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.[37] Under the LOI,
the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers
on police patrol procedures.[38] It is their responsibility to
direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.[39] It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to
the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers.[40] In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious
incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in
violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.[41]
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General
Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged
involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually
appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited
provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated
in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution,
the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it
does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually
participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not
exercise any authority or control over the same. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the
civilian character of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines
render nothing more than assistance required in
conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no
“insidious incursion” of the military in civilian affairs nor can
there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to
civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine
jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not
averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the
implementation and execution of certain traditionally “civil”
functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military
aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that
bring both the civilian and the military together in a
relationship of cooperation, are:
1. Elections;[42]
2. Administration of the Philippine National
Red Cross;[43]
 3. Relief and rescue operations during
calamities and disasters;[44]
4. Amateur sports promotion and
development;[45]
5. Development of the culture and the arts;[46]
6. Conservation of natural resources;[47]
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform
program;[48]
8. Enforcement of customs laws;[49]
9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement
activities;[50]
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;[51]
11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary
and high school students;[52]
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;[53]
[54]
13. Sanitary inspections;
14. Conduct of census work;[55]
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics
Board;[56]
16. Assistance in installation of weather
forecasting devices;[57]
17. Peace and order policy formulation in local
government units.[58]
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive
power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and,
yet, never before questioned.[59] What we have here is
mutual support and cooperation between the military
and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian
supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of
suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for
domestic purposes has persisted,[60] and whose
Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for
the power to call, the use of military personnel by civilian
law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances
similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the
Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act[61] of
the US, the use of the military in civilian law enforcement is
generally prohibited, except in certain allowable
circumstances. A provision of the Act states:
§ 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of
Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.[62]
To determine whether there is a violation of
the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel,
the US courts[63] apply the following standards, to wit:
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law
enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner
that the military personnel subjected the citizens to the
exercise of military power which was regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory[64] George Washington Law
Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which discusses the four
divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement
of military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise
HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY
FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in
nature, either presently or prospectively?
x x x
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal
context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even
when not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a
statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it
actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the
part of those claiming relief. A mere threat of some future
injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid
standards to the present case to determine whether there
is permissible use of the military in civilian law
enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation
of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is
committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the
observation of the Solicitor General:
3. The designation of tasks in Annex A[65] does not
constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not
control or direct the operation. This is evident from
Nos. 6,[66] 8(k)[67] and 9(a)[68] of Annex A. These
soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or
condemn. In No. 9(d)[69] of Annex A, all arrested
persons are brought to the nearest police stations
for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply
no coercive force. The materials or equipment
issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)[70] of Annex A,
are all low impact and defensive in character. The
conclusion is that there being no exercise of
regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military
power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine
Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military
power for civilian law enforcement.[71]
It appears that the present petition is anchored on
fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military
will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished
liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are
unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just that
- calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can
show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the
Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law,
exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of
the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the
President’s determination of the factual basis for the
calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint
visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has
complained that his political or civil rights have been
violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It
was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil
liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was
conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom
only when people feel secure in their homes and in the
streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy
constantly lurk in their midst.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on official leave.
Puno, J., see separate opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing, J., joins the opinion of J. Mendoza.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
If the case at bar is significant, it is because of the
government attempt to foist the political question
doctrine to shield an executive act done in the exercise of
the commander-in-chief powers from judicial scrutiny. If
the attempt succeeded, it would have diminished the
power of judicial review and weakened the checking
authority of this Court over the Chief Executive when he
exercises his commander-in-chief powers. The attempt
should remind us of the tragedy that befell the country
when this Court sought refuge in the political question
doctrine and forfeited its most important role as protector
of the civil and political rights of our people. The ongoing
conflict in Mindanao may worsen and can force the Chief
Executive to resort to the use of his greater commander-in-
chief powers, hence, this Court should be extra cautious in
assaying similar attempts. A laid back posture may not sit
well with our people considering that the 1987 Constitution
strengthened the checking powers of this Court and
expanded its jurisdiction precisely to stop any act
constituting “xxx grave abuse of jurisdiction xxx on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”1
The importance of the issue at bar includes this
humble separate opinion. We can best perceive the
different intersecting dimensions of the political question
doctrine by viewing them from the broader canvass of
history. Political questions are defined as “those questions
which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government.”2 They have
two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by
the people in their primary political capacity and (2)
matters which have been specifically delegated to some
other department or particular office of the government,
with discretionary power to act.3 The exercise of the
discretionary power of the legislative or executive branch
of government was often the area where the Court had to
wrestle with the political question doctrine.4
A brief review of some of our case law will thus give
us a sharper perspective of the political question
doctrine. This question confronted the Court as early as
1905 in the case of Barcelon v. Baker.5 The Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to a resolution
of the Philippine Commission, suspended the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas based
on a finding of open insurrection in said provinces. Felix
Barcelon, who was detained by constabulary officers in
Batangas, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that there was no open
insurrection in Batangas. The issue to resolve was
whether or not the judicial department may investigate the
facts upon which the legislative (the Philippine
Commission) and executive (the Governor-General)
branches of government acted in suspending the privilege
of the writ.
The Court ruled that under our form of government,
one department has no authority to inquire into the acts of
another, which acts are performed within the discretion of
the other department.6Surveying American law and
jurisprudence, it held that whenever a statute gives
discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him
upon his own opinion of certain facts, the statute
constitutes him the sole judge of the existence of those
facts.7 Since the Philippine Bill of 1902 empowered the
Philippine Commission and the Governor-General to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, this
power is exclusively within the discretion of the legislative
and executive branches of government. The exercise of
this discretion is conclusive upon the courts.8
The Court further held that once a determination is
made by the executive and legislative departments that the
conditions justifying the assailed acts exists, it will presume
that the conditions continue until the same authority decide
that they no longer exist.9 It adopted the rationale that the
executive branch, thru its civil and military branches,
are better situated to obtain information about peace and
order from every corner of the nation, in contrast with the
judicial department, with its very limited machinery.10 The
seed of the political question doctrine was thus planted in
Philippine soil.
The doctrine barring judicial review because of the
political question doctrine was next applied to the internal
affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to interfere in
the legislative exercise of disciplinary power over its own
members. In the 1924 case of Alejandrino v.
Quezon,11 Alejandrino, who was appointed Senator by the
Governor-General, was declared by Senate Resolution as
guilty of disorderly conduct for assaulting another Senator
in the course of a debate, and was suspended from office
for one year. Senator Alejandrino filed a petition for
mandamus and injunction to compel the Senate to
reinstate him. The Court held that under the Jones Law,
the power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an
appointive member from the exercise of his office. While
the Court found that the suspension was illegal, it refused
to issue the writ of mandamus on the ground that "the
Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to
make the Philippine Senate take any particular
action. [T]he Philippine Legislature or any branch thereof
cannot be directly controlled in the exercise of their
legislative powers by any judicial process."12
The issue revisited the Court twenty-two (22) years
later. In 1946, in Vera v. Avelino,13 three senators-elect
who had been prevented from taking their oaths of office
by a Senate resolution repaired to this Court to compel
their colleagues to allow them to occupy their seats
contending that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction
over contests relating to their election, returns and
qualifications. Again, the Court refused to intervene
citing Alejandrino and affirmed the inherent right of the
legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its
membership.
In the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito,14 three
Senators and eight representatives who were proclaimed
elected by Comelec were not allowed by Congress to take
part in the voting for the passage of the Parity amendment
to the Constitution. If their votes had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote
in either House of Congress to pass the amendment. The
amendment was eventually submitted to the people for
ratification. The Court declined to intervene and held that
a proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political
function performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity.15
In the 1955 case of Arnault v. Balagtas,16 petitioner,
a private citizen, assailed the legality of his detention
ordered by the Senate for his refusal to answer questions
put to him by members of one of its investigating
committees. This Court refused to order his release
holding that the process by which a contumacious witness
is dealt with by the legislature is a necessary concomitant
of the legislative process and the legislature's exercise of
its discretionary authority is not subject to judicial
interference.
In the 1960 case of Osmena v. Pendatun,17 the
Court followed the traditional line. Congressman Sergio
Osmena, Jr. was suspended by the House of
Representatives for serious disorderly behavior for making
a privilege speech imputing "malicious charges" against
the President of the Philippines. Osmena, Jr. invoked the
power of review of this Court but the Court once more did
not interfere with Congress' power to discipline its
members.
The contours of the political question doctrine have
always been tricky. To be sure, the Court did not always
stay its hand whenever the doctrine is invoked. In the
1949 case of Avelino v. Cuenco,18 Senate President Jose
Avelino, who was deposed and replaced, questioned his
successor's title claiming that the latter had been elected
without a quorum. The petition was initially dismissed on
the ground that the selection of Senate President was an
internal matter and not subject to judicial review.19 On
reconsideration, however, the Court ruled that it could
assume jurisdiction over the controversy in light of
subsequent events justifying intervention among which
was the existence of a quorum.20 Though the petition was
ultimately dismissed, the Court declared respondent
Cuenco as the legally elected Senate President.
In the 1957 case of Tanada v. Cuenco,21 the Court
assumed jurisdiction over a dispute involving the formation
and composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. It
rejected the Solicitor General's claim that the dispute
involved a political question. Instead, it declared that the
Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in
the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
and the exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are mandatory in nature.22 It
held that under the Constitution, the membership of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal was designed to insure the
exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election
contests affecting members of the lawmaking body.23 The
Court then nullified the election to the Senate Electoral
Tribunal made by Senators belonging to the party having
the largest number of votes of two of their party members
but purporting to act on behalf of the party having the
second highest number of votes.
In the 1962 case of Cunanan v. Tan, Jr.,24 the Court
passed judgment on whether Congress had formed the
Commission on Appointments in accordance with the
Constitution and found that it did not. It declared that the
Commission on Appointments is a creature of the
Constitution and its power does not come from Congress
but from the Constitution.
The 1967 case of Gonzales v. Comelec25 and the
1971 case of Tolentino v. Comelec26 abandoned Mabanag
v. Lopez-Vito. The question of whether or not Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly in proposing
amendments to the Constitution violates the Constitution
was held to be a justiciable and not a political
issue. In Gonzales, the Court ruled:
"It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political
one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not a
given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution-which was being
submitted to the people for ratification-satisfied the three-
fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The
force of this precedent has been weakened, however,
by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, Avelino v.
Cuenco, Tanada v. Cuenco, and Macias v. Commission on
Elections. In the first, we held that the officers and
employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its
supervision and control, not of that of the Senate
President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this
Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators
necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party
having the largest number of votes in said chamber,
purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators
belonging to the first party, as members, for the second
party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth,
we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting
to apportion the representative districts for the House of
Representatives upon the ground that the apportionment
had not been made as may be possible according to the
number of inhabitants of each province. Thus, we rejected
the theory, advanced in these four cases, that the issues
therein raised were political questions the determination of
which is beyond judicial review.”27
The Court explained that the power to amend the
Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. As a constituent assembly, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the fundamental law
and they do not have the final say on whether their acts
are within or beyond constitutional limits.28 This ruling was
reiterated in Tolentino which held that acts of a
constitutional convention called for the purpose of
proposing amendments to the Constitution are at par with
acts of Congress acting as a constituent assembly.29
In sum, this Court brushed aside the political
question doctrine and assumed jurisdiction whenever it
found constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of
powers conferred upon the Legislature.30
The Court hewed to the same line as regards the
exercise of Executive power. Thus, the respect accorded
executive discretion was observed in Severino v.
Governor-General,31where it was held that the Governor-
General, as head of the executive department, could not
be compelled by mandamus to call a special election in the
town of Silay for the purpose of electing a municipal
president. Mandamus and injunction could not lie to
enforce or restrain a duty which is discretionary. It was
held that when the Legislature conferred upon the
Governor-General powers and duties, it did so for the
reason that he was in a better position to know the needs
of the country than any other member of the executive
department, and with full confidence that he will perform
such duties as his best judgment dictates.32
 Similarly, in Abueva v. Wood,33 the Court held that
the Governor-General could not be compelled by
mandamus to produce certain vouchers showing the
various expenditures of the Independence
Commission. Under the principle of separation of powers,
it ruled that it was not intended by the Constitution that one
branch of government could encroach upon the field of
duty of the other. Each department has an exclusive field
within which it can perform its part within certain
discretionary limits.34 It observed that "the executive and
legislative departments of government are frequently
called upon to deal with what are known as political
questions, with which the judicial department of
government has no intervention. In all such questions, the
courts uniformly refused to intervene for the purpose of
directing or controlling the actions of the other department;
such questions being many times reserved to those
departments in the organic law of the state."35
In Forties v. Tiaco,36 the Court also refused to take
cognizance of a case enjoining the Chief Executive from
deporting an obnoxious alien whose continued presence in
the Philippines was found by him to be injurious to the
public interest. It noted that sudden and unexpected
conditions may arise, growing out of the presence of
untrustworthy aliens, which demand immediate action. The
President's inherent power to deport undesirable aliens is
universally denominated as political, and this power
continues to exist for the preservation of the peace and
domestic tranquility of the nation.37
In Manalang v. Quitoriano,38 the Court also declined
to interfere in the exercise of the President's appointing
power. It held that the appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations
may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from
the need of securing concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited
legislative power to prescribe qualifications to a given
appointive office.
We now come to the exercise by the President of his
powers as Commander-in-Chief vis-a-vis the political
question doctrine. In the 1940's, this Court has held that
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the
President has the power to determine whether war, in the
legal sense, still continues or has terminated. It ruled that
it is within the province of the political department and not
of the judicial department of government to determine
when war is at end.39
In 1952, the Court decided the landmark case
of Montenegro v. Castaneda.40 President Quirino
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for
persons detained or to be detained for crimes of sedition,
insurrection or rebellion. The Court,
citing Barcelon, declared that the authority to decide
whether the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension
of the privilege belongs to the President and his decision
is final and conclusive on the courts.41
Barcelon was the ruling case law until the 1971 case
of Lansang v. Garcia came.42 Lansang reversed the
previous cases and held that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was not a political
question. According to the Court, the weight
of Barcelon was diluted by two factors: (1) it relied heavily
on Martin v. Mott, which involved the U.S. President's
power to call out the militia which is a much broader power
than suspension of the privilege of the writ; and (2) the
privilege was suspended by the American Governor-
General whose act, as representative of the sovereign
affecting the freedom of its subjects, could not be equated
with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with
the freedom of the sovereign Filipino people.
The Court declared that the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is neither absolute
nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on the
exercise of executive discretion on the matter. These
limits are: (1) that the privilege must not be suspended
except only in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion
or imminent danger thereof; and (2) when the public safety
requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for
the suspension shall exist. The extent of the power which
may be inquired into by courts is defined by these
limitations.43
On the vital issue of how the Court may inquire into
the President's exercise of power, it ruled that the function
of the Court is not to supplant but merely to check the
Executive; to ascertain whether the President has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act. Judicial inquiry is confined to the
question of whether the President did not act
arbitrarily.44 Using this yardstick, the Court found that the
President did not.
The emergency period of the 1970's flooded the
Court with cases which raised the political question
defense. The issue divided the Court down the
middle. Javellana v. Executive Secretary45 showed that
while a majority of the Court held that the issue of whether
or not the 1973 Constitution had been ratified in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution was justiciable, a
majority also ruled that the decisive issue of whether the
1973 Constitution had come into force and effect, with or
without constitutional ratification, was a political question. 46
The validity of the declaration of martial law by then
President Marcos was next litigated before the
Court. In Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,47 it upheld the President's
declaration of martial law. On whether the validity of the
imposition of martial law was a political or justiciable
question, the Court was almost evenly divided. One-half
embraced the political question position and the other half
subscribed to the justiciable position in Lansang. Those
adhering to the political question doctrine used different
methods of approach to it.48
In 1983, the Lansang ruling was weakened by the
Court in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.49 The petitioners therein
were arrested and detained by the Philippine Constabulary
by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO). Petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. The Court found that the PCO had the function of
validating a person's detention for any of the offenses
covered in Proclamation No. 2045 which continued in force
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. It held that the issuance of the PCO by the
President was not subject to judicial inquiry.50 It went
further by declaring that there was a need to re-examine
Lansang with a view to reverting to Barcelon and
Montenegro. It observed that in times of war or national
emergency, the President must be given absolute control
for the very life of the nation and government is in great
peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his
conscience, the people, and God.51
But barely six (6) days after Garcia-Padilla, the Court
promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile52 reiterating Lansang. It
held that by the power of judicial review, the Court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of a person's
detention from the moment he was taken into custody up
to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the
petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy
itself that the due process clause of the Constitution has
been met.53
It is now history that the improper reliance by the
Court on the political question doctrine eroded the people's
faith in its capacity to check abuses committed by the then
Executive in the exercise of his commander-in-chief
powers, particularly violations against human rights. The
refusal of courts to be pro-active in the exercise of its
checking power drove the people to the streets to resort to
extralegal remedies. They gave birth to EDSA.
Two lessons were not lost to the members of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution. The first was the need to grant this Court the
express power to review the exercise of the powers as
commander-in-chief by the President and deny it of any
discretion to decline its exercise. The second was the
need to compel the Court to be pro-active by expanding its
jurisdiction and, thus, reject its laid back stance against
acts constituting grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government. Then Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, a member of the
Constitutional Commission, worked for the insertion of the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII in the draft
Constitution,54 which reads:
"Sec. 1. x x x.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
The language of the provision clearly gives the Court the
power to strike down acts amounting to grave abuse of
discretion of both the legislative and executive branches of
government.
We should interpret Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution in light of our constitutional history. The
provision states:
"Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
x x x."
It is clear from the foregoing that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of
the Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject to
two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary; and
(2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. Undeniably, these conditions lay down the sine
qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the
objective sought to be attained by the exercise of the
power. They define the constitutional parameters of the
calling out power. Whether or not there is compliance with
these parameters is a justiciable issue and is not a political
question.
I am not unaware that in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Bernas opined
that the President's exercise of the "calling out power,"
unlike the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the declaration of martial law, is not a
justiciable issue but a political question and therefore not
subject to judicial review.
It must be borne in mind, however, that while a
member's opinion expressed on the floor of the
Constitutional Convention is valuable, it is not necessarily
expressive of the people's intent.55The proceedings of the
Convention are less conclusive on the proper construction
of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of
the proper construction of a statute, for in the latter case it
is the intent of the legislature the courts seek, while in the
former, courts seek to arrive at the intent of
the people through the discussions and deliberations of
their representatives.56 The conventional wisdom is that
the Constitution does not derive its force from the
convention which framed it, but from the people who
ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.57
It is true that the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly gives the
Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual
bases used by the President in the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration
of martial law. It does not follow, however, that just
because the same provision did not grant to this Court the
power to review the exercise of the calling out power by
the President, ergo, this Court cannot pass upon the
validity of its exercise.
Given the light of our constitutional history, this
express grant of power merely means that the Court
cannot decline the exercise of its power because of the
political question doctrine as it did in the past. In fine, the
express grant simply stresses the mandatory duty of this
Court to check the exercise of the commander-in-chief
powers of the President. It eliminated the discretion of the
Court not to wield its power of review thru the use of the
political question doctrine.
It may be conceded that the calling out power may
be a "lesser power" compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
declare martial law. Even then, its exercise cannot be left
to the absolute discretion of the Chief Executive as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, as its impact on
the rights of our people protected by the Constitution
cannot be downgraded. We cannot hold that acts of the
commander-in-chief cannot be reviewed on the ground
that they have lesser impact on the civil and political rights
of our people. The exercise of the calling out power may
be "benign" in the case at bar but may not be so in future
cases.
The counsel of Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion
in Lansang that it would be dangerous and misleading to
push the political question doctrine too far, is apropos. It
will not be complementary to the Court if it handcuffs itself
to helplessness when a grievously injured citizen seeks
relief from a palpably unwarranted use of presidential or
military power, especially when the question at issue falls
in the penumbra between the "political" and the
"justiciable. "58
We should not water down the ruling that deciding
whether a matter has been committed by the Constitution
to another branch of government, or whether the action of
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation, and is a responsibility of the Court as
ultimate interpreter of the fundamental law.59 When private
justiciable rights are involved in a suit, the Court must not
refuse to assume jurisdiction even though questions of
extreme political importance are necessarily
involved.60 Every officer under a constitutional government
must act according to law and subject to the controlling
power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as
through the executive and legislative. One department is
just as representative of the other, and the judiciary is the
department which is charged with the special duty of
determining the limitations which the law places upon all
official action.61 Thishistoric role of the Court is the
foundation stone of a government of laws and not of
men.62
I join the Decision in its result.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
In the equation of judicial power, neither of two
extremes - one totalistic and the other bounded - is
acceptable nor ideal. The 1987 Constitution has
introduced its definition of the term "judicial power" to be
that which -
“x x x includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”1
It is not meant that the Supreme Court must be deemed
vested with the awesome power of overseeing the entire
bureaucracy, let alone of institutionalizing judicial
absolutism, under its mandate. But while this Court does
not wield unlimited authority to strike down an act of its two
co-equal branches of government, it must not wither under
technical guise on its constitutionally ordained task to
intervene, and to nullify if need be, any such act as and
when it is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The proscription then
against an interposition by the Court into purely political
questions, heretofore known, no longer holds within that
context.
Justice Feria, in the case of Avelino vs.
Cuenco,2 has aptly elucidated in his concurring opinion:
"x x x [I] concur with the majority that this Court has
jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so as to
establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions
as well."3
It is here when the Court must have to depart from the
broad principle of separation of powers that disallows an
intrusion by it in respect to the purely political decisions of
its independent and coordinate agencies of government.
The term grave abuse of discretion is long
understood in our jurisprudence as being, and confined to,
a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of
judgment amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Minus the not-so-unusual exaggerations often
invoked by litigants in the duel of views, the act of the
President in simply calling on the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, an executive prerogative, to assist the
Philippine National Police in "joint visibility patrols" in the
metropolis does not, I believe, constitute grave abuse of
discretion that would now warrant an exercise by the
Supreme Court of its extraordinary power as so envisioned
by the fundamental law.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the opinion of the Court insofar as it holds
petitioner to be without standing to question the validity of
LOI 02/2000 which mandates the Philippine Marines to
conduct "joint visibility" patrols with the police in Metro
Manila. But I dissent insofar as the opinion dismisses the
petition in this case on other grounds. I submit that
judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised by
petitioner must await an actual case involving real parties
with "injuries" to show as a result of the operation of the
challenged executive action. While as an organization for
the advancement of the rule of law petitioner has an
interest in upholding the Constitution, its interest is
indistinguishable from the interest of the rest of the
citizenry and falls short of that which is necessary to give
petitioner standing.
As I have indicated elsewhere, a citizens' suit
challenging the constitutionality of governmental action
requires that (1) the petitioner must have suffered an
"injury in fact" of an actual or imminent nature; (2) there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action by this Court.1 The "injury
in fact" test requires more than injury to a cognizable
interest. It requires that the party seeking review be
himself among those injured.2
My insistence on compliance with the standing
requirement is grounded in the conviction that only a party
injured by the operation of the governmental action
challenged is in the best position to aid the Court in
determining the precise nature of the problem
presented. Many a time we have adverted to the power of
judicial review as an awesome power not to be exercised
save in the most exigent situation. For, indeed, sound
judgment on momentous constitutional questions is not
likely to be reached unless it is the result of a clash of
adversary arguments which only parties with direct and
specific interest in the outcome of the controversy can
make. This is true not only when we strike down a law or
official action but also when we uphold it.
In this case, because of the absence of parties with
real and substantial interest to protect, we do not have
evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and
commercial centers, i.e., whether such presence is
coercive or benign. We do not know whether the presence
of so many marines and policemen scares shoppers,
tourists, and peaceful civilians, or whether it is reassuring
to them. To be sure, the deployment of troops to such
places is not like parading them at the Luneta on
Independence Day. Neither is it, however, like calling
them out because of actual fighting or the outbreak of
violence.
We need to have evidence on these questions
because, under the Constitution, the President's power to
call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation
that the exercise of this power is required in the interest of
public safety.3
Indeed, whether it is the calling out of the armed
forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial
law (in case of invasion or rebellion), the exercise of the
President's powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof
- not mere assertion.4 As has been pointed out, "Standing
is not `an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable'
. . . but requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible
harm."5
Because of the absence of such record evidence,
we are left to guess or even speculate on these
questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says
that what is involved here is not even the calling out of the
armed forces but only the use of marines for law
enforcement. (p. 13) At another point, however, the
majority opinion somersaults and says that because of
bombings perpetrated by lawless elements, the
deployment of troops in shopping centers and public
A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to
utilities is justified. (p. 24)
enjoin respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. from
We are likely to err in dismissing the suit brought in
this case on the ground that the calling out of the military promulgating his decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910,
does not violate the Constitution, just as we are likely to do entitled People of the Philippines versus Bernardino
so if we grant the petition and invalidate the executive
Marcelino, and for release from detention of petitioner, the
issuance in question. For indeed, the lack of a real,
earnest and vital controversy can only impoverish the accused in said case, on the ground of loss of jurisdiction
judicial process. That is why, as Justice Laurel
of respondent trial court over the case for failure to decide
emphasized in the Angara case, "this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be the same within the period of ninety [90] days from
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, submission thereof.
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented."6 Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XII. Trial was
We are told, however, that the issues raised in this
case are of "paramount interest" to the nation. It is conducted and the same was concluded when the
precisely because the issues raised are of paramount
accused rested his case on August 4, 1975. On the same
importance that we should all the more forego ruling on the
constitutional issues raised by petitioner and limit the date, however, the attorneys for both parties moved for
dismissal of this petition on the ground of lack of standing
time within which to submit their respective memoranda.
of petitioner. A Fabian policy of leaving well enough alone
is a counsel of prudence. The trial court granted the motion as follows:
Upon joint motion, the parties are given thirty [30] days to
For these reasons and with due appreciation of the
scholarly attention lavished by the majority opinion on the submit their respective memoranda, simultaneously, and
constitutional questions raised, I am constrained to limit my
thereafter the case shall be deemed submitted for decision
concurrence to the dismissal of this suit on the ground of
lack of standing o f petitioner and the consequent lack of of the Court.
an actual case or controversy.
Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due
time, but no memorandum was filed by the People.
On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the
G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983
Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said case for
BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner,
promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28,
vs.
1975. 1
THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., as Presiding Judge of
A certification dated January 26, 1976 was executed by
Branch XII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, PEOPLE
Postmaster Jesse A. Santos of the Grace Park Post
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN
Office2 to the effect that registered letters Nos. 011980 and
OF THE PROVINCIAL JAIL OF RIZAL,respondents.
011981, addressed to Marietta Ferrer of 9-E Mango Road,
Portero, Malabon, Rizal, the complaining witness, and Atty.
DECISION
Angel P. Purisima of 414 Shurdut Bldg., Intramuros,
ESCOLIN, J.:
Manila, counsel for the accused, respectively, were posted
in said office on December 4, 1975. These notices were
received by the respective addressees on December 8
and 9, 1975. 3
Similar notices were sent to the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig
and to the Provincial Warden of Pasig, Rizal, who both
4
received them on December 2, 1975,
On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel
for accused moved for postponement, raising for the first
time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for
failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission
thereof for decision. Acceding to counsel’s request that he
be given time to consider the proper remedial measure to
take, the respondent judge reset the promulgation of the
decision to January 19, 1976 at 8:30 A. M.
On January 19, 1976, counsel for petitioner moved anew
for the resetting of the promulgation of decision. Granting
the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the
promulgation to January 26, 1976.
Meanwhile, on January 12, 1976, counsel for the accused
filed before Us the present petition. On January 16, 1976,
this Court issued an Order temporarily restraining
respondent judge from promulgating the decision in
Criminal Case No. C-5910.
Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period
prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973
Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory
in character and that non-observance thereof results in the
loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.
We disagree. Undisputed is the fact that on November 28,
1975, or eighty- five (85) days from September 4, 1975 the
date the case was deemed submitted for decision,
respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the
decision in Criminal Case No. 5910. He had thus veritably
rendered his decision on said case within the three-month
period prescribed by the Constitution.
In Comia v. Nicolas, 5 Ago v. Court of
Appeals 6 and Balquidra v. Court of First Instance 7 this
Court ruled that the rendition of the judgment in trial courts
refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of
court. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision
cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and
not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that
should be considered in determining whether or not
respondent judge had resolved the case within the allotted
period. Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision
could not serve as the reckoning date because the same
necessarily comes at a later date, considering that notices
have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other
parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of
the judge. As pointed out in People v. Court of Appeals 8,
the promulgation of a judgment in the trial court does not
necessarily coincide with the date of its delivery by the
judge of the clerk of court.
Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in
full, to wit:
SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the
maximum period within which a case or matter shall be
decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall
be eighteen months for the Supreme court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all other
inferior courts.
To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-quoted
provision has been rendered by this Court. Thus, in
approaching this novel question, We now tread upon what
Mr. Cooley characterizes as “very dangerous ground when
they [referring to the courts] venture to apply rules which
distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the
provisions of a constitution.” 9
The established rule is that “constitutional provisions are to
be construed as mandatory, unless by express provision or
by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest.” 10
“The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the
general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter
of the law.” 11
In Trapp v. McCormick, 12 a case calling for the
interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty
[30] days within which a decree may be entered without
the consent of counsel, it was held that “the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity,
without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are
usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing
that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
Legislature or some incident of the essential act. ” Thus, in
said case, the statute under examination was construed
merely to be directory.
On this view, authorities are one in saying that:
Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or
immediately after the trial or verdict have been held by
some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance
with them does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory
that if the statute had intended such result it would clearly
have indicated it.” [American Tupe Founders Co. v.
Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742; Heillen v.
Phillips, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo.
App. 39, State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585, 5 Ann. Cas. 1000, 4
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1023, 92 S.W. 484; Wissman v. Meagher,

115 Mo. App. 82, 91 S.W. 448; Pohle v. Dickmann, 67 Mo.
App. 381;Herwick v. Koken Barber Supply Co., 61 Mo.
App. 454].
Such construction applies equally to the constitutional
provision under consideration. In Mikell v. School Dis. of
Philadelphia, 13 it was ruled that “the legal distinction
between directory and mandatory laws is applicable to
fundamental as it is to statutory laws.”
To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question
indicates that it falls within the exception rather than the
general rule. By the phrase “unless reduced by the
Supreme Court,” it is evident that the period prescribed
therein is subject to modification by this Court in
accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of
Article X of the New Constitution to “promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts
… ” And there can be no doubt that said provision, having
been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates
merely to matters of procedure. Albermarle Oil & Gas Co.
14
v. Morris, declares that constitutional provisions are
directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters
merely procedural.
In practice, We have assumed a liberal stand with respect
to this provision. This Court had at various times, upon
proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed
judges of inferior courts additional time beyond the three-
month period within which to decide cases submitted to
them. The reason is that a departure from said provision
would result in less injury to the general public than would
its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the
courts with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of
jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which conflicts
are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved
causes by reason merely of having failed to render a
decision within the alloted term. Such an absurd situation
could not have been intended by the framers of our
fundamental law.
As foreseen by Mr. Henry Campbell Black
his Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 15 the
constitutional provision in question should be held merely
as directory. “Thus, where the contrary construction) would
lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences,
it should not be followed.”
One last point, notwithstanding Our conclusion that courts
are not divested of their jurisdiction for failure to decide a
case within the ninety-day period, We here emphasize the
rule, for the guidance of the judges manning our courts,
that cases pending before theirsalas must be decided
within the aforementioned period. Failure to observe said
rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction
against the defaulting judge. In fact a certificate to this
effect is required before judges are allowed to draw their
salaries.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED; and the
Restraining Order dated January 16, 1976 issued by this
Court is lifted. Since respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr.
is already deceased, his successor is hereby ordered to
decide Criminal Case No. C-5910 on the basis of the
record thereof within ninety [90] days from the time the
case is raffled to him.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
in
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for
respondent Ong, Jr.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting
aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before
us is whether or not, in making that determination, the
HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of
the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found
for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues
raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualificationsof their respective members. (See Article
VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete. The use of the word soleemphasizes
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168
SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution,
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and
exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole"
emphasizes the exclusive character of
the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra at p.
162). The exercise of power by the
Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had originally
remained in the legislature." (id., at p.
175) Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and
complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39
Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal and it remained as
full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the Legislature and
the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v.
Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same
may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal
under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the
Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a
matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be
reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes
the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the
same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral
Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780
[1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of
the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in
the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power
as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429
[1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any
event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous
area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has
to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of
discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been
given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the
government to determine whether or not they have acted
within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII,
Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not
that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET
alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA
668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power,
the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the
tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of
their functions independent organs — independent of
Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to
HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
[1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and
careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this
exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the
Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the
present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists
today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political
composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is
nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET
because of its composition any less independent from the
Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The
degree of judicial intervention should not be made to
depend on how many legislative members of the HRET
belong to this party or that party. The test remains the
same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of
power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private
respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence
in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he
bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was
born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring populace were concerned.
relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
assimilation into the community.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private
respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's
and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the
family constructed another one in place of their ruined
years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-
house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang
Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
was their abode and home.
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice.
After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private
in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
respondent who was born in 1948.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this
family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in
country. He decided to put up a hardware store and
Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still
shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two
doors of which were reserved for the family.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As
a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the
The private respondent graduated from college, and
meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of
thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where
he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the
February 15, 1954. respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the
Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,
however, he worked in the hardware business of his family
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared
in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as
Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship
take his Oath of Allegiance. formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full
brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional
Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization
on this subject.
was issued to him.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang,
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private
Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.
respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. There is
nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named perform any act to acquire or perfect (Records of the
Desiree Lim. their citizenship. Those who elect Constitutional
Philippine citizenship in accordance Commission, Vol.
with paragraph 3 hereof shall be 1, p. 228;
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr.
deemed natural-born citizens. Emphasis
registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
supplied)
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as
applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship xxx xxx xxx
The private respondent after being engaged for several
after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
years in the management of their family business decided
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that
to be of greater service to his province and ran for public Mr. Trenas: The
date.
office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran Committee on
in the elections for representative in the second district of Citizenship, Bill of
Northern Samar. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an Rights, Political
unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. Rights and
There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Obligations and
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of
Constitutional Commission, viz: Human Rights
Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even
has more or less
if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong
decided to extend
would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes. Mr. Azcuna: With
the interpretation
respect to the
of who is a
provision of
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article natural-born
section 4, would
IV read: citizen as
this refer only to
provided in
those who elect
section 4 of the
SECTION 1, the following are citizens Philippine
1973 Constitution
of the Philippines: citizenship after
by adding that
the effectivity of
persons who have
the 1973
1. Those who are citizens of the elected Philippine
Constitution or
Philippines at the time of the adoption Citizenship under
would it also
of the Constitution; the 1935
cover those who
Constitution shall
elected it under
be natural-born?
2. Those whose fathers or mothers the 1973
Am I right Mr.
are citizens of the Philippines; Constitution?
Presiding Officer?

3. Those born before January 17, Fr. Bernas: It

Fr. Bernas: yes.
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect would apply to
Philippine citizenship upon reaching anybody who
the age of majority; and elected Philippine xxx xxx xxx
citizenship by
virtue of the
4. Those who are naturalized in Mr. Nolledo: And I
provision of the
accordance with law. remember very
1935 Constitution
well that in the
whether the
Reverend Father
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are election was done
Bernas' well
those who are citizens of the before or after
written book, he
Philippines from birth without having to January 17, 1973.
said that the
 decision was Fr. Bernas: However, those
designed merely Correct. We are born of Filipino
to accommodate quite aware of mothers but alien
former delegate that and for that fathers would
Ernesto Ang and reason we will have to elect
that the definition leave it to the Philippine
on natural-born body to approve citizenship upon
has no retroactive that provision of reaching the age
effect. Now it section 4. of majority; and if
seems that the they do elect, they
Reverend Father become Filipino
Mr. Rodrigo: I
Bernas is going citizens but not
think there is a
against this natural-born
good basis for the
intention by Filipino citizens.
provision because
supporting the (Records of the
it strikes me as
amendment? Constitutional
unfair that the
Commission, Vol.
Filipino citizen
1, p. 356)
Fr. Bernas: As the who was born a
Commissioner day before
can see, there January 17, 1973 The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the
has been an cannot be a framers. To make the provision prospective from February
evolution in my Filipino citizen or 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an
thinking. (Records a natural-born inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
of the citizen. (Records
Constitutional of the
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts
Commission, Vol. Constitutional
are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its
1, p. 189) Commission, Vol.
language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail
1, p. 231)
over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter
xxx xxx xxx would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of
xxx xxx xxx Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
Mr. Rodrigo: But
this provision Mr. Rodrigo: The A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to
becomes very purpose of that give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at
important provision is to which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision
because his remedy an which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v.
election of inequitable Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
Philippine situation.
citizenship makes Between 1935
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason
him not only a and 1973 when
v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
Filipino citizen but we were under
a natural-born the 1935
Filipino citizen Constitution, To that primordial intent, all else is
entitling him to those born of subordinated. Our Constitution, any
run for Congress. Filipino fathers constitution is not to be construed
.. but alien mothers narrowly or pedantically for the
were natural-born prescriptions therein contained, to
Filipinos. paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
 mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form but are organic
living institutions, the significance of
which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father
and an alien mother was automatically granted the status
of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier
laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers
and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father
were placed on equal footing. They were both considered
as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born"
cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time
or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the
same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted,
that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and,
therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either
before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore
curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the
inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and
thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at
the time had it not been for the curative provisions.
(See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a
natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV
of the Constitution accords natural born status to children
born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He
was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have
divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed
a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of
his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had
been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we
held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his
right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they
were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of
Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial
distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino
since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the
child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession
requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting
a license. He has participated in political exercises as a
Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino
citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he
does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing
to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of
Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage.
They should know him better than any member of this
Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming
numbers to have him represent them in Congress.
Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered
him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to
Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public
office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries. There is no
doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when
he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the
part of the private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.
How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how
Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong
Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as
such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not,
validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature
taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death
and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father
through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v.
Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run
against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has
already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak.
To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have
long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously
he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie
to defend himself were this matter to be made a central
issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of
citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to
determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of
authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the
respondent traces his natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino
when he came of age. At that time and up to the present,
both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent
Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless
he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of
a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a
problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his
father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET
as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion.
The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already
been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971
and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of
the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full
blood brother of the respondent, was declared and
accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the
Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and
the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the
HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's
declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of
April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the
status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish
subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those
who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are
Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or
mother, even though they were born
out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained
naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who
may have acquired domicile in any
town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis
supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual
residence. This domicile, once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of
Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of
Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a
certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of
his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued
until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the
19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his
business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te
falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of
the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he,
nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact
that he died in China, during one of his visits in said
country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact
that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines
and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a
Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having
established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of
Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the
Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who
has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a
domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II)
Apriori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in
concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born
Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that
document presented to prove it were not in compliance
with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that
the private respondent failed to present the original of the
documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the
transcript of the proceedings of the body which the
aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private
respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence
rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET
that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the
minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional
Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo,
Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by
Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law
Center, in their respective testimonies given before the
HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency
which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp.
30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February
1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty.
Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to
such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was
also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty.
Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to
produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be
of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that
after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be
found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
[1918])
The petitioners question the residence qualification of
Since the execution of the document and the inability to respondent Ong.
produce were adequately established, the contents of the
questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence"
by the recollection of witnesses.
under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been
understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the Constitution.
former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal
hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents
a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as
presented during the hearing of the election protest
that of domicile, to wit:
against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN,
February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
Mr. Nolledo: With
respect to Section
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-
5, I remember
president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he
that in the 1971
was presiding officer of the plenary session which
Constitutional
deliberated on the report on the election protest against
Convention, there
Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of
was an attempt to
delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice
require residence
Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could
in the place not
have presented any one of the long list of delegates to
less than one
refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born
year immediately
citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
preceding the day
contents of the documents presented by the private
of the elections.
respondent. They merely relied on the procedural
So my question
objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence
is: What is the
presented.
Committee's
concept of
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the residence of a
qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. candidate for the
The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is legislature? Is it
the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a actual residence
member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on or is it the concept
the controversies over which they were sole judges. of domicile or
Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of constructive
all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. residence?
Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we
cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of
Mr. Davide:
discretion. We have to keep clear the line
Madame
between error and grave abuse.
President, in so
far as the regular
 members of the Ms. Rosario residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
National Braid: Yes, So, continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words,
Assembly are would the domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v.
concerned, the gentlemen Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
proposed section consider at the
merely provides, proper time to go
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was
among others, back to actual
the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.
and a resident residence rather
Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never
thereof, that is, in than mere
abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even
the district, for a intention to
up to the present.
period of not less reside?
than one year
preceding the day The private respondent, in the proceedings before the
Mr. De los Reyes:
of the election. HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted
But we might
This was in effect their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
encounter some
lifted from the
difficulty
1973 Constitution,
especially Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their
the interpretation
considering that a house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their
given to it was
provision in the family, two doors of which were reserved as their family
domicile.
Constitution in the residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
(Records of the
Article on
1987
Suffrage says that
Constitutional The petitioners' allegation that since the private
Filipinos living
Convention, Vol. respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
abroad may vote
11, July 22, 1986. cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
as enacted by
p. 87)
law. So, we have
to stick to the The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name
xxx xxx xxx original concept of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of
that it should be his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant
by domicile and to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof
Mrs. Rosario
not physical and (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still
Braid: The next
actual residence. in the names of his parents.
question is on
(Records of the
Section 7, page 2.
1987
I think Even assuming that the private respondent does not own
Constitutional
Commissioner any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case
Commission, Vol.
Nolledo has ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it
11, July 22, 1986,
raised the same is not required that a person should have a house in order
p. 110)
point that to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that
"resident" has he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in
been interpreted The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
at times as a definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it
matter of intention as having the same meaning as domicile.
rather than actual To require the private respondent to own property in order
residence. to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence property qualification. The Constitution only requires that
to which when absent for business or pleasure, one the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and
Mr. De los Reyes: intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Domicile. 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent Constitution that the candidate should also own property in
order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96
Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in
Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to
practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon
the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the
periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that
he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has,
rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our
history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays,
Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other
nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our
country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded
nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To
mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the
late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese,
and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also
part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud
were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest
wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must
forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of
citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who
qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our
antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent
backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the
indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often
corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and
whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical
traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised
to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful
examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A
more humane, more indubitable and less technical
approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong,
Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and
Gancayco, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek
to annul the decision * of respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to
as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared
private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22
February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the
Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to be a
Member of the House of Representatives and to declare
him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest
number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly
elected representative of the second legislative district of
Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner
Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent
Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not
qualified for membership in the House of Representatives
and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected
representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and
private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the
candidates for the position of Representative or
Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private
respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987
with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes
over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number
of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election
protests against private respondent with the tribunal,
docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively.
Both protests raised almost the same issues and were
thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning,
Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section
6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article
IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar,
in contemplation of Section 6, Article
VI of the same Constitution, for a
period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the
congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November
1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to
the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore,
declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the
House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines,
representing the second legislative district of Northern
Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated
proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on
June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses
Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong
Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place
of birth is Laoang which is now one of
the municipalities comprising the
province of Northern Samar (Republic
Act No. 6132 approved on August 24,
1970 and the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong
Chuan was born in China and arrived
in Manila on December 16, 1915.
(Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter,
he took up residence in Laoang,
Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married
Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was
celebrated according to the rites and
practices of the Roman Catholic
Church in the Municipality of Laoang
(Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose
Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, both her
parents at the time of her birth being
Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Jose Ong Chuan.
Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine (Exh. F)
citizenship, filed his petition for
naturalization with the Court of First
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan
Instance of Samar, pursuant to
having taken the corresponding oath
Commonwealth Act No. 473,
of allegiance to the Constitution and
otherwise known as the Revised
the Government of the Philippines as
Naturalization Law.
prescribed by Section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, was
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First issued the corresponding Certificate of
Instance of Samar rendered a Naturalization. (Exh. G)
decision approving the application of
Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L.
declaring said petitioner a Filipino
Ong, a full-brother of the protestee
citizen "with all the rights and
and a son born on July 25, 1937 at
privileges and duties, liabilities and
Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose
obligations inherent to Filipino citizens.
Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was
(Exh. E)
elected delegate from Northern Samar
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court
issued an order:
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it
was established that he had attended
(1) declaring the grade school in Laoang. Thereafter,
decision of this he went to Manila where he finished
Court of April 28, his secondary as well as his college
1955 final and education. While later employed in
executory; Manila, protestee however went home
to Laoang whenever he had the
opportunity to do so, which invariably
(2) directing the
would be as frequent as twice to four
clerk of court to
times a year.
issue the
corresponding
Certificate of 11. Protestee also showed that being
Naturalization in a native and legal resident of Laoang,
favor of the he registered as a voter therein and
applicant Ong correspondingly voted in said
Chuan who municipality in the 1984 and 1986
prefers to take his elections.
oath and register
his name as Jose
12. Again in December 1986, during
Ong Chuan.
the general registration of all voters in
Petitioner may
the country, Protestee re-registered as
take his oath as
a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay
Filipino citizen
Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's
under Ms new
affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is
christian name,
 a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh.
7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's
decision having been denied, petitioners filed the present
petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of
the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision
vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives. 2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present
controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents'
contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence
to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to
decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held
in Morrero vs.Bocar, 3 construing Section 4, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the
(electoral) commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, "upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of
due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73
Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-
bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more
than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of
ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the
electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by
constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests
relating to such matters. The present controversy,
however, involves no less than a determination of whether
the qualifications for membership in the House of
Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have
been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss
in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the
Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the
House of Representatives, solely because the House
Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a
case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to
require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of
private respondent for the office of Member of the House
of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners
who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the
office illegally held by private respondent. From this
additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly
perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by
another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for
this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision
of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention
of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of
powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a
function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of
interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine
and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory)
interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of
the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the
State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate
area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B.
Sevisher, 1958, p. 36). 4
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest
and concern to determine whether or not private
respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a
public office which is specifically reserved by the
Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the
evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent
tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned
decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution 5 requires that a Member of the House of
Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines
natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987
Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of
the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting
the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The first
sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic
definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private
respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines
under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
because he did not have "to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship." It bears to
repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still
a minor of 9 years he already became
a Filipino citizen by declaration of law.
Since his mother was a natural-born
citizen at the time of her marriage,
protestee had an inchoate right to
Philippine citizenship at the moment of
his birth and, consequently the
declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA
473 that he was a Filipino citizen
retroacted to the moment of his birth
without his having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such Philippine
citizenship. 6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such
kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private
respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses
Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In
other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese
citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his
father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized
Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was
enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19
June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the
Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose
mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in
order to be considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a
natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution,
private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the
Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth,
although from birth, private respondent had the right to
elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother,
but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law
(C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father),
who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization
of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, 8 this
does not alter the fact that private respondent was not
born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of
CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-
born citizen merely because he did not have to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent
could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the
operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid
and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private
respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that
only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a
Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral
attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an
electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong
Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that
the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must
emanate from the Government and must be made in a
proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-
naturalization directed against the proper party, who in
such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however,
afforded the character of impregnability under the principle
of res judicata. 9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion
made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or
his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain
conditions the privilege of citizenship.
He may accept the offer and become
a citizen upon compliance with the
prescribed conditions, but not
otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of
right. He can only become a citizen
upon and after a strict compliance with
the acts of Congress. An applicant for
this high privilege is bound, therefore,
to conform to the terms upon which
alone the right he seeks can be
conferred. It is his province, and he is
bound, to see that the jurisdictional
facts upon which the grant is
predicated actually exist and if they do
 not he takes nothing by this paper
grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege
to a specified class of persons, no
other person is entitled to such
privilege, nor to a certificate purporting
to grant it, and any such certificate
issued to a person not so entitled to
receive it must be treated as a mere
nullity, which confers no legal rights as
against the government, from which it
has been obtained without warrant of
law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most
discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor." 11
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made
by the petitioners that the naturalization of private
respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court
should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization
proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more
inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat
for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
office. 12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the
citizenship of private respondent is derived from his father.
If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning,
then there is nothing from which private respondent can
derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring
cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private
respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship
by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would
constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against
the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose
Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section
12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI
issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the
applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to
take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application
for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper
and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the
issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said
order. 13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, 14 this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of
allegiance on the same day as
issuance of order granting citizenship
is irregular and makes the
proceedings so taken null and void.
(Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244
[1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil.
1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the
naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's
father) was null and void. It follows that the private
respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be
considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing
the clerk of court to issue the certificate of naturalization to
Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance
was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of
Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic
naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a
Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or
perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private
respondent acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino
citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother
was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to
an examination of the second sentence in Article IV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner
of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the
same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen
to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. The right or privilege of election is
available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers
under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973
Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted
in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion
as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment
by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-born"
Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship —
all in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support
private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the
House of Representatives. 15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of
section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino
mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973
and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect
Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born
Filipino citizen. 16
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the
constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to
refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of
Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the
1987 Constitution was (sic) intended
by its (sic) framers to be endowed,
without distinction, to all Filipinos by
election pursuant to the 1935
Constitution is more than persuasively
established by the extensive
interpellations and debate on the issue
 as borne by the official records of the MR. TRENAS: whether it is
1986 Constitutional Commission. 17 The Committee contrary to the
on Citizenship, spirit is something
Bill of Rights, that has been
Although I find the distinction as to when election of
Political Rights debated before
Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at
and Obligations and is being
bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of
and Human debated even
the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship,
Rights has more now. We will
as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the
or less decided to recall that during
controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional
extend the the 1971
provisions in question.
interpretation of Constitutional
who is a natural- Convention, the
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, born Filipino status of natural-
interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the citizen as born citizenship of
1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in provided in one of the
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even Section 4 of the delegates, Mr.
nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus — 1973 Constitution, Ang, was
by adding that challenged
persons who have precisely because
The ascertainment of that intent is but
elected Philippine he was a citizen
in keeping with the fundamental citizenship under by election.
principle of constitutional construction the 1935 Finally, the 1971
that the intent of the framers of the
Constitution shall Constitutional
organic law and of the people be considered Convention
adopting it should be given effect. The natural-born. Am I considered him a
primary task in constitutional
right, Mr. natural-born
construction is to ascertain and Presiding Officer? citizen, one of the
thereafter assure the realization of the requirements to
purpose of the framers and of the be a Member of
people in the adoption of the FR BERNAS:
the 1971
Constitution. It may also be safely Yes.
Constitutional
assumed that the people in ratifying Convention. The
the constitution were guided mainly by reason behind
MR. TRENAS:
the explanation offered by the
And does the that decision was
framers. 18 that a person
Commissioner
think that tills under his
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission addition to circumstances
relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) Section 4 of the already had the
of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of 1973 Constitution inchoate right to
petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before would be contrary be a citizen by the
17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine to the spirit of that fact that the
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are section? mother was a
to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens. Filipino. And as a
matter of fact, the
FR BERNAS: 1971
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Yes, we are quite
Constitutional
Commissioner Treñas specifically asked Commissioner aware that it is Convention
Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus: contrary to the formalized that
letter really. But
recognition by
 adopting the 1935 become Filipino
paragraph 2 of Constitution? citizens, yet, but
Section 1 of the not natural-born
1971 Constitution. Filipino citizens.
FR BERNAS: It
So, the entire
would apply to
purpose of this
anybody who The 1973 Constitution equalized the
proviso is simply
elected Philippine status of those born of Filipino
to perhaps
citizenship by mothers and those born of Filipino
remedy whatever
virtue of the fathers. So that from January 17, 1973
injustice there
provision of the when the 1973 Constitution took
may be so that
1935 Constitution, effect, those born of Filipino mothers
these people born
whether the but of alien fathers are natural-born
before January
election was done Filipino citizens. Also, those who are
17, 1973 who are
before or after 17 born of Filipino fathers and alien
not naturalized
January 1973. 20 mothers are natural-born Filipino
and people who
citizens.
are not natural
born but who are And during the period of amendments. Commissioner
in the same Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as If the 1973 Constitution equalized the
situation as we Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the status of a child born of a Filipino
are considered 1987 Constitution, thus: mother and that born of a Filipino
natural-born father, why do we not give a chance to
citizens. So, the a child born before January 17, 1973,
intention of the MR. RODRIGO:
if and when he elects Philippine
Committee in The purpose of
citizenship, to be in the same status
that proviso is to
proposing this is as one born of a Filipino father —
to equalize their remedy an
namely, natural-born citizen.
status. 19 inequitable
situation.
Between 1935 Another thing I stated is equalizing the
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born and 1973, when status of a father and a mother vis-a-
citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner we were under vis the child. I would like to state also
Azcuna thus: the 1935 that we showed equalize the status of
Constitution, a child born of a Filipino mother the
those born of day before January 17, 1973 and a
MR. AZCUNA:
Filipino fathers child born also of a Filipino mother on
With respect to
but alien mothers January 17 or 24 hours later. A child
the proviso in
were natural-born born of a Filipino mother but an alien
Section 4, would
Filipinos. father one day before January 17,
this refer only to
However, those 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects
those who elect
born of Filipino Philippine citizenship, but he is not a
Philippine
mothers but alien natural-born Filipino citizen. However,
citizenship after
fathers would the other child who luckily was born 24
the effectivity of
have to elect hours later — maybe because of parto
the 1973
Philippine laborioso — is a natural-born Filipino
Constitution or
citizenship upon citizen. 21
would it also
reaching the age
cover those who
of majority; and, if
elected it under
they do elect, they
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen
was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino
mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity
date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien
spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born
to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino
citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of
the age of majority, may be made before or after 17
January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in
consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's
individual interests, 22 and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or
before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien
spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on
19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or
soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-
born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital
question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine
citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to
the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino
mother and an alien father had
exercised the right of suffrage when
he came of age, the same constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare)
[sic] The acts of the petitioner in
registering as a voter, participating in
elections and campaigning for certain
candidates were held by the Supreme
Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship.
Accordingly, even without complying
with the formal requisites for election,
the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was
judicially upheld. 23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be
patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be
made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act mandate that the option to
elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not
impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio
Mallare 25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of
the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the
doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not
applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal
failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625
was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years
before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of
election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect
the presentation of a formal deed to
that effect considering that prior to the
enactment of Commonwealth Act 625
on June 7, 1941, no particular
proceeding was required to exercise
the option to elect Philippine
citizenship, granted to the proper party
by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. 26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a
Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate
(natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus
followed her citizenship. I therefore agree with
the petitioners' submission that,
inciting the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal
had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by
operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the
law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him.
For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private
respondent's father was valid, and that there was no
further need for private respondent to elect Philippine
citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino
citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the
Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by
him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the
Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship
derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching
the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable
time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he
cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I
am constrained to state that private respondent is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is
disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of
Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the
issue of required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives
must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be
elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of
the petitioners can replace private respondent as the
Representative of the second legislative district of Northern
Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the
petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the
House of Representatives representing the second district
of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon a candidate is not Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of
L.Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) entitled to the Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father and
EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal, 27 is controlling. There office because of mother.
we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo fraud or
warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as irregularities in
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971
mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he the election is
Constitutional Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the quite different
was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of from that
House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a
Baguio City for mayor of that City. produced by
natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially
declaring a
impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not
person ineligible
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision
to hold such an
for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of
office. . . . If it be
if it is labelled an election protest. 28 It is a proceeding to its decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in
found that the
unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily reference to this submission, said:
successful
to install the protestant in his place. 29
candidate
(according to the Be that as it may and in the light of the
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority board of Tribunal's disposition of protestee's
of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an canvassers) citizenship based on an entirely
election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next obtained a different set of circumstances, apart
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a plurality in an from the indisputable fact that the
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the illegal manner, matters attempted to be brought in
election is a nullity. 30 and that another issue in connection therewith are too
candidate was the far removed in point of time and
real victor, the relevance from the decisive events
Sound policy dictates that public
former must retire relied upon by the Tribunal, we view
elective offices are filled by those who in favor of the these two issues as being already
have the highest number of votes cast latter. In the other inconsequential. 33
in the election for that office, and it is a case, there is not,
fundamental idea in all republican strictly speaking,
forms of government that no one can a contest, as the The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to
be declared elected and no measure wreath of victory predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship
can be declared carried unless he or it cannot be by naturalization of private respondent's father
receives a majority or plurality of the (Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of
transferred from
legal votes cast in the election. (20 an ineligible to Philippine citizenship by private respondent.
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676). any other
candidate when Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971
As early as 1912, this Court has the sole question Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-
already declared that the candidate is the eligibility of 07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and
who lost in an election cannot be the one receiving Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his
proclaimed the winner in the event a plurality of the citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election
that the candidate who won is found legally cast Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention
ineligible for the office to which he was ballots. . . . 31 heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a
elected. This was the ruling in Topacio report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of
v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) — The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 which stated:
Constitutional Convention as a natural-born
Again, the effect Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case. It appearing that protestee's
of a decision that grandfather was himself a Filipino
 citizen under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty
of Paris of December 10, 1898, thus
conferring upon protestee's own
father, Ong Chuan, Philippine
citizenship at birth, the conclusion is
inescapable that protestee himself is a
natural-born citizen, and is therefore
qualified to hold the office of delegate
to the Constitutional Convention. 34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed
against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of
the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials. 35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to
say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention
decision in the Emil L. Ong case
involved the 1935Constitution; the
present case, on the other hand
involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no
specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987
Constitution contains a precise and
specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2,
Art. IV thereof and private respondent
does not qualify under such definition
in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case
of Emil L. Ong was a decision of
apolitical body, not a court of law. And,
even if we have to take such a
decision as a decision of aquasi-
judicial body (i.e., a political body
exercising quasi-judicial functions),
said decision in the Emil L. Ong case
can not have the category or character
of res judicata in the present judicial
controversy, because between the two
(2) cases, there is no identity of
parties (one involves Emil L. Ong,
while the other involves private
respondent) and, more importantly,
there is no identity of causes of action
because the first involves the 1935
Constitution while the second involves
the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on
procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted before
the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court,
does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong
before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially
adopted by private respondent in the present controversy.
This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L.
Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under
the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" — and this
appears crucial and central to its decision — that Emil L.
Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his descendants
like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent)
became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a
Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was
therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law
expressly declared that all inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who
were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands." (Section 4,
Philippine Bill of
1902). 36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te
private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was
"an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside
therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he
met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then,
Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a
Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z
,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the
"Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show
that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar
where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners
(protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a
certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records
and Management and Archives Office, stating that the
name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central
de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend
to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close
to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing
in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to
private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs
or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT
ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE,
except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the
majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted
any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of
Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not
surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father
or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim
Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino
citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead
applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the
House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed
the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the
light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino
citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to
look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had
become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902
was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held
in Lee vs. Commissioners of
Immigration: 37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in
a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding Court or
administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court
in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8
May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is
contended by private respondent that the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case
was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L.
Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the
Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private
respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee
Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it
would help to look into the circumstances of the case
brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or
disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both
candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May
1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification with
the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed
as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a natural-
born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the Identical
issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94)
The motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting
Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong(SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R.
Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner
for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and
considering that at the hearing this
morning, it was brought out that the
1971 Constitutional Convention, at its
session of November 28, 1972, after
considering the Report of its
Committee on Election Protests and
Credentials, found that the protest
questioning the citizenship of the
protestee (the petitioner herein) was
groundless and dismissed Election
Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed
against said petitioner (p. 237, Rollo),
the authenticity of the Minutes of said
session as well as of the said
Committee's Report having been duly
admitted in evidence without objection
and bears out, for now, without need
for a full hearing, that petitioner is a
natural-born citizen, the Court
Resolved to ISSUE, effective
immediately, a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further
hearing on the disqualification case
entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at
3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any
other day, except to dismiss the
same.This is without prejudice to any
appropriate action that private
respondent may wish to take after the
elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No.
67201 was rendered without the benefit of a hearing on
the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and
merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is
quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action
that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the
elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the
resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the
1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further
proceeding in regard to the same question and that,
consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to
such recognition. How much more when the Constitution
involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987
Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all
such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still
inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private
respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the
second district of Northern Samar, would have had to
cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full
membership of the Court had participated in this case, with
the result that the legislative district would cease to have,
in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in
cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the
Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when
the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar cast the majority of their votes for private
respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully
eligible and qualified for the office because he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief
can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the
Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the
Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says,
"Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is
worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even
aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private
respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT
QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a
question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves
facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite
agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. 1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not
substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows
better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 2 it was
held that this Court can not review the errors of the
Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all
election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and
unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is
to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred
expanded powers on the Court, 3 but as the Charter states,
our authority is "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 4 It is not to review
facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical
exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or
otherwise, to denial of due process of law. 5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a
matter of opinion with which men may differ, but certainly,
it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal
has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has
begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the
Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the
Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the
Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently,
is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the
House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the
Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in
question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be
noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated
September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Committee 6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which
the Committees upheld the citizenship, and sustained the
qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's
full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the
Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having
complied with the requirements on Filipinization by existing
laws for which his successors need not have elected
Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim.
There can hardly be any doubt that
Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was
a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was
therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law
expressly declared that all inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who
were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899, as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine
Bill of 1902). Excepted from the
operation of this rule were Spanish
subjects who shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the Treaty
of Paris of December 10, 1898. But
under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of
Peninsular Spain had the privilege of
preserving their Spanish nationality. 7
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's
grandfather established residence in
the Philippines in 1895, as shown by
the Registro Central de Chinos. He
was also issued a certificate of
registration. He established a
business here, and later acquired real
property. Although he went back to
 China for brief visits, he invariably
came back. He even brought his
eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the
Philippines when the latter was only
10 years old. And Ong Chuan was
admitted into the country because, as
duly noted on his landing certificate,
his father, Ong Te had been duly
enrolled under CR 16009-36755 —
i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed,
even when Ong Te went back to
China in the 1920's for another visit,
he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was
then still a minor, in the Philippines —
obviously because he had long
considered the Philippines his home.
The domicile he established in 1895 is
presumed to have continued up to,
and beyond, April 11, 1899, for, as
already adverted to, a domicile once
acquired is not lost until a new one is
gained. The only conclusion then can
thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly
domiciled in the Philippines as of April
11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4,
Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 —
and was, consequently, a Spanish
subject, he qualified as a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of Section
4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 8
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father,
subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he
was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of
the fact that both Ong Te and his son,
Ong Chuan (protestee's father),
appear to have been registered as
Chinese citizens even long after the
turn of the century. Worse, Ong
Chuan himself believed the was alien,
to the extent of having to seek
admission as a Pilipino citizen through
naturalization proceedings. The point,
to our mind, is neither crucial nor
substantial. Ong's status as a citizen
is a matter of law, rather than of
personal belief. It is what the law
provides, and not what one thinks his
status to be, which determines
whether one is a citizen of a particular
state or not. Mere mistake or
misapprehension as to one's
citizenship, it has been held, is not a
sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture
of Philippine citizenship; it does not
even constitute estoppel (Palanca vs.
Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too,
estoppel applies only to questions of
fact and not of law (Tanada v.
Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957). 9
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously
approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972,
approved without any objection by the Convention in
plenary session. 10
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as
mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from
experience, because when the Convention approved the
Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the
presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this
Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to
sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) 11 in
which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit
that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled
matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of
the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court,
involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however,
that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or
not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates,
indeed, also of this Court.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek
to annul the decision * of respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to
as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared
private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22
February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the
Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to be a
Member of the House of Representatives and to declare
him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest
number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly
elected representative of the second legislative district of
Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner
Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent
Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not
qualified for membership in the House of Representatives
and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected
representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and
private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the
candidates for the position of Representative or
Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private
respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987
with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes
over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number
of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election
protests against private respondent with the tribunal,
docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively.
Both protests raised almost the same issues and were
thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning,
Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section
6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article
IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar,
in contemplation of Section 6, Article
VI of the same Constitution, for a
period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the
congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November
1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to
the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore,
declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the
House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines,
representing the second legislative district of Northern
Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated
proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on
June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses
Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong
Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place
of birth is Laoang which is now one of
the municipalities comprising the
province of Northern Samar (Republic
Act No. 6132 approved on August 24,
1970 and the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong
Chuan was born in China and arrived
in Manila on December 16, 1915.
(Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter,
he took up residence in Laoang,
Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married
Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was
celebrated according to the rites and
practices of the Roman Catholic
Church in the Municipality of Laoang
(Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose
Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, both her
parents at the time of her birth being
Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong
Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship, filed his petition for
naturalization with the Court of First
Instance of Samar, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First
Instance of Samar rendered a
decision approving the application of
Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and
declaring said petitioner a Filipino
citizen "with all the rights and
privileges and duties, liabilities and
obligations inherent to Filipino citizens.
(Exh. E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court
issued an order:
(1) declaring the
decision of this
Court of April 28,
1955 final and
executory;
(2) directing the
clerk of court to
issue the
corresponding
Certificate of
Naturalization in
favor of the
applicant Ong
Chuan who
prefers to take his
oath and register
his name as Jose
Ong Chuan.
Petitioner may
take his oath as
Filipino citizen
under Ms new
christian name,
Jose Ong Chuan.
(Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan
having taken the corresponding oath
of allegiance to the Constitution and
the Government of the Philippines as
prescribed by Section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, was
issued the corresponding Certificate of
Naturalization. (Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L.
Ong, a full-brother of the protestee
and a son born on July 25, 1937 at
Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose
Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was
elected delegate from Northern Samar
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it
was established that he had attended
grade school in Laoang. Thereafter,
he went to Manila where he finished
his secondary as well as his college
education. While later employed in
Manila, protestee however went home
to Laoang whenever he had the
opportunity to do so, which invariably
 would be as frequent as twice to four
times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being
a native and legal resident of Laoang,
he registered as a voter therein and
correspondingly voted in said
municipality in the 1984 and 1986
elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during
the general registration of all voters in
the country, Protestee re-registered as
a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay
Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's
affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is
a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh.
7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's
decision having been denied, petitioners filed the present
petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of
the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision
vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives. 2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present
controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents'
contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence
to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to
decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held
in Morrero vs.Bocar, 3 construing Section 4, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the
(electoral) commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, "upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of
due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73
Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-
bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more
than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of
ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the
electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by
constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests
relating to such matters. The present controversy,
however, involves no less than a determination of whether
the qualifications for membership in the House of
Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have
been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss
in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the
Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the
House of Representatives, solely because the House
Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a
case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to
require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of
private respondent for the office of Member of the House
of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners
who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the
office illegally held by private respondent. From this
additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly
perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by
another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for
this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision
of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention
of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of
powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a
function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of
interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine
and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory)
interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of
the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the
State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate
area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B.
Sevisher, 1958, p. 36). 4
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest
and concern to determine whether or not private
respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a
public office which is specifically reserved by the
Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the
evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent
tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned
decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution 5 requires that a Member of the House of
Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines
natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987
Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of
the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting
the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The first
sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic
definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private
respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines
under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
because he did not have "to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship." It bears to
repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still
a minor of 9 years he already became
a Filipino citizen by declaration of law.
Since his mother was a natural-born
citizen at the time of her marriage,
protestee had an inchoate right to
Philippine citizenship at the moment of
his birth and, consequently the
declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA
473 that he was a Filipino citizen
retroacted to the moment of his birth
without his having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such Philippine
citizenship. 6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such
kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private
respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses
Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In
other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese
citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his
father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized
Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was
enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19
June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the
Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose
mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in
order to be considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a
natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution,
private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the
Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth,
although from birth, private respondent had the right to
elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother,
but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law
(C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father),
who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization
of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, 8 this
does not alter the fact that private respondent was not
born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of
CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-
born citizen merely because he did not have to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent
could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the
operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid
and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private
respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that
only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a
Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral
attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an
electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong
Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that
the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must
emanate from the Government and must be made in a
proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-
naturalization directed against the proper party, who in
such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however,
afforded the character of impregnability under the principle
of res judicata. 9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion
made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or
his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain
conditions the privilege of citizenship.
He may accept the offer and become
a citizen upon compliance with the
prescribed conditions, but not
otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of
right. He can only become a citizen
upon and after a strict compliance with
the acts of Congress. An applicant for
this high privilege is bound, therefore,
to conform to the terms upon which
alone the right he seeks can be
conferred. It is his province, and he is
bound, to see that the jurisdictional
facts upon which the grant is
predicated actually exist and if they do
not he takes nothing by this paper
grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege
to a specified class of persons, no
other person is entitled to such
privilege, nor to a certificate purporting
to grant it, and any such certificate
issued to a person not so entitled to
receive it must be treated as a mere
nullity, which confers no legal rights as
against the government, from which it
has been obtained without warrant of
law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most
discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor." 11
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made
by the petitioners that the naturalization of private
respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court
should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization
proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more
inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat
for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
office. 12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the
citizenship of private respondent is derived from his father.
If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning,
then there is nothing from which private respondent can
derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring
cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private
respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship
by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would
constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against
the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose
Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section
12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI
issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the
applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to
take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application
for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper
and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the
issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said
order. 13
14
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of
allegiance on the same day as
issuance of order granting citizenship
is irregular and makes the
proceedings so taken null and void.
(Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244
[1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil.
1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the
naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's
father) was null and void. It follows that the private
respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be
considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing
the clerk of court to issue the certificate of naturalization to
Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance
was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of
Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic
naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a
Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or
perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private
respondent acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino
citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother
was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to
an examination of the second sentence in Article IV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner
of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the
same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen
to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. The right or privilege of election is
available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers
under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973
Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted
in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion
as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment
by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-born"
Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship —
all in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support
private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the
House of Representatives. 15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of
section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino
mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973
and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect
Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born assumed that the people in ratifying FR BERNAS:
Filipino citizen. 16 the constitution were guided mainly by Yes.
the explanation offered by the
framers. 18
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the MR. TRENAS:
constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to And does the
refer to the interpellations made during the 1986 The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission Commissioner
Constitutional Commission. It said: relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) think that tills
of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of addition to
petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before Section 4 of the
That the benevolent provisions of
17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine 1973 Constitution
Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are would be contrary
1987 Constitution was (sic) intended
to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens. to the spirit of that
by its (sic) framers to be endowed,
section?
without distinction, to all Filipinos by
election pursuant to the 1935 During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship,
Constitution is more than persuasively Commissioner Treñas specifically asked Commissioner FR BERNAS:
established by the extensive Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus: Yes, we are quite
interpellations and debate on the issue aware that it is
as borne by the official records of the contrary to the
MR. TRENAS:
1986 Constitutional Commission. 17 letter really. But
The Committee
whether it is
on Citizenship,
contrary to the
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Bill of Rights,
spirit is something
Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at Political Rights
that has been
bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of and Obligations
debated before
the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, and Human
and is being
as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the Rights has more
debated even
controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional or less decided to
now. We will
provisions in question. extend the
recall that during
interpretation of
the 1971
who is a natural-
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, Constitutional
born Filipino
interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the Convention, the
citizen as
1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in status of natural-
provided in
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even born citizenship of
Section 4 of the
nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus — one of the
1973 Constitution,
delegates, Mr.
by adding that
Ang, was
The ascertainment of that intent is but persons who have
challenged
in keeping with the fundamental elected Philippine
precisely because
principle of constitutional construction citizenship under
he was a citizen
that the intent of the framers of the the 1935
by election.
organic law and of the people Constitution shall
Finally, the 1971
adopting it should be given effect. The be considered
Constitutional
primary task in constitutional natural-born. Am I
Convention
construction is to ascertain and right, Mr.
considered him a
thereafter assure the realization of the Presiding Officer?
natural-born
purpose of the framers and of the
citizen, one of the
people in the adoption of the requirements to
Constitution. It may also be safely be a Member of
the 1971 When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born and 1973, when
Constitutional citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner we were under
Convention. The Azcuna thus: the 1935
reason behind Constitution,
that decision was those born of
MR. AZCUNA:
that a person Filipino fathers
With respect to
under his but alien mothers
the proviso in
circumstances were natural-born
Section 4, would
already had the Filipinos.
this refer only to
inchoate right to However, those
those who elect
be a citizen by the born of Filipino
Philippine
fact that the mothers but alien
citizenship after
mother was a fathers would
the effectivity of
Filipino. And as a have to elect
the 1973
matter of fact, the Philippine
Constitution or
1971 citizenship upon
would it also
Constitutional reaching the age
cover those who
Convention of majority; and, if
elected it under
formalized that they do elect, they
the 1935
recognition by become Filipino
Constitution?
adopting citizens, yet, but
paragraph 2 of not natural-born
Section 1 of the FR BERNAS: It Filipino citizens.
1971 Constitution. would apply to
So, the entire anybody who
The 1973 Constitution equalized the
purpose of this elected Philippine
status of those born of Filipino
proviso is simply citizenship by
mothers and those born of Filipino
to perhaps virtue of the
fathers. So that from January 17, 1973
remedy whatever provision of the
when the 1973 Constitution took
injustice there 1935 Constitution,
effect, those born of Filipino mothers
may be so that whether the
but of alien fathers are natural-born
these people born election was done
Filipino citizens. Also, those who are
before January before or after 17
born of Filipino fathers and alien
17, 1973 who are January 1973. 20
mothers are natural-born Filipino
not naturalized
citizens.
and people who
And during the period of amendments. Commissioner
are not natural
born but who are Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the
in the same Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the
status of a child born of a Filipino
1987 Constitution, thus:
situation as we mother and that born of a Filipino
are considered father, why do we not give a chance to
natural-born MR. RODRIGO: a child born before January 17, 1973,
citizens. So, the The purpose of if and when he elects Philippine
intention of the that proviso is to citizenship, to be in the same status
Committee in remedy an as one born of a Filipino father —
proposing this is inequitable namely, natural-born citizen.
to equalize their situation.
status. 19 Between 1935
 Another thing I stated is equalizing the
status of a father and a mother vis-a-
vis the child. I would like to state also
that we showed equalize the status of
a child born of a Filipino mother the
day before January 17, 1973 and a
child born also of a Filipino mother on
January 17 or 24 hours later. A child
born of a Filipino mother but an alien
father one day before January 17,
1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects
Philippine citizenship, but he is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen. However,
the other child who luckily was born 24
hours later — maybe because of parto
laborioso — is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. 21
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen
was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino
mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity
date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien
spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born
to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino
citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of
the age of majority, may be made before or after 17
January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in
consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's
individual interests, 22 and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or
before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien
spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on
19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or
soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-
born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital
question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine
citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to
the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino
mother and an alien father had
exercised the right of suffrage when
he came of age, the same constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare)
[sic] The acts of the petitioner in
registering as a voter, participating in
elections and campaigning for certain
candidates were held by the Supreme
Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship.
Accordingly, even without complying
with the formal requisites for election,
the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was
judicially upheld. 23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be
patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be
made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act mandate that the option to
elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not
impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio
Mallare 25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of
the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the
doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not
applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal
failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625
was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years
before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of
election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect
the presentation of a formal deed to
that effect considering that prior to the
enactment of Commonwealth Act 625
on June 7, 1941, no particular
proceeding was required to exercise
the option to elect Philippine
citizenship, granted to the proper party
by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. 26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a
Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate
(natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus
followed her citizenship. I therefore agree with
the petitioners' submission that,
inciting the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal
had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by
operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the
law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him.
For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private
respondent's father was valid, and that there was no
further need for private respondent to elect Philippine
citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino
citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the
Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by
him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the
Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship
derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching
the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable
time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he
cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I
am constrained to state that private respondent is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is in the election for that office, and it is a case, there is not,
disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of fundamental idea in all republican strictly speaking,
Representatives. forms of government that no one can a contest, as the
be declared elected and no measure wreath of victory
can be declared carried unless he or it cannot be
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the
receives a majority or plurality of the transferred from
issue of required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution
legal votes cast in the election. (20 an ineligible to
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676). any other
must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
candidate when
for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be
the sole question
elected. As early as 1912, this Court has
is the eligibility of
already declared that the candidate
the one receiving
who lost in an election cannot be
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of a plurality of the
proclaimed the winner in the event
the petitioners can replace private respondent as the legally cast
that the candidate who won is found
Representative of the second legislative district of Northern ballots. . . . 31
ineligible for the office to which he was
Samar in the House of Representatives.
elected. This was the ruling in Topacio
v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) — The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the Constitutional Convention as a natural-born
petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Again, the effect
House of Representatives representing the second district
of a decision that
of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon
a candidate is not Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of
L.Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
entitled to the Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father and
EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal, 27 is controlling. There
office because of mother.
we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo
fraud or
warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as
irregularities in
mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971
the election is
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the Constitutional Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong
quite different
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the
from that
Baguio City for mayor of that City. House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a
produced by
natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially
declaring a
impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified person ineligible
supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision
for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even to hold such an
of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of
if it is labelled an election protest. 28 It is a proceeding to office. . . . If it be
its decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in
unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily found that the
reference to this submission, said:
to install the protestant in his place. 29 successful
candidate
(according to the Be that as it may and in the light of the
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority board of Tribunal's disposition of protestee's
of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an canvassers) citizenship based on an entirely
election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
obtained a different set of circumstances, apart
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a plurality in an from the indisputable fact that the
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the illegal manner, matters attempted to be brought in
election is a nullity. 30
and that another issue in connection therewith are too
candidate was the far removed in point of time and
Sound policy dictates that public real victor, the relevance from the decisive events
elective offices are filled by those who former must retire relied upon by the Tribunal, we view
have the highest number of votes cast in favor of the
latter. In the other
 these two issues as being already
inconsequential. 33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to
predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship
by naturalization of private respondent's father
(Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of
Philippine citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-
07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and
Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his
citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election
Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention
heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a
report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of
which stated:
It appearing that protestee's
grandfather was himself a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty
of Paris of December 10, 1898, thus
conferring upon protestee's own
father, Ong Chuan, Philippine
citizenship at birth, the conclusion is
inescapable that protestee himself is a
natural-born citizen, and is therefore
qualified to hold the office of delegate
to the Constitutional Convention. 34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed
against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of
the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials. 35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to
say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention
decision in the Emil L. Ong case
involved the 1935Constitution; the
present case, on the other hand
involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no
specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987
Constitution contains a precise and
specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2,
Art. IV thereof and private respondent
does not qualify under such definition
in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case
of Emil L. Ong was a decision of
apolitical body, not a court of law. And,
even if we have to take such a
decision as a decision of aquasi-
judicial body (i.e., a political body
exercising quasi-judicial functions),
said decision in the Emil L. Ong case
can not have the category or character
of res judicata in the present judicial
controversy, because between the two
(2) cases, there is no identity of
parties (one involves Emil L. Ong,
while the other involves private
respondent) and, more importantly,
there is no identity of causes of action
because the first involves the 1935
Constitution while the second involves
the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on
procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted before
the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court,
does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong
before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially
adopted by private respondent in the present controversy.
This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L.
Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under
the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" — and this
appears crucial and central to its decision — that Emil L.
Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his descendants
like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent)
became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a
Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was
therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law
expressly declared that all inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who
were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands." (Section 4,
Philippine Bill of
1902). 36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te
private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was
"an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside
therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he
met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then,
Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a
Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z
,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the
"Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show
that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar
where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners
(protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a
certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records
and Management and Archives Office, stating that the
name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central
de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend
to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close
to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing
in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to
private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs
or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT
ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE,
except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the
majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted
any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of
Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not
surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father
or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim
Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino
citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead
applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the
House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed
the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the
light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino
citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to
look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had
become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902
was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held
in Lee vs. Commissioners of
Immigration: 37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in
a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding Court or
administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court
in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8
May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is
contended by private respondent that the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case
was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L.
Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the
Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private
respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee
Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it
would help to look into the circumstances of the case
brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or
disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both
candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May
1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification with
the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed
as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a natural-
born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the Identical
issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94)
The motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting
Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong(SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R.
Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner
for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and
considering that at the hearing this
morning, it was brought out that the
1971 Constitutional Convention, at its
session of November 28, 1972, after
considering the Report of its
Committee on Election Protests and
Credentials, found that the protest
questioning the citizenship of the
protestee (the petitioner herein) was
groundless and dismissed Election
Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed
against said petitioner (p. 237, Rollo),
the authenticity of the Minutes of said
session as well as of the said
Committee's Report having been duly
admitted in evidence without objection
and bears out, for now, without need
for a full hearing, that petitioner is a
natural-born citizen, the Court
Resolved to ISSUE, effective
immediately, a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further
hearing on the disqualification case
entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at
3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any
other day, except to dismiss the
same.This is without prejudice to any
appropriate action that private
respondent may wish to take after the
elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No.
67201 was rendered without the benefit of a hearing on
the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and
merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is
quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action
that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the
elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the
resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the
1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further
proceeding in regard to the same question and that,
consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to
such recognition. How much more when the Constitution
involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987
Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all
such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still
inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private
respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the
second district of Northern Samar, would have had to
cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full
membership of the Court had participated in this case, with
the result that the legislative district would cease to have,
in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in
cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the
Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when
the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar cast the majority of their votes for private
respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully
eligible and qualified for the office because he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief
can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the
Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the
Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says,
"Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is
worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even
aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private
respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT
QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a
question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves
facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite
agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. 1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not
substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows
better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 2 it was
held that this Court can not review the errors of the
Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all
election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and
unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is
to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred
expanded powers on the Court, 3 but as the Charter states,
our authority is "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 4 It is not to review
facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical
exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or
otherwise, to denial of due process of law. 5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a
matter of opinion with which men may differ, but certainly,
it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal
has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has
begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the
Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the
Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the
Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently,
is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the
House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the
Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in
question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be
noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated
September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Committee 6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which
the Committees upheld the citizenship, and sustained the
qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's
full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the
Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having
complied with the requirements on Filipinization by existing
laws for which his successors need not have elected
Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim.
There can hardly be any doubt that
Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was
a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was
therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law
expressly declared that all inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who
were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899, as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine
Bill of 1902). Excepted from the
operation of this rule were Spanish
subjects who shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the Treaty
of Paris of December 10, 1898. But
under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of
Peninsular Spain had the privilege of
preserving their Spanish nationality. 7
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's
grandfather established residence in
the Philippines in 1895, as shown by
the Registro Central de Chinos. He
was also issued a certificate of
registration. He established a
business here, and later acquired real
property. Although he went back to
China for brief visits, he invariably
came back. He even brought his
eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the
Philippines when the latter was only
10 years old. And Ong Chuan was
admitted into the country because, as
duly noted on his landing certificate,
his father, Ong Te had been duly
enrolled under CR 16009-36755 —
i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed,
even when Ong Te went back to
China in the 1920's for another visit,
he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was
then still a minor, in the Philippines —
obviously because he had long
considered the Philippines his home.
The domicile he established in 1895 is
presumed to have continued up to,
and beyond, April 11, 1899, for, as
already adverted to, a domicile once
acquired is not lost until a new one is
gained. The only conclusion then can
thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as
domiciled in the Philippines as of April mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from
11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4, experience, because when the Convention approved the
Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 — Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the
and was, consequently, a Spanish presiding officer.
subject, he qualified as a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of Section
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this
4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 8
Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to
sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) 11 in
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he
was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit
that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled
Protestants, however, make capital of matter. Let it rest.
the fact that both Ong Te and his son,
Ong Chuan (protestee's father),
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of
appear to have been registered as
the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court,
Chinese citizens even long after the
involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however,
turn of the century. Worse, Ong
that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
Chuan himself believed the was alien,
to the extent of having to seek
admission as a Pilipino citizen through I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or
naturalization proceedings. The point, not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates,
to our mind, is neither crucial nor indeed, also of this Court
substantial. Ong's status as a citizen
is a matter of law, rather than of
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
personal belief. It is what the law
provides, and not what one thinks his
status to be, which determines ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
whether one is a citizen of a particular vs.
state or not. Mere mistake or ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
misapprehension as to one's REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
citizenship, it has been held, is not a
sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
of Philippine citizenship; it does not
even constitute estoppel (Palanca vs.
Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
estoppel applies only to questions of vs.
fact and not of law (Tanada v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957). 9 REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972,
approved without any objection by the Convention in
plenary session. 10 Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for
respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting
aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before
us is whether or not, in making that determination, the
HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of
the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found
for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues
raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualificationsof their respective members. (See Article
VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete. The use of the word soleemphasizes
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168
SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution,
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and
exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole"
emphasizes the exclusive character of
the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra at p.
162). The exercise of power by the
Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had originally
remained in the legislature." (id., at p.
175) Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and
complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39
Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal and it remained as
full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the Legislature and
the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v.
Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same
may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal
under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the
Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a
matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be
reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes
the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the
same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral
Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780
[1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of
the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in
the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power
as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429
[1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any
event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous
area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has
to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of
discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been
given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the
government to determine whether or not they have acted
within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII,
Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not
that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET
alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA
668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power,
the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the
tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of
their functions independent organs — independent of
Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to
HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
[1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and
careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this
exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the
Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the
present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists
today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political
composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is
nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET
because of its composition any less independent from the
Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The
degree of judicial intervention should not be made to
depend on how many legislative members of the HRET
belong to this party or that party. The test remains the
same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of
power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private
respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence
in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he
bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was
born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of
Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring
relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values
and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the
years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-
Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private
respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this
country. He decided to put up a hardware store and
shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As
a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the
meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of
his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where
he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on
February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared
Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar
issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as
final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already
take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization
was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private
respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. There is
nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private
respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's
family constructed another one in place of their ruined
house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang
was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila
in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the
family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in
Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still
another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two
doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and
thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the 1. Those who are citizens of the Constitution or
respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Philippines at the time of the adoption would it also
Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, of the Constitution; cover those who
however, he worked in the hardware business of his family elected it under
in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as the 1973
2. Those whose fathers or mothers
a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His Constitution?
are citizens of the Philippines;
status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Fr. Bernas: It
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to 3. Those born before January 17,
would apply to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
anybody who
formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full Philippine citizenship upon reaching
elected Philippine
brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional the age of majority; and
citizenship by
Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural
virtue of the
born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article
4. Those who are naturalized in provision of the
on this subject.
accordance with law. 1935 Constitution
whether the
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, election was done
Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days. SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are before or after
those who are citizens of the January 17, 1973.
Philippines from birth without having to
(Records of the
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named perform any act to acquire or perfect Constitutional
Desiree Lim. their citizenship. Those who elect Commission, Vol.
Philippine citizenship in accordance
1, p. 228;
with paragraph 3 hereof shall be Emphasis
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr.
deemed natural-born citizens. supplied)
registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as xxx xxx xxx
applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
The private respondent after being engaged for several
after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
years in the management of their family business decided
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that Mr. Trenas: The
to be of greater service to his province and ran for public
date. Committee on
office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran
Citizenship, Bill of
in the elections for representative in the second district of
Rights, Political
Northern Samar. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an Rights and
unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. Obligations and
There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Human Rights
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of
Constitutional Commission, viz: has more or less
Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even
if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong decided to extend
would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes. Mr. Azcuna: With the interpretation
respect to the of who is a
provision of natural-born
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article citizen as
section 4, would
IV read: provided in
this refer only to
those who elect section 4 of the
SECTION 1, the following are citizens Philippine 1973 Constitution
of the Philippines: citizenship after by adding that
the effectivity of persons who have
the 1973 elected Philippine
 Citizenship under xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
the 1935
Constitution shall
Mr. Rodrigo: But Mr. Rodrigo: The
be natural-born?
this provision purpose of that
Am I right Mr.
becomes very provision is to
Presiding Officer?
important remedy an
because his inequitable
Fr. Bernas: yes. election of situation.
Philippine Between 1935
citizenship makes and 1973 when
xxx xxx xxx
him not only a we were under
Filipino citizen but the 1935
Mr. Nolledo: And I a natural-born Constitution,
remember very Filipino citizen those born of
well that in the entitling him to Filipino fathers
Reverend Father run for Congress. but alien mothers
Bernas' well .. were natural-born
written book, he Filipinos.
said that the However, those
Fr. Bernas:
decision was born of Filipino
Correct. We are
designed merely mothers but alien
quite aware of
to accommodate fathers would
that and for that
former delegate have to elect
reason we will
Ernesto Ang and Philippine
leave it to the
that the definition citizenship upon
body to approve
on natural-born reaching the age
that provision of
has no retroactive of majority; and if
section 4.
effect. Now it they do elect, they
seems that the become Filipino
Reverend Father Mr. Rodrigo: I citizens but not
Bernas is going think there is a natural-born
against this good basis for the Filipino citizens.
intention by provision because (Records of the
supporting the it strikes me as Constitutional
amendment? unfair that the Commission, Vol.
Filipino citizen 1, p. 356)
who was born a
Fr. Bernas: As the
day before
Commissioner The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the
January 17, 1973
can see, there framers. To make the provision prospective from February
cannot be a
has been an 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an
Filipino citizen or
evolution in my inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
a natural-born
thinking. (Records
citizen. (Records
of the
of the It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts
Constitutional
Constitutional are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its
Commission, Vol.
Commission, Vol. language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail
1, p. 189)
1, p. 231) over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter
would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of
Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to
give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at
which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision
which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v.
Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason
v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is
subordinated. Our Constitution, any
constitution is not to be construed
narrowly or pedantically for the
prescriptions therein contained, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form but are organic
living institutions, the significance of
which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father
and an alien mother was automatically granted the status
of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier
laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers
and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father
were placed on equal footing. They were both considered
as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born"
cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time
or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the
same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted,
that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and,
therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either
before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore
curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the
inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and
thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at
the time had it not been for the curative provisions.
(See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a
natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV
of the Constitution accords natural born status to children
born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He
was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have
divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed
a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of
his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had
been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we
held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his
right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they
were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of
Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial
distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino
since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the
child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession
requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting
a license. He has participated in political exercises as a
Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino
citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he
does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing
to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of
Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage.
They should know him better than any member of this
Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming
numbers to have him represent them in Congress.
Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered
him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to
Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public
office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries. There is no
doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when
he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the
part of the private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.
How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how
Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong
Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as
such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not,
validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature
taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death
and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father
through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v.
Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run
against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has
already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak.
To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have
long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously
he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie
to defend himself were this matter to be made a central
issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of
citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to
determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of
authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the
respondent traces his natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino
when he came of age. At that time and up to the present,
both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent
Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless
he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of
a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a
problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his
father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET
as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion.
The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already
been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971
and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of
the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full
blood brother of the respondent, was declared and
accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the
Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and
the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the
HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's
declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of
April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the
status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish
subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those
who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are
Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or
mother, even though they were born
out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained
naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who
may have acquired domicile in any
town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis
supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual
residence. This domicile, once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of
Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of
Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a
certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of
his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued
until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the
19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his
business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te
falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of
the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he,
nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact
that he died in China, during one of his visits in said
country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact
that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines
and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a
Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having
established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of
Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the
Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who
has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a
domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II)
Apriori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in
concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born
Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that
document presented to prove it were not in compliance
with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that
the private respondent failed to present the original of the
documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the
transcript of the proceedings of the body which the
aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private
respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence
rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET
that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the
minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional
Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo,
Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by
Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law
Center, in their respective testimonies given before the
HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency respondent. They merely relied on the procedural
which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. presented.
30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February
1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the
qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body.
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is
Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a
Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on
such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24) the controversies over which they were sole judges.
Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of
all relevant factors which the parties wished to present.
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was
Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we
also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty.
cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of
Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to
discretion. We have to keep clear the line
produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be
between error and grave abuse.
of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that
after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be
found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
[1918])
The petitioners question the residence qualification of
Since the execution of the document and the inability to respondent Ong.
produce were adequately established, the contents of the
questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence"
by the recollection of witnesses.
under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been
understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the Constitution.
former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal
hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents
a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as
presented during the hearing of the election protest
that of domicile, to wit:
against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN,
February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
Mr. Nolledo: With
respect to Section
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-
5, I remember
president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he
that in the 1971
was presiding officer of the plenary session which
Constitutional
deliberated on the report on the election protest against
Convention, there
Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of
was an attempt to
delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice
require residence
Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could
in the place not
have presented any one of the long list of delegates to
less than one
refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born
year immediately
citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
preceding the day
contents of the documents presented by the private
 of the elections. Mrs. Rosario that it should be
So my question Braid: The next by domicile and
is: What is the question is on not physical and
Committee's Section 7, page 2. actual residence.
concept of I think (Records of the
residence of a Commissioner 1987
candidate for the Nolledo has Constitutional
legislature? Is it raised the same Commission, Vol.
actual residence point that 11, July 22, 1986,
or is it the concept "resident" has p. 110)
of domicile or been interpreted
constructive at times as a
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier
residence? matter of intention
definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it
rather than actual
as having the same meaning as domicile.
residence.
Mr. Davide:
Madame
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
President, in so Mr. De los Reyes:
to which when absent for business or pleasure, one
far as the regular Domicile.
intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA
members of the
966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent
National
Ms. Rosario residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
Assembly are
Braid: Yes, So, continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words,
concerned, the
would the domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v.
proposed section
gentlemen Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
merely provides,
consider at the
among others,
proper time to go
and a resident The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was
back to actual
thereof, that is, in the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.
residence rather
the district, for a Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never
than mere
period of not less abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even
intention to
than one year up to the present.
reside?
preceding the day
of the election.
This was in effect The private respondent, in the proceedings before the
Mr. De los Reyes:
HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted
lifted from the But we might
1973 Constitution, their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
encounter some
the interpretation difficulty
given to it was especially Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their
domicile. considering that a house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their
(Records of the provision in the family, two doors of which were reserved as their family
1987 Constitution in the residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
Constitutional Article on
Convention, Vol. Suffrage says that
11, July 22, 1986. Filipinos living The petitioners' allegation that since the private
p. 87) respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
abroad may vote
as enacted by cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
law. So, we have
xxx xxx xxx
to stick to the The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name
original concept of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of
his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant
to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof
(as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still
in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own
any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case
ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it
is not required that a person should have a house in order
to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that
he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in
that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order
to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a
property qualification. The Constitution only requires that
the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and
residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also own property in
order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96
Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in
Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to
practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon
the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the
periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that
he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has,
rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our
history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays,
Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other
nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our
country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded
nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To
mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the
late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese,
and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also
part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud
were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest
wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must
forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of
citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who
qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our
antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent
backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the
indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often
corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and
whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical
traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised
to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful
examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A
more humane, more indubitable and less technical
approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong,
Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and
a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and
Gancayco, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek
to annul the decision * of respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to
as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared
private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22
February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the
Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to be a
Member of the House of Representatives and to declare
him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest
number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly
elected representative of the second legislative district of
Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner
Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent
Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not
qualified for membership in the House of Representatives
and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected
representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and
private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the
candidates for the position of Representative or
Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private
respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987
with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes
over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number
of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election
protests against private respondent with the tribunal,
docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively.
Both protests raised almost the same issues and were
thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning,
Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section
6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article
IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar,
in contemplation of Section 6, Article
VI of the same Constitution, for a
period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the
congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November
1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to
the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore,
declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the
House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines,
representing the second legislative district of Northern
Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated
proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on
June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses
Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong
Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place
of birth is Laoang which is now one of
the municipalities comprising the
province of Northern Samar (Republic
Act No. 6132 approved on August 24,
1970 and the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong 1955 final and
Chuan was born in China and arrived executory;
in Manila on December 16, 1915.
(Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter,
(2) directing the
he took up residence in Laoang,
clerk of court to
Samar.
issue the
corresponding
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Certificate of
Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was Naturalization in
celebrated according to the rites and favor of the
practices of the Roman Catholic applicant Ong
Church in the Municipality of Laoang Chuan who
(Exh. E). prefers to take his
oath and register
his name as Jose
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose
Ong Chuan.
Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a
Petitioner may
natural-born Filipino citizen, both her
take his oath as
parents at the time of her birth being
Filipino citizen
Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
under Ms new
christian name,
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Jose Ong Chuan.
Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine (Exh. F)
citizenship, filed his petition for
naturalization with the Court of First
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan
Instance of Samar, pursuant to
having taken the corresponding oath
Commonwealth Act No. 473,
of allegiance to the Constitution and
otherwise known as the Revised
the Government of the Philippines as
Naturalization Law.
prescribed by Section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, was
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First issued the corresponding Certificate of
Instance of Samar rendered a Naturalization. (Exh. G)
decision approving the application of
Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L.
declaring said petitioner a Filipino
Ong, a full-brother of the protestee
citizen "with all the rights and
and a son born on July 25, 1937 at
privileges and duties, liabilities and
Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose
obligations inherent to Filipino citizens.
Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was
(Exh. E)
elected delegate from Northern Samar
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court
issued an order:
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it
was established that he had attended
(1) declaring the grade school in Laoang. Thereafter,
decision of this he went to Manila where he finished
Court of April 28, his secondary as well as his college
 education. While later employed in
Manila, protestee however went home
to Laoang whenever he had the
opportunity to do so, which invariably
would be as frequent as twice to four
times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being
a native and legal resident of Laoang,
he registered as a voter therein and
correspondingly voted in said
municipality in the 1984 and 1986
elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during
the general registration of all voters in
the country, Protestee re-registered as
a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay
Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's
affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is
a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh.
7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's
decision having been denied, petitioners filed the present
petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of
the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision
vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives. 2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present
controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents'
contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence
to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to
decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held
in Morrero vs.Bocar, 3 construing Section 4, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the
(electoral) commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, "upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of
due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73
Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-
bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more
than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of
ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the
electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by
constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests
relating to such matters. The present controversy,
however, involves no less than a determination of whether
the qualifications for membership in the House of
Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have
been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss
in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the
Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the
House of Representatives, solely because the House
Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a
case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to
require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of
private respondent for the office of Member of the House
of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners
who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the
office illegally held by private respondent. From this
additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly
perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by
another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for
this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision
of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention
of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of
powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a
function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of
interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine
and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory)
interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of
the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the
State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate
area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B.
Sevisher, 1958, p. 36). 4
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest
and concern to determine whether or not private
respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a
public office which is specifically reserved by the
Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the
evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent
tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned
decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution 5 requires that a Member of the House of
Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines
natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987
Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of
the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting
the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The first
sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic
definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private
respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines
under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
because he did not have "to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship." It bears to
repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still
a minor of 9 years he already became
a Filipino citizen by declaration of law.
Since his mother was a natural-born
citizen at the time of her marriage,
protestee had an inchoate right to
Philippine citizenship at the moment of
his birth and, consequently the
declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA
473 that he was a Filipino citizen
retroacted to the moment of his birth
without his having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such Philippine
citizenship. 6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such
kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private
respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses
Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In
other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese
citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his
father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized
Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was
enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19
June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the
Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose
mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in
order to be considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a
natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution,
private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the
Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth,
although from birth, private respondent had the right to
elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother,
but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law
(C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father),
who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization
of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, 8 this
does not alter the fact that private respondent was not
born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of
CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-
born citizen merely because he did not have to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent
could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the
operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid
and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private
respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that
only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a
Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral
attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an
electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong
Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that
the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must
emanate from the Government and must be made in a
proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-
naturalization directed against the proper party, who in
such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however,
afforded the character of impregnability under the principle
of res judicata. 9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion
made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or
his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain
conditions the privilege of citizenship.
He may accept the offer and become
a citizen upon compliance with the
prescribed conditions, but not
otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of
right. He can only become a citizen
upon and after a strict compliance with
the acts of Congress. An applicant for
this high privilege is bound, therefore,
to conform to the terms upon which
alone the right he seeks can be
conferred. It is his province, and he is
bound, to see that the jurisdictional
facts upon which the grant is
predicated actually exist and if they do
not he takes nothing by this paper
grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege
to a specified class of persons, no
other person is entitled to such
privilege, nor to a certificate purporting
to grant it, and any such certificate
issued to a person not so entitled to
receive it must be treated as a mere
nullity, which confers no legal rights as
against the government, from which it
has been obtained without warrant of
law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most
discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor." 11
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil.
by the petitioners that the naturalization of private 1381).
respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court
should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the
proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more
naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's
inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat
father) was null and void. It follows that the private
for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
office. 12
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be
considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Filipino citizen.
citizenship of private respondent is derived from his father.
If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning,
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing
then there is nothing from which private respondent can
the clerk of court to issue the certificate of naturalization to
derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring
Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance
cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private
was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of
respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship
Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic
by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would
naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a
constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against
Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or
the Constitution.
perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private
Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
respondent acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino
and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section
citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother
12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI
was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to
issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the
an examination of the second sentence in Article IV,
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner
applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the
same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has age of majority. The right or privilege of election is
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers
for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973
and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted
order. 13
in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion
as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, 14 this Court held that: by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-born"
Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship —
all in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support
Administration of the oath of
private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the
allegiance on the same day as
House of Representatives. 15
issuance of order granting citizenship
is irregular and makes the
proceedings so taken null and void. Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of
(Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
[1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino
mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973 purpose of the framers and of the FR BERNAS:
and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect people in the adoption of the Yes.
Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. It may also be safely
Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born assumed that the people in ratifying
MR. TRENAS:
Filipino citizen. 16 the constitution were guided mainly by
And does the
the explanation offered by the
Commissioner
framers. 18
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the think that tills
constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to addition to
refer to the interpellations made during the 1986 The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission Section 4 of the
Constitutional Commission. It said: relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) 1973 Constitution
of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of would be contrary
petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before to the spirit of that
That the benevolent provisions of
17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine section?
Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are
1987 Constitution was (sic) intended
to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
by its (sic) framers to be endowed, FR BERNAS:
without distinction, to all Filipinos by Yes, we are quite
election pursuant to the 1935 During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, aware that it is
Constitution is more than persuasively Commissioner Treñas specifically asked Commissioner contrary to the
established by the extensive Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus: letter really. But
interpellations and debate on the issue whether it is
as borne by the official records of the contrary to the
MR. TRENAS:
1986 Constitutional Commission. 17 spirit is something
The Committee
that has been
on Citizenship,
debated before
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Bill of Rights,
and is being
Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at Political Rights
debated even
bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of and Obligations
now. We will
the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, and Human
recall that during
as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the Rights has more
the 1971
controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional or less decided to
Constitutional
provisions in question. extend the
Convention, the
interpretation of
status of natural-
who is a natural-
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, born citizenship of
born Filipino
interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the one of the
citizen as
1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in delegates, Mr.
provided in
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even Ang, was
Section 4 of the
nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus — challenged
1973 Constitution,
precisely because
by adding that
he was a citizen
The ascertainment of that intent is but persons who have
by election.
in keeping with the fundamental elected Philippine
Finally, the 1971
principle of constitutional construction citizenship under
Constitutional
that the intent of the framers of the the 1935
Convention
organic law and of the people Constitution shall
considered him a
adopting it should be given effect. The be considered
natural-born
primary task in constitutional natural-born. Am I
citizen, one of the
construction is to ascertain and right, Mr.
requirements to
thereafter assure the realization of the Presiding Officer?
be a Member of
the 1971 When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born and 1973, when
Constitutional citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner we were under
Convention. The Azcuna thus: the 1935
reason behind Constitution,
that decision was those born of
MR. AZCUNA:
that a person Filipino fathers
With respect to
under his but alien mothers
the proviso in
circumstances were natural-born
Section 4, would
already had the Filipinos.
this refer only to
inchoate right to However, those
those who elect
be a citizen by the born of Filipino
Philippine
fact that the mothers but alien
citizenship after
mother was a fathers would
the effectivity of
Filipino. And as a have to elect
the 1973
matter of fact, the Philippine
Constitution or
1971 citizenship upon
would it also
Constitutional reaching the age
cover those who
Convention of majority; and, if
elected it under
formalized that they do elect, they
the 1935
recognition by become Filipino
Constitution?
adopting citizens, yet, but
paragraph 2 of not natural-born
Section 1 of the FR BERNAS: It Filipino citizens.
1971 Constitution. would apply to
So, the entire anybody who
The 1973 Constitution equalized the
purpose of this elected Philippine
status of those born of Filipino
proviso is simply citizenship by
mothers and those born of Filipino
to perhaps virtue of the
fathers. So that from January 17, 1973
remedy whatever provision of the
when the 1973 Constitution took
injustice there 1935 Constitution,
effect, those born of Filipino mothers
may be so that whether the
but of alien fathers are natural-born
these people born election was done
Filipino citizens. Also, those who are
before January before or after 17
born of Filipino fathers and alien
17, 1973 who are January 1973. 20
mothers are natural-born Filipino
not naturalized
citizens.
and people who
And during the period of amendments. Commissioner
are not natural
born but who are Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the
in the same Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the
status of a child born of a Filipino
1987 Constitution, thus:
situation as we mother and that born of a Filipino
are considered father, why do we not give a chance to
natural-born MR. RODRIGO: a child born before January 17, 1973,
citizens. So, the The purpose of if and when he elects Philippine
intention of the that proviso is to citizenship, to be in the same status
Committee in remedy an as one born of a Filipino father —
proposing this is inequitable namely, natural-born citizen.
to equalize their situation.
status. 19 Between 1935
 Another thing I stated is equalizing the
status of a father and a mother vis-a-
vis the child. I would like to state also
that we showed equalize the status of
a child born of a Filipino mother the
day before January 17, 1973 and a
child born also of a Filipino mother on
January 17 or 24 hours later. A child
born of a Filipino mother but an alien
father one day before January 17,
1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects
Philippine citizenship, but he is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen. However,
the other child who luckily was born 24
hours later — maybe because of parto
laborioso — is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. 21
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen
was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino
mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity
date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien
spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born
to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino
citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of
the age of majority, may be made before or after 17
January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in
consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's
individual interests, 22 and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or
before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien
spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on
19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or
soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-
born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital
question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine
citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to
the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino
mother and an alien father had
exercised the right of suffrage when
he came of age, the same constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare)
[sic] The acts of the petitioner in
registering as a voter, participating in
elections and campaigning for certain
candidates were held by the Supreme
Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship.
Accordingly, even without complying
with the formal requisites for election,
the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was
judicially upheld. 23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be
patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be
made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act mandate that the option to
elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not
impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio
Mallare 25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of
the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the
doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not
applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal
failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625
was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years
before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of
election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect
the presentation of a formal deed to
that effect considering that prior to the
enactment of Commonwealth Act 625
on June 7, 1941, no particular
proceeding was required to exercise
the option to elect Philippine
citizenship, granted to the proper party
by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. 26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a
Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate
(natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus
followed her citizenship. I therefore agree with
the petitioners' submission that,
inciting the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal
had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by
operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the
law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him.
For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private
respondent's father was valid, and that there was no
further need for private respondent to elect Philippine
citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino
citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the
Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by
him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the
Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship
derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching
the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable
time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he
cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I
am constrained to state that private respondent is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is in the election for that office, and it is a case, there is not,
disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of fundamental idea in all republican strictly speaking,
Representatives. forms of government that no one can a contest, as the
be declared elected and no measure wreath of victory
can be declared carried unless he or it cannot be
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the
receives a majority or plurality of the transferred from
issue of required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution
legal votes cast in the election. (20 an ineligible to
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676). any other
must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
candidate when
for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be
the sole question
elected. As early as 1912, this Court has
is the eligibility of
already declared that the candidate
the one receiving
who lost in an election cannot be
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of a plurality of the
proclaimed the winner in the event
the petitioners can replace private respondent as the legally cast
that the candidate who won is found
Representative of the second legislative district of Northern ballots. . . . 31
ineligible for the office to which he was
Samar in the House of Representatives.
elected. This was the ruling in Topacio
v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) — The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the Constitutional Convention as a natural-born
petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
Again, the effect
House of Representatives representing the second district
of a decision that
of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon
a candidate is not Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of
L.Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
entitled to the Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father and
EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal, 27 is controlling. There
office because of mother.
we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo
fraud or
warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as
irregularities in
mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971
the election is
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the Constitutional Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong
quite different
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the
from that
Baguio City for mayor of that City. House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a
produced by
natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially
declaring a
impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified person ineligible
supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision
for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even to hold such an
of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of
if it is labelled an election protest. 28 It is a proceeding to office. . . . If it be
its decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in
unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily found that the
reference to this submission, said:
to install the protestant in his place. 29 successful
candidate
(according to the Be that as it may and in the light of the
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority board of Tribunal's disposition of protestee's
of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an canvassers) citizenship based on an entirely
election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
obtained a different set of circumstances, apart
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a plurality in an from the indisputable fact that the
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the illegal manner, matters attempted to be brought in
election is a nullity. 30
and that another issue in connection therewith are too
candidate was the far removed in point of time and
Sound policy dictates that public real victor, the relevance from the decisive events
elective offices are filled by those who former must retire relied upon by the Tribunal, we view
have the highest number of votes cast in favor of the
latter. In the other
 these two issues as being already
inconsequential. 33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to
predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship
by naturalization of private respondent's father
(Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of
Philippine citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-
07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and
Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his
citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election
Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention
heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a
report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of
which stated:
It appearing that protestee's
grandfather was himself a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty
of Paris of December 10, 1898, thus
conferring upon protestee's own
father, Ong Chuan, Philippine
citizenship at birth, the conclusion is
inescapable that protestee himself is a
natural-born citizen, and is therefore
qualified to hold the office of delegate
to the Constitutional Convention. 34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed
against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of
the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials. 35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to
say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention
decision in the Emil L. Ong case
involved the 1935Constitution; the
present case, on the other hand
involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no
specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987
Constitution contains a precise and
specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2,
Art. IV thereof and private respondent
does not qualify under such definition
in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case
of Emil L. Ong was a decision of
apolitical body, not a court of law. And,
even if we have to take such a
decision as a decision of aquasi-
judicial body (i.e., a political body
exercising quasi-judicial functions),
said decision in the Emil L. Ong case
can not have the category or character
of res judicata in the present judicial
controversy, because between the two
(2) cases, there is no identity of
parties (one involves Emil L. Ong,
while the other involves private
respondent) and, more importantly,
there is no identity of causes of action
because the first involves the 1935
Constitution while the second involves
the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on
procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted before
the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court,
does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong
before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially
adopted by private respondent in the present controversy.
This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L.
Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under
the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" — and this
appears crucial and central to its decision — that Emil L.
Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his descendants
like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent)
became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a
Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was
therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law
expressly declared that all inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who
were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands." (Section 4,
Philippine Bill of
1902). 36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te
private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was
"an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside
therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he
met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then,
Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a
Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z
,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the
"Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show
that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar
where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners
(protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a
certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records
and Management and Archives Office, stating that the
name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central
de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend
to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close
to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing
in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to
private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs
or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT
ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE,
except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the
majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted
any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of
Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not
surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father
or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim
Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino
citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead
applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the
House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed
the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the
light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino
citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to
look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had
become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902
was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held
in Lee vs. Commissioners of
Immigration: 37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in
a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding Court or
administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court
in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8
May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is
contended by private respondent that the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case
was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L.
Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the
Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private
respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee
Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it
would help to look into the circumstances of the case
brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or
disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both
candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May
1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification with
the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed
as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a natural-
born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the Identical
issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94)
The motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting
Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong(SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R.
Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner
for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and
considering that at the hearing this
morning, it was brought out that the
1971 Constitutional Convention, at its
session of November 28, 1972, after
considering the Report of its
Committee on Election Protests and
Credentials, found that the protest
questioning the citizenship of the
protestee (the petitioner herein) was
groundless and dismissed Election
Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed
against said petitioner (p. 237, Rollo),
the authenticity of the Minutes of said
session as well as of the said
Committee's Report having been duly
admitted in evidence without objection
and bears out, for now, without need
for a full hearing, that petitioner is a
natural-born citizen, the Court
Resolved to ISSUE, effective
immediately, a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further
hearing on the disqualification case
entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at
3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any
other day, except to dismiss the
same.This is without prejudice to any
appropriate action that private
respondent may wish to take after the
elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No.
67201 was rendered without the benefit of a hearing on
the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and
merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is
quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action
that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the
elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the
resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the
1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further
proceeding in regard to the same question and that,
consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to
such recognition. How much more when the Constitution
involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987
Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all
such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still
inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private
respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the
second district of Northern Samar, would have had to
cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full
membership of the Court had participated in this case, with
the result that the legislative district would cease to have,
in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in
cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the
Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when
the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar cast the majority of their votes for private
respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully
eligible and qualified for the office because he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief
can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the
Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the
Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says,
"Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is
worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even
aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private
respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT
QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a
question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves
facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite
agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. 1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not
substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows
better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 2 it was
held that this Court can not review the errors of the
Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all
election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and
unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is
to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred
expanded powers on the Court, 3 but as the Charter states,
our authority is "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 4 It is not to review
facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical
exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or
otherwise, to denial of due process of law. 5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a
matter of opinion with which men may differ, but certainly,
it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal
has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has
begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the
Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the
Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the
Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently,
is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the
House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the
Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in
question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be
noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated
September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Committee 6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which
the Committees upheld the citizenship, and sustained the
qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's
full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the
Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having
complied with the requirements on Filipinization by existing
laws for which his successors need not have elected
Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim.
There can hardly be any doubt that
Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was
a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was
therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law
expressly declared that all inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who
were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899, as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine
Bill of 1902). Excepted from the
operation of this rule were Spanish
subjects who shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the Treaty
of Paris of December 10, 1898. But
under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of
Peninsular Spain had the privilege of
preserving their Spanish nationality. 7
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's
grandfather established residence in
the Philippines in 1895, as shown by
the Registro Central de Chinos. He
was also issued a certificate of
registration. He established a
business here, and later acquired real
property. Although he went back to
China for brief visits, he invariably
came back. He even brought his
eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the
Philippines when the latter was only
10 years old. And Ong Chuan was
admitted into the country because, as
duly noted on his landing certificate,
his father, Ong Te had been duly
enrolled under CR 16009-36755 —
i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed,
even when Ong Te went back to
China in the 1920's for another visit,
he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was
then still a minor, in the Philippines —
obviously because he had long
considered the Philippines his home.
The domicile he established in 1895 is
presumed to have continued up to,
and beyond, April 11, 1899, for, as
already adverted to, a domicile once
acquired is not lost until a new one is
gained. The only conclusion then can
thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as
domiciled in the Philippines as of April mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from
11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4, experience, because when the Convention approved the
Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 — Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the
and was, consequently, a Spanish presiding officer.
subject, he qualified as a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of Section
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this
4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 8
Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to
sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) 11 in
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he
was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit
that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled
Protestants, however, make capital of matter. Let it rest.
the fact that both Ong Te and his son,
Ong Chuan (protestee's father),
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of
appear to have been registered as
the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court,
Chinese citizens even long after the
involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however,
turn of the century. Worse, Ong
that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
Chuan himself believed the was alien,
to the extent of having to seek
admission as a Pilipino citizen through I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or
naturalization proceedings. The point, not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates,
to our mind, is neither crucial nor indeed, also of this Court.
substantial. Ong's status as a citizen
is a matter of law, rather than of
personal belief. It is what the law
provides, and not what one thinks his
status to be, which determines Separate Opinions
whether one is a citizen of a particular
state or not. Mere mistake or
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
misapprehension as to one's
citizenship, it has been held, is not a
sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture I dissent.
of Philippine citizenship; it does not
even constitute estoppel (Palanca vs.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek
Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too,
to annul the decision * of respondent House of
estoppel applies only to questions of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to
fact and not of law (Tanada v.
as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared
Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957). 9
private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22
approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972, February 1990 denying petitioners' motions for
approved without any objection by the Convention in reconsideration.
plenary session. 10
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the
Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to be a
Member of the House of Representatives and to declare
him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest
number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly
elected representative of the second legislative district of
Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner
Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent
Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not
qualified for membership in the House of Representatives
and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected
representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and
private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the
candidates for the position of Representative or
Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private
respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987
with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes
over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number
of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election
protests against private respondent with the tribunal,
docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively.
Both protests raised almost the same issues and were
thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning,
Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section
6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article
IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar,
in contemplation of Section 6, Article
VI of the same Constitution, for a
period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the
congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong
1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine
citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of citizenship, filed his petition for
Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to naturalization with the Court of First
the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, Instance of Samar, pursuant to
declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the Commonwealth Act No. 473,
House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, otherwise known as the Revised
representing the second legislative district of Northern Naturalization Law.
Samar.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated Instance of Samar rendered a
proceedings in the tribunal are the following: decision approving the application of
Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and
declaring said petitioner a Filipino
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on
citizen "with all the rights and
June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses
privileges and duties, liabilities and
Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong
obligations inherent to Filipino citizens.
Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place
(Exh. E)
of birth is Laoang which is now one of
the municipalities comprising the
province of Northern Samar (Republic 7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court
Act No. 6132 approved on August 24, issued an order:
1970 and the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution).
(1) declaring the
decision of this
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Court of April 28,
Chuan was born in China and arrived 1955 final and
in Manila on December 16, 1915. executory;
(Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter,
he took up residence in Laoang,
(2) directing the
Samar.
clerk of court to
issue the
3. On February 4, 1932, he married corresponding
Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was Certificate of
celebrated according to the rites and Naturalization in
practices of the Roman Catholic favor of the
Church in the Municipality of Laoang applicant Ong
(Exh. E). Chuan who
prefers to take his
oath and register
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose
his name as Jose
Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a
Ong Chuan.
natural-born Filipino citizen, both her
Petitioner may
parents at the time of her birth being
take his oath as
Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
Filipino citizen
under Ms new
christian name,
 Jose Ong Chuan.
(Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan
having taken the corresponding oath
of allegiance to the Constitution and
the Government of the Philippines as
prescribed by Section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, was
issued the corresponding Certificate of
Naturalization. (Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L.
Ong, a full-brother of the protestee
and a son born on July 25, 1937 at
Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose
Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was
elected delegate from Northern Samar
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it
was established that he had attended
grade school in Laoang. Thereafter,
he went to Manila where he finished
his secondary as well as his college
education. While later employed in
Manila, protestee however went home
to Laoang whenever he had the
opportunity to do so, which invariably
would be as frequent as twice to four
times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being
a native and legal resident of Laoang,
he registered as a voter therein and
correspondingly voted in said
municipality in the 1984 and 1986
elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during
the general registration of all voters in
the country, Protestee re-registered as
a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay
Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's
affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is
a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh.
7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's
decision having been denied, petitioners filed the present
petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of
the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision
vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives. 2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present
controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents'
contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence
to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to
decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held
in Morrero vs.Bocar, 3 construing Section 4, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the
(electoral) commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, "upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of
due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73
Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-
bound to determine whether or not, in an actual
controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more
than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of
ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the
electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by
constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests
relating to such matters. The present controversy,
however, involves no less than a determination of whether
the qualifications for membership in the House of
Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have
been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss
in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the
Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the
House of Representatives, solely because the House
Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a
case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to
require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of
private respondent for the office of Member of the House
of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners
who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the
office illegally held by private respondent. From this
additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly
perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by
another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for
this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision
of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention
of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of
powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a
function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of
interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine
and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory)
interpretation, in the context of the
interactions of the three branches of
the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the
State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate
area of governmental power (the
Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B.
Sevisher, 1958, p. 36). 4
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest
and concern to determine whether or not private
respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a
public office which is specifically reserved by the
Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the
evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent
tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned
decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution 5 requires that a Member of the House of
Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines
natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987
Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of
the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting
the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The first
sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic
definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private
respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines
under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
because he did not have "to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship." It bears to
repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still
a minor of 9 years he already became
a Filipino citizen by declaration of law.
Since his mother was a natural-born
citizen at the time of her marriage,
protestee had an inchoate right to
Philippine citizenship at the moment of
his birth and, consequently the
declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA
473 that he was a Filipino citizen
retroacted to the moment of his birth
without his having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such Philippine
citizenship. 6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such
kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private
respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses
Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In
other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese
citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his
father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized
Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was
enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19
June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the
Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose
mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in
order to be considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a
natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution,
private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the
Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth,
although from birth, private respondent had the right to
elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother,
but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law
(C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father),
who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization
of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, 8 this
does not alter the fact that private respondent was not
born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of
CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-
born citizen merely because he did not have to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent
could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the
operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid
and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private
respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that
only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a
Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral
attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an
electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong
Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that
the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must
emanate from the Government and must be made in a
proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-
naturalization directed against the proper party, who in
such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however,
afforded the character of impregnability under the principle
of res judicata. 9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion
made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or
his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain
conditions the privilege of citizenship.
He may accept the offer and become
a citizen upon compliance with the
prescribed conditions, but not
otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of
right. He can only become a citizen
upon and after a strict compliance with
the acts of Congress. An applicant for
this high privilege is bound, therefore,
to conform to the terms upon which
alone the right he seeks can be
conferred. It is his province, and he is
bound, to see that the jurisdictional
facts upon which the grant is
predicated actually exist and if they do
not he takes nothing by this paper
grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege
to a specified class of persons, no
other person is entitled to such
privilege, nor to a certificate purporting
to grant it, and any such certificate
issued to a person not so entitled to
receive it must be treated as a mere
nullity, which confers no legal rights as
against the government, from which it
has been obtained without warrant of
law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most
discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor." 11
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made
by the petitioners that the naturalization of private
respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court
should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization
proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more
inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat
for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
office. 12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the
citizenship of private respondent is derived from his father.
If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning,
then there is nothing from which private respondent can
derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring
cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private
respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship
by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would
constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against
the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose
Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section
12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI
issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the
applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to
take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application
for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper
and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the
issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said
order. 13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic, 14 this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of
allegiance on the same day as
issuance of order granting citizenship
is irregular and makes the
proceedings so taken null and void.
(Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244
[1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil.
1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the
naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's
father) was null and void. It follows that the private
respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be
considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing
the clerk of court to issue the certificate of naturalization to
Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance
was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of
Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic
naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a
Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or
perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private as borne by the official records of the MR. TRENAS:
respondent acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino 1986 Constitutional Commission. 17 The Committee
citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother on Citizenship,
was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to Bill of Rights,
Although I find the distinction as to when election of
an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Political Rights
Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner and Obligations
bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of
of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the and Human
the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship,
same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen Rights has more
as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the
to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the or less decided to
controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional
age of majority. The right or privilege of election is extend the
provisions in question.
available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers interpretation of
under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973 who is a natural-
Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973. I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, born Filipino
interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the citizen as
1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in provided in
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even Section 4 of the
in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion
nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus — 1973 Constitution,
as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment
by adding that
by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-born"
persons who have
Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship — The ascertainment of that intent is but
elected Philippine
all in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support in keeping with the fundamental citizenship under
private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the principle of constitutional construction the 1935
House of Representatives. 15 that the intent of the framers of the
Constitution shall
organic law and of the people be considered
adopting it should be given effect. The natural-born. Am I
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of
primary task in constitutional
section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution right, Mr.
construction is to ascertain and Presiding Officer?
contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino
thereafter assure the realization of the
mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973
purpose of the framers and of the
and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect
people in the adoption of the FR BERNAS:
Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution. It may also be safely Yes.
Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born
assumed that the people in ratifying
Filipino citizen. 16
the constitution were guided mainly by
MR. TRENAS:
the explanation offered by the
And does the
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the framers. 18
Commissioner
constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to
think that tills
refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission addition to
Constitutional Commission. It said:
relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) Section 4 of the
of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of 1973 Constitution
That the benevolent provisions of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before would be contrary
Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine to the spirit of that
1987 Constitution was (sic) intended citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are section?
by its (sic) framers to be endowed, to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
without distinction, to all Filipinos by
FR BERNAS:
election pursuant to the 1935
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Yes, we are quite
Constitution is more than persuasively
Commissioner Treñas specifically asked Commissioner aware that it is
established by the extensive
Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus: contrary to the
interpellations and debate on the issue
letter really. But
whether it is adopting the 1935
contrary to the paragraph 2 of Constitution?
spirit is something Section 1 of the
that has been 1971 Constitution.
FR BERNAS: It
debated before So, the entire
would apply to
and is being purpose of this
anybody who
debated even proviso is simply
elected Philippine
now. We will to perhaps
citizenship by
recall that during remedy whatever
virtue of the
the 1971 injustice there
provision of the
Constitutional may be so that
1935 Constitution,
Convention, the these people born
whether the
status of natural- before January
election was done
born citizenship of 17, 1973 who are
before or after 17
one of the not naturalized
January 1973. 20
delegates, Mr. and people who
Ang, was are not natural
challenged born but who are And during the period of amendments. Commissioner
precisely because in the same Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as
he was a citizen situation as we Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the
by election. are considered 1987 Constitution, thus:
Finally, the 1971 natural-born
Constitutional citizens. So, the
Convention intention of the MR. RODRIGO:
considered him a Committee in The purpose of
that proviso is to
natural-born proposing this is
citizen, one of the to equalize their remedy an
requirements to status. 19 inequitable
be a Member of situation.
the 1971 Between 1935
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born and 1973, when
Constitutional
citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner we were under
Convention. The
Azcuna thus: the 1935
reason behind
Constitution,
that decision was
that a person those born of
MR. AZCUNA:
under his Filipino fathers
With respect to
but alien mothers
circumstances the proviso in
already had the were natural-born
Section 4, would
inchoate right to Filipinos.
this refer only to
However, those
be a citizen by the those who elect
fact that the born of Filipino
Philippine
mother was a mothers but alien
citizenship after
fathers would
Filipino. And as a the effectivity of
matter of fact, the have to elect
the 1973
1971 Philippine
Constitution or
citizenship upon
Constitutional would it also
Convention reaching the age
cover those who
formalized that of majority; and, if
elected it under
they do elect, they
recognition by
 become Filipino
citizens, yet, but
not natural-born
Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the
status of those born of Filipino
mothers and those born of Filipino
fathers. So that from January 17, 1973
when the 1973 Constitution took
effect, those born of Filipino mothers
but of alien fathers are natural-born
Filipino citizens. Also, those who are
born of Filipino fathers and alien
mothers are natural-born Filipino
citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the
status of a child born of a Filipino
mother and that born of a Filipino
father, why do we not give a chance to
a child born before January 17, 1973,
if and when he elects Philippine
citizenship, to be in the same status
as one born of a Filipino father —
namely, natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the
status of a father and a mother vis-a-
vis the child. I would like to state also
that we showed equalize the status of
a child born of a Filipino mother the
day before January 17, 1973 and a
child born also of a Filipino mother on
January 17 or 24 hours later. A child
born of a Filipino mother but an alien
father one day before January 17,
1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects
Philippine citizenship, but he is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen. However,
the other child who luckily was born 24
hours later — maybe because of parto
laborioso — is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. 21
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen
was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino
mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity
date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien
spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born
to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino
citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of
the age of majority, may be made before or after 17
January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in
consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's
individual interests, 22 and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or
before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien
spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on
19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or
soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-
born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital
question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine
citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that private
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to
the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino
mother and an alien father had
exercised the right of suffrage when
he came of age, the same constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare)
[sic] The acts of the petitioner in
registering as a voter, participating in
elections and campaigning for certain
candidates were held by the Supreme
Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship.
Accordingly, even without complying
with the formal requisites for election,
the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was
judicially upheld. 23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be
patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be
made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act mandate that the option to
elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not
impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio
Mallare 25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of
the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the
doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not
applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal
failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625
was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years
before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of
election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect
the presentation of a formal deed to
that effect considering that prior to the
enactment of Commonwealth Act 625
on June 7, 1941, no particular
proceeding was required to exercise
the option to elect Philippine
citizenship, granted to the proper party
by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. 26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a
Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate
(natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus
followed her citizenship. I therefore agree with
the petitioners' submission that,
inciting the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal
had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon a candidate is not
operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, L.Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) entitled to the
providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal, 27 is controlling. There office because of
citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo fraud or
law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as irregularities in
For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he the election is
respondent's father was valid, and that there was no obtained only the second highest number of votes in the quite different
further need for private respondent to elect Philippine election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of from that
citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino Baguio City for mayor of that City. produced by
citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the declaring a
Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by person ineligible
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified
him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the to hold such an
for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even
Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship office. . . . If it be
if it is labelled an election protest. 28 It is a proceeding to
derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching found that the
unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily
the age of majority, not during one's minority. successful
to install the protestant in his place. 29
candidate
(according to the
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority board of
respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an canvassers)
reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable
election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next obtained a
time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a plurality in an
cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the illegal manner,
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
election is a nullity. 30 and that another
candidate was the
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I real victor, the
Sound policy dictates that public
am constrained to state that private respondent is not a former must retire
elective offices are filled by those who in favor of the
natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of
have the highest number of votes cast latter. In the other
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
in the election for that office, and it is a case, there is not,
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is
fundamental idea in all republican strictly speaking,
disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of
forms of government that no one can a contest, as the
Representatives.
be declared elected and no measure wreath of victory
can be declared carried unless he or it cannot be
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the receives a majority or plurality of the
transferred from
issue of required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution legal votes cast in the election. (20 an ineligible to
requires that a Member of the House of Representatives Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676). any other
must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
candidate when
for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be the sole question
As early as 1912, this Court has
elected. is the eligibility of
already declared that the candidate
who lost in an election cannot be the one receiving
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of proclaimed the winner in the event a plurality of the
the petitioners can replace private respondent as the that the candidate who won is found legally cast
Representative of the second legislative district of Northern ineligible for the office to which he was ballots. . . . 31
Samar in the House of Representatives. elected. This was the ruling in Topacio
v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) — The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the Constitutional Convention as a natural-born
petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the Again, the effect Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.
House of Representatives representing the second district of a decision that
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of
Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father and
mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong
was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the
House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a
natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially
impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not
supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision
of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of
its decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in
reference to this submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the
Tribunal's disposition of protestee's
citizenship based on an entirely
different set of circumstances, apart
from the indisputable fact that the
matters attempted to be brought in
issue in connection therewith are too
far removed in point of time and
relevance from the decisive events
relied upon by the Tribunal, we view
these two issues as being already
inconsequential. 33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to
predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship
by naturalization of private respondent's father
(Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of
Philippine citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-
07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and
Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his
citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election
Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention
heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a
report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of
which stated:
It appearing that protestee's
grandfather was himself a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty
of Paris of December 10, 1898, thus
conferring upon protestee's own
father, Ong Chuan, Philippine
citizenship at birth, the conclusion is
inescapable that protestee himself is a
natural-born citizen, and is therefore
qualified to hold the office of delegate
to the Constitutional Convention. 34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed
against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of
the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials. 35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to
say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention
decision in the Emil L. Ong case
involved the 1935Constitution; the
present case, on the other hand
involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no
specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987
Constitution contains a precise and
specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2,
Art. IV thereof and private respondent
does not qualify under such definition
in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case
of Emil L. Ong was a decision of
apolitical body, not a court of law. And,
even if we have to take such a
decision as a decision of aquasi-
judicial body (i.e., a political body
exercising quasi-judicial functions),
said decision in the Emil L. Ong case
can not have the category or character
of res judicata in the present judicial
controversy, because between the two
(2) cases, there is no identity of
parties (one involves Emil L. Ong,
while the other involves private
respondent) and, more importantly,
there is no identity of causes of action
because the first involves the 1935
Constitution while the second involves
the 1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on
procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted before
the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court,
does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong
before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially
adopted by private respondent in the present controversy.
This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L.
Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under
the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" — and this
appears crucial and central to its decision — that Emil L.
Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his descendants
like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent)
became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a
Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was
therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law
expressly declared that all inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who
were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands." (Section 4,
Philippine Bill of
1902). 36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te
private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was
"an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside
therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he
met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then,
Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a
Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z
,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the
"Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show
that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar
where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners
(protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a
certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records
and Management and Archives Office, stating that the
name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central
de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend
to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close
to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing
in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to
private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs
or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT
ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE,
except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the
majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted
any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of
Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not
surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father
or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim
Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino
citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead
applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the
House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed
the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the
light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino
citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to
look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had
become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902
was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held
in Lee vs. Commissioners of
Immigration: 37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensable in
a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding Court or
administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court
in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8
May 1984. In connection with said resolution, it is
contended by private respondent that the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case
was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L.
Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the
Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private
respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee
Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it
would help to look into the circumstances of the case
brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or
disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both
candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May
1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification with
the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed
as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a natural-
born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the Identical
issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94)
The motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting
Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong(SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R.
Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner
for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and
considering that at the hearing this
morning, it was brought out that the
1971 Constitutional Convention, at its
session of November 28, 1972, after
considering the Report of its
Committee on Election Protests and
Credentials, found that the protest
questioning the citizenship of the
protestee (the petitioner herein) was
groundless and dismissed Election
Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed
against said petitioner (p. 237, Rollo),
the authenticity of the Minutes of said
session as well as of the said
Committee's Report having been duly
admitted in evidence without objection
and bears out, for now, without need
for a full hearing, that petitioner is a
natural-born citizen, the Court
Resolved to ISSUE, effective
immediately, a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further
hearing on the disqualification case
entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at
3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any
other day, except to dismiss the
same.This is without prejudice to any
appropriate action that private
respondent may wish to take after the
elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No.
67201 was rendered without the benefit of a hearing on
the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and
merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is
quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action
that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the
elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the
resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the
1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further
proceeding in regard to the same question and that,
consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to
such recognition. How much more when the Constitution
involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987
Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all
such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still
inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private
respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the
second district of Northern Samar, would have had to
cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full
membership of the Court had participated in this case, with
the result that the legislative district would cease to have,
in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in
cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the
Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when
the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar cast the majority of their votes for private
respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully
eligible and qualified for the office because he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief
can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the
Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the
Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says,
"Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is
worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even
aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private
respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT
QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a
question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves
facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite
agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. 1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not
substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows
better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 2 it was
held that this Court can not review the errors of the
Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all
election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and
unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is
to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred
expanded powers on the Court, 3 but as the Charter states,
our authority is "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 4 It is not to review
facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical
exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or
otherwise, to denial of due process of law. 5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a
matter of opinion with which men may differ, but certainly,
it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal
has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has
begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the
Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the
Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the
Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently,
is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the
House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the
Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in
question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be
noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated
September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Committee 6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which
the Committees upheld the citizenship, and sustained the
qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's
full blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the
Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having
complied with the requirements on Filipinization by existing
laws for which his successors need not have elected
Filipino citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim.
There can hardly be any doubt that
Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was
a Spanish subject residing in the
Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was
therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law
expressly declared that all inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who
were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899, as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine
Bill of 1902). Excepted from the
operation of this rule were Spanish
subjects who shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the Treaty
of Paris of December 10, 1898. But
under the Treaty of Paris, only
Spanish subjects who were natives of
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father,
Peninsular Spain had the privilege of
subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he
preserving their Spanish nationality. 7
was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted, protestee's
grandfather established residence in
the Philippines in 1895, as shown by
the Registro Central de Chinos. He
was also issued a certificate of
registration. He established a
business here, and later acquired real
property. Although he went back to
China for brief visits, he invariably
came back. He even brought his
eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the
Philippines when the latter was only
10 years old. And Ong Chuan was
admitted into the country because, as
duly noted on his landing certificate,
his father, Ong Te had been duly
enrolled under CR 16009-36755 —
i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed,
even when Ong Te went back to
China in the 1920's for another visit,
he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was
then still a minor, in the Philippines —
obviously because he had long
considered the Philippines his home.
The domicile he established in 1895 is
presumed to have continued up to,
and beyond, April 11, 1899, for, as
already adverted to, a domicile once
acquired is not lost until a new one is
gained. The only conclusion then can
thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly
domiciled in the Philippines as of April
11, 1899, within the meaning of par. 4,
Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 —
and was, consequently, a Spanish
subject, he qualified as a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of Section
4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 8
Protestants, however, make capital of
the fact that both Ong Te and his son,
Ong Chuan (protestee's father),
appear to have been registered as
Chinese citizens even long after the
turn of the century. Worse, Ong
Chuan himself believed the was alien,
to the extent of having to seek
admission as a Pilipino citizen through
naturalization proceedings. The point,
to our mind, is neither crucial nor
substantial. Ong's status as a citizen
is a matter of law, rather than of
personal belief. It is what the law
provides, and not what one thinks his
status to be, which determines
whether one is a citizen of a particular
state or not. Mere mistake or
misapprehension as to one's
citizenship, it has been held, is not a
sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture
of Philippine citizenship; it does not
even constitute estoppel (Palanca vs.
Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too,
estoppel applies only to questions of
fact and not of law (Tanada v.
Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957). 9
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously
approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972,
approved without any objection by the Convention in
plenary session. 10
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as
mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from
experience, because when the Convention approved the
Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the
presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this
Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to
sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) 11 in
which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit
that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled
matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of
the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court,
involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however,
that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or
not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates,
indeed, also of this Court.
Footnotes
 Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and this code. The
Villaba. new legislative
districts created
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
as a result of such
The fourth district 5 is composed of Ormoc City and the
conversion shall
municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob,
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner, continue to be
Merida, and Palompon.
vs. represented in
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Congress by the
The fifth district 6 is composed of the municipalities of duly-elected
Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan, representatives of
SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom. the original
districts out of
which said new
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its
provinces or
sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 districts were
PUNO, J.: of the law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959. 7 created until their
own
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities representatives
bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran, shall have been
First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and elected in the next
of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting Naval and all the territories comprised therein." regular
certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it congressional
violates the principle of equality of representation. To elections and
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took qualified.
remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer
effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province of
the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second
Biliran became a regular province. It provides:
District of the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was
representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
inclusion ofTolosa in his district. We gave due course to Existing sub- held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the
the petition considering that, at bottom, it involves the provinces are conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third District
validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of hereby converted composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran,
the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment. into regular Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and
provinces upon Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third
approval by a District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and
majority of the 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative districts. 1
votes cast in a
plebiscite to be
The first district 2 covers Tacloban City and the held in the sub- To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of
municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San provinces and the inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of
Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa. original provinces Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings
directly affected. with the incumbent representatives of the province and
The plebiscite other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it
The second district 3 is composed of the municipalities of shall be promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it
Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
conducted by the
Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, COMELEC District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth
Tabontabon, and Tunga. simultaneously District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of
with the national the First District which includes the municipality
The third district 4 is composed of the municipalities of elections following of Tolosaand the composition of the Fifth District were not
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, the effectivity of disturbed. After the movement of municipalities, the
composition of the five (5) legislative districts appeared as
follows:
First District:
Population
Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Tacloban City, 137,190
81,679
2. Alangalang, 33,375
20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033
22,357
8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700
———— ————
TOTAL 303,349 178,688
Second District:
Population
Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
10. Mac Arthur, 13,159
8,628
11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183
4,419
13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387
———— ————
TOTAL 272,167 156,462
Third District:
Population
Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649
2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6. Capoocan, and 23,687
13,595
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474
———— ————
TOTAL 214,499 125,763
Fourth District:
Population
Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Ormoc City, 129,456
75,140
2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345
12,474
———— ————
TOTAL 269,347 155,995
Fifth District:
Population
Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682
2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673
13,616
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247
———— ————
TOTAL 309,148 181,242
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling
the attention of respondent COMELEC, among others, to
the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters
between the First and Second Districts. He alleged that the
First District has 178,688 registered voters while the
Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a
difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the
difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with
7,7000 registered voters be transferred from the First to
the Second District. The motion was opposed by
intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent Commission
denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of
municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial
composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment
complied with the constitutional requirement that each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of
Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of
representation ordained in the Constitution.
Citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 8 he argues that respondent
COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as
much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor
General, in his Comment, concurred with the views of the
petitioner. The intervenor, however, opposed the petition
on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it has
jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the
Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own
Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters of the
Constitution.
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our
first inquiry will relate to the constitutional power of the
respondent COMELEC 9 to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another legislative district in the
province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent
COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election
laws, are spelled out in black and white in section 2(c),
Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent
COMELEC does not invoke this provision but relies on the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the
source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally
regarded as part of the power to make laws. The
Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House
of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to
the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities
and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections
state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of
Members of the House of
Representatives of the First Congress
of the Philippines under the
Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and
subsequent elections, and until
otherwise provided by law, the
Members thereof shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections
is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment
herein made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at
least one Member or such number of
Members as it may be entitled to on
the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3),
Section 5 of Article VI of the THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Constitution. The number of Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is
Members apportioned to the province recognized.
out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a
population has so increased, is
very simple motion by way of
geographically located shall be
amendment by substitution and this
correspondingly adjusted by the
was, I believe, a prior or a proposed
Commission on Elections but such
amendment. Also, the chairman of the
adjustment shall not be made within
Committee on the Legislative said that
one hundred and twenty days before
he was proposing a vote first by the
the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Chamber on the concept of whether
the election is by province and cities
The Ordinance was made necessary because on the one hand, or by legislative
Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C. Aquino, districts on the other. So I propose this
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of simple formulation which reads: "FOR
the Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa. 11 She THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS
then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE
Constitution. 12 DISTRICTS SHALL BE
APPORTIONED BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS." I
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then
hope the chairman will accept the
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a
proposed amendment.
distinguished member of this Court. The records reveal
that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several
prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional SUSPENSION OF SESSION
elections under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital
issues were: whether the members of the House of
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or
Representatives would be elected by district or by
less, the same insofar as the
province; who shall undertake the apportionment of the
apportionment is concerned, but the
legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should be
Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal
made. 14 Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3)
would also provide for a mandate for
options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow President
the apportionment later, meaning after
Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2) empower the
the first election, which will in effect
COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the
embody what the Commission had
Commission exercise the power by way of an Ordinance
approved, reading as follows: "Within
appended to the Constitution. 15 The different dimensions
three years following the return of
of the options were discussed by Commissioners Davide,
every census, the Congress shall
Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote the
make a reapportionment of legislative
debates in extenso, viz.: 16
districts based on the standards
provided in this section."
xxx xxx xxx
So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer. request for a suspension of the
session, so that all the proponents can
work together.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). The session is suspended.
It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:40 p.m., the session was
resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as
a compromise, I wonder if the
Commission will allow this. We will just
delete the proposed subparagraph (4)
and all the capitalized words in
paragraph (5). So that in paragraph
(5), what would be left would only be
the following: "Within three years
following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in
this section."
But we shall have an ordinance
appended to the new Constitution
indicating specifically the following:
"FOR PURPOSES OF THE
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN
THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTION IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION
PROPOSED BY THE 1986
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS
AND UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED
BY LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL BE ELECTED FROM
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
APPORTIONED AMONG THE
PROVINCES, CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS
FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the
allocation of seats to Metropolitan
Manila Area, to the provinces and to
the cities, without indicating the
municipalities comprising each of the
districts. Then, under Section 2, we
will mandate the COMELEC to make
the actual apportionment on the basis
of the number of seats provided for
and allocated to each province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is
recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the
provision which will give mandate to
COMELEC to do the redistricting.
Redistricting is vitally linked to the
baneful practices of cutting up areas
or spheres of influence; in other
words, gerrymandering. This
Commission, being a nonpartisan, a
nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the
best possible situation under the
circumstances to undertake that
responsibility. We are not wanting in
expertise and in time because in the
first place, the Committee on the
Legislative has prepared the report on
the basis of the recommendation of
the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). Commissioner Ople is
recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the
position taken by Commissioner
Aquino in this respect. We know that
the reapportionment of provinces and
cities for the purpose of redistricting is
generally inherent in the constituent
power or in the legislative power. And
I would feel very uncertain about
delegating this to a quasi-judicial body
even if it is one of the constitutional
offices created under this Constitution.
We have the assurance of
Commissioner Davide, as chairman of
the Committee on the Legislative, that
even given the very short time
remaining in the life of this
Commission, there is no reason why
we cannot complete the work of
reapportionment on the basis of the
COMELEC plan which the committee
has already thoroughly studied and
which remains available to the
Constitutional Commission.
So, I support the position taken by
Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding
Officer. I think, it is the safest, the
most reasonable, and the most
workable approach that is available to
this Commission.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). What does Commissioner
Davide say:
MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is
whether this body will make the
apportionment itself or whether we will
leave it to the COMELEC. So, there
arises, therefore, a prejudicial
question for the body to decide. I
would propose that the Commission
should now decide what body should
make the apportionment. Should it be
the Commission or should it be the
COMELEC? And the Committee on
the Legislative will act accordingly on
the basis of the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is
recognized.
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I
would like to inform the body that I
believe the Committee on the
Legislative has precisely worked on
this matter and they are ready with a
list of apportionment. They have, in
fact, apportioned the whole country
into various districts based on the
recommendation of the COMELEC.
So they are ready with the list and if
this body would wish to apportion the
whole country by district itself, then I
believe we have the time to do it
because the Committee on the
Legislative is ready with that particular
report which need only to be
appended to the Constitution. So if
this body is ready to accept the work
of the Committee on the Legislative
we would have no problem. I just
would like to give that information so
that the people here would be guided
accordingly when they vote.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigo is
recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to
ask Commissioner Davide some
questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). Commissioner Davide may
yield if he so desires.
MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
MR. RODRIGO. Will this
apportionment which we are
considering apply only to the first
election after the enactment of the
Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the
Padilla proposal, it will be for the first
election; on the basis of the Sarmiento
proposal, it will only apply to the first
election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that,
Congress will have the power to
reapportion.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this
to the Constitution — the
reapportionment based on the
COMELEC study and between the
approval of the Constitution and the
first election — the COMELEC no
longer has the power to change that
even a bit.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir) Commissioner Regalado is
recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a
clarificatory question to Commissioner
Davide?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). Gentleman will please
proceed.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the
Commissioner's proposed
apportionment and considering the
fact that there will be a corresponding
reduction to 183 seats, would there be
instances representation of under non-
representation?
MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr.
Presiding Officer. I can assure the
Commission that there will be no case
of inequitable distribution. It will come
out to be one for every 350 to 400,000
inhabitants.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be
within the standard that we refer.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). The Floor Leader is
recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary
situation is that there was a motion by
Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate
COMELEC to do the redistricting. This
was also almost the same motion by
Commissioner Padilla and I think we
have had some kind of meeting of
minds. On the other hand, there
seems to be a prejudicial question, an
amendment to the amendment as
suggested by Commissioner Aquino,
that instead of the COMELEC, it
should be this Commission that shall
make the redistricting. So may I ask
Commissioner Aquino, if she insists
on that idea, to please formulate it into
a motion so we can vote on that first
as an amendment to the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is
recognized.
MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this
Commission to undertake the
apportionment of the legislative
districts instead of the proposal that
COMELEC be given the mandate to
undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified,
Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion
or the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). The proposed amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for
the approval of this proposed
amendment which we substitute for
paragraphs 4 and 5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it
should be treated merely as a motion
to be followed by a deletion of
paragraph 4 because that should not
really appear as a paragraph in
Section 5; otherwise, it will appear
very ugly in the Constitution where we
mandate a Commission that will
become functus officioto have the
authority. As a matter of fact, we
cannot exercise that authority until
after the ratification of the new
Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). What does Commissioner
Sarmiento say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr.
Presiding Officer. So, may I move for
the approval of this proposed
amendment.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is
recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a
two-thirds vote or a simple plurality to
adopt that motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). That will require a two-thirds
vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr.
Presiding Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the
motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir) The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that
this Commission do the
reapportionment legislative districts.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). What is the pleasure of
Commissioner Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again
on the motion. Is Commissioner
Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my
motion? Would it not be right for him
to move that the COMELEC be
mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted
the amendment. It is already the
Commission that will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has
accepted the amendment the
amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that
this Commission do the
reapportionment.
VOTING
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise
their hand. (Several Members raised
their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise
their hand. (No Member raised his
hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and
none against; the motion is approved.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the
COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment
as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance
only empowered the COMELEC "to
make minoradjustments of the reapportionment herein
made." The meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments
was again clarified in the debates 17 of the
Commission, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just
clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In
Section 2, the Commission on
Elections is empowered to make
minor adjustments on the
apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set
any time limit for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a
time limit unless during the period of
amendments a proposal is made. The
authority conferred would be on minor
corrections or amendments, meaning
to say, for instance, that we may have
forgotten an intervening municipality in
the enumeration, which ought to be
included in one district. That we shall
consider a minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the
meaning of minor adjustment. Can it
be possible that one municipality in a
district be transferred to another
district and call it a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done,
Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning,
that there should be no change in the
allocations per district. However, it
may happen that we have forgotten a
municipality in between which is still in
the territory of one assigned district, or
there may be an error in the correct
name of a particular
municipality because of changes
made by the interim Batasang
Pambansa and the Regular Batasang
Pambansa. There were many batas
pambansa enacted by both the interim
and the Regular Batasang Pambansa
changing the names of municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor
adjustment may be made only if one
of the municipalities is not mentioned
in the ordinance appended to, and it
will be up for the COMELEC now to
adjust or to put such municipality to a
certain district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding
Officer. For instance, we may not have
the data regarding a division of a
municipality by the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the Regular Batasang
Pambansa into two municipalities,
meaning, a mother municipality and
the new municipality, but still actually
these are within the geographical
district area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor
adjustment which the COMELEC
cannot do is that, if, for example, my
municipality is in the First District of
Laguna, they cannot put that in any
other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor
correction. It is a substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor
adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give
the respondent COMELEC any authority to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the
respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number
of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated
section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the
municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-
province to a regular province brought about an imbalance
in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5)
legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This
imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a
citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this
time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at
bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of
reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's
remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the
Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to
reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section." In Macias
v. COMELEC,18 we ruled that the validity of a legislative
apportionment is a justiciable question. But while this Court
can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it
cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would
want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to
the Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736
insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the
Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the
Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte,
is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition
praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosafrom
the First District to the Second District of the province of
Leyte. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946
JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.
Jose W. Diokno and Antonio Barredo for petitioners.
Vicente J. Francisco and Solicitor General Tañada for
respondents.
J. Antonio Araneta of the Lawyers' Guild as amicus curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X),
the Commission on elections submitted, last May, to the
President and the Congress of the Philippines, its report
on the national elections held the preceding month, and,
among other things, stated that, by reason of certain
specified acts of terrorism and violence in the Provinces of
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in
said region did not reflect the true and free expression of
the popular will.
When the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, it the influence of threats or violence,
proceeded with the selection of its officers. Thereafter, in are valid or invalid. . . ."
the course of the session, a resolution was approved
referring to the report and ordering that, pending the
WHEREAS, the minority report of the Hon.
termination of the protest lodged against their election, the
Vicente de Vera, member of the Commission on
herein petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
Elections, says among other things, that "we
E. Romero — who had been included among the sixteen
know that as a result of this chaotic condition,
candidates for senator receiving the highest number of
many residents of the four provinces have
votes, proclaimed by the Commission on Elections — shall
voluntarily banished themselves from their home
not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber.
towns in order not to be subjected to the
prevailing oppression and to avoid being
Pertinent parts of the resolution — called Pendatun — are victimized or losing their lives"; and that after the
these: election dead bodies had been found with notes
attached to their necks, reading, "Bomoto kami
kay Roxas" (we voted for Roxas);
WHEREAS the Commission on Elections,
charged under the Constitution with the duty of
insuring free, orderly, and honest elections in the WHEREAS the same Judge De Vera says in his
Philippines, reported to the President of the minority report that in the four Provinces of
Philippines on May 23, 1946, that Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija,
the worst terrorism reigned during and after the
election, and that if the elections held in the
". . . Reports also reached this
aforesaid provinces were annulled as demanded
Commission to the effect that in the
by the circumstances mentioned in the report of
Provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga,
the Commission, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno,
Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, the secrecy of
and Jose Romero, would not and could not have
the ballot was actually violated; the
been declared elected;
armed bands saw to it that their
candidates were voted for; and that
the great majority of the voters, thus xxx xxx xxx
coerced or intimadated, suffered from
a paralysis of judgement in the matter
WHEREAS the terrorism resorted to by the
of exercising the right of suffrage;
lawless elements in the four provinces
considering all those acts of terrorism,
mentioned above in order to insure the election
violence and intimidation in connection
of the candidates of the Conservative wing of the
with elections which are more or less
Nationalist Party is of public knowledge and that
general in the Provinces of
such terrorism continues to this day; that before
Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and
the elections Jose O. Vera himself declared as
Nueva Ecija, this Commission
campaign Manager of the Osmeña faction that
believes that the election in the
he was sorry if Presidential Candidate Manuel A.
provinces aforesaid did not reflect the
Roxas could not campaign in the Huk provinces
true and free expression of the
because his life would be endangered; and that
popular will. It should be stated,
because of the constant murders of his
however, that the Commission is
candidates and leaders, Presidential Candidate
without jurisdiction, to determine
Roxas found it necessary to appeal to American
whether or not the votes cast in the
High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt for
said provinces which, according to
protection, which appeal American High
these reports have been cast under
Commissioner personallyreferred to President
 Sergio Osme_¤_a for appropriate action, and
the Presidentin turn ordered the Secretary of the
existence and reign of such terrorism;
WHEREAS the Philippines, a Republic State,
embracing the principles ofdemocracy, must
condem all acts that seek to defeat the popular
will;
WHEREAS it is essential, in order to maintain
alive the respect fordemocratic institutions
among our people, that no man or group of men
be permitted to profit from the results of an
election held under coercion, in violation of law,
and contrary to the principle of freedom of
choice which should underlie all elections under
the Constitution;
WHEREAS protests against the election of Jose
O. Vega, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero,
have been filed with the electoral Tribunal of the
Senate of the Philippines on the basis of the
findings of the Commission on Elections above
quoted;
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the
Senate of the Philippines in session assembled,
as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno, and Jose Romero, pending the hearing
and decision on the protests lodged against their
elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the
report of the Commission on Elections and in the
report of the Provost Marshal constitutes the
ground of said protests and will therefore be the
subject of investigation and determination.
Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their
colleagues responsible for the resolution. They pray for an
order annulling it, and compelling respondents to permit
them to occupy their seats, and to exercise their senatorial
prerogatives.
In their pleadings, respondents traverse the jurisdiction of [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924],
this court, and assert the validity of the Pendatun 45 Phil., 612.) (Supra, pp. 88, 89.)
Resolution.
. . . Under our form of government the judicial
The issues, few and clear-cut, were thoroughly discussed department has no power to revise even the
at the extended oral argument and in comprehensive most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
memoranda submitted by both sides. department, or of either house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to
that department by the constitution. (Supra, p.
A.—NO JURISDICTION
93)
Way back in 1924, Senator Jose Alejandrino assaulted a
No court has ever held and we apprehend no
fellow-member in the Philippine Senate. That body, after
court will ever hold that it possesses the power
investigation, adopted a resolution, suspending him from
to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature or
office for one year. He applied here for mandamus and
a branch thereof to take any particular action. If
injunction to nullify the suspension and to require his
a court should ever be so rash as to thus trench
colleagues to reinstate him. This court believed the
on the domain of either of the other
suspension was legally wrong, because, as senator
departments, it will be the end of popular
appointed by the Governor-General, he could not be
government as we know it in democracies.
disciplined by the Philippine Senate; but it denied the
(Supra, p. 94.)
prayer for relief, mainly upon the theory of the separation
of the three powers, Executive, Legislative and Judicial.
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 81.) Said the decision: Conceding therefore that the power of the
Senate to punish its members for disorderly
behavior does not authorize it to suspend an
. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative
appointive member from the exercise of his
body, its members, or its officers, to compel the
office for one year, conceding what has been so
performance of duties purely legislative in their
well stated by the learned counsel for the
character which therefore pertain to their
petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the
legislative functions and over which they have
writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-
exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate
conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does
action in this respect without a gross usurpation
not possess the power of coercion to make the
of power. So it has been held that where a
Philippine Senate take any particular action. . . .
member has been expelled by the legislative
(Supra, p. 97.)
body, the courts have no power, irrespective of
whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to
issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. The same hands-off policy had been previously followed in
(Code of civil Procedure, section 222, 515; 18 Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of
R.C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366) and Abueva vs. Wood
Limitations, 190; French vs. Senate [1905], 146 (45 Phil., 612)
Cal; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex
parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte
At this point we could pretend to erudition by tracing the
[1889], 151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of
origin, development and various applications of theory of
Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood
separation of powers, transcribing herein whole
Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo.,
paragraphs from adjudicated cases to swell the pages of
156; State ex rel. Crammer vs. Thorson [1896],
judicial output. Yet the temptation must be resisted, and
33 L. R. A., ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258
the parties spared a stiff dose of juris prudential lore about
Ill., 441; Peopleex rel. La Chicote vs. Best
a principle, which, after all, is the first fundamental
imparted to every student of Constitutional Law.
Not that a passable excuse would be lacking for such a
dissertation. The advent of the Republic, and the
consequent finality of our views on constitutional issues,
may call for a definition of concepts and attitudes. But
surely, there will be time enough, as cases come up for
adjudication.
Returning to the instant litigation, it presents no more than
the questions, whether the Alejandro doctrine still obtains,
and whether the admitted facts disclose any features
justifying departure therefrom.
When the Commonwealth Constitution was approved in
1935, the existence of three coordinate, co-equal and co-
important branches of the government was ratified and
confirmed. That Organic Act contained some innovations
which established additional exceptions to the well-known
separation of powers; for instance, the creation of the
Electoral Tribunal wherein Justices of the Supreme Court
participate in the decision of congressional election
protests, the grant of rule-making power to the Supreme
Court, etc.; but in the main, the independence of one
power from the other was maintained. And the Convention
— composed mostly of lawyers (143 out of a total of 202
members), fully acquainted with the Abueva, Alejandrino
and Severino precedents — did not choose to modify their
constitutional doctrine, even as it altered some
fundamental tenets theretofore well established.1
However, it is alleged that, in 1936, Angara vs. Electoral
Commission (63 Phil., 139), modified the aforesaid ruling.
We do not agree. There is no pronouncement in the latter
decision, making specific reference to the Alejandrino
incident regarding our power — or lack of it — to interfere
with the functions of the Senate. And three years later, in
1939, the same Justice Laurel, who had penned it, cited
Alejandrino vs. Quezon as a binding authority of the
separation of powers. (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil., 62.) It must
be stressed that, in the Angara controversy, no legislative
body or person was a litigant before the court, and
whatever obiter dicta, or general expressions, may therein
found can not change the ultimate circumstance that no
directive was issued against a branch of the Legislature or
any member thereof.2 This Court, in that case, did not It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief
require the National Assembly or any assemblyman to do executive performed within the limits of his
any particular act. It only found it "has jurisdiction over the jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
Electoral Commission." (Supra, 63 Phil., 161.) neither direct nor restrain executive action in
such cases. The rule is non-interference. But
from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
That this court in the Angara litigation made declarations,
follow that we are precluded from making an
nullifying a resolution of the National Assembly, is not
inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his
decisive. In proper cases this court may annul any
acts when these are properly challenged in an
Legislative enactment that fails to observe the
appropriate legal proceeding. . . . In the present
constitutional limitations. That is a power conceded to the
case, the President is not a party to the
judiciary since Chief Justice Marshall penned Marbury vs.
proceeding. He is neither compelled nor
Madison in 1803. Its foundation is explained by Justice
restrained to actin a particular way. . . . This
Sutherland in the Minimum Wage Case (261 U. S.,
court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant
544).Said the Court:
proceedings and will accordingly proceed to
determine the merits of the present controversy."
. . . The Constitution, by its own terms, is the (Planas vs. Gil., 67 Phil., 62, 73, 74, 76.)
(Emphasis ours.) (See also Lopez vs. De los
supreme law of the land, emanating from the
Reyes, 55 Phil., 170.)
people, the repository of ultimate sovereignty
under our form of government. A congressional
statute, on the other hand, is the act of an
More about the Angara precedent: The defendant there
agency of this sovereign authority, and if it
was only the Electoral Commission which was "not a
conflicts with the Constitution, must fall; for that
separate department of the Government" (Vol. 63,p. 160),
which is not supreme must yield to that which is.
and exercised powers "judicial in nature." (Supra, p. 184)
To hold it invalid (if it be invalid) is a plain
Hence, against our authority, there was no objection based
exercise of the judicial power, — that power
on the independence and separation of the three co-
vested in courts to enable them to administer
equal departments of Government. Besides, this court said
justice according to law. From the authority to
no more than that, there being a conflict ofjurisdiction
ascertain and determine the law in a given case
between two constitutional bodies, it could not decline to
there necessa ruly results, in case of conflict, the
take cognizance of the controversy to determine the
duty to declare and enforce the rule of the
"character, scope and extent" of their respective
supreme law and reject that of an inferior act of
constitutional spheres of action. Here, there is actually no
legislation which, transcending the Constitution,
antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate
is no effect, and binding on no one. This is not
and the Senate itself, for it is not suggested has adopted a
the exercise of a substantive power to review
rule contradicting the Pendatun Resolution. Consequently,
and nullify acts of Congress, for such no
there is no occasion for our intervention. Such conflict of
substantive power exists. It is simply a
jurisdiction, plus the participation of the Senate Electoral
necessary concomitant of the power to hear and
Tribunal are essential ingredients to make the facts of this
dispose of a case or controversy properly before
case fit the mold of the Angara doctrine.
the court, to the determination of which must be
brought the test and measure of the law.
Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino
case, may this petition be entertained? The answer must
And the power is now expressly recognized by our Organic
naturally be in the negative. Granting that the
Act. (See sections 2 and 10. Article VIII.)
postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to
suspension of the petitioners from their office, and
But we must emphasize, the power is to be exercised conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the
in proper cases, with the appropriate parties. power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as
the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil.,
83, 88),this petition should be denied. As was explained in
the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch of the
Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would
be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the
classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into
our institutional setup.
Adherence to established principle should generally be our
guiding criterion, if we are to escape the criticism voiced
once by Bryce in American Commonwealth thus:
The Supreme Court has changed its color i. e.,
its temper and tendencies, from time to time
according to the political proclivities of the men
who composed it. . . . Their action flowed
naturally from the habits of thought they had
formed before their accession to the bench and
from the sympathy they could not feel for the
doctrine on whose behalf they had contended.
(The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50.)
Needless to add, any order we may issue in this case
should, according to the rules, be enforceable by contempt
proceedings. If the respondents should disobey our order,
can we punish them for contempt? If we do, are we not
thereby destroying the independence, and the equal
importance to which legislative bodies are entitled under
the Constitution?
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every
wrong there is are medy, and that the judiciary should
stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many
wrongs the judicature may not correct, for instance, those
involving political questions. Numerous decisions are
quoted and summarized under this heading in 16 Corpus
Juris Secundum, section 145.
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the
judiciary is the repository of remedies for all political and
social ills. We should not forget that the Constitution had
judiciously allocated the powers of government to three
distinct and separate compartments; and that judicial
interpretation has tended to the preservation of the
dependence of the three, and a zealous regard of the
prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the
guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-doing,
each may be brought to account, either by impeachment,
trial or by the ballot box.
The extreme case has been described wherein a
legislative chamber, without any reason whatsoever,
decrees by resolution the incarceration, for years, of a
citizen. And the rhetorical question is confidently
formulated. Will this man be denied relief by the courts?
Of course not: He may successfully apply for habeas
corpus, alleging the nullity of the resolution and claiming
for release. But then, the defendant shall be the officer or
person, holding him in custody, and the question therein
will be the validity or invalidity of resolution. That was done
in Lopez vs. De los Reyes, supra. (See also Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.)
Courts will interfere, because the question is not a political
one, the "liberty of citizen" being involved (Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, supra) and the act will clearly beyond the
bounds of the legislative power, amounting to usurpation
of the privileges of the courts, the usurpation being clear,
palpable and oppressive and the infringement of the
Constitution truly real. (See 16 C.J.S., p. 44.)
Nevertheless, suppose for the moment that we have
jurisdiction:
B.—PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE
Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law,
prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, exercising
functions judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section 2, Rules
of Court.) As the respondents do not exercise such kind of
functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear the dispute falls
beyond the scope of such special remedy.
C.—SENATE HAS NOT EXCEEDED POWERS
Again let us suppose the question lies within the limits of
prohibition and of our jurisdiction.
Before the organization of the Commonwealth and the
promulgation of the Constitution, each House of the
Philippine Legislature exercised the power to defer oath-
taking of any member against whom a protest had been
lodged, whenever in its discretion such suspension was
necessary, before the final decision of the contest. The
cases of Senator Fuentebella and Representative Rafols
are known instances of such suspension. The discussions
in the constitutional Convention showed that instead of
transferring to the Electoral Commission all thepowers of
the House or Senate as "the sole judge of the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly," it was given only jurisdiction over "all contests"
relating to the election, etc. (Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p. 271.) The proceedings in
the Constitutional Convention on this subject are
illuminating:
It became gradually apparent in the course of
the debates that the Convention was evenly
divided on the proposition of creating the
Electoral Commission with the membership and
powers set forth in the draft. It was growing
evident, too, that the opposition to the Electoral
Commission was due to rather inclusive power
of that body to judge not only of cases
contesting the election of the members of the
National Assembly, but also of their elections,
returns, and qualifications.
Many of the delegates wanted to be definitely informed of
the scope of the powers of the Electoral Commission as
defined in the draft before determining their final decision;
for if the draft meant to confer upon the Electoral
Commission the inclusive power to pass upon the
elections, returns, and qualifications — contested or not —
of the members of the National Assembly, they were more
inclined to vote against the Electoral Commission. In an
attempt to seek this clarification, the following
interpretations took place:
xxx xxx xxx
Delegate Labrador.—Does not the gentleman
from Capiz believe that unless this power is
granted to the assembly, the assembly on its
own motion does not have the right to contest
the election and qualification of its members?
Delegate Roxas.—I have no doubt that the
gentleman is right. If this right is retained, as it is,
even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a
member has not the qualifications provided by
law, they cannot remove him from that reason.
xxx xxx xxx
In the course of the heated debates, with the
growing restlessness on the part of the
Convention, President Recto suspended the
session in order to find out if it was possible to
arrive at a compromise plan to meet the
objection.
When the session was resumed, a compromise
plan was submitted in the form of an amendment
presented by Delegates Francisco, Ventura,
Lim, Vinzons, Rafols, Mumar, and others,
limiting the power of the Electoral Commission to
the judging of all cases contesting elections,
returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly. Explaining the difference
between the amendment thus proposed and the
provision of the draft, Delegate Roxas, upon the
request of President Recto, said:
The difference, Mr. President, consists only in
obviating the objection pointed out by various
delegates to the effect that the first clause of the
draft which states "The election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National
Assembly" seems to give to the Electoral
commission the power to determine also the
election of the members who have not been
protested. And in order to obviate that difficulty,
we believe that the amendment is right in that
sense . . . that is, if we amend the draft so that it
should read as follows: "All cases contesting the
election, etc.", so that the judges of the Electoral
Commission will limit themselves only to cases
in which there has been a protest against the
returns.
The limitation to the powers of the Electoral by the party having the second largest
Commission proposed in the compromise number of votes therein. The senior
amendment did much to win in favor of the Justice in the Commission shall be its
Electoral Commission many of its opponents; so Chairman.The Electoral Commission
that when the amendment presented by shall be the sole judge of the election,
Delegate Labrador and others to retain in the returns, and qualifications of the
Constitution the power of the lawmaking body to Members of the National Assembly."
be the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members was put to a
The report of the special committee on style on
nominal vote, it was defeated by 98 negative
the power of the Commission was opposed on
votes against 56 affirmative votes.
the floor of the Convention by Delegate
Confesor, who insisted that the Electoral
With the defeat of the Labrador amendment, the Commission should limit itself to judging only of
provision of the draft creating the Electoral all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
Commission, as modified by the compromise qualifications of the members of the National
amendment, was consequently approved. Assembly. The draft was amended accordingly
by the Convention.
"All cases contesting the elections, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National As it was finally adopted by the Convention, the
Assembly shall be judged by an electoral provision read:
commission, composed of three members
elected by the party having the largest number
There shall be an Electoral Commission . . . The
of votes in the National Assembly, three elected
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of
by the members of the party having the second
all contestsrelating to the election, returns, and
largest number of votes, and three justices of the
qualifications of the Members of the National
Supreme Court designated by the Chief, the
Assembly. (Aruego, The Framing of the
Commission to be presided over by one of said
Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 267, 269, 270,
justices."
271 and 272.).
In the special committee on style, the provision
Delegate Roxas rightly opined that "if this draft is retained"
was amended so that the Chairman of the
the Assembly would have no power over election and
Commission should be the senior Justice in the
qualifications of its members; because all the powers are
Commission, and so that the Commission was to
by the draft vested in the Commission.
be the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. As it was then amended, the The Convention, however, bent on circumscribing the
provision read: latter's authority to "contests" relating to the election, etc.
altered the draft. The Convention did not intend to give
it all the functions of the Assembly on the subject of
"There shall be an Electoral
election and qualifications of its members. The distinction
Commission composed of three
is not without a difference. "As used in constitutional
Justices of the Supreme court
provisions", election contest "relates only to statutory
designated by the Chief Justice, and
contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the
of six Members chosen by the
intruder, but also to have himself inducted into the
National Assembly, three of whom
office."(Laurel on Elections, Second Edition, p. 250; 20
shall be nominated by the party having
C.J., 58.)
the largest number of votes, and three
One concrete example will serve to illustrate the remaining
power in either House of Congress: A man is elected by a
congressional district who had previously served ten years
in Bilibid Prison for estafa. As he had no opponent, no
protest is filed. And the Electoral Tribunal has no
jurisdiction, because there is no election contest. (20 C.J.,
58,supra.) When informed of the fact, may not the
House, motu propio postpone his induction? May not the
House suspend, investigate and thereafter exclude
him?3 It must be observed that when a member of the
House raises a question as to the qualifications of another,
an "election contest" does not thereby ensue, because the
former does not seek to be substituted for the latter.
So that, if not all the powers regarding the election,
returns, and qualifications of members was withdrawn by
the Constitution from the Congress; and if, as admitted by
petitioners themselves at the oral argument, the power to
defer the oath-taking, until the contests is adjudged, does
not belong to the corresponding Electoral Tribunal, then it
must be held that the House or Senate still retains such
authority, for it has not been transferred to, nor assumed
by, the Electoral Tribunal. And this result flows, whether
we believe that such power (to delay induction) stemmed
from the (former) privilege of either House to be judge of
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
thereof, or whether we hold it to be inherent to every
legislative body as a measure of self-preservation.
It is customary that when a number of persons come
together to form a legislative body, ". . . the first
organization must be temporary, and if the law does not
designate the person who shall preside over such
temporary organization, the persons assembled and
claiming to be members may select one of their number for
that purpose. The next step is to ascertain in some
convenient way the names of the person who are, by
reason of holding the proper credentials, prima
facie entitled to seats, and therefore entitled to take part in
permanent organization of the body. In the absence of any
statutory or other regulation upon this subject, a committee
on credentials is usually appointed, to whom all credentials
to be entitled to seats. . . . (Laurel on Elections, Second
Edition, pp. 356, 357, quoting McCrary on Elections.)
Therefore, independently of constitutional or statutory
grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the
power to inquire into the credentials of any member and
the latter's right to participate in its deliberations. As we
have seen, the assignment by the constitution of the
Electoral Tribunal does not actually negative that power —
provided the Senate does not cross the boundary line,
deciding an election contest against the member. Which
the respondents at bar never attempted to do. Precisely,
their resolution recognized, and did not impair, the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to decide the contest.
To test whether the resolution trenched on the territory of
the last named agency let ask the question: May the
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate order that Body to defer
the admission of any member whose election has been
contested? Obviously not. Then it must be conceded that
the passage of the disputed resolution meant no invasion
of the former's realm.
At this juncture the error will be shown of the contention
that the Senate has not this privilege "as a residuary
power". Such contention is premised on the proposition
that the Houses of the Philippine Congress possess only
such powers as are expressly or impliedly granted by the
Constitution. And an American decision is quoted on the
powers of the United States Congress. The mistake is due
to the failure to differentiate between the nature of
legislative power under the Constitution of the United
States, and legislative power under the State Constitutions
and the Constitution of the Commonwealth (now the
Republic). It must be observed that the Constitution of the
United States contains only a grant or delegation of
legislative powers to the Federal Government, whereas,
the other Constitutions, like the Constitution of the
Commonwealth (now the Republic), are limits upon the
plenary powers of legislation of the Government. The
legislative power of the United States Congress is confined
to the subject on which it is permitted to act by the Federal
constitution. (Dorr vs. United States, 195 U. S., 140;
Martin vs. Hunter, 1 Wheat., 326; McCullock vs. Maryland,
4 Wheat., 405; United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.,
551.) The legislative power of the Philippine Congress is
plenary, subject only to such limitations, as are found in
the Republic's Constitution. So that any power, deemed to
be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Organic
Act has lodged it elsewhere.
Another line of approach. The Senate, as a branch of the
legislative department, had the constitutional power to
adopt rules for its proceedings(section 10 [3], Article VI of
the Constitution), and by legislative practice it is conceded
the power to promulgate such orders as may be necessary
to maintain its prestige and to preserve its dignity.4 We are
advised by the respondents that, after weighing the
propriety or impropriety of the step, the Senate, in the
exercise of its authority and discretion and of its inherent
power of self-preservation, resolved to defer the
administration of oath and the sitting of the petitioners
pending determination of the contest. It is not clear that the
measure had no reasonable connection with the ends in
view, and neither does it palpably transcend the powers of
the public deliverative body. On the contrary, there are
reasons to believe it was prompted by the dictates of
ordinary caution, or of public policy. For, if, as reported by
the corresponding constitutional agency, concededly well-
posted on the matter by reason of its official duties, the
elections held in the Provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan,
Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija were so tainted with acts of
violence and intimidation, that the result was not the
legitimate expression of the voters' choice, the Senate
made no grievous mistake in foreseeing the probability
that, upon proof of such widespread lawlessness, the
Electoral Tribunal would annull the returns in that region
(see Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., 521; Laurel, Elections
[2d ed.], p. 488 et seq.), and declare herein petitioners not
entitled to seats in the Senate. Consequently, to avoid the
undesirable result flowing from the participation of
disqualified members in its deliberations, it was prudent for
it to defer the sitting of the respondents. True, they may
have no direct connection with the acts of intimidation; yet
the votes may be annulled just the same, and if that
happens, petitioners would not among the sixteen
senators elected. Nor was it far-fetched for the Senate to
consider that "in order to maintain alive the respect for
democratic institutions among our people, no man or
group of men (should) be permitted to profit from the
results of an election held under coercion, in violation of
law and contrary to the principle of freedom of choice
which should underlie all elections under the Constitution."
(Exhibit A of petitioners' complaint.)
a. Justices in the Electoral Tribunals
During our deliberations, it was remarked that several
justices subscribing the majority opinion, belong to the
electoral tribunals wherein protests connected with the
Central Luzon polls await investigation. Mulling over this,
we experience no qualmish feelings about the
coincidence. Their designation to the electoral tribunals
deducted not a whit from their functions as members of
this Supreme Court, and did not disqualify them in this
litigation. Nor will their deliverances here at on a given
question operate to prevent them from voting in the
electoral forum on identical questions; because the
Constitution, establishing no incompatibility between the
two roles, naturally did not contemplate, nor want, justices
opining one way here, and thereafter holding
otherwise, pari materia, in the electoral tribunals, or vice-
versa.
Anyhow, these should be no diversity of thought in a
democratic country, at least, on the legal effects of the
alleged rampant lawlessness, root and basis of the
Pendatun Resolution.
However, it must be observed and emphasized, herein is
no definite pronouncement that terrorism and
violenceactually prevailed in the district to such extent that
the result was not the expression of the free will of the
electorate. Such issue was not tendered in these
proceedings. It hinges upon proof to be produced by
protestants and protestees at the hearing of the respective
contests.
b. Doubt and presumption.
After all is said or written, the most that may be conceded
to the industry of petitioners' counsel is that the Senate
power, or lack of power, to approve the resolution is not
entirely clear. We should, therefore, indulge the
presumption that official duty has been performed
regularly, (Rule 123, section 69, Rule of Court), and in the
right manner:
It is a general principle to presume that public
officers act correctly until the contrary is shown.
United States vs. Weed, 5 Wall., 62.
It will be presumed, unless the contrary be
shown, that a public officer acted in accordance
with the law and his instructions. Moral y
Gonzales vs. Ross (Gonzales vs. Ross), 120
U.S., 605; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 705.
Officers charged with the performance of a
public duty are presumed to perform it correctly.
Quinlan vs. Greene Country, 205 U.S., 410; 27
Sup. Ct. Rep., 505. (United State Supreme
Court Reports Digest, Vol. 5, p. 3188.)
It is presumed that the legislature has acted
within its constitutional powers. (See cases cited
at p. 257, 16 C.J.S., note 1.)
And should there be further doubt, by all the maxims of
prudence, left alone comity, we should heed the off-limits
sign at the Congressional Hall, and check the impulse to
rush in to set matters aright — firm in the belief that if a
political fraud has been accomplished, as petitioners aver,
the sovereign people, ultimately the offended party, will
render the fitting verdict — at the polling precints.
c. Membership in the Constitutional Convention
The theory has been proposed — modesty aside — that
the dissenting members of this Court who were delegates
to the Constitutional Convention and were "co-authors of
the Constitution" "are in a better position to interpret" that
same Constitution in this particular litigation.
There is no doubt that their properly recorded utterances
during the debates and proceedings of the Convention
deserve weight, like those of any other delegate therein.
Note, however, that the proceedings of the Convention
"are less conclusive of the power construction of the
instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper
construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the
intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are
endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through
the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.
(Willoughby on the Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 54, 55.)
Their writings (of the delegates) commenting or explaining
that instrument, published shortly thereafter, may, like
those of Hamilton, Madison and Jayin The Federalist —
here in the Philippines, the book of Delegate
Aruego,supra, and of others — have persuasive force.
(Op. cit., p. 55.)
But their personal opinion on the matter at issue
expressed during our deliberations stand on a different
footing: If based on a "fact" known to them, but not duly
established or judicially cognizable, it is immaterial, and
their brethren are not expected to take their word for it, to
the prejudice of the party adversely affected, who had no
chance of rebuttal. If on a matter of legal hermeneutics,
their conclusions may not, simply on account of
membership in the Convention, be a shade better, in the
eyes of the law. There is the word "deference" to be sure.
But deference is a compliment spontaneously to be paid
— never a tribute to be demanded.
And if we should (without intending any disparagement)
compare the Constitution's enactment to a drama on the
stage or in actual life, we would realize that intelligent
spectators or readres often know as much, if not more,
about the real meanings, effects or tendency is of the
event, or incidents thereof, as some of the actors
themselves, who sometimes become so absorbed in
fulfilling their emotional roles that they fail to watch the
other scenes or to meditate on the larger aspects of the
whole performance, or what is worse, become so
infatuated with their lines as to construe the entire story
according to their prejudices or frustrations. Perspective
and disinterestedness help certainly a lot in examining
actions and occurrences.
Come to think of it, under the theory thus proposed,
Marshall and Holmes (names venerated by those who
have devoted a sizable portion of their professionals lives
to analyzing or solving constitutional problems and
developments) were not so authoritative after all in
expounding the United States Constitution — because
they were not members of the Federal Convention that
framed it!
D.—ALLEGED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS
Quoting section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725,
counsel for petitioners assert that it was respondents' duty
legally inescapable, to permit petitioners to assume office
and take part in the current regular session. The section
reads partly:
The candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives and those for Senators who
have been proclaimed elected by the respective
Board of Canvassers and the Commission on
Elections shall assume office and shall hold
regular session for the year nineteen hundred
and forty-six on May twenty-five, nineteen
hundred and forty-six. (Section 12,
Commonwealth Act. No. 725.)
We have carefully considered the argument. We opine
that, as contended by the Solicitor-General, this provision
is addressed to the individual member of Congress,
imposing on him the obligation to come to Manila, and join
his colleagues in regular session. However, it does not
imply that if, for any reason, he is disqualified, the House is
powerless to postpone his admission. Suppose that after
elections a member is finally convicted of treason. May not
the House refuse him outright admission, pending an
investigation (by it or the Electoral Tribunal as the case
may be) as to his privilege to sit there? Granting the right
to admission as the counterpart of the duty to assume
office by virtue of said section 12; we must nevertheless
allow that such rights would not be peremptory whenever it
contacts other rights of equal or superior force. To
illustrate: if the law provided that all children, seven years
or more "shall go to school", it can not reasonably be
inferred that school authorities are bound to accept every
seven-year boy, even if he refuses to pay fees, or to
present the certificates required by school regulations.
Furthermore, it would not be erroneous to maintain that
any right spelled out of section 12 must logically be limited
to those candidates whose proclamation is clear,
unconditional and unclouded, and that such standard is
not met by the petitioners, because in the very document
attesting to their election one member of the Commission
on Elections demurred to the non-exclusion of the votes in
Central Luzon, calling attention to the reported reign of
terror and violence in that region, and virtually objecting to
the certification of herein petitioners. To be sure, it was the
beclouded condition of petitioner's credential (certificate of
canvass) that partly prompted the Senate to enact the
precautionary measure herein complained of. And finding
no phrase or sentence in the Constitution expressly or
impliedly outlawing the step taken by that legislative body,
we should be, and we are, reluctant to intervene.
Indeed, had the Senate been officially informed that the
inclusion of petitioners' name in the Commission's
certificate had been made at the point of a gangster's
automatic, none will deny the appositeness of the
postponement of their induction, pending an inquiry by the
corresponding authorities. Yet the difference between such
situation and the instant litigation is one of degree, broad
and wide perhaps, but not altering the dominant legal
principle.
In answer to the suggestions as to abuse of the power it
should be stated that the mere possibility of abuse is no
conclusive argument against the existence of the power, of
the power, for the simple reason that every official
authority is susceptible of misuse. And everybody knows
that when any people will discover the methods to curb it.
Perhaps it is necessary to explain that this decision goes
no further than to recognize the existence of
Congressional power. It is settled that the point whether
such power has been wisely or correctly exercised, is
usually beyond the ken of judicial determination.
E.—PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES
One final consideration.
The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for
any speech or debate" in congress, Senators and
congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other place."
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted
this privilege to include the giving of a vote or the
presentation of a resolution.
. . . It would be a narrow view of the
constitutional provision to limit it towards spoken
in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in
its application to written reports presented in that
body by its committees, to resolutions offered,
which, though in writing, must be reproduced in
speech, and to the act of voting, . . . (Kilbourn
vs. thompson, 103 U.S., 204; 26 Law. ed., 377,
p. 391.)
In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer
questions put to him by the House of Representatives of
the United States Congress, concerning the business of a
real estate partnership, was imprisoned for contempt by
resolution of the house. He sued to recover damages from
the sergeant at arms and the congressional members of
the committee, who had caused him to be brought before
the house, where he was adjudged to be in contempt. The
Supreme Court of the United States found that the
resolution of the House was void for want of jurisdiction in
that body, but the action was dismissed as to the members
of the committee upon the strength of the herein above-
mentioned congressional immunity. The court cited with
approval the following excerpts from an earlier decision of
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the
intention of protecting the members against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support
the rights of the people, by enabling their
representatives to execute the functions of their
office without fear of prosecutions, civil or
criminal. I, therefore, think that the article ought
not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the
full design of it may be answered. . . (103 U.S.,
203.) (Emphasis ours.)
Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby
relates apparently as controlling, the following incident:
In 1910, several Members of Congress having
been served with a writ of mandamus in a civil
action brought against them as members of the
Joint Committee on Printing and growing out a
refusal of a bid of the Valley Paper Company, for
the furnishing of paper, the Senate resolved that
the Justice issuing the writ had "unlawfully
invaded the constitutional privileges and
prerogatives of the Senate of the United States
and of three Senators; and was without
jurisdiction to grant the rule, and Senators are
directed to make no appearance in response
 thereto." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the
United States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.)
Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account for
their votes in approving the Pendatum Resolution. Having
sworn to uphold the Constitution, we must enforce the
constitutional directive. We must not question, nor permit
respondents to be questioned here in connection with their
votes. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.)
Case dismissed. No costs.
Moran, C J., Paras, Pablo, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
HILADO, J., concurring:
I concur.
Petitioners, alleging that they have been elected Senators
in the last national elections, have filed this proceeding
against respondents who, according to the complaint, have
been likewise elected Senators in the same elections. In
paragraph III of the complaint it is alleged that respondent
Hon. Jose A. Avelino is joined in this proceeding as
member and President of the Senate. Two kinds of
remedies are sought by petitioners, one ancillary and the
other principal. The ancillary they would have consist in a
preliminary injunction addressed to "respondents, their
officials, employees, agents and other persons acting
under them, ordering them", until the order is remanded by
the court, "to desist and to abstain from carrying out" the
so-called Pendatun Resolution complained of. (Exhibit A
attached to complaint.) The principal remedy, if the suit is
to prosper, would be as follows: a judicial declaration that
the said resolution is entirely null and void, a definite order
of this court prohibiting respondents, and each of them,
from preventing petitioners from "continuing in their seats
in the Senate of the Philippines and freely exercising their
office as Senators, and likewise prohibiting them from
adopting any other ulterior procedure to execute the said 905). And Bouvier says: "Political rights consist in the
resolution." power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or management of the government." (2
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 597.)
1. Has this court power to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction sought by petitioners under the facts alleged in
their complaint? xxx xxx xxx
The power of this court to issue auxiliary writs and process . . . The prayer of the bill is that, upon the
is defined in, and conferred by, section 19 of Act No. 136, hearing of the cause, both acts be declared
as follows: unconstitutional and void, and held to be of no
effect; and that a writ of injunction issue to
Walter C. Tuttle, county clerk of Vermilion
Sec. 19. Power to issue all necessary auxiliary
county, restraining him from issuing, or causing
writs.—The Supreme Court shall have power to
to be posted, notices of election calling an
issue writs ofcertiorari and all other auxiliary
election for the house of representatives for the
writs and process necessary to the complete
eighteenth senatorial district; and that such
exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
injunction be made perpetual; and that the court
grant to the petitioner and to the people all such
Under this provision, such auxiliary writ or process as the other and further relief as the case demands.
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners in the
instant case, is only issuable by this court is engaged in
xxx xxx xxx
the exercise of its original (or appellate) jurisdiction in
a main case, and secondly, when such writ or process is
necessary to a complete exercise of that jurisdiction. This From the foregoing statement of these two bills,
principle is ingrained in and underlies the pertinent it seems to be perfectly plain that the entire
provisions of the present Rules of Court (Rule 60). Indeed, scope and object of both is the assertion and
it is elementary that an independent action cannot be protection of political, as contradistinguished
maintained merely to procure a preliminary injunction as its from civil, personal or property rights. In both the
sole objective. (Panay Municipal Cadastre vs. Garduño complainant is a legal voter, and a candidate for
and Soncuya, 55 Phil., 574.) a particular elective office; and by his bill he is
seeking the protection and enforcement of his
right to cast his own ballot in a legal and
Besides, there are other grounds for holding that this court
effective manner, and also his right to be such
lacks jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
candidate, to have the election called and held
prayed for by petitioners. It is clear that the rights sought to
under the provisions of a valid law, and to have
be exercised or protected by petitioner through this
his name printed upon the ballots to be used at
proceeding are political rights and the questions raised are
such election, so that he may be voted for in a
political questions, and it is well settled that the equitable
legal manner. The rights thus asserted are all
remedy of injunction is not available for such a purpose.
purely political; nor, so far as this question is
The principle has also been incorporated in the rule that a
concerned, is the matter aided in the least by the
court of chancery will not entertain a suit calling for a
attempt made by the complainant in each bill to
judgement upon a political question, and of course this
litigate on behalf of other voters or of the people
court has been resorted to in the instant case as a court of
of the state generally. The claims thus attempted
equity in so far as injunctive relief is being sought. In the
to be set up are all of the same nature, and are
case of Flethcer vs. Tuttle (151 Ill., 41; 25 L.R.A.,
none the less political.
143,146), the definitions of a political right by Anderson
defines a political right as a "right exercisable in the
administration of government" (Anderson Law Dictionary,
As defined by Anderson, a civil right is "a right
accorded to every member of a district
community, or nation," while a political right is a
"right exercible in the administration of
government." Anderson, Law Dictionary, 995.
Says bouvier: "Political rights consist in the
power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or management of the
government. These political rights are fixed by
the constitution. Every citizen has the right of
voting for public officers, and of being elected.
These are the political rights which the humblest
citizen possesses. Civil rights are those which
have no relation to the establishment, support,
or management of the government. They consist
in the power of acquiring and enjoying property,
or exercising the paternal or marital powers, and
the like. It will be observed that every one,
unless deprived of them by sentence of civil
death, is in the enjoyment of the civil rights,
which is not the case with political rights; for an
alien, for example, has no political, although in
full enjoyment of the civil rights." (2 Bouvier Law
Dict., 597.)
. . . A preliminary injunction having been
awarded, it was disregarded by the city officers,
who proceeded, notwithstanding, to canvass the
vote and declare the result. Various of the city
officers and their advisers were attached and
fined for contempt, it was held that the matter
presented by the bill was a matter over which a
court of chancery had no jurisdiction, and
that the injunction was void, so that it violation
was not an act which subjected the violators to
proceedings for contempt.
. . . In Georgia vs. Stanton (73 U. S., 6 Wall., 50;
18 Law. ed., 721), a bill was filed by the state of
Georgia against the secretary of war and other
officers representing the executive authority of
the United States, to restrain them in the
execution of the acts of congress known as the
"Reconstruction Acts," on the ground that the
enforcement of those acts would annul and
totally abolish the existing state government of
the state, and establish another and different
one in its place, and would, in effect, ovewrthrow
and destroy the corporate existence of the state,
by depriving it of all means and instrumentalities
whereby its existence might and otherwise
would be maintained; and it was held that the bill
called for a judgement upon a politicalquestion,
and that it would not therefore be entertained by
a court of chancery; and it was further held that
the character of the bill was not changed by the
fact that, in setting forth the political rights
sought to be protected, it averred that the state
had real and personal property, such, for
example, as public buildings, etc., of the
enjoyment of which, by the destruction of its
corporate existence, the state would be
deprived, such averment not being the
substantial ground of the relief sought. (Flethcer
vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill., 41; 25 L.R.A., 143, 145-147;
(emphasis supplied.)
Section 381. 3. Political Questions.—a. in
General.—It is well-settled doctrine that political
questions are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal
with such questions has been conferred on the
courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions. It is not easy, however, to define the
phrase "political question," nor to determine
what matters fall within its scope of the judicial
power. More properly, however, it means those
questions which, under the constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. Among the
questions that have been held to be political,
and therefore beyond the province of the
judiciary to decide, are: Questions relating to the
existence orlegality of the government under
which the court is acting; what persons or
organizations constitute the lawful government
of a state of the Union, or of a foreign country; . .
. the canvass of an election. (12 C.J., 878, 879;
emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 20. 4. Only Civil Rights Protected.—
The subject matter of equitable jurisdiction being
civil property and the maintenance of civil rights,
injunction will issue only in cases where
complainant's civil rights have been invaded.
Injunctions do not issue to prevent acts merely
because they are immoral, illegal, or criminal.
Courts of equity have no jurisdiction over
matters or questions of a political nature unless
civil property rights are involved and will not
interfere to enforce or protect purely political
rights, . . . (32 C. J., 41; emphasis supplied.)
But petitioners seem to proceed upon the theory that there
is a main case here to which the preliminary injunction
would be merely auxiliary — one of prohibition,
presumably under Rule 67, sections 2, 4, and 7. Rule 67,
section 2, omitting impertinent parts, says:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
or person, whether exercising functions judicial
or ministerial . . .
To begin with, respondents herein cannot in any rational
sense be said to constitute a "tribunal, corporation, board,
or person . . . exercising functions judicial or ministerial."
To be sure, the functions of the Senate and of its members
in the premises are not judicial. It is no less certain, in my
opinion, that they are not ministerial. Indeed, they are not
only legislative but discretionary in the highest sense, as
more at length demonstrated hereafter.
It is insisted, however, that the provisions of section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 725 imposed upon respondents
the ministerial duty of letting petitioners assume office and
participate in the regular session for the year 1946 on May
25, 1946. But, as in my opinion correctly contended by the
Solicitor General at the argument, this provision is
addressed to the members of both Houses of Congress
who are to assume office and hold regular session. Altho
to this, some who opine differently from us, may counter
with the question: What is the use of imposing upon said
members the ministerial duty to assume office and hold the
session if either House or other members thereof could
prevent them from doing so? In the first place, I would not
say that, considering together, as we should, the report of
the Commission on Elections to the President of the
Senate of May 23, 1946 (Exhibit B), and the certificate of
canvass of the same date (Exhibit C), said Commission
"proclaimed elected" those candidates whose election may
be adversely affected by the Commission's own express
reservation as to the validity or invalidity of the votes cast
in the Provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and
Nueva Ecija, in the same sense that they proclaimed
elected those not so affected — it would seem that the
proclamation made in Exhibit C was based merely upon a
numerical canvass or count of the votes cast, the
Commission considering itself without authority to discount
the votes cast in said four provinces, leaving that question
to the Electoral Tribunal for the Senate; and it would seem
further, that within the meaning and intent of section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 725 the phrase "candidates . . .
proclaimed elected," rationally construed, is exclusive of
those of whose valid election the Commission is the first, in
effect, to express very grave doubts. As to these,
considering the Commission's report and certificate of
canvass together, the Commission, in final effect, far from
proclaiming them elected, confesses that it does not really
know whether they have been or not. In the second place,
Ido not admit that any such ministerial duty is imposed
upon the members of Congress in the sense that its
fulfillment may be compelled by mandamus issuing from
the judiciary. In the third place, if we were to concede that
the intention of the law is as petitioners contend it to be,
that is, that it imposes upon both Houses of Congress and
upon the members thereof who legitimately act for them,
the ministerial duty of letting even those members, as to
whom there exist grounds for suspension, assume office
and participate in the Houses' deliberations, I am of the
considered opinion that the provisions would be null and
void for the simple reason that it would be destructive of,
and repugnant to, the inherent power of both Houses to
suspend members for reasons of self-preservation or
decorum. I say null and void, because the principle
underlying said inherent power is ingrained in the very
genius of a republican and democratic government, such
as ours, which has been patterned after that of the United
States, and therefore lies at the very foundation of our
constitutional system. It was admitted at the argument that
when both legislative chambers were the sole judges of
the election, returns and qualifications of its members,
each chamber possessed such inherent power of
suspension, particularly as against members whose
election was the subject of contest. When the
Commonwealth Constitution transferred to the Electoral
Tribunal for each chamber the jurisdiction as sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members, without any provision as to
said power of suspension, the clear inference is that the
same was left intact, to remain where it was inherent. And
certainly the framers should not be presumed to
have silently intended to abrogate and take away a power
so vital and so essential.
Coming now more fundamentally to the alleged main case
presented by the complaint. As stated at the outset, the
principle remedy pursued by petitioners, if this suit is to
prosper, and therefore the main case which they seem to
allege as justifying the ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction, would be concerned with a judicial declaration
by this court that the so-called Pendatun Resolution is
entirely null and void, with a definite order of this court
prohibiting respondents, and each of them, from
preventing petitioners "from continuing in their seats in the
Senate of the Philippines and freely exercising their
functions as Senators, and likewise prohibiting them form
adopting any other ulterior procedure to execute the said
resolution."
This immediately brings to the fore the vital and serious
question of whether this court has jurisdiction to grant the
remedy thus prayed for by giving final judgment making
the said judicial declaration of nullity and granting the writ
prohibition definitely prohibiting the respondent President
of the Senate and respondent senators from executing the
above specified acts. Such fundamental principle as the
separation of powers, as well as the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Electoral Tribunal for the Senate of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, are involved.
Our Constitution and laws will be scanned and searched in
vain for the slightest hint of an intention to confer upon the
courts, including the Supreme Court, the power to issue
coercive process addressed to, or calculated to control the
action of, either of the other two coordinate departments of
the government — the legislative whose power is vested in
the Congress, consisting of the Senate and the House of
Representatives (Constitution, Article VII, section 1),
concerning matters within the sphere of their respective
functions. Besides, if we had jurisdiction to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction, it must be upon the ground
that prima facie the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to justify the writ. In that case, we must have the
power to make said injunction final if upon a trial on the
merits we find those facts proven. (Rule 60, section
10.)But since such a permanent or perpetual writ would
have to be premised upon the determination that
petitioners have been legally and validly elected, which
question is beyond our power to decide, it is clear that we
lack jurisdiction to issue even the preliminary process. And
be it not contended that our preliminary writ is simply to
serve while the contest has not been decided by the
Electoral Tribunal, because under Act No. 136, section 19,
and Rule 60, sections 2 and 3, this court can issue such a
process in aid only of its own jurisdiction of another tribunal
— and it is unthinkable that the Supreme Court should be
made to serve as a sort of auxiliary court to the Electoral
tribunal.
2. Has this court jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
alleged main case and, consequently, to grant the alleged
principal remedy?
The judicial declaration of nullity sought by petitioners,
severed from the writ of prohibition prayed for by them,
would become, if at all, nothing more nor less than a
declaratory relief. Thus divorced from a remedy of
prohibition, it will be a mere abstract pronouncement of an
opinion of this court regarding the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of the Pendatun Resolution, giving rise
to no substantial relief or positive remedy of any kind. It will
order nothing and will prohibit nothing to be done by one
party or the other. But not even as such declaratory relief
can said judicial declaration be considered under Rule 66,
nor its antecedents, Act No. 3736 Commonwealth Act No.
55, since the Pendatun Resolution is neither a "deed, will,
contract or other written instrument . or a statue or
ordinance," within the plain and natural meaning of said
rule and said acts, aside from the reason that pursuant to
the same acts the action for a declaratory judgment should
be brought in a Court of First Instance, without any
express provision conferring original jurisdiction upon this
court in such cases, which provision is necessary before
this court can possess such original jurisdiction (Act No.
136, section 17), and the final consideration that alike
under said Act No. 3736 and Rule 66, section 6, the court
has a discretion to refuse to exercise the power to
construe instruments, among other cases, where the
construction is not necessary and proper at the time under
all circumstances. In the case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon
(46 Phil., 83,95), this court, referring to a case
ofmandamus, said:
 . . . On the one hand, no consideration of policy
or convenience should induce this court to
exercise a power that does not belong to it. On
the other hand, no consideration of policy or
convenience should induce this court to
surrender a power which it is its duty to exercise.
But certainly mandamus should never issue from
this court where it will not prove to be effectual
and beneficial. It should not be awarded where it
will create discord and confusion. It should not
be awarded where mischievous consequences
are likely to follow. Judgment should not be
pronounced which might possibly lead
to unseemly conflicts or which might
be disregarded with impunity. This court offer no
means by a decision for any possible collision
between it as the highest court in the Philippines
and the Philippine Senate as a branch of
coordinate department, or between the court and
the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive
Legislature. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that the Alejandrino case was one of mandamus.
But under the principle of separation of powers, the rule is
equally applicable to cases of injunction--in fact, to all
cases where it is desired to have the judiciary directly
control the action of either the executive or legislative
department, or either branch of the latter, concerning
matters within their respective province. Moreover, not
much scrutiny is required to see that what is here pursued
is, in practical effect, an order of this tribunal commanding
the Senate or respondents, who represent it, to allow the
petitioners to remain seated in the Senate and freely
exercise their alleged functions and rights as Senators: for
no other is the effect of an order prohibiting the Senate or
said respondents from preventing petitioner's from
remaining thus seated and exercising said functions and
rights. Looking thru the form to the substance, the petition
is really one of mandamus.
As the writ of prohibition, the complaint asks this court,
after trial on the merits, to enjoin respondents and each of
them from preventing petitioners from continuing seated in
the Senate and freely exercising the functions of Senators,
and likewise, from adopting any other ulterior proceeding
in execution of the resolution in question. The writ thus
sought would, if granted, be definite and final in its effects.
(Rule 67, sections 2, 8, and 9.) Such a writ of prohibition
would necessarily be perpetual or permanent in character
and operation, in the same way that a final injunction
under Rule 60, section 10, would permanently enjoin the
act complained of and perpetually restrain the defendant
from the commission or continuance of such act. It would
enjoin respondents from preventing petitioners from acting
as members of the Senate in exactly the same way and
with exactly the same rights and privileges as the other
members whose election is unchallenged and
uncontested, not only temporarily but for the entire term of
the office. But for this court to so order, it would
necessarily have to base its judgment and decree upon
the premise that petitioners have been duly and validly
elected as members of the Senate. This would inevitably
involve a determination of precisely the question, presently
contested before the Electoral Tribunal for the Senate, as
sole judge under the Constitution, of whether or not said
petitioners have been duly and validly elected as Senators.
This clearly would be an unconstitutional invasion of the
sphere allotted by the fundamental law to said Electoral
Tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
Senate. All of which means that this court cannot
constitutionally possess jurisdiction over the alleged main
case of prohibition. This is another way of saying that
petitioners are not entitled to the principal remedy thus
sought by them from this Court.
Sec. 17 (2). Prima Facie Case.—While it is not a
ground for refusing a preliminary injunction that
is not absolutely certain that complainant has the
right to relief, yet to authorize a temporary
injunction, complain must make out at least
a prima facie showing the right to the final relief.
(32 C. J.,38 ; emphasis supplied.)
Reason for rule.—The injunction pendente
lite can be justified only upon theory that it is
necessary incident to the granting of
such final relief as complainants appear to be
entitled to. The right to such final relief must
appear; if not, the allowance of an injunction is
erroneous. Amelia Milling Co. vs. Tennessee
Coal, etc., R. Co. (123 Fed., 811, and other
cases cited.) (32 C. J., 39 under note 76
beginning on p. 38; emphasis supplied.)
Finally, we come to the great principle of separation of
powers. In the case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra, this
court said (pp. 88, 89):
There are certain basic principles which lie at the
foundation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, which are familiar to students of public
law. It is here only necessary to recall that under
our system of government, each of the three
departments is distinct and not directly subject to
the control of another department. The power to
control is the power to abrogate and the power
to abrogate is the power to usurp. . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative
body, its members, or its officers, to compel the
perfromance of duties purely legislative in their
character which therefore pertain to their
legislative functions And over which they have
exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate
action in this respect without a gross usurpation
of power. So it has been held that where a
member has been expelled by the legislative
body, the courts have no power, irrespective of
whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to
issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
If mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of
purely legislative duties by the legislature, its members, or
its officers, how can, under the same principle, injunction
or prohibition lie to enjoin or prohibit action of the
Legislature, its members, or its officers, in regard to
matters pertaining to their legislative functions and over
which they have exclusive control? And if the courts are
powerless to compel reinstatement of an expelled member
of the legislative body, it seems inconceivable that under
the same system of government the courts should possess
jurisdiction to prohibit the expulsion in the first instance.
And if the courts cannot interfere to prevent such
expulsion, a fortiori they should lack authority to intervene
to prevent a mere suspension, which is a less drastic
measure against the member. If the expulsion of a
member of the Senate is purely a legislative question, as
clearly decided in the Alejandrino case, the supension of a
member of the same body must equally be of the same
nature.
In the same case this court, in remarking that some of the
cases cited therein related to the chief executive rather
than to the legislature, said that the rules which govern the
relations of the courts to the chief executive likewise
govern the relations of the courts to the legislature.
In Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord (4 Wall., 475), a bill
was filed praying the United States Supreme Court to
enjoin Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
and E. O. C. Ord, General Commanding in the District of
Mississipi and Arkansas from executing certain acts of
Congress. The court, per chief Chief Justice Chase, said
that the single point for consideration was: Can the
President be restrained by injunction from carrying into
effect an Act of Congress alleged to the be
unconstitutional? It continued:
The Congress is the Legislative Department of
the government; the President is the Executive
Department.Neither can be restrained in its
action by the Judicial Department; though the
acts of both, when performed, are, in proper
cases, subject to its cognizance.
The impropriety of such interference will be
clearly seen upon consideration of its possible
consequences.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed
for allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it
is needless to observe that the court is without
power to enforce its process. If, on the other
hand, the President complies with the order of
the court and refuses to execute the acts of the
Congress, is it not clear that a collision may
occur between the Executive and Legislative
Departments of the Government? May not the
House of Representatives impeach the
President for such refusal? And in that case
could this court interfere in behalf of the
President, thus endangered by compliance with
its mandate, and restrain by injunction the
Senate of the United States from sitting as a
court of impeachment? Would the strange
spectacle be offered to the public wonder of an
attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in
that court?
These questions answer themselves.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . we are fully satisfied that this court has no
jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties; and that such
bill ought to be received by us.
It has been suggested that the bill contains a
prayer that, if the relief sought cannot be had
against Andrew Johnson, as President, as
President, it may be granted against Andrew
Johnson as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain
that relief as against the execution of an act of
Congress by Andrew Johnson, if relief against its
execution by the President. . .
In the case of Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan (29
Mich., 320), Justice Cooley, speaking for the Supreme
Court of Michigan, had the following to say:
. . . Our government is one whose powers have
been carefully apportioned between three
distinct departments, which emanate alike from
the people, have their powers alike limited and
defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity,
and within their respective spheres of action
equally independent.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that neither of the departments can
operate in all respects independently of the
others, and that what are called the checks and
balances of government constitute each a
restraint upon the rest. . . . But in each of these
cases the action of the department which
controls, modifies, or in any manner influences
that of another, is had strictly within its own
sphere, and for that reason gives no occassion
for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The
Legislative in prescribing rules for the courts, is
acting within its proper province in making laws,
while the courts, in declining to enforce an
unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting
within their proper province, because they are
only applying that which is law to the
controversies in which they are called upon to
give judgment. It is mainly by means of these
checks and balances that the officers of the
several departments are kept within their
jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any
case, and power is usurped or abused, the
remedy is by impeachment, and not by another
department of the government attempting to
correct the wrong by asserting a superior
authority over that which by the constitution is its
equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the
Legislature cannot dictate to the courts what
their judgments shall be, or set aside or alter
such judgments after they have been rendered.
If it could, constitutional liberty would cease to
exist; and if the Legislature could in like manner
override executive action also, the government
would become only a despotism under popular
forms. On the other hand it would be readily
conceded that no court can compel the
Legislature to make or to refrain from making
laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to
take any action whatsoever, though the duty to
take it be made ever so clear by the constitution
or the laws. In these cases the exemption of the
one department from the control of the other is
not only implied in the framework of government,
but is indispensably necessary if any useful
apportionment of power is to exist.
xxx xxx xxx
It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of
the relators that any other course than that
which leaves the head of the executive
department to act independently in the
 discharge of his duties might possibly lead to
unseemly conflicts, if not something worse,
should the courts undertake to enforce their
mandates and the executive refuse to obey. . . .
And while we should concede, if jurisdiction was
plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our
judgment would be no sufficient reason for
failing to pronounce it, especially against an
officer who would be presumed ready and
anxious in all cases to render obedience to the
law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is involved
in doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the
court to pronounce judgments which may be
disregarded with impunity, nor with that of the
executive to place him in position where, in a
matter within his own province, he must act
contrary to his judgment, or stand convicted of a
disregard of the laws.
In the same case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra), we
find the following quotation from French vs. Senate of the
State of California (146 Cal., 604):
Even if we should give these allegations their
fullest force in favor of the pleader, they do not
make a case justifying the interposition of the
court. Under our form of government the judicial
department has no power to revise even the
most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, or of either house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to
that department by the constitution. . . .
From the case of Masachusetts vs. Mellon (262 U.S., 447;
67 Law. ed., 1078, 1084), we quote the following passage:
. . . If an alleged attempt by congressional action
to annul and abolish an existing state
government, "with all its constitutional powers
and privileges," presents no justifiable issue, as
was ruled in Geogia vs. Stanton, supra, no
reason can be suggested why it should be
otherwise where the attempt goes farther, as it is
here alleged, than to propose to share with the
state the field of state power.
In our case the Senate action through the Pendatun
Resolution and the acts alleged to have been performed
thereunder, are still less transcendental in comparison to
those involved in Georgia vs. Stanton (supra), and
Massachusetts vs. Mellon (supra), as should be obvious to
every one.
In the case of Barry vs. United States ex rel. Cunningham
(279 U.S., 597; 73 Law ed., 867, 872), the Federal
Supreme Court was concerned with a case where the
United States Senate, pending the adjudication of the
validity or nullity of the election of William S. Vare as
Senator, refused acceptance of his credentials consisting
of the returns, upon the face of which he had been elected,
and a certificate form the Governor of the State to that
effect, and refused to administer the oath of office to him,
and to accord the full right to participate in the business of
the Senate. It was held that all this "was a matter within the
discretion of the Senate." This is strikingly similar to the
instant case where the Senate of the Philippines, which I
maintain retained it inherent power of suspension after the
transfer to the Electoral Tribunal for the Senate for its
exclusive jurisdiction to judge contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of its members, deemed
it to be necessary or convenient to suspend the
administration of oath to petitioners, their seating in the
Senate and their participation in its deliberations, pending
final decision by said Electoral Tribunal of the contest
concerning their election, which matters were in my
opinion within the discretion of said Senate.
In the case of Masachusetts vs. Mellon (supra), the
Supreme Court of the United States concluded its decision
in these words:
. . . Looking through forms of words to the
substance of their complaint, it is merely that
officials of the executive department of the
government are executing and will execute an
act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional;
and this we are asked to prevent. To do so
would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but
to assume a position of authority over the
governmental acts of another and co-equal
department — an authority which plainly we do
not possess.
Strikingly similar, our case is one wherein the substance of
the complaint is merely that respondents President and
Members of the Philippine Senate have executed and will
execute a resolution of the body asserted to be
unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent, to
paraphrase the Federal Supreme Court. I could not do
better than make mine the conclusion of that High Tribunal
that rather than a judicial controversy which we are asked
to decide, it is a position of authority over the
governmental acts of another and co-equal department
which we are asked to assume — an authority which
plainly we do not possess.
In the adjudicated cases, it has often been said that in
actual and appropriate controversies submitted to the
courts the judiciary has the constitutional power to declare
unconstitutional any legislative or executive act which
violates the Constitution; thus, in the case of Angara vs.
Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139, 182), the fourth
conclusion established by this court was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of
judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to
see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which
is the source of all authority. (Emphasis
supplied.)
But I am of the considered opinion that, aside from such
writs, as that of habeas corpus, as may be guaranteed in
the Constitution, all others of a purely statutory origin and
coersive in their operation are not issuable by the judiciary
against either of the other coordinate and co-equal
departments. In the latter cases, I think the function of the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, does
not go beyond the declaration of constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of the legislative or executive act
assailed. But some would ask how such a judgment could
be enforced as against the other two departments or either
of them. I believe that in a democratic system of
government, built as it is upon the principle of separation
of powers, with the consequent freedom of each
department from direct control by the others, the
effectiveness of the adjudications of the courts, in cases
properly coming under their jurisdiction, has perforce to
depend upon the conscience of those at the head of, or
representing, the other two departments, and their loyalty
to the Constitution. I for one am persuaded that when the
officers in whom at the time are vested the executive and
legislative power should see that the highest court of the
land, at the head of the judicial power, as, in a case
properly brought before it and within its legitimate
jurisdiction, decided that an act of the executive or
legislative department is unconstitutional, their conscience
and loyalty to the Constitution can safely be relied upon to
make them, with good grace, respect such final
adjudication. As was said in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission (supra), our Constitution is, of course, lacking
perfection and perfectibility; but it has been deemed by the
framers of this and similar antecedent organic laws
preferable to leave the three coordinate departments
without power of coercion, one against the other, with the
exceptions which may have been therein established, to
open the door to mutual invasion of jurisdiction, with the
consequent usurpation of powers of the invaded
department. And it is here where appeal will have to be
made to the conscience of the department concerned. If
the executive or legislative department, in such cases,
should abuse its powers against good conscience, or in a
manner disloyal to the Constitution, ignoring the judgment
of the courts, the aggrieved party will have to seek his
remedy through the ordinary processes of democracy.
During our consideration of this case reference has been
made to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Barry vs. United States ex rel. Cunningham (279
U.S. 597; 73 Law. ed. 867). But an examination of the
facts of that case will readily reveal that the question of
whether or not Cunningham should have been released on
habeas corpus arose from his arrest by order of the United
States Senate in the course of certain proceedings before
that body, sitting as a tribunal to judge of the election,
returns and qualifications of William S. Vare for Senator. It
was held that:
In exercising the power to judge the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members, the
Senate acts as a judicial tribunal, and the
authority to require the attendance of witnesses
is a necessary incident of the power to adjudge,
in no wise inferior under like circumstances to
that exercised by a court of justice. (P. 873.)
In the last sentence of the same paragraph the court
speaks of the power of the Senate "to compel a witness to
appear to give testimony necessary to enable that body
efficiently to exercise a legislative function; "and the court
proceeds: "but the principle is equally, if not
a fortiori applicable where the Senate is exercising
a judicial function." (Emphasis supplied.)It will thus appear
that the powers of the Senate there involved were not
legislative but judicial in character which fact differentiates
the case from those here cited, wherein purely legislative
powers or functions of the Legislature or any branch
thereof were in question. There is no wonder, therefore,
that the Federal Supreme Court, in the Barry case, by what
really amounts to an obiter, made the remark at the
conclusion of its opinion that "if judicial interference can be
successfully invoked it can only be upon a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process of law," the power
referred to being the judicial power to which the court
refers in the paragraph which I have quoted above. In such
a case, the Senate being permitted by the Constitution to
exercise, for a special purpose, a portion of the powers
which primarily belong to the judiciary, it is but proper that
any abuse of such limited and special power, constituting a
denial of the due process of law, should have its redress in
the judicial department, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter; not so in cases where any branch of the
legislative department is exercising powers or functions
purely legislative in nature and, therefore, within its alloted
province under the Constitution, as in the case at the bar.
The Federal Supreme Court speaks of "judicial
interference" without specifying its kind or nature. Much
less does it say that such interference will necessarily be
coercive in character. But even if it had in mind the writ of
habeas corpus there applied for, this being a high
prerogative writ (29 C. J., 6, 7) the privilege of which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in our Constitution (Article
III, section 1, paragraph [14]), it is in a class apart from the
coercive writs or process spoken of elsewhere in this
opinion — it is not merely a statutory remedy, such as
injunction, prohibition, etc., but a constitutional remedy
which by its very nature should be binding, in proper
cases, upon any department or agency of the Government
to which it may be lawfully addressed.
TUASON, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. On the authority of Alejandrino vs.
Quezon (46 Phil., 83), "the writ prayed for cannot issue for
the whole simple reason that the Supreme Court does not
possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine
Senate take any particular action."
With regret I have to dissent from the majority opinion
upholding the constitutionality of the Pendatum Resolution.
That the National Assembly, now Congress, retains the
power it possessed prior to the approval of the Constitution
over the uncontested election, returns and qualifications of
its members, cannot successfully be disputed. This power
remains intact, unaffected by section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution, which limits the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal to election, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress that are the subject of protest.
But within this limited sphere of its jurisdiction, the authority
of the Electoral Tribunal is supreme, absolute, exclusive. In
the language of section 11, Article VI of the Constitution
(supra), "the Electoral Tribunal shall be thesole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of their respective members."
In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), it was
held, in the light of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Convention, that the purpose of the creation of the
Electoral Commission "was to transfer in its totality all the
power previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal," which, though
constituted by majority members of the legislature, "is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature." It
was said that "the grant of power to the Electoral
Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had remained originally in the legislature"; that "the
express lodging of that power by the National Assembly,"
and that "this is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution." In other parts of the decision, this court
characterized as exclusive the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Commission over protests against the election of members
of the National Assembly and "determination thereof."
No stronger language than this can be found to emphasize
the completeness of the inhibition of the National
Assembly from interference in any matter pertaining to an
election protest filed with the Electoral Commission.
The resolution in question destroys the exclusive character
of the Electoral Tribunal's power. It encroaches upon the
Electoral Tribunal's prerogative as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Congress. In seeking the
suspension of the petitioners on the strenght of the
reported election irregularities in Central Luzon,
irregularities which constitute the sole basis of the main
protest, to that extent the resolution passed judgment on
the truth or probabilities of the charges, although the
judgment may not have been intended as final. At the very
least, the resolution touches directly on a matter which
involves a senatorial election contest. From whatever
stand pointone may look at the Pendatun Resolution, it is
hard to escape the conclusion that it oversteps the bounds
of the Senate's authority and trespasses on a territory
entirely reserved for the Electoral Tribunal.
Viewed from another angle, the legality of petitioners'
suspension is open to attack. This suspension was
resorted to as an auxiliary and interlocutory step
subordinated to the final outcome of the election protest
filed against them. Only a few will disagree with the
proposition that the power of the Senate or the House of
Representatives to suspend its members as a subsidiary
measure for causes connected with their election, returns
and qualifications, is, if such power exists, an implied
power derived from the power to remove or exclude, or
what is the same thing in this connection, the power to
invalidate an election. It follows that where the political
power has been taken away, as in the case of protested
elections, the accessory power to suspend vanishes. The
fact that the power to suspend may not have been
transferred, as is contended, to the Electoral Commission
does not argue in favor of the contention that it still resides
in the Congress.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
I.—TO MEET OR NOT TO MEET THE CHALLENGE
The challenge has been flung. Shall we evade it by an
unmanly and shameful retreat?
By this case the highest tribunal of the land in undergoing
a crucial test. Shall it do honor to its constitutional role as
the last bastion of the "regime of justice" proclaimed by the
Constitution in its preamble, as one of the fundamental
goals of the government established?
The Constitution itself is on the balance. Fundamental
principles of good government, basic human rights, prime
rules for the existence of an orderly society have been
trampled upon. The victims come to the Supreme Court
where the last line of democracy lies. Shall we allow that
line to give under the onslaught? Shall we betray the faith
of our people?
Shall we refuse to do our part, our duty, our mission, to
maintain in our country a government of laws, only
because we have to face a powerful group of senators?
Three senators of the Philippines, duly proclaimed as
elected by 1,736,407 combined votes cast by qualified
Filipino electors, immediately after assuming their
respective positions, were deprived of their seats in the
Senate through the unscrupulous, irresponsible, and
subversive action of a tyrannical and ruthless majority who
would not stop even to a downright trampling of the
fundamental law. The victims come to us clamoring for
relief and justice. Shall we meet the clamor with deaf ears?
Shall we remain aloof with callous indifference to a flagrant
violation of the Constitution? Shall we leave the victims at
the mercy of a despotic oligarchy and allow the latter to
supplant democracy? Shall we leave them instead to pin
their hopes on popular justice, if they be patient enough
not to seek justice by their hands or by the people who
exalted them by suffrage to be their spokesmen in the
Senate and in Congress?
Within the remaining span of our life, never shall we be
more conscious of the great privilege of performing our
duties as the ultimate guardians of the fundamental source
of vitality of our nation as an organic whole, whether
normality prevails or the people boil in the cauldron of ex
surging partisan passions. The very essence of
constitutional government is under our trust and the
momentous question is whether we shall betray that trust
and keep unblemished our judicial escutcheon. The
blinding grandeur of the unprecedented opportunity
challenging us cannot fail to move our whole being, from
ender on to the inner recesses of heart and brains, in the
effort to be equal to the high duty.
II.—CONFLICT OF PHILOSOPHIES
Under the admitted lack of perfection and perfectability of
our Constitution, it being the work of men, still we can not
subscribe to the nihilistic theory that there are flagrant
violations of its provisions, committed in utter oppression of
a minority, to whom our government is incapable of giving
redress, and when a judicial controversy arising from them
is submitted for our decision we must allow ourselves to be
petrified in buddhistic nirvana and declare ourselves
impotent, like the bystander who can not lift a finger to
save people crying for help inside a burning house or a
little child inclosed in a cage full of hungry tigers.
Here, three senators of the Philippines are wantonly
deprived of their seats in the Senate as constitutional
representatives of the people. Here, chosen, spokesmen
of many hundreds of thousands of qualified voters, are
silenced and muzzled, and their constitutional rights
trampled upon. The transgression of the fundamental law
is evident. But it is alleged that the Supreme Court is
powerless to protect the victims, to revindicate their
constitutional rights and those of the qualified voters who
elevated them to office, and to restore law. It is alleged
that within our system of government there is absolutely no
remedy for such an oppression. The theory is an
unmistakable upshot of a philosophy of frustration,
defeatism, and despair. We can not subscribe to such an
effete philosophy, afflicted with moral asthenia, unable to
see but an horizon of failure. We refuse to adopt the
despairing and fatalistic attitude of decrepit and impotent
senility. Philosophical eunuchry is incompatible with
enemy. Gelded intellectual virility or a dynamic moral
effeminacy has no place within the system of Philippine
constitutional democracy.
The framing of our Constitution is based on a philosophy
of faith and hope, the philosophy of healthy, vigorous and
courageous youth, full of the zest of life, brimming with
sturdy and exalted ideas, drunk with the wine of inspired
ambition and filled with enthusiasm for all good and
beautiful things, always dreaming of a nobler and more
glorious future. Within that strenuous philosophy there is
no place for the theory of impotency of our system of
government in redressing constitutional transgressions
and of the incapability of the courts of justice in giving
protection and redress to the victims.
III.—QUALITIES REQUIRED IN JUDICIAL FUNCTION
We cannot accept the invitation to bury our heads in
ostrich-like fashion in the sands of indifference and
inaction because, in having to exercise the constitutional
function of administering justice, we will be constrained to
face and take action against powerful, defiant or arrogant
parties. It is precisely in cases like this where we should
never show the least hesitancy in the performance of our
official duties and in the exercise of the loftiest function of
humanity: the administration of justice.
The judicial function calls for those qualities which, for lack
of better words, are described as manliness, moral
courage, intellectual decision, firmness of character, and
steadfastness of convictions. We accepted our position in
this court fully cognizant of the grave responsibilities it
entails and aware that it will exact from us all the best that
nature has bestowed on us. We must not give less. We
must not betray popular trust. We should not disappoint
the people.
IV.—FACTS IN THE CASE
The Commission on Elections, pursuant to the provisions
of section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, made the
canvass of the votes cast for senators in the election held
on April 23, 1946, and on May 23, 1946, proclaimed
petitioners as elected. (See accompanying Appendix A.)
Of the 16 senators proclaimed elected, 9 belong to the
Liberal Party, respondents Jose A. Avelino, Vicente
Francisco, Vicente Sotto, Melecio Arranz, Ramon Torres,
Mariano J. Cuenco, Olegario Clarin, Enrique Magalona,
and Salipada Pendatun; and 7 to the Nacionalista Party,
the 3 petitioners and Tomas Confesor, Carlos P. Garcia,
Tomas Cabili, and Alejo Mabanag.
Of the senators elected in 1941, 8 remain in office, 4
belonging to the Liberal Party, Domingo Imperial, Proceso
Sebastian, Sa Ramain Alonto, and Emiliano Tria Tirona;
and 4 to the Nacionalista Party, Eulogio Rodriguez,
Nicolas Buendia, Pedro Hernaez, and Vicente Rama.
The Senate therefore, is actually composed of 13 Liberals,
with a precarious majority of 2, and a minority of 11
Nacionalistas.
On May 25, 1946, in accordance with the Commonwealth
Act No. 725, the Senate convened to inaugurate the
regular legislative session for this year.
The session, with all senators present, except Senators Sa
Ramain Alonto and Vicente Rama, began by the reading
of the proclamation made by the Commission on Elections,
as copied in the accompanying Appendix A. No objection
having been raised against the proclamation, there being
no question as to its legality and regularity, with all the 22
members present, including petitioners, recognized and
accepted as full-fledged senators of the Philippines, the
Senate proceeded to elect its President, a vacant position
previously held by President Manuel A. Roxas. The result
was: 3 absent; 2 abstained; for respondent Senator Jose
A. Avelino, 10 votes, including his own; for petitioner
Senator Jose O. Vera, 8 votes; and for Senator Carlos P.
Garcia, 1 vote.
After respondent Senator Avelino assumed his office as
President of the Senate, it was moved that he receive the
collective oath of office of the newly elected senators, and,
at that juncture, Senator Salipada Pendatun proposed the
adoption of a resolution herein attached as Appendix B, as
a historical exhibit of the scurviest dealing a minority has
ever endured, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the
Senate of the Philippines, in session assembled,
as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of JOSE O. VERA,
RAMON DIOKNO, and JOSE ROMERO,
pending the hearing and decision on the
protests lodged against their elections, wherein
the terrorism averred in the report of the
Commission on Elections and in the report of the
Provost Marshall constitute the ground of said
protests and will therefore be the subject of
investigation and determination.
Debate began upon the adoption of the proposed
resolution. Afterwards it was unanimously agreed upon to
postpone further debate on the question for Monday, May
27, 1946.
The Senate proceeded thereafter to consider another
matter during which, in protest against the action taken by
the majority on the said matter, all the minority senators
walked out from the session hall, leaving therein only 12
majority senators, including the President of the Senate.
Taking advantage of the absence of all the minority
senators, the 12 majority senators remaining in the session
hall approved and adopted the Pendatun Resolution,
notwithstanding the fact that the Senate had already
postponed the further consideration of said resolution to
May 27, 1946, and the 12 majority senators, for lack of
quorum, could not, under the Constitution, proceed with
the business of the same and, therefore, had not the
authority either to reconsider the resolution taken by the
Senate, postponing the continuation of the debate on the
Pendatun Resolution to May 27, 1946, or to consider and
approve said resolution.
At the time the petition has been filed, May 27, 1946,
respondent Senator Jose Avelino, President of the Senate,
had already begun to put into effect the Pendatun
Resolution by ordering the Secretary of the Senate to
erase from the roll of the same the names of the three
petitioners.
Among the three petitioners who are complaining of being
deprived of their constitutional and legal right to continue
sitting in the Senate of the Philippines is the minority Floor
Leader Jose O. Vera, who lost the election for President of
the Senate by the bare difference of two votes. All the
three petitioners, by the high positions they formerly
occupied in the Government of which we may take judicial
notice, are recognized as political leaders of national
stature, whose presence will do honor to any legislative
chamber of any country in the world.
V.—PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Upon the facts above related and the allegations made in
the petition under oath, including the one to the effect that
the respondents of the majority party are determined to put
into effect immediately the Pendatun resolution, to deprive
the petitioners of their right to sit in the Senate, the
"sinister purpose" of which was the approval, without the
intervention and participation of petitioners, of important
measures, including an alleged terroristic one for judicial
reorganization and the highly controversial Bell Bill, as
soon as the petition was submitted in the night of May 27,
1946, the undersigned issued the preliminary injunction
prayed for in the petition upon petitioners' filing a cash
bond in the amount of P1,000. (Copy of the order is
attached as Appendix D.)
On May 29, 1946, the Supreme Court in banc was
specially called to session with the specific purpose of
considering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
As the court functioning is a special division of six, and the
Supreme Court in banc was then in vacation, the session
had to be called upon the initiative of the Chief Justice. In
the meantime, the service of the writ was suspended.
The Supreme Court in banc adopted then the following
resolution:
The court in banc, having been informed that a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued in
G.R. No. L-543, Jose O. Vera vs. Jose Avelino
by Justice Perfecto under sections 2 and 5 of
Rule 60, Resolved to set for hearing the petition
for preliminary injunction on Saturday, June 1st,
1946, at 10 o'clock a.m., for the purpose of
determining whether or not the issuance of said
writ was justified. Let notice be given to all the
parties.
The Chief Justice and Associate Justices Paras,
Hilado and Bengzon voted to dissolve the
preliminary injunction in the meantime.
Upon the adoption of the above resolution, the
undersigned instructed the Clerk to proceed with the
service of the writ of preliminary injunction, which was
immediately served to respondents.
On June 3, 1946, a majority adopted the following
resolution, dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction:
Considering that the preliminary injunction was
issued in the case of Jose O. Vera,
petitioners, vs. Jose A. Avelino, respondents,
G.R. No. L-543, to preserve the status quo and
thus prevent the execution of the acts alleged
under oath in the last part of paragraph X of the
petition, without the intervention of the
petitioners; and taking into consideration that
this court, after hearing both parties, at any rate
believes and trusts that the respondents will not
carry out said acts during the pendency of this
proceeding, this court, without deciding whether
or not the said injunction was justified, hereby
resolves to dissolve it in the meantime, without
prejudice to whatever action or decision this
court may take or render on the question
involved in this case including that of jurisdiction.
Justice Paras concurs in the result.
Justice Jaranilla absent.
Justice Perfecto dissents as follows:
The facts alleged in the petition show that
petitioners' fundamental rights have been
trampled upon in open defiance of the law and
the Constitution; that respondents, in adopting
the Pendatun Resolution and trying to enforce it,
usurped constitutional functions exclusively
entrusted by the people to the Electoral Tribunal
of the Senate, as an independent and separate
department of the government; that the people
at large, who voted for and of whom petitioners
are legal representatives, are intended to be
deprived of their voice and vote on matters of
transcendental importance to the welfare and
future of this nation, that are and to be under
consideration of the Senate. Respondents did
not deny these facts. They reduced themselves
to impugn the inherent and undisputable
jurisdiction of this Supreme Court to pass upon
the above mentioned flagrant violations of the
Constitution and to afford coercive relief to the
victims thereof. We cannot agree with an action
which history may give a damaging
interpretation. We must have proper respect to
the judgement of posterity. We have a plain duty
to uphold the Constitution. We must not shirk
that sacred duty. We are called upon to protect
the constitutional prerogatives of the
representatives of the people. Our loyalty to the
people does not permit any alternative action to
that of extending the cloak of our authority so
that the representatives of the people may
continue performing unhampered their
fundamental prerogatives and functions. We
cannot agree with any suspension of their
exercise in utter violation of the fundamental law
of land. The sovereignty of the people itself is
involved in this case. We cannot suffer the idea
that in one of the crucial moments in the
performance of our functions and in the
compliance of our duty as is pointed out by our
conscience, we have faltered. The preliminary
injunction must not be dissolved.
Although the belief expressed in the majority resolution is,
in effect, a moral injunction, addressed solely to the sense
of responsibility, fairness, decency, and patriotism of
respondents, without any enforceable legal sanction, the
majority being sure that respondents will not betray the
trust reposed on them, yet we felt it our duty to dissent
because in questions so important as those raised in this
case we do not agree with indirect and diplomatic
procedures, with wavering, innocious and hesitating
action, with laodicean measures and resolutions, with
equivocal, furtive, and not forth putting attitude. In judicial
matters, the best policy is forthrightness, not ambiguity.
The way of Themis is always rectilinear. Her path is never
tortuous, labyrinthine, or misleading.
Without any attempt at prophecy, not long after the
resolution dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction,
events have shown the moral, indirect, or admonitory
injunctions by courts of justice are mere sounds
transcribed on scraps of paper, not worthier than the
sheets on which they are written. Hocking at the credulity,
ingenuousness, and compliance of the majority of this
court, with the exclusion of petitioners, respondents
proceeded to carryout the acts alleged in the last part of
paragraph X of the petition, such as the approval of the
Bell bill, the revamping of the judiciary system of the
Philippines, including the unconstitutional reduction of the
membership of the Supreme Court from the eleven to
seven, and the measure which would wipe out the time-
honored principle of stability in the Philippine civil service
system, by placing many thousands of public officers and
employees in iniquitous insecurity in the positions in which
they have invested the be stenergies in years of public
service.
For the nonce, it will be hard to gauge and appraise the full
consequences of the resolution of June 5, 1946, dissolving
the writ of preliminary injunction based on the majority's
belief and trust that events have shown to be completely
hazy and groundless. It is only our fervent hope that the
consequences, whatever they may be, may not dampen
the enthusiasm of those who have reposed so much faith
in the success of our sovereign Republic as the pursuivant
heralding a new era to all subjected peoples.
On June 8, 1946, petitioners filed a motion praying that the
above majority's resolution of June 3, 1946, be
reconsidered and that the writ of preliminary injunction be
restored. It remained deplorably unacted upon for weeks
until respondents were able to consummate the acts
above mentioned.
That action continues now to be pending before us for
decision, the same as respondents' motion to dismiss.
VI.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution reads as
follows:
The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be members of the Senate or
of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House,
three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The constitution of the Electoral Tribunals is provided in
section 13 of Article VI of the Constitution, wherein it is
required that they shall be constituted "within thirty days
after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
have been organized with the election of their President
and Speaker, respectively."
From the foregoing, it is evident that the power to judge "all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications"
of senators and representatives, is exclusively lodged in
the respective Electoral Tribunal, the exclusivity being
emphasized by the use of the word "sole" by the drafters of
the Constitution.
By the Pedatun Resolution, respondents exercised, in
effect, the power to judge "the election, returns, and
qualifications" of petitioners as senators of the Philippines,
duly proclaimed as elected on April 23, 1946.
From the very words of respondents themselves there can
be no possible mistakes as to the fact that, in adopting the
Pendatun Resolution, they exercised the judicial power to
judge a controversy concerning the election of petitioners
as senators of the Philippines.
From their motion to dismiss dated June 6, 1946, through
Solicitor General Lorenzo Tañada and Atty. Vicente J.
Francisco, himself one of the Senate, referring to the
reasons behind the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution,
we read:
The Senate considers it against its dignity and
inimical to its welfare and integrity to allow
petitioners to sit as members pending the final
determination of the question whether or not
they were duly elected . . . it was an expression
of the legislative (?) policy, a desire on the part
of the Senate to recognize only members whom
it believes were legally elected. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The respondents do not constitute the Senate Electoral
Tribunal which has the exclusive jurisdiction to exercise
said power. The fact that latter three among the
respondent Senators were chosen to be members of said
Tribunal does not change the situation, nor cures the
constitution inroad. They, therefore, in adopting the
Pendatun Resolution, usurped a power, a jurisdiction, and
an authority exclusively belonging to the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. The usurpation has been perpetrated in flagrant
violation of the Constitution. The Pendatun Resolution,
being unconstitutional, is null and void per se.
Among the Justices who voted to declare it invalid,
because it wimbles the fundamental law, are two former
members of the constitutional convention and of its
committee on style, who took active part in the creation of
the Electoral Commission, and a former member of the
Second National Assembly which, by constitutional
amendment, created the present Senate and the two
Electoral Tribunals. Justice Hontiveros, one of the present
three Justices who took part in the framing of the original
Constitution, did not participate in the voting.
We have to bring out these facts because it is only logical
that the co-authors of the Constitution and of its
amendments must be in a better position to interpret their
own will, intention, and purposes as they expressed them
in their own words in the fundamental law.
VI.-A.—THE INTENT OF THE PEOPLE IN THE
CONSTITUTION IS IDENTICAL WITH THE
INTENT OF THEIR DELEGATES
Even the majority themselves admit that, in construing the
Constitution of the United States, the writings in "The
Federalist" of the delegates of the constitutional
convention, such as Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, have
persuasive force, the same as the book of Delegate
Aruego and of other members of our own constitutional
convention concerning the Constitution of the Philippines.
It is only logical that the authors themselves should be in
the advantageous situation of construing more exactly the
product of their own minds.
But, as if repenting for making the admission, foreseeing
the damaging consequences thereof for the majority's
position, they tried to neutralize it or subtract its validity by
seconding the sophistic distinction made by Willoughby as
to the conclusiveness of the parliamentary proceedings as
means by proper construction of the Constitution, on one
side, and of the statutes, on the other, since in the
legislative proceedings "it is the intent of the legislature we
seek, " while in the preceedings of the constitution
convention "we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of
the people through the discussions and the liberations of
their representative." The distinction is absolutely
groundless. In either the constitutional convention are in
the legislature, it is the people who speak through their
delegates and representatives, and the intent of the people
may only be gathered from the utterances of said
delegates and representatives. The "intent of the
legislature" in ordinary laws is the "intent of the people,"
both and being undistinguishable for all practical purposes.
And the "intent of the people" in a constitutional convention
is identified with the "intent" of their delegates thereof. It is
absurd, in practical, and against the realities of all
experience to mention "intent of the people" as something
different from and in opposition to the intent of their own
representatives. The delegates and representatives are
the mouthpiece of the people. In the system of the
representative democracy prevailing in the United States
of America and in the Philippines, the people never speak
by themselves, but by their chosen mouthpieces — the
voters in the matter of selection of government officers,
and the officers in the matter of expressing the people's
will in government or state matters.
There is no essential difference between the parliamentary
role of the delegates to a constitutional convention and
that of the members of a legislature. The fact that the
former are charged with the drafting of the fundamental
law and the latter with the enactment of ordinary laws does
not change their common character as representatives
and mouthpieces of the people. In either the Constitution
or in the ordinary statutes, it is the thought and the will of
the people which are expressed. What that thought and
that will are can only be gathered from the way they are
expressed by the representatives. The thought and the will
of the people are interpreted and expressed by the
representatives and crystallized in the words uttered and
written by them. No one may pretend to know the meaning
of the expressions uttered of the provisions written better
than the very persons who poured on them their own
thoughts and decisions. The thought and the will of the
people remain in the abstract, are incapable of caption, are
more ideological entities, and do not form and cannot be
pointed out or determined until and unless their
representatives in the constitutional convention are in the
legislature express them in concrete and specific words of
their own. The collective entity of the people is, by its very
in being, inarticulate. It becomes articulate only through its
chosen representatives. Its will is an aphlogistic amber that
becomes aflame only in the parliamentary actuations of its
delegates.
And if we are not dreaming, we must accept the fact that
what the representatives of the people stereotype either in
a constitution or in ordinary laws are their own personal
opinions and convictions, their own individual and personal
thoughts and wills, although in doing so they act in their
representative capacity. We, the members of the Supreme
Court, are also representatives of the people and are
performing our official functions in are presentative
capacity, but the opinions we express and write flow, not
from any extrinsic or indwelling reservoir of justice,
reserved to us by the sovereign people, but from the
spiritual fountain of our own personal consciousness.
We will not dare to dispute any one's claim to wield, in
interpreting the fundamental law, the same authority of
such judicial giants as Marshall and Holmes, but we
consider it completely out of place to conclude that,
because in the present constitutional controversy we
maintain that the co-authors of our fundamental law are in
better position to construe the very document in which they
have infused the ideas which boiled in their minds, and
gave a definite form to their own convictions and
decisions, said great justices shall not be so authoritative
in expounding the United States Constitution, because
they were not members of the federal convention that
framed it, eventhough, it should be recalled, Chief Justice
Marshall was one of the outstanding figures in the Virginia
convention that ratified said Constitution. The mention is
out of place, because it has not been, and can not be,
shown that the constitutional opinions of Marshall and
Holmes, for which they were hailed as authorities, are in
conflict with what Madison, Hamilton, Jay, and other
delegates to the federal convention had said or written as
to the intent expressed in said fundamental law; while in
the present controversy, there is an actual conflict of
interpretation between former delegates and those who
never have been, and it happens that the former members
of the constitutional convention taking part in the disposal
of this case, are unanimous in construing the document in
the drafting of which they took personal and active part.
Of course, in our atmosphere of freedom of opinion,
outsiders may perfectly claim and pretend to know what
the delegates to our constitutional convention intended to
express in the Constitution better than the delegates
themselves, as it is possible for some anthropologists to
claim that they are in a position to recognize the children of
some parents better than the parents themselves. But
everybody must also agree that such feats of clairvoyance
are not within the range of normal experience and,
therefore, must not ordinarily be accepted at their face
value.
VII.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE
The Pendatun Resolution has been adopted when there
was no quorum in the Senate. Those present were only
12, all respondent senators.
When respondents adopted the resolution, they
purportedly adopted it as a resolution of the Senate.
Section 10 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides that
"a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and may compel the attendance of absent members in
such manner and under such penalties as such House
may provide."
It is evident, therefore, that, to do business, the Senate,
being composed of 24 members, needs the presence of at
least 13 senators. "A smaller number may adjourn from
day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
members," but not in exercising any other power, such as
the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution.
The procedure used by respondents in adopting the
Pendatun Resolution is, therefore, conclusively
unconstitutional.
VIII.—CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Petitioners are among the senators who, having been
proclaimed elected by the Commission on Elections, are
duty bound to assume office from May 23, 1946, under the
following mandatory provision of section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 725:
SEC. 12. The candidates for member of the
House of Representatives and those for Senator
who have been proclaimed elected by the
respective Board of Canvassers and the
Commission on Elections shall assume office
and shall hold regular session for the year
nineteen hundred and forty-six on May twenty-
five, nineteen hundred and forty-six. Within
thirty-five days after the election has been held,
both Houses of Congress shall meet in session
and shall publicly count the votes cast for the
offices of President and Vice-President, in
accordance with Article VII, section two of the
Constitution. The persons respectively having
the largest number of votes for President and
Vice-President shall be declared elected; but in
case two or more candidates shall have an
equal and largest number of votes for either
office, one of them shall be chosen President or
Vice-President, as the case may be, by a
majority vote of the members of Congress in
joint session assembled.
If petitioners should fail to discharge the duties of their
respective offices, they will incur criminal responsibility and
may be punished, according to the Penal Code, with
arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or
both.
Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office.—
The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who, having been
elected by popular election to a public office,
shall refuse without legal motive to be sworn in
or to discharge the duties of said office.
No one may prevent them from performing the duties of
their office, such as attending the meetings of the Senate
or of any of its committees or subcommittees, or from
expressing their opinions or casting their votes, without
being criminally guilty of a violation of parliamentary
immunity, a criminal offense punished by the Penal Code
withprision mayor.
ART. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity.—
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall use force,
intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any
member of the National Assembly
(Congress)from attending the meetings of the
Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees
or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or
committees or divisions thereof, from expressing
his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty
of prision correccional shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who shall, while
the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special
session, arrest or search any member thereof,
except this Code by a penalty higher than prision
mayor. (Words in parenthesis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents have the
inexcusable duty of recognizing petitioners as legal
members of the Senate, otherwise they may be liable to
criminal prosecution for an offense defined and punished
by the Penal Code with imprisonment ranging from 6 years
to 12 years.
IX.—PETITIONERS' CREDENTIALS CONCLUSIVE AS
TO THEIR RIGHT TO THEIR SEATS IN THE SENATE
It is a duty from which respondents can not legally escape.
Otherwise they will invite the sword of Damocles of
criminal prosecution to be hanging on their heads. As the
Supreme Court of Kansas said in Re Gunn. 19 L.R.A.,
519:
But, again we have what is known as a
"standard work" on parliamentary or legislative
practice. It is found in almost every public library,
is examined and referred to by every legislative
assembly and every congressional body, and its
title is "Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative
Assemblies." . . . In section 240 it is said: "the
principle of parliamentary law applicable to the
question are perfectly simple and plain, founded
in the very nature of things, established by the
uniform practice and authority of parliament,
confirmed by reason and analogy. These
principles are as follows: First, that every person
duly returned is a member, whether legally
elected or not, until his election is set aside;
second, that no person who is not duly returned,
is a member, although legally elected, until his
election is established; third, that conflicting
claimants, both in form legally returned (that
would be where two persons had certificates),
are neither of them entitled to be considered as
members until the question between them has
been settled; fourth, that those members who
are duly returned, and they alone — the
members whose rights are to determined being
excluded — constitute the judicial tribunal for the
decision of all questions of this nature." Upon
this question of certificates, we also cite the
contest in the United States Senate from
Montana, which is the latest utterance of the
highest legislative body in this land. In the report
of the majority of the committee it is said: "The
majority of the committee are of the opinion that,
if this body of persons had lawful and
constitutional certificates of their election, that
title is a good title against all the world,
governing their associates in that body,
governing the senate, governing everybody who
had a lawful duty to determine who are lawfully
elected representatives, until there can be an
adjudication by the House itself to the contrary;
and that nobody can be heard to say, and that
 no authority can be permitted to inquire into or
determine, the actual facts of the election as
against the title." (51st Congress, 1st Session
[21 Cong. Record, pt. 3, pp. 2906-2810], p. 521.)
The court also quoted from the American and English
Encyclopedia, saying:
The American and English Encyclopedia
summarizes the law of the worth of a certificate
This Supreme Court laid down the same doctrine by
of election as follows: "It is settled that when it is
stating the following:
made the duty of certain officers to canvass the
votes, and issue a certificate of election in favor
of the successful candidate, a certificate of such
officers, regular upon its face, is sufficient to
entitle the person holding it to the possession of
the office during an action to contest the right."
Volume 6, p. 373; 33 Law. ed., 948; State vs.
Buckland (23 Kan., 369).
The court might well have added that Ruling Case Law
wholly confirms its stand:
. . . The certificate entitles the recipient to
exercise the office until the regular constitutional
authority shall determine who is legally elected
officer, and it is duty of the incumbent of an
office at the expiration of his term to surrender it
to one who has received a certificate of election
and has qualified thereunder. If it is desired to
contest the election or qualification of such
person, this may be done in the manner
prescribed by law for determining claims to an
office. Disbursing officers, charges with the
payment of salaries, have a right to rely on the
apparent title, and treat the officer who is clothed
with it as the officer de jure, without inquiring
whether another has the better right. While a
certificate of election may be superseded by a
decree in proceedings to contest the election, it
cannot be subjected to attack in a collateral
proceeding in which the title may be in question;
and if the time should pass within which such
proceeding may be instituted the title may
become absolute and indefeasible in default of
any contest. Hence it has been said that the
holder of a certificate of election who has duly Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th
qualified is prima facie entitled to the office when ed., sec. 166). (Angara vs. Electoral
his term begins, as against everyone except Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 180, 181.)
a de facto officer in possession under color of
authority. He is entitled to retain possession and
As a matter of fact, in the Gunn case, the Supreme Court
to perform the duties of the office without
of Kansas had occasion to comment on the exclusion of
interference until such certificate is set aside by
ten duly proclaimed members from the roll of the House,
some appropriate proceeding." (22 R. C. L., 436,
and unhesitatingly condemned it in these words:
437.)
It seems that while 10 contestants are marked in
the Dunsmore Journal as present, but not voting,
10 names on the certified roll are wholly omitted.
Any rightful reason for such omission does not
. . . As a matter of fact, certification by the proper appear. We cannot perceive any valid reason for
provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to such omission, even if 10 certified members had
entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National their seats contested. Every person duly
Assembly and to render him eligible to any office returned too a house of representatives, and
in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National having a certificate, is a member thereof,
Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935) whether elected or not, whether eligible or not,
until his election is set aside. And this must be
set aside by the House, not by the individual
Under the practice prevailing both in the English
members before organization, not by anyone
House of Commons and in the Congress of the
member, not by any contestant, not by any mob.
United States, confirmation is neither necessary
Before organization, a few members properly
in order to entitle a member-elect to take his
elected, meeting in causus or otherwise, cannot
seat. The return of the proper election officers is
pass upon the "elections, returns, and
sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such
qualification of a members of the House to be
return begins to enjoy the privileges of a
thereafter organized." If one member, before
member from the time that he takes his oath of
organization can object to any other member
office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331, 332;
duly returned and having a certificate, then all
vol. 21, pp. 694, 695;U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs.
members can be objected to, and there could be
21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in
no one left to organize any house. In McCraryon
cases of contested elections where the decision
Election (2d ed., s. 204) the practice is thus
is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In
stated; "Where two or more persons claim the
England, the judges' decision or report in
same office, and where a judicial investigation is
controverted election is certified to the Speaker
required to settle the contest upon the merits, it
of the House of Commons, and the House, upon
is often necessary to determine which of the
being informed of such certificate or report by
claimants shall be permitted to qualify and to
the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon
exercise the functions of the office pending such
the Journals, and to give such directions for
investigation. If the office were to remain vacant
confirming or altering the return, or for the issue
pending the contest, it might frequently happen
of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into
that the greater part of the term would expire
execution the determination as circumstances
before it could be filled; and thus the interests of
may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In
the people might suffer for the want of a public
the United States, it is believed, the order or
officer. Besides, if the mere institution of a
decision of the particular house itself is generally
contest were deemed sufficient to prevent the
regarded as sufficient, without any actual
swearing in of the person holding the usual
alteration or amendment of the return (Cushing,
credentials, it is easy to see that every great and
 serious injustice might be done. If this were the
rule, it would only be necessary for an evil-
disposed person to contest the right of his
successful rival, and to protract the contest as
long as possible, in order to deprive the latter of
his office for at least a part of the term; and this
might be done by a contest having little or no
merit on his side for it would be impossible to
discover in advance of an investigation the
absence of merit. And, again, if the party holding
the ordinary credentials to an office could be
kept out of the office by the mere institution of a
contest, the organization of a legislative body-
such, for example, as the House of
Representatives of the United States-might be
altogether prevented by instituting contest
against a majority of the members; or what is
more to be apprehended, the relative strength of
political parties against members of one or the
other of such parties. These considerations have
made it necessary to adopt and to adhere to the
rule that the person holding the ordinary
credential shall be qualified and allowed to act
pending a contest and until a decision can be
had on the merits.
Now, why should not this principle be followed?
Why should not this rule, which is universal
throughout the states of this Union, and which is
accepted and adopted by Congress, be followed
in the state of Kansas? It has history to sustain
it. It has reason to sustain it. And let us here
remark that in every state of this Union where,
through political excitement or personal
contests, a different rule has been adopted,
disturbance, violence, and almost bloodshed
have always occurred. (Pp. 522-523.)
X.—ELECTORAL CONTESTS ON LEGISLATIVE
POSITIONS
Much reliance has been placed by respondents on the
Rafols case in support of their authority to suspend the
seatings of petitioners through the Pendatun Resolution.
We agree that not enough emphasis may be placed on
said case, although not as an isolated one but as the initial
link of a chain of historical events handing with the leading
and epoch-making, although not enough of the publicized
case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, decided on July
15, 1936, which reversed the pusillanimous, vacillating,
and self-contradictory majority position taken in
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, decided on September 11, 1924.
A little piece of history will be helping.
In 1925, Nicolas A. Rafols was reelected as representative
from one district of Cebu. The House of Representatives of
the 7th Philippine Legislature suspended his seating. The
resolution for suspension was passed after a bitter
parliamentary debate between members of the majority
belonging to the Nacionalista Party and the members of
the minority belonging to the Democrata Party. The House
was then presided over by Speaker Manuel A. Roxas, now
President of the Philippines, and among those who with us
opposed the resolution for suspension were
Representative Jose Avelino from Samar, now President
of the Senate, and the minority floor leader, Claro M.
Recto, who later became President of the House of
Representatives. The arbitrariness and injustice committed
against Representative Rafols were bitterly resented and
rankled deep in the hearts of the minority who felt they
were despotically trampled upon by a bulldozing majority.
The Pro-Anti political struggle in 1934 resulted in new
alignments. Former Democratas Avelino and Recto
happened to align with the Anti majority, the same as
Justice Hontiveros, who also became a Delegate to the
constitutional convention; and former Nacionalistas
Manuel A. Roxas and Manuel C. Briones happened to
align with the Pro minority.
In 1934, the constitutional convention was presided over
by Claro M. Recto, as President, Ruperto Montinola, as
First Vice President, and Teodoro Sandico, as Second
Vice President. All of them belonged to the Democrata
Party when in 1925 injustice was committed against
Representative Rafols. Recto and Sandico were aligned
with the Anti majority and Montinola with the Pro minority.
Although the Pro delegates of the convention were only
about one-fifth of all the members, some of them were
elected to preside over important committees--Rafael
Palma, on principles; Jose P. Laurel, on the bill of rights;
Manuel C. Briones, on legislative power; and ourselves on
citizenship. By his leading and influential role in the
drafting of the Constitution, Manuel A. Roxas was pointed
out as the Hamilton of our convention.
With such men and with their background, the convention
introduced the innovation of creating the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly, to which the power
to judge upon the election, returns, and qualifications of
legislators, formerly exercised by legislative bodies, was
transferred. The innovation was introduced precisely with
the purpose of avoiding the repetition of such abuses and
injustices as those committed against Rafols, by lodging
the judicial power of deciding electoral contests for
legislative positions to where it should logically belong--to
a judicial body, which is expected to do justice and not to
serve partisan political interests without compunctions and
scruples.
Although the initiative came from the minority, Pros, it was
whole heartedly supported by the majority Anti leaders.
The members of the constitutional convention, with the
most prominent leaders thereof, were fully aware of how
changeable the political fortunes of men are, and it was in
the interest of everybody that the rights of the minority be
equally protected as those of the majority.
Through Justice Laurel, a former member of the
constitutional convention, this Supreme Court said:
The members of the Constitutional Convention
who framed our fundamental law were in their
majority men mature in years and experience.
To be sure, many of them were familiar with the
history and political development of other
countries of the world. When, therefore, they
deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and
invested it with the exclusive function of passing
upon and determining the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in
the light of their own experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation
of the Electoral Commission was designed to
remedy certain evils of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. Nothwithstanding
the vigorous opposition of some members of the
convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body
by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said
now is that, upon the approval of the
Constitution, the creation of the Electoral
Commission is the expression of the wisdom
and "ultimate justice of the people." (Abraham
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our constitutional
convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matter pertaining
to contested elections of its members, to an
indefendent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents,
however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people,
acting through their delegates to the Convention,
to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite
body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set
partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial
temper by including in its membership three
justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral commission is a constitutional
creation, invested with the necessary authority in
the performance and execution of the limited
and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission
to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by
the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte
Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1).
(Angara vs. Electoral commission, 63 Phil., 139,
174-176.)
XI.—SEPARATION OF POWERS
There is much misunderstanding as to the real import
meaning, and scope of the much vaunted principle of
separation of power due to the confusion in many minds
between two conceptions: one, naive and vulgar; and the
other, constitutional and strictly juridical. The trouble lies in
the fact that, for lack of more appropriate term, the
word separation has been used to convey a group of
concepts and ideas, when the word only expresses just
one of partial aspect of one of said concepts and ideas.
Thus a misconception results by confounding a part with
the whole or the whole with the part.
The vulgar notion of separation of powers appears to be
simple, rudimentary, and clear-cut. As a consequence, the
principle of separation of powers creates in the mind of the
ignorant or uninitiated the images of the different
departments of government as individual units, each one
existing independently, all alone by itself, completely
disconnected from the remaining all others. The picture in
their mental panorama offers, in effect, the appearance of
each department as a complete government by itself. Each
governmental department appears to be a veritable state
in the general set up of the Philippine state, like the
autonomous kingdoms and princedoms of them a harajahs
of India. Such undiscerning and rudimentary notion can
not fit in the pattern framed by the Filipino people through
their representatives in the constitutional convention. The
true concept of the principle of separation of powers may
not be obtained but in conjunction with the political
structure set up by the Constitution and only in accordance
with the specific provisions thereof.
The drafters of the constitution were fully acquainted with
the then prevailing confusions and misconceptions as to
the meaning of the principle of separation of powers. One
outstanding instance is shown in the self-contradicting,
courageless decision in Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil.,
83), where the majority deflected from the natural and
logical consequences of the premises unanimously agreed
upon by all the members of the court using as a subterfuge
an erroneous, disrupting, and subversive interpretation
and application of the principle of separation of powers,
becoming since a fetish of a class of unanalytical
constitutional doctrinaires, distressingly unmindful of its
dangerous implications, eager to emulate, in proclaiming it
as a legal dogma, the plangent exertions of housetop
bawlers preaching the virtues of a new panacea.
Fully knowing the prevailing misconceptions regarding said
principle, although there was an implicit agreement that it
is one of those underlying principles of government
ordered by the Constitution to be established, the
delegates to the constitutional convention purposely
avoided its inclusion in the Declaration of Principles
inserted as Article II of the fundamental law. They even
went to the extent of avoiding to mention it by the phrase it
is designated.
XII.—CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION—THE ONLY
ONE ACCEPTABLE
The only acceptable conception of the principle of
separation of powers within our democracy in the
constitutional one. We must reject any idea of it as
something existing by itself, independent of the
Constitution and, as some misguided jurist would have it,
even superior to the fundamental law of the land.
The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. . . . The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings
of the various departments of the government.
 For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in
the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject
to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-
fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as check on the
Executive in the sense that its consent through
its Commission on Appointments is necessary in
the appointment of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is
essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a
certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of
the Constitution. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 156, 157.)
The framers of the Constitution had never intended to
create or allow the existence of governmental departments
as autonomous states within the republican state of the
Philippines. The three departments mentioned in the
Constitution were created, not as complete independent
units, but as limbs and organs of the organic unit of the
department is independent and separate from the others in
the sense that it is an organ specifically entrusted with the
performance of specific functions, not only for the sake of
efficiency resulting from division of labor, but to avoid
tyranny, despotism, and dictatorship which, as experience
and history have taught, result from the concentration of
government powers in one person or in an oligarchical
group.
XIII.—FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF UNITY
The idea of unity is fundamental in our Constitution.
The Filipino people ordained and promulgated the
Constitution "in order to establish a government that shall
embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony
of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy" (Preamble of the Constitution). "The
Philippines is a republic state. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them"
(section 1, Article 11, Constitution). Under this principle we
must view the whole government as a unit, and all
departments and other government organs, agencies and
instrumentalities as parts of that unit in the same was as
the head, the hands, and the heart are parts of a human
body.
By examining the provisions of the Constitution, the vulgar
notion of the principle of separation of powers can be
shown to be wrong, as there is neither an office nor a
department, created or allowed to be created under the
Constitution, that may be considered as effectively
separate from the others, as the misinformed people would
have it. As a matter of fact, there is no government power
vested exclusively in any authority, office, or government
agency. Section 1 of Article VI vests the legislative power
in a Congress of the Philippines, but this provision does
not preclude the President of the Philippines and the
Supreme Court from partaking in the exercise of legislative
power. The President has the initiative in the making of
appropriations which may not be increased by Congress
except those pertaining to Congress itself and the judicial
department, and the President may veto any bill enacted
by Congress (sections 19 and 20, Article VI, of the
Constitution). The Supreme Court may declare
unconstitutional and, therefore, nullify a law enacted by
Congress and approved by the President of the Philippines
(sections 2 and 10, Article VIII, of the Constitution). The
Supreme Court exercises, besides, legislative power in
promulgating rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts (section 13, Article VIII, of the
Constitution)
The executive power is vested in a President of the
Philippines (section 1, Article VII, Constitution of the
Philippines), but the Senate and House of
Representatives, through the Commission on
Appointments, take part in the exercise of the executive
power of appointment (section 12, Article VI, and section
10 [3], Article VII, of the Constitution), and in the granting
of amnesty and in making treaties (section 10 [6] and 10
[7], Article VII, of theConstitution). The Supreme Court
exercises executive power regarding the transfer of judges
from their districts to another. (Section 7, Article VIII, of the
Constitution.) Tribunals' power to order the execution of
their decisions and mandates is of executive character.
The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior court as may be established by law (section
1, Article VIII, of the Constitution).But there are many
instances wherein the President of the Philippines must
administer justice, so it is required from him by the
Constitution to swear to "do justice to every man" (section
7, Article VII, of the Constitution). And by impeachment
proceedings, the House of Representatives and the
Senate exercise judicial function (Article IX, of the
Constitution). Their power to construe and apply their own
rules and their disciplinary power to punish their own
members for disorderly conduct are of judicial nature.
Furthermore, there are specific functions of government
entrusted to agencies other than the three great
departments of government, the legislative, the executive,
and the judicial. The judicial function of judging contests as
to election, returns, and qualifications of senators in
entrusted to the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate; and that
of judging contests as to election, returns, and
qualifications of representatives, to the Electoral Tribunal
of the House of Representatives (section 11, Article VI, of
the Constitution).The executive function of auditing the
government accounts is entrusted to a constitutional
officer, the Auditor General (Article XI, of the Constitution),
and the administrative function of supervising elections is
entrusted to the Commission on Elections (Article X, of the
Constitution).
To understand well the true meaning of the principle of
separation of powers, it is necessary to remember and pay
special attention to the fact that the idea of separation
refers, not to departments, organs, or other government
agencies, but to powers exercised. The things separated
are not the subject of the powers, but the functions to be
performed. It means division of functions, but not of
officials or organs which will perform them. It is analogous
to the economic principle of division of labor practiced in a
factory where multiple manufacturing processes are
performed to produce a finished article.
XIV.—APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS
In the discussion of the question how the principle of
separation of powers must be applied, misunderstood
ideas have been asserted as springboard to jump to rash
and unfounded conclusions. Among such assertions is the
one which would have three great departments of
government, not only co-equal in dignity, but,
notwithstanding their admitted coordination, as actual
sovereigns — as if within the sphere of the sovereigns can
be admitted — each one with full powers to destroy and
trample upon the Constitution, with the victims absolutely
incapable and powerless to obtain redress against the
offense. Such an assertion would make of said
departments as states within a state. The fundamental
error of the assertion lies in the failure to consider the
following principle of the Constitution:
Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
(Section 1, Article II.)
Each department of government is nothing but a mere
agency by which the people exercise its supreme
sovereignty. Within the framework of the Constitution, our
government may be compared to a human being: the
legislative department is the brain that formulates policies
and rule through the laws it enacts; the executive
department is the hand that executes such policies and
rules; the judicial department is the conscience that
declares what is wrong and what is right, and determines
what acts are in consonance with or inimical to the
constitutional unity as the very condition of life and
survival.
The brain that defines policies and the hand that executes
them may go astray and disregard, by their physical
power, the infallible pronouncements and admonitions of
conscience; but nothing can and should stop conscience in
its great ethical mission as a condition indespensable to
existence itself. By the same token, nothing can and contestants have been duly elected — all the claimants
should silence tribunals as the organs, in the government being in possession of incompatible, self-denying and self-
set up by the Constitution, of the collective conscience of destroying credentials — reason counsels that all of them
the people. In the long trip of destiny, that collective be suspended by the Electoral Tribunal pending the
conscience shall ever be the guiding star, unerring even in presentation of the necessary evidence to allow one of
the gloomiest confusions. them to take his seat in the Senate until the contest is
finally decided.
Applying to the case at bar the principle of separation of
powers in its true meaning, the logical result will be The usurpation perpetrated by respondents is a flagrant
precisely the opposite of the position taken by respondents violation of the principle of separation of powers, they
who, unwittingly, are insistently invoking it to challenge the having invaded a ground belonging exclusively to the
power, authority, and jurisdiction of this Supreme Court to Senate Electoral Tribunal.
entertain the petition and to grant petitioners coercive
relief.
XV.—THE SENATE WITHOUT POWER TO SUSPEND
ITS MEMBERS
From the facts of the case, it is evident that respondents
encroached upon, invaded, and usurped the ancillary
Respondents lack the power of suspension, not only as
powers to suspend petitioners in relation to the power to
ancillary remedy in senatorial election contests, but even in
judge electoral contests concerning senators, a power
the exercise of the Senate judicial power to punish its
which the Constitution specifically assigns to the Senate
members for disorderly conduct. The majority and the
Electoral Tribunal, exclusive of all other departments,
minority of the Supreme Court in the case of Alejandrino
agencies or organs of government. That power of
vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83), agreed unanimously with
suspension is accessory, adjective, complementary, and
respect to said Senate Malcolm, speaking for the Court in
ancillary to the substantial power to judge said electoral
said case, stated:
contests. The accessory must follow the principal; the
adjective, the substantive; the complementary, the
complemented. As to whether the power to "suspend" is
included in the power to "punish," a power
granted to the Houses of the Legislature by the
It is a settled rule of construction that where a
Constitution, or in the power to "remove" a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
power granted to the Governor-General by the
every particular power necessary for the
Constitution, it would appear that neither is the
exercise of the one or the performance of the
correct hypothesis. The Constitution has
other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
purposely withheld from the two Houses of the
Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139).
Legislature and the Governor-General alike the
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139,
power to suspend an appointive member of the
177.)
Legislature.
That power of suspension may, in the interest of reason
It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United
and justice, be exercised by the Senate Electoral Tribunal
States has not in all its long history suspended a
in relation too an electoral contest, among other possible
member. And the reason is obvious. Punishment
cases that can be surmissed, where two or more allegedly
by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the
elected senators are in possession of apparently valid
outraged dignity of the House without depriving
credentials of having been proclaimed as duly elected. In
the construency of representation; expulsion,
such a case, as the Constitution does not allow more than
when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor
twenty-four senators to sit in the Senate and there is, in
of the legislative body while giving to the
the meantime, no possibility of determining who among the
constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but
 suspension deprives the electoral district of
representation without the district being afforded
any means by which to fill the vacancy. By
suspension, the seat remains filled but the
occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is
equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. (P.
96.)
And Justice Johnson, who dissented on another ground,
explained the ruling in greater detail as follows:
The power to punish for misbehavior was
intended purely as a disciplinary measure. When
a member of the Legislature is removed either
by the Governor-General or by the Legislature, a
vacancy exists, and the law gives the Governor-
General the right to appoint, and the people of
the district the right to fill the vacancy by
election, so that the people may again, under
either case, be represented. A "suspension" of a
member, however, does not create a vacancy,
and the people of the district are without a
representative and the Governor-General cannot
appoint one and the people cannot elect one
during the period of suspension. They are
without representation during that period. They
are, for the period of suspension, taxed without
representation. If a member, under the power to
punish, can be suspended for ten or more years,
thus depriving the Governor-General of his right
under the law, and the people of the district, of a
representative, and without a remedy in the
premises.
If the power "to punish for disorderly behavior"
includes the power to suspend or to deprive a
member of all his rights, and if the suspension is
in effect a removal, then an appointed member
many be removed, under the power to punish,
by a mere majority, while the law requires a two-
thirds majority to remove an elective member. In
other words, if under the power to "punish," any
member of the legislature, including an
appointive member, may be in effect removed,
then an elective member may be removed by a
majority vote only, thus encroaching upon the
power of the executive department of the
government, as well as violating the powers an indefinite time and lasting for a period of six
conferred upon the Legislature, because the months, lost its temporary character, ceased to
Legislature cannot remove an elective member be a suspension, and in effect became a
except by two-thirds majority. removal from such office. It was held, in the case
of the State vs. Chamber of Commerce, that the
suspension of a member was a qualified
It is strenuously argued by the respondents that
expulsion, and that whether it was called a
the resolution depriving the petitioner "of all his
suspension or expulsion or removal, it in effect
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the
disfrachised the person suspended. In the case
period of one year" is not a removal from his
of Metsker vs. Nelly, it was held that a
office but a mere suspension. The resolution
suspension or a deprivation for either a definite
does not use the word "suspend" but does not
period is in effect a removal. In the case of
use the word "deprive." It provides that the
Gregory vs. New York, it was held that the
petitioner is "deprived" of all his prerogatives,
power to remove an officer or punish him does
etc., for a period of one year. If that word means
not include the power to suspend him
anything it means that all of the prerogatives,
temporarily from his office. A mere suspension
privileges, and emoluments of the petitioner and
would not create a vacancy, and the anomalous
the citizens whom he represents have been
and unfortunate condition would exist of an
taken from him and them. His prerogatives,
office, — an officer, — but no vacancy, and of no
privileges, and emoluments constitute his right to
one whose right and duty it was to execute the
represent the people of his district, and his right
office. (Pp. 100-102.)
to exercise all the duties and to assume all the
responsibilities pertaining to his office. His
emoluments constitute his right to receive his XVI.—POWER OF JUDICIAL NATURE
salary and the benefits pertaining to his office as
a senator. If a value can be placed upon his
The principle of separation of powers can not be invoked
prerogatives, privileges and emoluments, and if
to deny the Supreme Court jurisdiction in this case,
he has been deprived of them, then it must
because to decide the question of validity or nullity of the
follow that they have been removed from him, or
Pendatun Resolution, of whether petitioners are illegally
that he has been removed from them. At any
deprived of their constitutional rights and privileges as
rate, the resolution has separated the petitioner
senators of the Philippines, of whether respondents must
and the people whom he represents and
or must not be enjoined by injunction or prohibition from
deprived them of all of one year; and, for all
illegally and unconstitutionally trampling upon the
intents and purposes, he and the people whom
constitutional and legal rights of petitioners, is a function
he represents, have been deprived of their
judicial in nature and, not having been assigned by the
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and in
Constitutional to other department of government, is
effect, has been removed from any participation
logically within the province of courts of justice, including
in the legislative affairs of the government.
the Supreme Court.
A great many cases have been studied on the
The power, authority, and jurisdiction to decide any
question of removal and suspension, and we are
question as to the allocation of powers by the Constitution
confindent in the assertion that the power to
are of judicial nature and belong to court of justice. In
punish does not include the power to remove or
denying that power to the Supreme Court, respondents
suspend. A suspension from an office or a
only add insult to injury by maintaining that there is no
deprivation of the rights of an officer of all his
remedy for any usurpation being committed in adopting the
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, is in
Pendatun Resolution.
effect a deprivation or a removal from office for
the time mentioned in the order of suspension. It
has been held that a suspension from office for
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and
duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just
where the one leaves off and the other begins.
In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of power between the several
departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of
course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but
as much as it was within the power of our
people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression
of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole,
under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions
provided in the said instrument. The Constitution
sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional
channels, for then distribution of powers would
be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of
good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is
found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of
its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescense for a
period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of
article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even this, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon the questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government. (Angara vs.
Election Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 157-159.)
XVII.—SENATORIAL TERRORISM
There is much loose talk as to the inherent power of the
Senate to adopt the unsconstitutional Pendatun Resolution
for the self-preservation of the Senate, for its dignity and
decorum. We are afraid that, by the facts publicly known to
everybody, such talks serve only to reveal sheer hypocrisy.
There is absolutely no showing that they are guilty of any
disorderly conduct or of any action by which they may be
subject to criminal prosecution, or that by their conduct
they have become unworthy to have a seat in Congress.
On the other hand, there are three senators who are under
indictment for the heinous crime of treason before the
People's Court, not for acts committed before their
election, but for acts committed while they were already
holding office as such senators. Respondents have not
taken any action looking toward the suspension of said
three senators. Although we do not propose to criticize
respondents for this inaction, as the three senators
undicted for treason must be presumed innocent unless
and until they are finally convicted by the proper court,
such inaction serves to emphasize the iniquitous
discrimination committed against petitioners, who have not
even been indicted before any court of justice for the
slightest violation of law.
The Pendatun Resolution invokes the report of the
Commission on Elections as to alleged electoral
irregularities in four Central Luzon provinces; but there is
absolutely nothing in the resolution to show that petitioners
had anything to do with said irregularities, and
respondents themselves, in the canvass of votes for
President and Vice President, had counted as valid all the
votes cast in said Central Luzon provinces and had
accepted as good ones the votes they themselves
obtained therein. In fact, one of them occupied the first
place in one of said provinces. This self-contradicting
attitude has absolutely no defense in the judgement of any
decent person. To this we must add that the Pendatun
Resolution, in fact, misquotes the report of the
Commission on elections in the sense that it tries to
convey an impression contrary to said report by quoting
parts thereof based on unverified and uncorroborated
hearsay evidence, and ignoring its main conclusion in
which it is stated that the alleged irregularities did not
affect the orderly election in said provinces.
There is much talk as to the alleged terrorism prevailing in
the provinces in question during election, but there is
absolutely no reliable evidence as to such terrorism that
can be found either in the report of the Commission on
Elections or in the Pendatun Resolution. Even in the case
that such terrorism really happened, there is no reason to
make any pronouncement based on it without proper
investigation by proper authorities, and in the present case
the proper authority that must determine, if such terrorism
did really take place and affect the election on April 23,
1946, concerning senators, is the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. And until then there is no reason why
respondents must themselves resort to senatorial terrorism
in order to oppress, muzzle, and crush minority senators,
such as petitioners. Congressional terrorism is no better
than lawless terrorism. Because it is practised by
despotice government officials does not make it holy and
sacrosanct.
XVIII.—NOBODY IS ABOVE THE LAW
but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to
its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize
certain principles, supposed to have been long
and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to
establish, for their future government, such
principles, as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness is the basis on
which the whole American fabric has been
erected. The exercise of this original right is a
very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be
frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so
established, are deemed fundamental. And as
the authority from which they proceed is
supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed
to be permanent.
means, or it is On a level with ordinary legislative
acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then
a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not
law; if the latter part be true, then written
constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of
the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation,
and, consequently, the theory of every such
government must be, that an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.

There are assertions to the effect that we may exercise
jurisdiction against individual officers of the Senate, but not
against the Senate or against respondents. We do not
agree with such an unmanly attitude. We do not agree with
the theory that the Supreme Court must exercise its
judicial power to give redress to the victims of a usurpation
only when its decision is addressed to minor officers of
government, but not when it is addressed to minor officers
of government, but not when it is addressed to powerful
ones. We will incur a grave dereliction of duty if we should
refuse to grant the redress that justice demands only and
because we have to reverse an illegal and unconstitutional
act committed by a legislative chamber, or a group of its
members, specially if the group forms the majority, or by
Congress itself. To show that under the Constitution
nobody is above the law, we have only to refer to its
provision which recognizes in the Supreme Court the
power to nullify the declare unconstitutional an act enacted
by Congress and approved by the President of the
Philippines. A law passed by Congress is enacted with the
direct participation of the two great departments of our
government, the legislative and the executive.
Nevertheless, if the law enacted is unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court has the power to declare it so and deny
effect to the same.
This original and supreme will organizes the
This theory is essentially attached to a written
government, and assigns to different
constitution, and, is consequently, to be
departments their respective powers. It may
considered, by this court, as one of the
either stop here, or establish certain limits not to
fundamental principles of our society.
be transcended by those departments.
xxx xxx xxx
The government of the United States is of the
latter description. The powers of the legislature
are defined and limited; and that those limits It is emphatically the province and duty of the
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the judicial department to say what the law is. Those
constitution is written. To what purpose are who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
powers limited, and to what purpose is that necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two
limitation committed to writing, if these limits laws conflict with each other, the courts must
may, at any time, be passed by those intended decide on the operation of each.
to be restrained? The distinction between a
government with limited and unlimited powers is
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if
abolished, if those limits do not confine the
both the law and the constitution apply to a
persons on whom they are imposed, and if act
particular case, so that the court must either
prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal
decide that case conformably to the law,
obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to
contested, that the constitution controls any
the constitution, disregarding the law; the court
legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the
must determine which of these conflicting rules
legislature may alter the Constitution by an
governs the case. This is of the very essence of
ordinary act.
judicial duty.

Between these alternatives there is no middle

The question, whether an act, repugnant to the If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution,
ground. The constitution is either a superior
constitution, can become the law of the land, is a and the constitution is superior to any ordinary
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
question deeply interesting to the United States; act of the legislature, the constitution, and not
such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply.
Those, then, who controvert the principle that
the constitution is to be considered, in court, as
a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on
the constitution, and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation
of all written constitutions. It would declare that
an act which, according to the principles and
theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet,
in practice, completely obligatory. It would
declare that if the legislature shall do what is
expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding
the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It
would be given to the legislature a practical and
real omnipotence, with the same breath which
professes to restrict their powers within narrow
limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that
those limits may be passed at pleasure.
Manbury vs. Madison (1 Cr., 137; 2 Law. ed., pp.
60, 73, 74)
But we have found no better expression of the
true principle on this subject than the language
of Justice Hoar, in the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts reported in 14 Gray, 226, in the
case of Burnham vs. Morrissey. That was a case
in which the plaintiff was imprisoned under an
order of the House of Representatives of the
Massachusetts Legislature for refusing to
answer certain questions as a witness and to
produce certain books and papers. The opinion,
or statement rather, was concurred in by all the
court, including the venerable Chief Justice
Shaw;
"The House of Representatives (says the court)
is not the final judge of its own power and
privileges in cases in which the rights and
liberties of the subject are concerned, but the
legality of its action may be examined and
determined by this court. That House is not the
Legislature, but only a part of it, and is therefore
subject in its action to the law in common with all
other bodies, officers and tribunals within the
Commonwealth. Especially is it competent and
proper for this court to consider whether its
proceedings are in conformity with the
Constitution and laws, because living under a
written Constitution, no branch or department of
the government is supreme, and it is the
province and duty of the judicial department to
determine in cases regularly brought before
them, whether the powers of any branch of the
government, and even those of the Legislature
in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in
conformity to the Constitution; and if they have
not, to treat their acts as null and void. . . ."
In this statement of the law, and in the principles
there laid down, we fully concur. (Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, 26 Law. ed., 377, 390.)
Professor Edward S. Corwin, in this book "The Twilight of
the Supreme Court," says:
The pivotal proposition was set up that between
the making of law and its construction was an
intrinsic difference of the most vital nature; and
that since the latter function was demonstrably a
daily concern of courts, it followed necessarily
that the legislature might not perform it in a way
to produce finally binding results.
Applied to the Constitution, this reasoning
automatically produces judicial review. As
Marshall insists inMarbury vs. Madison, the
Constitution, a solemn act of the people
themselves, was made to be preserved, and no
organ of government may alter its terms. But
interpretation, which belongs to the courts
exclusively and is "their peculiar and proper
province," does not change the law,
it conserves it. By the same token, judicial
interpretation of the Constitution is vested with
the authority of the Constitution itself. (P. 110.)
A passage in Cicero's De Legibus, the
substance of which was later recalled by Coke,
describes the law as "the silent magistrate" and
the magistrate as "the law speaking." Despite
the apparent implication of these words, the
Roman Law would seem to have regarded
interpretation as primarily an extension and
condition of the process of law making, as the
maxim "curius est cendere est interpretari"
appears to bear witness. Reciprocally, the
official attitude of the common law has not
always escaped skeptical comment. A yearbook
of the fourteenth century records a dispute
among the judges over whether they were
enforcing reason or only their own will, and two
hundred years later we find an Elizabethan
bishop asserting flatly: "Whoever that an
absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to
all intents and purposes, and not the person who
first wrote or spoke them." Suppose the good
bishop had known of the Constitution of the
United States, a law first spoken in 1789 and
subject 150 years later to the "absolute
authority" of the Supreme Court to interpret it!
(Pp. 112-113.)
What gives the coup de grace to the idea that —
in the words of Chief Justice Marshall — "courts
are the mere instruments of the law and can will
nothing," is the simple fact that most so-called
"doubtful cases" could very evidently have been
decided just the opposite way to which they
were decided without the least infraction of the
rules of logical discourse or the least attenuation
of the principle of stare decisis. (P. 114.)
In short, decision is choice; the very
circumstance which produces doubtful cases
guarantees the Court what Justice Holmes has
termed "the sovereign prerogative of choice" in
deciding them. This circumstance may be
described as a factual situation which forthwith
divides, as it were, the acknowleged body of
established law as far as it bears upon the said
facts into two opposed — two antinomous —
camps. (P. 115.)
Should the Constitution be construed "strictly" or
"liberally"? That depends logically on whether it
came from the people at large or from state
sovereignties. Then there is the antimony of
"inclusive" versus "exclusive" construction —
in Marbury vs. Madison Chief Justice Marshall
invoked the latter principle, in McCulloch vs.
Maryland he invoked the former. Again there is
the issue whether the Court's mandate to
interpret the Constitution embraces the power
and duty of adopting it to change circumstances.
Marshall thought that it did, while Taney
repudiated any such mission for the Court; and
in the recent Minnesota Moratorium Case the
Chief Justice takes as his point of departure
Marshall's doctrine, while Justice Sutherland,
dissenting, builds upon Taney's doctrine.
Furthermore, there are those diverse attitudes of
a shifting majority of the Bench which, though
they may never have found clear-cut expression
in antithetical principles of constitutional
construction, have given rise none the less to
conflicting courses of decision, the potential
bases of future opposed arguments which either
counsel or the Court may adopt without incurring
professional reproach. In brief, alternative
principles of construction and alternative lines of
precedent constantly vest the Court with a
freedom virtually legislative in scope in choosing
the values which it shall promote through its
reading of the Constitution. (P. 117.)
The concept of a "government of laws" simmers
down, therefore, under the Constitution to a
power in the Supreme Court which is without
statable limits to set the metes and bounds of
political authority in both the nation and the
states. But the dominating characteristic of
judicial review, wide-ranging though it be, is that
it is ordinarily or negative power only — a power
of refusal. The Court can forbid somebody else
to act but cannot, usually, act itself; in the words
of Professor Powell, it "can unmake the laws of
Congress, but cannot fill the gap." (P.122.)
To summarize: From legal history emerge two
conceptions of law — that of a code of intrinsic
justice, not of human creation but discoverable
by human reason, and that of a body of
ordinances assertive of human will and owing its
binding force thereto. The idea of a "government
of laws and not of men" originally predicated the
sway of the former kind of law and a "legislative
power" which was merely a power to declare
such law, and hence was indistinguishable in
principle from "judicial power." But as we saw in
the previous chapter, the very essence of the
American conception of the separation of power
is its insistence upon the inherent distinction
between law-making and law-interpreting, and
its assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a
notion which, when brought to bear upon the
constitution, yields judicial review. For all that,
the idea that legislative power embraces an
element of law-declaring power has never been
entirely expelled from our inherited legal
traditions, while, conversely, modern analysis of
the interpretative function exercised by courts
plainly discloses that it involves unavoidably an
exercise of choice substantially legislative in
character; and especially is this so as the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the national
Constitution, on account of the wealth of
alternative doctrines from which the Court may
at any time approach its task of interpretation. In
short, the meaning of "a government of laws" in
our constitutional law and theory is government
subject to judicial disallowance. (Pp. 146, 147.)
XIX.—PARALLELISM WITH THE ANGARA CASE
No better precedent may be invoked to decide several
important questions raised in this case than the decision
rendered by this very Supreme Court in Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, supra, which may be considered as
an outstanding milestone in Philippine jurisprudence.
The facts and legal issues in said case are in exact parallel
with the ones in the present controversy. Then, there was
a conflict between two independent departments or organs
of government, the National Assembly and the Electoral
Tribunal. Now the conflict is between two equally
independent departments or organs of government, the
Senate and the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The differences
between the contending parties consist in: (a) that while
the former National Assembly constituted the whole
legislative department, the present Senate is but a part of
the legislative department; (b) that the National Assembly
that adopted the resolution then in question and, finally,
declared by this Supreme Court as unconstitutional, null,
and void, acted as a body, with undisputable quorum and
regularity; while the Pendatun Resolution was adopted by
but 12 senators or the majority Liberal Party, when there
was no quorum present in the Senate. There is also an
accidental difference in the fact that, in the Angara case,
the Electoral Commission was the respondent and the
National Assembly was not a party, although 6 members
thereof were also parties in the case, they constituting a
majority of two-thirds of the Electoral Commission
membership; while the present case, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is not a party, and the respondents are the
majority members of the Senate, which is but a branch of
Congress. In both cases the legislative department upon
which the legislative power was vested by the Constitution
— the National Assembly in 1936 or Congress in 1946 —
is definitely not a party.
Another difference between the two cases is the fact that
in the Angara case, petitioner sought to nullify a resolution
of the Electoral commission because it was in conflict with
one previously adopted by the National Assembly. The
Supreme Court, is denying the petition, nullified instead
the resolution of the National Assembly as adopted without
the powers vested in it by the Constituiton. In the present
case, petitioners pray for the annulment of the Pendatun
Resolution which the respondents or the Senate could not
and cannot adopt without transgressing the Constitution.
Many of the conclusions and pronouncements of the
Supreme Court in the Angara case may appear as if
written expressly to decide several of the very legal issues
raised in the present case. This will readily appear if we
should read "Senate" and "Senate Electoral Tribunal,"
respectively, in lieu of "National Assembly" and "Electoral
Commission," in the following summarized conclusion in
said case:
(a) That the government established by the
Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of powers into the legislative, the
executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and
the overlapping of functions and duties often
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers
granted.
(c) That in case of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof,
the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of
judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to
see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which
is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an
independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any other two departments of
the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before
the present Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the
sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred
all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the
legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necessitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time
and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the
Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if
the National Assembly were to retain the power
to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the
manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution
repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature
respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective
members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contests
against the election of its members, the time and
manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond
or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the
costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election of any member, irrespective of
whether his election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of
a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly
of the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said confirmation,
does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe
the time within which protests against the
election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra.)
Without the slightest ambiguity, in perspicuous and clear-
cut language, the Supreme Court stated the real conflict,
grave and transcendental, in said case as follows:
Here is then presented an actual controversy
involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra.)
The Supreme Court then, in the full consciousness of the
far-reaching importance of the pronouncement it had to
make, with manly courage stated:
From the very nature of the republican
government established in our country in the
light of American experience and of our own,
upon the judicial department is thrown the
solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. . . . Conflicting claims
of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the
judiciary injusticiable and appropriate cases.
Discarding the English type and other European
types of constitutional government, the framers
of our Constitution adopted the American type
where the written constitution is interpreted and
given effect by the judicial department. . . . The
nature of the present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. Were we
to decline to take cognizance of the controversy,
who will determine the conflict? And if the
conflict were left undecided and undetermined,
would not a void be thus created in our
constitutional system which may in the long run
prove destructive of the entire framework? To
ask these questions is to answer them. Natura
vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion
in our constitutional system. Upon principle,
reason and authority, we are clearly of the
opinion that upon the admitted facts of the
present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
 Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of
the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly."
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra.)
Where the Supreme Court wrote "Electoral Commission" in
the last preceding lines, we may also write as well
"Senate," "House of Representatives," "Congress,"
"Senate Electoral Tribunal," "House Electoral Tribunal," or
any other constitutional body.
The above pronouncements of the Supreme Court made
in the ringing words penned by Justice Jose P. Laurel who,
with President Roxas, Justice Briones, Justice Hontiveros,
former Justices Romualdez and Recto, and several others,
was among the leaders and most prominent figures in the
constitutional convention, we believe will sound through
the ages as the expression of permanent truth and
undisputable wisdom. Since the words have been written,
the question as to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to take
cognizance and decide controversies such as the present
one and to grant redress for or against parties like those
included in this litigation, has been unmistakably definitely
and definitely settled in this jurisdiction.
XX.—THREE DIFFERENT EDITIONS OF A SENTENCE
Regret can not be repressed when, upon reading the
majority opinion, one notices that, in the very first
paragraph heading it, truth is unwittingly immolated by, as
a counterpart of the Pendatun Resolution and without the
benefit of any ritual, attributing to the Commission on
Elections an assertion which in fact it did not make.
The Commission is represented to have fathered the
statement that in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva
Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, voting "did not reflect the true
and free expression of the popular will."
This assertion is the third revised edition of a 3-line
sentence appearing in the report of the Commission on
Elections. For clearness, we will reproduce the three
editions, the original one and the amended two:.
First edition.—In the report of the Commission on
Elections, the sentence reads as follows:
It is believed that the election in the provinces
aforesaid did not reflect the true and free
expression of the popular will.
Second edition—The drafter of the Pendatun Resolution,
who appears to be ready to sacrifice truth if it is necessary
to serve or bolster his interests and purposes, in
reproducing said statement, without any compunction or
scruple, changed the words "it is believed" to the words
"This Commission believes" as follows:
This commission believes that the election in the
provinces aforesaid did not reflect the true and
free expression of the popular will.
Third edition.—In the majority opinion the idea of belief by
third persons, contained in the report of the Commission,
and the idea of belief by the Commission, attributed in the
Pendatun Resolution are eliminated and substituted by a
positive statement by the Commission on Elections of a
categorical and conclusive nature as follows:
The Commission on Elections . . . stated that . . .
the voting in said region did not reflect the true
and free expression of the popular will.
The discrepancy is emphasized by reading the following
paragraph of the report of the report of the Commission on
Elections:
Except for alleged suppression of the popular
will in the Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac,
Bulacan and certain municipalities of Nueva
Ecija wherein the voters
were allegedly intimidated or coerced by the
Hukbalahaps and other lawless elements to
such an extent that the election in said provinces
is considered a farce, not being the free
expression of the popular will, the elections
throughout the country were carried on
peacefully, honestly and in an orderly manner,
as a result of which the respective
representatives-elect for all the provinces
throughout the country have been duly
proclaimed by the various boards of provincial
canvassers, and the Commission on Elections
on May 23, 1946, also proclaimed those elected
senators in accordance with section 11 of
Commonwealth Act No. 725. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is evident: (1) that the alleged
suppression of the popular will in Pampanga, Tarlac,
Bulacan, and certain municipalities of Nueva Ecija is
mentioned by the Commission only as a hearsay
information that the Commission itself, contrary to the idea
which the Pendatun Resolution or the majority opinion
conveys, does not accept; (2) that to emphasize the
Commission's refusal to accept the unverified information,
it explicitly and conclusively manifested that "the elections
throughout the country were carried on peacefully,
honestly and in an orderly manner, as a result of which the
respective representatives-elect for all the provinces
throughout the country have been duly proclaimed elected
by the various boards of provincial canvassers, and the
Commission on Elections on May 23, 1946, also
proclaimed those elected senators in accordance with
section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725."
An abiding respect for truth compels us to point out the
above glaring error of fact, which is just a fitting prelude
and milieu to a long chain of errors of law spread over the
opinion of the majority, resulting in conclusions that we are
sure will fail to withstand the test of posterity.
XX-A.—UNJUSTIFIED AND RECKLESS
PRONOUNCEMENTS
The error of reading the report of the Commission on
Elections assertions contrary to the ones appearing
therein, induces the majority to make pronouncements
which are necessarily groundless and unjustified, because
premised on assertions not borne out by the truth.
Thus, in justifying the adoption of the Pendatun
Resolution, the majority assert that "there are reasons to
believe it was prompted by the dictates of ordinary caution,
or of public policy" for "if, as reported by the corresponding
constitutional agency" (the Commission on Elections), the
elections held in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan,
Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija" were so tainted with acts of
violence and intimidation, that the result was not the
legitimate expression of the voters' choice, the Senate
made no grievous mistake in foreseeing the probability
that, upon proof of such widespread lawlessness, the
Electoral Tribunal would annul the returns in that region
(seeGardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., 521; Laurel,
Elections[2d Ed.], p. 448 et seq.), and declare herein
petitioners not entitled to seats in the Senate."
Taking as point or departure the false assumption, that of
attributing to the Commission on Elections a statement
that, upon the very face of its report, is contrary to what it
made, the majority, not only attribute to the respondent
majority of the Senate preternatural prophetic foresight,
taking for granted what the Senate Electoral Tribunal will
do, but by making the pronouncement pretend to assume
an improper role, the one by which, in effect, they pretend
to direct and dictate to the Senate Electoral Tribunal what
it should do in the pending electoral protests against
petitioners, thus recklessly prejudicing the decision and
disposal of a litigation pending in an independent tribunal
with exclusive and final constitution jurisdiction over said
litigation.
On second thought, it seems that the majority try, with an
apologetic attitude, to recede from the bold position of
practically announcing what the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
three members of which are Justices of the Supreme
Court, will do, by beginning to state that "there should be
no diversity of thought in a democratic country, at least, on
the legal effects of the alleged rampant lawlessness, root
and basis of the Pendatun Resolution," and ending with
the following paragraph:
However, it must be observed and emphasized,
herein is no definte pronouncement that
terrorism and violence actually prevailed in a
district to such extent that the result was not the
expression of the free will of theelectorate. Such
issue was not tendered in these proceedings. It
hinges upon proof to be produced by protestants
and protestees at the hearing of the respective
contests.
We can not but regret that the endeavor is futile, because
it can not subtract a scintilla from the boldness of the
pronouncement emphasized with the following reiteration:
"True, they may have no direct connection with the acts of
intimidation; yet the votes may be annulled just the same,
and if that happens, petitioners would not be among the
sixteen senators elected."
Furthermore, the recession seems only to be apparent,
used as a breathing respite, preparatory to another
onslaught, on less unjustified, reckless, and out of reason.
Commenting on section 12 of Commonwealth Act no. 725,
the majority restrict the provision to those candidates
whose proclamation "is clear, unconditional, unclouded,"
adding — and here comes the aggressive thrust,
prejudging petitioners on the basis of an unfounded
surmise — "that such standard is not only met by the
petitioners, because is the very document attesting to their
election one member of the Commission on Elections
demurred to the non-exclusion of the votes in Central
Luzon, calling attention to the reported reign of terror and
violence in that region, and virtually objecting to the
certification of herein petitioners. To be sure, it was the be
clouded condition of petitioners' credential (certificate of
canvass) that partly prompted the Senate to enact the
precautionary measure herein complained of."
The attack does not stop here. It goes even further when,
adducing as argument by analogy, an uncharitable
example is used by comparing the situation imagined
without any evidentiary foundation on fact by the
dissenting minority of one in the Commission on Elections
with the case if "the inclusion of petitioners" name in the
Commission's certificate had been made at the point of a
gangster's automatic," although adding that " the
difference between such situation and the instant litigation
is one of degree, broad and wide perhaps, . . . .
XXI.—FUTILE EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE THE
SWEEPING EFFECT OF DECISION IN ANGARA CASE
In a futile effort to neutralize the sweeping effect of the
decision of this court in the Angara case, the majority
assume unfoundedly that in said case "no legislative body
or person was a litigant before the court," and that "no
directive was issued against a branch of the Legislature
or any member there of" the statements being premised on
the error of fact and law that two-thirds of the members of
the Electoral Commission were assemblymen.
The fact that this court, in the Angara case, made
declarations nullifying a resolution of the National
Assembly is, according to the majority, "not decisive,"
when a better precedent can hardly be cited to show the
practical exercise by the Supreme Court of its power to
declare null and void any legislative resolution violative of
the fundamental law. The majority recognize the power of
this court to annul any unconstitutional legislative
enactment, citing as authorities the epoch-making decision
of Chief Justice Marshall in Marburry vs. Madison, and the
following pronouncement of Justice Sutherland in the
Minimum Wage Case (261 U. S., 544):
. . . The Constitution, by its own terms, is the
supreme law of the land, emanating from the
people, the repository of ultimate sovereignty
under our form of government. A congressional
statute, on the other hand, is the act of an
agency of this sovereign authority, and if it
conflicts with theConstitution, must fall; for that
which is not supreme must yield to that which is.
To hold it invalid (if it be invalid) is a plain
exercise of the judicial power — that power
vested in courts to enable them to administer
justice according to law. From the authority to
ascertain and determine the law in a given case
there necessarily results, in case of conflict, the
duty to declare and enforce the rule of the
supreme law and reject that of an inferior act of
legislation which, transcending the Constitution,
is of no effect, and binding on no one. This is not
the exercise of a substantive power to review
and nullify acts of Congress, for no such
substantive power exists. It is simply a
necessary concomitant of the power to hear and
dispose of a case or controversy properly before
the court, to the determination of which must be
brought the test and measure of the law.
If the above reasoning is accepted by the majority with
respect to a law enacted by two Houses of Congress and
approved by the Chief Executive, there is absolutely no
logic in denying its applicability to mere resolutions
adopted by just a legislative branch, by the Senate alone,
or by a group of senators acting collectively when the
Senate is without quorum. The Supreme Court has the
power to declare null and void such resolutions when they
are in conflict with the Constitution, the same as the acts of
the President as, according to the decision rendered by
this court in Planas vs. Gil (67 Phil., 62, 73, 74), cited with
approval by the majority, the Supreme Court has the
power of "making an inquiry into the validity or
constitutionality of his(the Chief Executive's) acts when
these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding."
The majority, accepting the pronouncement in the Angara
case that this court could not decline to take cognizance of
the controversy to determine the "character, scope and
extent" of the respective constitutional spheres of action of
the National Assembly and the Electoral Commission,
maintain that in the present case, there is actually no
antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate
and the Senate itself, "for it is not suggested that the
former has adopted a rule contradicting the Pendatun
Resolution." This assertion is based on the wrong idea that
in order that antagonism may exist between two
independent bodies, the attacks should be reciprocal and
bilateral, and it is not enough that one should rashly invade
the province of the other. The theory is parallel with the
Japanese insistence in calling what they term "China
Incident" because China was not able to invade in her turn
the Japanese mainland of Honshu.
XXII.—FALLACIOUS ARGUMENT
It is argued by the majority that conceding that petitioners'
suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, the
petition should be denied, because for this court to order
the reinstatement of petitioners "would be to establish
judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of
checks and balances wisely woven into our constitutional
setup." The argument is utterly fallacious. There can be no
more judicial predominance because the Supreme Court,
without shirking its responsibility, should order that
petitioners be reinstated in the full exercise of their
constitutional rights, functions and prerogatives, of which
they were deprived, in flagrant violation of the fundamental
law, than there will be legislative predominance because
Congress should refuse to be cowed into prevarication in
the exercise of its legislative powers, or executive
predominance because the President would not allow
denial of his executive functions. And the pattern of checks
and balances is not disrupted because the Supreme Court
should proceed to perform its judicial duty by granting
petitioners the legal redress to which they are entitled.
The indictment of volubility flung by Lord Bryce against the
Supreme Court of the United States, resulting from "the
political proclivities of the man who composed it," is quoted
by the majority in order to support the rule of conduct that
"adherence to established principle should generally be
our guiding criterion." We underline generallybecause we
prefer it to the word invariably, as, otherwise, we will
expose ourselves to the English author's indictment, and
with more reason if we should reverse the doctrines and
principles enunciated in the Angara case in order not to
displease a controlling majority in the Senate.
XXIII.—NOT DEMIGODS OUTSIDE THE REACH OF
LAW
Should respondents disobey any order we may issue in
this case, the majority ask, can we punish them for
contempt? Of course. They are not demigods, duces,
fuehrers, or nippon emperor divinities, who are outside the
reach of law. They do not pretend that they are like the
king of France who said L'etat c'est moi.
But, why should we render respondents the disservice of
entertaining the false hypothesis that they may disobey
any order we may legally issue? Our people were not
crazy enough to elect anarchists to our Senate.
XXIV.—BUILT ON PRECARIOUS FOUNDATION
The majority insist, notwithstanding, in arguing that if we
should punish respondents for contempt because they
should have disobeyed an order of ours, we would be
destroying the independence and equal importance of
legislative bodies, under the Constitution. We would never
imagine that the independence and equal importance of
legislative bodies, under the Constitution, should be
precariously built upon the unstable and shifting quagmire
of immoral immunity to punishment for contempt, an
offense punishable under all modern systems of criminal
law.
Dogmatizing ex cathedra, the majority preached that we
must "disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary
is the repository of remedies for all political and social ills."
Shooting in the dark of fantastic hobglobins, insufflated
with extraterrestrial life by supercreative imagination, might
be an amusing sport, but is misleading in juridical
controversy. No one has ever entertained the false and
laughable notion that the judiciary may afford remedies "for
all political and social ills." No one, unless he be a
paranoiac mogalomaniac, may pretend to be the happy
possessor of any political or social panacea. The argument
is irrelevant because, in the case, we are dealing with a
constitutional wrong which, under the fundamental law,
can and must be redressed by the judiciary.
XXV.—FLAGRANT INCONSISTENCY
A citizen, deprived of liberty by a resolution to incarcerate
him for years, illegally and unconstitutionally adopted by a
legislative chamber, according to the majority, may not be
denied relief by the courts and "may successfully apply for
habeas corpus, alleging the nullity of the resolution and
claiming for release," invoking as authorities Lopez vs. De
los Reyes (55 Phil., 170) Kilbourn vs. Thompson (103 U.
S., 168; 26 Law ed., 377). The reason is because the
resolution is beyond the bounds of the legislative power, is
a usurpation of functions belonging to courts, is an
infringement of the Constitution, which is precisely the
case of the Pendatun Resolution. But the majority would
then have only as defendant the officer or person holding
the victimized citizen in custody, which officer or person
might be a senator or a group of senators.
The majority's inconsistency can not be hidden.
XXVI.—ELECTION CONTESTS—WRONG DEFINITION
The majority maintain that not all the powers of the House
or Senate as "the sole judge of the election, returns and
qualifications of the members" thereof were transferred to
the Electoral Commission, but only "all contests" relating to
said election, returns and qualifications. But the use of the
words "all contests" in the Constitution does not affect or
limit the transfer of all powers as "the sole judge of the
election, returns and qualifications" of the legislative
members, because these all powers have always been,
from the very beginning, circumscribed by the word
"contests." The very words "the sole judge" imply
necessarily contests, because if there is no contest, there
is nothing to be judged.
The majority adhere to the following quotation: "As used in
the constitutional provisions, `election contest' relates only
to statutory contests in which the contestants seek not only
to oust the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into
office." (Laurel on Elections, 2d ed., p. 250; 20 C.
J.,58.)The assertion is wrong because there are election
contests in which the contestants do not seek to be
inducted into office, as when the contestants do not
pretend to have won in the election and, admitting that the
protestee obtained the majority votes, should, however, be
ousted because he is unqualified.
The example of a man, disqualified for having served a
long term of imprisonment, elected to either House of
Congress, is a good one not in support of the majority's
theory that the House may, upon its authority, investigate
and exclude the disqualified person, but to show that the
election may be contested before the corresponding
Electoral Tribunal in a proper contest, without the
protestant seeking to be himself seated.
XXVII.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The majority's theory that an election contest does not
ensue when a member of the House raises a question as
to the qualification of another because the former does not
seek to be substituted for the latter, is based on the wrong
definition of an election contest, the one limiting it to cases
wherein protestants seek also to have themselves
inducted into the contested office. Having for its basis a
wrong premise, the theory can not be correct. The election
contests mentioned in section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution include contests "relating to qualifications" of
the respective members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives. To maintain that either House may
investigate and thereafter exclude a disqualified member,
is to maintain a constitutional heresy. An insistent effort to
justify and approve an action that violates elemental
standards of law and justice, such as the Pendatun
Resolution, may often lead one to advancing unwittingly
the most expected theories.
Invoking as authority the erroneous statement made by
one of the attorneys for petitioners during the oral
argument to the effect that the power to defer the oath
taking until the contest is adjudicated does not belong to
the corresponding Electoral Tribunals, the majority
gleefully jumps to the conclusion that "then it must be held
that the House or Senate still retains such authority,
whether we believe that such power (to delay induction)
stemmed from the privilege of either House to be the judge
of the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
thereof, or whether we hold it to be inherent to every
legislative body as a measure of self-preservation.
Thus we see that the majority seem reluctant to accept the
new constitutional setup by the creation of the Electoral
Commission, later substituted by the Electoral Tribunals.
They would rather stick to the old order of things when the
majority of the Senate and the House of Representatives
before the Commonwealth were the absolute dictators of
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the respective legislative chambers, when they boldly
assert that either House has "the privilege to be the judge
of the election, returns and qualifications of the members
thereof."
XXVIII—THE CHARACTER AND PHYSIOGNOMY OF
THE CONSTITUTION
The discussions as to the character of the legislative
power vested in Congress gives way to a confusion of
ideas due mainly to lack of discrimination between
preconceived constitutional ideas, ingrained in the mind
during university training, and the actual provisions of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which enjoy outstanding
and substantial advantages over older ones, because the
delegates to our constitutional convention embodied in it
new precepts and principles based on the lessons of one
century and a half experience of American and European
countries in constitutional government and four decades of
Philippine constitutional history and last juridical and
idealogical discoveries.
Whether the Constitution of the United States is only a
grant or delegation of legislative powers to the federal
government and the American state constitutions are mere
limitations of plenary powers of legislation, having nothing
to do with the true character and physiognomy of our own
Constitution which we must examine, not on the mirror of
other constitutions, but on the face of its own concepts,
precepts and provisions, and there we will see at once that
our Constitution is both a grant and a limitation of powers
of government decreed by our people, on whom
sovereignty resides and from whom all government
authority emanates. (Section 1, Article II of the
Constitution.) The sovereign people is the repository of all
powers of government, in fact, also political and social
powers. From them emanate, not only all government
authority, but the plenary and unlimited power of society
which is the foundation of government. Social order is
established and maintained by the will of the people. The
people is the absolute master of his own destiny. The
people is the holder of the universality and residuum of all
human powers. This being a natural conviction of humanity
since time immemorial although not always articulate and
vocal, to justify the absolutism of kings and emperors, it
had been necessary to create the fiction of the divine
genesis of their authority, imposed on the ignorance and
religious credulity of superstitious masses, so much so that
in certain epochs of history the position of high priest and
king were merged in the same individual. And those who
would attach to a high officers of government, no matter in
what department, any kind of monarchial or oligarchical
absolutism, unlimited because placed above the law and
not controllable by the provisions of the Constitution or any
agency existing under its authority, are only trying to
perpetuate the worn-out tradition of the divine origin of the
despotic rulers of the past.
To our mind, no power of government may be exercised by
any branch, agency or officer thereof unless expressly or
implicitly granted by the people through the Constitution.
Subject to the limitations provided therein and in
accordance with express provisions, the residuum of
legislative, executive and judicial powers, respectively, are
vested in Congress, the President, and the Supreme
Court. It is wrong to maintain that any legislative power is
vested exclusively in the Senate. The legislative power is
vested in Congress, composed of the Senate and the
House for Representatives, and not in any of its branches
alone.
XXIX.—RIZALIAN ADMONITION ON TOLERANCE
Although there is absolutely nothing in the report of the
Commission on Elections or in the Pendatun Resolution
itself which imputes upon petitioners any act of disorderly
behavior, it not appearing that they have anything todo
with alleged irregularities and terrorism in the four
provinces of Central Luzon, yet had the Senate elected to
deprive petitioners of their seat in the Senate under the
power to punish and expel a member for disorderly
behaviour provided in section 10 (3) of Article VI of the
Constitution, and the Senate adopted the Pendatun
Resolution in pursuance thereof, the majority of this court
would still dismiss the petition. It appearing that not two-
thirds of all members of the Senate concurred or could
concur in the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution and,
therefore, under the constitutional provision invoked, the
deprivation of petitioners of their seat in the Senate would
appear as a flagrant transgression of the fundamental law,
the majority of this court would still shield respondents with
the palladium of judicial noli me tangere. Respondents
must be very extraordinary beings to enjoy such an
immunity from even the most shocking and tyranical
violation of theConstitution.
The majority would counsel prudence and comity and
admonish to heed the off-limits sign at the Congressional
hall, firm in the belief that "if apolitical fraud has been
accomplished, as petitioners aver, the sovereign people,
ultimately the offended party, will render the fitting verdict
— at the polling precint."
We are reluctant to wash our hands so easily. We can not
remain comfortably seated in the highest tribunal of the
land nor reconcile with our conscience by abstaining to
give the relief we are duty bound to give the victims of a
political fraud which constitutes a wanton trampling down
of the rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution.
Let us not so easily forget the Rizalian admonition:
"Sufferance is not always a virtue; it is a crime when it
encourages tyrannies." Let us not disguise such kind of
resignation under the inoffensive name of judicial
prudence. Burke said: "There is also a false, reptile
prudence, the result not of caution, but of fear." Fear, as
favor, should not have place in judicial vocabulary.
XXX.—CONSTITUTIONALISM
The present nuclear physics of a far cry from the more
than twenty-five centuries old theory enunciated by
Democritus in the following words: "By convention sweet is
sweet, by convention bitter is bitter, by convention hot is
hot, by convention cold is cold, by convention color is
color. But in reality there are atoms and the void. That is,
the objects of sense are supposed to be real and it is
customary to regard them as such, but in truth they are
not. Only the atoms and the void are real."
The heated controversy between Ptolemy and Copernicus,
the discoveries of Galileo and Newton, are just small
incidents in the perennial struggle in which man is
engaged to be, through science, fully acquainted with the
truth about our universe. It takes 1,600 years for one-half
of a gram of radium to disintegrate, and it takes one
second for light to travel 186,300 miles; formerly matter
and energy were essentially different things, but now solid
matter is but concentrated energy, and energy has weight;
it is not yet answered whether light is wave of a shower of
photons, but it is known that it can be weighed. The theory
of relativity, opened new vistas in the panorama of
science, but new riddles meet man in the great adventure
to the unknown. Albert Einstein said:
Yet new, still more difficult problems arise which
have not been definitely settled as yet. We shall
mention only some of these unsolved problems.
Science is not and will never be a closed book.
Every important advance brings new questions.
Every development reveals, in the long run, new
and deeper difficulties." (The Evolution of
Physics, p. 308.)
All theories which, in their day, served useful scientific
purposes, had to give way to others giving better
explanations of physical phenomena. The prevailing
theories may not resist the onslaught of new intellectual
discoveries, but because they may eventually be
discarded themselves is no reason to dispense with them
when, in the meantime, they are only ones that can satisfy
reason. Otherwise, science will be crippled. Paralysis will
keep her from new advances.
By the same token, in the history of law, man had to stick
in each epoch to the known as the best of legal
institutions. In the millenia of human life no more wonderful
legal institution was devised by man than constitutionalism,
the evolution of which is one of the most inspiring chapters
of history. A mere religious concept, giving voice to moral
law, in Israel, a philosophical concept, merely normative, in
Greece, it was in republican Rome where it took a definite
legal and political force as the basis of jurisdiction as
distinguished fromgobernaculum, the reason of the law as
opposed to the power of government. In England for the
common law to prevail over the prerogative of the crown it
took several hundred years of bitter struggle. But fate had
it that in America is where the evolution of
constitutionalism had to reach its highest accomplishment.
It became the basis of the government of the United States
from its very inception. Now constitutionalism for the world
is envisaged as the only hope of humanity to attain the
goal that will insure juridical order for the world, so that
men's inventions, including those ominous on nuclear
energy, may be placed under adequate social control.
The hope of the Republic of the Philippines lies also on
constitutionalism. Not the one that would merely offer lip
service to the Constitution, but that would make of that
document as one of the living tissues of our body politic,
absolutely indispensable to its own existence.
XXXI.—THE MOST VITAL ISSUE
The validity of the Constitution of the most vital issue
involved in this case. If no one must be allowed to be
above the law, with greater reason no one should be
allowed to ignore or to trample upon the provisions and
mandates sacred by all persons living under the pale of
the Republic of the Philippines, and not rocked of as an
insignificant pushpin to toy with.
Burning with the thirst of immortality, shepherd Erostratus
burned the temple of Ephesus to gain a berth in history.
Let us not make of the Constitution of the Philippines
another temple of Ephesus. It is much better to be buried
in the dust of eternal oblivion than to permanently live in
the memory of future generations as guilty of arson, as
rivals of the barbaric hordes who destroyed the great
works of art of Greece and Rome, or the contemporary
vandals who destroyed without any compunction churches
and schools, treasures of noble human institutions, or
other works wherein the loftiest ideals and aspirations of
man have blossomed with imperishable grandeur and
beauty. Letus spare the Constitution from the deleterious
effects of our prejudices and from the ravages of blind
passions. Let us keep it as an underlying beacon of hope,
the indestructible foundation of our national existence, the
inexpugnable citadel of the rights and liberties of our
people, the eternal rock upon which the Republic of the
Philippines shall forever subsist with dignity.
The pamphlet in which it is printed may wizen and shrivel,
its paper rived into shreds, the shreds pulverized into dust
and ashes, and these reduced into infinitesimal atoms
which will finally scatter in the wide universe, to form new
substances. But the juridical sense of our people,
crystallized in that pamphlet and permeating that paper,
embodied in the great document, like the mythological
phoenix of Arabia, undergoing the five hundred years cycle
of resurrection, shall again and again rise in youthful
freshness from the scattered ashes and atoms, the
undying symbol of the spirit of law, the flaming banner of
justice, the magnificent expression of the undaunted will-
power to live.
The petition must be granted, and the preliminary
injunction of May 29, 1946, must be reissued and made
perpetual.
BRIONES, M., disidente:
Despues de las elecciones generales de 23 abril, 1946, en
que fueron elegidos el Presidente y Vice Presidente de
Filipinas y los miembros del Congreso, el senado y la
Camara de Representantes inauguraron se periodo de
sesiones reuniendose por primera vez el 25 mayo. Uno de 9. Olegario Clarin
los primeros documentos que seleyeron en el Senado fue
la roclama expedida por la Comision sobre 10. Alejo Mabanag
Eleccionescuyo texto integro se transcribe a continuacion:
11. Enrique B. Magalona
CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS BY THE
12. Tomas Cabili
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF RETURNS
OF VOTES FOR THE OFFICE OF SENATOR
13. Jose O. Vera
AND PROCLAMATION OF THE CANDIDATES
ELECTED IN THE ELECTIONS HELD ON
14. Ramon Diokno
APRIL 23, 1946.
15. Jose O. Vera
We, the undersigned, constituting the
Commission on Elections, do hereby certify that,
16. Salipada E. Romero
pursuant to the provisions of section 11 of
Commonwealth Act No. 725, we have made the
canvass of the votes cast in the Philippines for
the office of Senator in accordance with the In view of the above result, we hereby proclaim
statements submitted by the Provincial Board of that the above-named sixteen(16) registered
candidates are the duly elected Senators in the
Canvassers of the different provinces and the
election held on April 23, 1946.
City Board of Canvassers of Manila, and that the
result thereof shows the following sixteen (16)
registered candidates to have received the We further certify that Vicente J. Francisco,
highest number of votes: Vicente Sotto, Jose Avelino, Melecio Arranz,
Ramon Torres, Tomas, Confesor, Mariano
Jesus Cuenco and Carlos P. Garcia received the
Name of candidates Votes
first eight (8) highest number of votes, and that
Olegario Clarin, Alejo Mabanag, received
Enrique B.
Magalona, Tomas Cabili, Jose O. Vera, Ramon
1. Vicente J. Francisco Diokno, Jose E. Romero and Salipada Pendatun
735,671
received the next eight (8) highest number of
2. Vicente Sotto votes. 717,225
3. Jose Avelino 708,420
We further certify that the attached statement of
votes shows the number of votes polled by each
4. Melencio Arranz candidate for the Office of Senator666,700
in the
Philippines by provinces.
5. Ramon Torres 640,477
In witness whereof, we have signed these
6. Tomas Confessor presents in the City of Manila, this627,354
23rd day of
May, 1946.
7. Mariano Jesus Cuenco 623,650
8. Carlos P. Garcia (Sgd.) JOSE LOPEZ VITO 617,542

Chairman
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO ENAGE
Member
I concur in toto, except as regards the
proclamation of the 16 Senators-elect, on the
basis of the canvassing of all the votes cast in
their favor, without excluding those of Central
Luzon. (Separate opinion prepared.)
(Sgd.) VICENTE DE VERA
Member
Acto seguido procediose a la eleccion del Presidente del
Senado saliendo elegido como tal el candidato de la
mayoria Hon. Jose A. Avelino que obtuvo 10 votos contra
el candidato del partido de la minoria Hon. Jose O. Vera
que obtuvo 8. Tanto el Sr. Vera como sus correcurrentes
Sres. Diokno y Romero tomaron parte en la votacion.
Elegido el Presidente se iba a proceder a la toma del
juramento colectivo de los Senadores electos, pero en
esto el Senador Hon. Salipada Pendatun presento para su
aprobacion un proyecto de resolucion cuyo texto tambien
se transcribe integro a continuacion:
Whereas, the Commission on Elections, charged
under the Constitution with the duty of insuring
free, orderly, and honest elections, in the
Philippines, reported to the President of the
Philippines on May 23, 1946, that
"On election day, altho no acts of
violence were officially reported to this
Commission in connection with the
elections, we were advised by our
representative in Nueva Ecija that
ballot boxes were stolen by armed
bands in the barrios of the
municipalities of Bongabon, Gapan,
Sta. Rosa and Guimba. These
incidents are still under investigation
by the Military Police Command. After
the election we cannot fail to notice
the reports published in the
newspapers on the attacks that have
been made by armed bands upon
persons or group of persons who were
known to have voted for candidates
other than the candidates of those
armed elements. Even the report
submitted to this Commission by the
Provost Marshal General on May 20,
1946, . . . contains a recital of
incidents of terrorism that occured in
the four provinces of Central Luzon
herein above mentioned which
disturbed or affected the national
election in an undesirable manner.
Reports also reached this Commission
to the effect that in the provinces of
Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and
Nueva Ecija, the secrecy of the ballot
was actually violated; that armed
bands saw to it that their candidates
were voted for; and that the great
majority of the voters, thus coerced or
intimidated, suffered from a paralysis
of judgment in the matter of exercising
the right of suffrage. Considering all
those facts of terrorism, violence and
intimidation in connection with
elections which are more or less
general in the provinces of Pampanga,
Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, this
Commission believes that the election
in the provinces aforesaid did not
reflect the true and free expression of
the popular will. It should be stated,
however, that the Commission is
without jurisdiction, to determine
whether or not the votes cast in the
said provinces which, according to
these reports have been cast under
the influence of threats or violence,
are valid or invalid. Suffice to state
that in accordance with the provision
of Article 1, section 2, of the
Constitution, "The Commission on
Elections shall have exclusive charge
of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and shall exercise all other
functions which may be conferred
upon it by law. It shall decide — save
those involving the right to vote — all
administrative questions, affecting
elections, including the determination
of the number and location of polling
places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other
election officials . . ." and that the
question of whether or not a vote has
been cast legally or illegally is not for
this Commission to determine. The
matter is therefore being brought to
the attention of the President and
Congress of the Philippines for such
action as may be deemed proper
pursuant to the requirements of the
Constitution that this Commission
submit after every election a report to
the said offices on the manner the
election was conducted."
WHEREAS, the minority report of the Hon.
Vicente de Vera, member of the Commission on
Elections, says among other things, that "we
know that as result of this chaotic condition,
many residents of the four provinces have
voluntarily banished themselves from their home
towns in order not to be subjected to the
prevailing oppression and to avoid being
victimized or losing their lives;" and that after the
election dead bodies had been found with notes
attached to their necks, reading: "Bumoto kami
kay Roxas" (We voted for Roxas);
WHEREAS, the same Judge De Vera says in his
minority report that in the four provinces of
Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija,
the worst terrorism reigned during and after the
election, and that if the elections held in the
aforesaid provinces were annulled as demanded
by circumstances mentioned in the report of the
Commission, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and
Jose Romero, would not and could not have
been declared elected;
WHEREAS, in his report to the Provost Marshal,
col. Amando Dumlao, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-
2, attached to the report of the Commission on
Elections, states among other things, that "all
the members of the Church of Christ(Iglesia ni
Cristo) were intimidated and coerced, some
kidnapped and murdered" by the
HUKBALAHAPS "because they had expressed
their opinion that they were going to vote for
President-elect Manuel A. Roxas"; that because
of terrorism and coercion "a great many barrio
people have evacuated their respective places
and signified their attention not to vote"; and that
ballot boxes were taken away from barrios San
Miguel, Pasong Isip, Pakap, Guimba and
Galvan, and that in some instances election
inspectors were kidnapped;
WHEREAS, the terrorism resorted to by the
lawless elements in the four provinces
mentioned above in order to insure the election
of the candidates of the Conservative Wing of
the Nacionalista Party is of public knowledge
and that such terrorism continues to this day;
that before the elections Jose O. Vera himself
declared as campaign manager of the Osmeña
faction that he was sorry if Presidential
Candidate Manuel A. Roxas could not campaign
in Huk provinces because his life would be in
endangered; and that because of the constant
murders of his candidates and leaders,
Presidential Candidate Roxas found it necessary
to appeal to American High Commissioner Paul
V. Mcnutt for protection, which appeal American
High Commissioner personally referred to
President Sergio Osmeña for appropriate action,
and the President in turn ordered the Secretary
of the Interior to afford the necessary protection,
thus impliedly admitting the existence and reign
of such terrorism;
WHEREAS, the Philippines, a Republic state,
embracing the principles of democracy, must
condemn all acts that seek to defeat the popular
will;
WHEREAS, it is essential in order to maintain
alive the respect for democratic institutions
among our people, that no man or group of men
be permitted to profit from the results of election
held under coercion, in violation of law, and
contrary to the principle of freedom of choice
which should underlie all elections under the
Constitution;
WHEREAS, protest against the election of Jose
O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero, have
been filed with the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate of the Philippines on the basis of the
findings of the Commission on Elections above
quoted;
NOW THEREFORE, be it resolved by the
Senate of the Philippines in session assembled,
as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose Romero, pending the hearing
and decision of reports lodged against their
elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the
report of the Commission on Elections and in the
report of the Provost Marshal constitute the
ground of said protests and will therefore be the
subject of investigation and determination.
Parece que cuando se puso a debate la resolucion arriba
transcrita, el Senado acordo unanimemente transferir la
discusion para la sesion del lunes siguiente, 27 de mayo.
Ya se estaba discutiendo otro asunto cuando surgio
unacalorado incidente en virtud del cual los Senadores de
la minoria salierontodos del salon de sesiones,
quedandose alli solamente el Presidente Avelinocon sus
once (11) compañeros de la mayoria. Se alega en esta
ocasion, ausenteslos Senadores minoritarios y sin el
necesario quorum legal para poder seguir despachando
asuntos, los Senadores de la mayoria, revocando el
acuerdo anterior de transferencia, decidieron considerar y
aprobar la resolucion sinmas debate.
Tales son, a grandes rasgos, los hechos que han dado
lugar a la demanda quedirecta y originariamente plantean
ante este Tribunal Supremo los recurrentes Jose O. Vera,
Ramon diokno y Jose Romero, y cuya parte petitoria es
como sigue:
POR LO TANTO, los recurrentes
respetuosamente piden a este Honorable
Tribunal y a cualquier Magistrado del mismo,
tenga a bien expedir un interdicto prohibitorio
preliminar dirigido a los recurridos, sus
funcionarios, empleados, agentes y demas
personas que obran en su ayuda, ordenandoles
que hasta nueva orden del Tribunal, desistan y
se abstengan de poner en ejecucion la
resolucion arriba mencionada, y impedir a los
recurrentes continuen en sus asientos en el
Senado y ejerzan libremente sus funciones y
derechos como senadores de Filipinas,
deshaciendo todo lo hecho en contrario hasta
esta fecha; que acorte los terminos de
contestacion; que una vez contestada esta
demanda, designe un Comisionado para recibir
las pruebas, con instrucciones de que la haga
sin dilaciones, y que, previa la vista
correspondiente, dicte sentencia declarando
enteramente nula y de ningun valor la citada
resolucion, y prohibiendo consecuentemente a
los recurridos y a cada uno de ellos a impedir a
los recurrentes a continuar en sus cargos como
senadores, y prohibiendoles igualmente a
realizar cualquier otro procediemiento ulterior
para ejecutar la resolucion citada, con las
costas. Los recurrentes piden tambien cualquier
otro remedio justo y equitativo.
El magistrado Perfecto concedio el interdicto preliminar
pedido principalmenteen virtud de la alegacion expuesta
en el parrafo 10 de la demanda, en el sentido de que la
resolucion cuestionada tenia por objecto, entre otras
cosas, "la realizacion de fines siniestros, tales como la
aprobacion, sin la fiscalizacion e intervencion de los
recurrentes, del Bill Bell, de una medidade reorganizacion
judicial terrorista para el personal de la judicatura y
deotras semejantes, y para doblegar a los recurrentes, por
tal hitlerico procedimiento a los manejos de tal mayoria."
Sometido el interdicto preliminar a la corte en pleno, esta
lo aprobo en una votacion de seis (6) contra cuatro (4), y
al propio tiempo lo señalo a vista para la determinacion de
la cuestion de si su expedicion estaba o no justificada. En
dicha vista que duro 6 horas seguidas, desde la mañana
hasta la tarde (una de las mas largas si no la mas larga
que se haya celebrado jamas en los anales de esta
Corte), arguyeron extensamente tanto la representacion
de los recurrentes como la de los recurridos. El Procurador
General Tañada comparecio y arguyo en nombre de estos
ultimos, pero limitandose en su informe a cuestionar e
impugnar la jurisdiccion de este Supremo Tribunal para
conocer y enjuiciar el asunto bajo el principio de la
separacion de poderes que informa nuestra Constitucion.
Puede decirse sin exageracion que el tema se agoto
discutiendose con minuciosidad los puntos
constitucionales y juridicos planteados en el asunto.
Despues de la vista esta Corte en pleno, con la
solañausencia del Magistrado Jaranilla, y con la disidencia
del Magistrado Perfecto, acordo disolver el interdicto
prohibitorio preliminar mediante lasiguente orden:
Considering that the preliminary injunction was
issued in the case of Jose O. Vera et al.,
petitioners, vs. Jose Avelino, respondents, ( G.
R. No. L-543), to preserve the status quo and
thus prevent the execution of the acts alleged
under oath in the last part of paragraph X of the
petition, without the intervention of the
petitioners; and taking into consideration that
this court, after hearing both parties, at any rate
believes and trusts that the respondents will not
carry out said acts during the pendency of this
proceeding, this court, without deciding whether
or not the said injunction was justified, hereby
resolves to dissolve it in the meantime, without
prejudice to whatever action or decision this
court may take or render on the questions
involved in this case including that of jurisdiction.
Resulta evidente de autos que las cuestiones que
tenemos que considerar yresolver son las siguientes: (1) a
la luz de nuestra Constitucion y de nuestras ¿es legal y
sostenible la resolucion objecto de controversia, en cuanto
por ella se priva a los recurrentes de sus asientos en el
Senado de Filipinas, y de los derechos, privilegios y
prerrogativas anejos a dichos asientos?; (2) a la luz de
nuestra constitucion y de nuestrs leyes ¿tiene este
Tribunal Supremo jurisdiccion y competencia para
conocer, enjuiciar y decidir el asunto?
Primera cuestion.—A la luz de nuestre
Constitucion y de nuestre leyes ¿eslegal
sostenible la resolucion objecto de controversia,
en cuanto por ella sepriva a los recurrentes de
sus asientos en el Senado de Filipinas, y de
losderechos, privilegios y prerrogativas anejos a
dichos asientos?
Antes de la aprobacion de la primera Constitucion del
Commonwealth de Filipinas (1935), la Legistura era el juez
de las elecciones, actas y condiciones de sus propios
miembros. La disposicion original relativa a esta materia
era la contenida en la Ley Congreso de los Estados
Unidos de 1.º de julio de 1902 (Ley Organica, articulo 7,
parrafo 5), la cual preceptuaba que "La Asamblea
(Filipina) decidira de las elecciones, su resultado y las
calificaciones de los representantes. . . ." Cuando se
aprobo la Ley del Congreso de 1916 (Ley Jones, de
amplia automania, seccion 18, parrafo 1), la citada
disposicion se reincorporo, con una modificacion que la
hacia mas enfatica insertandose la palabra "unicos," a
saber: "Que el Senado y la Camara de Representantes,
respectivamente, seran los unicos jueces de las
elecciones, del resultado, escrutinio y condiciones de sus
miembros electivos. . . ." Esta disposicion no era de
ningun modo original: no hacia mas que transplantar a
este pais la tradicion y el sistema americano provisto en la
clausula 1.ª de la seccion 5 del Articulo I de la constitucion
de los Estados Unidos, que dispone que "cada Camara
sera juez de las Elecciones, Actas y Condicciones de sus
propios miembros. . ."
La Asamblea Constituyente convocada en 1934 para
redactar la Constitucionde nuestro Commonwealth pudo
haber seguido sobre esta materia diferents cursos de
accion: reafirmar la tradicion americana vigente en este
pais desde1902; o seguir el ejemplo de algunos paises —
verbigracia, Canada, Australia,Hungria y Polonia — que
habian transladado esta facultad de las Camaras
Legislativas al departamento judicial, hablando mas
concretamente, al TribunalSupremo; o bien instituir un
sistema mixto, creando un cuerpo constitucional separado
e independiente, con jurisdiccion exclusiva sobre la
materia. La Asemblea Constituyente opto por este ultimo
creando "una Comision Electoralque se compondra de
tres Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo que seran
designadospor su Presidente, y de seis diputados
escogidos por la Asamblea Nacional, tres de los cuales el
mayor numero de votos, y tres por el partido que lesiga en
el mayor numero de votos. Esta Commision Electoral sera
presidida porel Magistrado mas antiguo y conocera
exclusivamente de todas las controversiasrelativas al
resultado de la eleccion y a las calificaciones de los
miembrosde la Asamblea Nacional" (Articulo IV,
Constitucion de Filipinas, 1935). Cuando la Constitucion
se reformo en 1940 restaurandose le legislatura
bicameral, la filosofia de la comision electoral se respecto
y conservo en la Constitucion reformada y en lugar de una
comision se crearon dos, una para cada camara, y ya no
se llamaba Comision electoral sino Tribunal Electoral,
como para recalcar y subrayar el caracter judicial del
nuevo organismo. El precepto constitucional pertinente es
como sigue:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns,and
qualifications of their respective members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
members, three of whom shall be Justice of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be members
of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having
the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in each Electral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman.
De lo expuesto resulta evidente que una importante fa
cultad judicial que tenian las camaras legislativas
anteriormente — la facultad de actuar como jueces sobre
las elecciones, actas y calificaciones de sus miembros —
ha quedado eliminada completamente bajo la actual
Constitucion y traspasada tambien completa y plenamente
al nuevo organismo constitucional — el Tribunal Electoral.
La pregunta ahora en orden es si la resolucion
cuestionada que para mayor claridad llamaremos
Resolucion Pendatun representa o constituye,por parte de
los Senadores recurridos, el ejercicio de una facultad
constitucional que no les pertenece sino al Tribunal
Electoral, y nuestra contestacion es decididamente
afirmativa. Con esa resolucion en la mano es como si los
recurridos hubieran dicho a los recurrentes lo
siguiete:"Señores, aqui tenemos un informe de la
Comision sobre Elecciones en donde se dice que en
cuatro provincias del centro de Luzon no ha habido
sufragio libre, sincero y or denado, por los actos de
intimadacion y violencia de vuestros partidarios. Sin los
votos de esas provincias, vosotros no hubierais triunfado.
Por tanto, hasta que se decida en vuestro favor las
protestas formuladas contra vuestras actas ante el
Tribunal Electoral, os negamos el derecho de jurar, de
sentarse en estos escaños, de participar en las
deliberaciones del Senado y de gozar de los derechos,
prerrogativas y privilegios anejos al cargo de Senador."
¿Que es esto sino una innegabale susurpacion de la
facultad exclusiva que tiene el Tribunal Electoral de ser el
unico juez de las controversias relativas a la eleccion,
actas y calificaciones de los miembros de la camara a qu
corresponde dicho tribunal?
Se arguye que independientemente de la cuestion
electoral cada camara, para proteger su existencia, su
buen nombre y su decoro, tiene el poder inherente de
suspender a cualquier miembro suyo; que la Resolucion
Pendatun se inspiro en estos motivos; que la suspension
de los recurrentes es un acto politico que nada tiene que
ever con la determinacion de sus actas por el Tribunal
Electoral y no se halla sujeto a revision de parte del
departamento judicial por cuestionable que fuera el mismo
desde el punto de vista del derecho o de la moral publica;
y que, por tanto, no hay tal usurpacion de poderes
constitucionales, no habiendose los recurridos entrometido
en la esfera de accion del Tribunal Electoral. Sin embargo,
no hay mas que leer la resolucion en cuestion para
convencerse de que su entera motivacion se deriva de las
elecciones de 23 de April, dandose en ella por
establecido, en virtud del informe de la Comision sobre
Elecciones, que el triunfo de los recurrentes se debio a un
estado de terror y violencia en las Provincias de
Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija y Bulacan. Los "por
cuantos" de la resolucion hacen referencia a las supuestas
anomalias e irregularidades que viciaron el sufragio en
dichas provincias; hacen ciertas afirmaciones de caracter
general como la de que Filipinas, a fuer de nacion y
estado democratico, debe condenar todo acto tendente a
derrotar la voluntad popular, y la de que "para mantener
vivo entre nosotros el respeto a las instituciones
democraticas, a ningun hombre o grupo de hombres se
debe permitir que reporten beneficio de los resultados de
una eleccion llev ada a cabo bajo coercion"; y al final se
dice "por cuanto, sobre la base de los informes arriba
citados de la Comision sobre Elecciones se han formulado
protestas ante el Tribunal Electoral de Senado contra la
eleccion de Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E.
Romero"; y luego la parte dispositiva en virtud de la cual
se priva a los recurrentes del juramento y de sus asientos
en el Senado entre tanto no se resuelvan las protestas
formuladas contra sus actos, interregno que puede durar
meses y hasta años. De todo esto resulta bien claro que
los considerandos de la resolucion versan precisamente
sobre los mismos hechos electorales cuya determinacion
incumbe exclusivamente al Tribunal Electoral, y que la
interdiccion, o mejor dicho, la suspension de los derechos,
prerrogativas y privilegios de los recurrentes se basa
indudablemente en tales considerandos. No hay en la
resolucion ni la mas minima insinuacion de que se haya
aprobado por altos motivos de dignidad y decoro
senatorial — eso que algun tratadista lllama graficamente
medida de profilaxis — como para evitar el roce
deshonroso con miembros que fuerean algo aso com de la
casta despreciable de lost intocables, aquejados de lepra
moral en sus personas. No hay ni el menor cargo de
torpeza moral contra los recurrentes, ni siquiera se insinua
que estos fuereon directa o indirectamente responsables
del alegado estado de terror y violencia. La conclusion
indeclinable, pues, es que la Resolucion Pendatun enjuicia
y resuelve cuestiones o "issues" puramente electorales,
aceptando prima facie un informe incompetente sobre
terrorismo, violencias y fraudes, y como tal constituye una
intromision en la facultad que bajo la Constitucion tiene el
Tribunal Electoral del Senado de ser el unico juez de las
controversias relativas a la eleccion, actas y calificaciones
de los miembros de dicho alto cuerpo colegislador.
Pero admitamos por un momento que la Resolucion
Pendatun tiene ese caracter profilactico que le atribuyen a
ultima hora; que, contra lo que es evidente y claro con
claridad meridiana, esa resolucion nada tiene que ver con
la determinacion judicial de las actas de los recurrentes
por el Tribunal electoral. La pregunta otra vez en orden s
la siguiente: sometida la Resolucion Pendatum a la piedra
de toque de nuestra Constitucion ¿puede resistir con exito
la prueba? Nuestra contestacion es terminantemente
negativa. La Constitucion filipina es el producto de la
sabiduria, experiencia y genio politico de nuestro pueblo.
No es un documento enteramente original: en ciencia
politica las concepciones originales no abundan. Hemos
volcado en ella no solo el resultado de nuestra experiencia
necessariamentelimitada, sino lo que hemos aprendido de
la sabiduria y experiencia de otros pueblos mas
avanzados que nosotros, particularmente del pueblo
Americano, con el cual nos ha ligado una convivencia de
cerca de medio sigolo. Despues de largas y laboriosas
deliberaciones nuestra Asamablea Constituyente, elegida
por el pueblo (1934-1935), adopto el sistema presidencial
de gobierno dividido en tres altospoderes,
independendientes entre si pero coordinandos en un
mecanismo cuidadosamente elaborado de frenos y
contrapesos. Esos poderes son: legislativo, ejecutivo y
judicial.Sus altas facultades y funciones se hallan
especificadas en la Constitucion, en capitulos separados.
En el uso del lenguaje se ha evitado la municiosidad, el
pormenorismo caractereistico de las leyesordinarias, a fin
de hacer del instrumento suficientemente amplio y flexible
para acomodarse y para subvenir a las necesidades y
condiciones cambiantes de los tiempos; pero, con todo,
los trazos, los lineamientos son suficientemente claros,
firmes y seguros, y creemos puededecirse sin inmodestia
que en concision, en claridad y en buen ordenamiento
nuestra Constitucion no cede a ninguna de las
constituciones escritas que se conocen.
Examinemos ahora el departamento o poder legislative
que es lo que nos concierne e interesa en el presente
asunto. Es un principio constitucional bien establecido que
el poder de legislar es ilimitado en tanto en cuanto no
pugna con la Constitucion, la cual opera como una
limitacion. Todos los demas poderes y facultades que no
tengan caracter legislativo deben ser conferidos expresa o
implicitamente. Nuestro Congreso, actuando
concurrentemente por medio de sus dos camaras, tiene el
poder de legislar. "El poder legislativo queda investido en
un Congreso de Filipinas, compuesto de un Senado y de
una Camara de Representates (Articulo VI, seccion 1,
Constitucion de Filipinas, 1940). Pero ademas de este
poder de conjunto, cada camara tiene ciertas facultades,
entre ellas algunas de caracter disciplinario, a saber: (a) la
de compeler la asistencia de miembros ausentes en la
forma y bajo las penas que dicha camara prescriba; (b) la
de castigar a sus miembros por conducta desordenada, y,
con la concurrencia de dos terceras partes de sus
miembros, expulsar a un miembro por tal motivo (Articulo
VI, seccion 10, ap. 2 y 3). Fuera de estas facultades no
hay en nuestra Constitucion ninguna otra que autorice la
imposicion de un castigo o pena, o envuelva una privacion
de derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios, siguiera sea
temporal, tal como la que se provee en la Resolucion
Pendatun. ¿Encaja esta resolucion en cualquiera de las
facultades arriba enumeradas? Evidentemente que no. No
encaja en el inciso (a)—la facultad de compeler
disciplinariamente la asistencia de miembros ausentes —
porque es superfluo decir que no se trata ni remotamente
de tal caso. Tampoco encaja en el inciso "b" porque se ha
admitido desde el comienzo que el caso que nos ocupa no
es el de conducta desordenada de un miembro. Tampoco
encaja en la facultad de determinar y resolver la legalidad
y solvencia de las actas y credenciales de los recurrentes
porque ya hemos demostrado hasta la saciedad que
habiendose retirado totalmente de las camaras
la substancia, laesencia de esa facultad trasladandola al
Tribunal Electoral, quedo tambien ipso facto retirada y
eliminada la facultad de suspender que es nada mas que
un incidente un aledaño de la substancia.
Pero se dice: el Tribunal Electoral no tiene la facultad de
suspender, esto se halla admitido por todo el mundo;
luego esa facultad ha quedado, por lo menos, en las
camaras como residuo no afectado por el traspaso de
jurisdiccionsobre las credenciales y actas electorales. Sin
embargo,esto no es mass que una habil sustileza. En la
Constitucion no hay mas que dos categorias de poderes:
el expreso o el implicito (either by express grant or byfair
implication from what is granted). Como quiera que
esa reserva, ese residuo (la facultad de suspender) no
esta conferido expresamente en la Constitucion, luego hay
que suponerlo implicito. Pero ¿implicito de que? Tiene que
ser de algo de un poder mas general y mas amplio
expresamente conferido (parte de un todo) que en este
caseo tendria que ser el poder de conocer y resolver las
controversias electorales sobre las actas de los miembros
del Congreso. Es asi que este poder ya no lo tienen las
camaras bajo la Constitucion; luego tampoco queda
nada implicito en elias, so pena de sostener que lo
implicito, que es nada mas que un incidente, puede
subsistir por si solo sin la substancia — el vaso esencial
que lo envuelve y entraña. El corolario forzoso de todo
esto es que los redactores de la Constitucion filipina
eliminaron por completo la facultad de suspender no solo
del Congreso sino del Tribunal Electroral; que la voluntad
soberana del pueblo expresada en el codigo fundamental,
es que ningun protestado seria privado de sus asiento ni
por un solo minuto; que ninguna presuncion se
estableceria en contra de la legitimidad y solvencia de su
acta; que solamente una sentencia final podira cerrarle las Constituyente dominaba en Filipinas un partido politico
puertas del Congreso. No tenemos porque averiguar si fuerte, denso, acaudillado por una personalidad genial,
con esta decision la Asamblea Constituyente quiso erigir brillante, dinamica y poderosa. Ese partido acababa de
un firme valladar a los excesos y demasias de la pasion ganar en unas elecciones apasionadisimas y muy reidas
politica creando un clima propicio para el desarrollo de las una victoria espectacular, abrumadora, que le daba el
minorias en un pais en que, como el nuestro, ciertas dominio y control de todos los resortes de la vida politica
causas y circunstancias han retardado el turno periodico y no solo en la nacion sino hasta en las provincias y
saludable de los partidos; todo lo que nos incumbe hacer municipios.Ese partido dominaba naturalmente tambien la
es señalar y destacar el hecho inexorable, la volicion Convencion Constitucional, la Asamblea Constituyente.
constitucional. ¿Que hizo ese partido en medio de su omnipotencia? ¿Le
emborracho ese peligroso licor de los dioses — el licor de
la victoria, el licor del poder? No. Ese partido, sus
Se han citado dos casos de nuestra jurisprudencia
caudillos, resolvieron ser generosos, ser justos, ser
parlamentaria para justificar la Resolucion Pendatun: el
prudentes, ser democraticos, y lo fueron; determinaron
caso de Jose Fuentebella en el Senado de Filipinas, en
pensar en terminos de humanidad, en terminos de nacion,
1916, y el caso de Nicolas Rafols en la Camara de
en terminos de justica pero justicia de verad, en terminos
Representantes, en 1925. Bajo la alegacion de haberse
de libertad y democracia, y lo hicieron tal como lo
cometido graves irregularidades y fraudes en las primeras
pensaron. Podian haber escrito una constitucion a su
elecciones senatoriales celebradas en el 6. o distrito
talante — una constitucion que sirviese sus propios fines,
(provincias bicolanas)al candidato electo Jose Fuentebella
que asegurase su perpetuidad en el poder. No lo hicieron.
se le nego prima facie el juramento y el asiento pendiente
Y no solamente no lo hicieron, sino que hicieronalgo mas;
la resolucion de la protesta formulada contra su acta. Lo
algo extraordinario, inconcebible, juzgado a la luz y segun
mismo se hizo en el caso de Nicolas Rafols, por alegados
la norma usual del egoismo de los partidos. Teniendo en
fraudes electorales cometidos en el 6.º distrito diputacional
sus manos un poder enorme, formidable, sumamente
de Cebu. Pero la endeblez e inaplicabilidad de estos
tentador, el poder de resolver las controversias electorales
precedentes salta inmediatamente a la vista si se tiene en
sobre las actas de los miembros de la Legislatura,
cuenta que cuando se establecieron las camaras
renunciaron a ese poder para alojarlo en un cuerpo
legislativas eran constitucionalmente los unicos jueces de
constitucional separado e independiente, el cual es
la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de sus miembros; asi
practicamente un tribunal de justicia: la Comision
que la suspension prima facie del juramento y del asiento
Electoral, hoy Tribunal Electoral. La determinacion de
no fue mas que un incidente en el ejercicio de esa
hacer este cuerpo lo mas apolitico posible se denota en el
facultad; y, prescindiendo de si esto era justo o injusto,
hecho de que sus miembros legislativos estan distribuidos
prudente o arbitrario, parecia incuestionable que estaba
en igual numero, 3-3, de suerte que los 3 Magistrados
dentro los poderes y facultades de las camaras el hacerlo.
componen el factor decisivo.
Pero, en realidad, los casos de Fuentebella y Rafols
¿Por que los redactores de la Constitucion, y, sobre todo,
pueden citarse para un efecto completamente opuesto al
por que el partido politico mayoritario pudo hacer
perseguido por los abogados dee los recurridos cuando se
estarenuncia de la que pocos ejemplos hay en la historia
analizan y discuten amplia y objetivamente los motivos,
politica del mundo? No parece dificil imaginarse los
circunstancias y designios que indujeron a nuestra
motivos, las causas, sobre todo para uno que como el
Asamblea Constituyente a abandonar la bien arraigada
autor de esta opinion tuvo algo que ver, siguera muy
tradicion americana de hacer de las camaras legislativas
modestamente, con las tareas de la Asamblea
los unicos jueces de la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de
Constituyente. El pueblo filipino estab empeñado en una
sus miembros, trasladanddo la jurisdiccion a un organismo
suprema, altisima tarea — la de estructurar el Estado, la
constitucional completamente separado e independiente.
de escribir el codigo fundamental de la nacion no solo
Un analisis de este genero viene a ser altamente
para los 10 años del Commonwealth sino para la
revelador y expresivo. Lo primero que embarga la
Republica que se proclamaria despues de dicho periodo
atencion del observador es que cuando se adopto esta
de tiempo. Todo el mundo sabia que la suerte de la
reforma fundamental y original por la Asamblea
democracia en filipinas dependia principalmente de la
Constitucion que se escribiera, no solo en su letra sino en
su espiritu, y, sobre todo, de la forma y manera como ella
moldearia, penetraria e influiria en la vida cotidiana del
pueblo y del individuo. Desde luego no eramos unos
ilusos, utopistas, perfeccionistas; no aspirabamos ni
mucho menos a crear un trasunto de la republica ideal de
Platon; pero deseabamos hacer lo mejor posible dadas
nuestras circunstancias y limitaciones, dada nuestra
historia y tradiciones, y dado el temperamento y genio
politico y social de nuestro pueblo. Se habia acuñado y
popularizado por aquel tiempo la frase "justicia politica"
para denotar la clase de justicia convencional que cabia
esperar en relacion con las protestas electorales
planteadas ante las camaras legislativas. No solo se
aceleraba o demoraba el despacho de las mismas a ritmo
con los dictados de ciertas conveniencias de taifa o grupo,
sino que no pocas veces el complejo politico o personal
era el factor determinante en las resoluciones y decisiones
que se tomaban. Todo esto lo sabian los delegados a la
asamblea constituyente, lo sabian los liders de los
partidos, lo sabian los escritores y pensadores dedicados
al estudio de las ciencias politicas y sociales.
En la Convencion habi delegados que eran miembros
actuales y pasados de la Legislatura, hombres que sabian
por propia experiencia como se resolvian las protestas
electorales en las camaras legislativas y que, ademas,
sabian por sus lecturas lo que sobre el particular ocurria
en otros paises. Alli estaba, como delegado, Nicolas
Rafols — actor del drama politico que determino uno de
los procedentes parlamentarios que se citan — acaso
rumiando todavia en su fuero interno el agravio contra lo
que reputara arbitrariedad cometida por la mayoria en su
caso. ¿Que de extraño habia que en medio de tal
"background", en medio de tal ambiente ideologico se
formara una fuerte opinionen favor de un cambio de
sistema, en favor de unarbitrio constitucional que
sustituyera la llamada "justicia politica" con una justicia de
verdad, una "justicia judicial?"Asi se creo la Comision
Electoral. Nada mejor que las siguientes palabras del
malogrado Magistrado Abad Santos en su luminosa
opinion concurrente en el celebrado asunto de
Angara contra Comision Electoral, para definir el caracter
del sistema: "El objeto que se trataba de obtener con la
creacion del a Comision Electoral no era crear un cuerpo
que estuviera por encima de la ley, sino el elevar las
elecciones legislativas de la categoria de cuestiones
politicas a la de justiciables." (Angara contra Comision
Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 151, 200.) Y el ponente en dicho
asunto el Magistrado Laurel se explaya mas todavia con
los siguientes pronunciamientos que no tienen
desperdicio:
Los miembros de la Convencion Constitucional
que planearon nuestra ley fundamental eran, en
su mayor parte, hombres de edad madura y de
experiencia. A buen seguro muchos de ellos
estaban familiarizados con la historia y
desarrollo politico de otros paises del mundo.
Por tanto, cuando creyeron conveniente crear
una Comision Electoral como un organismo
constitucional y lo invistieron con la exclusiva
funcion de conocer y fallar las controversias
electorales, actas y condiciones de los
miembros de la Asamblea Nacional,debieronde
haberlo hecho asi, no solamente a la luz de su
propia experiencia, sino tambien teniendo en
cuente la experiencia de otros pueblos
ilustrados del mundo. La creacion de la
Comision Electoral fue planeada para remediar
ciertos males que conocian los autores de
nuestra Constitucion. No obstante la tenaz
oposicion de algunos miembros de la
Convencion a su creacion, el proyecto como
antes se ha dicho, fue aprobado por ese cuerpo
mediante una votacion de 98 contra 58. Todo
cuanto se puede decir ahora sobre la
aprobacion de la Constitucion, la creacion de la
Comision Electoral es la expresion de la
sabiduria y "la justicia esencial al pueblo".
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address,
marzo 4, 1861.)
De las deliberaciones de nuestra Convencion
Constitucional resulta evidente que el objeto era
traspasar en su totalidad toda la facultad
previamente ejercitada por la Legislatura en
asuntos pertenecientes a protestas electorales
de sus miembros, a un tribunal independiente e
imparcial. Sin embargo, no fue tanto el
conocimientoy apreciacion de precedentes
constitucionales contemporaneos comola ha
tiempo sentida necesidad de fallar protestas
legislativas, libres de prejuicios partidistas lo que
impulso al pueblo, obrando por medio de sus
delegados a la Convencion, a establecer este
Cuerpo que se conoce por Comision Electoral.
Con estas miras, se creo un cuerpo en el que
tanto el partido de la mayoria como el de la
minoria estanigualmente representados para
contrarrestar la influencia partidista en sus
deliberaciones, y dotado, ademas, de caracter
judicial mediantela inclusion entre sus miembros
de tres magistrados del Tribunal Supremo.
La Comision Electoral es una creacion
constitucional, investida de las facultades
necesarias para el cumplimiento y ejecucion de
las funciones limitadas y especificas que la ha
asignado la Comision. Aunque no es un Poder
en nuestro Gobierno tripartito, es, para todos los
fines, cuando obra dentro de los limites de su
autoridad, un organismo independiente. Se
aproxima mas, ciertamente, al Departamento
Legislativo que a cualquiera otro. El lugar que
ocupa la disposicion legal (articulo 4) que crea la
Comision Electoral en el Titulo VI, titulado
"Departamento Legislativo" de nuestra
Constitucion,es muy significativo. Su
composicion es tambien significativa por cuanto
etsa constituida por una mayoria de miembros
de la Legislatura. Pero es un cuerpo separado e
independiente de la Legislatura.
La concesion de facultades a la Comision
Electoral para conocer de todas las
controversias relativas a las elecciones, actas y
condiciones de los miembros de la Asamblea
Nacional, tiene por objeto hacer que esas
facultades sean tan completas y queden tan
incolumes como si hubieran continuado
originalmente en la Legislatura. El haber
expresamente investido de esas facultades a la
Comision Electoral, es una negativa tacita del
ejercicio de esas facultades por la Asamblea
Nacional. Y esto es una restriccion tan eficaz a
las facultades legislativas como una prohibicion
expresa contenida en la Constitucion (Ex
parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
Whisman,36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). . . ."
(Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil.,
151-, 188-190.)
Acaso se pueda decir algo mas todavia acerca de los
motivos que indujeron la creacion de la Comision
Electoral; acaso se pueda aventurar la afirmacion de que
con este cuerpo los redactores de la Constitucion, los
caudillos de los partidos se propusieron asegurar por
todos los medios y garantias la vida y crecimiento de la
democracia en Filipinas. Democracia es esencialmente
libre discusion de los asuntos publicos, de los problemas
de la comunidad; libreexpresion del pensamiento y de la
opinion. De esto se sigue necesariamente un regimen
basado en la existencia de una mayoria que gobierna y de
una minoria que aspira a gobernar entretanto que vigila
los actos del gobierno en su doble papel de censor y de
aspirante al poder. La mejor piedra de toque para apreciar
y juzgar la calidad de un regimen politico es la manera y
forma como trata a las minorias y oposiciones. Un
gobierno totalitario, despotico, las liquida, las ahoga; un
gobierno democratico no solo las respeta, sino que crea
para ellas un clima vital propicio. Mirado en esta sentido el
Tribunal electoral es un instrumento de minorias por
antonomasia: la idea basica de su creacion es el
desposeer a las mayhorias del poder de destruir, de
aniquilar a las minorias mediante lo que cinicamente se ha
denominado "justicia politica," e impartir a las minorias las
maximas garantias de una justicia de verdad — una
"justicia judicial" de la mayoria en el Senado,
pronunciando su discurso a favor de la reforma en la
Asamblea Constituyente, dijo entre otros conceptos las
siguientes significativas palabras: "Many have criticized,
many have complained against the tyranny of the majority
in electoral cases. . . ." (Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution,Tomo I, pag. 263). Por eso es un
absurdo sostener que la facultad de suspender utilizada
mediante la Resolucion Pendatun haya quedado en el
Congreso como residuo, independientemente de la
jurisdiccion exclusiva del Tribunal Electoral para resolver
protestas electorales legislativas. Ello equivaldria a
sostener que los redactores de la Constitucion pusieron un
remedio paraderrotarlo al propio tiempo mediante una
puerta reservada y trasera por la que podria escurrirse el
pequeño monstruo de la "justicia politica". Este juego
infantil no podian haberlo hecho los redactores de la
Constitucion, los liders de los partidos que tuvieron alguna
responsabilidad en la redaccion de dicho documento.
¿Que mas? Esa facultada para suspender equivale
practicamentea una carta blanca para intervenir y estorbar
las actuaciones y procedimientos del Tribunal Electoral,
provocando suspicacias, creando anticipadamente
prejuicios no solo en la mente del publico sino de los
miembros mismos, empequeñeciendo, en una palabra, el
prestigio del tribunal. ¿Como se puede pensar que la
Asamblea Constituyente permitiera y posibitara ese
resultado antijudicial, reservandoalgo al Congreso en un
traspaso de facultades que se consideraba total, absoluto
e incondicional? Los tribunalesordinarios de justicia estan
por ley protegidos contra todo estorbo y obstruccion a sus
funciones. El Tribunal Electoral — criatura de la misma
Constitucion — tiene, por lo menos, iguales si no mejores
titulos a esa impermeabilidad, mejor todavia, a esa
inmunidad contra toda obstruccion y entorpecimiento. El
hecho de que la intromision venga del Congreso o de una
de sus camaras no puede ser una justificacion.
Las deliberaciones de la Asamblea Constituyente arrojan
buena luz sobre el espiritu del precepto que nos ocupa.
Queel traspaso de facultades fue total, absoluto; que al
Congreso no se reservo ninguna facultad, mucho menos
la de suspender, en toda cuestion relativa a la eleccion de
sus miembros, lo denotan bien claro ciertas
observaciones, que a estas alturas resultan profeticas, del
Delegado ManuelRoxas, uno de los liders mas
autorizados de la Asamblea Constituyente, hoy primer
Magistrado de la nacion. El Sr. Roxas estaba contestando
varias interpelaciones sobre el alcance del nuevo sistema
propuesto. Replicando al Delegado Ventura no parece
sino que el Sr. Roxas presintiera la Resolucion Pendatun
o actos semejantes a ella cuando dijo lo siguiente: ". . .
Ademas, si la Asamblea desea anular el poder de la
Comision (Electoral), puede hacerlo asi mediante
ciertasmaniobras en su primera sesion cuando se
someten las actas a la Asamblea. El objeto es dar a la
Comision Electoral todo el poder ejercitado por la
Asamblea referente a las elecciones, actas y condiciones
de sus miembros" (vease Angara contra Comision
Electoral, supra, pag. 179). Ese todo de que habla el Sr.
Roxas excluye la idea de cualquier reserva o residuo
dejado a las camaras del Congreso.
Se dice, sin embargo, en la opinion de la mayoria que los
debates en la Asamblea Constituyente sobre el precepto
constitucional de que se trata demuestran que la intencion
de los redactores de la Constitucion no fue el
entregar todo a la Comision Electoral (ahora Tribunal
Electoral), sino que se le confirio solamente la facultad de
ser "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."Es decir — se arguye — que cuando no hay
"contest" o contencion las camaras tienen la facultad de
entender y juzgar de "la eleccion, actas y cualificaciones
de sus miembros".Esto se desprende, segun la ponencia,
del hecho de que mientras el "draft" o proyecto original
decia lo siguiente:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its members
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission.
la redaccion final del proyecto quedo como sigue:
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly.
Se asevera enfaticamente en la opinion de la mayoria que
la supresion de la primera parte de la clausula es harto
significativa. Ello demuestra, se dice, que la clausula tenia
dos partes con significados distintos: la primera parte,
relativa a casos no contenciosos, y la segunda referente a
casos contenciosos. La eliminacion de la primera parte
venia a reducir consiguientemente la jurisdiccion de la
ComisionElectoral a los casos contenciosos, reservandose
los no contenciosos a las camaras. Y para probar esta
tesis a primera vista deslumbrante se transcribe en la
ponencia una larga tirada del diario de sesiones de la
Asamblea Constituyente — tirada que, en verdad, ofrece
ciertos equivocos y ambiguedades. Pero esto no es mas
que un aspecto del cuadro.
Estos nos obliga a revisar y examinar toda la parte del
diario de sesiones que abarca los debates sobre el
particular.Afortunadamente, las discusiones fueron
amplias, plenas de informacion y detalle, y sobre todo
llevadas muyinteligentemente. El Delegado Manuel
Roxas, ahora Presidente de Filipinas, era quien sostenia
el lado afirmativo, esto es, el precepto original tal como lo
habia sometido el llamando Comite de Siete y tal como
queda transcritoen el parrafo anterior. Un grupo de
Delegados, encabezado por el Hon. Alejo Labrador, de
Zambales, estaba fundamental y decididamente opuesto a
la formula. Estos Delegados no aceptaban la reforma
propuesta, querian que se conservase el antiguo sistema
por virtud del cual las camaras eran los jueces exclusivos
de la elecccion, actas ycualificaciones de sus miembros.
Acaso sea pertinente consignar el hecho de que si bien es
verdad que los partidos (anti y pro) habian declarado una
tregua patriotica y saludable en sus luchas dentro de la
Convencion, el Sr. Roxas pertenecia al partido minoritario
— el de los pros — mientras que el Sr. Labrador era de la
mayoria, el partido fuerte y poderoso de los antis cuyo
indiscutible lider era el entonces Presidente del Senado
Sr. Quezon. La oposicion del Sr. Labrador y
compa_¤_eros se fundaba principalmente en la teoria de
la separacion de poderes: ellos creian que la reforma era
demasiado radical, que la misma venia a mermar
grandemente el poder y prestigio del departamento
legislativo,reduciendolo a un estado de inferioridad y
vasallaje, particularmente al poder judicial, en virtud de la
intervencion de miembros de la Corte Suprema en la
composicion de la Comision o Tribunal Electoral. Acaso
sea pertinente decir tambien que entre los ardientes
patrocinadores de la reforma figuraban distinguidos
Delegados de la mayoria entre ellos el Hon. Vicente J.
Francisco, de Cavite, en la actualidad Senador de
Filipinas.
Veamos ahora el proceso de como se enmendo el
"draft"original del precepto. Las siguientes interpelaciones
arrojan copiosa luz sobre la cuestion.
Delegate VENTURA. We have a doubt here as
to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft reading: "The
elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of anyof its members
shall be judged by an electoral Commission ."I
should like to ask from the gentleman from
Capiz whether the election and qualification of
the members whose election is not contested
shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Delegate ROXAS. If there is no question about
the election of the member, there is nothing to
be judged; that is why the word "judge"is used to
indicate a controversy. If there is no qustion de proclamacion expedido por la Comision sobre
about the election of a member, there is nothing Elecciones), ello era bastante, a menos que su eleccion
to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and fuese cuestionada, ycuestionada legalmente, esto es,
there is nothing to be determined. protestada debidamente ante el Tribunal Electoral.
Delegate VENTURA. But that does carry the El pensamiento del Delegado Roxas se aclaro mas
idea also that the Electoral Commission shall contestado otras interpelaciones. El dijo positiva y
confirm also the election of those whose election terminantemente, replicando al DelegadoCinco, que no
is not contested? habia ninguna diferencia entre la primera y segunda parte
de laclausula; que, en realidad, los casos de elections,
returns and qualifications," y que la frase "and contested
Delegate ROXAS. There is no need of
elections" se inserto meramente para los efectos de mayor
confirmation. As the gentleman knows, theaction
claridad.
of the House of Representatives in confirming
the election of its members is just a matter of the
rules of the Assembly. It is not constitutional. It is xxx xxx xxx
not necessary. After a man (adviertase bien
esto) fileshis credentials that he has been
Delegate CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar
elected, that is sufficient, unless the election is
question as that propounded by the gentleman
contested." (Arruego, The Framing of the
from Ilocos Norte (Mr. Ventura) when I arose a
Philippine Constitution,pp. 267, 268.)
while ago.However, I want to ask more
questions from the Delegate from Capiz. This
Como se ve, lo que preocupada al Delegado Ventura era paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases
que con la fraseologiaindicada la Comision Electoral contesting the election asseparated from the first
tuviera jurisdiccion y competencia hasta sobrelas part of the section which refers to elections,
credenciales no protestadas; parece que se temia esta returns and qualifications.
ambiguedad. Peroni el Delegado Ventura ni nadie en la
Convencion tuvo jamas en la mente la idea de que la
Delegate ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of
fraseologia envolvia una dual jurisdiccion: una, de parte de
clarity. In fact the cases ofcontested elections
la Asamblea Nacional, sobre las credenciales no
are alreadyincluded in the phrase "the elections,
protestadas; y otra, de parte de la Comision Electoral,
returns and qualifications." This phrase "and
sobre las credenciales protestadas. Y elDelegado Roxas,
contested elections" was inserted merely for the
con su contestaciones, establecio bien claramente que se
sake of clarity.
empleaba la palabra "judge"; y el "contest," el litigio tenia
que ser enjuiciado naturalmente por la Comision Electoral.
Delegate CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not
the Electoral Commission, at its own instance,
De la ultima contestacion del Delegado Roxas transcrita
refuse to confirm the election of the members?
arriba se deduceincuestionablemente que el no admitia la
posibilidad de que la Asemblea Nacional rehusase su
confirmacion a una credencial no protestada o contendida. Delegate ROXAS. I do not think so unless there
El sostenia que esta confirmacion no era constitucional, no is a protest. (Arruego, id.,p. 269.)
era necesaria. Poreso el dijo categoricamente: "After a
man files his credential, that issufficient, unless the
Pero hay todavia cosa mas importante. En realidad, esta
election is contested." Aplicado este criterio al casoque
nos ocupa, equivale a lo siguiente: Despues de haberse misma custion que nos ocupa ya se planteo en aquellos
debates y la solucion que entonces se le diocuadra
presentado alSenado las credenciales de los recurrentes
perfectamente con el criterio que sostenemos en esta
Sres. Vera, Diokno y Romero (a ello monta el certificado
disidencia. ElDelegado Labrador, lider, como ya se ha
dicho, de los opositores a la reforma,hizo al Delegado
Roxas algunas interpelaciones que parecian hechas
enanticipacion a los presentes acontecimientos. He aqui el
dialogo Roxas-Labrador:
Delegate LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman
from Capiz believe that unless this power is
granted to the Assembly, the Assembly on its
own motion does nothave the right to contest the
election and qualification of its members?
Delegate ROXAS. I have no doubt that the
gentleman is right. If this draft is retained, as it
is, even if two-thirds of the Assembly believe that
a member has not the qualifications provided by
law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Delegate LABRADOR. So that the right to
remove shall only be retained by the Electoral
Commission.
Delegate ROXAS. By the Assembly for
misconduct.
Delegate LABRADOR. I mean with the respect
to the qualifications of the members.
Delegate ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral
Commission.
Delegate LABRADOR. So that under this draft,
no member of the Assembly has the right to
question the eligibility of its members?
Delegate ROXAS. Before a member can
question the eligibility, he must go to the
Electoral Commission and make the question
heard before the Electoral Commission.
Delegate LABRADOR. So that the Electoral
Commission shall decide whether the election is
not contested.
Delegate ROXAS. Yes sir; that is the purpose.
(Aruego, idem, pp. 269, 270.)
Este dialogo Roxas-Labrador nos da la mejor clave para
interpretar el perfecto. Labrador pregunto si bajo el mismo
la Asamblea tenia derecho acuestionar, de su propia
iniciativa (on its motion). la eleccion y cualificacion de sus
miembros; Roxas contesto que NO, que "aunque dos
terceras partes de la Asamblea creyeran que un miembro
no tenia las cualificaciones provistas por la ley, ellos no
podrian removerle por tal razon".
Labrador volvio a preguntar inquiriendo sobre quien tenia
el derecho de remover. Roxas contesto: la Asamblea
Nacional por mala conducta (for misconduct); y la
Comision Electoral, con respeto a las cualificaciones de
losmiembros de la Asamblea.
Y cuando Labrador volvio a remachar preguntando si un
miembro de la AsambleaNacional podria, bajo el precepto
que se discutia, cuestionar la elegibilidadde sus miembros,
Roxas contesto categoricamente que "antes de que un
miembro pudiera cuestionar la eligibilidad (de otro) debia ir
a la Comision Electoral y hacer que la cuestion se oyera
ante la Comision Electoral." Es decir que,aplicado este
criterio al caso nos ocupa, ni el Senador Pendatun, ni
ningun otro Senador, ni nadie tenia derecho a cuestionar
la elegibilidad de los recurrentes Sres. Vera, Diokno y
Romero ante el Senado, sino que el asunto debia llevarse
directamente al Tribunal Electoral y hacer que este lo
enjuiciara.
Pero se preguntara: ¿entonces por que se reformo el
"draft" o proyecto original eliminando la primera clausula y
dejando solo la segunda, o sea la frase "all cases
contesting the elections, returns and qualifications," etc.
etc? Es verdad, se hizo la enmienda, pero la misma no es
sustancial,no afecta al fondo del precepto, no involucra el
espiritu del sistema tal como lo definio y explico el
Delegado Roxas en sus luminosas respuestas a las
diversas interpelaciones, particularmente las dadas al
Delegado Labrador. Se acepto la enmienda mas bien por
razones puramente psicologicas, esas que conoce bien
todo aquel que este familiarzado con la mecanica de los
parlamentos y asambleas deliberativas.Por un lado, el
Delegado Roxas veia que habia ciertas dudascon
respecto al alcance del proyecto tal como estaba
fraseado;pero, por otro lado, el decia que esas dudas
carecian de fundamento, que las dos clausulas del
precepto tenian un mismo significado, que la segunda ya
estaba contenida en la primera y se insertaba tan solo
para fines de claridad.Asi que, habil estrategia
parlamentario, creyo que podia aceptar perfectamente la
enmienda, entre cuyos proponentes (esto es muy
significativo, como se vera mas adelante) figuraba por
cierto el Delegado Rafols, pues con ello no perdia nada,
no comprometia ni un apice de su posicion, y en cambio
ganaba mucho, atraia el apoyo de los
indecisos,aseguraba la aprobacion del precepto en la
votacion final, derrotando a los que estaban
fundamentalmente opuestos al mismo como, en efecto, los
derroto por 98 votos contra 56. Que la enmienda no era
sustancial y de ningun modoafectaba al sistema, asi lo
declaro categoricamente el Sr. Roxas cuando, defiriendo a
una sugestion del Presidente Recto de la Convencion,
definio el alcance del cambio diciendo que era "tan solo
para obviar la objecion apuntadapor varios delegados en
el sentido de que la primera clausula del 'draft' que dice
'The election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly' parece dar a la Comision Electoral
el poder de determinar hasta la eleccion de los miembros
que no han sido protestados."Es decir, que o unico que se
quiso aclarar y establecer fuera de toda duda con la
enmienda es que el poder de la Comision Electoral no
podia extenderse a las credenciales no protestadas, pero
jamas se penso que el efecto de la enmienda era el
desgajar este poder de la Comision Electoral para dejarlo
como un residuo en la Legislatura; en otros terminos,
jamas se imagino que con la enmienda la Asamblea
Nacional todavia podria ser juez de las credenciales no
protestadas de sus miembros. He aqui las palabras
textuales del Sr. Roxas:
The difference, Mr. President, consists only in
obviating the objection pointed out by various
delegates to the effect that the first clause which
states "The election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly" seems
to give to the Electoral Commission the power to
determine also the election of the members who
have not been elected. And in order to obviate,
we believe that the amendment is right in that
sense . that is, if we amend the draft so that it
should read as follows: "All cases contesting the
 election, etc.," so that the judges of the Electoral
Commission will limit themselves only to cases
in which there has been a protest against the
returns.
No pudo haberse concebido jamas la peregrina, fantastica
idea de que el "draft" enmendado dejaba a la Asamblea
Nacional la facultad de enjuiciar la "eleccion, actas y
cualificaciones de los miembros" contra los cuales no
existiera ninguna protesta ante la Comision Electoral, por
al sencilla razon de que ello engendraria las siguientes
anomalias: (a) la creacion de dos jueces: uno, para
credenciales no protestadas — la Asamblea Nacional o
Congreso; y otro, para credenciales protestadas — la
Comision o Tribunal Electoral; (b) en un momento dado,
una mayoria sin escrupulos,viendo peligrar el poder en
sus manos despues de unas elecciones reñidisimas,
podria dar un golpe de mano mediante la estratagema de
hacer que sus candidatos derrotados se inhiban de
protestar ante el Tribunal Elctoral a fin de dar lugar a que
el Congreso actue directamente sobre el caso, con la mira
de ajusticiar a los candidatos minoritarios triunfantes bajo
la guillotina de lo que el cinismo de los descreidos ha
llamado justicia politica de las mayorias; (c) occurriria la
paradoja de que las credenciales no protestadas estarian
en peor situacion que las protestada, porque mientras
estas ultimas tendrian el beneficio de una justicia de
verdad, la justicia judicial del Tribunal Electoral, aquellas
caerian bajo la justicia politica de las mayorias, sedientas
de sangre adversaria. Es indudable que, como hemos
dicho en otra parte de esta disidencia, la Asamblea
Constituyente no podia ser parte en un juego infantil como
este; y el Delgado Roxas, con su seriedad, con su bien
conocida madurezpolitica, con su devocion a la causa de
la libertad y democracia, de ningun modo podia ser
corresponsable de un precepto constitucional que pudiera
dar lugar a tan tremendas anomalias. Y ¿que decir del
Delgado Rafols? ¿Como se puede concebir que, con sus
tristes reminiscencias de lajusticia politica de las mayorias,
diera su patrocinio a una enmienda que pudiera producir
tales consecuencias?
Para remachar la tesis de que cada camara de nuestro
Congreso todavia retiene la facultad de determinar "la
eleccion, las actas y las cualificaciones de sus miembros"
en casos en que no hay protesta, la mayoria propone en
su opinion el siguiente ejemplo: "Es elegido por un distrito
congresil un hombre que habia servido previamente 10
años en las Prisiones de Bilibid, por estafa. Como no tuvo
contrincante(¡este hombre debia de ser muy popular!),
ninguna protesta se formula contra su eleccion. Y
naturalmente el Tribunal Electoral no adquiere jurisdiccion
sobre el caso, pues no hay 'contest' o controversia. Una
vez informada del hecho ¡no puede la Camara, motu
propio, suspender la toma de su juramento? ¿No puede la
Camara investigarle y despues exclurle? Se observara
que cuando un miembro de la Camara suscita una
cuestion respecto a las cualificaciones de otro, de ello no
se sigue un pleito electoral, pues ninguno pretende
sustituir a este ultimo."
Pareceria que estabamos excusados de replicar a este
argumento por dos razones: primera, porque
evidentemente el ejemplo propone un caso que es
completamente distintodel que nos ocupa, pues los
recurrentes no estan acusados de estafa ni de nada que
afecta a su caracter, y su caso,como ya hemos dicho, es
de motivacion enteramente electoral, es decir, relacionada
con la forma como fueron elegidos que se dice viciada por
actos de violencia y terrorismo de sus partidarios; y
segunda, porque si bien es verdad que el ejemplo es
meramente hipotetico, plantea, sin embargo, un caso que
puede perfectamente occurrir y pareceria que ni esta
Corte ni ningun miembro suyo deberia adelantar su
opinion sobre semejante hipotesis susceptible de
realizarse. Pero como del ejemplo se pretende hacer
argumento aquiles, no tenemos mas remedio que
comentarlo y discutirlo.
Ante todo se deben deslindar bien los conceptos. El
derecho o facultad de expulsar a un miembro de una
camara legislativa (Articulo VI, seccion 10, ap. 3,
Constitucion de Filipinas) es una cosa bien diferente del
derecho derehusar la admision de uno para ser miembro
de dicha camara. En esto ultimo las cuestiones envueltas
se refieren principalmente, tal vez exclusivamente, a las
cualificaciones constitucionales de aquiellos que se
presentan para ser admitidos como miembros, o bien a la
regularidad y legalidad de las elecciones en que fueron
elegidos; mientras que en lo primero, esto es, en lo que
toca a la expulsion, lo que de lugar a la accion es el
caracter personal o conducta de la parte afectada
(Willoughby, On the Constitution of the United States,
tomo 1.º, pag. 611).
En el ejemplo que propone la mayoria, la condena por
estafa no es cosa que guarda relacion con
lascualificaciones constitucionales del congresista o
Representante electo ni con la regularidad y legalidad de
las elecciones en que salio victorioso, por cierto sin ningun
contrincante. Es cosa que afecta a su caracter personal o
conducta. Por tanto, no cabe discutir su derecho a ser
admitido como miembro de la camara; el reune las
cualificaciones constitucionales (ciudadania, edad, etc.)
para ser Representante y la limpieza de su eleccion esta
admitida. Asi que, parafraseando al Delegado Roxas, la
"presentacion de su credencial de que ha sido eligido, es
bastante para que sea admitido como miembro." Pero ¿la
condena por estafa? ¿No puede la camara por este
motivo investigarle y excluirle como elemento no
deseable? — pregunta la mayoria. Esta es otra cuestion.
Ya hemos visto que el derecho de admision es una cosa,
y el derecho de expulsion, otra. El derecho de expulsion,
por mala conducta, lo tienen las camaras
independientemente del Tribunal Electroral. Ya lo dijo el
Delegado Roxas, contestando al Delegado Labrador: la
facultad de remover, en tratandose de la "eleccion, actas y
cualificaciones de los miembros," la tiene la Comision o
Tribunal Electoral, previa protesta; la facultad de remover,
por mala conducta, la tiene la Asamblea (Congreso)
Pero examinemos el ejemplo de la estafa que plantea la
mayoria hast sus ultimas consecuencias. Willoughby dice
que sobre este respecto el punto principal de controversia
es si los actos de mala conducta objeto de queja debenser
solo los subsiguientes a la eleccion y que afecten a la
dignidad del Congreso y al debido desempeño de sus
funciones, o deben ser tambien los anteriores. "Respecto
de los actos de los miembros electos cometidos con
anterioridad a su eleccion se ha argumentado fuertemente
que las Camaras no deben tenerlos cuenta, pues se debe
conceder que los electores tienen el derecho de elegir a
quienes quieran para representarles en el Congreso, y se
debe presumir que han tenido en cuenta el caracter y la
conducta de aquellos a quienes elegen."
A disregard of the foregoing doctrine, it has been
urged, operates as a denial to the States of a
right or privilege constitutionally provided for
them. Thus, we find James M. Beck, former
Solicitor General of the United States, declaring :
"It seems too clear for argument, that each
States has the right to select from its people any
 representative in the Senate (or the House) that
it sees fit, irrespective of his intellectual or moral
qualifications (provided he possesses the
qualifications specified in the Constitution), . . ."
A state may have selected a member of the
Senate or secured his nomination by unworthy
means. He may be intelectually unfitted for the
high office, and his moral character may, in other
respects, leave much to be desired. The People
of the United States may justifiably think that the
States has sent to Congress an unfit man, who
could add nothing to its deliberations, and
whose influence might well be pernicious. None
the less, the States has the right to send him. It
is its sole concern, and to nullify its choice is to
destroy the basic right of a sovereign State, and
amounts to a revolution" (Willoughby, idem, pp.
611, 612).
El primer precedente — añade el autor citado — de que,
como base para expulsion, los actos cometidos antes de
la eleccion no deben ser considerados, fue en el caso del
Senador Humphrey Marshall, en 1796, quien fue acusado
de que habia cometido perjurio. El Senado en este caso
se nego a tomar jurisdiccion para determinar si, de hecho,
Marshall habia sido reo de un delito, a pesar del hecho de
que el pidio que el Senato investigase y determinase el
caso" (supra, p. 612). Parece que en estos casos el
criteriogeneral y predominante es que el sufragio popular
es como un especie de Jordan que lava con sus aguas
purificadoras todos los pecados cometidos antes de la
eleccion. Es como si al pueblo se le supusiera investido de
la facultad suprema de indultar totalmente a sus favoritos
por medio de la balota electoral.
Se insinua que los recurridos tenian la facultad de adoptar
la Resolucion Pendum en virtud del principio de que todo
cuerpolegislativo tiene el poder inherente de adoptar
reglas para su organizacion, funcionamiento y
preservacion. Se cita la practica legislativa de que al
inaugurarse un cuerpo deliberativo se forma un comite de
credienciales que examia los certificados o titulos que
presentan los miembros para su admision. Dicho comite
rinde su informe recomendando la aprobacion o
desaprobacion de las credenciales. No puede sostenerse
una tesis mas peligrosa que esta. Las camaras legislativas
son mas, muchisimo mas que una camara de comercio,
por ejemplo. Los legisladores son funcionarios
constitucionales. Sus cualificaciones, la invenstidura y el
ejercicio de su cargo, el termino del mismo,estan definidos
y amparados por la Constitucion mediante preceptos y
disposiciones que operan como limitaciones
constitucionales sobre el poder legislativo en general.
Esos preceptos y disposiciones no se pueden enmendar o
derogar mediante una ley ordinaria, mucho menos
mediante una resolucion simple como la del Senador
Pendatun: para enmendarlos o derogarlos hace falta que
se reforme la Constitucion por los procesos que ella
preceptua. Hacer depender la admision del legislador o la
tenencia de sus cargo de una resolucion o acuerdo
reglamentario es de los mas subversivo, pues le reduciria
a un a situacion tan precaria y tan endeble que un mero
empleado del servicio civil tendria mas prestancia y mas
seguridad que el.
Se nos cita, sin embargo, el caso de Barry vs. United
States ex rel. Cunningham (279 U.S., 867, 874; 73 Law,
ed. 597), para demostrar que la Resolucion Pendatun es
valida y legal por entrar y recaer dentro del poder
inherente del Senado para suspender a cualquier
miembro, independientemente de la cuestion electoral.
Hemos revisado cuidadosamente la sentencia citada y la
hemos hallado inaplicable el presente caso. Es verdad
que ella tiene cierta relacion con el caso de Vare,
candidatoa Senador en Pennsylvania en las elecciones de
1926, a quien se lenegro prima facie el asiento mientras
se efectuaba una investigacion dealegadas irregularidades
y practicas corruptas cometidas para promover
sunominacion y su eleccion, entre ellas el haber hecho
promesas impropiase ilegales, etc. Pero, aparte de que la
suspension del juramento y asientode Vare caia del
Senado American como "unico juez de la eleccion, actas y
calificaciones de sus miembros," solo muy incidental y
colateralmentese habla de esto en el caso de Barry. La
unica y verdadera cuestion planteadaen esta caso era la
de si a un tal Cunningham se le podia arrestrar, mediante
orden del Senado, y traerle a la barra para contestar a
ciertas preguntassobre la procedencia de ciertos fondos
gastados en la nominacion y eleccionde Vare. La Corte
Suprema Federal dijo que si, que esto caia dentro de
los poderes judiciales del Senado. "Generally" — dice la
Corte — "the Senate is alegislative body, exercising in
connection with the House only the power to make laws.
But it has had conferred upon it by the Constitution certain
powers which are not legislative but judicial in character.
Among these is the power to judge of the elections, returns
and qualifications of its members. That power carries with
it authority to take such steps as may beappropriate and
necessary to secure information upon which to decide
concerning elections" (Barry, supra, 871). Y al final de la
sentencia la Corte sienta la siguiente afirmacion que es
muysignificativa para el presente caso: "Here the question
under consideration concerns the exercise by the Senate
of an indubitable power; and if judicial interference can be
successfullyinvoked it can only be upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of the due process of law. That
condition we are unable to find in the present case"
(Barry, supra, 874). De suerte que, bien mirado, el asunto
de Barry hasta es un argumento en favor de la jurisdiccion
de esta Corte Suprema para conocer y enjuiciar la
Resolucion Pendatun,para determinar si con ella se ha
infringido o no la Constitucion.
Se arguye que los recurridos no hicieron mas que actuar
sobre un informe rendido por la Comisioon sobre
Elecciones en obediencia a un mandato constitucional. En
el informe se recitaban ciertos hechos y se sentaban
conclusiones sobre alegados actos de terrorismo y
violencia que posian afectar a la eleccion de los
recurrentes. Se dice que la Resolucion Pendatun no es
sino la reaccion, la respuesta de los recurridos adicho
informe; que estos tenian absoluta discrecion sobre el
particular; que ello entraba dentro de sus poderes politicos
y no era revisable por el departamento judicial. Para
contestar esto nos bastara repetir que la Resolucion
Pendatun es algo mas que el ejercicio de un poder politico
y discrecional: es una usurpacion de poderes
constitucionales pertenecientes a otro organismo
constitucional; y para demostrarlo no necesitamos
reproducir los argumentos ya extensamente expuestos.
Por lo demas, el discutido informe de la Comission sobre
Elecciones no tiene el valor ni alcane que le atribuye. Ese
informe no podia autorizar ni justifica ninguna accion que
como la Resolucion Pendatun tuviese el efecto de privar a
los recurrentes de sus asientos en el Senado, siguera
temporalmente. El documento sometido por la Comision
sobre Elecciones que tiene verdadero valor constitucional
y legal, que tiene fuerza obligatoria, es su proclama
declaranda electos a los recurrentes. Esa proclama
impone a los recurridos el deber ministerial de recibir y
aceptar a los recurrentes como miembros del Senado
hasta que el Tribunal Electoral diga otra cosa. ¿Como un
informe, que ni siquiera es al resultado de una
investigacion propia, sino que esta basado en otros
informes de fuerea, podia tener la trascendencia que se le
ha dado, tomando pie del mismo para una sacudida
seismica de tales proporciones como es la suspension de
los derechos de tres miembros electos del Senado y siete
miembros electos de la Camara de Representantes? Ni la
imaginacion mas libre y erratica en la Asamblea Nacional
pudo haberse figurado jamas este efecto a cuenta de esa
clausula inofensiva de la Constitucion que manda a la
Comision sobre Elecciones presentar un informe despues
de cada eleccion al Jefe Ejecutivo y al Congreso.
La accion sobre ese informe no puede ir mas alla de los
limites que confinan cada poder. El Ejecutivo, por ejemplo,
investigaria los abusos e irregularidades los funcionarios
encargados de ejecutar y hacer cumplir la Ley Electoral en
cumplimiento de su mandato constitucional de ejecutar las
leyes y de hacer que estas se ejecuten fielmente
(Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo VII, secciones 7 y 10); y
el Congreso estudiaria y consideraria reformas a la ley con
vista de dicho informe, o bien crearia inmediatamente el
Tribunal Electoral para despachar sin demora las
protestas sobre elecciones legislativas. El Ejecutivo no
podria, por ejemplo, so pretexto de tremendas
irregularidades y anomalias expuestas en el informe sobre
elecciones locales y provinciales, mandar suspender el
juramento de algun concejal, alcalde o gobernador
provincial electo, puesto que esto seria una usurpacion y
una invasion de la jurisdiccion de los tribunales de justicia.
De todo lo antedicho resulta evidente que, resolviendo la
promera cuestion propuesta, la Resolucion Pendatun
objeto de controversia es ilegal, es anticonstitucional y es,
por tanto, insostenible.
Segunda cuestion. — A la luz de nuestra
Constitucion y de nuestras leyes ? tiene este
Tribunal Supremo jurisdiccion y competencia
para conocer, enjuiciar y decidir el asunto?
Los recurrentes invocan nuestra jurisdiccion pidiendo un
remedio a que, segun ellos, tienen derecho bajo la
Constitucion y la ley. Alegan que son Senadores electos y,
por tanto, funcionarios constitucionales de Filipinas, pues
el Senado es cuerpo constitucional; que han sido
debidamente proclamados por la Comission sobre
Elecciones bajo las dispposiciones de la Ley No. 725 y,
por tanto, tienen derecho por ministerio de la Constitucion
y de la ley a ocupar sus asientos en el Senado con todos
los derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios anejos al cargo;
que, sin embargo, los recurridos, o mas bien una mayoria
de ellos, han aprobado una resolucion — la Resolucion
Pendatun — por la cual se les priva de sud asientos; que
dicha resolucion infringe la Constitucion y la ley; por tanto,
piden dictemos sentencia "declarrando entramente nula y
de ningun valor la citada resolucion, y prohibiendo
consecuentemente a los recurridos y a cada uno de ellos
a impedir a los recurrentes a continuar en sus asientos en
el Senado de Filipinas y a ejercer libremente sus cargos
como Senadores, y prohibiendoles igualmente a realizer
cualquier otro procedimiento ulterior para ejeccutar la
resolucion citada." ¿Podemos negarnos a asumir la
jurisdiccion que se invoca? ¿Hay alguna manera de evadir
la cuestion, inhibiendose este Tribunal de declarar si es o
no verdad que se han infringido la Constitucion y la ley, y
de conceder el remedio pedido si ha habido tal infraccion?
La comodidad, la linea de menor resistencia hubiera sido
por el lado de la inaccion, de la inhibicion. Nos damos
perfecta cuenta de la tremenda responsabilidad que
supone el mantener la armonia entre los poderes del
Estado. Es parte de la prudencia y sabiduria de los
gobernantes el evitar en todo lo posible cualquier ocasion
de conflicto entre dichos poderes, recordando siempre que
si las instituciones son entidades abstractas, por ende
anestesicas, insensibles, los hombres estan hechos de
arcilla animada y ya no son tan impasibles como las
instituciones. Pero hemos hallado que en el presente caso
nuestro deber de actuar, y de actuar positivamente, tiene
la fuerza de un imperativo categorico. Nuestra jurisdiccion
esta escrita en la Constitutcion, se halla reafirmada en la
ley. En el Titulo VIII de la Constitucion (sobre la judicatura)
esta declarada tanto implicita como expresamente la
facultad judicialde resolver y decidir casos
constitucionales; y en la regla 67 del Reglamento de los
Tribunales hallamos la implementacion procesal de esa
jurisdiccion y competencia.
Puede decirse que en este respecto nuestra Constitucion
es una edicion mejorada de la Constitucion federal de los
Estados Unidos. Como se sabe, la llamada facultad
judicial de revisar la Constitucion en controversias
propiamente planteadas no se halla concedida
expresamente en la magna carta americana. Ha diso el
genio audaz de sus juristas, particularmente del gran
Marshall, el que arrnaco esa facultad de las penumbras de
la Constitucion (Marbury vs. Madison [1803], 1 Cranch,
137) contribuyendo ello grandemente, segun opinion
general de los criticos tanto nacionales como exranjeros, a
fortalecer y estabilizar las instituciones politicas de
America. Aprovechando la experiencia americana hemos
escrito expresamente en nuestra Constitucion lo que en
Americ no era mas que doctrina judicial o jurisprudencia.
Se dice, sin embargo, con todo enfasis, con todo vigor,
que aun admitiendo que los recurridos, actuando como
mayoria del Senado, hayan infringido la Constitucion al
aprobar la Resolucion Pendatun y hacerla efectiva, con
todo la judicatura, la judicatura filipina no tiene jurisdiccion
para intervenir en el caso, bajo el principio de la
separacion de poderes que informa nuestra Constitucion.
Se arguye que los tres poderes del Estado son igueles;
que ninguno de ellos es superior al otro; que cada poder
puede interpretar la Constitucion a su modo y cuando asi
lo hace ningun otro poder puede ni debe entrometerse yu
revisar su interpretacion; que el Senado es el unico juez
de sus actos y si algun ciudadano sale agraviado por
algun alegado atropello a sus derechos constitucionales,
su recurso no esta en acudir al poder judicial o al poder
ejecutivo, sino en apelar directamente al pueblo en la
epoca de elecciones, en los comicios, empleando el arma
civil por excelencia del ciudadano — la balota; y,
finalmente, que el poder judicial no es un "curalo todo,"
una especie de Don Quijote que con la lanza en ristre
pretenda endereezar todos los entuertos.
Como se ve, nos llaman a decidir custiones de tremenda
importancia para el desenvolvimiento constitutcional en
este pais; lo que resolvamos puede trascender mucho
mas alla del promedio de tiempoo en que puede durar
nuestra existencia. Puede dicirse sin inmodestia que
grandes diciones del futuro — empleamos la palabra no
en su sentido exclusivamente judicial — dependeran de
como resolvamos esas cuestiones formidables que se nos
plantean hoy.
En parte, el argumento expuesto es correcto y acertado.
No se puede discutir que los tres poderes del Estado son
iguales e independientes entre si; que ninguno de ellos es
superior al otro, mucho menos el poder judicial que entre
los tres es el menos fuerte y el mas precario en medios e
implementos materiales. Tampoco se pude discutir que
bajo la Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona, una
esfera de accion propia y privativa, y dentro de esa esfera
un cumulo de facultades que le pertenecen
exclusivamente; que dentro de esa esfera y en el suso de
esas facultades cada poder tiene absoluta discrecion y
ningun otro poder puede controlar o revisar sus actos so
pretexto de que alguien los cuestiona o tach de arbitrarios,
injustos, imprudentes o insensatos. Pero la insularidad, la
separacion llega solo hasta aqui. Desde Montesquieu que
lo proclamo cientificamente hasta nuestros dias, el
principio de la separacion de poderes ha sufrido
tremendas modificaciones y limitaciones. El consenso
doctrinal hoy es que la teoria es solo relativa y que la
separacion de poderes queda condicionada mecanica
constitucional — la mecanica de los frenos y cortapisas.
(Willoughby, On the Constitution of the United States,
tomo 3, pags. 1619, 1620, 2.ª edicion.) Como queda dicho,
cada poder es absoluto dentro de la esfera que le asigna
la Constitucion; alli el juego de sus facultades y funciones
no se puede coartar. Pero cuando se sale y extravasa de
esa esfera invadiendo otros esferas constitucionales,
ejerciendo facultades que no le pertenecen, la teoria de la
separacion ya no le ampara, la Constitucion que es
superior a el le sale al encuentro, le restringe y le achica
dentro de sus fronteras, impidiendo sus incursiones
anticonstitucionales. La cuestion ahora a determinar es si
bajo nuestro sistema de gobierno hay un mecanismo que
permite restablecer el juego normal de la Constitucion
cuando surgen estos desbarajustes, estos conflictos que
podriamos llamar de fronteras constitucionales; tambien es
cuestion a determinar si cuando surgen esos conflictos, un
ciudadano sale perjudicado en sus derechos, el mismo
tiene algun remedio expedito y adecuado bajo la
Constitucion y las leyes, y quien puede concederle ese
remedio. Y con esto llegamos a la cuestion basica,
cardinal en este asunto.
Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio
existen — son los tribunales de justicia. "They very
essence of the American conception of the separation of
powers is its insistence upon the inherent distinction
between lawmaking and law-interpreting, and its
assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion which,
when brought to bear upon the Constitution, yields judicial
review" (Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court, p.
146). En Angara contra Comision Electoral (supra) dijimos
que "prescindiendo del tipo ingles y otros tipos europeos
de gobierno constitucional, los redactores de nuestra
Constitucion han adoptado el tipo americano, en donde el
departamento judicial interpreta y da efecto a la
Constitucion escrita. En algunos paises, que han rehusado
seguir el ejemplo americano, se han insertado
disposiciones en sus constituciones prohibiendo a los
tribunales que ejerciten su facultad de interpretar la ley
fundamental. Esto se toma como un reconocimiento de lo
que, de otro modo, seria la regla de que a falta de
prohibicion expresa los tribunales estan obligados a
asumir lo que logicamente es deber suyo"
(Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63, Jur. Fil., 173, 174).
En el famoso asunto de Marbuyr vs. Madison, supra, el
Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos, por boca de su
gran Chief Justice John Marshall, en tarminos inequivocos
definio y explico las facultades de la judicatura para poner
en vigor la Constitucion como la suprem ley del pais, y
declaro que "es terminantemente de la competencia y
deber del departamento judicial el decider cual es la ley
que rige.
The reasoning of Webster and Kent is
substantially the same. Webster says: "The
Constitution being the supreme law, it follows of
course, that every act of the legislature constrary
to the law must be void. But who shall decide
this question? Shall the legislature itself decide
it? If so, then the Constitution ceases to be legal
and becomes only a moral restraint for the
legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge
whether their acts be conformable to the
Constitution, then the Constitution is advisory
and accessory only, not legally binding;
because, if the construction of it rest wholly with
them, their discretion, in particular cases, may
be in favor of very erroneous constructions.
Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the
case arises, must decide upon the validityof
particular acts." Webster, Works, Vol. III, 30.
(Willoughby on the Constitution of the United
States, Vol. 1, 2d edition pp. 4,5.)
En realidad, esta cuestion no es nueva en esta jurisdicion.
El precedente mas inmediato que tenemos en nuestra
jurisprudencia es el asunto de Angara contra Comision
Electoral ya tantas veces citado (1936). Por primera vez
se planteaban y discutian ante esta Corte cuestiones
importantisimas resultantes de la Constitucion del
Commonwealth que acababa de promulgarse. Se trataba
precisamente de deslindar las zonas constitucionales
ocupadas por la Asamblea Nacional y la Comision
electoral; es decir que, fundamentalmente, casi, casi las
mismas cuestiones que ahora se plantea ante nosotros.
La teoria de la separacion de poderes — el leit motif de la
presente controversia — se analizo y discutio alli hasta en
sus ultimas implicaciones los siguientes; Jose Angara
habia sido proclamado Representante electo por uno de
los distritos de Tayabas. Al inaugurarse la Asamblea
Nacional su acta fue confirmada por este cuerpo
juntamente con las de otros Representantes contra
quienes no se habian formulado protestas. el acta de
Angara no estaba protestada entonces. Algunos dias
despues Pedro Insua, su contrincante, presento una
protesta ante la Comision electoral que acababa
solamente de constituirse. Escuadado tras el hecho de
que su acta ya habia sido confirmada por la Asamblea
Nacional, Angara vino a esta Corte planteando una accion
orginaria para que se expidiera un mandamiento de
inhibicion prohibiendole a la Comision Electoral que
siguera conociendo de la protesta. Esta Corte acepto el
reto asumiendo jurisdiccion sobre el caso, procediendo a
desempenar su alta funcion de interllamo deslinde de
facultades constitucionales. Reconociendo y
estableciendo firmemente la jurisdiccion exclusiva de la
novisima Comision Electoral sobre controversias relativas
a la eleccion de miembros de la Asamblea Nacional, esta
Corte denego el recurso de prohibicion. Llevaando las
cosas por la tremenda, la Asamblea Nacional, bajo la
teoria de la separacion de poderes, pudo haber ignorado
la decision de esta Corte, pudo haber pasado por encima
de la Comision Electoral conservandole el asiento a
Angara, ya que el acta de este habia sido confirmada por
ella cuando jjaun no habia portesta. No lo hizo. La
Constitucion, casi entre los pañales aun de su cuna, se
salvo gracias a la compostura de todo el mundo, saliendo
ilesa de la prueba, rodeada de grandes prestigios. Las
conclusiones y pronunciamientos de la Corte por boca del
ponente el Magistrado Laure, parecen estereotipados para
el case que nos ocupa y para el presente momento
historico con todas sus crisis; asi que los vamos a
reproducir en toda su integridad a continuacion:
La separacion de poderes es un principio
fundamental de nuestro sistema de gobierno. Se
establece, no por disposicion expresa, sino por
division real trazada en nuestra Constitucion.
Cada departamento del Gobeierno tiene
conocimiento exclusivo de las materias que
caen dentro de su jurisdiccion, y es supremo
dentro de su propia esfera. Pero del hecho de
que los tres poderes han de conservarse
separados yu distintos no se sigue que la
Constitucion se propuso que fuerean
absolutamente irrestringidos e independientes
unos de otros. La Constitucion ha dispuesto un
sistema elaborado de frenos y cortapisas para
asegurar coordinacion en los trabajos de los
varios departamentos del Gobierno. Por
ejemplo, el Jefe Ejecutivo, bajo nuestra
Constitucion, es hasta tal punto erigido en un
freno para el poder legislativo que se requiere
su asentimiento en la aprobacion de las leyes.
Sin embargo, esto esta sujeto al ulterior freno de
que un proyecto de ley puede convertirse en ley
no obstante la negativa del Presidente de
aprobarlo, por medio de una votacion de dos
tercios tiene el Presidente facultad de convocar
a la Asamblea cuando lo crea conveniente. Por
otra parte, la Asamblea Nacional funciona como
un freno sobre el Ejecutivo, en el sentido de que
es necesario su consentimiento, por medio de la
Comision de Nombramientos, en el
nombramiento de ciertos funcionarlos; y es
esencial la conformidad de todos sus miembros
para la conclusien de tratados. Ademas, en su
facultad de determinar que tribunales, que no
sea el Tribunal Supremo, se habran de
establecer, para definir su competencia, y de
destinar fondos para su sostenimiento, la
Asamblea Nacional rigte al departamento
judicial en cierto grado y medida. La Asamblea
ejercita, tambien, la facultad judicial de conocer
de recusaciones. Y la judicatura, a su vez, con
el Tribunal Supremo por arbitro final, frena con
efectividad a los demas departamentos en el
ejercicio de su facultad de determinar la ley, y
de aqui que pueda declarar nulos los actos
ejecutivos y legislativos que contravengan la
Constitucion.
Pero, en esencia, la Constitucion ha delineado
con mano firme y en terminos energicos la
sasignacion de facultade as los departamentos
ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial de Gobierno. La
superposicion y el entralazamiento de funciones
y deberees de los varios departamentos, sin
embargo, a veces hace dificil decir precisamente
donde termina uno y empieza otro. En tiempos
de intraquilidad social o excitacion politica, las
grandes piedras angulares de la Constitucion
son susceptibles de ser olvidadas o anubladas,
si no desatendidas enteramente. En casos de
conflicto, el departamento judicial es el unico
organismo constitucional que puede ser llamado
para deteminar el proprio deslinde de facultades
entre los varios departamentos y entre las
unidades integrales o constituyentes de los
mismos.
Como cualquier producto humano, nuestra
Constitucion carece, desde luego, de perfeccion
y perfectibilidad; pero, en tanto en cuanto
estaba en manos de nuestro pueblo disponerlo
asi, obrando por medio de sus delegados, ese
instrumento, que es expresion de su soberania,
por limitada que se, ha establecido un gobierno
republicano destinado a obrar y funcionar como
un conjunto armonico, bajo un sistema de frenos
y cortapisas, y con sujecion a las limitaciones y
restricciones que se disponen en dicho
instrumento. La Constitucion señala, en un
lenguaje nada incierto, las restricciones y
limitaciones de los poderes y organismos
gubernamentales. Si estas restrcciones y
limitaciones fueran traspuestas, seria
inconcebible que la Constitucion no hubiera
dispuesto un mecanismo por el cual pudiera
encauzarse el curso del Gobierno por los
canales constitucionales, pues entoneces la
distribucion de poderes seria merea palabreria,
el bill de derechos meras expresiones
sentimentales, y los principios de buen gobierno
meros apotegmas politicos. Ciertamente, las
limitaciones y restricciones que comprende
nuestra Constitucion son reales, como debe
serlo en cualquier Constitucion. En loos Estados
Unidos en donde no se encuentra ninguna
concesion constitucional expresa en su
Constitucion, la posesion de este poder
moderador de los tribunales, por no diceir ya
nada de su origen historico y desenvolvimiento
aqui, ha sido dejado en reposo por la
aquiescencia popular por un periodo de mas de
un siglo y medio. En nuestro caso, este poder
moderador esta concedido, si no expresamente,
por decuccion tacita del articulo 2, Titulo VIII, de
nuestra Constitucion.
La Constitucion es una defnicion de las
facultades del Gobierno. ¿Quien es el llamado a
determinar la naturaleza, proposito y alcance de
esas facultades? La Constitucion misma ha
dispuesto el organismo de la judicatura como el
medio racional. Y, cuando la judicatura media
para determinar los linderos constitucionales, no
mantiene ninguna superioridad sobre los otros
departamentos; en realida no anula ni invalida
un acto de la Legislatura, sino que solamente
asevera la solemne y sagrada obligacion a ella
asignada por la Constitucion de determinar
pretensiones incompatibles de autoridad
dimanada de la Constitucion, y de establecer
para las partes en una contraversia actual los
derechos que ese intrumento asegura y
garantiza a las mismas. Esto, a la verdad, es
todo lo que va implicito en la expresion
"supremacia judicial", que propiamente es la
facultad de revision judicial bajo la Constitucion.
Aun entonces, este poder de revision judicial
esta limitado a casos y controversias reales, que
se ha de ejercitar despues de que las partes
han tenido plena libertad de hacerse oir, y esta,
ademas, limitado a la cuestion constitucional
suscitada, o a la misma lis mota planteada.
Cualquier tentativa de abstraccion , solo
conduciria a la dialectica, y obstaculizaria las
cuestiones legales, y a conclusiones esteriles
que nada tendrian que ver con los hechos
reales. Circunsrita de este modo a sus
funciones, la judicatura no se ocupa de resolver
cuestiones sobre la cordura, justicia o
convenciencia de la legislacion. Aun mas, los
tribunales conceden la presucnion de
constitucionalidad a las leyes aprobadas por la
Legisltura, no solamente porque se presume
que esta acata la Constitucion, sino, tambien,
porque la judicatura, en el fallo de actuales
casos y controversias, debe reflejar la sabiduria
 y la justicia del pueblo, tal y como se han
expresado por medio de sus representantes y
por los departamentos ejecutivo y legislativo del
Gobierno.
Pero por mucho que pudieramos postular sobre
los frenos internos de poderes que dispone
nuestra Constitucion, debe, con todo, recordarse
que, segun las palabras de James Madison, el
sistema mismo no es el principal paladin de la
libertad constitucional . . . el pueblo, que es el
autor de esta bendicion, debe, tambien, ser su
guardian . . . sus ojos deben siempre estar
alertos para señalar, su voz para delatar . . .
agresiones a la autoridad de su constitucion. En
ultimo analisis, pues, el trinof de nuestro
Gobierno en los años venideros debera ser
puesto a prueba en el crisol de las mentes y en
los corazones de los filipinos, mas bien que en
las salas de consultas y camaras de audiencia
de los tribunales." (Angara contra Comision
Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 169-172.)
Algo mas se puede añadir sobre el caso de Angara. Alli la
Corte descarto sin vacilaciones la posibilidad de un vacio,
de un estado juridico de inerme impotencia frente a
conflictos constitucionales, sentando la siguiente
conclusion: "En nuestro caso, la indole de la actual
contrversia revela la necesidad de un arbitro constitucional
ultimo que determine la incompatibilidad de facultades
entre dos organismos creados por la Constitucion. Si
fueramos a rehusar el conocer de la contrversia ?quien
determinaria el conflicto? Y si se dejara sin decidir ni
determinar el conflicto ¿no se crearia en si un vacio en
nuestro sistema constitucional que la larga daria por
resultado echar a perder toda la labor? El hacer estas
preguntas es contestarlas. Natura vacuum abhorret, por lo
que debemos evitar toda postracion en nuestro sistema
constitucional." No solamente esto — añadimos — sino
que a toda costa debemos evitar que fuera de la legalidad
sse forme un "territorio de nadie" donde puedan germinar
situaciones peligrosas y explosivas.
Pero ademas del caos de Angara tenemos en nuestra
jurisprudencia otro precedente mas inmediato todavia en
apoyo de la tesis de la supremacia judicial en tratandose
de interpretar la Constitucion y de dirimir conflictos
constitucionales; nos referimos al asunto de Carmen
Planas, recurrente, contra Jose Gil, Comisionado del
Servicio Civil, recurrido, decidido por este Tribunal
Supremo el 18 de enero de 1939 bajo la ponencia del
mismo Magistrado Laurel (67 Phil., 62). Carmen Planas,
siendo miembro de la Junta Municipal de Manila, publico
un articulo en La Vanguardia criticando duramente a
ciertos funcionarios del Gobierno, entre ellos el Presidente
de Filipinas Sr. Quezon, en relacion con las elecciones de
Diputados a la Asamblea Nacional celebradas el 8 de
noviembre de 1938. Entre los fuertes cargos formulados
por la articulista contra los dioses del Olimpo oficial ,
figuraban los siguientes: que, no obstante el tacito
interdicto impuesto por la Constitucion al disponer que el
Presidente de Filipinas ejerciese su cargo por un solo
periodo — años — sin reeleccion, situandosele de esta
manera en las serenas alturas del Poder como un
supremo arbitro, moderador y neutral, el Sr. Quezon
intervino activamente en aquellas elecciones a favor de
los nacionalistas poniendo en juego toda la enorme
influencia de su cargo y apalstando asi a los condidatos
de la oposicion; que toda la maquinaria del Gobierno se
movilizo favor de los candidatos nacionalistas,
colocandose en la vanguardia de dicha movlizaccion los
miembros del Gabinete; y que no se escatimaron medios
para asegurar el trifunfo de los coandidatos de la
adminstracion, el fraude y la corrupcion inclusive. Al dia si
guiente de haberse publicado este articulo sensacional, la
Srta. Planasa recibio una carta firmada de la siguiente
manera: "By authority of the President: Jorge B. Vargas,
Secretary to the President," en donde se le decia: "Por la
presente se le instruye que comparezca ante el
Comisionado del Servicio Civil, sola o acompañada por un
abogado, a las 9 de la mañana, Noviembre 22, para
porbar las declaraciones hechas por usted. El que tales
cargo no se puedan sostener o no se pruebe que se han
hecho de buena fe, sera considerado como razon
suficiente para su suspension o destitucion del cargo."
La Srta. Planas objeto a la investigacion rescusando al
Comissionaldo del Servicio Civil. Este, sin embargo,
insistio en proseguir la investigacion y fue entonces
cuando ella vino ante este Tribunal Supremo pidiendo un
mandamiento de prohibicion contra el Comisionado, por
los siguientes fundamentos, entre otros: que bajo la
Constitucion y las leyes que protegen la libertad de
palabra y de expresion, ella tenia derecho o formular la
censura de que se trata como libre ciudadana de un pais
democretico; que, en efecto, ella escribio el articulo no
como concejal sino como persona particular; que como
funcionario ella solamente podia ser investigada y
exigirsele responsabilidad por motivo de prevaricacion,
mala conducta o infraccion relacionada con su cargo, y
este no era el caso; que suponiendo que el articulo en
cuestion fuera libeloso o contuviera algo por lo cual la
articulista pudiera ser cirminalmente responsable, el
Codigo Penal y el Procedimiento Criminal Señalan el
modo de hacerefectiva esa responsabilidad ante los
tribunales de justicia. El Procurador General, al impugnar
el recurso, aleego entre otros fundamentos que este
Tribunal, bajo "el principio de la separacion de poderes
establecido por la Constitucion, no tenia jurisdiccion para
revisar las ordenes del jefe Ejecutivo de que se trata, las
cuales son de caracter puramente administrativo,"
citandose en apoyo de la impugnacion las sentencias de
este Tribunal en los asunto de Severino contra El
Gobernador General y Junta Provincial de Negros
Occidental, Abueva contra Wood y
Alejandrion contra Quezon, citados en otra parte de esta
disiddencia. Esta Corte desestimo la objecion y resolvio
que tenia jurisdiccion y competencia sobre el caso,
diciendo que si bien "los actos del Ejecutivo ejecutados
dentro de los limites de su jurisdiccion son sus actos
oficialies y los tribunales no dirigiran ni controlaran la
accion ejecutiva en tales casos" (la regla es la de no-
intervencion), sin embargo, "de esta premisa legal no se
sigue necesariamente que no podemo inquirir la validez o
constitucionalidad de sus actos cuando estos se
cuestionan y atacan en un procedimiento legal apropiado."
"Por lo que respecta a la judicatura" — añadio esta Corte
— "si bien es verdad que ella no agara `ni la estpada ni la
bolsa," es por arreglo constitucional el organo llmado para
deslindar las fronteras constitucionales, y al Tribunal
Supremo esta encomendada expresamente o por necesari
aimplicacion la oblligacion de determinar en
procedimientos appropieados la validea o
constitucionalidad de cualquier tratado, ley, ordenanaza,
orden ejecutiva o regulacion."
Es verdad que esta Corte denego el recurso interpuesto
por la Srta. Planas, pero no por el fundamento de la falta
de jurisdiccion alegado poor el Procurador General, sino
porque llego a la conclusion de que la orden de
investigacion cuestionada caia dentro de los limites
constitucionales de la jurisdiccion del Presidente, y, por
tanto, era valida, constitucional y legalmente. He aqui los
prononciamientos pertinentes de la Corte, los cuales no
tienen desperdicio y reafirman con todo vigor la doctrina
de la supremacia judicial en materia de deslindes
constitucionales, establecida en el asunto de Angara, a
saber:
The Solicitor General, under the last paragraph
(par. 10) of his amended answer, raises the
question of jurisdiction of this court over the acts
of the Chief Executive. He contends that "under
the separation of powers marked by the
Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to
review the orders of the Chief Executive,
evidenced by Annex A and Annex C of the
petition, which are of purely administrative
character." Reliance is had on the prrvious
decisions of this court: Severino vs. Governor-
General ([1910], 16 Phil., 366);Abueva vs. Wood
([1924], 45 Phil., 612); and Alejandrino vs.
Quezon ([1924], 46 Phil., 83). Although this is
the last point raised by the Government in its
answer, it should, for reasons that are apparent,
be first to be considered. If this court does not
have jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings,
then, the same should be dismissed as a matter
of course; otherwise the merits of the
controversy should be passed upon and
determined.
It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief
Executive performed within the limits of his
jurisidction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in
such cases. The rule is noninterference. But
from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that we are precluded from making an
inquirey into the validity or constitutionality of his
acts when those are properly challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding. The classical
separation of governmental powers, whether
viewed in the light of the political philosophy of
Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of the
postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is
a relative theory of government. There is more
truism and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of
Philippine orgin, we cannot lay down "with
mathematical precision and divide the branches
into watertight compartments" not only because
"the great ordinances of the Constitution do not
establish and divide fields of blacks and white"
but also because "even the more specific of
them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to the
other." (Springer vs. Government [1928], 277
U.S. 189; 72 Law ed., 845, 852.) As far as the
judiciary is concerned, while it holds "neither the
sword nor the purse" it is by constitutional
placement the organ called upon to allocate
constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme
Court is entrusted expressly or by necessary
implication the obligation of determinig in
appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order
or regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Article VIII, Constitution
of the Philippines.) In this sense and to this
extent, the judiciary restrains the other
departments of the government and this result is
one of the necessary corollaries of the "system
of checks and balances" of the government
established.
In the present case, the President is not a party
to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor
restrained to act in a particular way. the
Commissioner of Civil Service is the party
respondent and the theory is advanced by the
Government that because an investigation
undertaken by him is directed by authority of the
President of the Philippines, this court has no
jurisdiction over the present proceedings
instituted by the petitioner, Carmen Planas. The
argument is ferafetched. A mere plea that a
subordinate officer of the government is acting
under orders from the Chief Executive may be
an important averment, but is neither decisive
nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of
his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief
Executive from judicial interference is not in the
nature of a sovereign passport for all the
subordinate officials and employees of the
Executive Department to the extent that at the
mere invocation of the authority that it purports
the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the
validity or legality of an executive order is
necessarily abated or suspended. The facts in
Severino vs. Governor-General (supra), Abueva
vs. Wood (supra), and Alejandrino vs. Quezon,
(supra), are different, and the doctrines laid
down therein must be confined to the facts and
legal environment involved and whatever
general observations might have been made in
elaboratioon of the views therein expressed but
which are not essential to the determination of
the issues presented are mere obiter dicta.
While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary
legal writ willnot issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-
judicial functions (50 C.J., 658), its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this
jurisdiction it may issue to any inferior tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, whose
acts are without or in excess of jurisidction.
(Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with
reference to "functions" in the statute are
undoubtedly comprehensive and include the
challenged investigation by the
respondentCommissioner of Civil Service, which
investigation if unauthorized and is violative of
the Constitution as contended is a fortiori without
or in excess or jurisdiction. The statutory rule in
this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is
not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to
keep them within the limits of their own
jurisdiction and to prevent them from
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other
tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to
an officer or person whose acts are without or in
excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ
is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of
the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or
vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions."
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922],
43 Phil., 304, 307; Aglipay vs. Ruiz [1937], 35
Off. Gaz., 1264.) This court, therefore, has
jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will
accordingly proceed to determine the merits of
the present controversy.
Se arguye, sin embargo, que de permitirse la
interventcionjudicial para deslinde constitucional o para
dirimir conflictos constitucionales, ello tiene que ser
en casos o procedimientos apropiados. Se dice que en el
asunto de Angara la intromision judicial era procedente y
justificada porque en el la parte litigante era solo la
Comision (Tribunal) Electoral, como recurrida, y la
Asamblea Nacional, como uno de los tres poderes del
Estado, no era ni recurrente ni recurrida. Por analogia se
insinua tambien que en el asunto de Planas contra Gil
Presidente de Filipinas no era parte directa sino tan solo el
Comisionado del Servicio Civil.
El argumento es de esos que, por su sutileza, provocan
una batalla de argucxias hasta sobre el filo de una navaja,
como se suele dicir. Es verdad que en el caso de Angara
la Asamblea Nacional no era parte directa porque de su
inclusion no habi necesidad; pero ¿cambia ello el aspecto
de la cuestion? ¿Se puede negar que alli habia conflicto
de jurisdicciones contituciones constitucionales entre la
Asamablea y la Comision electoral y que cuando, a
instancia de parte, se invoco y pidio la intervencioon de
esta Corte, la misma intermvino y se declaro competente
para hacer el deslinde constituticonal y finalmente
adjudico la zona disputada a la Comision (Tribunal)
Electoral? Supongase que una mayoria de los miembros
de la Asamblea Nacional, pasando por encima de la
sentencia de esta Corte, hubieran insistido en hacer
efectiva la confirmacion del acta de Angara y le hubieran
dado un asiento en los escanos de dicha Asamblea,
despojando a la Comision Electoral de su derecho de
conocer y enjuiciar la protesta de Insua ?hubiera ello
modificado la fase fundamental del caso, haciendo
constitucional lo que era anticonstitucional, y hubiera
perdido este Tribunal Supremo la jurisdiccion para
entender del asunto? Indudablemente que no: la infraccion
de la Constitucion seria misma, tal vez mayor y mas grave;
y la jurisdiccion de este Tribunal para interveneir en el
conflicto, mas obligada y mas forzosa, a fin de mantener
inviolada la suprema Ley de la nacion. En otras palabras,
la inhibicion judicial no seria una actitud mas correcta, mas
sana y mas prudente tan solo porque la infraccion de la
Constitucion fuera mas audaz y mas agresiva. Aqui no
habria medias tintas: to be or not to be, que dijo Hamlet.
Y lo propio se puede decir del asunto de Planas contra Gil.
Es verdad que el Presidente no estaba nombrado como
parte directa en el litigio. Pero ?que mas da? ?No se
trataba de una orden ejecutiva expedida por directa completamente ultra vires. Y no es necesario que
autorizacion del Presidente? Y asi como se pudo dictar repitamos los argumentos ya extensamente desarrollados
una sentencia a favor del recurrido por el fundamento de acercade este punto.
que con la expedicion de la orden cuestionada el
Presidente ne se habia extralimitado de sus facultades
Todas las autoridades que se citan en la decision de la
constitucionales y estatutorias, a sensu contrario tambien
mayoria en el asunto de Alejandrino tienen la misma
se hubiera podido dictar una sentencia adversa, es decir,
ratiodecidendi, el mismo leit motif. Se trata de casos en
si se hubiese tratado de un acto ejecutivo que cae fuera
que los actos discutidos recaian dentro de las facultades
de las facultades conferidas al Presidente por la
constitucionales del poder envuelto en el litigio; de ahi la
Constitucion; y en este ultimo caso la sentencia no hubiera
negativa del departamento judicial a intervenir, a
sido menos derogatoria tan solo porque hubiese estado
entrometerse.
dirigida contra el Comisionado del Servicio Civil que
actuaba por mandato directo del Presidente. El que esta a
las maduras, tambien debe estar a las duras. . . . Y si examinamos los precedentes locales sobre la materia,
vemos que la veta de la jurisprudencia tiene el mismo tipo,
la misma naturaleza. En el asunto de
Se nos dice, sin embargo, que el caso de Angara no es la
Barcelon contra Baker y Thompson (5 Jur. Fil., 89) se
cita pertinente aplicable, sino el de Alejandrino contra
declaro legal lo hecho por el Gobernador General por la
Quezon (46 Jur. Fil., 87, 151), decidido en 1924. El
razon de que caia dentro de sus poderes politicos o
Senador Alejandrino agredio a otro miembro del Senado
ejecutivos bajo la constitucion.
fuera de la sala de sesiones de resultas de un debate
acalorado. Con motivo del incidente la mayoria aprobo
una resulucion. suspendiendo a Alejandrino por un año y Lo propio se hizo en los siguientes asuntos:
privandole, ademas, de todas sus prerrogativas, privilegios
y emolumentos durante dicho periodo de tiempo.
Alejandrino planteo ante esta Corte una accion originaria Forbes contra Chuoco Tiaco y Crossfield, 16 Jur. Fil.,
535; Asunto de McCulloch Dick, 38 Jur. Fil., 43, 225, 240;
pidiendo la expedicion de una orden de mandamus o
interdicto para que se le repusiera en su cargo on todos Severino contra gobernador General y Junta Provincial de
los drechos y privilegios anexos. Se denego el recurso por Negros Occidental, 16 Jur. Fil., 369; Abueva contra Wood,
el fundamento de que esta Corte carecia de jurisdiccion 45 Jur. Fil., 643.
para conocer del asunto.
Al negarse esta Corte a revisar lo actuado por el Jefe
Ejecutivo en los casos citados, ha tenido indudablemente
Un somero examen del caso Alejandrino demuestra, sin
en cuenta el siguiente pronunciamiento del Chief
embargo, que no tiene ninguna paridad con el que nos
Justice Marshall en el citado asunto de Marburry vs.
ocupa. Es evidente que el Senado tenia el derecho de
Madison: "The Constitution itself endows the President
castigar a Alejandrino dentro de sus facultades
with certain important political powers in the exercise of
disciplinarias provistas por la ley organica — la Ley Jones.
which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable
Esta era una facultad discrecional y constitucional cuyo
onlyu to his country in his political character, and to his
ejercicio no podia ser regido ni revisado por ningun otro
own conscience." De modo que, en ultimo resultado, en
poder. Como hemos dicho mas arriba, cada poder es
tales casos se ha reconocido que el ejecutivo ha ejercido
arbitro unico y exclusivo dentro de su esfera
solamente sus poderes constitucionales; nada hay en
constitucional. (Planas contra Gil, 67 Phil., 62.) Ninguno
ellos que sugiera la idea de la inmunidad e
tiene derecho a entrometerse en la forma como se las
irresponsabilidad por una infraccion de la Constitucion.
arregla alli. Pero nuestro caso es completamente
diferente. Aqui los recurridos o la mayoria de los
Senadores han ejercido una facultad que Contra la pretension de que el departamento judicial no
constitucionalmente no les pertenece. Por tanto, han puede revisar los procedimientos de una Camara
traspasado los confined de su predio constitucional, legislativa en casos de extralimitacion constitucional y
invadiendo otro; por tanto, la Resolucion Pendatun es
dictar la orden correspondiente, militan varios precedentes
en la jurisprudencia americana. El mas conocido y
celebrado entre ellos es el asunto de Kilbourn vs.
Thompson (103 U.S., 168; 26 Law. ed., 377). En 1876 la
Camara de Representantes de los Estados Unidos aprobo
una resolucion disponiendo que se investigara cierta
compania en la que el gobierno federal, por medio del
Secretario de la Marina, habia hecho depositos
improvidentes de dinero publico. Se decia que la
compania estaba en quiebra y el gobierno federal era uno
de los mayores acreedores. Se alegaba, ademas, en la
resolucion que los tribunales eran impotentes para hacer
algo en el caso y proteger el interes publico. Se nombraba
en la resolucion un comite de cinco Representates para
efectuar la investigacion.
En el curso de la investigacion se le cito al recurrente
Hallet Kilbourn subpoena duces tecum para que produjera
ante el comite ciertos documentos y contestase ciertas
preguntas. Killbourn se nego a hacer lo uno y lo otro.
Kilbourn fue entonces arrestado por orden del Speaker y
como quiera que siguio rehusando contestar las mismas
preguntas formulada ahora por el Speaker y producir los
documentos requeridos por el comite, la Camara aprobo
otra resolucion disponiendo que Kilbourn fuese otra vez
arrestado y detenido en la carcel de Distrito de Columbia
hasta que se aviniese a cumplir la orden contenida en las
resoluciones de la Camara de representantes. Kilbourn no
Finalmente, la Corte dispuso que la causa contra
solo inistio en su negativa, sino que formulo una queja
Thompson, el sargento de armas, se devolviera al tribunal
contra el sargento de armas de la Camara y los cinco
de origen para ulteriores procedimientos. Se estimo el
miembros del Comite por "trespass for false
sobreseimiento con respecto a los miembros del comite
imprisonment," acusandoles de haberle arrancado de su
bajo el principio de la libertad parlamentaria de debate qu
casa mediante fuerza y detnido por 45 dias en la carcel.
les hacia imunes. A proposito de esto ultimo son muy
Elevado el asunto al Tribunal Supremo Federal, este
significativas las siguientes palabras de la Corte:
declaro que la resolucion de investigacion era
anticonstitucional; que la investigacion no tenia por objeto
una accion legislativa sino que era mas bien para una
inquisicion de caracter judicial; asi que la Corte declaro lo
siguiente:
In looking to the Preamble and Resolution under
which the committee acted, before which Mr.
Kilbourn refused to testify, we are of opinion that
the House of Representatives not only exceeded
the limit of its own authority, but assumed a
power which could only be properly exercised by
another branch of the government, because the
power was in its nature clearly judicial.
The Constitution declares that the judicial power
of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain. If
what we have said of the division of the powers
of the government among the three departments
be sound, this is equivalent to a declaration
that no judicial power is vested in the Congress
or either branch of it, save in the cases
specifically enumerated to which we have
referred . . .
We are of opinion, for these reasons, that the
Resolution of the House of Representatives
authorizing the investigation, was in excess of
the power conferred on that body by the
Constitution; that the committee, therefore, had
no lawful authority to require Mr. Kilbourn to
testify as a witness beyond what he voluntarily
chose to tell; that the orders and resolutions of
the House, and the warrant of the Speaker,
under which Mr. Kilbourn was improsined, are, in
like manner, void for want of jurisdiction in that
body, and that his imprisonment was without any
lawful authority. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103
U.S., 168; 26 Law. ed., 377.)
It is not necessary to decided here that there
may not be things done, in the one House or
other, of an extraordinary character, for which
the members who take part in the act may be
held legally responsible. If we could suppose the
members of these bodies so far to forget their
high functions and the noble instrument under
which they act as to imitate the Long Pariliament
in the execution of the Chief Magistrate of the
Nation, or to follow the example of the French
Assembly in assuming the functions of a court
for capital punishment, we are not prepared to
say that such an utter perversion of their powers
to a criminal purpose would be screened from
punishment by the constitutional provision for
freedom of debate. (Idem. p. 392.)
Ademas de la precedente cita, varias decisiones de los
mas altos tribunales pueden ictarse en apoyo de la
doctrina de que "todos los funcionarios, departamentos o
agencias gubernamentales estan sujetos a restriccion
judicial cuando obran fuereaa de sus facultades, legales o
constitucionales, y por virtud de dicha extralimitacion
privan a un ciudadano de sus derechos" (Osborn vs.
United States Bank, 9 Wheaton [U.S.], 739; Board of
Liquidation vs. McComb, 92 [U.S.], 531; United States vs.
Lee, 106 U.S., 196; Virginia Cases, 114 U.S., 311; Regan
vs. Farmers & Co., 154 U.S., 362; Smith vs. Ames, 169
U.S. 466; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; Philadelphia Co.
vs. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605.)
Respecto de la facultad judicial para expedir, en casos
apropiados, ordenes coercitivas dirigidas a funcionarios de
la Legislatura, hay en la jurisprudencia americana una
buena copia de autoridades. He aqui algunas de ellas:
. . . En el asunto Ex parte Pickett (24 Ala., 91) se
libro el mandamiento contra el Presidente de la
Camara de representantes para obligarle a que
certificara al Interventor de Cuentas Publicas la
cantidad a que tenia derecho el recurrente como
miembro de lal Camara como compensacion por
millaje y dietas. En el asunto de State vs. Elder
(31 Neb., 169), se libro el mandamiento para
obligar al Presidente de la Camara de
Representantes para que abriera y publicara los
resultados de la eleccion general. En el asunto
de State vs. Moffitt (5 Ohio, 350) se declaro que
procedia expedir un mandamus contra el
Presidente de la Camara de Representantes
para obligarle que certificara la eleccion y
nombramiento de funcionarios. En el asunto de
Wolfe vs. McCaull (76 Va., 87) se expidio el
mandmiento para obligar al Archivero de las
Nominas de la Camara de Representantes a
que imprimiera y publicara un proyecto de ley
aprobado por la Legislatura y, a solicitud, que
facilitara copia del mismo propiamente
certificada. (Veanse tambien los asuntos de
 Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U.S., 168;
Statee vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41People vs.
Marton, 156 N.Y., 136.)
(Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil, 87, 149.)
De lo expuesto resulta evidente que esta Corte tiene
facultad para dictar la sentencia y expedir el interdicto que
se solicita. La orden ira dirigida no contra el Senado de
Filipinas, entidad abastracta que nada ha hecho contra la
Constitucion. La orden resitringente ira dirigida contra los
recurridos en cuanto ellos intentan hacer efectiva una
resolucion que es ilegal, que es anticonstitucional, lo
mismo que se hizo en el asunto de Kilbourn. Se les
restringe y cohibe como se les restringiria y cohibiria si,
por ejemplo, en vez de la Resolucion Pendatun, hubieran
aporbado otra resolucion mandando a la carcel a los
recurrentes hasta que el Tribunal Electoral resuelva la
cuestion de sus actas. ¿Habria alguien que sostuviera que
si en tal caso vinieran a esta Corte los afectados para
pedir el adecuado remedio contra el atropello, esta Corte
no podria concederlo bajo la teoria de la sepracion de
poderes? Luego la cuestion se reduce a una de grado, de
tamaño de la transgresion constitucional; pero es obvio
que nuestra jurisdiccion y competencia no queda
condicionada por el volumen de la transgresion. ¿Y quien
diria en tal caso que el Senado de Filipinas ha sido el
sujeto de la orden de interdicto, con grave desdoro de sus
altos prestigios como uno de los tres poderes del Estado?
Puesto que la accion en el presente caso va dirigida no
contra el Senado como corporacion o institucion, sino
contra una mayoria de sus miembros como personas,
como individuos, si bien en su concepto de Senadores,
dicho se esta que tenemos competencia para conceder el
recurso, no solo por las razones constitucionales ya
expuestas, sino porque esta claramente reconocida y
definida dicha competencia en nuestros estatutos:
anteriormente en los articulos 226 y 516 de la Ley No. 190
(Cod. de Proc. Civ.), y ahora en la regla 67, secciones 2 y
4, Reglamento de los Tribunales. Estas disposiciones
legales prescriben que el mandamiento de inhibicion
(prohibition) puede expedirse a "una corporacion, junta,
o persona, en ejercicio de sus funciones judicales o
ministeriales, siempre que se demuestre que carecian de
competencia o se han extralimitado de ella en las
actuaciones que hayan practicado" (Planas contra Gil
ut supra). Sin embargo, se arguye que los recurridos como
Senadores no ejercen funciones judiciales ni ministeriales,
sino legislativas; luego la regla no es aplicable a ellos.
Pero es evidente que en el presente caso la funcion de
que se trata no es de caracter legislativo sino ministerial;
apenas es necesario decir que la Resolucion Pendatun no
es un acto legislativo. Bajo la Constitucion y los estatutos
el derecho de un miembro electo del Congreso a ser
admitido y a ocupar su asiento es de naturaleza
ministerial, imperativa. La Ley No. 725 del Commonwealth,
aprobada por el pasado Congreso para implimentar la Ley
Electoral con vista a Las elecciones nacionales del pasado
23 de Abril, dice en parte lo siguiente:
ART. 11. La Comision de Elecciones hara el
escrutinio de los resultados para Senadores tan
pronto como se hayan recibido las actas decada
provincia y ciaudad, pero no depues del viente
de mayo de milnovecientos cuarenta y seis.
Sera proclamados elegidos los dieciseis
candidatos inscritos que obtuvieren el mayor
numero de votos para el cargo de Seandor. En
caso de que apareciere de los resultados del
escrutinio de los votos para Senadores que dos
os mas candidatos han obtenido el mismo
numero de votos para el decimosexto puesto, la
Comision de Elecciones, despues de hacer
constar este hecho en el acta correspondiente,
celebrara otra sesion publica, previa notificacion
con tres dias de antelacion a todos los
candidatos empatados, para que ellos os sus
representantes debidamente autorizados
puedan estar presentes si asi lo desearen, en la
cual procedera al sorteo de los candidatos
empatados y proclamara el candidato que
saliere favorecido por la suerte. El condidato asi
proclamado tendra derecho a tomar posesion
del cargo del mismo modo que si hubiere sido
elegido por pluralidad de votos. Acto seguido, la
Comision de Elecciones levantara acta del
procedimiento seguido en el sorteo, de su
resultado y de la proclamacion subsiquiente. Se
enviaran copias cerfificadas de dicha acta por
correo certificado al Secretario del Senado y a
cada uno de os candidatos empatados.
Art. 12. . . . The candidates for Member of the
House of Representatives and those for Senator
who have been proclaimed elected by the
respective Board of Canvassers and the
Commission on Elections shall assume
office and shall hold regular session for the year
1946 on May 25, 1946 (las bastardillas son
nuestras).
Si bajo estas disposisciones legales los recurrentes tienen
el derecho de asumir el cargo, es obvio que los demas
Senadores, entre ellos los recurridos, tienen el correlativo
deber ministerial de no impedirles el ejercicio de ese
derecho, o dicho de otro modo, el correlativo deber
ministerial de admitirles para que tomen posesion de sus
cargos a la sola presentacion de sus credenciales que en
este caso viene a ser la proclama expedidda por la
Comision sobre Elecciones declarandolos electos
(Delegado Roxas, debates en la Asamblea
Constituyente, ut supra). Se dice que la frase shall assume
office, con ser imperative, no impone una obligacion
especifica de admitir a cualquier miembro electo, sino que
es tan solo un mandamiento, un directive al legislador
electo para que tome posesion de su cargo
inmediatamente, como si un candidato triunfante que, es
de presumir, se presento voluntariamente candidato y a lo
mejor gasto una fortuna para promover su eleccion,
necesitara de eseukase legislativo para asumir su oficio.
Pero concedamos por un momento, arguendo, que esa
disposicion legal no tiene mas que el significado de una
especie de conscripcion civil, todavia cabe preguntar:
¿como prodri el legislador electoasumir forzosamente
(shall) su cargo, si, por otro lado, un mayoria de sus
compañeros en conclave tuvieran la facultad discrecional
— que puede degenerar en arbitraria — de negarle el
asiento, siquiera sea con caracter temporal? ¿No seria ello
claramente un absurdo, un contrasentido? Luego la
conclusion logica y natural es que esa frase imperativa es
de doble via, esto es, tanto para admitir al miembro electo
como para que este asuma el cargo.
Se apunta el temor de que la intervencion judicial en el
caso que nos ocupa puede dar lugar a una grave
consecuencia — la de que una orden adversa sea
desobedecida por los recurridos, suscitandose por tal
motivo un conflicto de poderes. Pero, aparte de que el
deber — maxime si esta impuesto por la Constitucion y las
leyes — se tiene que cumplir rigurosamdnete por penoso
que fuese sin consideraciona las consecuencias, parece
impropio e injusto presumir que los recurridos sean
capaces, en un momento dado, de desplazar las
cuestiones que entraña la presente controversia del
elevado nivel en que deben discutirse y resolverse, en
medio de un atmosfera de absouta impersonalidad y
objetividad, libre de los miasmas de la pasion y suspicacia
Y no se diga, fulanizando ostensiblemente la cuestion que
cuando la judicatura, en el apropiado ejercicio de su
facultad de interpretar la Constitucion y los estatutos, dicta
un fallo adverso a ciertos intereses y a ciertos hombres
pertenecientes a otro poder del Estado, humilla y
empequeñece con ello a ese poder, colocandolo en
condicion inferior y subalterna. en los grandes conflictos y
disputas sobre la cosa publica lo que, en verdad,
empequeñece y deslustra no es el contrateimpo y reves
que se sufre — incidente inevitable en toda noble lid por la
razon, la verdad y la justicia — sino la falta de esa serena
dignidad, de ese sentido sobrio de propia inhibicion y
propio dominio paa aceptar y sufrir el reves, de todo eso
que es la mejor piedra de toque de la madurez politica y
de las virtudes publicas en un regimen de caracter popular
y democratico. Los hombres van y vienen, pasan con sus
miserias y sus disputas en la interminable caravana del
tiempo; las instituciones quedan, y eso es lo que importa
salvar a toda costa por encima de las pasiones y
caprichos transeuntes del momento.
Se esta corte tiene, segun la Constitucion, facultad para
conceder el remedio solictado, es de suponer que los
recurridos acataran el fallo que se dicte, pues son
hombres de orden y de ley, y seran los primeros en dar el
ejemplo de cumplir los mandatos de la Constitucion,
interpretados y aplicados por la judicatura; pero si — lo
que para nosotros es imposible que ocurra —
escudandose tras sus privilegios, llegaren al extremo de
cometer desacato, que cada cual asuma su
responsabilidad ante su conciencia, ante el pais y ante la
historia. Esta Corte habra cumplido solamente consu
deber, sin miedo y sin favor, y en la forma mejor que le
haya sido dable hacerlo en la medida de sus luces y
alcances.
En esta jurisdiccion tenemos un precedente tipico, claro y
terminante de orden coercitiva dirigida por el
departamento judicial al departamento ejecutivo del
gobierno. Nos referimos al asunto de
Concepcion contraParedes (42 Jur. Fil., 630) en el cual se
trataba de una solicitud de mandamiento de inhibicion
ordenando al recurrido Secretario de Justicia de inhibicion
ordenando al recurrido Secretario de Justicia que
desistiera de poner en vigor las disposiciones de la Ley
No. 2941 que exigia a los jueces de primera instancia que violencia. El sistema presidencial no tiene esa valvula. El
echasen suertes cada cinco años para el cambio de periodo que media de eleccion a eleccion es inflexible.
distritos. Esta Corte declaro que la ley popularmente Entre nosotros, por ejemplo, el periodo es de seis años
conocida por ley de la "loteria judicial" era para el Senado, y de cuatro años para la Camara de
anticonstitucional. Se concedio, por tanto, el mandamiento Representantes y los gobiernos provinciales y
de prohibicion, haciendose definitivo el interdicto municipales. Solamente se celebran elecciones especiales
preliminar expedido. para cubrir vacantes que ocurran entre unas elecciones
generales y otras. Se comprendera facilmente que bajo un
sistema asi es harto peligroso, es jugar con fuego el
Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente,
posibilitar situaciones donde el individuo y el pueblo no
desalentador de que el caso que nos ocupa no tiene
pueden buscar el amparo de la Constitucion y de las
remedio ni bajo la Constitucion ni bajo las leyes ordinarias.
leyes, bajo procesos ordenandos y expeditos, para
A los recurrentes se les dice que no tienen mas que un
proteger sus derechos.
recurso: esperar las elecciones y plantear directamente la
cuestion ante el pueblo elector. Si los recurrentes tienen
razon, el pueblo les reivindicara eleigiendoles o elevando En resumen, direcmos lo siguiente:
a su partido al poder, repudiando, en cambio, a los
recurridos o a su partido. algunas cosas se podrian decir
Tenemos una Constitucion escrita que representa el genio
acerca de este argumento. Se podria decir, por ejemplo,
politico y socio de nuestro pueblo, que encarna nuestra
que el remedio no es expedito ni adecuado porque la
historia, nuestras tradiciones, nuestra civilizacion y cultura
mayoria de los recurridos han sido elegidos para un
influida por las mas grandes civilizaciones y culturas
periodo de seis años, asi que no se les podra exigir
conocidas en el mundo. Esa Constitucion se escribio no
ninguna responsabilidad por tan largo tiempo. Se podria
solo para el Commonwealth, sino para la Republica: esta
decir tambien que en una eleccion politica entra muchos
hecha para perdurar y sobrevivir a todas las crisis y
factores, y es posible que la cuestion que se discute hoy,
vicisitudes. Sobrevivio casi milagrosamente a la peor de
con ser tan fervida y tan palpitante, quede, cuando llegue
estas — la ocupacion japonesa. Es un formidable
el caso, obscurecida por otros "issues" mas presionantes y
instrumento de libertad y democracia. Su modelo mas
decisvos. Tambien se podria decir que,
cercano es la Constitucion americana, pero en ciertos
independientemente de la justicia de su causa, un partido
respectos es una superacion del modelo. Uno de sus
minoritario siempre lucha con desventaja contra el partido
aspectos mas originales y progresivos es indudablemente
mayoritario.
la creacion del Tribunal Electoral. Esta reforma constituye
el valiente reconocimiento de una dura realidad, al propio
Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento tiempo que un energico remedio.
es que no cabe concebir que los redactores de la
Constitucion filipina hayan dejado en medio de nuestro
Pero en las constituciones la letra no es el todo, ni siquiera
sistema de gobierno un peligroso vacio en donde quedan
lo principal. Lo imporatante, lo fundamental es el espiritu,
paralizados los resortes de la Constitucion y de la ley, y el
el caracter del pueblo; son las practicas, las costumbres,
ciudadano queda inerme, importente frente a lo que el
los habitos politicos que vivifican e implementan la letra
considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los
esrita que es inorganica e inerte. Exceptuando el
redactores de la Constitucion conocian muy bien nuestro
parentesis tragico de la guerraa, nuestra Constitucion lleva
sistema de gobierno — sistema presidenecial. Sabian
unos ocho años de vigencia. En ese breve periodo de
mauy bien que este no tiene la flexibilidad del tipo ingles
tiempo se ha formado en su derredor una limitada
— el parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en los paises que
jurisprudencia, encaminada a robustecerla y expandirla
siguen su sistema hay una magnifica valvula de seguridad
como intrumento de libertad y democracia. Los casos de
politica; cuando surge una grave crisis, de esas que
Angara y Planas, tan copiosamente comentados en esta
sacuden los cimientos de la nacion, el parlamento se
modesta disidencia, son tipicamente representativos de
disuelve y se convocan elecciones generales para que el
esa magnifica tendencia. La custion ahoraa es si esta ha
pueblo decida los grandes "issues" del dia. Asi se
de poder continuar sin estorbos, sin trabas, o ha de sufrir
consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin sangre, sin
un serio reves en su marcha ascendente. Nuestro sentir x-----------------------x A.M. No. 10-2-5- FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN
es que se debe permitir el ordenado desenvolvimiento de IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SC NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP
la Constitucion en toda su anchura, bajo los amplisimos SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE (KADAMAY) SECRETARY
auspicios de la libertad, en terminos y perspectivas que CONSTITUTION TO GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO;
hagan de ella la formidable herramienta de democracia y APPOINTMENTS TO THE ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG
justicia que debe ser. JUDICIARY, KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, PARA SA KAUNLARAN
¡ Ojala el resultado del presente asunto no sea parte para Petitioner, (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN
estorbar ese desenvolvimiento! x-----------------------x LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG
JOHN G. PERALTA, G.R. No. 191149 PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN
Petitioner, PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
- versus - STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN
JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF
(JBC). STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent. (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS
PETER IRVING CORVERA; GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, G. R. No. CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT
Petitioner, 191002 CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE
ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN
- versus - MA. CRISTINA ANGELA
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S GUEVARRA;
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL LAWYERS;
(JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO, MARLOU B. UBANO; ANN P. ROSALES;
Respondents
. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS
x-----------------------x PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR ORGANIZATION OF THE
JAIME N. SORIANO, G.R. No. 191032 CHAPTER, represented by its PHILIPPINES, represented by
Petitioner, Immediate Past President, ATTY. YOLANDA QUISUMBING-
ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO
- versus - latter in his own personal capacity DEMAISIP; TERESITA
as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL BAR; VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA;
(JBC), MARILYN STA. ROMANA;
Respondent. MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; LEONILA DE JESUS; and
x-----------------------x GUINEVERE DE LEON.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION G.R. No. 191057 BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN Intervenors.
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Petitioner, CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO,
SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO JR., (IBP
- versus - M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION Governor–Southern Luzon), and
FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL ADVANCE-MENT OF (IBP Governor–Eastern Visayas), G.R. No. 191342
(JBC), GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Petitioners,
Respondent. (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN
 - versus -
presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002[1] and
(JBC),
Respondent. dilemmas. May the incumbent President appoint his G.R. No. 191149[2] as special civil actions
x-----------------------x
successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII for certiorari andmandamus, praying that the JBC be
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of
Petitioner,
President or Acting President from making appointments at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief
G.R. No. 191420
within two months immediately before the next presidential Justice.
Present:
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO, appointments to executive positions when continued In G.R. No. 191032,[3] Jaime N. Soriano, via his
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger petition for prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from
MORALES,
VELASCO, JR., public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), conducting its search, selection and nomination
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which proceedings for the position of Chief Justice.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and CASTRO,
HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA BRION, provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, PERALTA,
Respondents. BERSAMIN, filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, matter of the appointment of his successor? May the for mandamus,[4] the Philippine Constitution Association
VILLARAMA,
JR., Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of (PHILCONSA) wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ. screening the candidates nominated or being considered for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief

Promulgated: to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010,
March 17, 2010
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------- nominees to the incumbent President even during the because the incumbent President is not covered by the
-------------x
period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII? prohibition that applies only to appointments in the
DECISION
Doesmandamus lie to compel the submission of the Executive Department.
BERSAMIN, J.:
shortlist of nominees by the JBC?

In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC,[5] petitioner

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato
Precís of the Consolidated Cases Estelito M. Mendoza, a former Solicitor General, seeks a
S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
ruling from the Court for the guidance of the JBC on
whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to respectively (Valenzuela),[7] by which the Court held that acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring the

the Judiciary. Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the submission of the list of nominees to the President; and

President of the power to appoint to judicial positions that a “final and definitive resolution of the constitutional
[6]
In G.R. No. 191342, which the Court consolidated during the period therein fixed. questions raised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in

on March 9, 2010 with the petitions earlier filed, petitioners the legal community that would go a long way to keep and

Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting, Integrated In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system.”[9]

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal

and Eastern Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and luminaries – one side holds that the incumbent President In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that

restrain the JBC from submitting a list of nominees for the is prohibited from making appointments within two months the JBC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting

position of Chief Justice to the President for appointment immediately before the coming presidential elections and to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it resolved

during the period provided for in Section 15, Article VII. until the end of her term of office as President on June 30, unanimously on January 18, 2010 to open the search,

2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies nomination, and selection process for the position of Chief

All the petitions now before the Court pose as the only to appointments to executive positions that may Justice to succeed Chief Justice Puno, because the

principal legal question whether the incumbent President influence the election and, anyway, paramount national appointing authority for the position of Chief Justice is the

can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during Supreme Court itself, the President’s authority being

retirement. That question is undoubtedly impressed with the election ban – has impelled the JBC to defer the limited to the appointment of the Members of the Supreme

transcendental importance to the Nation, because the decision to whom to send its list of at least three nominees, Court. Hence, the JBC should not intervene in the process,

appointment of the Chief Justice is any President’s most whether to the incumbent President or to her unless a nominee is not yet a Member of the Supreme

important appointment. successor.[8] He opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating Court.[10]

unto itself “the judicial function that is not conferred upon it

A precedent frequently cited is In Re by the Constitution,” which has limited it to the task of

Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not For its part, PHILCONSA observes in its petition

Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the empowered it to “finally resolve constitutional questions, in G.R. No. 191057 that “unorthodox and exceptional

Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of which is the power vested only in the Supreme Court circumstances spawned by the discordant interpretations,

Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, under the Constitution.” As such, he contends that the JBC due perhaps to a perfunctory understanding, of Sec. 15,
Art. VII in relation to Secs. 4(1), 8(5) and 9, Art. VIII of the appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three

Constitution” have bred “a frenzied inflammatory legal Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. [13]
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for

debate on the constitutional provisions mentioned that has every vacancy.”

divided the bench and the bar and the general public as The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 insist that

well, because of its dimensional impact to the nation and there is an actual controversy, considering that the “JBC On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V.

the people,” thereby fashioning “transcendental questions has initiated the process of receiving applications for the Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a

or issues affecting the JBC’s proper exercise of its position of Chief Justice and has in fact begun the letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for

“principal function of recommending appointees to the evaluation process for the applications to the position,” and nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be

Judiciary” by submitting only to the President (not to the “is perilously near completing the nomination process and commenced immediately.

next President) “a list of at least three nominees prepared coming up with a list of nominees for submission to the

by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy” from President, entering into the period of the ban on midnight In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc,

which the members of the Supreme Court and judges of appointments on March 10, 2010,” which “only highlights therefore, the JBC passed a resolution, [15]
which reads:

the lower courts may be appointed.”[11] PHILCONSA the pressing and compelling need for a writ of prohibition
The JBC, in its en
further believes and submits that now is the time to revisit to enjoin such alleged ministerial function of submitting the banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the
and review Valenzuela, the “strange and exotic Decision of list, especially if it will be cone within the period of the ban process of filling up the position of
Chief Justice to be vacated on May
the Court en banc.” [12]
on midnight appointments.”[14] 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the
incumbent Chief Justice Honorable
Reynato S. Puno.

Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 Antecedents It will publish the opening of
the position for applications or
that mandamus can compel the JBC “to immediately recommendations; deliberate on the
list of candidates; publish the names
transmit to the President, within a reasonable time, its These cases trace their genesis to the of candidates; accept comments on or
opposition to the applications; conduct
nomination list for the position of chief justice upon the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming public interviews of candidates; and
prepare the shortlist of candidates.
mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17,
As to the time to submit this
compliance with its mandated duty under the Constitution” 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under shortlist to the proper appointing
authority, in the light of the
in the event that the Court resolves that the President can Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article
Constitution, existing laws and
VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
 jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and
will consider all views on the matter. The announcement was published on January Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita

18 January 2010. 20, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Carpio Morales.[19] Declining their nominations were Atty.

Star.[17] Henry Villarica (via telephone conversation with the

Executive Officer of the JBC on February 5, 2010) and

(sgd.)
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC Atty. Gregorio M. Batiller, Jr. (via telephone conversation
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
“automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice with the Executive Officer of the JBC onFebruary 8,
Clerk of Court &
the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, 2010).[20]
Ex-Officio Secretary
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Judicial and Bar Council
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC

Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Judge Florentino Floro (for failure to meet the standards
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. set by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-
Justice for application or recommendation, and published
However, the last two declined their nomination through Ignacio of the Office of the Ombudsman (due to cases
for that purpose its announcement dated January 20,
letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, pending in the Office of the Ombudsman).[21]
[16]
2010, viz:
respectively.[18]

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved

The Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) announces the opening for
Others either applied or were nominated. Victor to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of
application or recommendation, of the
position of CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
Fernandez, the retired Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, the following candidates to invite the public to file their
SUPREME COURT, which will be
vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the applied, but later formally withdrew his name from sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not
retirement of the incumbent Chief
Justice, HON. REYNATO S. PUNO. consideration through his letter dated February 8, 2010. later than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice
Applications or Candidates who accepted their nominations without Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice
recommendations for this position
must be submitted not later than 4 conditions were Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro,
February 2010 (Thursday) to the JBC
Secretariat xxx: Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval.

Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion; and Associate Justice The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily

Edilberto G. Sandoval (Sandiganbayan). Candidates who Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February 13,

accepted their nominations with conditions were Associate 2010.[22]

 Section 15, Article VII of the
ruling from the Court, the integrity of the process and the Constitution applicable only to
positions in the Executive
Issues credibility of whoever is appointed to the position of Chief Department?

Justice, may irreparably be impaired.”[23] b. Assuming that the prohibition under

Although it has already begun the process for
the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in Accordingly, we reframe the issues as submitted by
accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on each petitioner in the order of the chronological filing of
when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the their petitions.
position due to the controversy now before us being yet
unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is marching in quick
step towards May 17, 2010 when the vacancy occurs upon
G.R. No. 191002
the retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
a. Does the JBC have the power and
authority to resolve the
The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous constitutional question of whether
the incumbent President can
debate not only among legal luminaries, but also among appoint a Chief Justice during the
election ban period?
non-legal quarters, and brought out highly disparate
b. Does the incumbent President
opinions on whether the incumbent President can appoint have the power and authority to
appoint during the election ban
the next Chief Justice or not. Petitioner Mendoza notes the successor of Chief Justice
Puno when he vacates the
that in Valenzuela, which involved the appointments of two position of Chief Justice on his
retirement on May 17, 2010?
judges of the Regional Trial Court, the Court addressed
Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution also applies to
members of the Judiciary, may
such appointments be excepted
because they are impressed with
public interest or are demanded
by the exigencies of public
service, thereby justifying these
appointments during the period
of prohibition?
c. Does the JBC have the authority to
decide whether or not to include
and submit the names of
nominees who manifested
interest to be nominated for the
position of Chief Justice on the
understanding that his/her
nomination will be submitted to
the next President in view of the
prohibition against presidential
appointments from March 11,
2010 until June 30, 2010?
A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC
a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution apply to
appointments to positions in the
Judiciary under Section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution?

this issue now before us as an administrative matter “to G.R. No. 191032
avoid any possible polemics concerning the matter,” but he
a. Is the power to appoint the Chief
Justice vested in the Supreme
opines that the polemics leading to Valenzuela “would be
Court en banc?
miniscule [sic] compared to the “polemics” that have now
G.R. No. 191057
erupted in regard to the current controversy,” and that
a. Is the constitutional prohibition
unless “put to a halt, and this may only be achieved by a against appointment under
b. May President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo make appointments to the
Judiciary after March 10, 2010,
including that for the position of
Chief Justice after Chief Justice
Puno retires on May 17, 2010?
G.R. No. 191149
a. Does the JBC have the discretion
to withhold the submission of the
 short list to President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo?
G.R. No. 191342
a. Does the JBC have the authority
to submit the list of nominees to
the incumbent President without
committing a grave violation of
the Constitution and
jurisprudence prohibiting the
incumbent President from
making midnight appointments
two months immediately
preceding the next presidential
elections until the end of her
term?
b. Is any act performed by the JBC,
including the vetting of the
candidates for the position of
Chief Justice, constitutionally
invalid in view of the JBC’s illegal
composition allowing each
member from the Senate and the
House of Representatives to
have one vote each?
On February 16, 2010, the Court directed the
JBC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
comment on the consolidated petitions, except that filed
in G.R. No. 191342.
On February 26, 2010, the JBC submitted its
comment, reporting therein that the next stage of the
process for the selection of the nominees for the position
of Chief Justice would be the public interview of the
candidates and the preparation of the short list of
candidates, “including the interview of the constitutional principal function under the Constitution to recommend
experts, as may be needed.” [24] [25]
It stated: appointees in the Judiciary; (b) the JBC’s function to
recommend is a “continuing process,” which does not
Likewise, the JBC has yet to take
a position on when to submit the begin with each vacancy or end with each nomination,
shortlist to the proper appointing
authority, in light of Section 4 (1), because the goal is “to submit the list of nominees to
Article VIII of the Constitution,
which provides that vacancy in Malacañang on the very day the vacancy arises”;[26] the
the Supreme Court shall be filled
within ninety (90) days from the JBC was thus acting within its jurisdiction when it
occurrence thereof, Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution commenced and set in motion the process of selecting the
concerning the ban on
Presidential appointments “two nominees to be submitted to the President for the position
(2) months immediately before
the next presidential elections of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno;[27] (c)
and up to the end of his term”
and Section 261 (g), Article XXII petitioner Soriano’s theory that it is the Supreme Court, not
of the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines. the President, who has the power to appoint the Chief
Justice, is incorrect, and proceeds from his
12. Since the Honorable Supreme
Court is the final interpreter of the
misinterpretation of the phrase “members of the Supreme
Constitution, the JBC will be
guided by its decision in these
Court” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution as
consolidated Petitions and
Administrative Matter. referring only to the Associate Justices, to the exclusion of
the Chief Justice; [28] (d) a writ of mandamus can issue to
compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the
On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted
President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at
its comment, essentially stating that the incumbent
least three nominees is unqualified, and the submission of
President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to
upon his retirement by May 17, 2010.
perform under the Constitution; as such, the JBC, the
nature of whose principal function is executive, is not
The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition
vested with the power to resolve who has the authority to
cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its
appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore, has no
discretion to withhold the list from the President; [29] and (e)
a writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the JBC to
include or exclude particular candidates as nominees,
considering that there is no imperative duty on its part to
include in or exclude from the list particular individuals, but,
on the contrary, the JBC’s determination of who it
nominates to the President is an exercise of
[30]
discretionary duty.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President
may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It
argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be
filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; [31]
that in their
deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment
of Supreme Court Justices, the framers neither mentioned
nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments, or
[32]
its effects on such period, or vice versa; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so
in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition
found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written
in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers
also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or
limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of
the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
“political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,”[33] such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified
a period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme
Court Justice.
The OSG posits that
although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC
Judges, the situation now refers to the appointment of the
next Chief Justice to which the prohibition does not apply;
that, at any rate, Valenzuela even recognized that there
might be “the imperative need for an appointment during
the period of the ban,” like when the membership of the
Supreme Court should be “so reduced that it will have no
quorum, or should the voting on a particular important
question requiring expeditious resolution be
[34]
divided”; and that Valenzuela also recognized that the
filling of vacancies in the Judiciary is undoubtedly in the
public interest, most especially if there is any compelling
reason to justify the making of the appointments during the
period of the prohibition.[35]
Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now
undeniably compelling reasons for the incumbent
President to appoint the next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a
deluge of cases involving sensitive political issues is “quite
expected”;[36] (b) the Court acts as the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President and Vice President and, as
such, has “the power to correct manifest errors on the
statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass
(COC)”;[37] (c) if history has shown that during ordinary
times the Chief Justice was appointed immediately upon
the occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the
effectivity of the Constitution, there is now even more
reason to appoint the next Chief Justice immediately upon
the retirement of Chief Justice Puno;[38] and (d) should the
next Chief Justice come from among the incumbent
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, thereby causing
a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to
start the selection process for the filling up of the vacancy
in accordance with the constitutional mandate.[39]
On March 9, 2010, the Court admitted the
following comments/oppositions-in-intervention, to wit:

(a) The opposition-in-intervention
dated February 22, 2010 of Atty.
Peter Irving Corvera (Corvera);[40]
(b) The opposition-in-intervention
dated February 22, 2010 of Atty.
Christian Robert S. Lim (Lim);
(c) The opposition-in-intervention
dated February 23, 2010 of Atty.
Alfonso V. Tan, Jr. (Tan);
(d) The comment/opposition-in-
intervention dated March 1,
2010 of the National Union of
People’s Lawyers (NUPL);
(e) The opposition-in-intervention
dated February 25, 2010 of Atty.
Marlou B. Ubano (Ubano);
(f) The opposition-in-intervention
dated February 25, 2010 of
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Davao del Sur Chapter and its
Immediate Past President, Atty.
Israelito P. Torreon (IBP- Davao
del Sur);
(g) The opposition-in-intervention
dated February 26, 2010 of Atty.
Mitchell John L. Boiser (Boiser);
(h)The consolidated
comment/opposition-in-
intervention dated February 26,
2010 of BAYAN Chairman Dr.
Carolina P. Araullo; BAYAN
Secretary General Renato M.
Reyes, Jr.; Confederation for
Unity, Recognition and
Advancement of Government
Employees (COURAGE)
Chairman Ferdinand Gaite;
Kalipunan ng Damayang
Mahihirap (KADAMAY) Secretary
General Gloria Arellano; Alyansa Section 15, Article VII, the outgoing President is
ng Nagkakaisang Kabataan ng
Samayanan Para sa Kaunlaran constitutionally banned from making any appointments
(ANAKBAYAN) Chairman Ken
from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010, including the
Leonard Ramos; Tayo ang Pag-
asa Convenor Alvin Peters;
League of Filipino Students appointment of the successor of Chief Justice Puno.
(LFS) Chairman James Mark
Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the JBC to
Terry Lacuanan Ridon; National
Union of Students of the
Philippines (NUSP) Chairman submit the list of nominees to the outgoing President if the
Einstein Recedes, College
constitutional prohibition is already in effect. Tan adds that
Editors Guild of the Philippines
(CEGP) Chairman Vijae
Alquisola; and Student Christian the prohibition against midnight appointments was applied
Movement of the Philippines
by the Court to the appointments to the Judiciary made by
(SCMP) Chairman Ma. Cristina
Angela Guevarra (BAYAN et al.);
then President Ramos, with the Court holding that the duty
(i) The opposition-in-intervention
of the President to fill the vacancies within 90 days from
dated March 3, 2010 of Walden
F. Bello and Loretta Ann P.
occurrence of the vacancies (for the Supreme Court) or
Rosales (Bello et al.); and
from the submission of the list (for all other courts) was not
(j) The consolidated
comment/opposition-in- an excuse to violate the constitutional prohibition.
intervention dated March 4, 2010
of the Women Trial Lawyers
Organization of the Philippines
(WTLOP), represented by Atty. Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP,
Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana;
Atty. Belleza Alojado Demaisip; BAYAN et al., and Bello et al. oppose the insistence
Atty. Teresita Gandionco-Oledan;
Atty. Ma. Verena Kasilag- that Valenzuela recognizes the possibility that the
Villanueva; Atty. Marilyn Sta.
Romana; Atty. Leonila de Jesus; President may appoint the next Chief Justice if exigent
and Atty. Guinevere de Leon
(WTLOP). circumstances warrant the appointment, because that
recognition is obiter dictum; and aver that the absence of a
Chief Justice or even an Associate Justice does not cause
Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera,
epic damage or absolute disruption or paralysis in the
IBP Davao del Sur, and NUPL take the position that De
operations of the Judiciary. They insist that even without
Castro’s petition was bereft of any basis, because under
the successor of Chief Justice Puno being appointed by
the incumbent President, the Court is allowed to sit and
adjudge en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven
members at its discretion; that a full membership of the
Court is not necessary; that petitioner De Castro’s fears
are unfounded and baseless, being based on a mere
possibility, the occurrence of which is entirely unsure; that
it is not in the national interest to have a Chief Justice
whose appointment is unconstitutional and, therefore, void;
and that such a situation will create a crisis in the judicial
system and will worsen an already vulnerable political
situation.
ice is imperative for the stability of the judicial system and
the political situation in the country when the election-
related questions reach the Court as false, because there
is an existing law on filling the void brought about by a
vacancy in the office of Chief Justice; that the law is
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which has not
been repealed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or any other
law; that a temporary or an acting Chief Justice is not
anathema to judicial independence; that the designation of
an acting Chief Justice is not only provided for by law, but
is also dictated by practical necessity; that the practice was
intended to be enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, but the
Commissioners decided not to write it in the Constitution
on account of the settled practice; that the practice
was followed under the 1987 Constitution, when, in 1992,
at the end of the term of Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan,
Associate Justice Andres Narvasa assumed the position
as Acting Chief Justice prior to his official appointment as
Chief Justice; that said filling up of a vacancy in the office
of the Chief Justice was acknowledged and even used by
analogy in the case of the vacancy of the Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, per Brillantes v. Yorac, 192
SCRA 358; and that the history of the Supreme Court has
shown that this rule of succession has been repeatedly
observed and has become a part of its tradition.
Intervenors Ubano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and
Lim maintain that the Omnibus Election Code penalizes as
an election offense the act of any government official who
appoints, promotes, or gives any increase in salary or
remuneration or privilege to any government official or
employee during the period of 45 days before a regular
election; that the provision covers all appointing heads,
officials, and officers of a government office, agency or
instrumentality, including the President; that for the
incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice
upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno, or during the
period of the ban under the Omnibus Election
Code, constitutes an election offense; that even an
appointment of the next Chief Justice prior to the election
ban is fundamentally invalid and without effect because
there can be no appointment until a vacancy occurs; and
that the vacancy for the position can occur only by May 17,
2010.
Intervenor Boiser adds that De Castro’s prayer
to compel the submission of nominees by the JBC to the
incumbent President is off-tangent because the position of
Chief Justice is still not vacant; that to speak of a list, much
more a submission of such list, before a vacancy occurs is
glaringly premature; that the proposed advance
appointment by the incumbent President of the next Chief
Justice will be unconstitutional; and that no list of
nominees can be submitted by the JBC if there is no
vacancy.
All the intervenors-oppositors submit that Section
15, Article VII makes no distinction between the kinds of
appointments made by the President; and that the Court,
inValenzuela, ruled that the appointments by the President
of the two judges during the prohibition period were void.
Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply only to the
appointments in the Executive Department, but also to
judicial appointments, contrary to the submission of
PHILCONSA; that Section 15 does not distinguish; and
that Valenzuela already interpreted the prohibition as
applicable to judicial appointments.
Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner
Soriano’s contention that the power to appoint the Chief
Justice is vested, not in the President, but in the Supreme
Court, is utterly baseless, because the Chief Justice is also Chief Justice during the period of prohibition; that even if nominees to the President by the JBC is a matter of right

a Member of the Supreme Court as contemplated under the JBC has already come up with a short list, it still has to under law.

Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at any rate, the term bow to the strict limitations under Section 15, Article VII;

“members” was interpreted in Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. that should the JBC defer submission of the list, it is not The main question presented in all the filings

No. L-1612, February 26, 1948) to refer to the Chief arrogating unto itself a judicial function, but simply herein – because it involves two seemingly conflicting

Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court; respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution; and that provisions of the Constitution – imperatively demands the

that PHILCONSA’s prayer that the Court pass a resolution the application of the general rule in Section 15, Article attention and resolution of this Court, the only authority

declaring that persons who manifest their interest as VII to the Judiciary does not violate the principle of that can resolve the question definitively and finally. The

nominees, but with conditions, shall not be considered separation of powers, because said provision is an imperative demand rests on the ever-present need, first, to

nominees by the JBC is diametrically opposed to the exception. safeguard the independence, reputation, and integrity of

arguments in the body of its petition; that such glaring the entire Judiciary, particularly this Court, an institution

inconsistency between the allegations in the body and the Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et that has been unnecessarily dragged into the harsh

relief prayed for highlights the lack of merit of al. state that the JBC’s act of nominating appointees to polemics brought on by the controversy; second, to settle

PHILCONSA’s petition; that the role of the JBC cannot be the Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does not once and for all the doubt about an outgoing President’s

separated from the constitutional prohibition on the involve the exercise of judgment; that there can be no power to appoint to the Judiciary within the long period

President; and that the Court must direct the JBC to follow default on the part of the JBC in submitting the list of starting two months before the presidential elections until

the rule of law, that is, to submit the list of nominees only nominees to the President, considering that the call for the end of the presidential term; and third, to set a definite

to the next duly elected President after the period of the applications only begins from the occurrence of the guideline for the JBC to follow in the discharge of its

constitutional ban against midnight appointments has vacancy in the Supreme Court; and that the primary office of screening and nominating qualified

expired. commencement of the process of screening of applicants persons for appointment to the Judiciary.

to fill the vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice only

Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the begins from the retirement on May 17, 2010, for, prior to Thus, we resolve.

JBC – because it is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial this date, there is no definite legal basis for any party to

body – has no duty under the Constitution to resolve the claim that the submission or non-submission of the list of Ruling of the Court

question of whether the incumbent President can appoint a

 Locus Standi of Petitioners
The preliminary issue to be settled is whether or
not the petitioners have locus standi.
Black defines locus standi as “a right
appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.”[41] In public or constitutional litigations, the Court
is often burdened with the determination of the locus
standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to
regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to
correct any official action or policy in order to avoid
obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and
offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore,
that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr.
v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:[42]
The question on legal standing
is whether such parties have “alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”[43] Accordingly, it has been
held that the interest of a person
assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal.
He must be able to show, not only that
the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is
in imminent danger of sustaining some “transcendental importance.” Some notable controversies
direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were
suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
It must appear that the person allowed to be treated in the same way as in Araneta v.
complaining has been or is about to
be denied some right or privilege to Dinglasan.[51]
which he is lawfully entitled or that he
is about to be subjected to some
of burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.[44] In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on
Elections,[52] this Court decided to resolve the issues raised
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. by the petition due to their “far-reaching implications,” even
Vera,[45] the Court adopted the direct injury test for if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The
determining whether a petitioner in a public action liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has
had locus standi.There, the Court held that the person who been adopted in
would assail the validity of a statute must have “a personal several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legis
and substantial interest in the case such that he has lators, and civic
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a organizations to bring their suits involving the
result.” Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and
Senate,[46] Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De rulings.[53]
la Fuente,[47] Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v.
Felix,[48] and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.[49] However, the assertion of a public right as a
predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or
unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement
theory that the petitioner represents the public in general.
of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can
Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected
be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For
instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan,[50] the Court by the action complained against as are others, it is
liberalized the approach when the cases had enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that
he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the Faculty of the College of Law of the University of the

vindication of a public right. Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No. 191002), Philippines.

Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Peralta (G.R. No. 191149)

Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public all assert their right as citizens filing their petitions on The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 are the

action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issue Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

That is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to of the appointment of the next Chief Justice. De Castro for Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas. They allege that

concern only the public in general, such capacities and Soriano further claim standing as taxpayers, with they have the legal standing to enjoin the submission of

nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to Soriano averring that he is affected by the continuing the list of nominees by the JBC to the President, for “[a]n

sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[54] the Court aptly proceedings in the JBC, which involve “unnecessary, if not, adjudication of the proper interpretation and application of

explains why: illegal disbursement of public funds.” [59]

the constitutional ban on midnight appointments with

regard to respondent JBC’s function in submitting the list of

Case law in most jurisdictions
now allows both “citizen” and PHILCONSA alleges itself to be a non-stock, nominees is well within the concern of petitioners, who are
“taxpayer” standing in public actions.
The distinction was first laid down non-profit organization existing under the law for the duty bound to ensure that obedience and respect for the
in Beauchamp v. Silk,[55] where it was
held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s purpose of defending, protecting, and preserving the Constitution is upheld, most especially by government
suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the Constitution and promoting its growth and flowering. It also offices, such as respondent JBC, who are specifically
former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in alleges that the Court has recognized its legal standing to tasked to perform crucial functions in the whole scheme of
the latter, he is but the mere
instrument of the public concern. As file cases on constitutional issues in several cases.[60] our democratic institution.” They further allege that,
held by the New York Supreme Court
in People ex rel Case v. Collins:[56] “In reposed in them as members of the Bar, is a clear legal
matter of mere public right,
however…the people are the real In A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, Mendoza states that he interest in the process of selecting the members of the
parties…It is at least the right, if not
the duty, of every citizen to interfere is a citizen of the Philippines, a member of the Philippine Supreme Court, and in the selection of the Chief Justice,
and see that a public offence be
properly pursued and punished, and Bar engaged in the active practice of law, and a former considering that the person appointed becomes a member
that a public grievance be remedied.”
Solicitor General, former Minister of Justice, former of the body that has constitutional supervision and
With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr
v. Jordan[57] held that “the right of a
Member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa and the authority over them and other members of the legal
citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful
Regular Batasang Pambansa, and former member of the profession.[61]
use of public funds to his injury cannot
be denied.”[58]
 The Court rules that the petitioners have each of an obstacle more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. Intervenor Tan raises the lack of any actual
[63]
demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the v.Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination,

controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus pointed out: “Standing is a peculiar concept in pointing out that petitioner De Castro has not even shown

standi. The issues before us are of transcendental constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not that the JBC has already completed its selection process

importance to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners brought by parties who have been personally injured by and is now ready to submit the list to the incumbent

in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the operation of a law or any other government act but by President; and that petitioner De Castro is merely

the petitioners), regardless of one’s personal interest in concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in presenting a hypothetical scenario that is clearly not

life, because they concern that great doubt about the the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the sufficient for the Court to exercise its power of judicial

authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only petitioners “are not covered by the definition, it is still within review.

the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement

also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already and so remove the impediment to its addressing and Intervenors Corvera and Lim separately opine

suffers from a far too great number of vacancies in the resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.” [64]
that De Castro’s petition rests on an overbroad and vague

ranks of trial judges throughout the country. allegation of political tension, which is insufficient basis for

Justiciability the Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

In any event, the Court retains the broad

discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in Intervenor NUPL maintains that there is no Intervenor BAYAN et al. contend that the

favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has actual case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for petitioners are seeking a mere advisory opinion on what

transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a adjudication, considering that although the selection the JBC and the President should do, and are not invoking

liberalization of the requirement.[62] process commenced by the JBC is going on, there is yet any issues that are justiciable in nature.

no final list of nominees; hence, there is no imminent

Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus controversy as to whether such list must be submitted to Intervenors Bello et al. submit that there exist no

standi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order the incumbent President, or reserved for submission to the conflict of legal rights and no assertion of opposite legal

to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of incoming President. claims in any of the petitions; that PHILCONSA does not

the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not allege any action taken by the JBC, but simply avers that

to shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone the conditional manifestations of two Members of the
Court, accented by the divided opinions and interpretations requires the President to appoint one from the short list to

of legal experts, or associations of lawyers and law We hold that the petitions set forth an actual fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief

students on the issues published in the daily newspapers case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the

are “matters of paramount and transcendental importance The reality is that the JBC already commenced the occurrence of the vacancy.

to the bench, bar and general public”; that PHILCONSA proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be

fails not only to cite any legal duty or allege any failure to included in a short list to be submitted to the President for The ripeness of the controversy for judicial

perform the duty, but also to indicate what specific action consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice determination may not be doubted. The challenges to the

should be done by the JBC; that Mendoza does not even Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and

attempt to portray the matter as a controversy or conflict of yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of to continue the process until the submission of the list of

rights, but, instead, prays that the Court should “rule for the nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to

guidance of” the JBC; that the fact that the Court has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list

supervises the JBC does not automatically imply that the the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, to the incumbent President; the counter-insistence of the

Court can rule on the issues presented in the Mendoza makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short

petition, because supervision involves oversight, which the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, list to the incumbent President on the ground that said list

means that the subordinate officer or body must first act, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the should be submitted instead to the next President; the

and if such action is not in accordance with prescribed “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.” strong position that the incumbent President is already

rules, then, and only then, may the person exercising prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any

oversight order the action to be redone to conform to the A part of the question to be reviewed by the appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on

prescribed rules; that the Mendoza petition does not allege Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary

that the JBC has performed a specific act susceptible to there being an insistence from some of the oppositors- position that the incumbent President is not so prohibited

correction for being illegal or unconstitutional; and that the intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the are only some of the real issues for determination. All such

Mendoza petition asks the Court to issue an advisory vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). issues establish the ripeness of the controversy,

ruling, not to exercise its power of supervision to correct a Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume considering that for some the short list must be

wrong act by the JBC, but to declare the state of the law in its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by May 17,

the absence of an actual case or controversy. provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly 2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction, or a merely
hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy will
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
surely settle – with finality – the nagging questions that are Department), provides: The Court agrees with the submission.

preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it

Section 15. Two months
already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to immediately before the next First. The records of the deliberations of the
presidential elections and up to the
desist from the rest of the process. end of his term, a President or Acting Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted
President shall not make
appointments, except temporary time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
appointments to executive positions
We need not await the occurrence of the when continued vacancies therein will Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the
prejudice public service or endanger
vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to public safety. organization and arrangement of the provisions of the

ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a Department), states: framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and

constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the manifest their vision of what the Constitution should
Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of Court shall be composed of a Chief contain.
Justice and fourteen Associate
the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or
to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the
Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of
occurrence thereof.
[65]
intelligently adjudicate the issues. Herein, the facts are government among the three great departments, the

not in doubt, for only legal issues remain. Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a
Substantive Merits
the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that true recognition of the principle of separation of powers
the incumbent President can appoint the successor of that underlies the political structure, as Constitutional
I
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply
Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a worthy member of
to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
or to other appointments to the Judiciary
on the ground that the prohibition against presidential the Court) explained in his sponsorship speech:
appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend
We have in the political part of
to appointments in the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in this Constitution opted for the
conflict. separation of powers in government
because we believe that the only way
 to protect freedom and liberty is to
separate and divide the awesome Had the framers intended to extend the the prohibition not being intended to apply to the
powers of government. Hence, we
return to the separation of powers prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
doctrine and the legislative, executive
and judicial departments.[66] appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should

have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the prevail.

meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the

Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the framers in the genesis of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz:

powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
V . Intent of the
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such Constitutional Commission

14, 15 and 16 of the Article. specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition The journal of the Commission
which drew up the present
against the President or Acting President making Constitution discloses that the original
proposal was to have an eleven-
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial appointments within two months before the next member Supreme Court.
Commissioner Eulogio Lerum wanted
Department and defines the duties and qualifications of presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s to increase the number of Justices to
fifteen. He also wished to ensure that
Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members that number would not be reduced for
any appreciable length of time (even
4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions of the Supreme Court. only temporarily), and to this end
proposed that any vacancy “must be
specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme filled within two months from the date
that the vacancy occurs.” His
Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the proposal to have a 15-member Court
was not initially adopted. Persisting
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made however in his desire to make certain
that the size of the Court would not be
by the President upon the submission of a list of at least Although Valenzuela[67] came to hold that the
decreased for any substantial period
as a result of vacancies, Lerum
three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot
proposed the insertion in the provision
(anent the Court’s membership) of the
mandates the President to fill the vacancy within90 days be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest
same mandate that “IN CASE OF
on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL
from the occurrence of the vacancy. BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS
Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior FROM OCCURRENCE
THEREOF.” He later agreed to
Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a suggestions to make the period three,
instead of two, months. As thus
former member of the Constitutional Commission, about amended, the proposal was
approved. As it turned out, however,
the Commission ultimately agreed on
a fifteen-member Court. Thus it was
that the section fixing the composition
of the Supreme Court came to include
a command to fill up any vacancy
therein within 90 days from its
occurrence.
In this connection, it may be
pointed out that that instruction that
any “vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days” (in the last sentence of
Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts
with the prohibition in Section 15,
Article VII, which is couched in
stronger negative language - that “a
President or Acting President shall
not make appointments…”
The commission later
approved a proposal of Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a Member
of this Court) to add to what is now
Section 9 of Article VIII, the following
paragraph: “WITH RESPECT TO
LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT
SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT
WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE
SUBMISSION OF THE LIST” (of
nominees by the Judicial and Bar
Council to the President). Davide
stated that his purpose was to provide
a “uniform rule” for lower
courts. According to him, the 90-day
period should be counted from
submission of the list of nominees to
the President in view of the possibility
that the President might reject the list
submitted to him and the JBC thus
need more time to submit a new one.
On the other hand, Section 15,
Article VII - which in effect deprives
the President of his appointing power
“two months immediately before the
next presidential elections up to the
end of his term” - was approved
without discussion.[68]
However, the reference to the records of the
Constitutional Commission did not advance or support the
result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records
disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine in
the Constitution, upon the initiative of Commissioner
Eulogio Lerum, “a command [to the President] to fill up any
vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence,” which
even Valenzuela conceded.[69] The exchanges
during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a
vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period
was a true mandate for the President, viz:
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand
that our justices now in the Supreme
Court, together with the Chief Justice,
are only 11.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And the
second sentence of this subsection
reads: “Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.”
MR. CONCEPCION. That is
right.
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a
mandate to the executive to fill the
vacancy?
MR. CONCEPCION. That is
right. That is borne out of the fact that
in the past 30 years, seldom has the
Court had a complete complement.[70]
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII
of the word shall – an imperative, operating to impose a
duty that may be enforced[71] – should not be disregarded.
Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President
the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member
of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will
be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1),
Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to
establish a definite mandate for the President as the
appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial
interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15,
Article VII prevailed because it was “couched in stronger
negative language.” Such interpretation even turned out to
be conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional
Commission’s deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

How Valenzuela justified its pronouncement and
result is hardly warranted. According to an authority on
statutory construction:[72]
xxx the court should seek to
avoid any conflict in the provisions of
the statute by endeavoring to
harmonize and reconcile every part so
that each shall be effective. It is not
easy to draft a statute, or any other
writing for that matter, which may not
in some manner contain conflicting
provisions. But what appears to the
reader to be a conflict may not have
seemed so to the drafter.
Undoubtedly, each provision was
inserted for a definite reason. Often by
considering the enactment in its
entirety, what appears to be on its
face a conflict may be cleared up and
the provisions reconciled.
Consequently, that
construction which will leave every
word operative will be favored over
one which leaves some word or
provision meaningless because of
inconsistency. But a word should not
be given effect, if to do so gives the
statute a meaning contrary to the
intent of the legislature. On the other
hand, if full effect cannot be given to
the words of a statute, they must be
made effective as far as possible. Nor
should the provisions of a statute
which are inconsistent be harmonized
at a sacrifice of the legislative
intention. It may be that two provisions
are irreconcilable; if so, the one which
expresses the intent of the law-makers
should control. And the arbitrary rule
has been frequently announced that
where there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the different
provisions of a statute, the provision
last in order of position will prevail,
since it is the latest expression of the like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false
legislative will. Obviously, the rule is
subject to deserved criticism. It is premises have been exposed.[74] It will not do to merely
seldom applied, and probably then
only where an irreconcilable conflict distinguishValenzuela from these cases, for the result to
exists between different sections of
the same act, and after all other be reached herein is entirely incompatible with
means of ascertaining the meaning of
the legislature have been exhausted. what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently,
Where the conflict is between two
statutes, more may be said in favor of Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin
the rule’s application, largely because
of the principle of implied repeal. of the unworthy and forgettable.
We reverse Valenzuela.
In this connection, PHILCONSA’s urging of a
revisit and a review of Valenzuela is timely and
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as
appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express
well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.
intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4
(1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision,
There is no question that one of the reasons
least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that
underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII
the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless
was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made
of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative. As
by anoutgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the
judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not
appointments dealt with in the leading case of Aytona v.
accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of the
Castillo.[75] In fact, in Valenzuela, the Court so observed,
[73]
framers.
stating that:
xxx it appears that Section 15,
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President
Article VII is directed against two types
of appointments: (1) those made for
from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that
buying votes and (2) those made for
partisan considerations. The first
Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the
refers to those appointments made
within the two months preceding a
Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation
Presidential election and are similar to
those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election
Code, viz.:
xxx
The second type of
appointments prohibited by Section
15, Article VII consists of the so-called
“midnight” appointments. In Aytona v.
Castillo, it was held that after the
proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal
as duly elected President, President
Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in
his bid for reelection, became no more
than a “caretaker” administrator whose
duty was to “prepare for the orderly
transfer of authority to the incoming
President.” Said the Court:
“The filling up of
vacancies in important
positions, if few, and so
spaced as to afford some
assurance of deliberate
action and careful
consideration of the need
for the appointment and
appointee's qualifications
may undoubtedly be
permitted. But the
issuance of 350
appointments in one night
and the planned induction
of almost all of them in a
few hours before the
inauguration of the new
President may, with some
reason, be regarded by
the latter as an abuse of
Presidential prerogatives,
the steps taken being
apparently a mere
partisan effort to fill all
vacant positions
irrespective of fitness and
other conditions, and
thereby to deprive the
new administration of an
opportunity to make the
corresponding
appointments.”
As indicated, the Court
recognized that there may well be
appointments to important positions
which have to be made even after the
proclamation of the new
President. Such appointments, so
long as they are “few and so spaced
as to afford some assurance of
deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee’s
qualifications,” can be made by the
outgoing President. Accordingly,
several appointments made by
President Garcia, which were shown
to have been well considered, were
upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a
broader scope than
the Aytona ruling. It may not
unreasonably be deemed to
contemplate not only “midnight”
appointments – those made obviously
for partisan reasons as shown by their
number and the time of their making –
but also appointments presumed
made for the purpose of influencing
the outcome of the Presidential
election.
On the other hand, the
exception in the same Section 15 of
Article VII – allowing appointments to
be made during the period of the ban
therein provided – is much narrower
than that recognized inAytona. The
exception allows only the making
of temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety. Obviously,
the article greatly restricts the
appointing power of the President
during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective
reasons for the time frames for filling
vacancies in the courts and the
restriction on the President's power of
appointment, it is this Court’s view
that, as a general proposition, in case
of conflict, the former should yield to
the latter. Surely, the prevention of
vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding
delays in filling up of court vacancies
or the disposition of some
cases. Temporary vacancies can
abide the period of the ban which,
incidentally and as
earlier pointed out, comes to exist
only once in every six
years. Moreover, those occurring in
the lower courts can be filled
temporarily by designation. But
prohibited appointments are long-
lasting and permanent in their
effects. They may, as earlier pointed
out, in fact influence the results of
elections and, for that reason, their
making is considered an election
offense.[76]
Given the background and rationale for the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that
the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment
of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the
unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any

that there would no longer bemidnight appointments to the level backed by people influential with the President could The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no

Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold not always be assured of being recommended for the weight and due consideration to the confirmation of Justice

of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or consideration of the President, because they first had to Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on

made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather

his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC than on the deliberations of the Constitutional

the incoming President or for partisanship,[77] the was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt about the

appointments to the Judiciary made after the doing away with the intervention of the Commission on President’s power to appoint during the period of

establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such Appointments. This insulating process was absent from prohibition in Section 15, Article VII could have been

defects because of the JBC’s prior processing of the Aytona midnight appointment. dispelled since its promulgation on November 9, 1998,

candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction had Valenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on the

that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of confirmation of a distinguished member of the

a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was Constitutional Commission like Justice Regalado.

of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to

must necessarily shed considerable light on “the law of the the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three

statute,” i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be question raised by some sectors about the (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the

construed with reference to its intended scope and “constitutionality of xxx appointments” to the Court of appointing powers of the President.

purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections.

purpose rather than to defeat it.[78] He assured that “on the basis of the (Constitutional) Section 14 speaks of the power of

Commission’s records, the election ban had no application the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by

Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the to appointments to the Court of Appeals.”[79] This an Acting President,[81] and evidently refers only to

danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then appointments in the Executive Department. It has no

the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential submitted to the President for consideration the application to appointments in the Judiciary,

election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of because temporary or acting appointments can only

experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC Appeals.[80] undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their
being revocable at will.[82] The letter and spirit of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run

Constitution safeguard that independence. Also, there is i.e. that every part must be considered together with the the same risk of compromising judicial independence,

no law in the books that authorizes the revocation of other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.
[84]
appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the

retirement or resignation, judges of the first and second framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section Sixth. The argument has been raised to the

level courts and the Justices of the third level courts may 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to effect that there will be no need for the incumbent

only be removed for cause, but the Members of the cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was President to appoint during the prohibition period the

Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment. their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of

the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be

Section 16 covers only the presidential surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1),

appointments that require confirmation by the Commission likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. Article VIII remaining.

on Appointments. Thereby, the Constitutional Commission

restored the requirement of confirmation by the Fifth. To hold like the Court did The argument is flawed, because it is focused

Commission on Appointments after the requirement was in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice

removed from the 1973 Constitution. Yet, because of the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Puno’s retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to

Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did not Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the

include appointments to the Judiciary.[83] Department from the Executive and Legislative Supreme Court.

Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political The argument also rests on the fallacious

obviously of the same character, in that they affect the leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. assumption that there will still be time remaining in the 90-

power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is

and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the easily demonstrable, as the OSG has shown in its

Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure comment.

also applies only to the Executive Department. This judicial independence, because the appointee can also

conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast,
 Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular
elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting
the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at
the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on
May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such
elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition
is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than
the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19
occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest
possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day
mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing
President would be in no position to comply with the
constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme
Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. In
fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4
(1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor
mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on
the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to,
because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to
apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the
lower courts.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme
case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is
necessary at all for the President – any President – to
appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the
ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the
Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for any
vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
xxx
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming
into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-
member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of
candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are
already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of
whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.
Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the
incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice?
The question is not squarely before us at the
moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper analysis if and
when circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for
the proposed Constitutional Convention to consider in the
light of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile’s statement
that the President can appoint the Chief Justice from
among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC
list.
II
The Judiciary Act of 1948
The posture has been taken that no urgency exists
for the President to appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still
address the situation of having the next President appoint
the successor.
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states:
Section 12. Vacancy in Office
of Chief Justice. — In case of a
vacancy in the office of Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court or of his inability
to perform the duties and powers of
his office, they shall devolve upon the
Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is
removed, or another Chief Justice is
appointed and duly qualified. This
 provision shall apply to every
Associate Justice who succeeds to the on Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he
office of Chief Justice.
or she is appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the

the appointment is never in an acting capacity. The incumbent President is preferable to having the Associate
The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in
express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under the
the event of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice, or
the framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive
in the event that the Chief Justice is unable to perform his
the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are
duties and powers. In either of such circumstances,
would have simply written so in the Constitution. elected and proclaimed at once become the leaders of
the duties and powers of the office of the Chief Justice
Consequently, to rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any
shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
1948 in order to forestall the imperative need to appoint appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the
precedence until a new Chief Justice is appointed or until
the next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain intent of independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice
the disability is removed.
the Constitution. is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice

performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the

Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to
For sure, the framers intended the position of nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the
dwell on this peripheral matter after the Court has hereby
Chief Justice to be permanent, not one to be occupied in Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the
resolved the question of consequence, we do not find it
an acting or temporary capacity. In relation to the scheme Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the
amiss to confront the matter now.
of things under the present Constitution, Section 12 of the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being

Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in mandatory for the incumbent President to make within the
We cannot agree with the posture.
which the new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification

which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be
A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows
duties and powers of the office. It ought to be appointed by the next President.
that the Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice
remembered, however, that it was enacted because the
and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall be appointed by
Chief Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution was Historically, under the present Constitution, there
the President from a list of at least three nominees
subject to the confirmation of the Commission on has been no wide gap between the retirement and the
prepared by the JBC for every vacancy, which
Appointments, and the confirmation process might take resignation of an incumbent Chief Justice, on one hand,
appointments require no confirmation by the Commission
longer than expected. and the appointment to and assumption of office of his
successor, on the other hand. As summarized in the
comment of the OSG, the chronology of succession is as
follows:
1. When Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee retired on April 18,
1988, Chief Justice Pedro Yap
was appointed on the same day;
2. When Chief Justice Yap retired
on July 1, 1988, Chief Justice
Marcelo Fernan was appointed
on the same day;
3. When Chief Justice Fernan
resigned on December 7, 1991,
Chief Justice Andres Narvasa
was appointed the following
day, December 8, 1991;
4. When Chief Justice Narvasa
retired on November 29, 1998,
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
was sworn into office the
following early morning
of November 30, 1998;
5. When Chief Justice Davide
retired on December 19, 2005,
Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban was appointed the
next day, December 20, 2005;
and
6. When Chief Justice Panganiban
retired on December 6, 2006,
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
took his oath as Chief Justice
at midnight of December 6,
2006.[85]
III
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC
May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of
nominees to the President?
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins
[86]
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
proper when the act against which it is directed is one
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal
officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of
a judgment or discretion in a particular way.[87]
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must
be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to
the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant
to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c)
the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the
duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is
ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate
the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the
President for every vacancy in the Judiciary:
Section 8. xxx
(5) The Council shall have the
principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. xxx
Section 9. The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower
It is
courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial
or and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the
President shall issue the appointments
within ninety days from the submission
of the list.
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article
VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the
list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is
directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC
should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence
of the vacancy.
 Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the duty.[88] For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the

JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a there should be an unexplained delay on its part in vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief

vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in Justice Puno.

President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period submitting the list to the President.

from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no

IV
discretion to submit the list to the President after the The distinction between a ministerial act and a Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC

vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period discretionary one has been delineated in the following

allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the manner: In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the

appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable The distinction between a conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can
ministerial and discretionary act is well
on its part, considering that it will delineated. A purely ministerial act or appoint the Chief Justice. Hence, Soriano’s petition for
duty is one which an officer or tribunal
thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the performs in a given state of facts, in a prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent
prescribed manner, in obedience to
ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the the mandate of a legal authority, the JBC from intervening in the process of nominating the
without regard to or the exercise of his
qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC own judgment upon the propriety or successor of Chief Justice Puno, lacks merit.
impropriety of the act done. If the law
before making the appointment. imposes a duty upon a public officer
and gives him the right to decide how
or when the duty shall be performed, On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in
such duty is discretionary and not
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of ministerial. The duty is ministerial only G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge
when the discharge of the same
nominees before the start of the President’s mandatory 90- requires neither the exercise of official mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the
discretion or judgment.[89]
day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to

candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted the ex officio members from the Senate and the House of

to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant Representatives, thereby prejudicing the chances of some

object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number

refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that of votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC,

nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC is not based on the petitioners’ actual interest, because

order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to they have not alleged in their petition that they were

an unjustified delay in performing that nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the
 INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN
Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that (b) To prepare the short list of FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT,
issue. nominees for the position of DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
Chief Justice; PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in
representation of various taxpayers and as non-
WHEREFORE, the Court: governmental organizations, petitioners,
(c) To submit to the incumbent vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO,
LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON
President the short list of ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO
1. Dismisses the petitions BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO
nominees for the position of HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA
for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO
Chief Justice on or before May MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA,
No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL
17, 2010; and ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE
191057 for being premature; WEBB, in their respective capacities as
members of the Philippine Senate who
(d) To continue its proceedings for concurred in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in the nomination of candidates to the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; fill other vacancies in the
Budget and Management; CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National
and Judiciary and submit to the
Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity
as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO
President the short list of
SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5- nominees corresponding thereto Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO
SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council: in accordance with this decision. ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,
in his capacity as Executive
(a) To resume its proceedings for the Secretary,respondents.
SO ORDERED.
nomination of candidates to fill DECISION
the vacancy to be created by the PANGANIBAN, J.:

compulsory retirement of Chief WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE

COSETENG, as members of the Philippine
Justice Reynato S. Puno byMay Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO
ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members
17, 2010; of the House of Representatives and as
taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers;
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION,
CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World
Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of
the vast majority of countries has revolutionized
international business and economic relations amongst
states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade
liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization,
globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-
millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless
world of business by sweeping away as mere historical
relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and
protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies,
import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions
and currency controls. Finding market niches and
becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven
and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that unilaterally protect
weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and
services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known
management guru, “Increased participation in the world
economy has become the key to domestic economic
growth and prosperity.”
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation
wrought by the Second World War, plans for the
establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by
that grand political body, the United Nations -- were
discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton
Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to
address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-
ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with
currency problems; and the third, the International Trade
Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and
predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral
protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation,
from other states. However, for a variety of reasons,
including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO,
unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained
was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing
access to the economies of treaty adherents with no
institutionalized body administering the agreements or
dependable system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of
negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo
Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth
to that administering body -- the World Trade Organization
-- with the signing of the “Final Act” in Marrakesh, Morocco
and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its
members.[1]
Like many other developing countries, the
Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the
goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two
letters to the Senate (infra), of improving “Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products.” The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of “new
opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the reduction
of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting x x x,
and (the attraction of) more investments into the
country.” Although the Chief Executive did not expressly
mention it in his letter, the Philippines - - and this is of
special interest to the legal profession - - will benefit from
the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial
adjudication through the independent WTO settlement
bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2)
Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were
settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were
arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining
strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped
countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the
Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or
impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and
the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court
assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of
the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos
(and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution
prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it
prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy that
is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the
main questions raised in this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional
grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of
its implementation and enforcement through the release
and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public
officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence
is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December
14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro,
then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry
(Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final
Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
“(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of their respective competent authorities,
with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.”
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the
President of the Philippines,[3] stating among others that
“the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution.”
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines[4] likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated
among others that “the Uruguay Round Final Act, the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Agreement on Technical Understanding on Rules and
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Barriers to Trade Procedures Governing the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are Settlement of Disputes
hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence
Agreement on Trade-Related
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.”
Investment Measures ANNEX 3
On December 9, 1994, the President of the
Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate Agreement on Trade Policy Review Mechanism”
adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled “Concurring in Implementation of
the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Article VI of
Trade Organization.”[5] On December 16, 1994, the President of the
the General
Philippines signed[7] the Instrument of Ratification,
Agreement on Tariffs
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate declaring:
and Trade 1994
adopted Resolution No. 97 which “Resolved, as it is
hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby
“NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V.
concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Agreement on
RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Implementation of
having seen and considered the aforementioned
Trade Organization.”[6] The text of the WTO Agreement is Article VII of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and
written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36- General on Tariffs
the agreements and associated legal instruments included
volumeUruguay Round of Multilateral Trade and Trade 1994
in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
Negotiations and includes various agreements and
Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at
associated legal instruments (identified in the said
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and
Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively
Inspection confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof.”
referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity)
as follows:
Agreement on Rules of Origin To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the
President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement
“ANNEX 1
Proper and “the associated legal instruments included in
Agreement on Imports
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement
Licensing Procedures
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods which are integral parts thereof.”

Agreement on Subsidies and On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary
General Agreement on Tariffs Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its
Coordinating
and Trade 1994 integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the
Measures
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the
Agreement on Agriculture Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In
Agreement on Safeguards his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,[8] the Solicitor
General describes these two latter documents as follows:
Agreement on the Application
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services
of Sanitary and
and Annexes “The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five
declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters,
Phytosanitary such as measures in favor of least developed countries,
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Measures notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the
Intellectual Property Rights
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on
Agreement on Textiles and technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.
ANNEX 2
Clothing
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services
dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and
qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming
measures, market access, national treatment, and
definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services,
commercial presence and new financial service.”
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was
filed. After careful deliberation on respondents’ comment
and petitioners’ reply thereto, the Court resolved on
December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and
the parties thereafter filed their respective
memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia
R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United
Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a
paper, hereafter referred to as “Bautista Paper,”[9] for
brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2)
summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996,
the Court directed:
“(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee
Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript
of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file
(1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine
adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from
Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume
WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the
Final Act, as soon as possible.”
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court
said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In
a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor
General submitted a printed copy of the 36-
volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he
listed the various “bilateral or multilateral treaties or
international instruments involving derogation of Philippine
sovereignty.” Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted
their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30,
1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996,
petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
“A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is
otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate
who participated in the deliberations and voting
leading to the concurrence are estopped from
impugning the validity of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization or
of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II,
and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine
sovereignty specifically the legislative power
which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine
Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the
Philippines’;
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization
interfere with the exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted
for concurrence in the ratification of the
constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when they
concurred only in the ratification of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, and not with the Presidential
submission which included the Final Act,
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services.”
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel
for respondents “synthesized the several issues raised by
petitioners into the following”:[10]
“1. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’
cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the
letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections
10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’
implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.”
By raising and arguing only four issues against the
seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has
effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition
presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable;
(2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E.
Tañada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped
from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-
members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion
when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the
WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this
Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The “political question” issue -- being very fundamental
and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very
jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case --
was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled
upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because
this defense is waivable and the respondents have
effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their
pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in
respondents’ favor, will not cause the petition’s dismissal
as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who
are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an
integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by
the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted
that the respondents did not question the locus standi of
petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived
the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that
grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds
and serious international commitments of the nation are
involved here, and that transcendental public interest
requires that the substantive issues be met head on and
decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by
procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon
shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A
JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE
STATED, DOES THE PETITION
INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION
OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE
ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19,
ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12,
ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR
OR INTERFERE WITH THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY
THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING
RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE
SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT
AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT
AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL
ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS
AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON
COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL
SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over
the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate
on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.”[12] Once a
“controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court
is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.”[13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the
matters[14] raised in the petition is clearly set out in the
1987 Constitution,[15] as follows:
“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.”
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial
department’s duty and power to strike down grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government including Congress. It is an innovation in our
political law.[16] As explained by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion,[17] “the judiciary is the final arbiter on
the question of whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized
in many cases,[18] it will not shirk, digress from or abandon
its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought
before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer,
agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and
as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in
holding that this petition should be given due course and
the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On
this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction
over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of
the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting
the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade
liberalization as a policy espoused by said international
body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
government’s economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs,
taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other
import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
constitutional duty “to determine whether or not there had
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate in ratifying
the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
 Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that
Nationalism will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
petition.
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the “letter, spirit and
intent” of the Constitution mandating “economic
nationalism” are violated by the so-called “parity xx
provisions” and “national treatment” clauses scattered in xx
various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its
annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of
Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
Financial Services.
goods, and adopt measures that help make them
Specifically, the “flagship” constitutional provisions competitive.”
referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12,
Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional
follows: principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions
quoted in their memorandum:[19]
“Article II
“a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
xx xx “Article 2
xx xx
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by 1. Without prejudice to other rights and
Filipinos. obligations under GATT 1994. no Member
shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent
xx xx with the provisions of Article III or Article XI
xx xx of GATT 1994.
Article XII 2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are
inconsistent with the obligations of general
elimination of quantitative restrictions
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of
GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to
xx xx this Agreement.” (Agreement on Trade-
xx xx Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27,
Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments,
p.22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
“ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of
national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of
xx
Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are
xx
mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or
under administrative rulings, or compliance with
which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and
which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of
products of domestic origin or from any
domestic source, whether specified in
terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms
of proportion of volume or value of its
local production; or
(b) that an enterprise’s purchases or use of
imported products be limited to an
amount related to the volume or value of
local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations
of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT
1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic laws or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which
is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which
restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of
products used in or related to the local
production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of
products used in or related to its local
production by restricting its access to
 foreign exchange inflows attributable to
the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified
in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of
a preparation of volume or value of its
local production.” (Annex to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal
Documents, p.22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is
quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use. the provisions of this paragraph shall
not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the
economic operation of the means of transport and not on
the nationality of the product.” (Article III, GATT 1947, as
amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article
XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in
relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments p.177, emphasis supplied).
“b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords
to its own nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol.
31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.25432
(emphasis supplied)
“(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and
subject to any conditions and qualifications
set out therein, each Member shall accord
to services and service suppliers of any
other Member, in respect of all measures
affecting the supply of services, treatment
no less favourable than it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of
paragraph I by according to services and
service suppliers of any other Member,
either formally identical treatment or
formally different treatment to that it
accords to its own like services and service
suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different
treatment shall be considered to be less
favourable if it modifies the conditions of
completion in favour of services or service
suppliers of the Member compared to like
services or service suppliers of any other
Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement
on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay
Round Legal Instruments, p.22610
emphasis supplied).”
It is petitioners’ position that the foregoing “national
treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement
“place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in
contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the
phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.” The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when
viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the
Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of
its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed
agreements.[20] Petitioners further argue that these
provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role
exports play in national development and negate the
preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor
General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not
self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that
these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by
petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be
related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly
Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited
WTO clauses do not conflict with the Constitution; and (4)
that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to
protect developing countries like the Philippines from the
harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
“declaration of principles and state policies.” The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution[21] is
called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean
Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts.[23] They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato,[24] the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII
are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do
not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation.”
In the same light, we held in Basco vs.
Pagcor[25] that broad constitutional principles need
legislative enactments to implement them, thus:
“On petitioners’ allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections
11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of
Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and
Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely
statements of principles and policies. As such, they are
basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be
passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
‘In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather
directives addressed to the executive and to the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to
heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was
not judicial but political. The electorate could express their
displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas,
Vol. II, p. 2).”
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an
alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are
sourced from basic considerations of due process and the
lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted ocean
of social and economic policy making.” Mr. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa
vs. Factoran, Jr.,[26] explained these reasons as follows:
“My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the
trial court, show a more specific legal right -- a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than
Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood
as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the
trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a
specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back
on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
‘Section 1. xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.’ (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as ‘the right to a
balanced and healthy ecology’ and ‘the right to health’ are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as ‘a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,’ the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to
propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast
area of environmental protection and management, our
courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making departments -- the legislative and
executive departments -- must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those
norms and standards, and to implement them before the
courts should intervene.”
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other
Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development
of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII,
apart from merely laying down general principles relating
to the national economy and patrimony, should be read
and understood in relation to the other sections in said
article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
“Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth;
a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality
of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full
employment based on sound agricultural development and
agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy
and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. x x x
x x x x x
x xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.”
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays
down the basic goals of national economic development,
as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising
the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
 With these goals in context, the Constitution then
ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by
expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos “in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony”[27] and in the use of
“Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced
goods”; (2) by mandating the State to “adopt measures
that help make them competitive;[28] and (3) by requiring
the State to “develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”[29] In
similar language, the Constitution takes into account the
realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of “a
trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity”;[30] and speaks of industries “which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets” as
well as of the protection of “Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices.”
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince
Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et
al., this Court held that “Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of
[31]
the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable.” However, as the constitutional
provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to
“the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony” and not to every aspect
of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than
the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of
Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the
issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And
we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a
bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases
of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair.[32] In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the
WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak
and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major
states have permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the
basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal
in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent
of the UN Security Council.
“WTO decides by consensus whenever possible,
otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes
cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or
waiver of the obligation of a member which would require
three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds
vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the
Amendments provision will require assent of all
members. Any member may withdraw from the
Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date
of notice of withdrawals.”[33]
Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than through
one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within
the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to
push their economic agenda more decisively than outside
the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus,
the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to “share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.” These basic principles are found in the
preamble[34] of the WTO Agreement as follows:
“The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expanding the production of and
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal
use of the world’s resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts
designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least developed among them, secure
a share in the growth in international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable
and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of
past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further
the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system, x
x x.” (underscoring supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant
to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the
WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more
lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some
protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with
respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given
to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff
reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be
spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff
reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be
effected within aperiod of six (6) years while developing
countries -- including the Philippines -- are required to
effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten
(10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT
requires developed countries to reduce domestic support
to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as
compared to only 13% for developing countries to be
effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products,
GATT requires developed countries to reduce their
budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export
volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period
of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the
reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for
developed countries and a longer period of ten (10)
years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in
protection from unfair foreign competition and trade
practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing
measures and safeguards against import surges. Where
local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign
competition, the Philippines can avail of these
measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the
statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be
deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the
weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines
have been taken into account; thus, there would be no
basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have
gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a
bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet
uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such
decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or
simply because we believe only in other economic
policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction
of this case will not pass upon the advantages and
disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic
policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of
determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-
reliant and independent national economy”[35] does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods
and services. It contemplates neither “economic
seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
“Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a
developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most
basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic
seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the
freedom from undue foreign control of the national
economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities.”[36]
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,”
“national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination”
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they
are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
“equality and reciprocity,”[37] the fundamental law
encourages industries that are “competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development
of robust industries that can compete with the best in the
foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez
faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or
Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any
unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor
does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino
companies should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand
, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make
available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and
services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most
reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down
to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the
public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of
favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos’
general welfare because it will -- as promised by its
promoters -- expand the country’s exports and generate
more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment,
purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve “judgment
calls” by our policy makers, for which they are answerable
to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such
questions and the answers thereto are not subject to
judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of
discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and
Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in
existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in
1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is
necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not
have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of
business. By the same token, the United Nations was not
yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became
effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then
Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of
the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines
signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering
part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions
of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this
question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and
infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing
winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one
eminent political law writer and respected jurist[38] explains:
“The Constitution must be quintessential rather than
superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and
framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the
core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling
by mandate of our delegates, but slowly ‘in the crucible of
Filipino minds and hearts,’ where it will in time develop its
sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally
achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like
the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the
Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat
an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to
re-structure and march apace with the progress of the
race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the
dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a
petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat
of the nation.”
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that “(e)ach Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided
in the annexed Agreements.”[39] Petitioners maintain that
this undertaking “unduly limits, restricts and impairs
Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power
which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It
is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines
because this means that Congress could not pass
legislation that will be good for our national interest and
general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the
WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in
goods x x x but also to the flow of investments and money
x x x as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-
cultural matters x x x.”[40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said
WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is
lodged in the Congress.[41] And while the Constitution
allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject
to “specified limits and x x x such limitations and
restrictions” as Congress may provide,[42] as in fact it did
under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and
passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on
this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally
been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision
a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the
world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations."[43] By the doctrine
of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own
laws.[44] One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda -- international
agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state
which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.”[45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict
the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power
in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from
a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit
the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus,
treaties have been used to record agreements between
States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for
example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of
territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct
of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of
commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying
down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations.[46] The
sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality
be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F.
Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny
alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The
age of interdependence is here.”[47]
UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations
as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict
its sovereign rights under the “concept of sovereignty as
auto-limitation.”47-AUnder Article 2 of the UN Charter, “(a)ll
members shall give the United Nations every assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter,
and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action.” Such assistance includes payment of
its corresponding share not merely in administrative
expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping
operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of
July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that
money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in
the Middle East and in the Congo were “expenses of the
United Nations” under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN
Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their
corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the
Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to
appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it
agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too,
under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its
representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities,
thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of
members within their own territory. Another example:
although “sovereign equality” and “domestic jurisdiction” of
all members are set forth as underlying principles in the
UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to
enforcement measures decided by the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security under
Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article
103, “(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall
prevail,” thus unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as
a member -- the sovereign power to make a choice as to
which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has
entered into many other international pacts -- both
bilateral and multilateral -- that involve limitations on
Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the
Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24,
1996, as follows:
“(a) Bilateral convention with the United States
regarding taxes on income, where the
Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt
from tax, income received in the Philippines
by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank
of the United States, the Export/Import Bank
of the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation of the United
States. Likewise, in said convention, wages,
salaries and similar remunerations paid by the
United States to its citizens for labor and
personal services performed by them as
employees or officials of the United States are
exempt from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing,
among others, for the avoidance of double
taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden
for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for
the avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea
where the Philippines agreed to exempt from
all customs duties, inspection fees and other
duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the
regular equipment, spare parts and supplies
arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where
the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs
duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other
similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating
oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on
board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine
soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium
where the Philippines granted Belgian air
carriers the same privileges as those granted
to Japanese and Korean air carriers under
separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of
transit and visitor visas where the Philippines
exempted Israeli nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas
for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding
59 days.
(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting
French nationals from the requirement of
obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn
not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions,
where the Philippines agreed that premises of
Special Missions in the Philippines are
inviolable and its agents can not enter said
premises without consent of the Head of
Mission concerned. Special Missions are also
exempted from customs duties, taxes and
related charges.
(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of
Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines
agreed to be governed by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines
accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice. The
International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in
all legal disputes concerning the interpretation
of a treaty, any question of international law,
the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of international
obligation.”
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has
effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign
powers of taxation, eminent domain and police
power. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of
the other contracting states in granting the same privilege
and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its
citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine
commitments under WTO-GATT.
“International treaties, whether relating to nuclear
disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of
the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty
through the assumption of external obligations. But unless
anarchy in international relations is preferred as an
alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of
the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs
associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade
treaties that structure relations by reference to durable,
well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute
resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries
exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries,
by subjecting power relations to some form of legal
ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to
gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is
due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access
to a larger set of potential new trading relationship than in
case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to
the smaller country’s market.”[48]
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties,
a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating
the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all
nations.”
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the
General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)[49] intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedures.[50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34,
TRIPS,[51] it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
“Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of
the infringement of the rights of the owner referred
to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject
matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a
product, the judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order the defendant to prove that the
process to obtain an identical product is different
from the patented process. Therefore, Members
shall provide, in at least one of the following
circumstances, that any identical product when
produced without the consent of the patent owner
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
deemed to have been obtained by the patented
process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the
identical product was made by the
process and the owner of the patent has
been unable through reasonable efforts
to determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the
burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on
the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to
in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition
referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the
legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken
into account.”
From the above, a WTO Member is required to
provide a rule of disputable (note the words “in the
absence of proof to the contrary”) presumption that a
product shown to be identical to one produced with the use
of a patented process shall be deemed to have been
obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process,
(1) where such product obtained by the patented product
is new, or (2) where there is “substantial likelihood” that the
identical product was made with the use of the said
patented process but the owner of the patent could not
determine the exact process used in obtaining such
identical product. Hence, the “burden of proof”
contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood
as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow
such presumption. Such burden, properly understood,
actually refers to the “burden of evidence” (burden of
going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or
fake) product to show that his product was produced
without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still
has the “burden of proof” since, regardless of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34,
such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence
of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is “identical”
to the genuine one produced by the patented process and
the fact of “newness” of the genuine product or the fact of
“substantial likelihood” that the identical product was made
by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in
changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise
known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption
in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model,
thus:
“SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent
or of a patent for utility model shall consist in unauthorized
copying of the patented design or utility model for the
purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in
the making, using or selling of the article or product
copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or
substantial identity with the patented design or utility model
shall constitute evidence of copying.” (underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of
Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only
if (1) the product obtained by the patented process is NEW
or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the process and the process owner
has not been able through reasonable effort to determine
the process used. Where either of these
two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and
processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection
with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation of
legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue
also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than
justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides,
Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial
system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most
international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.[52]
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and
Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
 Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the
WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the other
documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services -- is
defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of
discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO
Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a
rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document
signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the
Republic upon authority of the President. They contend
that the second letter of the President to the
Senate[53] which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act
should have been the subject of concurrence of the
Senate.
“A final act, sometimes called protocol de clôture, is
an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed
upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the
conference.”[54] It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a
summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference
which may have taken place over several years. The text
of the “Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations” is contained in
just one page[55] in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final
Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of
the Philippines undertook:
"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement
for the consideration of their respective
competent authorities with a view to seeking
approval of the Agreement in accordance with
their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its
signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the
WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were
deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were
approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of
GATT which provides that representatives of the members
can meet “to give effect to those provisions of this
Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a
view to facilitating the operation and furthering the
objectives of this Agreement.”[56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the
Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which
“have indicated in their respective schedules of
commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly,
expansion of operation of existing financial service
suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and
processing of information, and national treatment with
respect to access to payment, clearing systems and
refinancing available in the normal course of business.”[57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself
expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed
included as its integral parts,[58] as follows:
“Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations among
its Members in matters to the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in the
Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments
included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred
to as “Multilateral Agreements”) are integral parts of
this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments
included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as
“Plurilateral Trade Agreements”) are also part of this
Agreement for those Members that have accepted
them, and are binding on those Members. The
Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either
obligation or rights for Members that have not
accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred
to as “GATT 1994”) is legally distinct from the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30
October 1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at
the conclusion of the Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, as
subsequently rectified, amended or modified
(hereinafter referred to as “GATT 1947”).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware
of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of
President Ramos dated August 11, 1994,[59] the senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was
concurring in, as follows: [60]
“THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity
of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this
Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by
Senator Tañada that what was submitted to the Senate
was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade
Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which
is not the same as the agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino
raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to
withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an
alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That
suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee
as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the
question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President
submitting a new... is he making a new submission which
improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear
cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his
intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Tañada and later
on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised
this question yesterday?
Senator Tañada, please.
SEN. TAÑADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now
clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate
for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,
but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization
as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and
the Understanding and Commitments in Financial
Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission
of President Ramos.
SEN. TAÑADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tañada. Can we
hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator
Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new
submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of
his earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions
of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself. The
Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It
requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being
submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to
be submitted to with the governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
‘By signing the present Final Act, the representatives
agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement
for the consideration of the respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures.’
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be
submitted to the governments for ratification or acceptance
as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide
but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if
that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it
satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I
call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter
are already a matter of record. And they had been
adequately reflected in the journal of yesterday’s session
and I don’t see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex
abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator
Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation
just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of
question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating
the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to
make.”
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine
ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking
this Court’s constitutionally imposed duty “to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of
the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate
Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ
of certiorarigrounded on grave abuse of discretion may be
issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[61] Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be graveabuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[62] Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave
abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the
petition.[63]
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets
that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two
sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great
respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body
independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are
presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless
convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented
to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve
every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted
definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption
of regularity in the Senate’s processes, this Court cannot
find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion
to the Senate’s exercise of its power of concurrence in the
WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution.[64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad
constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor,
products, domestic materials and locally produced
goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while
serving as judicial and legislative guides -- are not in
themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there
are other equally fundamental constitutional principles
relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a
“trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries
“which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets,” thereby justifying its acceptance of said
treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in
the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced
by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the
management expertise and/or an international
international law as part of the law of the land and the people, through their duly authorized elected officers,
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of make their free choice. marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
cooperation and amity with all nations. strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, merit. Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the
land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and EN BANC Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
power. We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in
such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner, share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national vs.
interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion the bid of petitioner.
to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by
power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a respondent GSIS state —
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise
was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of BELLOSILLO, J.: I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS
judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the WITH GSIS/MHC —
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the
nation should join the worldwide march toward trade Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set
liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that concessions covering the national economy and forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3,
our people should determine in electing their policy
makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase
of membership, should this be the political desire of a 1
Filipinos, is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block
member.
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the
owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents
seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance[65] where “the East will become the dominant maintain that the provision is not self-executing but GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
region of the world economically, politically and culturally in requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of
the next century.” He refers to the “free market” espoused
by WTO as the “catalyst” in this coming Asian Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic
ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries the national economy and patrimony covered by the plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .
including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for
membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections protective mantle of the Constitution. b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase
against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the The controversy arose when respondent Government and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .
WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING
trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. The alternative to WTO is privatization program of the Philippine Government under BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —
isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
destruction. Duly enriched with original membership,
keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are
globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with met:
a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning
crossroads of an international strategy for economic bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” is to provide
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC
not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3,
1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP
(Committee on Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained. 3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated
28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter
dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager’s check
issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the
5
Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to
the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by
the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First
Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in
the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power
and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino
people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part
6
of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being
a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of
the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51%
of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the
term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is
part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid
8
in terms of price per share.
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate,
there must be existing laws “to lay down conditions under
which business may be done.” 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing,
Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its
territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the
first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner
speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the
events that have transpired therein which make the hotel
historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under
the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of
the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own
separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of
the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked
is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.
Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to
the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right
from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1.,
of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders
that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents
postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid
has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching
bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well
be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving
rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching
bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse
of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not
exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner,
and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the
act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental
laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It
is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by
the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined
10
as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain
fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. 11
Under
the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of
policies and principles. Their provisions command the
legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the
framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays
down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means
of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
It so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions
have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why
the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered
self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless
the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they
quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission —
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this
question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the
wording of “PREFERENCE” is given to QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS,” can it be understood as a preference to
qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified.
So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as
against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word “QUALIFIED?”.
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely “TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS” as against whom? As against aliens or over
aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is
understood. We use the word “QUALIFIED” because
the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For
example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
16
MR. NOLLEDO Yes,
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is
couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so
long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature
may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be
used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may
supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does
not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of
such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self- life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the
24
executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily promotion of social justice, and the values of
25 26
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any education. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance refers to
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the constitutional provisions on social justice and human
the exercise of constitutional right and make it more rights 27 and on education. 28
Lastly, Kilosbayan,
17 29
available. Subsequent legislation however does not Inc. v. Morato cites provisions on the promotion of
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31
the vital role
is not, by itself, fully enforceable. of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total
33
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature human liberation and development. A reading of these
of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially
of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self- they are only principles upon which the legislations must
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of
owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority which is complete in itself and which needs no further
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
does not by its language require any legislation in order to se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates
give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
privileges and concessions covering the national economy covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self- give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that —
19
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
constitutional provisions are merely statements of circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce
principles and policies, which are basically not self- such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
— are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus
ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission 34
explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and
developed refers not only to out rich natural resources but
also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we
should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and
other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively
an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930′s. It was the site of the festivities during the
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it
plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are
36
accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the
book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. 37 During World War II the hotel was converted by the
Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese Constitutional Commission
together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
stand. Thereafter, in the 1950′s and 1960′s, the hotel MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to
became the center of political activities, playing host to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would
almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel consist in substituting the words “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS”
reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous with the following: “CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR
international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE
Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY
of a failed coup d’ etat where an aspirant for vice-president OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
was “proclaimed” President of the Philippine Republic. xxx xxx xxx
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question.
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do
public interest; its own historicity associated with our we not give it preference?
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the by Filipino citizens?
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent
of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the Filipino.
land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because
cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS” may refer only to individuals and
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold not to juridical personalities or entities.
39
is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.
not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building xxx xxx xxx
stands. 38 MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified amendment be read again.
Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: “IN THE
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.” And the word “Filipinos” here,
as intended by the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or
entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained
thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request
Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment
so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. “IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.”
MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign
enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some
aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is “yes.”
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision
Commissioner Nolledo continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of
“MUST,” it will be “SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GlVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called “Filipino First” policy. That means
that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of
concessions, privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the
Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision
was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the “Pro-
Filipino” bias in all economic concerns. It is better known
as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was
never found in previous Constitutions . . . .
The term “qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference
shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable
contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate
the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino
citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient,
since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter
productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
“qualified foreigner” end a “qualified Filipino,” the latter
shall be chosen over the former.”
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner
was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as
one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by
respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so
that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been
found to be possessed of proven management expertise in
the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in
another hotel company, or it has an overall management
and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the
Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not
self-executory and requires implementing legislation is
quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear
constitutional provision — by the government itself — is
only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to
renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the
Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the
Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation
have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a
judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further
enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the
discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty to
implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable
legal standards for executive action. When the executive
acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every
time the executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional government
operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision
is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality.
This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed
that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out
with the prior approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly
pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone
makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a “state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the
acts of persons distinct from the government are winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter
when the activity it engages in is a “public function;“ (2) into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the
when the government is so significantly involved with the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
private actor as to make the government responsible for dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which
his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of interested parties.
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the
MHC comes under the second and third categories of subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly
“state action.” Without doubt therefore the transaction. written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that
constitutional command. 46 all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose
only to the people but also to the government as elements their reason for being.
of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for
divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial. any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the in terms of price per share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding
State. its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact,
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding constitutional injunction itself.
rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
requisite approvals. Since the “Filipino First economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should
go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded.
To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this
policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to
be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his
rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws
of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad
since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a
foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to
the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if
no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match
the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case
before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by
Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its
earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent
GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid did the latter have a
cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the
constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match
the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be
treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by
its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus
we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still
an opportunity to do so than let the government develop
the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the
basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents
with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine
nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but
primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court
as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never
shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of
upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked
to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention
of this Court to impede and diminish, much less
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it,
the Court encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for
Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the
Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could
have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief
Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its
function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not
been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles
to economic progress and development . . . in connection
with a temporary injunction issued by the Court’s First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian
Firm and its partner, certain statements were published in
a major daily to the effect that injunction “again
demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a
major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no
business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind
referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are
viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that
they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never
shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair
and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of
enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not
take precedence over non-material values. A commercial,
nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at
the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material
values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the
Constitution in the proper governance of a free society;
after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic
policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the
Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with
sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom
all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the
happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The
nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere
to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments,
while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the
demands of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is
not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder
solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking
about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial
district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted
many of the most important events in the short history of
the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel
where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a
strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of
the highest state function to their official visits to the
Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the
Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a most
historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the
determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical
landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a
total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic
exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be
less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner
viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation’s soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage,
which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino,
can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that
it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of
national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage is
entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how
much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous
and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion
call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the
elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect
and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid
of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to
execute the necessary clearances and to do such other
acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the
same time, I would like to expound a bit more on the
concept of national patrimony as including within its scope
and meaning institutions such as the Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes
under “national patrimony” over which qualified Filipinos
have the preference, in ownership and operation. The
Constitutional provision on point states:
xxx xxx xxx
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall Give
preference to qualified Filipinos. 1
Petitioner’s argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the
1987 Constitution, “national patrimony” consists of the
natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in
our territory (Article I) consisting of land, sea, and
2
air. study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of
“national patrimony” originated, would show that its
framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive
expression “Patrimony of the Nation” in the belief that the
phrase encircles a concept embracing not only their
natural resources of the country but practically everything
that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the
material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets
and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the
framers did not stop with conservation. They knew that
conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this
may be achieved only through development as a
correlative factor to assure to the people not only the
exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of
their national patrimony). 3
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been
viewed as referring not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. 4
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very
much a part of our national patrimony and, as such,
deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it
and benefit from its operation. This institution has played
an important role in our nation’s history, having been the
venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and
as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting
foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future
generations of Filipinos. As President Manuel L. Quezon
once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our
country, but we should do so with. an eye to the welfare of
the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today
are the trustees of the patrimony of our race. To preserve
our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos was the
intent of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our
Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for nationalization
of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that
we should “put more teeth into our laws, and; not make the
nationalization of our lands and natural resources a
subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional
enactment” 6 To quote further: “Let not our children be
mere tenants and trespassers in their own country. Let us
preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs,
free from all foreign liens and encumbrances”. 7
Now, a word on preference. In my view “preference to
qualified Filipinos”, to be meaningful, must refer not only to
things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must
touch and affect the very “heart of the existing order.” In
the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that
pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified
Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal
the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not
operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the
non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should
undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The
Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino
an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-
Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino
bidder is to be significant at all.
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude
towards foreign investments in our country, stress is on the
elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in
the country. While government agencies, including the
courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend,
and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors
to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude
ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas
where our national identity, culture and heritage are
involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign
investors have established themselves creditably, such as
in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin
Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the
capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands
of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the
Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a particular matter, I
including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars
Filipinos. to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude
of the magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly
READ CASE DIGESTS: Filipino First Policy; Special possible for the competing bids to stand exactly “equal”
Commercial Law which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the
right of preference.
VITUG, J., concurring: It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been
I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut spared this great disappointment, a letdown that it did not
statements, shared by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in a deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules
well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that: of bidding along with the peculiar constitutional
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides implications of the proposed transaction. It is also
that “(I)n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions regrettable that the Court at time is seen, to instead, be the
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos” is self-
1
perception that it even takes on non-justiciable
executory. The provision verily does not need, although it controversies.
can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.
law or a set of rules.
Second, the term “patrimony” does not merely refer to the READ CASE DIGESTS: Filipino First Policy; Special
country’s natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. Commercial Law
A “historical landmark,” to use the words of Mr. Justice
Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
part of Philippine heritage. I take the view that in the context of the present
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional
System (“GSIS”), a government entity which derives its mandate that “[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and
authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC concessions covering the national patrimony the State
should be considered an act of the State subject to the shall give preference to qualified Filipinos” 1 is to allow
Constitutional mandate. petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the
On the pivotal issue of the degree of “preference to Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the
qualified Filipinos,” I find it somewhat difficult to take the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel
same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino
Puno. In the particular case before us, the only meaningful of Philippine corporation can be given preference in the
preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified
enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the
State, by favoring it over a foreign national corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government
Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and the
Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share,
“priority [would be given] to the bidder seeking the larger
ownership interest in MHC,” so that petitioner bid for
2
more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian
corporation for that reason and not because it is a
Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases
like the present one, where an alien corporation is the
highest bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine
corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by
allowing it “to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share” before it is awarded the shares of stocks. That, to
3
me, is what “preference to qualified Filipinos” means in the
context of this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they
are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 4 to
a 1947 statute giving “preference to Filipino citizens in the
lease of public market stalls.” 5 This Court upheld the
cancellation of existing leases covering market stalls
occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award
thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as
ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly,
in Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente, 6 this Court sustained
the validity of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to
the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of
public market stalls and granting preference to Filipino
citizens in the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy
7
of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo, the preference
granted under the statute was held to apply to cases in
which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by
alien vendors in the public markets even if there were
available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens.
“The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a
conflict of interest between Filipino applicants and aliens
for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the
right to preference immediately arises.” 8
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter
of a century efforts began only in the 1970s in America to
realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action
and reverse discrimination programs designed to remedy
past discrimination against colored people in such areas
9
as employment, contracting and licensing. Indeed, in vital
areas of our national economy, there are situations in
which the only way to place Filipinos in control of the
national economy as contemplated in the Constitution 10
is
to give them preferential treatment where they can at least
stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would
either invite foreign retaliation or deprive the country of the
benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing
here not with common trades of common means of
livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11
but with
the sale of government property, which is like the grant of
government largess of benefits and concessions covering
the national economy” and therefore no one should
begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our
citizens. That at any rate is the command of the
Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by
the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should
result in the relinquishment of the business in favor of
private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not
in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares
of stocks to petitioner we would be trading competence
and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the
Malaysian firm are qualified, having hurdled the
12
prequalification process. It is only the result of the public
bidding that is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner
to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to
allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of an alien
could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity
would then do would be not to make a bid or make only a
token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has
submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that of
the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules on
public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a
minimum bid required (P36.87 per share for a range of 9 to
15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum will not be
considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino entity, after
passing the prequalification process, does not submit a
bid, he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the
foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to
those who have “validly submitted bids.” 14 The suggestion
is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
READ CASE DIGESTS: Filipino First Policy; Special
Commercial Law
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I
say this as we are not confronted in the case at bar with
legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to
speak on the side of history. The reason perhaps is due to
the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., a “page of history is worth a volume of logic.”
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether
the Manila Hotel has a historical and cultural aspect within
the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of
the “patrimony of the nation”.
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national goals and priorities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction
with Article II of the same Constitution pertaining to
“Declaration of Principles and State Policies” which ordain
— MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively by Filipinos. (Sec. 19).
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to “qualified
Filipinos” was one of the highlights in the 1987 Constitution
Commission proceedings thus:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: “IN THE
GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS”. And the word “Filipinos” here,
as intended by the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-Controlled entities fully
controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 608).
MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as Commissioner
Villegas said, this committee and this body already
approved what is known as the Filipino First policy which
was suggested by Commissioner de Castro. So that it is
now in our Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the
Constitutional Commission, p. 225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision
adverted to above, said:
MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign
enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some
aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred:?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is “yes”. (Vol. III, p. 616,
Records of the Constitutional Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect
the history and spirit of the Malolos Constitution of 1898,
the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we
have no reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in
one of the earliest case, this Court said —
The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various
provisions of the Constitution. . . . It cannot therefore be
said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit
underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, et al. vs.
Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and
traditions are not legislated and is the product of events,
customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of
growth and acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It
is the spirit and soul of a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and
heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to
historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped
our history for almost 84 years.
As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to
examine the single instances of the legal largese which
have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has
been exhaustively discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to
say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should
not be placed in the auction block of a purely business
transaction, where profits subverts the cherished historical
values of our people.
As a historical landmark in this “Pearl of the Orient Seas”,
it has its enviable tradition which, in the words of the
philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is “more of a
river than a stone, it keeps flowing, and one must view the
flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If
you look towards the hill from which the river flows, you
see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push the
river or people towards the future, and if you look the other
way, you progress.”
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress
depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not jettison the
tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our
colonial history.
I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same
subject in different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says —
“He is always right who suspects that he makes mistakes”.
On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would
rather err upholding the belief that the Filipino be first
under his Constitution and in his own land.
I vote GRANT the petition.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by
the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a domestic
corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) from selling the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation.
Allegedly, the sale violates the second paragraph of
section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation. It is the sole owner of the Manila Hotel which it
operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel
Corporation. Manila Hotel was included in the privatization
program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to
sell to interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging
from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel
Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public
bidding, the block of shares offered for sale was increased
from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder,
or the eventual “strategic partner” of the GSIS was
required to “provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel” 1 The proposal was approved by
respondent Committee on Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification
documents and the bidding rules were furnished interested
parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic
corporation, and Renong Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT
Sheraton as operator, prequalified. 2
The bidding rules and procedures entitled “Guidelines and
Procedures: Second Prequalification and Public Bidding of
the MHC Privatization” provide:
I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS
DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC
PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will
be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner and will
be awarded the Block of Shares:
First — Pass the prequalification process;
Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share
basis for the Block of Shares;
Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts
with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995;
xxx xxx xxx
IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION
A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR
PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to
provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of The Manila
Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting to the
prequalification process any local and/or foreign
corporation, consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with
at least one of the following qualifications:
a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel industry; or
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board representation)
in another hotel company; or
c. Overall management and marketing expertise to
successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to
provide access to the requisite management expertise
and/or international marketing/reservation system for The
Manila Hotel.
xxx xxx xxx
D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION
OFFICE
The prequalification documents can be secured at the
Registration Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during
working days within the period specified in Section III.
Each set of documents consists of the following:
a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification
and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization
b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila
Hotel Corporation
c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and Bidding
Conference
xxx xxx xxx
4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE
A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at
The Manila Hotel on the date specified in Section III to
allow the Applicant to seek clarifications and further
information regarding the guidelines and procedures. Only
those who purchased the prequalification documents will
be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this
conference is strongly advised, although the Applicant will
not be penalized if it does not attend.
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification
documents (1 original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration
Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days
within the period specified in Section III.
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with the
assistance of the TEC based on the Information Package
and other information available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the
evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of the
group, taking into account the contribution of each member
to the venture.
3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the results of
the PBAC evaluation will be final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the
criteria set forth below:
a. Business management expertise, track record, and
experience
b. Financial capability.
c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic
plan for the Manila Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it
may deem appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public
bidding — ITT Sheraton, Marriot International Inc.,
Renaissance Hotels International Inc., consortium of
RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in the Public
Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification
process again.
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results containing the
shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be posted at the
Registration Office at the date specified in Section III.
2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the
withdrawal by member whose qualification was a material
consideration for being included in the shortlist is ground
for disqualification of the Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING
A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC
BIDDING
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be
eligible to participate in the Public Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three
Hundred Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock
representing Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-
51%) of the issued and outstanding shares of MHC, will be
offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The Qualified
Bidders will have the Option of determining the number of
shares within the range to bid for. The range is intended to
attract bidders with different preferences and objectives for
the operation and management of The Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE
BASIS
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis.The
minimum bid required on a price per share basis for the
Block of Shares is Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven
Centavos (P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the
GSIS.
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below
the minimum required will not considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid
Form, a copy of which is attached as Annex IV. The
Official Bid Form must be properly accomplished in all
details; improper accomplishment may be a sufficient basis
for disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will
submit the Official Bid Form, which will indicate the offered
purchase price, in a sealed envelope marked “OFFICIAL
BID.”
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following documents should
be submitted along with the bid in a separate envelop
marked “SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS”:
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).
If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative
of the Qualified Bidder should submit a Board resolution
which adequately authorizes such representative to bid for
and in behalf of the corporation with full authority to
perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the
Qualified Bidder.
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each
member of the Consortium/Joint venture should submit a
Board resolution authorizing one of its members and such
member’s representative to make the bid on behalf of the
group with full authority to perform such acts necessary or
requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million
Pesos (P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security
in the form of:
i. Manager’s check or unconditional demand draft payable
to the “Government Service Insurance System” and issued
by a reputable banking institution duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable banking
institution acceptable to the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if: 1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at 1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the
i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or the following location: Public Bidding, the PBAC will open all sealed envelopes
ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less than New GSIS Headquarters Building marked “SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS” for screening,
the required amount. Financial Center, Reclamation Area evaluation and acceptance. Those who submitted
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager’s check or Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila. incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which
unconditional demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid 2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the is/are not substantially in the form required by PBAC will
Security will be for the account of GSIS. Public Bidding to accept any and all bids and supporting be disqualified. The envelope containing their Official Bid
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning requirements. Representatives from the Commission on Form will be immediately returned to the disqualified
Bidder/Strategic Partner, the Bid Security will be applied as Audit and COP will be invited to witness the proceedings. bidders.
the downpayment on the Qualified Bidder’s offered 3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the 2. The sealed envelopes marked “OFFICIAL BID” will be
purchase price. Official Bid Form. The accomplished Official Bid Form opened at 3:00 PM. The name of the bidder and the
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned should be submitted in a sealed envelope marked amount of its bid price will be read publicly as the
immediately after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder “OFFICIAL BID.” envelopes are opened.
is not declared the Highest Bidder. 4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following 3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC
f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if documents in another sealed envelope marked will formally announce the highest bid and the Highest
the Highest Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with “SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS” Bidder.
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International a. Written Authority Bid 4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other types of b. Bid Security basis. In the event of a tie wherein two or more bids have
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic 5. The two sealed envelopes marked “OFFICIAL BID” and the same equivalent price per share, priority will be given
plan for The Manila Hotel. “SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS” must be submitted to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC.
g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in
favor of GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and 2:00 PM, Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the case:
executing the Management Contract, International Public Bidding. No bid shall be accepted after the closing a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed period;
Marketing/Reservation System Contract specified by the time. Opened or tampered bids shall not be accepted. or
Highest Bidder or other types of contract in its strategic 6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and
plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to: submission of the two sealed envelopes. The actual time acceptable to the PBAC.
i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with of submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS
GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or the face of the two envelopes. WITH GSIS/MHC
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price not 7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set
later than October 23, 1995; or dropped in the corresponding bid boxes provided for the forth below by October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will
iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for any purpose. These boxes will be in full view of the invited lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS
other reason. public. will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing Reservation System Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic
plan for The Manila Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is
intending to provide only financial support to The Manila
Hotel, a separate institution may enter into the
aforementioned contract/s with GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase
and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of which will be
distributed to each of the Qualified Bidder after the
prequalification process is completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a
Management Contract for The Manila Hotel, the maximum
levels for the management fee structure that GSIS/MHC
are prepared to accept in the Management Contract are as
follows:
a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross
revenues.(1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating
profit(1) after deducting undistributed overhead expenses
and the basic management fee.
c. Fixed component of the international
marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0% of
gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant should indicate in
its Information Package if it is wishes to charge this fee.
Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for
hotels.
The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable
parameters for the hotel management fees to facilitate the
negotiations with the Highest Bidder for the Management
Contract after the Public Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for
The Manila Hotel should determine whether or not the
management fee structure above is acceptable before
submitting their prequalification documents to GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided
that these Qualified are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.
2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified
Bidders will be in accordance wit the equivalent price per
share of their respective bids in their public Bidding, i.e.,
first and second priority will be given to the Qualified
Bidders that submitted the second and third highest bids
on the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING
BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are
met:
a. Execution of the necessary contract with GSIS/MHC not
later than October 23, 1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and
COP/OGCC are obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with
GSIS/MHC, the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must
fully pay, not later than October 23, 1995, the offered
purchase price for the Block of Shares after deducting the
Bid Security applied as downpayment.
2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager’s
Check or unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the
“Government Service Insurance System,” issued by a
reputable banking institution licensed to do business in the
Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any
or all applications, waive any formality therein, or accept
such application as maybe considered most advantageous
to the GSIS. The GSIS similarly reserves the right to
require the submission of any additional information from
the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public
Bidding prior to acceptance of the bids and call for a new
public bidding under amended rules, and without any
liability whatsoever to any or all the Qualified Bidders,
except the obligation to return the Bid Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the
prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the
submission of the prequalification documents, the date of
the Public Bidding or other pertinent activities at least three
(3) calendar days prior to the respective deadlines/target
dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and
participation it has on the Block of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified
Bidders, except the Bid Security, may be returned upon
request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the
Public Bidding is final. The Qualified Bidders, by
participating in the Public Bidding, are deemed to have
agreed to accept and abide by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any
liability, suit or allegation arising out of the Public Bidding

by the Qualified Bidders who have participated in the
3
Public Bidding.
The second public bidding was held on September 18,
1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for 15,300,000
shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also
for 15,300,000 shares. The GSIS declared Renong Berhad
the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner’s
bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding,
petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid price of
Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to
itself citing the second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII
of the Constitution. It sent a manager’s check for thirty-
three million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with
Renong Berhad the terms and conditions of the contract
and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel,
refused to entertain petitioner’s request.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a
temporary restraining order on October 18, 1995.
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of
Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution 4 on the “National
Economy and Patrimony” which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-
executing whether the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence,
mandated to implement section 10, paragraph 2 of Article
XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to
give preference to petitioner, a qualified
corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation;
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the
sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation.
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a
Constitution provides the guiding policies and principles
upon which is built the substantial foundation and general
framework of the law and government. As a rule, its 5
provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced
without further legislative action. 6 Some of its provisions,
however, can be implemented only through appropriate
laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a
Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to hoe. The key
lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law
oftentimes submerged in its language. A searching inquiry
should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a
present enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or
if it needs future legislation for completion
enforcement. 7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of
the text and the context of the provision in question.
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution
as self-executing, 9 rather than as requiring
10
legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not
difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-
executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by
the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by
Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the
unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to
constitutional rights but congressional in action should not
Filipino suffocate them. 12
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in
the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and seizures, 13 the
14
rights of a person under custodial investigation, the
15
rights of an accused, and the privilege against self-
incrimination, 16 It is recognize a that legislation is
unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional
provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life,
17
liberty and the protection of property. The same
treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions
forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public
use without just compensation. 18
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a
constitutional provision is not self-executing where it
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the
Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy
shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held
that the provisions in Article II of our Constitution entitled
“Declaration of Principles and State Policies” should
generally be construed as mere statements of principles of
the State. 20 We have also ruled that some provisions of
and Article XIII on “Social Justice and Human Rights,” 21 and
Article XIV on “Education Science and Technology, Arts,
8
Culture end Sports” 22 cannot be the basis of judicially
enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the
future
discretion of Congress though they provide the framework
23 24
for legislation to effectuate their policy content.
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now
consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the
economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain
areas of investments in the country 25 to Filipino citizens or
to corporations sixty per cent 26
of whose capital stock is
owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact
laws that will encourage the formation and operation of
one hundred percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In
checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the
entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights and privileges covering the national
economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs
the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our
national goals and well-set priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By
its express text, there is a categorical command for
Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in
certain areas of investments in the country and to
encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned
Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is
clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right
by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this paragraph
was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973
27
Constitution. The provision in the 1973 Constitution
affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong
28
v. Hernandez, where we upheld the discretionary
authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of
investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first
paragraph of section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to
nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of
Filipinos.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are
different. They are directed to the State and not to
Congress alone which is but one of the three great
branches of our government. Their coverage is also
broader for they cover “the national economy and
patrimony” and “foreign investments within [the] national
jurisdiction” and not merely “certain areas of investments.”
Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress
the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of
giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of
rights and privileges covering our national economy and
patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of
the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to
hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason
whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it
is now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section
10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the
Constitution entitled “Declaration of Principles and State
Policies.” Its Section 19 provides that “[T]he State shall
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.” It engrafts the all-
important Filipino First policy in our fundamental law and
by the use of the mandatory word “shall,” directs its
enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a
half- pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the
stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the
disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of
the Constitutional Commission show that the
Commissioners entertained the same view as to its
meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, “patrimony”
refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
30
cultural heritage of our race. By this yardstick, the sale of
Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional
provision giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos
in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The
unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture
cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the
hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by
Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912
as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular
Government for Americans living in, or passing through,
Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials
and Filipino craftsmanship were utilized in its construction,
For sometime, it was exclusively used by American and
Caucasian travelers and served as the “official
guesthouse” of the American Insular Government for
visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the
Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When
the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military
headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers
from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the
Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of
Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign
guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings, premiers
and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and
sports celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the
situs of international conventions and conferences. In the
local scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties
and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped
and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards
from international hotel and travel award-giving bodies, a
fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity.
These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent
by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national
cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but
that does not exclude it from our national patrimony.
Republic Act No. 4846, “The Cultural Properties
Preservation and Protection Act,” merely provides a
procedure whereby a particular cultural property may be
classified a “national cultural treasure” or an “important
32
cultural property. Approved on June 18, 1966 and
amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its
reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law
implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural
treasure and cultural property as synonymous to the
phrase “patrimony of the nation.”
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to
the State includes the respondent GSIS. A look at its
charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation that administers funds that come
from the monthly contributions of government employees
and the government. 33 The funds are held in trust for a
distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
indifferently. 34 They are to be used to finance the
retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the
employees and the administrative and operational
expenses of the GSIS, 35 Excess funds, however, are
allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for
the benefit of the employees. 36 It is thus contended that
the GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a
simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the
contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of
the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure
private corporation. It is essentially a public corporation
created by Congress and granted an original charter to
serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of
the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission on
Audit. 38
As state-owned and controlled corporation, it is
skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the
general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the
Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a
constitutional command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of
phrase “qualified Filipinos” and their “preferential right.”
The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This
is as it ought to be for a Constitution only lays down
flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet
today’s manifest needs and tomorrow’s unmanifested
demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can
grow as a living constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to define the phrase
brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase “qualified
Filipinos.” He explained that present and prospective
“laws” will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of
Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
“QUALIFIED?”
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely “TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS” as against whom? As against aliens over
aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is
understood. We use the word “QUALIFIED” because the
existing laws or the prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business map be done, for
example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera.
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. If we say, “PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS,” it can be understood as giving
preference to qualified Filipinos as against Filipinos who
are not qualified.
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the intention
of the proponents. The committee has accepted the
amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to
enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed to the State
and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word “laws” should
not be understood as limited to legislations but all state
actions which include applicable rules and regulations
adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in
the exercise of their rule-making power. In the case at bar,
the bidding rules and regulations set forth the standards to
measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and
foreigners alike. It is not seriously disputed that petitioner
39
qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad.
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of
preference which GSIS should have accorded petitioner, a
qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the
purchase of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel.
Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of
preference gives it a second chance to match the highest
bid of Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner’s submission.
I prescind from the premise that the second paragraph of
section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but
not anti-alien. It is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to
Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not
absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the
State is not prohibited from granting these rights, privileges
and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the
weal of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article
XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of our State policy-
makers is to maintain a creative tension between two
desiderata — first, the need to develop our economy and
patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and,
second, the need to keep our economy controlled by
Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not
define the degree of the right of preference to be given to
qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve the
general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can
be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing
needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of
qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time
dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need
for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the right of
preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to
determine the degree of this privilege at any given time is
addressed to the entire State. While under our
constitutional scheme, the right primarily belongs to
Congress as the lawmaking department of our
government, other branches of government, and all their
agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce
this state policy. Within the limits of their authority, they
can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining the
degree of this right of preference in cases where they have
to make grants involving the national economy and judicial
duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of
the state that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the
degree of the preferential right. Consequently, we must
turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents
Committee Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree
of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified
Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the rules and
regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of
preferential right to be accorded qualified Filipino bidder.
Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to
mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to
petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII of the
Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations.
Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which demand that we
interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I
submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only
if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all
things stand equal, and bidder, as a qualified Pilipino
bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view
that petitioner has a right to match the bid of Renong
Berhad. Petitioner’s submission must be supported by the
rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out .thousand
times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the
rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only “if for
any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of
shares . . .” No reason has arisen that will prevent the
award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It complied
with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It
was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and the
rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a
matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the
petitioner as a qualified Filipino privilege to match the
higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant,
petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with
petitioner but the court has no power to extend the latitude
and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the
rules. The parameters of the right of preference depend on
galaxy of facts and factors whose determination belongs to
the province of the policy-making branches and agencies
of the State. We are duty-bound to respect that
determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their
judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must
uphold the grant for as long as the right of preference is
not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a
denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike
down the denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing
the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner was aware of
the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the
rules and regulations do not provide that a qualified
Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting an
inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and
that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding.
Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it
agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules
when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If
sustained, petitioners’ stance will wreak havoc on he
essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require
highest bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the
government to maximize its capacity to deliver essential
services to our people. This is a duty that must be
discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a
bidding contest and the rules are carefully written to attain
this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to
insure their financial capability. The bidding is secret and
the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the parties.
This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner that
privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match it.
For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a bidder
not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation.
The visionary nationalist Don Claro M. Recto has warned
us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to
be an alien in his own land. The Constitution has
embodied Recto’s counsel as a state policy. But while the
Filipino First policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it
does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy
makers can write laws and rules giving favored treatment
to the Filipino but we are not free to be unfair to a foreigner
after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are
written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and
foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution protects all against unfairness. We can be
pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.
READ CASE DIGESTS: Filipino First Policy; Special
Commercial Law
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive
Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, may I
just add
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be
interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the
right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win.
However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply
states that “in the grant of rights . . . covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.” The majority concedes that there is no
law defining the extent or degree of such
preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing
Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the
winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law,
the majority’s strained interpretation, I respectfully submit
constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes
bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and
where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!.
2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such
judicial is short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely
prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages
other countries — in the guise of reverse comity or worse,
unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their
own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to
similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino
enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar
bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their
nationals. The majority’s thesis will thus marginalize
Filipinos as pariahs in the global marketplace with absolute
no chance of winning any bidding outside our country.
Even authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have
long ago found out unfairness, greed and isolation are self-
defeating and in the long-term, self-destructing.
The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other
what you dont want other to do unto you.
3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent
of the “Filipino First” policy of the Constitution, the
constitutional preference for the “qualified Filipinos” may
be allowed only where all the bids are equal. In this
manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing
him and without being unfair to the foreigner.
In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the
qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But not
when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted
the highest score.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO,
all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their
parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA
NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents
CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA
SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors
and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented
by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN,
GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA,
minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by
her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE
CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS
IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all
surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and
THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors,
represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented
by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX
and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors,
represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL
NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in
his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge
of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners. . . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to —
The Solicitor General for respondents.
(1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country;
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
(2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of approving new timber license
Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the agreements.
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of
"inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
equitable under the premises." 5
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests
and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital The complaint starts off with the general averments that
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area
of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with
rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77
unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%)
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
geared for the protection of our environment and natural
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable
distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new
resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
petitioners. 1 The complaint 2was instituted as a taxpayers'
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible
class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to
the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at
same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum —
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes,
"so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
"represent their generation as well as generations yet
dislocation of cultural communities, including the
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the
rendered:
siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g)
recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by
the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from
the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso
dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which
has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise
known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the
foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the
Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987
reveal that there remained no more
than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of
the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a
mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8%
of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0
million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that the
defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the
corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of
deforestation, i.e. about 200,000
hectares per annum or 25 hectares
per hour — nighttime, Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous
consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations
yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact,
the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are
already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.
14. The continued allowance by
defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see,
use, benefit from and enjoy this rare
and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resource property he holds
in trust for the benefit of plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity
as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated
March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as
Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and
refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to
the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal
by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an
act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be
left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the
policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive
and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is
conductive to a life of dignity and well-
being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's
continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory
to the Constitutional policy of the State
to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution
of opportunities, income and wealth"
and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth."
(Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's
cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the
harmony of nature." (Section 16, petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Article II, id.) Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary
to the highest law of humankind — the
natural law — and violative of Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
perpetuation. sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
22. There is no other plain, speedy
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
and adequate remedy in law other
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
than the instant action to arrest the
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
unabated hemorrhage of the country's
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
vital life support systems and
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of
man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by healthful environment.
the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains
to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and
for logging than what is available involves a judicial
(3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves
question.
the defendant's abuse of discretion.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain
granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the
that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs
said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the
are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
complaint states no cause of action against him and that it
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for
the public interest so requires.
would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the
petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their
as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them,
children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate
the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should
be properly addressed to the executive or legislative
branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to
lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would
ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,
respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA
remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has
been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated
the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some
procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No.
90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the
present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is
of common and general interest not just to several, but to
all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not
totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous
and representative enough to ensure the full protection of
all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil
case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others
of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file
a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the
created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not
hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect
evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe
that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to
enforce and protect, or a specific legal
wrong they are seeking to prevent and
redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions
based on unverified data. In fine,
plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action
in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes
that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this
Court without doing violence to the
sacred principle of "Separation of
Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression
that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e.,
to cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal
right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in
 accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
This right unites with the right to health
which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the
people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow
that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
— aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear
of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come — generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the
plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:
MR. Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
VILLACORTA: government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically
Does this section
forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
mandate the
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
State to provide
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
sanctions against
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to
all forms of
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
pollution — air,
for the welfare of the present and future generations of
water and noise
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement
pollution?
of policy:
MR. AZCUNA:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is
hereby declared the policy of the State
Yes, Madam to ensure the sustainable use,
President. The development, management, renewal,
right to healthful and conservation of the country's
(sic) environment forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas
necessarily and other natural resources, including
carries with it the the protection and enhancement of the
correlative duty of quality of the environment, and
not impairing the equitable access of the different
same and, segments of the population to the
therefore, development and the use of the
sanctions may be country's natural resources, not only
provided for for the present generation but for
impairment of future generations as well. It is also
environmental the policy of the state to recognize and
balance. 12 apply a true value system including
social and environmental cost
implications relative to their utilization,
The said right implies, among many other things, the development and conservation of our
judicious management and conservation of the country's
natural resources.
forests.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV,
Without such forests, the ecological or
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically
environmental balance would be irreversiby in Section 1 thereof which reads:
disrupted.
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1)
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and The State shall ensure, for the benefit
healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the of the Filipino people, the full
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
exploration and development as well
conservation, development and utilization of the country's as the judicious disposition, utilization,
natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino management, renewal and
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4
conservation of the country's forest,
of which expressly mandates that the Department of mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
 wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize
and apply a true value system that
takes into account social and
environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development
and conservation of our natural
resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining
a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same
Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate
of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the
fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The
Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher
authority, be in charge of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural
resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right"
of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D.
No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The
former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to
create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under
which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of
an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave
flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of
its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that
the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced
and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of
the other; and its essential elements
are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant,
and act or omission of the defendant
in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in
the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in
such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the
judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its
failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts
alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We
find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the
sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or
partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however,
that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said
to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-
vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
 Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine
Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority
represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement
of conflicting rights as conferred as
law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in
the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic
phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for
this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the . . . Provided, That when the national
jurisdictional objection becomes even interest so requires, the President may
less tenable and decisive. The reason amend, modify, replace or rescind any
is that, even if we were to assume that contract, concession, permit, licenses
the issue presented before us was or any other form of privilege granted
political in nature, we would still not be herein . . .
precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
us that now covers, in proper cases,
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
even the political question. Article VII,
not a contract, property or a property right
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
protested by the due process clause of the
provides: . . .
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found
. . . A timber license is an instrument
in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest
The Court is likewise of the impression resources to the end that public
that it cannot, no matter how we welfare is promoted. A timber license
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the is not a contract within the purview of
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., the due process clause; it is only a
to cancel all existing timber license license or privilege, which can be
agreements in the country and to validly withdrawn whenever dictated
cease and desist from receiving, by public interest or public welfare as
accepting, processing, renewing or in this case.
approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise
A license is merely a permit or
would amount to "impairment of
privilege to do what otherwise would
contracts" abhored (sic) by the
be unlawful, and is not a contract
fundamental law. 24
between the authority, federal, state,
or municipal, granting it and the
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are person to whom it is granted; neither
amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping is it property or a property right, nor
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent does it create a vested right; nor is it
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had Court held that the granting of license
done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the does not create irrevocable rights,
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits neither is it property or property rights
and advantages to the timber license holders because he (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
would have forever bound the Government to strictly
respect the said licenses according to their terms and
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that
as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry . . . Timber licenses, permits and
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides: license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State
 regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by
the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process
of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and
20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the
obligation of contracts shall be
passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the
same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a
law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by
its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only
been passed in the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant
system of government, is not meant to Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
be absolute. The same is understood respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case
to be subject to reasonable legislative No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
regulation aimed at the promotion of therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
public health, moral, safety and the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
welfare. In other words, the agreements.
constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is
No pronouncement as to costs.
limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and SO ORDERED.
general welfare.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero,
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Under our form of government the use
of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free
of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will Separate Opinions
use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the FELICIANO, J., concurring
common interest.
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is
power of the state. 31 one of the most important cases decided by this Court in
the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and
the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the course of the protection and management of the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, environment, which of course embraces the utilization
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself,
have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, what the Court appears to be saying.
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right. The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus
standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance
of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a
function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly
regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer
to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness
of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in
this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the
country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be
expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners
seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with
the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned
and the private persons or entities operating in the field or
sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision
and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has
alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal
right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology"
(Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it
is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great
respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific,"
without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact
very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in
scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to
be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission
of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor
vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage
and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by
vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities;
of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,
streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn
farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other
living sea resources through the use of dynamite or
cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora;
and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987;
Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear
to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The
Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment
management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an
extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management
and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural
calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of
surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly,
neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine
Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right
which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care
the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-
headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment
Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries
of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action
as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution
are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their
present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to
be explored in future cases; those implications are too
large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the
trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than
Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood
as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the
trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a
specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back
on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been agrave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the
right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the
timber companies, whose concession agreements or
TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should
cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the
timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies
litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek
to dispute the existence of the specific legal right
petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal
rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also
controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances
which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the
protection of the environment, including the forest cover of
our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The
doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today
should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in
the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is
one of the most important cases decided by this Court in
the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this
decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and
course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization
of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our
polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself,
what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus
standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance
of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a
function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly
regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer
to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness
of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in
this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the
country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be
expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners
seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with
the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned
and the private persons or entities operating in the field or
sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision
and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has
alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal
right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology"
(Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it
is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great
respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific,"
without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact
very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in
scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to
be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission
of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor
vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage
and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by
vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities;
of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,
streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn
farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other
living sea resources through the use of dynamite or
cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora;
and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987;
Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear
to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The
Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment
management policies" and "environment quality standards"
(fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an
extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management
and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural
calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of
surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly,
neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine
Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right
which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care
the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-
headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment
Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries
of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action
as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution
are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their
present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to
be explored in future cases; those implications are too
large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the
trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than
Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood
as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the
trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a
specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back
on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been agrave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the
right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the
timber companies, whose concession agreements or
TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should
cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the
timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies
litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek
to dispute the existence of the specific legal right
petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal
rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also
controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances
which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the
protection of the environment, including the forest cover of
our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The
doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today
should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
GEORGE T. VILLENA, CARLOS N. VILLENA, AURORA
M. BONDOC and RONNIE C. FERNANDEZ,
and their Respective Spouses, petitioners, vs.
Spouses ANTONIO C. CHAVEZ and NOEMI
MARCOS-CHAVEZ and CARLITA C.
CHAVEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Stare decisis simply means that a judgment reached
in one case should be applied to successive ones in which
the facts are substantially identical, even though the
parties may be different. Like cases ought to be decided
alike.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 9, 2001
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
58329. The decretalportion of the Decision reads as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, the judgment dated March 29, 2000 of
Branch 56 of the RTC of Angeles City is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment
entered in favor of the petitioners, ordering the
respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to
vacate from the subject lots and to remove their houses
and/or any other structures or constructions thereon.”[3]
The overturned Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 56,[4] affirmed in toto the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Angeles City, Branch II.[5]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in
this wise:
“In a Complaint for Illegal Detainer with Damages filed on
October 15, 1998, the [respondents] alleged that they are
the owners of four (4) parcels of land designated as Lot
Nos. 164, 165, 166, and 167 of the Cadastral Survey of
Angeles City, and covered, respectively, by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 83247, 83246, 83248 and 83249,
all issued by the Register of Deeds of Angeles City. These
four (4) parcels of land have been consolidated and
subdivided into several blocks and lots, and are now
collectively designated as Bagong Silang Phase III-C. By
mere permission and tolerance of the [respondents], the
[petitioners] have occupied and erected their homes on
four (4) of the said lots, as follows:
George T. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 14
Carlos N. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 13
Aurora M. Bondoc and husband = Block 2, Lot 4
Ronnie C. Hernandez and wife = Block 3, Lot 5
“All the [petitioners] are members of
the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners’ Association,
Inc., with office address at Cutud, Angeles City. The
[respondents] allowed the [petitioners] and other members
of the said homeowners’ association to continue occupying
the subject lots and ultimately to acquire ownership of the
lots occupied, in consideration of a certain amount to be
paid to the [respondents] as equity.
“The [respondents] further alleged that the other members
of the said homeowners’ association paid to the
[respondents] their respective equity for their right to
continue occupying and ultimately acquiring ownership of
the occupied lots. However, notwithstanding repeated
demands made upon the [petitioners], they have refused
and failed without any justifiable ground to pay their
respective equity. In view of such failure to pay, the
[petitioners] have forfeited their right to continue occupying
the lots in question. Formal demand letters were then sent
by registered mail to the [petitioners], wherein they were
given a period of thirty (30) days from receipt within which
to vacate and remove their houses from the subject lots.
The period given to the [petitioners] lapsed on April 11,
1998, but up to the present time, the [petitioners] refused
and failed without any justifiable reason or ground to
vacate and remove their houses from the said lots.
“The [respondents] then prayed in their Complaint that the
[petitioners] be ordered to vacate and remove their houses
from the lots currently occupied; that each of the
[petitioners] be ordered to pay the [respondents]
P1,000.00 a month as reasonable rental for the use and
occupation of the lots starting from April 11, 1998 until they
have finally vacated and removed their houses from said
lots; and that the [petitioners] jointly and severally pay the
[respondents] P25,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, P2,000.00 as appearance fee per hearing,
exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
“In their answer with compulsory counter-claim filed
on November 3, 1998, the [petitioners] countered that the
[respondents] have no cause of action to institute the
present action, considering that the properties in question
are under the community mortgage program implemented
by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation. Moreover, the [petitioners] claimed that they
are lawful tenants of the premises, and that they have
been paying their equity to their originator,
the Urban Land and Development Foundation[,] Inc.
However, they were not issued the corresponding receipts
evidencing payment and a copy of their contract. The
[petitioners] further averred that they were willing to
continue paying their equity until the same shall have been
fully paid, but their originator, without justifiable reason,
refused to accept the tender of payment made by them.
The [petitioners] subsequently agreed with their originator
that the payment of equity should be continued only upon
the release of a Purchase Commitment Line (PCL).
“In addition, the [petitioners] alleged that they are qualified
beneficiaries under Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise
known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992; hence, they cannot be summarily evicted and their
dwelling houses demolished unless and until they have
been relocated. According to the [petitioners], they are
also builders in good faith and should be indemnified for
the improvements they constructed on the properties in
question.
“The [petitioners] prayed in their answer that the complaint
be dismissed; that they be declared lawful tenants and
qualified beneficiaries under R.A. 7279; that the
[respondents] be ordered to sell the lots in question to
them, and to pay attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.
“After the pre-trial conference, both parties submitted their
position papers. On September 15, 1999, MTC Branch II of
Angeles City rendered a decision dismissing both the
[respondents’] complaint and the [petitioners’] counter-
claim, on the ground that the filing of an ejectment case
based on the alleged violation of the parties’ agreement
which has not yet been rescinded is premature, and that it
is beyond the competence of the said court to act on the
case, as rescission or specific performance is beyond the
jurisdiction of the said court.
“The [respondents] appealed such adverse judgment to
the RTC of Angeles City, which appeal was raffled to
Branch 56 of the said court. On March 29, 2000, RTC
Branch 56 of Angeles City rendered a decision affirming
in toto the MTC judgment.”[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the right of petitioners to continue
occupying the subject properties hinged on their continued
payment of the agreed amount as equity.[7] Even after
formal letters of demand to vacate the premises had been
sent to them, however, they still did not make any effort to
pay their equity to protect their right to continue occupying
those lots. Thus, the appellate court ruled that their failure
to pay made their occupancy unlawful, in consequence of
which they became subject to an ejectment suit.
The CA rejected the contention of petitioners that
they were protected by RA 7279. According to the
appellate court, there was no express declaration by the
local government unit that the parcels of land owned by
respondents were to be used for socialized housing.
Neither was there proof of the allegation that they had
applied therefor under the Community Mortgage Program
of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation under
Section 31 of RA 7279. Besides, even granting that
petitioners were protected under RA 7279, they were still
liable to pay amortization or face eviction.
Likewise debunked was the allegation of petitioners
that respondents were not the real parties in interest.
Being the owners of the lots occupied by the former, the
latter had a material interest in the suit and stood to be
benefited or injured by any judgment affecting those
parcels of land.
Hence, this Petition. [8]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our
consideration:
“I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in reversing and setting aside the
Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II and of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 56 both of Angeles City[;]
“II. Whether or not the Honorable Municipal Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case;
“III. Whether or not the non-inclusion of
the Bagong Silang Homeowners Association Inc., is fatal
to respondents[‘] cause of action[;]
“IV. Whether or not ejectment is proper in the case at bar;
“V. Whether or not the absence of contractual relation[s]
between the respondents and the petitioners bar[s] the
filing of any action by the respondents against the
petitioner.”[9]
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether
unlawful detainer is the proper action to resolve this
case. If it is, then the MTC indeed had jurisdiction over the
case, and the CA was correct in overturning
the RTC’s ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
case.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Unlawful Detainer
The CA ruled that petitioners’ possession or
occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance
of respondents. Hence, once petitioners failed to pay the
agreed amount as equity, their right to continue occupying
the lots was lost.
We disagree. Contradictory were the statements of
the appellate court that, on the one hand, there was no
contract between the parties; and yet, on the other, that
petitioners failed to pay theagreed equity. The fact that the
CA found that there was failure to pay the equity was an
indication of an agreement. To be sure, petitioners’
possession of the subject premises was not by mere
tolerance of respondents.
In the Complaint[10] of respondents, filed before
Branch II of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, they
themselves alleged the presence of an agreement
between the parties as follows:
“10. That in consideration of a certain amount to be paid to
the [respondents] by each of the [petitioners] as equity for
their right to continue occupying and ultimately acquire
ownership of the lots that they occupy, the said
homeowners’ association has made arrangements with the
[respondents] to allow the [petitioners] and other members
of the said homeowners’ association to continue occupying
and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that they
occupy[.]”[11]
Further, in the Special Power of Attorney[12] annexed
to their Complaint, they constituted and
appointed Teodorico B. Sanchez and/or Arturo
M. Yadan as their attorneys-in-fact to do, among others,
the following:
“1. To collect and receive any amount or amounts as
equity for the sale thereof to them from the occupants or
any other interested buyer or buyers of any portion or
portions of the following-described parcels of land:
xxx
xxx
xxx
of which we are the absolute and exclusive owners, and
which comprise the parcels of land being acquired by the
members or beneficiaries of the BAGONG SILANG
PHASE III-C HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
at Brgy. Cutud, Angeles City[.]”[13]
Based on the admissions of respondents
themselves, they entered into an agreement with
petitioners. Necessarily, the latter’s occupancy of the lots
in question was not based merely on theformer’s tolerance
or permission. Thus, petitioners were not necessarily
bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand,
failing which, a summary action for ejectment would have
become proper.
The MTC’s findings of fact on this point are
instructive:
“About the only thing that the parties have met on a
common ground is that: [Respondents] have entered into
an arrangement/agreement
with Bagong Silang Homeowners’ Association, Inc. that
called for the payment of certain amounts as equity for
[petitioners’] right to continue occupying the lots with the
end in view of eventually becoming the owners thereof,
that pursuant to such agreement [petitioners] have paid
certain amounts as acquisition fees or as equity but later
discontinued making payments in view of the non-issuance
of the so-called purchase commitment line/loan, and as a
consequence, [respondents] are now accusing [petitioners]
for violating the agreement and on the basis of such
breach of the agreement by [petitioners], demands for the
latter to vacate the lots were made by [respondents].”[14]
When respondents alleged that
the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners’ Association
made arrangements with them to allow petitioners and
other members of the association to continue to occupy
and ultimately to acquire ownership of the lots in question,
respondents explicitly admitted that a contract had indeed
been entered into. The eventual transfer of ownership of
real property evidenced that obligation. What is clear is
that in their Complaint, respondents alleged that
petitioners had violated the stipulations of their agreement
as follows:
“11. That the other members of the Ba[g]ong Silang Phase
III-C Homeowners’ Association, Inc., paid to the
[respondents] their respective equity for their right to
continue occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of
the lots that they occupy, but notwithstanding repeated
demands made on them, up to the present time, the
[petitioners] have refused and failed without any justifiable
ground or reason to pay their respective equity to the
[respondents], and, in view of such refusal and failure, the
[petitioners] have forfeited their right to continue occupying
and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that they
occupy[.]”[15]
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied any breach on
their part and argued that the principal issue was one of
interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the
contract. Under these circumstances, proof of violation of
the provisions of the contract is a condition precedent to
resolution or rescission.[16] The contract can be declared
rescinded only when its nature has been clarified and the
eventual violation thereof, if any, has been
established. Upon such rescission, in turn, hinges a
pronouncement that the possession of the realty has
become unlawful. Thus, the basic issue is not possession
but interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the
contract -- a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court to hear and determine.
An allegation of a violation of a contract or
agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the
presentation of competent evidence, upon which an MTC
judge might make a finding to that effect. But certainly, that
court cannot declare and hold that the contract is
rescinded, as such power is vested in the RTC.[17]
The rescission of the contract is the basis of, and
therefore a condition precedent for, the illegality of a
party’s possession of a piece of realty.[18] Without judicial
intervention and determination, even a stipulation entitling
one party to take possession of the land and building in
case the other party violates the contract cannot confer
upon the former the right to take possession thereof, if that
move is objected to.[19]
To be sure, the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint.[20] Thus, in ascertaining
whether or not an action is one for unlawful detainer falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the
averments of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought should be examined.
Also, as correctly pleaded by petitioners, a similar
case had been decided by the CA in CA-GR SP No.
58679, in which it ruled that the proper action should have
been a complaint for rescission or specific performance,
not for illegal detainer. In that case, the same plaintiffs filed
the same charges against a different but similarly situated
set of defendants.
 The appellate court ruled therein that there was an
existing agreement or contract that determined the nature
of the parties’ relationship.[21] Thus, it held that the proper
action should have been for rescission of contract or
specific performance, not unlawful detainer.[22] When the
CA Decision was elevated, this Court denied the appeal
for failure to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the appellate court. Thereafter, the Decision
became final and executory on April 23, 2002.[23]
Said the appellate court in the previous case:
“Inasmuch as the relationship existing between the parties
is not a lessor-lessee relationship but one that emanated
from the agreement between appellants and
the Urban Land and Development Foundation, Inc., the so-
called originator of the Bagong Silang Homeowners
Association, Inc., the relief being sought then by appellants
appears to be improper. If ever there was no payment of
equity as provided for under the said agreement, the same
cannot be considered as non-payment of rentals. Thus, it
cannot be a sufficient basis for filing an ejectment case
against appellees, the proper remedy being an action for
rescission of contract or specific performance.”[24]
We stress that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
in which the facts are substantially the
same.[25] Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is
settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different.[26] It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to
be decided alike.[27]
Having ruled that the MTC had indeed no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of this case in the first place, we see no
more need to address the other issues raised by
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is
hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is OVERTURNED. Consequently, the
Decisions of the MTC and the RTC of Angeles City
are REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
FRANCISCO A. VELOSO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, AGLALOMA B. ESCARIO, assisted
by her husband GREGORIO L. ESCARIO, the
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
This petition for review assails the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1991, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against appellant.”[1]
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner Francisco Veloso was the owner of a parcel of
land situated in the district of Tondo, Manila, with an area
of one hundred seventy seven (177) square meters and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 49138 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.[2] The title was
registered in the name of Francisco A. Veloso, single,[3] on
October 4, 1957.[4] The said title was subsequently
canceled and a new one, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
180685, was issued in the name of Aglaloma B. Escario,
married to Gregorio L. Escario, on May 24, 1988.[5]
On August 24, 1988, petitioner Veloso filed an action for
annulment of documents, reconveyance of property with
damages and preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-
45926, was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45,
Manila. Petitioner alleged therein that he was the absolute
owner of the subject property and he never authorized
anybody, not even his wife, to sell it. He alleged that he
was in possession of the title but when his wife, Irma, left
for abroad, he found out that his copy was missing. He
then verified with the Registry of Deeds of Manila and
there he discovered that his title was already canceled in
favor of defendant Aglaloma Escario. The transfer of
property was supported by a General Power of
Attorney[6] dated November 29, 1985 and Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated November 2, 1987, executed by Irma
Veloso, wife of the petitioner and appearing as his
attorney-in-fact, and defendant Aglaloma
Escario.[7] Petitioner Veloso, however, denied having
executed the power of attorney and alleged that his
signature was falsified. He also denied having seen or
even known Rosemarie Reyes and Imelda Santos, the
supposed witnesses in the execution of the power of
attorney. He vehemently denied having met or transacted
with the defendant. Thus, he contended that the sale of
the property, and the subsequent transfer thereof, were
null and void. Petitioner Veloso, therefore, prayed that a
temporary restraining order be issued to prevent the
transfer of the subject property; that the General Power of
Attorney, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 180685 be annulled; and the subject
property be reconveyed to him.
Defendant Aglaloma Escario in her answer alleged
that she was a buyer in good faith and denied any
knowledge of the alleged irregularity. She allegedly relied
on the general power of attorney of Irma Veloso which was
sufficient in form and substance and was duly
notarized. She contended that plaintiff (herein petitioner),
had no cause of action against her. In seeking for the
declaration of nullity of the documents, the real party in
interest was Irma Veloso, the wife of the plaintiff. She
should have been impleaded in the case. In fact, Plaintiff’s
cause of action should have been against his wife,
Irma. Consequently, defendant Escario prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and the payment to her of
damages.[8]
Pre-trial was conducted. The sole issue to be
resolved by the trial court was whether or not there was a
valid sale of the subject property.[9]
During the trial, plaintiff (herein petitioner) Francisco
Veloso testified that he acquired the subject property from
the Philippine Building Corporation, as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1957.[10] He married Irma
Lazatin on January 20, 1962.[11] Hence, the property did
not belong to their conjugal partnership. Plaintiff further
asserted that he did not sign the power of attorney and as
proof that his signature was falsified, he presented Allied
Bank Checks Nos. 16634640, 16634641 and 16634643,
which allegedly bore his genuine signature.
Witness for the plaintiff Atty. Julian G. Tubig denied
any participation in the execution of the general power of
attorney. He attested that he did not sign thereon, and the
same was never entered in his Notarial Register on
November 29, 1985.
In the decision of the trial court dated March 9,
1990,[12] defendant Aglaloma Escaro was adjudged the
lawful owner of the property as she was deemed an
innocent purchaser for value. The assailed general power
of attorney was held to be valid and sufficient for the
purpose. The trial court ruled that there was no need for a
special power of attorney when the special power was
already mentioned in the general one. It also declared that
plaintiff failed to substantiate his allegation of fraud. The
court also stressed that plaintiff was not entirely blameless
for although he admitted to be the only person who had
access to the title and other important documents, his wife
was still able to possess the copy. Citing Section 55 of
Act 496, the court held that Irma’s possession and
production of the certificate of title was deemed a
conclusive authority from the plaintiff to the Register of
Deeds to enter a new certificate. Then applying the
principle of equitable estoppel, plaintiff was held to bear
the loss for it was he who made the wrong possible. Thus:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds for the defendants and
against plaintiff-
a. declaring that there was a valid sale of the subject
property in favor of the defendant;
b. denying all other claims of the parties for want of legal
and factual basis.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner Veloso filed
his appeal with the Court of Appeals. The respondent
court affirmed in toto the findings of the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review before us.
This petition for review was initially dismissed for
failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy of the
petition on the counsel for private respondent. [13] A motion
for reconsideration of the resolution was filed but it was
denied in a resolution dated March 30, 1992.[14] A second
motion for reconsideration was filed and in a resolution
dated Aug. 3, 1992, the motion was granted and the
petition for review was reinstated.[15]
A supplemental petition was filed on October 9, 1992
with the following assignment of errors:
I the special power is required.
The Court of Appeals committed a grave error in not
finding that the forgery of the power of attorney (Exh. “C”)
had been adequately proven, despite the preponderant
evidence, and in doing so, it has so far departed from the
applicable provisions of law and the decisions of this
Honorable Court, as to warrant the grant of this petition for
review on certiorari.
II
There are principles of justice and equity that warrant a
review of the decision.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
trial court which misapplied the principle of equitable
estoppel since the petitioner did not fail in his duty of
observing due diligence in the safekeeping of the title to
the property.
We find petitioner’s contentions not meritorious.
An examination of the records showed that the
assailed power of attorney was valid and regular on its
face. It was notarized and as such, it carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution. While it is true that it was denominated as a
general power of attorney, a perusal thereof revealed that
it stated an authority to sell, to wit:
“2. To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or otherwise
hypothecate lands, tenements and hereditaments or other
forms of real property, more specifically TCT No. 49138,
upon such terms and conditions and under such
covenants as my said attorney shall deem fit and
proper.”[16]
Thus, there was no need to execute a separate and
special power of attorney since the general power of
attorney had expressly authorized the agent or attorney in
fact the power to sell the subject property. The special
power of attorney can be included in the general power
when it is specified therein the act or transaction for which
The general power of attorney was accepted by the
Register of Deeds when the title to the subject property
was canceled and transferred in the name of private
respondent. In LRC Consulta No. 123, Register of Deeds
of Albay, Nov. 10, 1956, it stated that:
“Whether the instrument be denominated as “general
power of attorney” or “special power of attorney,” what
matters is the extent of the power or powers contemplated
upon the agent or attorney in fact. If the power is couched
in general terms, then such power cannot go beyond acts
of administration. However, where the power to sell is
specific, it not being merely implied, much less couched in
general terms, there can not be any doubt that the attorney
in fact may execute a valid sale. An instrument may be
captioned as “special power of attorney” but if the powers
granted are couched in general terms without mentioning
any specific power to sell or mortgage or to do other
specific acts of strict dominion, then in that case only acts
of administration may be deemed conferred.”
Petitioner contends that his signature on the power
of attorney was falsified. He also alleges that the same
was not duly notarized for as testified by Atty. Tubig
himself, he did not sign thereon nor was it ever recorded in
his notarial register. To bolster his argument, petitioner
had presented checks, marriage certificate and his
residence certificate to prove his alleged genuine signature
which when compared to the signature in the power of
attorney, showed some difference.
 We found, however, that the basis presented by the
petitioner was inadequate to sustain his allegation of
forgery. Mere variance of the signatures cannot be
considered as conclusive proof that the same were forged.
Forgery cannot be presumed.[17] Petitioner, however, failed
to prove his allegation and simply relied on the apparent
difference of the signatures. His denial had not established
that the signature on the power of attorney was not his.
We agree with the conclusion of the lower court that
private respondent was an innocent purchaser for
value. Respondent Aglaloma relied on the power of
attorney presented by petitioner’s wife, Irma. Being the
wife of the owner and having with her the title of the
property, there was no reason for the private respondent
not to believe in her authority. Moreover, the power of
attorney was notarized and as such, carried with it the
presumption of its due execution. Thus, having had no
inkling on any irregularity and having no participation
thereof, private respondent was a buyer in good faith. It
has been consistently held that a purchaser in good faith is
one who buys property of another, without notice that
some other person has a right to, or interest in such
property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim
or interest of some other person in the property.[18]
Documents acknowledged before a notary public
have the evidentiary weight with respect to their due
execution. The questioned power of attorney and deed of
sale, were notarized and therefore, presumed to be valid
and duly executed. Atty. Tubig denied having notarized
the said documents and alleged that his signature had also
been falsified. He presented samples of his signature to
prove his contention. Forgery should be proved by clear
and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the
burden of proving the same. Just like the petitioner,
witness Atty. Tubig merely pointed out that his signature
was different from that in the power of attorney and deed
of sale. There had never been an accurate examination of
the signature, even that of the petitioner. To determine
forgery, it was held in Cesar vs. Sandiganbayan[19] (quoting
Osborn, The Problem of Proof) that:
“The process of identification, therefore, must include the
determination of the extent, kind, and significance of this
resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes
necessary to determine whether the variation is due to the
operation of a different personality, or is only the expected
and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the
same writer. It is also necessary to decide whether the
resemblance is the result of a more or less skillful imitation,
or is the habitual and characteristic resemblance which
naturally appears in a genuine writing. When these two
questions are correctly answered the whole problem of
identification is solved.”
Even granting for the sake of argument, that the
petitioner’s signature was falsified and consequently, the
power of attorney and the deed of sale were null and void,
such fact would not revoke the title subsequently issued in
favor of private respondent Aglaloma. In the case of
Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals,[20] it was held, viz.:
“The right of an innocent purchaser for value must be
respected and protected, even if the seller obtained his
title through fraud. The remedy of the person prejudiced is
to bring an action for damages against those who caused
or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an
action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed
for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.”
Finally, the trial court did not err in applying equitable
estoppel in this case. The principle of equitable estoppel
states that where one or two innocent persons must suffer
a loss, he who by his conduct made the loss possible must
bear it. From the evidence adduced, it should be the
petitioner who should bear the loss. As the court a
quo found:
“Besides, the records of this case disclosed that the
plaintiff is not entirely free from blame. He admitted that
he is the sole person who has access to TCT No. 49138
and other documents appertaining thereto (TSN, May 23,
1989, pp. 7-12). However, the fact remains that the
Certificate of Title, as well as other documents necessary
for the transfer of title were in the possession of plaintiff’s
wife, Irma L. Veloso, consequently leaving no doubt or any
suspicion on the part of the defendant as to her
authority. Under Section 55 of Act 496, as amended,
Irma’s possession and production of the Certificate of Title
to defendant operated as “conclusive authority from the
plaintiff to the Register of Deeds to enter a new
certificate.”[21]
Considering the foregoing premises, We found no
error in the appreciation of facts and application of law by
the lower court that will warrant the reversal or modification
of the appealed decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and FILINVEST FINANCE
CORP., respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
24684[1] which affirmed the order of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 40, Manila, in Civil Case No. 84804.[2]
The dispute stemmed from an unpaid promissory
note dated October 28, 1970, executed by petitioner
Leovillo C. Agustin in favor of ERM Commercial for the
amount of P43,480.80. The note was payable in monthly
installments[3] and secured by a chattel mortgage over an
Isuzu diesel truck,[4] both of which were subsequently
assigned to private respondent Filinvest Finance
Corporation.[5] When petitioner defaulted in paying the
installments, private respondent demanded from him the
payment of the entire balance or, in lieu thereof, the
possession of the mortgaged vehicle. Neither payment
nor surrender was made. Aggrieved, private respondent
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 26 (RTC Branch 26) against petitioner praying for
the issuance of a writ of replevin or, in the alternative, for
the payment of P32,723.97 plus interest at the rate of 14%
per annum from due date until fully paid.[6] Trial ensued
and, thereafter, awrit of replevin was issued by RTC
Branch 26. By virtue thereof, private respondent acquired
possession of the vehicle. Upon repossession, the latter
discovered that the vehicle was no longer in running
condition and that several parts were missing which private
respondent replaced. The vehicle was then foreclosed
and sold at public auction.
 Private respondent subsequently filed
“supplemental complaint” claiming additional
reimbursement worth P8,852.76 as value of replacement
parts[7] and for expenses incurred in transporting the
mortgaged vehicle from Cagayan to Manila. In response,
petitioner moved to dismiss the supplemental complaint
arguing that RTC Branch 26 had already lost jurisdiction
over the case because of the earlier extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. The lower court granted the
motion and the case was dismissed.[8] Private respondent
elevated the matter to the appellate court, docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 56718-R, which set aside the order of
dismissal and ruled that repossession expenses incurred
by private respondent should be reimbursed.[9] This
decision became final and executory, hence the case was
accordingly remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 40 (RTC Branch 40) for reception of
evidence to determine the amount due from
petitioner.[10] After trial, RTC Branch 40 found petitioner
liable for the repossession expenses, attorney's fees,
liquidated damages, bonding fees and other expenses in
the seizure of the vehicle in the aggregate sum
of P18,547.38. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
Acting thereon, RTC Branch 40 modified its decision by
lowering the monetary award toP8,852.76, the amount
originally prayed for in the supplemental
complaint.[11] Private respondent appealed the case with
respect to the reduction of the amount
awarded. Petitioner, likewise, appealed impugning the
trial court’s order for him to pay private
respondent P8,852.76, an amount over and above the
value received from the foreclosure sale. Both appeals
were consolidated and in CA- G.R. No. 24684, the
modified order of RTC Branch 40 was affirmed. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but to no avail[12] Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the award of repossession
expenses to private respondent as mortgagee is "contrary
to the letter, intent and spirit of Article 1484[13] of the Civil
Code".[14] He asserts that private respondent’s
repossession expenses have been amply covered by the
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, hence he could no
longer be held liable. The arguments are devoid of merit.
Petitioner’s contentions, we note, were previously
rejected by respondent court in its decision in CA-G.R. No.
56718-R the dispositive portion of which provides as
follows:
a "WHEREFORE, the order dismissing the case is hereby
set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for
reception of evidence of `expenses properly incurred in
effecting seizure of the chattel (and) of recoverable
attorney's fees in prosecuting the action for replevin' as
`repossession expenses' prayed for in the supplemental
complaint, without pronouncement as to costs."[15]
which ruling has long acquired finality. It is clear,
therefore, that the appellate court had already settled the
propriety of awarding repossession expenses in favor of
private respondent. The remand of the case to RTC
Branch 40 was for the sole purpose of threshing out the
correct amount of expenses and not for relitigating the
accuracy of the award. Thus, the findings of RTC Branch
40, as affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. No.
24684, was confined to the appreciation of evidence
relative to the repossession expenses for the query or
issue passed upon by the respondent court in CA-G.R.
No. 56718-R (propriety of the award for repossession
expenses) has become the “law of the case”. This
principle is defined as “a term applied to an established
rule that when an appellate court passes on a question
and remands the cause to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law
of the case upon subsequent appeal.”[16] Having exactly
the same parties and issues, the decision in the former
appeal (CA-G.R. No. 56718-R) is now the established and
controlling rule. Petitioner may not therefore be allowed in
a subsequent appeal (CA-G.R. No. 24684) and in this
petition to resuscitate and revive formerly settled
issues. Judgment of courts should attain finality at some
point in time, as in this case, otherwise, there will be no
end to litigation.
At any rate, even if we were to brush aside the “law
of the case” doctrine we find the award for repossession
expenses still proper. In Filipinas Investment & Finance
Corporation v. Ridad,[17] the Court recognized an exception
to the rule stated under Article 1484(3) upon which
petitioner relies. Thus:
“x x x Where the mortgagor plainly refuses to deliver the
chattel subject of the mortgage upon his failure to pay two
or more installments, or if he conceals the chattel to place
it beyond the reach of the mortgagee, what then is the
mortgagee expected to do? x x x It logically follows as a
matter of common sense, that the necessary expenses
incurred in the prosecution by the mortgagee of the action
for replevin so that he can regain possession of the
chattel, should be borne by the mortgagor. Recoverable
expenses would, in our view, include expenses properly
incurred in effecting seizure of the chattel and reasonable
attorney’s fees in prosecuting the action for replevin.”[18]
Anent the denial of the award for attorney’s fees, we
find the same in order. The trial court, as well as
respondent court, found no evidence to support the claim
for attorney's fees which factual finding is binding on
us.[19] We find no compelling reason, and none was
presented, to set aside this ruling.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
AMELIA D. DE MESA, ARACELI ADATO, RODRIGO
ALVARAN, AIDA CASTRO, BALTAZAR
ESTRELLES, ANTONIO A. FERRER, DANILO
GARCIA, JULIO M. GONZALES, MARRIETA A.
JOSE, PEPITA JUNTADO, EDUARDO U.
LAGO, NESTOR RODA, JAIME SANCHEZ and
JUANITA SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PEPSI COLA
PRODUCTS PHILS., INC. and PEPSICO
INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Order,[1] dated April
18, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 142 in Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421. In the
said Order, the RTC granted herein respondents’ motion to
dismiss the complaints filed by petitioners herein based on
the principle of stare decisis.
The instant case arose from the same set of facts as
(1) Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., et
al., G.R. No. 153183 promulgated on July 24,
2002[2] affirming the Court of Appeals Decision, dated April
16, 2002, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53860;[3] and (2) Rodrigo v.
Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. and Pepsico, Inc., G.R.
No. 149411, dated October 1, 2001, which also affirmed
the Court of Appeals Decision of May 21, 2001 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62837.[4]
The facts are culled from the aforesaid Decisions of
the Court of Appeals as affirmed by this Court.
Petitioners are holders of soft drink bottle caps
bearing the number “349,” allegedly a winning combination
in a contest sponsored by respondents Pepsi Cola
Products Phils., Inc. (PCPPI) and PEPSICO, Inc. (PI).
Respondent PCPPI is a domestic corporation
engaged in the production, bottling, and distribution of
carbonated drinks, while respondent PI is a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines and
is the major stockholder of PCPPI.
D.G. Consultores, a Mexican consulting firm that
handled similar promotions in other countries, was tasked
to randomly pre-select the winning numbers and send to
respondents a list of the 60 winning numbers with their
corresponding security codes. The process of selecting the
winning numbers was implemented with the approval of
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
During the initial promotion period, from February 17
to May 8, 1992, respondents seeded 1000 numbers, 60 of
which were winning numbers, 510 non-winning numbers,
while the remaining 430 were unused. To ensure that the
winning numbers would not be tampered, the DTI required
respondents to submit the list of winning numbers
including their security codes which was then deposited in
a safety deposit box in a bank.[5]
Owing to the promotional campaign’s success,
respondents extended the “Number Fever” by five more
weeks, from May 10 to June 12, 1992. Pepsi again tapped
D.G. Consultores to predetermine the 25 additional
winning numbers from the list of unused numbers.
On May 25, 1992, respondents announced “349” as
the winning number for the May 26 draw. Later the same
night, Quintin Gomez, Jr., then PCPPI’s Marketing
Services Manager called DTI Director Madarang informing
her that due to some security code problems a mistake
had been made in the announcement of number “349” as
the winning number.[6]
Numerous holders of the supposedly winning “349”
crowns were not honored and paid by respondents, which
led these rejected crown holders to file separate
complaints for specific performance and damages.
Civil Case No. 93-68351 was originally filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, but the
plaintiffs in the said case withdrew their complaint, leaving
Gerson Mendoza as the sole plaintiff in Gerson M.
Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc. and Pepsico,
Inc.[7] The other plaintiffs re-filed their complaints before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50,
entitled Romulo Rodrigo, et al. v. Pepsi Cola Products
Philippines, Inc., et al., docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
71403.[8]
For their part, petitioners herein filed their separate
complaints, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-
2421, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
142.
In the Mendoza case, the RTC dismissed the
complaint filed against herein respondents for specific
performance and damages in connection with the Number
Fever fiasco.[9] Mendoza appealed to the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 53860, which was dismissed for lack of
merit.[10] Unfazed, Mendoza filed with this Court a petition
for review, which was denied for failure to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error.[11]
In the Rodrigo case, the RTC likewise dismissed the
complaint against herein respondents for specific
performance and damages arising from the said
promotion.[12] On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
62837, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision.[13] A petition for review was subsequently filed
with this Court, which was denied for failure to show that a
reversible error was committed by the appellate court. The
motion for reconsideration was also denied with
finality[14] and entry of judgment was made.[15]
However, prior to the resolution of
the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, herein petitioners filed
with the RTC, on December 11, 2000, a motion for
leave[16] to (1) adopt the previous testimonial and
documentary evidence in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases;
or (2) archive the case until final resolution of the said two
cases, which were then pending with the Court of Appeals.
The RTC granted the said motion on January 8, 2001 and
the case was accordingly archived.[17]
Meantime, the Rodrigo case became final and
executory on February 5, 2002 in view of our denial of
therein petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari and
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, on February 20, 2002, herein respondents
filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss[18] the complaints
filed by petitioners herein invoking the principle of stare
decisis. The RTC, in its assailed Order,[19] granted the
motion to dismiss ratiocinating as follows:
The Court finds the instant motion meritorious under the
principle of stare decisis. The said doctrine embodies the
legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been
established by the decision of a court of controlling
jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving similar
situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability in the law and does not require
identity or privy of parties. This is explicitly ordained in
Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form part of the legal system. Such decisions “assume the
same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they
are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby
but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience
thereto” (Kilosbayan, Inc. et al. vs. Manuel Morato, G.R.
No. 118910, July 17, 1995).
In the instant cases as well as in Civil Case No. 93-68351
(the Mendoza case), not only are the legal rights and
relations of the parties substantially the same as those
passed upon in Civil Case No. 94-71403 (the Rodrigo
case), but the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of
action, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary
evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, i.e.
the Rodrigo case in Civil Case No. 94-71403, under the
rule of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issue.[20]
Petitioners now come to us in this petition for review
claiming that (1) the principle of res judicata does not
apply; and (2) the dismissal of the complaint was
premature as petitioners’ motion to archive the case and
the grant thereof was based on the condition that there be
a final resolution in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases.[21]
Simply put, the sole issue is whether the present
case is barred by this Court’s ruling in
the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases.
Petitioners contend that res judicata does not apply
as there is no identity of parties to begin with. Moreover,
they argue that stare decisis is not a hard and fast
rule. They insist another review should be taken on the
cause of action in this case because the Court of Appeals,
in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, erred in ruling that the
security code determines the real winning crowns. They
claim that the trial court’s dismissal of their complaint was
premature. Lastly, petitioners posit that there was a
breached contract between the parties; therefore,
respondents should be made to perform their contractual
obligation.
For their part, respondents counter that the RTC
correctly dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground
of res judicata. Respondents contend that, like
the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, the civil cases filed by
petitioners arose from the conduct of respondents’
“Number Fever” promotion. Petitioners’ causes of action,
testimonial and documentary evidence, are the same as
those in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases. Lastly,
respondents point out that the findings of fact in the said
two cases are also the same, i.e.: (i) Respondents did not
breach any contract since the “349” crowns with security
code “L-2560-FQ” are not winning crowns; and (ii)
Respondents were not negligent in the conduct of their
promotion and they exerted efforts to ensure the integrity
and smooth conduct of the same.
The instant petition must be denied.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere[22] is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It
requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a
final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.[23]
In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of
the parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of
action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the same
as those in the decided cases
of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left to
be argued. The issue has been settled and this Court’s
final decision in the said cases must be respected. This
Court’s hands are now tied by the finality of the said
judgments. We have no recourse but to deny the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 142, in Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to
94-2421, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores,
Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques and Enrile Bertumen,
was charged with and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538
or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for
which he and his co-accused were sentenced to a prison
term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.[1]
The case before us concerns only the petition for
review of accused Marvin Mercado where he assails his
conviction, and arguing that the Court of Appeals having
increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a
prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
thirty (30) years, should have certified the case to this
Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was
already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph
of Sec. 13, Rule 124,[2] of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead
with the Court of Appeals.
In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule
124, relied upon by petitioner, was applicable only when
the penalty imposed wasreclusion perpetua or higher as a
single indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at
least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by
the appellate court on the accused was clearly in
accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538,[3] which is not
considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13,
Rule 124.[4]
The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied
on People v. Omotoy[5] where the Regional Trial Court
found the accused guilty of arson and sentenced him to
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The
case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In Footnote
16 of the decision, it was observed -
The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the
reason no doubt that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
involved, albeit joined to prision mayor in its maximum
period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Actually, the appeal should have gone to the Court of
Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains
appeals in criminal cases only where “the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher” (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII,
Constitution), i.e., the penalty is at least
reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment, in special
offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so as not to delay
the disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed on the
accused, and causes no prejudice whatsoever to any
party.
Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of
Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure is applicable to the instant case considering
that the penalty imposed was seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months to thirty (30) years.
 Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. While the thirty
(30)-year period falls within that range, reclusion
perpetua nevertheless is a single indivisible penalty which
cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty (30)-
year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of
successive service of sentence under Art. 70 of The
Revised Penal Code.[6]
More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner
is one penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The
Revised Penal Code.Unless otherwise specified, if the
special penal law imposes such penalty, it is error to
designate it with terms provided for in The Revised Penal
Code since those terms apply only to the penalties
imposed by the Penal Code, and not to the penalty in
special penal laws.[7] This is because generally, special
laws provide their own specific penalties for the offenses
they punish, which penalties are not taken from nor refer to
those in The Revised Penal Code.[8]
The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months under RA 6538 is essentially within the range of
the medium period of reclusion temporal. However, such
technical term under The Revised Penal Code is not
similarly used or applied to the penalty for carnapping.
Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstance of violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things, i.e., seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months to thirty (30) years, does not correspond to
that in The Revised Penal Code.[9] But it is different when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is
killed or raped in the course of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof, since this is penalized with reclusion
perpetua to death.[10]
Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the
penalty of “x x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as
maximum.”[11] For these reasons the use of the
term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its
decision is not proper. Besides, we see no basis for the
trial court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years
and one (1) day since RA 6538 sets the minimum penalty
for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
We see no error by the appellate court in relying on
a Footnote in Omotoy[12] to affirm the conviction of the
accused. The substance of the Footnote may not be
the ratio decidendi of the case, but it still constitutes an
important part of the decision since it enunciates a
fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals.
That this rule is stated in a Footnote to a decision is of no
consequence as it is merely a matter of style.
It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with
the instant case since the former involves an appeal from
the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while the
case at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. As enunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme
Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis
for this doctrine is the Constitution itself which empowers
this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments of lower courts in all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.[13]
Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable
penalty in a criminal case brought to it on appeal is at
least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it
should impose such penalty, refrain from entering
judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate the entire
records to this Court for review.[14] This will obviate the
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of
criminal cases between this Court and the Court of
Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction over
the case from the very inception and can, without
bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed
the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.[15]
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals
imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a review
of the case may be had only by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45[16]where only errors or questions of
law may be raised.
Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue
of whether there was indeed a violation of The Anti-
Carnapping Act. This issue is factual, as we shall find
hereunder.
In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani
parked the subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house at
No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato St., Makati City, Metro Manila.
The vehicle was owned by Augustus Zamora but was used
by Bhagwani as a service vehicle in their joint venture. The
following day the Isuzu Trooper was nowhere to be found
prompting Bhagwani to report its disappearance to the
Makati Police Station and the Anti-Carnapping (ANCAR)
Division which immediately issued an Alarm Sheet.[17]
On 31 May 1996 Bhagwani’s neighbor, fireman
Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that he learned from his
daughter, a common-law wife of accused Michael
Cummins, that the accused Rommel Flores, Mark
Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael Cummins himself
stole the Isuzu Trooper. Alvarez’s daughter however
refused to issue any statement regarding the incident.[18]
In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 “Miling” Flores
brought to his house Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques,
Enrile Bertumen, Rommel Flores, and complaining witness
Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen
and Flores admitted that they took the vehicle and used it
in going to Laguna, La Union and Baguio.[19] They claimed
however that it was with the knowledge and consent of
Bhagwani. They alleged that on the night they took the
vehicle, they invited Bhagwani to join them in their outing
to Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they asked him
instead if they could borrow the Isuzu Trooper. Bhagwani
allegedly agreed and even turned over the keys to them.[20]
Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during
that confrontasi in the house of SPO3 “Miling” Flores but
his co-accused narrated his participation in the crime.[21]
The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but
increased the penalty imposed on the four (4) accused
from a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.[22]
Petitioner insists that the accused were more
motivated by fun rather than theft in taking the Isuzu
Trooper, and that they merely took the vehicle for a joyride
with no intention of stealing it. If they were really thieves,
according to petitioner, they would have sold the vehicle
outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio.[23]
Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a
petition for review on certiorari where only questions of
law, and not questions of fact, may be raised. The issue
before us being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and the
evidence may not be entertained in this appeal. Besides,
findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme
Court.[24] This rule may be disregarded only when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the
findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not
supported by the evidence on record. But there is no
ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This
Court will not assess all over again the evidence adduced
by the parties particularly where as in this case the findings
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely
coincide.[25]
However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on
its imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No. 6538
imposes the penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The
evidence in this case shows that the accused broke a
quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it,
thus demonstrating that force was used upon the vehicle;
nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit the
imposition of the full penalty. With the application of The
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed
may be reduced to an indeterminate prison term of
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two
(22) years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals denying the Motion and Manifestation of petitioner
Marvin Mercado dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to
an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and
PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA
NAPISA RETUYA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks the
reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 31
January 2000 as well as its Resolution dated 25 April 2000
in CA-G.R. No. CV-46716. The assailed Decision 5. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan,
dismissed petitioners’ appeal of the Decision of the Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24956;
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City (“trial
court”).
6. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan,
On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Napisa Retuya Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24957;
(“Eusebia”) filed a complaint before the trial court against
her husband Nicolas Retuya (“Nicolas”), Pacita Villanueva 7. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan,
(“Pacita”), and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24958;
Villanueva (“Procopio”). Eusebia sought the reconveyance
from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties listed in
paragraph 2 of the complaint (“subject properties”), 8. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City,
claiming the subject properties are her conjugal properties covered by tax dec. No. 01042;
with Nicolas. Eusebia also prayed for accounting,
damages and the delivery of rent and other income from 9. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City,
the subject properties. covered by tax dec. No. 01043;
10. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City,
Antecedent Facts covered by tax dec. No. 01046;
11. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City,
covered by tax dec. No. 01041;
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of 12. A parcel of land located at Nawanao-
defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been married to the Subangdaku, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No.
latter on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they 01488;
begot five (5) children, namely, Natividad, Angela,
Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided
13. A parcel of land located at Baklid, Mandaue City,
at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they covered by tax dec. No. 00492;
acquired real properties and all improvements situated in
Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu, more particularly
described as follows: 14. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City
covered by tax dec. No. 01044;
‘1. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan,
Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24951; 15. A residential house located at Tipolo, Mandaue
City covered by tax dec. No. 01050;
2. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan,
Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24952; 16. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City
covered by tax dec. No. 01048;
3. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan,
Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24953; 17. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City
covered by tax dec. No. 01051;
4. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan,
Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24954; 18. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City
covered by tax dec. No. 01047;
19. A parcel of land located at Banilad, Mandaue
City covered by tax dec. No. 02381;
20. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City
covered by tax dec. No. 01049;
21. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City
covered by tax dec. No. 01045;
22. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City
covered by tax dec. No. 01450 (in the name of Pacita
Villanueva).’
Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of
land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his
parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8)
parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of these properties above-mentioned earn income
from coconuts and the other lands/houses are leased to
the following:
a) Mandaue Food Products Company – for Lot
121-F, Lot 121-G and Lot 121-H under TCT No. 11300 at
an annual rental of P10,800.00;
b) Barben Wood Industries, Inc. – for Lot 148
covered by TCT No. 1731 for an annual rental
of P21,600.00;
c) Metaphil, Inc. – parcel of land consisting of
2,790.51 sq. meters at the rate of P2,700.00 annually for
the first five (5) years, and P3,240.00 for the second years;
d) Benedicto Development Corp. – for a portion of
Lot 148 covered by TCT No. 1731 for a period of 20 years
at an annual rate of P3,500.00 renewable for another 20
years after April 1, 1995 at an annual rate of P4,000.00;
e) Benedicto Development Corporation – for a
portion of Lot No. 148 covered by Certificate of Title No.
1731 over an area of 6,000 sq. meters for an annual rental
of P9,500.00 for a period of 2 years from June 1, 1982;
f) Visayan Timber and Machinery Corp. – over a
parcel of land at Nawanaw, Mandaue City, for a period of 2
years from June 1, 1987 and renewable for another 12
years at an annual income of P4,000.00;
g) House lessees listed in Exhibit “13” with total
monthly rentals of P1,975.00 a month for the 24 lessees
or P24,700.00 annually. (Exhs. “7” to “13”)
In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his
legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita
Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is
their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person
who received the income of the above-mentioned
properties.
Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started
living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation, she
had no properties of her own from which she could derive
income.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk
anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have to raise him
up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical
condition of her father because they visited him at the
hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered
a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the present, it is
defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas’
illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of
these properties. Witness Natividad Retuya went to
Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father
Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She
told defendant, Procopio that their father was already
incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the
latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the
matter.
Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for
reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached,
hence, the said official issued a certification to file
action. Written demands were made by plaintiff, through
her counsel, to the defendants, including the illegitimate
family asking for settlement but no settlement was reached
by the parties.
Further, plaintiff’s witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that
the parcel of land covered by tax declaration marked
Exhibit “T” was the property bought by her father from
Adriano Marababol for at the time of purchase of the
property, defendant Pacita Villanueva had no means of
livelihood (TSN, p. 6).
The trial court rendered its Decision on 16 February
1994 in favor of Eusebia. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff Eusebia
Napisa Retuya and against defendants Procopio
Villanueva, Nicolas Retuya and Pacita Villanueva:
1. Declaring the properties listed in paragraph 2 of the
amended complaint as conjugal properties of the spouses
plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and the defendant Nicolas
Retuya;
2. Ordering the transfer of the sole administration of
conjugal properties of the spouses Eusebia Retuya and
Nicolas Retuya in accordance with Art. 124 of the Family
Code to the plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya;
3. Ordering defendant Procopio Villanueva to account
and turnover all proceeds or rentals or income of the
conjugal properties from January 27, 1985 when he took
over as ‘administrator’ thereof and until he shall have
ceased administering the same in accordance with the
judgment of this Court;
4. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to
reconvey the parcel of land situated at Tipolo, Mandaue
City now in the name of defendant Pacita Villanueva under
tax dec. No. 01450 and transfer the same into the names
of the conjugal partners Eusebia N. Retuya and Nicolas
Retuya;
5. Ordering the City Assessor’s Office of Mandaue Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, COURT THAT THE PROPERTIES
City to cancel tax declaration No. 01450 in the name of whether the acquisition appears to have been made, LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE
Pacita Villanueva and direct the issuance of a new title and contracted or registered in the name of one or both COMPLAINT ARE CONJUGAL
tax declaration in the names of Eusebia Napisa Retuya spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the contrary is PROPERTIES OF NICOLAS RETUYA
and Nicolas Retuya; proved. AND EUSEBIA RETUYA ALTHOUGH
THIS WAS NOT ONE OF THE
CAUSES OF ACTION IN EUSEBIA’S
6. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to The trial court ruled that the documents and other
COMPLAINT.
reconvey that certain building of strong materials located evidence Eusebia presented constitute “solid evidence”
at Tipolo, Mandaue City under tax dec. No. 01450 into the which proved that the subject properties were acquired
names of Eusebia Retuya and Nicolas Retuya; during her marriage with Nicolas. This made the 2. WHETHER THE COURT OF
presumption in Article 116 applicable to the subject APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
properties. Thus, the trial court ruled that Eusebia had THE PRESUMPTION THAT
7. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay
proved that the subject properties are conjugal in nature. PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING
plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees
On the other hand, the trial court found that petitioners THE EXISTENCE OF THE
and expenses of litigation in the sum of P5,000.00 plus the
failed to meet the standard of proof required to maintain MARRIAGE OF NICOLAS RETUYA
costs.
their claim that the subject properties are paraphernal AND EUSEBIA RETUYA ARE
properties of Nicolas. The trial court added that Pacita CONJUGAL.
SO ORDERED. presented no “factual solidity” to support her claim that she
bought Lot No. 152[2] exclusively with her own money.
3. WHETHER THE COURT OF
Petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision to the APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
Court of Appeals. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. APPLYING INSTEAD THE
Thereafter, Eusebia’s heirs substituted her pursuant to the PRESUMPTION UNDER ARTICLE
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 7 April 1997. The The Court of Appeals’ Ruling 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE IN
Court of Appeals eventually upheld the Decision of the trial FAVOR OF CO-OWNERSHIP
court but deleted the award of attorney’s fees, ruling in this BETWEEN NICOLAS RETUYA AND
wise: The Court of Appeals concurred with the findings of PACITA VILLANUEVA.
the trial court. The appellate court found that Pacita failed
to rebut the presumption under Article 116 of the Family
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 16, 1994 is Code that the subject properties are conjugal. The 4. WHETHER THE COURT OF
AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of appellate court dismissed Pacita’s defense of prescription APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 is deleted. and laches since she failed to have the issue included in
DECLARING THAT THE ACTION
the pre-trial order after raising it in her answer with her co- FOR RECONVEYANCE OVER LOT
NO. 152 IS ALREADY BARRED BY
SO ORDERED. petitioners.
PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.[3]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 23

February 2000 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
The Issues
Resolution dated 11 May 2000. The Ruling of the Court

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners Nicolas, Pacita and Procopio contend
The petition lacks merit.
that both the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in
favor of Eusebia. They seek a reversal and raise the
The Trial Court’s Ruling following issues for resolution:
First Issue: On the Alleged Failure
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF To Claim that the Properties are Conjugal
The trial court applied Article 116 of the Family APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING
Code, which reads: THE DECLARATION OF THE TRIAL
 Petitioners’ contention that Eusebia’s complaint
failed to state that the subject properties are conjugal is
absolutely without basis. A cursory reading of the
complaint readily shows that the complaint maintains that
the subject properties are conjugal.[4] The first sentence of
the second paragraph of the complaint states:
2. The plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and defendant Nicolas
Retuya are husband and wife and conjugal owners of real
properties and all improvements thereon situated in
Mandaue City and Consolacion, Cebu more particularly
described as follows: (Emphasis added)
The same claim is restated and repleaded throughout the
complaint. Petitioners should know better than to clutter
their appeal with useless arguments such as this.
The other issues petitioners raise contest in essence
the finding that the subject properties are conjugal in
nature. Apart from this, the only other issue raised is
whether prescription or laches bars Eusebia’s
complaint. We shall resolve first the issue of prescription
and laches.
Second Issue: Prescription and Laches
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation that
while petitioners did raise the issue of prescription and
laches in their Answer,[5] they failed to have the same
included in the pre-trial order for consideration during the
trial. Now, petitioners wish to raise the issue on appeal by
relying on Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. –
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim.
Petitioners are mistaken.
The determination of issues during the pre-trial
conference bars the consideration of other questions,
whether during trial or on appeal.[6] Section 1 of Rule 9
covers situations where a defense or objection is not
raised in a motion to dismiss or an answer. What we have
before us is the exact opposite. Here, petitioners in fact
raised in their answer the defense of prescription and
laches. However, despite raising the defense of
prescription and laches in their answer, petitioners failed to
include this defense among the issues for consideration
during the trial. The non-inclusion of this defense in the
pre-trial order barred its consideration during the trial.
Clearly, Section 1 of Rule 9 does not apply to the present
case.
Pre-trial is primarily intended to insure that the
parties properly raise all issues necessary to dispose of a
case.[7] The parties must disclose during pre-trial all issues
they intend to raise during the trial, except those involving
privileged or impeaching matters.[8] Although a pre-trial
order is not meant to catalogue each issue that the parties
may take up during the trial, issues not included in the pre-
trial order may be considered only if they are impliedly
included in the issues raised or inferable from the issues
raised by necessary implication.[9] The basis of the rule is
simple. Petitioners are bound by the delimitation of the
issues during the pre-trial because they
themselves agreed to the same.[10]
Petitioners argue that in past instances we have
reviewed matters raised for the first time during appeal.
True, but we have done so only by way of exception
involving clearly meritorious situations.[11] This case does
not fall under any of those exceptions. The fact that the
case proceeded to trial, with the petitioners actively
participating without raising the necessary objection, all the
more requires that they be bound by the stipulations they
made at the pre-trial.[12] Petitioners were well aware that
they raised the defense of prescription and laches since
they included it in their answer. However, for reasons of
their own, they did not include this defense in the pre-trial.
Able counsels represented both parties. We see no
claim that either counsel erred or was negligent. This could
only mean that petitioners’ counsel chose to waive, or did
not consider important, the defense of prescription and
laches. Petitioners are bound by their counsel’s
choice. Other than arguing that it is allowable to raise the
issue for the first time on appeal, we have no explanation
from petitioners why they suddenly decided to change their
mind. Parties are not allowed to flip-flop. Courts have
neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties
who choose to go to trial haphazardly. Moreover, it would
be grossly unfair to allow petitioners the luxury of changing
their mind to the detriment of private respondents at this
late stage. To put it simply, since petitioners did not raise
the defense of prescription and laches during the trial, they
cannot now raise this defense for the first time on
appeal.[13]
Third Issue: Whether the Subject Properties Are Conjugal
We proceed to the crux of this petition.
We reiterate the basic rule that a petition for review
should only cover questions of law.[14] Questions of fact are
not reviewable. The exceptions apply only in the presence
of extremely meritorious circumstances.[15] None exists in
this case. We note with disfavor that most of the issues
raised in this petition are factual. We caution the
petitioners that this practice of deluging the Court with
factual issues in defiance of well-settled rule, in the hope
of having them reviewed, is unacceptable.
The only issue proper for resolution is the question
of whether the subject properties are conjugal. Petitioners
claim that the subject properties[16] are exclusive properties
of Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which they claim is
Pacita’s exclusive property. This issue is easily
resolved. The Family Code provisions on conjugal
partnerships govern the property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the
effectivity of Family Code.[17] Article 105[18] of the Family
Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply
to conjugal partnerships established before the Family
Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family
Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal.[19] The burden of
proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal.[20] This is counter-balanced by the requirement
that the properties must first be proven to have been
acquired during the marriage before they are presumed
conjugal.[21] Petitioners argue that Eusebia failed to prove
this pre-requisite. We disagree.
The question of whether the subject properties were
acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a
factual issue. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed
that the subject properties were in fact acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.[22] The tax
declarations[23] covering the subject properties, along with
the unrebutted testimony of Eusebia’s witnesses, establish
this fact. We give due deference to factual findings of trial
courts,[24] especially when affirmed by the appellate
court. A reversal of this finding can only occur if petitioners
show sufficient reason for us to doubt its
correctness. Petitioners in the present case have not.
Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is conjugal or
not, the answer came from petitioners themselves.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926.
Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia
died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were
married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves
admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957.[25] The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152,
were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia,
the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is
that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and
Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the
subject properties are not conjugal. The presumption in
Article 116, which subsists “unless the contrary is proved,”
stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may
have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive
property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the
evidence required must be clear and
convincing.[26] Petitioners failed to meet this standard.
Petitioners point out that the deed of sale, the
transfer certificate of title and the tax declaration of Lot No.
152 are all in the name of Pacita. Petitioners maintain that
this can only mean that Pacita is the real owner of Lot No.
152. We disagree. The totality of the evidence reveals
that this was merely just one of the several schemes
Nicolas employed to deprive Eusebia of their conjugal
property. Ironically, petitioners themselves submitted
in evidence a decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch IV, in Civil Case No. R-
9602[27] involving the acquisition of Lot No. 152.
The decision in Civil Case No. R-9602 stated that
Tranquiliana Marababol Remulta testified that the one who
offered to buy the lot from her was none other than Nicolas
Retuya.[28]Tranquiliana narrated that at first she refused to
sign the deed of sale because the buyer placed in the
deed was Pacita and not Nicolas, her understanding being
that the buyer was Nicolas. We find that the trial court in
the present case correctly took into consideration the
decision in Civil Case No. R-9602.[29] Considering that the
decision in Civil Case No. R-9602 has become final and
executory, its findings of fact involving the sale of Lot No.
152 to Nicolas and Pacita are conclusive and binding on
petitioners who introduced in evidence the decision.
Petitioners also point out that all the other tax
declarations presented before the trial court are in the
name of Nicolas alone. Petitioners argue that this serves
as proof of Nicolas’ exclusive ownership of these
properties. Petitioners are mistaken. The tax declarations
are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under
Article 116 of the Family Code. All property acquired by the
spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name
the property is registered, is presumed conjugal unless
proved otherwise.[30] The presumption is not rebutted by
the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or
the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses
only.[31] Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides
that the presumption remains even if the property is
“registered in the name of one or both of the spouses.”
In some of the documents that petitioners presented,
Nicolas misrepresented his civil status by claiming that he
was single. Petitioners point to this as proof of Nicolas’
desire to exclude Eusebia from the properties covered by
the documents.[32] Petitioners further claim that this
supports their stand that the subject properties are not
conjugal. This argument is baseless. Whether a property is
conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of
one of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one
spouse can change the character of conjugal property.
The clear intent of Nicolas in placing his status as single is
to exclude Eusebia from her lawful share in the conjugal
property. The law does not allow this.
Petitioners point out that Pacita had the means to
buy Lot No. 152. Even if Pacita had the financial capacity,
this does not prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her
own money. To rebut the presumption that Lot No. 152 is
conjugal, petitioners must prove that Pacita used her own
money to pay for Lot No. 152. Petitioners failed to prove
this.
Petitioners further argue that since Nicolas and
Pacita were already cohabiting when Lot No. 152 was
acquired, the lot cannot be deemed conjugal property of
Nicolas and Eusebia. Petitioners keep belaboring this point
in their petition and memorandum.
Petitioners’ argument is flawed.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person,
even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage.[33] Otherwise, the law would
be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal
and immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas
and Pacita’s cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of
Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that
Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property
acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and
Eusebia’s marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of
Eusebia’s death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners
have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject
properties was acquired outside or beyond this period.
Finally, petitioners’ reliance on Article 148 of the
Family Code[34] is misplaced. A reading of Article 148
readily shows that there must be proof of “actual joint
contribution” by both the live-in partners before the
property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their
contribution. The presumption of equality of contribution
arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate
contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint
contribution is proven first. Simply put, proof of actual
contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
sharing. Petitioners failed to show proof of actual
contribution by Pacita in the acquisition of Lot No. 152. In
short, petitioners failed to prove that Pacita bought Lot No.
152 with her own money, or that she actually contributed
her own money to acquire it.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2000 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 46716 is AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.
RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and HON. MAXIMIANO C.
ASUNCION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of RTC, Quezon City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an
information on the ground of lack of probable cause based
on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden
duty of the trial court is to make an independent
assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by
such resolution but is required to evaluate it before
proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary’s
ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial
court, however, commits reversible error or even grave
abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such
recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the
trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired
jurisdiction over the criminal action.
This principle is explained in this Decision resolving
a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on September 14, 1993 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 30832 which in effect affirmed an order of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City denying the
prosecution’s withdrawal of a criminal information against
petitioner.
The Antecedent Facts
From the pleadings submitted in this case, the
undisputed facts are as follows:
Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by
Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma,
petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s
Office, docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her
counter-affidavit to the complaint.
Finding ‘sufficient legal and factual basis,’ the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for
libel against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104.[3] The Information filed by
Assistant City Prosecutor Augustine A. Vestil reads: [4]
“That on or about the 27th day of June 1991, in Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, the said accused, acting
with malice, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously send a letter addressed to Dr. Esperanza I.
Cabral, Director of Philippine Heart Center, East Avenue,
this city, and furnished the same to other officers of the
said hospital, said letter containing slanderous and
defamatory remarks against DR. JUAN F. TORRES, JR.,
which states in part, to wit:
‘27June 1991
Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral
Director
Subject: Return of all professional fees due Dr.
Rhodora M. Ledesma, Nuclear Medicine
Specialist/Consultant, Philippine Heart Center, from
January 31, 1989 to January 31, 1991.
Respondents: Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr., Chief, Nuclear
Medicine Section
Dr. Orestes P. Monzon,
Staff Consultant
Dear Dr. Cabral,
This is to demand the return of all professional fees due
me as a consultant in Nuclear Medicine, this Center, since
January 31, 1989 until my resignation effective January
31, 1991, amounting to at least P100,000.00 for the year
1990 alone. Records in the Nuclear Medicine Section will
show that from January 1989 to January 1991, a total of
2,308 patients were seen. Of these, I had officially
supervised, processed, and interpreted approximately a
total of 1,551 cases as against approximately 684 and 73
cases done by Dr. Monzon and Dr. Torres respectively.
Until my resignation I had received a monthly share of
professional fees averaging P1,116.90/month supposedly
representing 20% of the total monthly professional
fees. The rest were divided equally between Dr. Monzon
and Dr. Torres. There was never any agreement between
us three consultants that this should be the arrangement
and I am certain that this was not with your approval. The
burden of unfairness would have been lesser if there was
an equal distribution of labor and the schedule of duties
were strictly followed. As it was, the schedule of duties
submitted monthly to the office of the Asst. Director for
Medical Services was simply a dummy to comply with
administrative requirements rather than a guideline for
strict compliance. Both consultants have complete daily
time records even if they did not come regularly. Dr.
Torres came for an hour every week, Dr. Monzon came
sporadically during the week while I was left with
everything from training the residents and supervising the
Techs to processing and interpreting the results on a
regular basis. I had a part time appointment just like Dr.
Monzon and Dr. Torres.
In the interest of fairness and to set a precedent for the
protection of future PHC Nuclear Medicine Alumni I am
calling your attention to the unfair and inhuman conditions
I went through as a Consultant in that Section. I trust that
your sense of professionalism will put a stop to this
corruption.
I suggest that a committee be formed to make an audit of
the distribution of professional fees in this Section. At this
point, let me stress that since professional fees vary
according to the type of procedure done and since there
was no equity of labor between us I am not settling for an
equal percentage share. I demand that I be indemnified of
all professional fees due me on a case to case basis.
Let me make clear my intention of pursuing this matter
legally should there be no favorable action in my
behalf. Let me state at this point6 that the actions of Dr.
Torres and Dr. Monzon are both unprofessional and
unbecoming and are clearly violating the code of ethics of
the medical profession and the Philippine Civil Service
Rules and Regulations related to graft and corruption.
Thank you.’
and other words of similar import, when in truth and in fact,
as the accused very well knew, the same are entirely false
and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose
than to expose said DR. JUAN F. TORRES, JR. to public
ridicule, thereby casting dishonor, discredit and contempt
upon the person of the said offended party, to his damage
and prejudice.”
A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant
City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the
Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as
amended by P.D. No. 911.
The Department of Justice gave due course to the
petition and directed the Quezon City prosecutor to move
for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the
entire records of the case.[5] Accordingly, a “Motion to
Defer Arraignment” dated September 7, 1992 was filed by
Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo.[6] On
September 9, 1992, the trial court granted the motion and
deferred petitioner’s arraignment until the final termination
of the petition for review.[7]
Without the consent or approval of the trial
prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to
Set the Case for Arraignment/Trial.[8]
On January 8, 1993, the trial court issued an Order
setting aside its earlier Order of September 9, 1992 and
scheduling petitioner’s arraignment on January 18, 1993 at
two o’clock in the afternoon.[9]
In a resolution dated January 27, 1993, then Justice
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon reversed the Quezon City
investigating prosecutor. Pertinent portions of Drilon’s
ruling read:[10]
“From the circumstances obtaining, the subject letter was
written to bring to the attention of the Director of the
Philippine Heart Center for Asia and other responsible
authorities the unjust and unfair treatment that Dr.
Ledesma was getting from complainants. Since
complainants and respondent are government employees,
and the subject letter is a complaint to higher authorities of
the PHCA on a subject matter in which respondent has an
interest and in reference to which she has a duty to
question the same is definitely privileged (US vs. Bustos,
37 Phil. 131). Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA
455, the Supreme Court, citing Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil.
922, ruled that ‘A communication made in good faith upon
any subject matter in which the party making the
communication has an interest or concerning which he has
a duty is privileged... although it contains incriminatory or
derogatory matter which, without the privilege, would be
libelous and actionable.
The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of
the PHCA, is a direct evidence of respondent’s righteous
disposition of following the rule of law and is a clear
indication that her purpose was to seek relief from the
proper higher authority who is the Director of PHCA.
The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and
administrative complaints which respondent filed against
complainants. They are mere manifestations of her
earnest desire to pursue proper relief for the alleged
injustice she got from complainants. If she was motivated
by malice and ill-will in sending the subject communication
to the Director of the PHCA, she would not have sent the
second letter and filed the administrative and civil cases
against complainants.
Moreover, it is unbelievable that it took complainants one
year to realize that the questioned letter subjected them to
public and malicious imputation of a vice or omission. It is
beyond the ordinary course of human conduct for
complainants to start feeling the effects of the alleged
libelous letter - that of experiencing sleepless nights,
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, moral shock and
besmirched reputation - one year after they read the
communication in question.
The claim that the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA
462 is applicable to the instant case is unfounded. In the
first place, the instant cases are not being
reinvestigated. It is the resolutions of the investigating
prosecutor that are under review. Further, the record
shows that the court has issued an order suspending the
proceedings pending the resolutions of the petitions for
review by this Office. In the issuance of its order, the court
recognizes that the Secretary of Justice has the power and
authority to review the resolutions of prosecutors who are
under his control and supervision.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed resolutions are
hereby reversed. You are directed to withdraw the
Informations which you filed in Court. Inform this Office of
the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.’
In obedience to the above directive, Quezon City
Trial Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed a Motion to
Withdraw Information dated February 17,1993,[11] attaching
thereto the resolution of Secretary Drilon. The trial judge
denied this motion in his Order dated February 22, 1993,
as follows:[12]
‘The motion of the trial prosecutor to withdraw the
information in the above-entitled case is denied. Instead,
the trial prosecutor of this court is hereby directed to
prosecute the case following the guidelines and doctrine
laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Crespo vs.
Mogul, 151 SCRA 462.’
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[13] was denied
by the trial judge in the Order dated March 5, 1993, as
follows:[14]
“Finding no cogent reason to justify the reconsideration of
the ruling of this Court dated February 22, 1993, the
Motion for Reconsideration dated March 1, 1993 filed by
the accused through counsel is hereby denied.”
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Supreme Court. In a Resolution dated
March 31, 1993, this Court referred the case to the Court
of Appeals for proper determination and disposition
pursuant to Section 9, paragraph 1 of B.P. 129.[15]
 Respondent Court dismissed the petition “for lack of
merit,” holding that it had no jurisdiction to overturn the
doctrine laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul -- once a
complaint or information has been filed in court, any
disposition of the case, i.e., dismissal, conviction or
acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of
the trial court.[16]
Hence, this recourse to this Court.
The Issues
For unexplained reasons, petitioner failed to make
an assignment of errors against the appellate court. Her
counsel merely repeated the alleged errors of the trial
court: [17]
“I. The Orders, dated February 22, 1993 and March 5,
1993, of respondent Judge Asuncion relied solely on the
‘Crespo vs. Mogul’ (151 SCRA 462) decision. It is
respectfully submitted that said case is not applicable
because:
1. It infringes on the constitutional separation of
powers between the executive and judicial branches of the
government;
2. It constitutes or it may lead to misuse or
misapplication of ‘judicial power’ as defined in the
Constitution;
3. It goes against the constitutional proscription that
rules of procedure should not diminish substantive rights;
4. It goes against the principle of non-delegation of
powers;
5. It sets aside or disregards substantive and
procedural rules;
6. It deprives a person of his constitutional right to
procedural due process;
7. Its application may constitute or lead to denial of
equal protection of laws;
8. It deprives the secretary of justice or the
president of the power to control or review the acts of a
subordinate official;
9. It will lead to, encourage, abet or promote abuse
or even corruption among the ranks of investigating fiscals;
10. It does not subserve the purposes of a
preliminary investigation because -
(10.a) It subjects a person to the burdens of an
unnecessary trial, specially in cases where the
investigating fiscal recommends no bail for the accused;
(10.b) It subjects the government, both the
executive and the judiciary, to unnecessary time and
expenses attendant to an unnecessary trial;
(10.c) It contributes to the clogging of judicial
dockets; and
11. It has no statutory or procedural basis or
precedent.
II. On the assumption that ‘Crespo vs. Mogul’ is
applicable, it is submitted that -
1. Respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when
he denied the Motion to Withdraw Information since he
had already deferred to, if not recognized, the authority of
the Secretary of Justice; and
2. The facts in ‘Crespo vs. Mogul’ are different from
the instant case. Hence, respondent Judge Asuncion
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, when he relied solely on said case in denying
the Motion to Withdraw Information.”
In sum, the main issue in this petition is: Did
Respondent Court commit any reversible error in affirming
the trial court’s denial of the prosecution’s Motion to
Withdraw Information?
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit. We answer the
above question in the affirmative.
Preliminary Matter
Before discussing the substance of this case, the
Court will preliminarily address a procedural matter. Prior
to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on
July 1, 1997, Section 2 of Rule 45, which governed
appeals from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court,
provided:
“SEC. 2. Contents of petition.—The petition shall
contain a concise statement of x x x the assignment of
errors made in the court below x x x.”
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
requires a concise statement of the errors committed by
the Court of Appeals, not of the trial court. For failure to
follow this Rule, the petition could have been dismissed by
this Court motu proprio, considering that under Section 4
of the same Rule, “review is not a matter of right but of
sound discretion.”
We take this occasion to stress the need for
precision and clarity in the assignment of errors. Review
under this rule is unlike an appeal in a criminal case where
the death penalty, reclusión perpetua or life imprisonment
is imposed and where the whole case is opened for
review. Under Rule 45, only the issues raised therein by
the petitioner will be passed upon by the Court, such that
an erroneous specification of the issues may cause the
dismissal of the petition. We stressed this in Circular No.
2-90, entitled “Guidelines to be Observed in Appeals to the
Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court,” as follows:
“4. Erroneous Appeals. x x x x
e) Duty of counsel.—It is therefore incumbent upon
every attorney who would seek review of a judgment or
order promulgated against his client to make sure of the
nature of the errors he proposes to assign, whether these
be of fact or of law; then upon such basis to ascertain
carefully which Court has appellate jurisdiction; and finally,
to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed
by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in
compliance may well be fatal to his client’s cause.
FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE.”
Be that as it may, the Court — noting the importance
of the substantial matters raised — decided to overlook
petitioner’s lapse and granted due course to the petition
per Resolution dated July 15, 1996, with a warning that
henceforth petitions which fail to specify an assignment of
errors of the proper lower court may be denied due
course motu proprio by this Court.
Determination of Probable Cause Is an Executive Function
The determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation is judicially recognized as an
executive function and is made by the prosecutor. The
primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free a
respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy
and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a
formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her
guilt has been passed upon in a more or less summary
proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for
that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also
protects the state from the burden of unnecessary
expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in
holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless
charges.[18]
Such investigation is not a part of the trial. A full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not
required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.[19] By reason of the
abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a
dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not
equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of
acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy attaches.
In declaring this function to be lodged in the
prosecutor, the Court distinguished the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a
search warrant from a preliminary investigation proper in
this wise:[20]
“xxx Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest from a preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or released. xxx The determination
of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the
Judge. The preliminary investigation proper--whether xxx
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether xxx
he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial--is the function of the prosecutor.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be
distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the
information or it is an investigation for the determination of
a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is
executive in nature. It is part of the prosecutor’s job. The
second kind of preliminary investigation which is more
properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature
and is lodged with the judge.”
Sound policy supports this distinction. Otherwise,
judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases
filed before their courts. The Separate Opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts, Jr. vs. Court
of Appeals stressed that the determination of the existence
of probable cause properly pertains to the public
prosecutor in the “established scheme of things,” and that
the proceedings therein are “essentially preliminary,
prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and
authoritative judgment of the guilt or innocence of the
persons charged with a felony or a crime.”[21]
In Crespo vs. Mogul,[22] the Court emphasized the
cardinal principle that the public prosecutor controls and
directs the prosecution of criminal offenses thus:
“It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file
the complaint or information, follow or not follow that
presented by the offended party, according to whether the
evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason
for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and
control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by
the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also
the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the
evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be
guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their
office. They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute
when after an investigation they become convinced that
the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case.”
In the same case, the Court added that where there
is a clash of views between a judge who did not
investigate and a fiscal who conducted a reinvestigation,
those of the prosecutor should normally prevail:[23]
“x x x x The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal’s
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not
prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the
fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him
on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon
by him is insufficient for conviction. Neither has the Court
any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an
information within a certain period of time, since this would
interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and control of criminal
prosecutions. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of
the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do
so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. The
fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move
for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either
that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be
established beyond reasonable doubt. In a clash of views
between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal
who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or
the defendant, those of the fiscal’s should normally
prevail. x x x x.”
Appeal as an Exercise of the Justice Secretary’s Power of
Control Over Prosecutors
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject
to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who
may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section
5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the
secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office
of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City
Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of
supervision and control is delineated in Section 38,
paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
“(1) Supervision and Control.— Supervision and control
shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; xxxx.”
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are
Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which
read:
“Section 3. x x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State
Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State
Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other duties as may
be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the
interest of public service.”
xxx xxx
xxx
“Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power,
authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of
bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be
understood as also conferred upon the proper Department
Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance
thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or
action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.”
“Supervision” and “control” of a department head
over his subordinates have been defined in administrative
law as follows:[24]
“In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform such
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter.”
Review as an act of supervision and control by the
justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds
basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or
by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher
administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a
rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may
judicial recourse be allowed.
Appeal to the Secretary of Justice Is Not Foreclosed by the
Ruling in Crespo
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court clarified
that Crespo[26] did not foreclose the power or authority of
the secretary of justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases. The Court recognized
in Crespo that the action of the investigating fiscal or
prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to the
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state
prosecutor. Thereafter, it may be appealed to the
secretary of justice.
The justice secretary’s power of review may still be
availed of despite the filing of an information in court. In
his discretion, the secretary may affirm, modify or reverse
resolutions of his subordinates pursuant to Republic Act
No. 5180, as amended,[27] specifically in Section 1 (d):
“(d) x x x Provided, finally, That where the resolution of
the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor
is, upon review, reversed by the Secretary of Justice, the
latter may, where he finds that no prima faciecase exists,
authorize and direct the investigating fiscal concerned or
any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or move for
the dismissal of the case, or, where he finds a prima
facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court
against the respondent, based on the same sworn
statements or evidence submitted without the necessity of
conducting another preliminary investigation.”
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Justice
promulgated Circular No. 7 dated January 25, 1990
governing appeals in preliminary investigation. Appeals
under Section 2 are limited to resolutions dismissing a
criminal complaint. However, Section 4 provides an
exception: appeals from resolutions finding probable cause
upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion are allowed, provided the accused has not been
arraigned. In the present case, petitioner’s appeal to the
secretary of justice was given due course on August 26,
1992 pursuant to this Circular.
On June 30, 1993, Circular No. 7 was superseded
by Department Order No. 223; however, the scope of
appealable cases remained unchanged:
“SECTION 1. What May Be Appealed. -- Only resolutions
of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a
criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in
Section 4 hereof.
Appeals from the resolutions of provincial/city prosecutors
where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged does
not exceed prisión correccional, regardless of the
imposable fine, shall be made to the Regional State
Prosecutors who shall resolve the appeals with finality,
pursuant to Department Order No. 318 dated August 28,
1991 as amended by D.O. No. 34 dated February 4, 1992,
D.O. No. 223 dated August 11, 1992 and D.O. No. 45
dated February 2, 1993. Such appeals shall also be
governed by these rules.
SEC. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions.--No appeal
may be taken from a resolution of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City
Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of
manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error
or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be
entertained where the appellant had already been
arraigned. If the appellant (is) arraigned during the
pendency of the appeal, x x x appeal shall be
dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution
finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of
the information in court.”
Apart from the foregoing statutory and administrative
issuances, the power of review of the secretary of justice is
recognized also by Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court:
“SEC. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal.--x x x x
xxx xxx
xxx
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice
reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or
chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned
to file the corresponding information without conducting
another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information.”
This appeal rests upon the sound discretion of the
secretary of justice arising from his power of supervision
and control over the prosecuting arm of the government,
not on a substantial right on the part of the accused as
claimed by petitioner.
Appeal Did Not Divest the Trial Court of Jurisdiction
Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of
review only after an information has been filed, trial courts
should defer or suspend arraignment and further
proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment
or suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court
is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of
justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not
lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to
withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.
Judicial Review of the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice
Judicial power is defined under the 1987
Constitution as the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. Such power includes the
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[28] Under this definition, a court is without
power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of Congress
or of the President. It may, however, look into the question
of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse
of discretion.
Judicial review of the acts of other departments is
not an assertion of superiority over them or a derogation of
their functions. In the words of Justice Laurel in Angara
vs. Electoral Commission:[29]
“x x x [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument sources
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved
in what is termed ‘judicial supremacy’ which properly is the
power of the judicial review under the Constitution. x x x.”
It is not the purpose of this Court to decrease or limit
the discretion of the secretary of justice to review the
decisions of the government prosecutors under
him. In Crespo, the secretary was merely advised to
restrict such review to exceptionally meritorious
cases. Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which
recognizes such power, does not, however, allow the trial
court to automatically dismiss the case or grant the
withdrawal of the information upon the resolution of the
secretary of justice. This is precisely the import of Crespo,
Marcelo, Martinez vs. Court of Appeals[30] and the recent
case of Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, which all
required the trial court to make its own evaluation of the
merits of the case, because granting the motion to dismiss
or to withdraw the information is equivalent to effecting a
disposition of the case itself.
The Marcelo and Martinez Cases Are Consistent
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court ruled
that, although it is more prudent to wait for a final
resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from the
secretary of justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or
a motion to withdraw an information, a trial court
nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of
said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of
the secretary. The trial court has the option to grant or
deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal,
whether before or after the arraignment of the accused,
and whether after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the secretary who reviewed the records of the
investigation; provided that such grant or denial is made
from its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of
the motion.
In Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court
overruled the grant of the motion to dismiss filed by the
prosecuting fiscal upon the recommendation of the
secretary of justice because such grant was based upon
considerations other than the judge’s own assessment of
the matter. Relying solely on the conclusion of the
prosecution to the effect that there was no sufficient
evidence against the accused to sustain the allegation in
the information, the trial judge did not perform his function
of making an independent evaluation or assessment of the
merits of the case.
Despite the pronouncement in Marcelo that a final
resolution of the appeal to the Department of Justice is
necessary, both decisions followed the rule in Crespo vs.
Mogul: Once a complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its
continuation rests on the sound discretion of the
court. Trial judges are thus required to make their own
assessment of whether the secretary of justice committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the
appeal, separately and independently of the prosecution’s
or the secretary’s evaluation that such evidence is
insufficient or that no probable cause to hold the accused
for trial exists. They should embody such assessment in
their written order disposing of the motion.
The above-mentioned cases depict two extreme
cases in complying with this rule. In Marcelo, the dismissal
of the criminal action upon the favorable recommendation
of the Review Committee, Office of the City Prosecutor,
was precipitate in view of the pendency of private
complainant’s appeal to the secretary of justice. In effect,
the secretary’s opinion was totally disregarded by the trial
court. In contrast, in Martinez the dismissal of the criminal
action was an “erroneous exercise of judicial discretion” as
the trial court relied hook, line and sinker on the resolution
of the secretary, without making its own independent
determination of the merits of the said resolution.
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in theResolution of the
Secretary of Justice
In the light of recent holdings
in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of
the correctness of the justice secretary’s resolution has
been amply threshed out in petitioner’s letter, the
information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the
motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in
the motion for reconsideration – all of which were
submitted to the court -- the trial judge committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw
the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous
reliance on Crespo. The trial court’s order is inconsistent
with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent
assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to
dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the
secretary’s recommendation finding the absence of
probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for
libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with
the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the
secretary’s recommendation.
Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he
would have discovered that there was, in fact, sufficient
ground to grant the motion to withdraw the
information. The documents before the trial court judge
clearly showed that there was no probable cause to
warrant a criminal prosecution for libel.
Under the “established scheme of things” in criminal
prosecutions, this Court would normally remand the case
to the trial judge for his or her independent assessment of
the motion to withdraw the information. However, in order
not to delay the disposition of this case and to afford the
parties complete relief, we have decided to make directly
the independent assessment the trial court should have
done. The petitioner has attached as annexes to the
present petition for review the information, which contains
a complete and faithful reproduction of the subject letter,
the resolution of the secretary of justice, the prosecution’s
motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s Order of
February 22, 1993, and even the private complainant’s
opposition to said motion. The records below have been
reproduced and submitted to this Court for its
appreciation. Thus, a remand to the trial court serves no
purpose and will only clog the dockets.
We thus proceed to examine the substance of the
resolution of the secretary of justice. The secretary
reversed the finding of probable cause on the grounds that
(1) the subject letter was privileged in nature and (2) the
complaint was merely a countercharge.
In every case for libel, the following requisites must
concur:
“(a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable.”
At the preliminary investigation stage, these
requisites must show prima facie a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and that the accused
probably committed it. A cursory reading of the
information immediately demonstrates a failure on the part
of the complainant to establish the foregoing elements of
libel.
Every defamatory imputation, even if true, is
presumed malicious, if no good intention or justifiable
motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the
author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to
injure the reputation of the person who claims to have
been defamed. [33] In this case however, petitioner’s letter
was written to seek redress of proper grievance against
the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional
fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine
Department of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a qualified
privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
“ART. 354. Requirement of publicity. -- Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty; and
xxx xxx
xxx”
The rule on privileged communication is that a
communication made in good faith on any subject matter
in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning
which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person
having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contains incriminatory matter which, without the privilege,
would be libelous and actionable. Petitioner’s letter was a
private communication made in the performance of a moral
duty on her part. Her intention was not to inflict an
unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to
present her grievance to her superior. The privileged
nature of her letter overcomes the presumption of
malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive exists;
and in the absence of malice, there is no libel. We note
that the information itself failed to allege the existence of
malice.
Thus, we agree with the ruling of the secretary of
justice:[34]
“x x x (T)he subject letter was written to bring to the
attention of the Director of the Philippine Heart Center for
Asia and other responsible authorities the unjust and unfair
treatment that Dr. Ledesma was getting from government
employees, and the subject letter is a complaint x x x on a
subject matter in which respondent has an interest and in
reference to which she has a duty to question the same is
definitely privileged (US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil.
131). Moreover, in Ang vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 455, the
Supreme Court, citing Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922,
ruled that ‘a communication made in good faith upon any
subject matter in which the party making the
communication has an interest or concerning which he has
a duty is privileged although it contains incriminatory or
derogatory matter which, without the privilege, would be
libelous and actionable.
The follow-up letter sent by respondent to the director of
the PHCA, is a direct evidence of respondent’s righteous
disposition of following the rule of law and is a clear
indication that her purpose was to seek relief from the
proper higher authority xxx.
The same interpretation should be accorded the civil and
administrative complaints which respondent filed against
complainants. They are mere manifestations of her
earnest desire to pursue proper relief for the alleged
injustice she got from complainants. If she was motivated
by malice and ill-will in sending the subject communication
to the Director of the PHCA, she would not have sent the
second letter and filed the administrative and civil cases
against complainants.”
In Alonzo, the settled rule is that, when a public
officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a
communication to another officer or to a body of officers,
who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject
matter of the communication, such communication does
not amount to publication within the meaning of the law on
defamation.[35] Publication in libel means making the
defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to
someone other than the person to whom it has been
written.[36] The reason for such rule is that “a
communication of the defamatory matter to the person
defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound
his self-esteem. A man’s reputation is not the good
opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which
others hold him.”[37] In this case, petitioner submitted the
letter to the director of said hospital; she did not
disseminate the letter and its contents to third
persons. Hence, there was no “publicity” and the matter is
clearly covered by paragraph 1 of Article 354 of the Penal
Code.
Further, we note that the information against
petitioner was filed only on July 27, 1992 or one year after
June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously
nothing more than a countercharge to give Complainant
Torres a leverage against petitioner’s administrative action
against him.
Ineluctably, Judge Asuncion’s denial of the motion to
withdraw the information and the reconsideration thereof
was not only precipitate but manifestly erroneous. This is
further compounded by the fact that he did not explain his
grounds for his denial inasmuch as he did not make an
independent assessment of the motion or the arguments in
the resolution of the secretary of justice. All in all, such
rash action did not do justice to the sound ruling in Crespo
vs. Mogul upon which, ironically, he supposedly rested his
action, or to the directive in Marcelo and Martinez where
this Court required trial courts to make an independent
assessment of the merits of the motion.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Motion to Withdraw the
Information dated February 17, 1993 filed before the trial
court is GRANTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE
POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and
appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork
for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage
for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specified period. Employees
of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its
advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted,
participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor
vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege
to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be
paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made.
Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each
Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the
deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At
the station level, called "Dealer Contest", the contestant
whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters
dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded
the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next,
the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene
stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter
lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight
with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize
winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the
"Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning
stubs of the qualified contestants in each region will be
deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be
drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to
make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to
take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-
prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of
P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the
stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be
placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the
final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be
made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage
are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third;
and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining
four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as
amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for
the transmission of communications relative thereto,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of
the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions
of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter.
— No matter belonging to any of the following
classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or
not, shall be imported into the Philippines
through the mails, or to be deposited in or
carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be
delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising,
describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any
information concerning any lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme depending in
whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any
money or property of any kind by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon
satisfactory evidence that any person or
company is engaged in conducting any lottery,
gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any
person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or
property of any kind through the mails by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct
any postmaster or other officer or employee of
the Bureau to return to the person, depositing
the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent"
plainly written or stamped upon the outside
cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class
mailed by or addressed to such person or
company or the representative or agent of such
person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money
order system and telegraphic transfer service.—
The Director of Posts may, upon evidence
satisfactory to him that any person or company
is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift
enterprise or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any
person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or
property of any kind through the mails by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any
postmaster of any postal money order or
telegraphic transfer to said person or company
or to the agent of any such person or company,
whether such agent is acting as an individual or
as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of
any kind, and may provide by regulation for the
return to the remitters of the sums named in
money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in
favor of such person or company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the
Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the
Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules
and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does
not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined
that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions
aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance.
In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought
a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that
there being involved no consideration in the part of any
contestant, the contest was not, under controlling
authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however,
on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an
unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of
1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that
the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it
is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned
by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960
not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the
proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest
was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued
against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the
present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be
rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not
to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent
to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest
to the attention of the public". After issues were joined and
upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial
court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by
the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex
B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal
Law and the respondent has no right to bar the
public distribution of said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other
upon two basic issues: first, whether the petition states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second,
whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old
Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for the
remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is
available to any person "whose rights are affected by a
statute . . . to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration
of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised
Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to
established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain
conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe
for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of
Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28,
1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50
O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al.,
G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the
appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is
to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing
crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the
present controversy, a number of significant points stand
out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business
enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the
unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and
to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate
increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the
appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of
the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to
suppress transgressions thereof — particularly thru the
issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of
the Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-
mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid,
the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme
hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in
the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
amongst other media, it was found expedient to request 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West
the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and
construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense
appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme
that there is here no question of construction because the
and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference
said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the
as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable
law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the
statute was thus reached. Communications in which the
contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The
parties expounded on their respective theories were
infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from
exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee
the assumption that, if the circumstances here presented,
insisted upon its position was matched only by the
the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced
obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And
from the matter of their application to the appellee's
this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open
contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art
warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was
or process of discovering and expounding the meaning
"conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it
and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
and all its representatives."
application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely
claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by
the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an
spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used
cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of
assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof construction or interpretation as any other.
on the other, concerning a real — not a mere theoretical —
question or issue. The contenders are as real as their
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a
interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty
pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to
occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of
nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down
construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance
of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of
its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the
course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been
appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law
committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction
he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable
thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a
duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the
fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal
appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried
issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle
out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow
lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety — nay,
of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their
the necessity — of setting the dispute at rest before it
differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing
accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion
declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the
and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III
Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And,
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132
contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long
and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing
past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's
the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31
"desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of
Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d.,
others" — which admittedly does not confer a cause of
p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the
action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a
situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to
justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was
choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot
translated into a positive claim of right which is actually
obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether
the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its
proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it
launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes
thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually
threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with
its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the
appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the
contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the
appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous
censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we
weigh these considerations in one equation and in the
spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be
interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule
1, Revised Rules of Court) — which, in the instant case, is
to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
with respect to, rights and duties under a law — we can
see in the present case any imposition upon our
jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and
binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he
believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function
that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At
the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than
this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction,
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the
Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same
authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they
are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby
but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience
thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our
resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at
hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the
conclusion we have herein just reached is not without
precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J.,
399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in
promotional advertising was advised by the county
prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the
characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion
were conducted, the corporation would be subject to
criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was
entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the
county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales
promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs.
Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin
vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super.
124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for
declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised
Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in
sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra,
condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the
Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or
otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service
to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise,
or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".
Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second
issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path.
As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44
Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power
of the postal authorities under the abovementioned
provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that —
While countless definitions of lottery have been
attempted, the authoritative one for this
jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme
Court, in analogous cases having to do with the
power of the United States Postmaster
General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all
schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance,
such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms
of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize;
and third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147
U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne
[1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and
Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and
Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio
[1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction
Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the
elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the
disputed scheme to be the subject of contention.
Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field
of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element
of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is
considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just
cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the
following terms —
In respect to the last element of consideration,
the law does not condemn the gratuitous
distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from
the party receiving the chance, but does
condemn as criminal schemes in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid
directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a
prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are
struck by the clarity of the language in which the invitation
to participate therein is couched. Thus —
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need
wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to
buy anything? Simply estimate the actual
number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the
hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense
from — to —, and win valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee
be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be
rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the
privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to
go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is
available on demand, and accomplish and submit the
same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles
or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any
discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look
beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to
unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which
the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs.
Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the
scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a
gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-
Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products simply to
win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a
consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps
this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product
or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to
participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs
reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give
anything of value.1awphîl.nèt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being
admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit the
sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who
will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get
the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The
required element of consideration does not consist of the
benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true
test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137
Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a
valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether
those conducting the enterprise receive something of
value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective
properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all
that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled
from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at
rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects
thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some
benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as
a result of the drawing; does not supply the
element of consideration.Griffith Amusement Co.
vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844"
(54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that
the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the
appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind",
which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the
appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the
issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be
avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its
tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and
preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was
predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217,
Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in
effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of
consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in
which that element is not essential, the determination of
whether or not the proposed contest — wanting in
consideration as we have found it to be — is a prohibited
gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise"
is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears to
be a consensus among lexicographers and standard
authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting
artifice of under which goods are sold for their market
value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a
chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654;
Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law
Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail
Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs.
Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193
S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507,
509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term
clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already
noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser.
The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective
of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the
appellee's contest can be encompassed within the
broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of
being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain
no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon,
rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise
involving an award by chance, even in default of the
element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery,
is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So.
73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154,
58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls
Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont.
52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally
impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift
enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it
exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and
consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142,
113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151
Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City
and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39
Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54
C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56
Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-
594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the
fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are
not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S.,
851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used
interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the
necessity for the element of consideration or chance has
been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-
352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford
vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The
lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent
jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be
resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable
statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in
question is used in association with the word "lottery". With
the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-
known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis —
which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although
only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if
lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so
also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.
Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of
any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from
the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought
to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination
thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory
construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are
designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for
disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public
policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries,
gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the
recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame
the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs.
Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in
gambling it is inherent that something of value be
hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows
ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the
contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can
hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held —
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or
chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not
resorted to as a device to evade the law and no
consideration is derived, directly or indirectly,
from the party receiving the chance, gambling
spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby.
City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41
N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed.,
p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift
enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that,
under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which
we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar
schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if,
like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that
the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules
submitted by the appellee does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
No costs.
G.R. No. L-29906 January 30, 1976
RODOLFO GENERAL and CARMEN
GONTANG, petitioners,
vs.
LEONCIO BARRAMEDA, respondent.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
E.V. Guevarra for respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals (Second Division) in CA-G.R. No. 38363-R,
entitled "Leoncio Barrameda, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
Development Bank of the Philippines (Naga Branch, Naga
City), Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang, defendants-
appellees," which reversed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 5697,
"dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiff".
Appellate Court's decision has the following dispositive
portion:
We therefore find that the appealed
judgment should be reversed and set
aside and another one entered
declaring (1) null and void the sale
executed on September 3, 1963, by
defendant Development Bank of the
Philippines in favor of its defendants
Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang, (2) T.C.T. No. 5003
cancelled and (3) the mortgaged
property redeemed; and ordering the
Clerk of the lower court to deliver the
amount of P7,271.22 deposited to
defendants Rodolfo General and
Carmen Gontang and the Register of
Deeds to issue a new Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of
plaintiff in lieu of T.C.T. No. 5003 upon
payment by him of corresponding
fees; with costs against the
defendants in both instances.
Undisputed facts are:
Plaintiff seeks to redeem the land
formerly embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1418,
containing an area of 59.4687
hectares, situated in barrio Taban,
Minalabac Camarines Sur; to annul
any and all contracts affecting said
property between the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and
Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang and to recover damages,
attorney's fees and costs.
The land in dispute was mortgaged by
plaintiff to the DBP to secure a loan of
P22,000.00. For failure of the
mortgagor to pay in full the
installments as they fall due, the
mortgagee foreclosed extrajudicially
pursuant to the provisions of Act 3135.
On April 23, 1962, the provincial
sheriff conducted an auction sale in
which the mortgagee, as the highest
bidder, bought the mortgaged property
for P7,271.22. On May 13, 1963, the
sheriff executed a final deed of sale in
favor of the DBP (Exhibit 2) and the
DBP executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership (Exhibit 3).
Upon registration of the sale and
affidavit on September 2,
1963 (Exhibit 1), TCT No. 1418 in the
name of plaintiff was cancelled and
TCT No. 5003 issued to the DBP
(Exhibit-5) in its stead. On September
3, 1963, defendants Rodolfo General
and Carmen Gontang purchased the
land from their codefendant. The sale
in their favor was annotated on TCT
No. 5003 on November 26, 1963 only.
Prior to the date last mentioned, or on
November 20, 1963, plaintiff offered to
redeem the land. In view of the refusal
of the DBP to allow the redemption,
plaintiff commenced this suit. The
original complaint was filed in court on
November 23, 1963. On August 12,
1964, plaintiff deposited with the clerk
of court the sum of P7,271.22,
 representing the repurchase price of shall the period of redemption start
the land. from the date of auction sale or the
date of the registration of the sale in
the register of deeds as the
The trial court held that the one-year
respondent Appellate Court held?
period of redemption began to run on
April 23, 1962, when the sale at public
auction was held, and ended on April (2) Were petitioners under obligation
24, 1963; that the plaintiff's offer to to look beyond what appeared in the
redeem on November 20, 1963 and certificate of title of their vendor the
the deposit of the redemption price on Development Bank of the Philippines
August 12, 1964 were made beyond and investigate the validity of its title
the redemption period; and that before they could be classified as
defendants Rodolfo General and purchasers in good faith?
Carmen Gontang 'are legitimate
purchasers for value.
Petitioners' principal contentions are: that Section 31 of
Commonwealth Act No. 459 which created the Agricultural
Two principal issues raised are: and Industrial Bank, predecessor of the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation and the Development Bank of the
Philippines, clearly provides that the right to redeem the
(1) In the interpretation and application
real property sold at public auction judicially or extra-
of Section 31, Commonwealth Act 459
judicially may only be exercised "within one year from the
(Law that created the Agricultural and
date of the auction sale"; that there is no provision in
Industrial Bank, now Development
Commonwealth Act No. 459 expressly stating that the
Bank of the Philippines) which
redemption period of one year shall start from the
provides:
registration of the certificate of sale in the register of
deeds; that Sec. 31 of C. A. 459 is a specific provision of
The Mortgagor or law which governs redemption of real property foreclosed
debtor to the by the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (now the
Agricultural and Development Bank of the Philippines), and prescribes the
Industrial Bank redemption period for both judicial and extra-judicial
whose real foreclosures of mortgage; that insofar as foreclosures of
property was sold mortgage by banking and financial institutions are
at public auction, concerned, the period of redemption applicable must be
judicially or extra- the one prescribed in their respective charters as, in the
judicially, for the case at bar, Section 31, C.A. No. 459; that the ruling in the
full or partial case of Agbulos vs. Alberto, G.R. No. L-17483, July 31,
payment of an 1962, cited by respondent Appellate Court as a basis for
obligation to said its decision, is not applicable to the case at bar because
bank shall, within this Court based its Agbulos ruling on Section 26 (now
one year from the Sec. 90) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is not
date of' the clear when the period of redemption should start (date
auction sale, have when execution sale was conducted, or when the
the right to certificate of sale was executed by sheriff, or when the
redeem the real certificate of sale was registered in the registry of deeds),
property ... and this Court ruled that as the land involved in that case
(Emphasis is registered under the Torrens system, the date of
supplied), redemption should begin to run from the date of
registration, unlike in the case at bar where Section 31 of
Commonwealth Act 459 specifically and clearly provides
that the running of the redemption period shall start from
the date of the auction sale; and that the ruling of this
Court in Gonzales vs. P.N.B., 48 Phil. 824, also invoked by
respondent Appellate Court as a basis for its decision, is
likewise not applicable to the case at bar because the
provisions on the matter of the P.N.B. Charter, Act No.
2938, are different from that of Commonwealth Act 459.
Section 32 of Act 2938, which is now Section 20 of R.A.
No. 1300 (PNB Charter) provides that the mortgagor shall
have the right to redeem within one year the sale of the
real estate. This is Identical to the provision appearing in
Sec. 26, now Sec. 30, Rule 39, Rules of Court, while under
Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act 459, the period of
redemption should star, on the date of the auction
sale, and the latter provision is applicable specifically and
expressly to the case at bar.
It is also petitioners' principal argument that the ruling in
Metropolitan Insurance Company, substituted by
spousesLoreto Z. Marcaida and Miguel de Marcaida vs.
Pigtain 101 Phil. 1111, 1115-1116, wherein this Court, in
construing Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, categorically stated that
the one year redemption period shall start from the date of
sale and not from the report of the sale or the registration
of the sale certificate in the office of the Register of
Deeds, is more applicable to the present case. The
pertinent portion of the decision in the Marcaida case
follows:
But again the appellants claim that in
this particular case, the statutory
redemption period of one year should
begin from December 17, 1954, when
the auction sale was actually recorded
in the office of the Register of Deeds
of Manila and not from December 15,
1953, when the sale at public auction
of the properties in question took
place. We find its contention to be also
untenable in view of the clear
provision of the aforesaid Section 6 of
Act No. 3135 to the effect that the right
of redemption should be exercised
within one year from the date of the
sale. It should not be overlooked that
the extrajudicial sale in question was
for foreclosure of a mortgage and was
 not by virtue of an ordinary writ of
execution in a civil case. ... And since
the appeallants had failed to redeem
the land in question within the time
allowed by Section 6 of Act 3135, the
appellee has perfect right to require
the cancellation of the attachment lien
in question. (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding the impressive arguments presented by
petitioners, the crucial issue to determine is the choice of
what rule to apply in determining the start of the one year
redemption period, whether from the date of the auction
sale or from that of the registration of the sale with the
registry of deeds. In other words it is whether a literal
interpretation of the provision of Section 31 of
Commonwealth Act 459 — that the period of redemption
shall start from the date of the auction sale — shall govern,
or whether the words, "auction sale" shall be considered in
their ordinary meaning or in the same sense that site is
used in the texts of Section 26, now 30, of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, and Section 26 of Act 2938, now Section
20, R.A. 1300 (Charter of PNB). Stated differently, should
the word "sale" used in the above indicated provisions of
the Rules of Court and the PNB Charter, under whichWe
ruled that the redemption period shall start from the
registration of the sale in the registry of deeds be applied
to foreclosure sales for the DBP and give to the words
auction sale" in its charter the same meaning of "sale" as
used in connection with registered land?
We are of the view that a correct solution to the foregoing
issue must entail not merely trying to determine the
meaning of the words auction sale" and "sale" in different
legislative enactments, but, more importantly, a
determination of the legislative intent which is quite a task
to achieve as it depends more on a determination of the
purpose and objective of the law in giving mortgagors a
period of redemptiom of their foreclosed properties.
Mortgagors whose properties are foreclosed and are
purchased by the mortgagee as highest bidder at the
auction sale are decidedly at a great disadvatage because
almost invariably mortgagors forfeit their properties at a
great loss as they are purchased at nominal costs by the
mortgagee himself who ordinarily bids in no more than his
credit or the balance threof at the auction sale. That is the
reason why the law gives them a chance to redeem their
properties within a fixed period. It cannot be denied that in
all foreclosures of mortgages and sale of property pursuan registered land. It
to execution, whether judicial or extrajudicial in nature, is the law in this
under different legislative enactments, a public auction jurisdiction that
sale is a indispensable pre-requisite to the valid disposal of when property
properties used as collateral for the obligation. So that brought under the
whether the legislators in different laws used as collateral operation of the
for the obligation. So that whether the legislators in Land Registration
different laws used the term "sale" or "auction sale" is of no Act
moment, since the presumption is that when they used sold, the operativ
those words "sale" and "auction sale" interchangeable in e act is the
different laws they really referred to only one act — registration of the
the sale at public auction indispensably necessary in the deed of
disposition of mortgaged properties and those levied upon conveyance.
to pay civil obligations of their owners. The deed of sale
does not take
effect this a
In the case of Ernesto Salazar, et al. vs. Flor De Lis
conveyance or
Meneses, et al.,G.R. No.
bind the land it is
L-15378, promulgated July 31, 1963, this Court stated:
registered. (Sectio
n 50, Act 496;
The issue decisive of this appeal is the Tuason vs.
one raised by appellants in their third Raymundo, 28
assignment of error, which is to this Phil. 635;
effect: that the lower court erred in not Sikatuna vs.
holding that the period of redemption Guevara, 43 Phil.
in this case, as far as appellants are 371; Worcester
concerned, started only on May 26, vs. Ocampo, 34
1956, registered. Should We rule to Phil. 646)
this effect, it is clear that hen (Emphasis
appellants attempted to exercise their supplied)
right to redeem, as judgment creditors
of the deceased mortgagor by
We find no compelling reason to deviate from the
judgment subsequent to the
aforequoted ruling and not apply the same to the present
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and
case. To Us petitioners' main contention that there is a
when they initiated the present action
great deal of difference in legislative intent in the use of the
on October 1, 1956, the period of
words 94 auction sale" in Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act
redemption had not yer expired.
459 and the word "sale" in See. 32 of Act 2938, and See.
30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, pales into
We find appellants' contention to be insignificance in the light of Our stand that those words
meritorious. In the case of Agbulos vs. used interchangeably refer to one thing, and that is the
Alberto, G.R. No. L-17483, public auction sale required by law in the disposition of
promulgated on July 31, 1962, We properties foreclosed or levied upon. Our stand in the
held: Salazar case and in those mentioned therein (Garcia vs.
Ocampo, G.R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959; Gonzales et
al. vs. Philippine National Bank et al. 48 Phil. 824) is firmly
The property
planted on the premise that registration of the deed of
involved in the conveyance for properties brought under the Torrens
present case is System is the operative act to transfer title to the property
and registration is also the notice to the whole world that a
transaction involving the same had taken place.
To affirm the previous stand this Court has taken on the
question of when the one year period of redemption should
start (from the time of registration of the sale) would better
serve the ends of justice and equity especially in this case,
since to rule otherwise would result in preventing the
respondent-mortgagor from redeeming his 59.4687
hectares of land which was acquired by the Development
Bank of the Philippines as the highest bidder at the auction
sale for the low price of only P7,271.22 which was simply
the unpaid balance of the mortgage debt of P22,000.00
after the respondent-mortgagor had paid the sum of
P14,728.78. As it is, affirmance of the Appellate Court's
decision would not result in any loss to petitioners since
the amount of P7,271.22 they paid to the Bank will be
returned to 'them. What further strengthen's Our stand is
the fact found by the respondent Appellate Court that
respondent Barrameda has always been in possession of
the disputed land.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, We find it no longer
necessary to determine whether the petitioners are
purchasers in good faith of the land involved, since the
respondent Barrameda redeemed the mortgaged property
within the legal period of redemption and, consequently
the sale of the property executed on September 3, 1963,
by the Development Bank of the Philippine in favor of the
petitioners is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Appellate
Court is affirmed, with costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. L-11988 April 4, 1918
JACINTO MOLINA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAMES J.
RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, Defendant-
Appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellant.
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellee.
FISHER, J.:
After the publication of the decision announced under the
date of February 1st., 1918, 1counsel for appellee
presented a petition for a rehearing. This petition was
granted and oral argument of the motion was permitted.
Two of the members of the court, as constituted at the time
of the argument on the motion for a rehearing, were not
present when the case was first submitted and did not
participate in the original
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Upon the facts, as correctly stated in the original majority
decision, a majority of the members of the court as now
constituted is in favor of setting aside the original decision
and affirming the judgment of the trial
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Plaintiff contends that the fish produced by him are to be
regarded as an "agricultural product" within the meaning of
that term as used in paragraph ( c) of section 41 of Act No.
2339 (now section 1460 of the Administrative Code of
1917), in forced when the disputed tax was levied, and that
he is therefore exempt from the percentage tax on
merchants' sales established by section 40 of Act No.
2339, as amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The provision upon which the plaintiff relies reads as
follows:
In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the
following commodities shall be excluded: . . . ( c)
Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner
of the land where grown, whether in their original state or
not. (Act No. 2339, sec. 41.)
The same exemption, with a slight change in wording, is
now embodied in section 1460 of the Administrative Code,
of 1917.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The question of law presented by this appeal, as we view,
is not whether fish in general constitute an agricultural
products, but whether fish produced as were those upon
which the tax in question was levied are an agricultural
product.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
As stated by judged Cooley in his great work on taxation:
The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent
of the legislature should be sought in the words employed
to express it, and that when found it should be made to
govern, . . . . If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful
import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look
beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the
legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the
circumstances were, under which the action was taken;
what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; . . . . And
where the law has contemporaneously been put into
operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily
been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for
some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as
being very probably a true expression of the legislative
purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is
not conclusive. (Cooley on Taxation [Vol. 1] 3d. Ed., p.
450.)
The first inquiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose of
the Legislative had in mind in establishing the exemption
contained in the clause now under consideration. It seems
reasonable to assume that it was due to the belief on the
part of the law making body that by exempting agricultural
products from this tax the farming industry would be
favored and the development of the resources of the
country encouraged. It is a fact, of which we take judicial
cognizance, that there are immense tracts of public land in
this country, at present wholly unproductive, which might
be made fruitful by cultivation, and that large sums of
money go abroad every year for the purchase of food
substances which might be grown here. Every dollar's
worth of food which the farmer produces and sells in these
Islands adds directly to the wealth of the country. On the
other hand, in the process of distribution of commodities to
the ultimate consumer, no direct increase in value results
solely from their transfer from one person to another in the
course of commercial transactions. It is fairly to be inferred
from the statute that the object and purpose of the
Legislature was, in general terms, to levy the tax in
question, significantly termed the "merchant's tax," upon all
persons engaged in making a profit upon goods produced
by others, but to exempt from the tax all persons directly
producing goods from the land. In order to accomplish this
purpose the Legislature, instead of attempting an
enumeration of exempted products, has grouped them all
under the general designation of "agricultural
products."chanrobles virtual law library
It seems to require no argument to demonstrate that it is
just as much to the public interest to encourage the
artificial propagation and growth of fish as of corn, pork,
milk or any other food substance. If the artificial production
of fish is held not to be included within the exemption of
the statute this conclusion must be based upon the
inadequacy of the language used by the Legislature to
express its purpose, rather than the assumption that it was
actually intended to exclude producers of artificially grown
fish from the benefits conferred upon producers of other
substances brought into the store of national wealth by the
arts of husbandry and animal
industry.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
While we have no doubt that the land occupied by the
ponds in which the fish in question are grown is
agricultural land within the meaning of the Acts of
Congress and of the Philippine Commission under
consideration in the case of Map vs. Insular Government
(10 Phil. Rep., 175) and others cited in the original majority
opinion, it does not seem to us that this conclusion solves
the problem. A man might cultivate the surface of a tract of
land patented to him under the mining law, but the
products of such soil would not for that reason, we
apprehend, be any the less "agricultural products."
Conversely, the admission that the land upon which these
fishponds are constructed is not to be classified as mineral
or forest land, does not lead of necessity to the conclusion
that everything produced upon them is for that reason
alone to be deemed an "agricultural product" within the
meaning of the statute under
consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
"Agriculture" is an English word made upon of Latin words
" ager," a field, and " cultura," cultivation. It is defined by
Webster's New International Dictionary as meaning in its
broader sense, "The science and art of the production of
plants and animal useful to man . . ."chanrobles virtual law
library
In Dillard vs. Webb (55 Ala., 468) it is held that the words
"agriculture" includes "the rearing, feeding and managing
of live stock." The same view was expressed in the case of
Binzel vs. Grogan (67 Wis.,
147).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Webster defines "product" to be "anything that is
produced, whether as the result of generation, growth,
labor, or thought ... ," while "grow" is defined in the Century
Dictionary as meaning "to cause to grow; cultivate;
produce, raise . . .."chanrobles virtual law library
While it is true that in a narrow and restricted sense
agricultural products are limited to vegetable substances
directly resulting from the tillage of the soil, it is evident
from the definitions quoted that the term also includes
animal which derived their sustenance from vegetable
growths, and are therefore indirectly the product of the
land. Thus it has been held that "The product of the dairy
and the product of the poultry yard, while it does not come
directly out of the soil is necessarily connected with the soil
. . . and is therefore farm produce. (District of
Columbia vs. Oyster, 15 D. C., 285.)chanrobles virtual law
library
In the case of Mayor vs. Davis (6 Watts & Sergeant [Penn.
Rep.], 269) the court said:
Swine horses, meat cattle, sheep, manure, cordwood, hay,
vegetables, fruits, eggs, milk, butter, lard . . . are strictly
produce of the farm . . .
Without attempting to further multiply examples, we think it
may safely be asserted that courts and lexicographers are
in accord in holding that the term "agricultural products" is
not limited in its meaning to vegetable growth, but includes
everything which serves to satisfy human needs which is
grown upon the land, whether it pertain to the vegetable
kingdom, or to the animal kingdom. It is true that there is
no decision which as yet has held that the fish grown in
ponds are an agricultural product, but that is no reason
why we should not so hold if we find that such fish fall
within the scope of the meaning of the term. Of necessity,
the products of land tend constantly to multiply in number
and variety, as population increases and new demands
spring up. In California there are farms devoted to the
growth of frogs for the market. In many places in North
America foxes and other animals usually found wild are
reared in confinement for their fur. In Japan land is
devoted to the culture of the silkworm and the growth of
the plants necessary for the food of those insects. Bees
are everywhere kept for the wax and honey into which the
land is made to produce by those engaged in these
occupations are "agricultural products" in the same sense
in which poultry, eggs, and butter have been held to be
agricultural products.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Now, if the purpose of agriculture, in the broader sense of
the term, is to obtain from the land the products to which it
is best adapted and through which it will yield the greatest
return upon the expenditure of a given amount of labor and
capital, can it not be said that it is just as much an
agricultural process to enclose a given area of land with
dykes, flood it with water, grow aquatic plants in it, and
feed fish with the plants so produced as to fence in it and
allow poultry to feed upon the plants naturally or artificially
grown upon the surface? In the last analysis the result is
the same - a given area of land produces a certain amount
of food. In the one case it is the flesh of poultry, in the
other the flesh of fish. It has been agreed between the
parties that an important article of diet consumed by fish
grown in a pond consists of certain marine plants which
grow from roots which affix themselves to the bottom of the
pond. In a real sense, therefore, the fish are just as truly a
product of the land as are poultry or swine, living upon its
vegetable growths, aquatic or terrestrial. Thus, land may
truly be said to produce fish, although it is true that the
producer is not a fisherman. Neither is one who grows
foxes for their pelts a hunter. As contended by counsel, the
inquiry is not whether fish in general constitute an
agricultural product, but whether fish artificially grown and
fed in confinement are to be so regarded. Honey produced
by one who devotes his land to apiculture might be so
regarded, even if we were to admit that wild honey
gathered in the forest is not. Pigeons kept in domestication
and fed by the owner would fall within the definition. Wild
pigeons obtained by a hunter would not. Firewood
gathered in a natural forest is not an agricultural product,
but firewood cut from bacauan trees planted for that
purpose has been held to be such a product, and its
producer exempt from the merchant's tax.
(Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 Phil. Rep.,
271.) Other comparisons might be made, many of which
will be found in the opinion in which two of the members of
the court expressed their dissent from the original majority
opinion, but enough have been given to make our position
clear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
During the many hears that the statute before us has been
in existence, since it first appeared, substantially in its
present form, in section 142 of Act No. 1189, passed in
1904, no attempt has been made, until this case arose, to
construe it as not applying to fish grown in ponds, and
much weight should be given to this long continued
administrative interpretation. The opinion of the Attorney-
General, cited by Justice Malcolm, will be found on
examination to have no bearing upon the present inquiry,
as in that case question was, not whether fish grown and
fed in ponds were agricultural products, but whether ". .
. fishermen, shell and pearl gatherers . . ." were liable to
the occupation tax. There is nothing in the opinion to
indicate that the word "fishermen" was used to mean men
growing fish in ponds, and it must, therefore, be assumed
that it was used in its proper grammatical sense to
designate persons engaged in catching fish not artificially
produced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The decision in the case of The United States vs. Laxa (36
Phil. Rep., 670) is not controlling, as the reasoning upon
which it is based was not concurred in by four members of
the court. Furthermore, the Laxa case might be
distinguished from the one now under consideration, were
it necessary to do so, in that it has been stipulated in this
case that fish cultivated in ponds subsist largely upon
aquatic plants which grow from roots which attach
themselves to the bottom of the pond, and are therefore in
a real sense a product of the land, while in the Laxa case
the evidence was that they subsisted solely upon free
floating algae.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that the CARSON, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library
decision heretofore rendered herein must be set aside,
and the judgment of the lower court affirmed. So
I dissent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
library
As I understand them, the contentions of counsel in
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Johnson, JJ., concur.
support of the motion for a rehearing and reconsideration
Araullo, J., dissents.
are substantially identical with those adduced in briefs and
the oral arguments when the case was originally
submitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Separate Opinionschanrobles virtual law library I have heard nothing which would lead me to modify my
views or my vote when the case was decided and the
decision promulgated.
STREET, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library
At the original hearing, I became quite firmly convinced, as
I supposed, that the product of a fishery maintained in the
manner shown in this case ought not to be considered an
agricultural products, within the meaning of the provision of MALCOLM, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library
the Internal Revenue Law which exempts agricultural
products from the merchant's tax. Upon fuller reflection,
This case well illustrates how on the same facts, the same
and further consideration of the arguments advanced at
law, and the same authorities, judges can arrive at
the rehearing in favor of the other contention, I have come
diametrically opposed
to the conclusion that I was wrong. I therefore take this
conclusions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
opportunity to recede from my former position and to
law library
express my conformity with the opinion which now
becomes the opinion of the majority of the
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law Take the facts. They are stipulated. The only difference is
library that possibly unconsciously, in order to fortify the
conclusion, the decision of the majority on reconsideration
would stress the point that an important article of diet
My conformity with the opinion first written was based on
consumed by fish grown in a pond consists of certain
the conviction that the term "agricultural products," as used
marine plants which grow from roots which affix
in this statute, had reference to articles produced by purely
themselves to the bottom of the pond, while the original
agricultural processes, more especially by the tillage of the
decision as well as the decision in the Laxa case,1 possibly
fields. As I now view the case, this conception of the
also in order to fortify their conclusions, would stress the
meaning of agricultural is too narrow. It must be admitted
scientific fact that the food of the bangus includes marine
that poultry, eggs, pigs, and other ordinary produce of farm
plants, that these algae are of seven classes, that one of
and country are agricultural products within the meaning of
these plants is rooted, that some of the others are very
the statute; and no sufficient reason is discernible for
loosely attached to the ground but not rooted, and that
excluding fish produced under the conditions revealed in
generally the algae float on the
this case.
water.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Or take the law. The section in dispute is made up of a few
simple words. In reality, the meaning of the phrase,
"agricultural products," is only to be ascertained. The
primary duty of the court is, of course, to ascertain
legislative intention. But here again the two decisions
radically differ. The decision of the majority on
reconsideration in a laudable endeavor to encourage
commercial development would make this the purpose of
the law and would follow this idea consistently to the end.
On the other hand, the original decision would start with
the same presumption but finding that to so construe the
law would result in judicial amendment must then
necessarily reach a different result; if the Legislature had
intended to exempt all classes of domestic products which
would include fish, it would undoubtedly have done so in
plain language.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Or take the authorities. The Supreme Court of Georgia
(Davis vs. Mayor [1879], 64 Ga., 128) would confine
"agricultural products" to the yield of the soil, as corn,
wheat, rye, hay, etc. Possibly this court was right. The
supreme courts Alabama and Wisconsin would go further
and would include as" agricultural products" the rearing,
feeding, and management of live stock. In this
construction, these courts may have been right for, as one
example, it is merely a matter of comparative profit to the
farmer whether he markets his corn in the ear or on the
hoof in the shape of swine. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania (Mayor vs. Davis [1843], 6 W. S., 269) would
go still further and would include as "agricultural products"
swine, horses, meat, cattle, sheep, manure, cord, wood,
hay, poultry vegetables, fruit, eggs, milk, butter, and lard,
that is, domestic animals and products of the farm.
Possibly, this court was right. And now the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands in granting the motion for
reconsideration would go even further and would include in
the term "agricultural products," frogs, foxes, bees,
pigeons, silkworms, silk, honey, and fish. Possibly, this
court is right. Try as I may, for I am gratified to have this
decision of the court, I cannot bring myself to this view.
Without giving way to the temptation to use ironical and
facetious language because of this result, let me merely
make the observation that where the limit will reached is
beyond my poor mind to comprehend. Another court could
very well instead of prolonging the examples ad
infinitum merely judicially repeal the word "agricultural" and
include everything which would fall under the word
"products."chanrobles virtual law library
My views and those of three other members of the court
are fully set out in the first decision. Restatement or
reargument will avail nothing. Suffice it to say that the
argument on motion for reconsideration and the decision
of the majority have failed to convince me that fish - or to
accede to the critical suggestion of the majority - that fish
produced as were those upon which the tax in question
was levied, are an agricultural product. The administrative
ruling of the Attorney-General, the decision of this court in
United States vs. Laxa ([1917], 36 Phil., 670), and the
original decision in the instant case should not be
overturned by granting this motion.
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO
JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal
Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor
Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act
No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant
Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-
fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45,
representing the income tax collected on his salary as
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to
Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from
January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to
December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as
they do the same question of law, they were jointly
submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge
Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and
well considered decision found and held that under the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the
salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a
diminution of their compensation and therefore was in
violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so
ordered the refund of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and
considering the proposition and the arguments pro and
cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra,
which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that
case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the
United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O
'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution
of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall
now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination
of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act
No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of
appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received
favorably by Congress, because immediately after its
promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To
bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced
what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower
House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act
No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9,
Article VIII of our Constitution:.
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court
and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office
during good behavior, until they reach the age of
seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. They shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their
 continuance in office. Until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and
each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above
constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that
judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax
on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the
Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries
during their continuance in office, a thing which is
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter,
according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did
not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case,
Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to
counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to
authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any
public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income
tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to
be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a
decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9,
Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from
payment of income tax on their salaries, because the
collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries,
specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the
Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says
that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of
the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds
to declare that payment of said income tax is not a
diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly
do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection
of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a
judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the
Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To
determine this question, we shall have to go back to the
fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the contrary to the provisions of the Federal and
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).
enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the
execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act
the interpretation and application of said laws belong
NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to
officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear
interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning
Before the courts can determine whether a law is
of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their
constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain
continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the
the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there
This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof
is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the
by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
and unconstitutional.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial
legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or
function and the legislative branch may not limit
act declaratory of what the law was before its
or restrict the power granted to the courts by the
passage, so as to give it any binding weight with
Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N.
the courts. A legislative definition of a word as
W., 2nd 341, 342.)
used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the would be usurping a judicial function in defining
authority vested in the legislature by the a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare
the act unconstitutional because they cannot
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law
shrink from it without violating their oaths of
which violates a constitutional provision, validate
office. This duty of the courts to maintain the
it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the state
courts, by a declaration that it shall be so
is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief
construed as not to violate the constitutional
Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in
inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)
violation of the fundamental law, the courts must
so adjudge and thereby give effect to the
Constitution. Any other course would lead to the We have already said that the Legislature under our form
destruction of the Constitution. Since the of government is assigned the task and the power to make
question as to the constitutionality of a statute is and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true
a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the
exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the
action might be taken by political agencies in Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare
disregard of the judgment of the judicial what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.) Constitution means, especially after the courts have in
actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and
applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion
Under the American system of constitutional
and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
government, among the most important
Under such a system, a final court determination of a case
functions in trusted to the judiciary are the
based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the
interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely
Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
connected power, the determination of whether
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the
laws and acts of the legislature are or are not
Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be
neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative
of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system
of government, particularly those governing the separation
of powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case.
Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the
collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and
evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where
the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or
sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent
and clear. All that the official who had previously received
his full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his
obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his
income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was
received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his
other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact
that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said
income tax. But under the present system of withholding
the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the
income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in
advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to
the number of pay-days during the year and actually
deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday,
said official actually does not receive his salary in full,
because the income tax is deducted therefrom every
payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case
of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to
say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every
payday, — fifteenth and end of month. In the present case,
the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue
on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve
(months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further
dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685,
which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his
salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as
a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the
income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he
would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of
receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but
P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his
salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is
decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection
with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No.
590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind
the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain
legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not
enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism
and love for their country, they should pay income tax on
their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the
exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme
Court alone but also by all judicial officers including
Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior
courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional
officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor
General, the members of the Commission on Elections,
and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals,
commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and
judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to
the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court
Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990
other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15
Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107 Judges of First
Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of
the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal
Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the
independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High
Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present
membership number more than 990 judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit
judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said
by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):
The primary purpose of the prohibition against
diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like
the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good
and competent men to the bench and to
promote that independence of action and
judgment which is essential to the maintenance
of the guaranties, limitations and pervading
principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to
person and with equal concern for the poor and
the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be
construed, not as a private grant, but as a
limitation imposed in the public interest; in other
words, not restrictively, but in accord with its
spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the
Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the
great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them
receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering further
the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such
as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each
dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived
from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if
not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or
substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not
affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the
considerations that prompted the establishment of the
constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs.
Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that
they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the
independence of the judges as far as greater importance
than any revenue that could come from taxing their
salaries.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly
ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his
salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office,
provided and secured by the fundamental law, not
primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to
secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought
and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of
short duration. Because of the limited membership in this
High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of
experience, practice and training required, one generally
enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite
late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and
being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does
not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not
in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It
is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption
can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous,
and because of the meager salary they receive, they can
less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by
the amount of the income tax if paid would be real,
substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing
unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public
policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject
to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime,
members of the Senate and House of Representatives
except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace
are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the
session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are
generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral
or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen
in making such statements during their sessions are
extended immunity and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who
enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are
exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and
improvements thereon when used exclusively for
educational purposes, even if they derive income
therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government
bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the
income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4],
National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 566). Payments or income received by any person
residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United
States administered by the United States Veterans
Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No.
360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the
Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the
United States, allowances earned by virtue of such
services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945,
inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act
No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of
officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the
Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation.
(Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public
policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by
constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his
ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under
the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not
higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution
deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers
from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease
their compensation, thereby insuring the independence of
the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is
a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We
further hold that the interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province
and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands
of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
specially when the interpretation sought and provided in
said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement
as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down
by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G. R. No. L-
2314, in view of the part I had in that case as former
Solicitor General, I wish however to state that I concur in
the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13,
Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of
the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered "not to be
a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution
or by law", constitutes an invasion of the province and
jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the
opinion that said section is null and void, it being a
transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the
separation of powers.
PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer, 85
Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the
majority in ruling that no legislation may provide that it be
held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA,
MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent
Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as
member of the National Assembly for the first assembly
district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as
admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935,
the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board
of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the
said district, for having received the most (6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral (a) That the Constitution confers exclusive
number of votes; Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely
of which provides: as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner
took his oath of office; 6. La Comision no considerara
ninguna protesta que no se haya (b) That the Constitution excludes from said
presentado en o antes de este dia. jurisdiction the power to regulate the
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National
proceedings of said election contests, which
Assembly in session assembled, passed the
power has been reserved to the Legislative
following resolution: (7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein
Department of the Government or the National
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
Assembly;
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before
[No. 8]
the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss
the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of (c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts
RESOLUCION Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose
CONFIRMANDO LAS No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding
ACTAS DE AQUELLOS the legitimate exercise of its constitutional the merits of controversies submitted to them for
DIPUTADOS CONTRA prerogative to prescribe the period during which decision and to matters involving their internal
QUIENES NO SE HA protests against the election of its members organization, the Electoral Commission can
PRESENTADO should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid regulate its proceedings only if the National
PROTESTA. resolution has for its object, and is the accepted Assembly has not availed of its primary power to
formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) so regulate such proceedings;
that the protest in question was filed out of the
Se resuelve: Que las actas
prescribed period;
de eleccion de los (d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National
Diputados contra quienes Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be
no se hubiere presentado (8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respected and obeyed;
debidamente una protesta respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to
antes de la adopcion de la the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the
presente resolucion sean, legal or constitutional provision barring the
ordinance appended to the Constitution and
como por la presente, son presentation of a protest against the election of
paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie
aprobadas y confirmadas. a member of the National Assembly after
Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United
confirmation;
States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
1935. (9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the to pass upon the fundamental question herein
aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal"; raised because it involves an interpretation of
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein the Constitution of the Philippines.
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" (10) That the case being submitted for decision,
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose the Electoral Commission promulgated a On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and
A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral
passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest." Commission interposing the following special defenses:
praying, among other-things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following (a) That the Electoral Commission has been
National Assembly for the first district of
grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for: created by the Constitution as an instrumentality
Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
of the Legislative Department invested with the
nullified;
jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
 election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly"; that in
adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the
presentation of protests against the election of
any member of the National Assembly, it acted
within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate
exercise of the implied powers granted it by the
Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations
essential to carry out the power and functions
conferred upon the same by the fundamental
law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23,
1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to
dismiss the election protest in question, and
declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the
legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
a an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department of the Commonwealth Government,
and hence said act is beyond the judicial
cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly
of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of
the members of the National Assembly against
whom no protest had thus far been filed, could
not and did not deprive the electoral
Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance
of election protests filed within the time that
might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body
invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by
the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior
tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person"
within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, against which
prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and
filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting
forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules
of the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, there was no existing law fixing the period could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-
within which protests against the election of judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the
members of the National Assembly should be Supreme Court;
filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last
day for the filing of protests against the election
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-
of members of the National Assembly, the
McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of
Electoral Commission was exercising a power
the united States) has no application to the case
impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution,
at bar.
by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936.
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of
Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed
protest before the Electoral Commission on
for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against
December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by
the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was
paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by
Commission;
resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said
respondent and over the parties thereto, and the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be
January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to reduced to the following two principal propositions:
dismiss said protest was an act within the
jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the
reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy upon the foregoing related facts,
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution and in the affirmative,
requires confirmation by the National Assembly
of the election of its members, and that such
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted
confirmation does not operate to limit the period
within which protests should be filed as to without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed
the election of the herein petitioner
over protest filed subsequent thereto;
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an Assembly?
independent entity created by the Constitution,
endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly
decision are final and unappealable;
upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question
of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ
constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense
corporation, board or person, within the terms of of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and
sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to
Procedure; and that neither under the provisions the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to
of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented
VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of to our consideration.
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on
the legislative power that this assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further
check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-
thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the
Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the
other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on
the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of
treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established,
to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their
support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also
exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And
the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the
one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved
in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the
government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of
power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
be remembered that, in the language of James Madison,
the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must
also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to
mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate
analysis, then, must the success of our government in the
unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino
minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court
chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution
(No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the
herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the
Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission
to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of
the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power
of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9,
1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date
as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as
it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between
the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the
light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as
we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose,
namely to determine all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of
authority under the fundamental law between department
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate
cases. Discarding the English type and other European
types of constitutional government, the framers of our
constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial
department. In some countries which have declined to
follow the American example, provisions have been
inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This
is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are
bound to assume what is logically their function. For
instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the
validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries
whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have
assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia returns and qualifications of the members of the National
(arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into
the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain the origin and history of this constitutional provision and
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who
1931) especial constitutional courts are established to adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full
pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the meaning, import and significance.
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a
final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of
authority between two agencies created by the
Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the
Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections,
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the
returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a
clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the
void be thus created in our constitutional system which
United States providing that "Each House shall be the
may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its
framework? To ask these questions is to answer
own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29,
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle,
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate
reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that
and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the
upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
their elective members . . ." apparently in order to
mater of the present controversy for the purpose of
emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular
determining the character, scope and extent of the
case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear
and qualifications of the members of the National
and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte
Assembly."
and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall
The first step towards the creation of an independent
now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and
tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to
determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted
the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its
appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees
resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take
of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security
thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935.
empowered to hear legislature but also against the
As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the
election of executive officers for whose election the vote of
issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI
the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate
of the Constitution which provides:
impeachment proceedings against specified executive and
judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices
composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds,
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be three members to be designed by the majority party and
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior
and three by the party having the second largest number Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which
of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was
shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight
modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative
representation to four members, that is, two senators to be
designated one each from the two major parties in the
Senate and two representatives to be designated one
each from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representation to the
executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also
preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on
September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the
proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as
follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of either house and all cases
contesting the election of any of their members
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
constituted, as to each House, by three
members elected by the members of the party
having the largest number of votes therein, three
elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and as to its
Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security
with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was
probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon
abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on
Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced
powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be
designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship
Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on
Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the
Electoral Commission and made further changes in
phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral
instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally
submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads
as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the National Assembly and all
cases contesting the election of any of its
Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members
elected by the party having the largest number
of votes in the National Assembly, three elected
by the members of the party having the second
largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
the Commission to be presided over by one of
said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by
Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to
strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and
inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National
Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the
following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of
the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to
the scope of the said draft:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt
here as to the scope of the meaning of the first
four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft,
reading: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly and all cases contesting the election
of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask
from the gentleman from Capiz whether the
election and qualification of the member whose
elections is not contested shall also be judged
by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the
election of the members, there is nothing to be
judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to
indicate a controversy. If there is no question
about the election of a member, there is nothing
to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and
there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also
that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also
the election of those whose election is not
contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation.
As the gentleman knows, the action of the
House of Representatives confirming the
election of its members is just a matter of the
rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is
not necessary. After a man files his credentials
that he has been elected, that is sufficient,
unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is
sufficient, as we have observed that for
purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election
of a member to a legislative body, because he
will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards
to the municipal president who is elected? What
happens with regards to the councilors of a
municipality? Does anybody confirm their
election? The municipal council does this: it
makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case
the municipal council proclaims who has been
elected, and it ends there, unless there is a
contest. It is the same case; there is no need on
the part of the Electoral Commission unless
there is a contest. The first clause refers to the
case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite
where one person tries to be elected in place of
another who was declared elected. From
example, in a case when the residence of the
man who has been elected is in question, or in
case the citizenship of the man who has been
elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the
power of the commission, it may do so by certain
maneuvers upon its first meeting when the
returns are submitted to the assembly. The
purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission
all the powers exercised by the assembly
referring to the elections, returns and
qualifications of the members. When there is no
contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think
Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar
question as that propounded by the gentleman
from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago.
However I want to ask more questions from the
delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page
11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election
as separate from the first part of the sections
which refers to elections, returns and
qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of
clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections
are already included in the phrase "the elections,
returns and qualifications." This phrase "and
contested elections" was inserted merely for the
sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the
Electoral Commission, at its own instance,
refuse to confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a
protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the
gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if
he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from
Capiz believe that unless this power is granted
to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion
does not have the right to contest the election
and qualification of its members?
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft
reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the
gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is,
even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a
member has not the qualifications provided by
law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove
shall only be retained by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the
qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no
member of the assembly has the right to
question the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the
eligibility, he must go to the Electoral
Commission and make the question before the
Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral
Commission shall decide whether the election is
contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be
informed if the Electoral Commission has power
and authority to pass upon the qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly even
though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no
power, because they can only judge.
members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by
the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment
introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons,
Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the
difference between the original draft and the draft as
amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship
Committee said:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente,
consiste solamente en obviar la objecion
apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que
la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The
elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly" parece que
da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de
determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros
que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa
dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon
en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal
modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases
contesting the election", de modo que los jueces
de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente
a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra
las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate
Labrador was voted upon the following
interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la
enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft,
dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a
la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no cree
Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a
dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal
Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el
tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa
 forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como
los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la
Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre
la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un
caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los
de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo
no les daria el triunfo.
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador,
Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly to the National
Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz
(C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court
in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as
to accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-
six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-
partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to
read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest
number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three
justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided
over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted
revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission
composed of three Justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of
votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on
February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President
Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the
Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests
relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words
"the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the
Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature
long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent,
impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere
experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies
(ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid
account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of
votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by
the House of Commons in the following passages which
are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed
memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons
established their right to be the exclusive judges
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their members, until the year 1770, two modes
of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of
controverted elections, and rights of
membership. One of the standing committees
appointed at the commencement of each
session, was denominated the committee of
privileges and elections, whose functions was to
hear and investigate all questions of this
description which might be referred to them, and
to report their proceedings, with their opinion
thereupon, to the house, from time to time.
When an election petition was referred to this
committee they heard the parties and their
witnesses and other evidence, and made a
report of all the evidence, together with their
opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions,
which were considered and agreed or disagreed
to by the house. The other mode of proceeding
was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself.
When this court was adopted, the case was
heard and decided by the house, in substantially
the same manner as by a committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee. The committee of privileges
and elections although a select committee was
usually what is called an open one; that is to
say, in order to constitute the committee, a
quorum of the members named was required to
be present, but all the members of the house
were at liberty to attend the committee and vote
if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in
parliament questions relating to the right of
membership gradually assumed a political
character; so that for many years previous to the
year 1770, controverted elections had been tried
and determined by the house of commons, as
mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for
Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after
repeated attacks upon his government, resigned
his office in consequence of an adverse vote
upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell
remarks, of the trial of election cases, as
conducted under this system, that "Every
principle of decency and justice were notoriously
and openly prostituted, from whence the
younger part of the house were insensibly, but
too successfully, induced to adopt the same
licentious conduct in more serious matters, and
in questions of higher importance to the public
welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished
member of the house of commons, undertook to
propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of
March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of
the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial
of controverted elections, or returns of members
to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain
his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville
alluded to the existing practice in the following
terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their
respective causes, the principal dependence of
both parties is their private interest among us;
and it is scandalously notorious that we are as
earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the
opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-
elective, and not bound to act by the principles
of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our
own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in
every contested election, many members of this
house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of
judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist
themselves as parties in the contention, and
take upon themselves the partial management of
the very business, upon which they should
determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus
described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill
which met with the approbation of both houses,
and received the royal assent on the 12th of
April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since
known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which
Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the
nobles works, for the honor of the house of
commons, and the security of the constitution,
that was ever devised by any minister or
statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of
the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy,
may have led many of the contemporaries of the
measure to the information of a judgement,
which was not acquiesced in by some of the
leading statesmen of the day, and has not been
entirely confirmed by subsequent experience.
The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De
Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common
pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk
of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox,
chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the
new system was an essential alteration of the
constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation
of one of the most important rights and
jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England
solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement
of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating
its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the
High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance
with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English
jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32
Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 &
47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911
[1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol.
XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests
which were originally heard by the Committee of the House
of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise,
in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which
were originally determined by each house, are since 1922
tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law
provides that all protests against the election of members
of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the
Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2,
art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17,
1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of
Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to
decide contested elections to the Diet or National
Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of
deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of
the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19)
and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2,
1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose
membership is recruited both from the legislature and the
judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In
the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to
the number of electoral votes received by each of the two
opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no
adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress
passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes
at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a
special Electoral Commission composed of five members
elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House
of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court,
the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the
Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding
unless rejected by the two houses voting separately.
Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived
from the experience of America in this regard, judging from
the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of
that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman,
the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate
Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless
Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the
experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed
our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in
years and experience. To be sure, many of them were
familiar with the history and political development of other
countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it
wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing
upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly,
they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the
Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain
evils of which the framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of
some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan,
as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a
vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that,
upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the
Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and
"ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it
is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members,
to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need
of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through
their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view,
a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence
in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three
justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
invested with the necessary authority in the performance
and execution of the limited and specific function assigned
to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our
tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location of
the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission
under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also
significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members
of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1;
State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we
concede the power claimed in behalf of the National
Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission
would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such
case would be invested with the power to determine
contested cases involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but
subject at all times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of
our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from
the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority
would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of
powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare
authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in
reality without the necessary means to render that
authority effective whenever and whenever the National
Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably
lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional
grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the
learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance
and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence
of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of
the government and of according validity to its acts, to
avoid what he characterized would be practically an
unlimited power of the commission in the admission of
protests against members of the National Assembly. But
as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a
settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence
of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the
petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its
regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any
reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and
peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly.
But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not
susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake
has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in
all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the
ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses
of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating
the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in
this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme
Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All
the agencies of the government were designed by the
Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each
constitutional organ working within its own particular
sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing
the great ends for which they were created by the
sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional
agencies might leave much to be desired in given
instances, is inherent in the perfection of human
institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the
exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its
acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be
challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of
the present case, there are considerations of equitable
character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation
of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The
Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution,
except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of
Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National
Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and
the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December
3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on
December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show
when the Electoral Commission was formally organized
but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly
passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the
Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
appear that said body had actually been organized. As a
mater of fact, according to certified copies of official
records on file in the archives division of the National
Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the
petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme
Court the six members of the National Assembly
constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively
designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution
No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested
elections of members of the National Assembly had the
effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of
protests, the result would be that the National Assembly —
on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power
of regulation in such cases — had already barred the
presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission
had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode
and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its
exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was
not and could not have been contemplated, and should be
avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly confirming the election of members against
whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage
on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation
upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While
there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation
alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National
Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral
Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936,
overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the
protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation
of the election of any member is not required by the
Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such
member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall
provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First
member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu],
render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin
Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First
1935). Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District,
Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period,
pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No.
Commons and in the Congress of the United States,
56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section
confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a
18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be
member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper
deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the
election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect
reason that with the power to determine all contest relating
presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
member from the time that he takes his oath of office
the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority
(Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694,
to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power.
695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is
There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which
in order only in cases of contested elections where the
authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to
decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In
have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of
England, the judges' decision or report in controverted
contests against the election of its members. And what the
elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of
National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by
Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such
indirection through the medium of confirmation.
certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the
same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for
confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ Summarizing, we conclude:
for a new election, or for carrying into execution the
determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32
(a) That the government established by the
Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed,
Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
the order or decision of the particular house itself is
separation of power into the legislative, the
generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual
executive and the judicial.
alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and
Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
(b) That the system of checks and balances and
the overlapping of functions and duties often
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers
in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the
granted.
time when protests against the election of any of its
members should be filed. This was expressly authorized
by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the (c) That in cases of conflict between the several
sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its departments and among the agencies thereof,
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final
empowering each house to respectively prescribe by arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, constitutional boundaries.
after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had
already expired, each house passed a resolution
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of
confirming or approving the returns of such members
judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
against whose election no protests had been filed within
and controversies, and is the power and duty to
the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the
see that no one branch or agency of the
filing of further protests against the election of those
government transcends the Constitution, which
is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an
independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before
the present Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the
sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred
all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the
legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time
and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the
Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if
the National Assembly were to retain the power
to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the
manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution
repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature
respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective
members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contests
against the election of its members, the time and
manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond
or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the
costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election is contested or not, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the
duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of
the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly
of the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said confirmation,
does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe
the time within which protests against the
election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was
acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election
of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935
can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests
against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing
of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the
character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional
creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority
under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it
unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral
Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably
expressed in the preceding opinion. I am, however,
constrained to withhold my assent to certain conclusions
therein advanced.
The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the
Constitution of judging of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly, is judicial in nature.
(Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.)
On the other hand, the power to regulate the time in which
notice of a contested election may be given, is legislative
in character. (M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law.
ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed.,
572.)
It has been correctly stated that the government
established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the
theory of the separation of powers into legislative,
executive, and judicial. Legislative power is vested in the
National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of
any clear constitutional provision to the contrary, the power
to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election
may be given, must be deemed to be included in the grant
of legislative power to the National Assembly.
The Constitution of the United States contains a provision
similar to the that found in Article VI, section 4, of the
Constitution of the Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the
Constitution of the United States provides that each house
of the Congress shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its own members.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has assumed
the power to regulate the time in which notice of a
contested election may be given. Thus section 201, Title 2,
of the United States Code Annotated prescribes:
Whenever any person intends to contest an
election of any Member of the House of
Representatives of the United States, he shall,
within thirty days after the result of such election
shall have been determined by the officer or
board of canvassers authorized by law to
determine the same, give notice, in writing, to
the Member whose seat he designs to contest,
of his intention to contest the same, and, in such
notice, shall specify particularly the grounds
upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par.
105.)
The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the
Jones Law, also contained a provision to the effect that the
Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall
be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding
this provision, the Philippine Legislature passed the
Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:
The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall by resolution respectively prescribe the
time and manner of filing contest in the election
of members of said bodies, the time and manner
of notifying the adverse party, and bond or
bonds, to be required, if any, and shall fix the
costs and expenses of contest which may be
paid from their respective funds.
The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the
Electoral Commission was not to erect a body that would
be above the law, but to raise legislative elections contests
from the category of political to that of justiciable
questions. The purpose was not to place the commission
beyond the reach of the law, but to insure the to decide such contests. Construing section 478 of the
determination of such contests with the due process of Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as required
law. by Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe the
time and manner of filing contests in the election of
Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of
members of the National Assembly is vested in the
the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV, section 2, of
Electoral Commission, which is now the body clothed with
which provides that —
power to decide such contests.
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue
In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the
in force until the inauguration of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could not have
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro
such laws shall remain operative, unless
Ynsua to contest the election of the petitioner. By the
inconsistent with this Constitution, until
same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized by
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
law to adopt its resolution of December 9, 1935, which
National Assembly, and all references in such
fixed the time with in which written contests must be filed
laws to the Government or officials of the
with the commission.
Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution. Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions,
the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hear and
determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua
The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was
against the petitioner Jose A. Angara.
to insure the orderly processes of government, and to
prevent any hiatus in its operations after the inauguration
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It was thus Republic of the Philippines
provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain SUPREME COURT
operative even after the inauguration of the Manila
Commonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with
the Constitution, and that all references in such laws to the
SECOND DIVISION
government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
government and corresponding officials under the G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987
Constitution. It would seem to be consistent not only with
the spirit but the letter of the Constitution to hold that
section 478 of the Election Law remains operative and BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO
should now be construed to refer to the Electoral CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and
Commission, which, in so far as the power to judge MAXIMO ADLAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
election contests is concerned, corresponds to either the
Senate or the House of Representative under the former HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO
regime. It is important to observe in this connection that LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE
said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to
regulate the time and manner in which notice of a COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL
contested election may be given, not in the Philippine SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE
PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE
Legislature but in the Senate and House of
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
Representatives singly. In other words, the authority to
prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the
elections of members of the Philippine Legislature was by No. L-34162 December 29, 1987
statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power
 BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO LABANG,
ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS ACEBES, IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY
FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE
PROSECUTORS, ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., and ARTEMIO
ROMANILLOS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local elections of
1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to
enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC
XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the
then Circuit Criminal Court sitting in Pagadian City, as well
as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the
respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature
of prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019) and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
commenced by the respondent Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc.
On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we
issued temporary restraining orders directing the
respondents (in both petitions) to desist from further
proceedings in the cases in question until further orders
from the Court. At the same time, we gave due course to
the petitions and accordingly, required the respondents to
answer.
The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are
hence, undisputed.
On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with the
respondent City Fiscal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1-
70 thereof, for violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft
Law as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as the amount of P4,823.95 under PTA
follows: No. 3654; that the same was not
passed in audit by the Provincial
Auditor in view of the then subsisting
xxx xxx xxx
contract with Tecson Trucking
Company; which was to expire on
SPECIFICATION NO. I — November 2, 1969; that nevertheless
the said amount was paid and it was
made to appear that it was collected
That on or about October 10, 1969, by Tecson Trucking Company,
above-named respondents, conspiring
although there was nothing due from
and confabulating together, allegedly tile latter and the voucher was never
conducted a bidding for the supply of indorsed or signed by the operator of
gravel and sand for the Province of
Tecson Trucking; and that in
Zamboanga del Sur: that it was made facilitating and consummating the
to appear that Tabiliran Trucking aforecited collection, respondent
Company won the bidding; that,
officials, hereinabove cited, conspired
thereafter, the award and contract and connived to the great prejudice
pursuant to the said simulated bidding and damage of the Provincial
were effected and executed in favor of
Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1
Tabiliran Trucking Company; that, in
truth and in fact, the said bidding was
really simulated and the papers on the xxx xxx xxx
same were falsified to favor Tabiliran
Trucking Company, represented by
On the same date, the private respondent commenced
the private secretary of respondent
Criminal Case No. 2-71 of the respondent City Fiscal,
Bienvenido Ebarle, formerly
another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019
confidential secretary of the latter; that
as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The
said awardee was given wholly
complaint reads as follows:
unwarranted advantage and
preference by means of manifest
partiality; that respondent officials are xxx xxx xxx
hereby also charged with interest for
personal gain for approving said
That on or about April 8, 1970, a
award which was manifestly irregular
bidding was held for the construction
and grossly unlawful because the
of the right wing portion of the Capitol
same was facilitated and committed
Building of the Province of
by means of falsification of official
Zamboanga del Sur, by the Bidding
documents.
Committee composed of respondents
cited hereinabove; that the said
SPECIFICATION NO. II building was maliciously manipulated
so as to give wholly unwarranted
advantage and preference in favor of
That after the aforecited award and
the, supposed winning bidder,
contract, Tabiliran Trucking Company,
Codeniera Construction, allegedly
represented by respondent Cesar
owned and managed by Wenceslao
Tabiliran, attempted to collect
Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife
advances under his trucking contract
of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle; that
in the under his trucking contract in
 respondent official is interested for were made knowingly to the great qualified operator
personal gain because he is damage and prejudice of the of "Teoson
responsible for the approval of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga Trucking Service,"
manifestly irregular and unlawful del Sur in violation of aforecited and
award and contract aforecited; and provisions of the Revised Penal notwithstanding
that, furthermore, respondent, being a Code. 3 his compliance
Member of the Bidding Committee, with all the rules
also violated Article 171 of the and requirements
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed
Revised Penal Code, by making it on public bidding;
a complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the respondent
appear in the very abstract of bids that that, instead,
Fiscal, an action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and
another interested bidder, was not aforecited
Articles 171 and 213 of the Revised Penal Code, as
interested in the bidding, when in truth respondents
follows:
and in fact, it was not so. 2 illegally and
irregularly
xxx xxx xxx awarded said
xxx xxx xxx
contract to Cesar
Tabiliran, an
We hereby respectfully charge the associate of
On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S.
above-named respondents for respondent
No. 4-71 of the respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for
violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 3019,
violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Governor
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Bienvenido
Penal Code, as follows:
Corrupt Practices Act, Articles 171 Ebarle; and
and 213, Revised Penal Code and the
xxx xxx xxx rules and regulations of public bidding,
committed as follows: 2. That in truth
and in fact,
That on or about April 4, 1967, in
aforesaid
Pagadian City, said respondent 1. That on June "bidding" was
testified falsely under oath in 16, 1970, without really simulated
Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC CAD publication, and papers were
REC. NO. N-468, for registration of respondents falsified or
title to Lot No. 2545 in particular; conducted the so- otherwise
called "bidding" "doctored" to
for the supply of favor respondent
That respondent BIENVENIDO
gravel and sand
EBARLE testified falsely under oath Cesar Tabiliran
for the province of thereby giving him
during the hearing and reception of
Zamboanga del wholly
evidence that he acquired said lot by
Sur; that said
purchase from a certain Brigido unwarranted
respondents, advantage,
Sanchez and that he is the owner,
without any valid preference and
when in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had
or legal ground,
been previously acquired and is benefits by means
did not include or of manifest
owned by the provincial Government
even open the bid partiality; and that
of Zamboanga del Sur, where the
of one Jesus
provincial jail building is now located. there is a
Teoson that was statutory
seasonably presumption of
2. That aforesaid deceit, false submitted, despite
interest for
testimony and untruthful statement of the fact that he is personal gain
respondent in said Cadastral case a registered duly because the
 transaction and That on or about December 18, 1969, latter is related with him within the
award were in Pagadian City, and within the third degree of consanguinity.
manifestly jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
irregular and BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
contrary to Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did
applicable law, then and there unlawfully and
rules and feloniously extended and gave xxx xxx xxx
regulations. 4 ELIZABETH EBARLE
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his
brother, his relative by consanguinity xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
within the third degree, and
appointment as Private Secretary in That on or about December 18, 1969,
The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid the Office of the Provincial Governor in Pagadian City, and within the
preliminary investigations, but the same having been of Zamboanga del Sur, although he jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
denied, he went to the respondent Court of First Instance well know that the latter is related with BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and
of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Melquiades him within the third degree by there unlawfully and feloniously made
Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and mandamus (Special consanguinity. untruthful statements in a narration of
Case No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a writ of facts by accomplishing and issuing a
preliminary injunction to enjoin further proceedings therein. certificate, to wit:
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
The court granted preliminary injunctive relief (restraining
order) for which the Anti-Graft League filed a motion to
have the restraining order lifted and to have the petition xxx xxx xxx c. That the provisions of law and rules
itself dismissed. on promotion, seniority and nepotism
have been observed.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito,
handed down the first of the two challenged orders, required by law in such cases, in
That on or about December 18, 1969, support of the appointment he
granting Anti-Graft League's motion and dismissing
in Pagadian City, and within the extended to TERESITO
Special Case No. 1000.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, MONTESCLAROS, husband of his
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and niece Elizabeth Ebarle, as Motor Pool
On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on there unlawfully and feloniously made Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial
certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order untruthful statements in a narration of Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur,
(G.R. No. 33628). As we said, we issued a temporary facts by accomplishing and issuing a although he well knew that the latter is
restraining order on June 16, 1971. certificate, to wit: , related with him within the third degree
affinity.
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of c. That the provisions of law and rules
criminal prosecutions, the private respondent, on April 26, on promotion, seniority and nepotism CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
1971, filed three complaints, subsequently docketed as have been observed.
Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS,
and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal Court of xxx xxx xxx
required by law in such cases, in
Pagadian City for violation of various provisions of the Anti-
support of the appointment he
Graft Law as well as Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent
extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-
Code, as follows: brought I.S. No. 6-71 of the respondent Pagadian City
MONTESCLAROS as Private
Secretary in the Office of the Fiscal against the petitioner, still another proceeding for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 171 (4) of
xxx xxx xxx Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur, although he well know that the the Revised Penal Code, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 1, 1969,
in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously
extended and gave MARIO EBARLE,
son of his brother, his relative by
consanguinity within the third degree,
an appointment as SECURITY
GUARD in the Office of the Provincial
Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur
although he well knew that the latter is
related with him in the third degree by
consanguinity and is not qualified
under the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That in January, 1970, at Pagadian
City, Gov. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE
replaced JOHNNY ABABONwho was
then the incumbent Motor Pool
Dispatcher in the Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del
Sur with his nephew-in-law
TERESITO MONTESCLAROS
relative by affinity within the third Civil
degree, in violation of the Civil Service
Law, this knowingly causing undue
injury in the discharge of his
administrative function through
manifest partiality against said
complaining employee.
Third Count:
That on or about December 18, 1969,
in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously
extended and gave ELIZABETH
EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter
of his brother, his relative by
consanguinity within the third degree,
an appointment as Private Secretary
in the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
although he well know that the latter is
related with him within the third degree
of consanguinity, and said
appointment is in violation of the Civil
Service Law.
Fourth Count.
That on or about January 22, 1970, in
Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously
extended and gave ZACARIAS
UGSOD, JR., son of the younger
sister of Governor Ebarle, his relative
by consanguinity within the third
degree, an appointment as
Architectural Draftsman in the Office
of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur although he well
know that the latter is related with him
in the third degree of consanguinity.
Fifth Count.
That on February 5, 1970, at
Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously
extended and gave TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his
niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, his
relative by affinity within the third
degree, an appointment as Motor Pool
Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial
Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur,
although he wen knew then that the
latter was not qualified to such
appointment as it was in violation of
the Civil Service Law, thereby
knowingly granting and giving
unwarranted advantage and
preference in the discharge of his
administrative function through
manifest partiality.
II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019
That on August 19, 1967, respondent
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Governor
of Zamboanga del Sur, taking
advantage of his position caused,
persuaded, induced, or influence the
Presiding Judge to perform irregular
and felonious act in violation of
applicable law or constituting an
offense into awarding and decreeing
Lot 2645 of the Pagadian Public
Lands subdivision to him who,
according to the records of the case,
failed to establish his rights of
ownership pursuant to the provisions
of the Land Registration law and the
Public Land Act, it appearing that the
Provincial Government of Zamboanga
del Sur as and is a claimant and in
adverse possession of Lot 2545
whereon the Provincial Jail Building
thereon still stands.
III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED
PENAL CODE
First Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969,
in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, then and there unlawfully
and feloniously made untruthful
statement in a narration of facts by
accomplishing and issuing
certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules
on promotion, seniority and nepotism
have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in
support of the appointment he
extended to TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his
niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, as Motor
Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del
Sur, although he wen knew that the
latter is related with him within the
third degree of affinity and is in
violation of the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969,
in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, then and there unlawfully
and feloniously made untruthful
statements a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of the law and
rules on promotion, seniority and
nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in
support of the appointment he
extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-
MONTESCLAROS as Private
Secretary in the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur, although he well knew that the
latter is related with him within the
third degree of consanguinity, and is in
violation of the Civil Service Law.
CONTRARY to aforecited laws. 8
xxx xxx xxx
a On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted That on or about November 1, 1969,
I.S. No. 7-71 of the said City Fiscal, again charging the at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
petitioner with further violations of Republic Act No. 3019 EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
thus: Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously
extend and give unwarranted benefits
xxx xxx xxx
and privileges PHENINA CODINERA,
sister-in-law of said respondent, an
First Count. appointment as CONFIDENTIAL
ASSISTANT in the Office of the
Provincial Governor, Pagadian City,
That on or about December 2, 1969, although he well knew that Phenina
in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO Codinera is related to him in the
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
second civil degree of consanguinity
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and and is not qualified under the Civil
there unlawfully and feloniously Service Law.
extend and give unwarranted benefits
and privileges BONINDA EBARLE,
wife of his brother Bertuldo Ebarle, the ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.
former being his relative by affinity
within the second civil degree, an
Please give due course to the above
appointment as LABORATORY
complaint and please set the case for
TECHNICIAN in Pagadian City,
immediate preliminary investigation
although he well knew that the latter is
pursuant to the First Indorsement
related to him in the second degree by
dated August 27, 1971 of the
affinity and is not qualified under the
Secretary of Justice, and in the
Civil Service Law.
paramount interest of good
government. 9
Second Count.
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about January 1, 1970, at
Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Asaali
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
Isnani presiding, on a special civil action (Special Civil
there unlawfully and feloniously
Case No. 1048) for prohibition and certiorari with
extend and give unwarranted benefits
preliminary injunction. The respondent Court issued a
and privileges JESUS EBARLE,
restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League
nephew of said respondent, an
moved to have the same lifted and the case itself
appointment as DRIVER of the
dismissed.
Provincial Engineer's Office, Pagadian
City, although he well knew that Jesus
Ebarle is related to him within the third On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order,
civil degree by consanguinity and is dismissing the case.
not qualified under the Civil Service
Law.
On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No.
34162 of this Court, a special civil action for certiorari with
Third Count.
preliminary injunction. As earlier noted, we on October 8,
1971, stayed the implementation of dismissal order.
Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and
considered the same submitted for decision.
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the
failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft
League to comply with the provisions of Executive Order
No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH
COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," 10 preliminary
to their criminal recourses. At the same time, he assails
the standing of the respondent Anti-Graft League to
commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No.
33628). He likewise contends that the respondent Fiscal
(in G.R. No. 34162), in giving due course to the complaints
notwithstanding the restraining order we had issued (in
G.R. No. 33628), which he claims applies as well thereto,
committed a grave abuse of discretion.
He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are
politically motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as we
said, a candidate for reelection as Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur.
We dismiss these petitions.
The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive
Order No. 264 has no merit. We reproduce the Order in
toto:
MALACAÑANG
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY
WHICH COMPLAINANTS
CHARGING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH
COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES
SHOULD BE GUIDED.
WHEREAS, it is necessary that the
general public be duly informed or
reminded of the procedure provided
by law and regulations by which
complaints against public officials and
employees should be presented and
prosecuted.
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are
at times delayed because of the failure
to observe the form.91 requisites
therefor, to indicate with sufficient
clearness and particularity the charges
or offenses being aired or denounced,
and to file the complaint with the
proper office or authority;
WHEREAS, without in any way
curtailing the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression, the
Administration believes that many
complaints or grievances could be
resolved at the lower levels of
government if only the provisions of
law and regulations on the matter are
duly observed by the parties
concerned; and
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials
misconduct should be eliminated and
punished, it is equally compelling that
public officials and employees be
given opportunity afforded them by the
constitution and law to defend
themselves in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law and
regulations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND
E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order:
1. Complaints against public officials
and employees shall be in writing,
subscribed and sworn to by the
complainants, describing in sufficient
detail and particularity the acts or
conduct complained of, instead of
generalizations.
2. Complaints against presidential
appointees shag be filed with the
Office of the President or the
Department Head having direct
supervision or control over the official
involved.
3. Those against subordinate officials
and employees shall be lodged with
the proper department or agency
head.
4. Those against elective local officials
shall be filed with the Office of the
President in case of provincial and city
officials, with the provincial governor
or board secretary in case of
municipal officials, and with the
municipal or city mayor or secretary in
case of barrio officials.
5. Those against members of police
forces shall be filed with the
corresponding local board of
investigators headed by the city or
municipal treasurer, except in the case
of those appointed by the President
which should be filed with the Office of
the President.
6. Complaints against public officials
and employees shall be promptly
acted upon and disposed of by the e
officials or authorities concerned in s
accordance with pertinent laws and i
regulations so that the erring officials d
or employees can be soonest e
removed or otherwise disciplined and n
the innocent, exonerated or vindicated t
in like manner, and to the end also
that other remedies, including court o
action, may be pursued forthwith by f
the interested parties after
administrative remedies shall have t
been exhausted. h
e
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day
P
of October, in the year of Our Lord,
h
nineteen hundred and seventy.
i
l
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It is plain from the very wording( of the Order that it has

P
exclusive application to administrative,
S not criminal
r
complaints. The Order itself shows
g why.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by
implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes."
While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive
Order could have very well referred to the more specific
term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for
informing the public "of the procedure provided by law and
regulations by which complaints against public officials and
employees should be presented and prosecuted. 12 To
our mind, the "procedure provided by law and regulations"
referred to pertains to existing procedural rules with
respect to the presentation of administrative charges
against erring government officials. And in fact, the
aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements thereof. That
presidential appointees are subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President, for instance, is a reecho of the
long-standing doctrine that the President exercises the
power of control over his appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on
the other hand, regarding subordinate officials, is a mere
reiteration of Section 33 of Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil
Service Act (of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction
upon "the proper Head of Department, the chief of a
bureau or office" 14 to investigate and decide on matters
involving disciplinary action.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against
elective local officials, reiterates, on the other hand, the
Decentralization Act of 1967, providing that "charges
against any elective provincial and city officials shall be
preferred before the President of the Philippines; against
any elective municipal official before the provincial
governor or the secretary of the provincial board
concerned; and against any elective barrio official before
the municipal or secretary concerned. 15
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the
provisions of the Police Act of 1966, vesting upon a "Board
of Investigators" 16 the jurisdiction to try and decide
complaints against members of the Philippine police.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these
existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus
in the matter of complaints against public officials.
Furthermore, the fact is that there is no reference therein
to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes
such a resort a secondary measure, but because it does
not intend to serve as a condition precedent to, much less
supplant, such a court resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s]
[being] pursued forthwith by the interested parties, " 17 but
that does not, so we hold, cover proceedings such as
criminal actions, which do not require a prior administrative
course of action. It will indeed be noted that the term is
closely shadowed by the qualification, "after administrative
remedies shall have been exhausted," 18 which suggests
civil suits subject to previous administrative action.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in
question makes specific reference to "erring officials or
employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. 19 If it
were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would
have employed such technical terms as "accused",
"convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a
controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in
construing the intent of the measure.
What is even more compelling is the Constitutional
implications if the petitioner's arguments were accepted.
For Executive Order No. 264 was promulgated under the
1935 Constitution in which legislative power was vested
exclusively in Congress. The regime of Presidential
lawmaking was to usher in yet some seven years later. If
we were to consider the Executive Order law, we would be
forced to say that it is an amendment to Republic Act No.
5180, the law on preliminary investigations then in effect, a
situation that would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly.
We cannot accordingly countenace such a view.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the
personality of the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines to
bring suit is equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft
League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate
the complaints in question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by
the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The
rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is
one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be
filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any
competent person. 20 The "complaint" referred to in the
Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the
fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by the
aggrieved party himself. 21
For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by
complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. In
case of a complaint, it must be filed by the offended party;
with respect to an information, it is the fiscal who files it.
But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial
action may be filed by any person.
The next question is whether or not the temporary
restraining order we issued in G.R. No. 33628 embraced
as well the complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162.
It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the
petitioner — whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162 — refer
invariably to violations of the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised
Penal Code. That does not, however, make such charges
Identical to one another.
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general,
nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No.
3019; exerting influence upon the presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur to award a
certain parcel of land in his favor, over which the provincial
government itself lays claims, contrary to the provisions of
Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019; and making
untruthful statements in the certificates of appointment of
certain employees in his office. On the other hand, the
complaints subject matter of G.R. No. 33628 involve
charges of simulating bids for the supply of gravel and
sand for certain public works projects, in breach of Section
3 of the Anti-Graft statute; manipulating bids with respect
to the construction of the capitol building; testifying falsely
in connection with Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cad.
Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner alleged that he was the
owner of a piece of land, in violation of Articles 182, 183,
and 318 of the Revised Penal Code; and simulating bids
for the supply of gravel and sand in connection with
another public works project.
It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are characterized 1 Rollo, G.R. No. 33628,40-41. 18 Supra, 19 Supra
by major differences. When, therefore, we restrained
further proceedings in I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71,
2 Id, No. 42. 20 Hernandez v. Albano, No. L-17081,
subject of G.R. No. 33628. we did not consequently stay
May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 607 (1961).
the proceedings in CCC-XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS,
CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the same 3 Id, No. 43.
proceedings we did restrain in G.R. No. 34162. 21 Supra.
4 Id, 45-46.
This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the 22 Asutilla v. Philippine National Bank,
complaints in question are tainted with a political color. No. L-51354, January 15; 1986, 141
5 Rollo, G.R. No. 34162,98 (Crim.
SCRA 40 (1986); Guingona, Jr. v. City
Case No. CCC XVI-4-ZDS).
Fiscal of Manila, No. L- 60033, April
It is not our business to resolve complaints the disposition
4,1984,128 SCRA 577 (1984).
of which belongs to another agency, in this case, the
6 Id, 99 (Crim. Case No. CCC XVI-6-
respondent Fiscal. But more than that, and as a general
rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal ZDS).
23 Supra.
prosecutions. 22 The rule is subject to exceptions, to wit:
(1) for the orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent 7 Id, 100 (Crimi. Case No. CCC XVI-8-
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and Republic of the Philippines
ZDS).
vindictive manner; (3) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (4) to SUPREME COURT
Manila
afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (5)
because the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm or 8 Id, 32-35.
otherwise void. 23 We cannot perceive any of the EN BANC
exceptions applicable here. The petitioner cries foul, in a 9 Id, 94-95.
manner of speaking, with respect to the deluge of
complaints commenced by the private respondent below, G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
but whether or not they were filed for harassment purposes 10 Exec. Order No. 264 (1970), 66
is a question we are not in a position to decide. The proper O.G. 9344 (Oct. 1970).
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
venue, we believe, for the petitioner's complaint is vs.
precisely in the preliminary investigations he wishes 11 Supra, 9394-9395. HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT
blocked here. OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L.
12 Supra, 9394.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO,
temporary restraining orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO
Costs against the petitioners. 13 See supra, par. 2; Ang-Angco v. T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR.,
Castillo, No. L-17169, November ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO
30,1963, 9 SCRA 619 (1963). V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA,
It is so ORDERED. REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
14 Rep. Act No. 2260, sec. 33 (1959).
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ.,
concur. G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
15 Rep. Act No. 5185, sec. 5 (1967).

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

16 Rep. Act No. 4864, sec. 15 (1966). vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST
Footnotes
17 Supra, par. 6. INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO
LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO
Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO
DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL,
TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO
REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom,
Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of
Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and
Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon
Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32
and L-46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES.
People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the 1081
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor
General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
INFORMATION
involve one basic question of law.
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First
CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a
Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila,
violation of paragraph 3, Presidential
Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17
Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081,
Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
committed as follows:
XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions)
and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon.
Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition). That on or about the 14 th day of
December, 1974, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the
and there wilfully, unlawfully,
respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
feloniously and knowingly have in his
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a
possession and under his custody and
motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
control one (1) carving knife with a
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden
before them — the details of which will be recounted below
handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall
— an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on
length of 11-¾ inches, which the said
a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege
accused carried outside of his
facts which constitute the offense penalized by
residence, the said weapon not being
Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
used as a tool or implement necessary
essential element of the crime.
to earn his livelihood nor being used in
connection therewith.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in
form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-
possession of deadly weapon" penalized under
42050-66)
Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the
central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all
other corollary matters not being indispensable for the The other Informations are similarly worded except for the
moment. name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
A — The Information filed by the People —
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with
the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the
Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AQUINO, accused.
plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO
CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
I
M T
. O

C L
A O
S I
E
N
N
o
O
.
.
INFORMATION
2
2
6
9 The undersigned accuses
6
6 REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a
7 VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3,
o
7 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in
f
relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266
of the Chief Executive dated April 1,
V t
1975, committed as follows:
I h
O e
L That on or about the 28 th day of
. C
January, 1977, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused didh then
O and there wilfully, unlawfullyi and
F knowingly carry outside ofe his
residence a bladed and pointed f
P weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an
A overall length of about 8½ inches, the
E
R same not being used as a necessary
x
. tool or implement to earn his livelihood
e
nor being used in connection
c
3 therewith.
u
,
t
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo i of L-
P 46229-32) v
D e
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded
9 d
except for the name of the accused, the date and place
a of
I the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapont
involved.
N e
d
R 3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First
E Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder: A
L p
. r
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, of ILLEGAL POSSESSION O OF
complainant, versus PANCHITO DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION F
REFUNCION, accused. OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President
of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972,
D
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
C E
dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972,
R A
committed as follows:
I D
M L
. That on or about the 6th day Y of
October, 1976, in the evening at
C Barangay Barruz, Municipality W of
A Matuginao, Province of Samar
E
S Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
A
E of this Honorabe Court, P the
abovenamed accused, knowingly, O
N wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
N
O carried with him outside of his
. residence a deadly weapon called
(
socyatan, an instrument which from its
V
9 very nature is no such as could be
I
3 used as a necessary tool or
O
3 instrument to earn a livelihood, which
L
act committed by the accused is a
A
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
F T
o I
r CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rolloOof L-
: 46997) N

O
I B. — The Orders of dismissal —
F
L
L
P
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts
E
concurred with the submittal of the defense thatD one
G
essential element of the offense charged is missing from
A
the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of N the
L
O
accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon
is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with. or
P
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
O
lawlessness or public disorder. 9
S
)
S
E 1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
INFORMATION S
S
I ... the Court is of the opinion that in
The undersigned First Assistant order that possession of bladed
O
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses weapon or the like outside residence
N
PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime may be prosecuted and tried under
 P.D. No. 9, the information must
specifically allege that the possession
of bladed weapon charged was for the
purpose of abetting, or in furtherance
of the conditions of rampant
criminality, organized lawlessness,
public disorder, etc. as are
contemplated and recited in
Proclamation No. 1081, as justification
therefor. Devoid of this specific
allegation, not necessarily in the same
words, the information is not complete,
as it does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute the offense contemplated in
P.D. No. 9. The information in these
cases under consideration suffer from
this defect.
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing
xxx xxx xxx
the charges as follows:
And while there is no proof of it before
xxx xxx xxx
the Court, it is not difficult to believe
the murmurings of detained persons
brought to Court upon a charge of
possession of bladed weapons under
P.D. No. 9, that more than ever
before, policemen - of course not all
can be so heartless — now have in
their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most
convenient tool for extortion, what with
the terrifying risk of being sentenced
to imprisonment of five to ten years for
a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where
it came from. Whereas before martial
law an extortion-minded peace officer
had to have a stock of the cheapest
paltik, and even that could only
convey the coercive message of one
year in jail, now anything that has the
semblance of a sharp edge or pointed
object, available even in trash cans,
may already serve the same purpose,
and yet five to ten times more
incriminating than the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived No. 9 does not contain any repealing
with the best of intentions and wisely clause or provisions.
applied, its necessity can never be
assailed. But it seems it is back-firing,
xxx xxx xxx
because it is too hot in the hands of
policemen who are inclined to
backsliding. The mere carrying outside of one's
residence of these deadly weapons if
not concealed in one's person and if
The checkvalves against abuse of
not carried in any of the aforesaid
P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart
specified places, would appear to be
of the Fiscal and the conscience of the
not unlawful and punishable by law.
Court, and hence this resolution, let
alone technical legal basis, is
prompted by the desire of this Court to With the promulgation of Presidential
apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, Decree No. 9, however, the
rollo of L-42050-66) prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal
Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his
opposition to the motion to quash, that
this act is now made unlawful and
punishable, particularly by paragraph
3 thereof, regardless of the intention of
the person carrying such weapon
because the law makes it "mala
prohibita". If the contention of the
As earlier noted the "desired result"
prosecution is correct, then if a person
sought to be attained by Proclamation
happens to be caught while on his
No. 1081 is the maintenance of law
way home by law enforcement officers
and order throughout the Philippines
carrying a kitchen knife that said
and the prevention and suppression of
person had just bought from a store in
all forms of lawless violence as well as
order that the same may be used by
any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is
one's cook for preparing the meals in
therefore reasonable to conclude from
one's home, such person will be liable
the foregoing premises that the
for punishment with such a severe
carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt
penalty as imprisonment from five to
weapons outside of one's residence
ten years under the decree. Such
which is made unlawful and
person cannot claim that said knife is
punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9
going to be used by him to earn a
is one thatabets subversion,
livelihood because he intended it
insurrection or rebellion, lawless
merely for use by his cook in
violence, criminality, chaos and public
preparing his meals.
disorder or is intended to bring about
these conditions. This conclusion is
further strengthened by the fact that all This possibility cannot be discounted if
previously existing laws that also Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be
made the carrying of similar weapons interpreted and applied in the manner
punishable have not been repealed, that that the prosecution wants it to be
whether expressly or impliedly. It is done. The good intentions of the
noteworthy that Presidential Decree President in promulgating this decree
 may thus be perverted by some
unscrupulous law enforcement
officers. It may be used as a tool of
oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and
humble view of this Court that the act
which the President intended to make
unlawful and punishable by
Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly
by paragraph 3 thereof, is one
that abets or is intended to abet
subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos
and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of
L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar
expounded his order dismissing the Information filed
before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an
offense under the aforcited
Presidential decree, the same should
be or there should be an allegation
that a felony was committed in
connection or in furtherance of
subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence and public disorder.
Precisely Proclamation No. 1081
declaring a state of martial law
throughout the country was issued
because of wanton destruction to lives
and properties widespread
lawlessness and anarchy. And in
order to restore the tranquility and
stability of the country and to secure
the people from violence anti loss of
lives in the quickest possible manner
and time, carrying firearms, explosives
and deadly weapons without a permit
unless the same would fall under the
exception is prohibited. This
conclusion becomes more compelling
when we consider the penalty
imposable, which is from five years to
ten years. A strict enforcement of the
provision of the said law would mean
the imposition of the Draconian
penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural
areas, even before and during martial
law, as a matter of status symbol,
carrying deadly weapons is very
common, not necessarily for
committing a crime nor as their farm
implement but for self-preservation or
self-defense if necessity would arise
specially in going to and from their
farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were
given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal
case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the
accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to
quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused
were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their
immediate release unless held on other charges.
C. — The law under which the Informations in question
were filed by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused
are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7
DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,
RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972,
the Philippines has been placed under
a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said
Proclamation No. 1081, General Order
No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and
General Order No. 7 dated September
23, 1972, have been promulgated by
me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos and public disorder
mentioned in the aforesaid
Proclamation No. 1081 are committed
and abetted by the use of firearms,
explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND
E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of
all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in older to attain the
desired result of the aforesaid
Proclamation No. 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order
and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is
unlawful and the violator shall, upon
conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by
a firing squad or electrocution as a
Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission
may direct, it the firearm involved in
the violation is unlicensed and is
attended by assault upon, or
resistance to persons in authority or
their agents in the performance of
their official functions resulting in
death to said persons in authority or
their agent; or if such unlicensed
firearm is used in the commission of
crimes against persons, property or
chastity causing the death of the
victim used in violation of any other
General Orders and/or Letters of
Instructions promulgated under said
Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twenty years to life
imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct,
when the violation is not attended by
any of the circumstances enumerated
under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the
preceding paragraphs shall be
imposed upon the owner, president,
manager, members of the board of
directors or other responsible officers
of any public or private firms,
companies, corporations or entities
who shall willfully or knowingly allow
any of the firearms owned by such
firm, company, corporation or entity
concerned to be used in violation of
said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly
weapons, including hand grenades,
rifle grenades and other explosives,
including, but not limited to, "pill box
bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs,"
"fire bombs," or other incendiary
device consisting of any chemical,
chemical compound, or detonating
agents containing combustible units or
other ingredients in such proportion,
quantity, packing, or bottling that
ignites by fire, by friction, by
concussion, by percussion, or by
detonation of all or part of the
compound or mixture which may
cause such a sudden generation of
highly heated gases that the resultant
gaseous pressures are capable of
producing destructive effects on
continguous objects or of causing
injury or death of a person; and any
person convicted thereof shall be
punished by imprisonment ranging
from ten to fifteen years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of
residence any bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon such as "fan knife," "spear,"
"dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong,"
"kris," or club, except where such
articles are being used as necessary
tools or implements to earn a
livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person
found guilty thereof shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from
five to ten years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the
preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is
committed during the commission of
or for the purpose of committing, any
other crime, the penalty shall be
imposed upon the offender in its
maximum extent, in addition to the
penalty provided for the particular
offenses committed or intended to be
committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd
day of October in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
(
S
G
D

D. — The arguments of the People —
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor
General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of
Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the
setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the
main argument advanced on the issue now under
consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9
'shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially
a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public
policy. 1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in
statutory offenses the intention of the accused who
commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the
prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9
provides and condemns not only the carrying of said
weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of
subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in
general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which
characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that
the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or preamble of the information nor from
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. 2
E. — Our Ruling on the matter —
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands
charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5,P Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, expressly requires that h for a complaint or
information to be sufficient it must,
i inter alia state the
designation of the offense by the l statute, and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting
i the offense. This
is essential to avoid surprise on pthe accused and to afford
him the opportunity to prepare hisp defense accordingly. 4
i the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code
n provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the
e and their violation or non- observance shall not be
Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is
s excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated
or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling
reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is
essential in these cases. As stated in the order of
respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called
"deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute
and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No.
1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for
any person to carry concealed about
his person any bowie knife, dirk
dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon:
... Any person violating the provisions
of this section shall, upon conviction in
a court of competent jurisdiction, be
punished by a fine not exceeding five
hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for
a period not exceeding six months, or
both such fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by
Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4,
1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than
P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or
both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry
concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise
its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or
other deadly weapon ... in any public place.Consequently,
it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified
as there exists a substantial difference between the statute
and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the
other regarding the circumstances of the commission of
the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned
statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by
P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing
clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not
favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with
regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be
construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act
may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or
a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city
ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case,
the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be
confronted with the facts constituting the essential
elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to
become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or
of negligent or misguided official action — a fear
understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the
nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such
dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are
charged in the caption as well as in the body of the
Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What
then are the elements of the offense treated in the
presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the
carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public
disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying
a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the
statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other
words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons
described in the presidential decree is not a criminal
offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that
motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city
ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so
warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the
only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to
P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers
one and all situations where a person carries outside his
residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in
the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose,
converts these cases into one of "statutory construction."
That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is
manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its
implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a
judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and
scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that
penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in
favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative
measure — a presidential decree in these cases — the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and
spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor,
for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr.
Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of
a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice
and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the
intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated
the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled
out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree,
thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the
desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in
P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public
disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed
and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of
other deadly weapons. statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or
phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from
the one actually intended and evident when the word or
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble
phrase is considered with those with which it is associated.
of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is
Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited
not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or
application if read together with other provisions. 9
confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p.
120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or
enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree
violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text must be within its reason or intent.
itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or
explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas"
decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
clause, the presidential decree states:
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND
problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of
E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of
P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and
an the Armed Forces of the
spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in
Philippines, in order to attain the
the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the
desired result of the aforesaid
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree
Proclamation No. 1081 and General
and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order
and decree that:
A "preamble" is the key of the statute,
to open the minds of the makers as to
xxx xxx xxx
the mischiefs which are to be
remedied, and objects which are to be
accomplished, by the provisions of the From the above it is clear that the acts
statute." (West Norman Timber v. penalized in P.D. 9 are those related
State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in to the desired result of Proclamation
Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and
emphasis supplied) 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer
to firearms and therefore have no
relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to
While the preamble of a statute is not
blunt or bladed weapons. With respect
strictly a part thereof, it may, when the
to Proclamation 1081 some of the
statute is in itself ambiguous and
underlying reasons for its issuance are
difficult of interpretation, be resorted
quoted hereunder:
to, but not to create a doubt or
uncertainty which otherwise does not
exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 WHEREAS, these lawless elements
Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and having taken up arms against our duly
Phrases, "Preamble") constituted government and against
our people, and having committed and
are still committing acts of armed
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu,
insurrection and rebellion consisting of
et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative
armed raids, forays, sorties,
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
ambushes, wanton acts of murders,
statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a
 spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons,
destruction of public and private
buildings, and attacks against
innocent and defenseless civilian lives
and property, all of which activities
have seriously endangered and
continue to endanger public order and
safety and the security of the nation,
...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is
throughout the land a state of anarchy
and lawlessness, chaos and disorder,
turmoil and destruction of a magnitude
equivalent to an actual war between
the forces of our duly constituted
government and the New People's
Army and their satellite organizations
because of the unmitigated forays,
raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence,
murders, assassinations, acts of
terror, deceits, coercions, threats,
intimidations, treachery, machinations,
arsons, plunders and depredations
committed and being committed by
the aforesaid lawless elements who
have pledged to the whole nation that
they will not stop their dastardly effort
and scheme until and unless they
have fully attained their primary and
ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing
political and state power in this
country by overthrowing our present
duly constituted government, ... (See
Book I, Vital Documents on the
Declaration of Martial Law in the
Philippines by the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed
weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the
afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is
within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the
light of purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking
Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in
LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians
Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis
supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason
for its enactment should be kept in
mind, and the statute should be
construed with reference to its
intended scope and purpose.
(Statutory Construction by E.T.
Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107
Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to
inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict
adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there
exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 9-
a under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3).
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by
the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a
hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of
authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a
weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge
Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before
the Court, it is not difficult to believe
the murmurings of detained persons
brought to Court upon a charge of
possession of bladed weapons under
P.D. No. 9, that more than ever
before, policemen - of course not all
can be so heartless — now have in
their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most
convenient tool for extortion, what with
the terrifying risk of being sentenced
to imprisonment of five to ten years for
a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where
it came from. Whereas before martial
law an extortion-minded peace officer
had to have a stock of the cheapest
paltik, and even that could only
convey the coercive message of one
year in jail, now anything that has the
semblance of a sharp edge or pointed
object, available even in trash cans,
may already serve the same purpose,
and yet five to ten times more
incriminating than the infamous paltik.
(pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's
interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To
his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding
citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his
house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his
neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while
crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon
seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him
Could the presidential decree have been conceived to
produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible
results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the
state and liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule
to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals;
the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the
court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in
this manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed
strictly. No person should be brought
within their terms who is not clearly
within them, nor should any act be
pronounced criminal which is not
made clearly so by the statute. (U.S.
v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given
a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of
such laws, instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor
to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal
laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA
684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must
be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may
constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an
Information is determined solely by the facts alleged
therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not
convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the
accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that
the defendant may move to quash the complaint or
information when the facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an
accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code,
failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was
rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice
Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the
Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an
Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a
public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because
the People could have availed itself of other available
remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of
sustaining the motion to quash. — If
the motion to quash is sustained the
court may order that another
information be filed. If such order is
made the defendant, if in custody,
shall remain so unless he shall be
admitted to bail. If such order is not
made or if having been made another
information is not filed withuntime to
be specified in the order, or within
such further time as the court may
allow for good cause shown, the
defendant, if in custody, shall be
discharged therefrom, unless he is in
custody on some other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. —
The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time
before the defendant pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same
can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the
quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People
could have filed an amended Information to include the
second element of the offense as defined in the disputed
orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the
facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a
punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but
the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend
the Information. 16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed
a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780,
quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as
amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most
if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to
arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to
quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense
unless the motion was based on the
grounds specified in section 2,
subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or
Information is barred only when the criminal action or
liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the
motion to quash was granted for reasons of double
jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be
successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases
should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter
We need not resolve for the present.
H. — We conclude with high expectations that police
authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true
to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost
circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular
circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just
conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3)
and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and
justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face
of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor
Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila
on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now
Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:
In any case, please study well each
and every case of this nature so that
persons accused of carrying bladed
weapons, specially those whose
purpose is not to subvert the duly
constituted authorities, may not be
unduly indicted for the serious
offenses falling under P.D. No. 9. 17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to
inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial
task and prerogative to determine if official action is within
the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental
rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are
not violated in the process of its implementation. We have
to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application
of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing
circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument
of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their
faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review
and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges
dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject
however to Our observations made in the preceding pages
23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or
Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information
under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new
one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the
facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero,
JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.
Aquino, J, took no part.
I concur with the additional observation that accused could
properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the
Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.
Footnotes
Separate Opinions
1 p. 118, rollo of L-42050-66.
2 pp. 10-11, brief of Petitioner at p.
BARREDO, J., concurring.
218, Ibid.
I concur with the qualification that under existing
3 Art. IV, Sec. 19, 1973 Constitution.
jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of
amending the information, for violation of other laws or
ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons. 4 Francisco on the Revised Rules of
Court, 1969 Ed., Vol. on Criminal
Procedure, p. 86.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
5 pp. 33-34 brief of Petitioner filed by
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
the City Fiscal of Manila.
I concur with the additional observation that accused could
6 Valera v. Tuason, Jr., et al., 80 Phil.
properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the
823, citing U.S. v. Palacio, 33 Phil.
Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.
208; Quisumbing v. Lachica, 2 SCRA
182; Almeda v. Florentino, 15 SCRA
514; Lechoco v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 43 SCRA 670.
7 People v. Elkanish, 1951, 90 Phil.
53, 57 People v. Yadao, 1954, 94 Phil.
Separate Opinions 726, 728.
BARREDO, J., concurring.
8 33 SCRA 105. See also 73 Am Jur
2d 351 citing United States v. N.E.
I concur with the qualification that under existing Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 US
jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of 50,86 L Ed 671; United States v.
amending the information, for violation of other laws or Stone & Downer Co., 274 US 225, 71
ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons. L Ed 1013; Ebert v. Poston, 266 US
548, 69 L Ed 435; Wisconsin C.R. Co.
v. Forsythe, 159 US 46,40 L Ed 71.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
9 13 SCRA 449, 453; Emphasis
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring: supplied.
 9-a 73 Am Jur 2d 428.
10 See 73 Am Jur 2d 432-433 for
cases on the foregoing undesirable
consequences.
11 United States v. Harris, 177 US
305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609;
Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d
646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69
NE2d 549; Jennings v.
Commonwealth, 109 Va 821, 63 SE
1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452.
12 State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737,
quoted in Martin's Handbook on
Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp.
183-184.
13 People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603,
606.
14 28 Phil. See Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol. 4, p.
222.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
and BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS as
LIQUIDATOR OF PARAMOUNT ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision, dated September 19, 1994, of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
which ordered petitioner to refund P65,259.00 as overpaid
income tax.
The facts are stated in the following portion of the
decision of the CTA which the Court of Appeals quoted
with approval:
Petitioner, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI for short) is
a bank and trust corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws. It acts as the liquidator of
Paramount Acceptance Corporation after its dissolution on
March 31, 1986.
After deducting Paramount’s total quarterly income tax
payments of P1,218,940.00 from its income tax
of P1,153,681.00, the return showed a refundable amount
of P65,259.00. The appropriate box in the return was
marked with a cross (x) indicating “To be refunded” the
amount of P65,259.00.
n April 14, 1988, petitioner BPI, as liquidator of Paramount,
through counsel filed a letter dated April 12, 1988
reiterating its claim for refund of P65,259.00 as overpaid
income tax for the calendar year 1985. The following day
or on April 15, 1988, BPI filed the instant petition with this
Court in order to toll the running of the prescriptive period
for filing a claim for refund of overpaid income taxes.
The question is whether the two-year period of
prescription for filing a claim for refund, as provided in
§230 of the National Internal Revenue Code, is to be
counted from April 2, 1986 when the corporate income tax
return was actually filed or from April 15, 1986 when,
according to §70(b) of the NIRC, the final adjustment
return could still be filed without incurring any penalty. The
aforesaid §230 of the NIRC[1] provides that such period
must be counted “from the date of payment of the
tax.” But, given the facts as stated above, when was the
corporate income tax paid in this case?

15 94 Phil. 726. On April 2, 1986, Paramount Acceptance Corporation The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision
(Paramount for brevity) filed its Corporate Annual Income considering the two-year period of prescription to have
Tax Return, for calendar year ending December 31, 1985, commenced to run from April 15, 1986, the last day for
16 People v. Plaza, 7 SCRA 617. declaring a Net Income of P3,324,802.00 (Exh. A). The filing the corporate income tax return, and, since the claim
income tax due thereon is P1,153,681.00. However, for refund was filed on April 14, 1988 and the action was
Paramount paid the BIR its quarterly income tax, to wit: brought on April 15, 1988, it held that prescription had not
17 This letter which was addressed to
the City Fiscal of Manila referred to a set in. Accordingly, the CTA ordered as follows:
decision of the Court of First Instance Qtr. CR/ROR Date Bank Amo
of Manila, Branch III, in Criminal Case unt Exh. WHEREFORE, the respondent [petitioner herein] is hereby
No. 21178, "People vs. Conrado C. ordered to REFUND in favor of petitioner, the sum
Petate, "for violation of Presidential of P65,259.00, representing overpaid income tax of
Decree No. 9. 1st 6817293 5-30-
85 DBP P308,779.00 C Paramount Acceptance Corporation for the calendar year
1985.
2nd 5613316 8-29-
85 DBP 626,000.00 C-1
3rd 77204711 1-29- No pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. No. 117254. January 21, 1999] 85 DBP 284,161.00 C-2
TOTAL SO ORDERED.[2]
P1,218,940.00
 On appeal, its decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Said the appellate court:[3]
We agree with the respondent court’s ruling that the date
of payment of the tax as prescribed under the Tax Code is
the date when the corporate income tax return is required
to be filed. . . .
The Supreme Court has laid down the rule regarding the
computation of the prescriptive period that the two-year
period should be computed from the time of filing of the
Adjustment Returns or Annual Income Tax Return and
final payment of income tax; it is only when the Adjustment
Return covering the whole year is filed that the taxpayer
would know whether a tax is still due or a refund can be
claimed based on the adjusted and audited figures
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. TMX Sales Inc.,
205 SCRA 184). The two-year prescriptive period within
which to claim a refund commences to run, at the earliest,
on the date of the filing of the adjusted final tax return
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Asia Australia
Express Ltd., G.R. No. 85956). The “date of payment”
from which to reckon the two-year period, in the case of a
corporation whose taxable year is on a calendar basis, is
the 15th day of the fourth month (April 15th) following the
close of the fiscal year, and the filing of the final
adjustment return on April 15th, following the close of the
preceding taxable year, is such “date of payment” (ACCRA
Investments Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 957).
In this case, BPI filed its final adjustment return on April 2,
1986. No taxes were paid then because the returns
showed that the quarterly taxes already paid exceeded the
income tax due by P65,259.00. As correctly put by BPI, it
is only on April 15 that the previous year’s income tax
becomes due and payable and the taxpayer is still free to
make amendments or adjustments on its return, without
penalty, until April 15, 1986 (See Section 80,
N.I.R.C.). Thus the final payment of income tax should be
deemed to be on April 15, 1986, when the previous year’s
income tax became due and payable and when the
quarterly corporate income taxes may be considered
paid. Accordingly the administrative claim and court
proceeding for tax refund were timely filed.
Petitioner disagrees with the foregoing decision of
the Court of Appeals. He contends that the two-year
prescriptive period should be computed from April 2, 1984,
when the final adjustment return was actually filed,
because that is the time of payment of the tax within the
meaning of §230 of the NIRC.
We agree.
The conclusions reached by the appellate court are
contrary to the very rulings cited by it. In Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.,[4] this Court, in
rejecting the contention that the period of prescription
should be counted from the date of payment of the
quarterly tax, held:
. . . [T]he filing of a quarterly income tax return required in
Section 85 [now Section 68] and implemented per BIR
Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax should
only be considered mere installments of the annual tax
due. These quarterly tax payments which are computed
based on the cumulative figures of gross receipts and
deductions in order to arrive at a net taxable income,
should be treated as advances or portions of the annual
income tax due, to be adjusted at the end of the calendar
or fiscal year. This is reinforced by Section 87 [now
Section 69] which provides for the filing of adjustment
returns and final payment of income tax. Consequently,
the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 292
[now Section 230 of the Tax Code] should be computed
from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual
Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax.
On the other hand, in ACCRA Investments
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[5] where the question was
whether the two-year period of prescription should be
reckoned from the end of the taxable year (in that case
December 31, 1981), we explained why the period should
be counted from the filing of the final adjustment return,
thus:[6]
Clearly, there is the need to file a return first before a claim
for refund can prosper inasmuch as the respondent
Commissioner by his own rules and regulations mandates
that the corporate taxpayer opting to ask for a refund must
show in its final adjustment return the income it received
from all sources and the amount of withholding taxes
remitted by its withholding agents to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. The petitioner corporation filed its final
adjustment return for its 1981 taxable year on April 15,
1982. In our Resolution dated April 10, 1989 in the case
of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Asia Australia
Express, Ltd. (G.R. No. 85956), we ruled that the two-year
prescriptive period within which to claim a refund
commences to run, at the earliest, on the date of the filing
of the adjusted final tax return. Hence, the petitioner
corporation had until April 15, 1984 within which to file its
claim for refund.
....
It bears emphasis at this point that the rationale in
computing the two-year prescriptive period with respect to
the petitioner corporation’s claim for refund from the time it
filed its final adjustment return is the fact that it was only
then that ACCRAIN could ascertain whether it made profits
or incurred losses in its business operations. The “date of
payment”, therefore, in ACCRAIN’s case was when its tax
liability, if any, fell due upon its filing of its final adjustment
return on April 15, 1982.
Finally, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Philippine American Life Insurance Co.,[7] we held:
Clearly, the prescriptive period of two years should
commence to run only from the time that the refund is
ascertained, which can only be determined after a final
adjustment return is accomplished. In the present case,
this date is April 16, 1984, and two years from this date
would be April 16, 1986. The record shows that the claim
for refund was filed on December 10, 1985 and the petition
for review was brought before the CTA on January 2,
1986. Both dates are within the two-year reglementary
period. Private respondent being a corporation, Section
292 [now Section 230] cannot serve as the sole basis for
determining the two-year prescriptive period for
refunds. As we have earlier stated in the TMX Sales case,
Sections 68, 69, and 70 on Quarterly Corporate Income
Tax Payment and Section 321 should be construed in
conjunction with it.
Sec. 49(a) of the NIRC provides that
§49. Payment and assessment of income tax for
individuals and corporations.
(a) Payment of tax (1) In general. The total amount of
tax imposed by this Title shall be paid by the person
subject thereto at the time the return is filed. . . .
On the other hand, §70(b) of the same Code
provides that
§70 (b) Time of filing the income return The corporate
quarterly declaration shall be filed within sixty (60) days
following the close of each of the first three quarters of the
taxable year. The final adjustment return shall be filed on
or before the 15th day of the 4th month following the close
of the fiscal year, as the case may be.
Thus, it can be deduced from the foregoing that, in
the context of §230, which provides for a two-year period
of prescription counted “from the date of payment of the
tax” for actions for refund of corporate income tax, the two-
year period should be computed from the time of actual
filing of the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax
Return. This is so because at that point, it can already be
determined whether there has been an overpayment by
the taxpayer. Moreover, under §49(a) of the NIRC,
payment is made at the time the return is filed.
In the case at bar, Paramount filed its corporate
annual income tax return on April 2, 1986. However,
private respondent BPI, as liquidator of Paramount, filed a
written claim for refund only on April 14, 1988 and a
petition for refund only on April 15, 1988. Both claim and
action for refund were thus barred by prescription.
The foregoing conclusion makes it unnecessary for
us to pass on the other issues raised in this case by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and the petition for refund filed by private
respondent is DISMISSED on the ground that it is barred
by prescription.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno,
Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
[1]
This provision reads in part as follows:
SEC. 230. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally
collected. - No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue
tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding
may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or
sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be
begun after the expiration of two years from the date of
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided,
however, That the Commissioner may, even without a
written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on
the face of the return upon which payment was made,
such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously
paid. . . .
[2]
Rollo, p. 55.
[3]
Id., pp. 36-37.
[4]
205 SCRA 184, 192 (1992) (emphasis added).
[5]
204 SCRA 957 (1991) (emphasis added).
[6]
Id., at 963-964 (emphasis added).
[7]
244 SCRA 446, 453 (1995) (emphasis added).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-21734 September 5, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBlDO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor
Ceferino Padua for plaintiff-appellee. Estanislao A.
Fernandez for defendant-appellant.
MARTIN, J.:
Appeal on questions of law from the Orders of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 23041,
entitled People of the Philippines versus Abelardo Subido,
denying defendant-appellant's motion for the cancellation
of his appeal bond and declaring him to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine and
indemnity.
From an adverse decision in said case, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
From the facts above stated the Court
finds the accused guilty of libel and he
is hereby sentenced to three (3)
months of arresto mayor with the
accessory penalties of the law, to pay
a fine of five hundred (P500.00)
pesos, to indemnify the offended
party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in the
sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00)
pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
defendant-appellant Abelardo Subido has taken an appeal
to the Court of Appeals, which modified the said judgment
in the following tenor:
However, in the application of the
penalty provided for the violation of
 the libel law, the courts are given
discretion of whether or not both fine
and imprisonment are to be imposed
upon the offender. In the instant case,
we believe, considering the attendant
circumstances of the case that the
imposition of the corresponding
penalty should be tempered with
judicial discretion. For this reason, we
impose upon accused-appellant a fine
of P500.00.
Similarly, the amount of the indemnity
to be paid by appellant to the offended
party is reduced to P5,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications
above indicated, the appealed
judgment is hereby affirmed at
appellant's costs.
In due time the case was remanded to the trial court for
execution of the judgment.
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a
motion with the trial court praying that (1) the court enter of
record that the judgment of the Court of Appeals has been
promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be cancelled.
Accused-appellant argued that although he could not pay
the fine and the indemnity prescribed in the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, he could not be required to serve the
amount of fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary
imprisonment because said judgment did not expressly
and specifically provide that he should serve the fine and
indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
On December 20, 1958, upon motion of the offended party
the lower court issued a writ of execution of its judgment.
However, the writ was returned unsatisfied.
On February 25, 1959, the Sheriff of the City of Manila,
armed with an alias writ of execution, attached "whatever
rights, interests, or participation, if any, defendant
Abelardo Subido may have" in a two-storey building
situated at No. 2313 Suter, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54170 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila. However, it turned out that the property
levied upon be the sheriff was registered in the name of
Agapito Subido who, upon learning of the levy,
immediately filed a Third party claim with the sheriff's office
and instituted an action in the lower court (Civil Case No.
41731) to enjoin the Sheriff of Manila from proceeding with
the sale of his property. In the meantime the lower court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the sale of
property levied upon by the sheriff.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its
opposition to accused-appellant's motion for cancellation
of appeal bond and asked the lower court to require
accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the
indemnity of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
On December 19, 1959, the lower court issued an order
denying the accused-appellant's motion and declared that
in accordance with the terms of the judgment of the Court
of Appeals the accused-appellant has to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine and
indemnity prescribed in the decision. Accused-appellant
moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied on
December 26, 1959.
Hence this appeal from the lower court's orders of
December 19 and 26.
In his appeal, accused-appellant presses that the lower
court erred
I discretion of whether or not both fine
IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE
TERMS OF THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS LIABLE TO
SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN
CASE OF INSOLVENCY.
II
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CIVIL
LIABILITY OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN SATISFIED
WITH THE ATTACHMENT SECURED
BY THE OFFENDED PARTY. 1
The threshold issue in this appeal is whether or not the
accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and
indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code
"a libel committed by means of writing, printing, litography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from 200 to
6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which
may be brought by the offended party". It is evident from
the foregoing provision that the court is given the
discretion to impose the penalty of imprisonment or fine or
both for the crime of libel. It will be noted that the lower
court chose to impose upon the accused: three months
ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00; indemnification of the
offended party in the sum of P10,000.00; subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the payment of
the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in the
exercise of its discretion decided to eliminate the penalty
of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the
indemnity of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.
Thus the Court of Appeals resolved:
However, in the application of the
penalty provided for in the violation of
the libel law, the courts are given
and imprisonment are to be imposed
upon the offender. In the instant case,
we believe, considering the attendant
circumstances of the same, that the
imposition of the corresponding
penalty should be tempered with
judicial discretion. For this reason we
impose the accused a fine of P500.00.
 Similarly, the amount of the indemnity
to be paid by appellant to the offended
party is reduced to P5,000.00.
WHEREUPON, with the modifications
above indicated, the appealed
judgment is hereby affirmed at
appellant's cost.
To Us it is clear that when the Court of Appeals provided in
the concluding portion of its decision:
WHEREUPON, with the modifications
above indicated, the appealed
judgment is hereby affirmed at
appellant's costs
the alluded modifications could mean no less than the
elimination of the three months of arresto mayor and the
reduction of the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. All the rest
of the punishment remains including the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Had the Court wanted
to do away with the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency of accused-appellant to pay the fine and the
indemnity it would have so expressly provided.
A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals
that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency" is separated by a comma (,) from the
preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months
ofarresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to
pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify
the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a
comma (,) in the part of the sentence is to make "the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not
only to non-payment of the indemnity, but also to non-
payment of the fine.
If the lower court intended to make the phrase "with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer to
non-payment of indemnity only and not to the non-
payment of the fine, it would have omitted the comma (,),
after the phrase "to indemnify the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson in the amount of P10,000.00 pesos," so
that the decision of the lower court would read:
From the facts above stated the Court
finds the accused guilty of libel and he
is hereby sentenced to three (3)
months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine
of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to
indemnify the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of ten
thousand (P10,000.00) pesos with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
As thus worded and punctuated there would be no doubt
that the lower court would want to make accused-appellant
serve the subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment
of the indemnity only.
Besides, We see no plausible reason why the lower court
would want accused-appellant to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the indemnity
only and not to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of the fine. Accordingly if according to the
lower court's decision, the accused-appellant should suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the
fine and the indemnity and the only modifications made by
the Court of Appeals are to eliminate the three (3) months
of arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity to the
offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to
P5,000.00, then by force of logic and reason, the fine of
P5000.00, the reduced indemnity of P5,000.00 and the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency should
stand.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the
retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an
accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay his civil liability. 2
It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused. 3 In the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it
careful scrutiny, and to construe it with such strictness as
to safeguard the rights of the defendant. 4 Considering that
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should be
made applicable to him. It is so provided in Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code that:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect in so far as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and
the convict is serving sentence.
Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be
required to serve his civil liability to the offended party in
form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
because this is no longer required by the aforesaid article.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be made to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment because his civil liability
has been satisfied with the attachment secured by the
offended party on the property of Agapito Subido, wherein
he is supposed to have an interest. He therefore argues
that until the final determinations of Civil Case No. 71731
which Agapito Subido filed to enjoin the Sheriff of Manila
from proceeding with the sale of his property, accused-
appellant's liability for subsidiary imprisonment cannot
attach as the determination of whether the accused is
solvent or not is a prejudicial question which must first be
determined before subsidiary imprisonment may be
imposed.
We cannot agree. Attachment does not operate as a
satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability and the
accused must suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment thereof. Subsidiary imprisonment applies
when the offender is insolvent as shown in the present
case. There is nothing in the law that before subsidiary
imprisonment may attach, there must be prior
determination of the question of solvency of the accused.
The moment he cannot pay the fine, that means he is
insolvent and he must serve the same in form of subsidiary
imprisonment. So accused-appellant has to choose to pay he shall remain 4. If the principal
the fine or serve in jail. under penalty imposed
confinement until is not to be
his fine referred in executed by
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING except with the
the preceding confinement in a
modification that accused-appellant may no longer be
paragraph is penal institution,
required to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
satisfied, but his but such penalty
insolvency to pay the indemnity provided for in the
subsidiary is of fixed
judgment below, the Orders of the lower court dated
imprisonment duration, the
December 19 and 26, 1959 denying defendant-appellant's
shall not exceed convict, during the
motion for cancellation of appeal bond and sentencing him
one-third of the period of time
to suffer the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
term of the established in the
to pay the fine imposed by said judgment, are hereby
sentence, and in preceding rules,
affirmed.
no case shall it shall continue to
continue for more suffer the same
SO ORDERED. than one year, deprivations as
and no fraction or those of which the
part of a day shall principal penalty
Castro, (Chairman), Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and be counted consists.
Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
against the
prisoner.
5. The subsidiary
personal liability
2. When the which the convict
Footnotes principal penalty may have
imposed be only a suffered by
fine, the reason of his
1 As the errors assigned involved subsidiary insolvency shall
purely questions of law, the honorable imprisonment not relieve him
court of Appeals certified the case to shall not exceed from the fine in
Us, pursuant to Section 17, par. 16, in six months, if the case his financial
relation to Section 31 of the Judiciary culprit shall have circumstances
Act of 1948. been prosecuted should improve.
for a grave or less
2 Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty.-If the grave felony, and
3 U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243;
convict has no property with which to shall not exceed
People vs. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 728.
meet the fine mentioned in paragraph fifteen days, if for
3 of the next preceding article, he shall a light felony.
be subject to a subsidiary personal 4 People vs. Ahearn, 196 N.Y. 221, 89
liability at the rate of one day for each NE 930, 26 LRA (NS) 1153.
3. When the
eight pesos, subject to the following principal penalty
rules: imposed is higher Republic of the Philippines
than prision SUPREME COURT
1. If the principal correccional no Manila
penalty imposed subsidiary
be prision imprisonment
EN BANC
correccional or shall be imposed
arresto and fine, upon the culprit.
 Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time It correctly focused on the sole issue of law as follows:
of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27, "(T)he only issue in this case is whether or not plaintiffs,
1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above- asshare tenants, are entitled to redeem the parcel of land
G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970
named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876- they are working from the purchasers thereof, where no
square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who
IGMIDIO HIDALGO and MARTINA of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas, described in was their landholder, of the latter's intention to sell the
ROSALES, petitioners, the decisions under review. property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit
vs. required by Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3844 before the
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA registration of the deed of sale. In other words, is the right
In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-
ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO, BERNARDINA of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of Republic Act No.
square meter parcel of land, together with two other
MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, 3844 applicable to share tenants?"
parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio
TEODULA DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS and
Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging
THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE PROVINCE OF
that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth But proceeding from several erroneous assumptions and
BATANGAS, respondents.
P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, premises, it arrived at its erroneous conclusion that the
productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three right of redemption granted by section 12 of the Land
G.R. No. L-25327 May 29, 1970 lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of Reform Code is available to leasehold tenants only but not
sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents- to share tenants, and thus dismissed the petitions: "(S)ec
vendees 1 in their favor. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, which comes under Chapter I
HILARIO AGUILA and ADELA HIDALGO, petitioners, of said Act, under the heading
'Agricultural Leasehold System,' reads as follows:
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-
vs. square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and petitioners-
spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants 'SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a Redemption. — In case the
ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO, BERNARDINA deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by landholding is sold to a third person
MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, respondents-vendees in their favor. without the knowledge of the
TEODULA DIMAANO, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS and agricultural lessee, the latter shall
THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE PROVINCE OF have the right to redeem the same at
As stated in the decisions under review, since the parties
BATANGAS, respondents. a reasonable price and
stipulated on the facts in both cases, petitioners-tenants
consideration: Provided: further, That
have for several years been working on the lands
where there are two or more
Jose O. Lara for petitioners. as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the
agricultural lessees, each shall be
lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption
entitled to said right of redemption
prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for respondents. only to the extent of the area actually
Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963)
cultivated by him. The right of
was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants.
redemption under this Section may be
Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent-
exercised within two years from the
vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds
registration of the sale, and shall have
and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their
TEEHANKEE, J.: priority over any other right of legal
respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by
redemption.'
respondent-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13
Two petitions for review of decisions of the Court of of the Land Reform Code. 2 The actions for redemption
Agrarian Relations dismissing petitioners' actions were timely filled on March 26, 1965 by petitioners-tenants The systems of agricultural tenancy
as sharetenants for the enforcerment of the right to within the two-year prescriptive period from registration of recognized in this jurisdiction
redeem agricultural lands, under the provisions of section the sale, prescribed by section 12 of the said Code. are share tenancy
12 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. As the same and leaseholdtenancy. (Sec. 4,
issue of law is involved and the original landowner and Republic Act No. 1199; Sec. 4,
The agrarian court rendered on July 19, 1965 two identical
vendees in both cases are the same, the two cases are Republic Act No. 3844).
decisions dismissing the petitions for redemption.
herein jointly decided. A share tenant is altogether different
 from a leasehold tenant and their
respective rights and obligations are
not co-extensive or co-equal. (See
Secs. 22 to 41, inclusive, and Secs.
42 to 48, inclusive, of Republic Act No.
1199; see also Secs. 4 to 38,
inclusive, of Republic Act No. 3844).
It is our considered view that the right
of redemption granted by Section 12
of Republic Act No. 3844 is applicable
to leasehold tenants only, but not
to share tenants, because said
provision of law clearly, definitely, and
unequivocally grants said right to the
'agricultural lessee,' and to nobody
else. In enacting the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, Congress was fully
aware of the existence
of sharetenancy and in fact provided
for the abolition of the
agricultural share tenancy system.
(Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844.) If it
were the intention of Congress to
grant the right of redemption
to sharetenants, it would have
unmistakably and unequivocally done
so. We cannot extend said right
to sharetenants through judicial
legislation, wherever our sympathies
may lie.
The agrarian court fell into several erroneous assumptions
and premises in holding that agricultural share tenancy
remains recognized in this jurisdiction; that "a share tenant
is altogether different from a leasehold tenant and their
respective rights and obligations are not co-extensive or
co-equal"; and that the right of redemption granted by
section 12 of the Land Reform Code" is applicable
to leasehold tenants only, but not to share tenants,
because said provision of law clearly, definitely, and
unequivocally grants said right to the 'agricultural lessee,'
and to nobody else."
1. The very essence of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy as proclaimed
in its title. Section 4 of the Code expressly outlaws
agricultural share tenancy as "contrary to public policy"
and decrees its abolition. 3 Section 2 of the Code
expressly declares it to be the policy of the State, inter alia,
"to establish owner cultivatorship and the economic family-
size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a
consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to
industrial development; to achieve a dignified existence for
the small farmers free from pernicious institutional
restraints and practices; ... and to make the small
farmersmore independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens, and a source of strength in our democratic
society." 4 It was error, therefore, for the agrarian court to
state the premise after the Land Reform Code had already
been enacted, that "the systems of agricultural tenancy
recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy
and leasehold tenancy." A more accurate statement of the
premise is that based on the transitory provision in the first
proviso of section 4 of the Code, i.e. that
existing share tenancy contracts are allowed to continue
temporarily in force and effect, notwithstanding their
express abolition, until whichever of the following events
occurs earlier: (a) the end of the agricultural year when the
National Land Reform Council makes the proclamation
declaring the region or locality a land reform area; or (b)
the shorter period provided in the share tenancy contracts
expires; or (c) the share tenant sooner exercises his option
to elect the leasehold system.
In anticipation of the expiration of share tenancy contracts
— whether by contractual stipulation or the tenant's
exercise of his option to elect the leasehold system instead
or by virtue of their nullity — occuring before the
proclamation of the locality as a land reform area, the
same section 4 has further declared in the third proviso
thereof that in such event, the tenant shall continue in
possession of the land for cultivation and "there shall be
presumed to exist a leasehold relationship under the
provisions of this Code."
2. The foregoing exposes the error of the agrarian court's
corollary premise that "a share tenant is altogether
different from a leasehold tenant." The agrarian court's
dictum that "their respective rights and obligations are not
co-extensive or co-equal "refer to
their contractual relations with the landowner, with respect
to the contributions given, management, division or
payment of the produce. 5
But the Land Reform Code forges by operation of law,
between the landowner and the farmer — be
a leaseholdtenant or temporarily a share tenant —
a vinculum juris with certain vital juridical consequences,
such as security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant's
right to continue in possession of the land he works
despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer
of the land to third persons, and now, more basically, the
farmer's pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates
under section 11 of the Code 6 as well as the right
to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his
knowledge, under section 12 of the Code.
This is an essential and indispensable mandate of the
Code to implement the state's policy of establishing owner-
cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified and self-reliant
existence for the small farmers that would make them a
pillar of strength of our Republic. Aside from expropriation
by the Land Authority of private agricultural land for resale
in economic family-size farm units "to bona fide tenants,
occupants and qualified farmers," 7 the purchase by
farmers of the lands cultivated by them, when the owner
decides to sell the same — through rights of pre-emption
and redemption — are the only means prescribed by the
Code to achieve the declared policy of the State.
3. The agrarian court therefore facilely let itself fall into the
error of concluding that the right of redemption (as well as
necessarily the right of pre-emption) imposed by the Code
is available to leasehold tenants only and
excludesshare tenants for the literal reason that the Code
grants said rights only to the "agricultural lessee and to
nobody else." For one, it immediately comes to mind that
the Code did not mention tenants,
whether leasehold or sharetenants, because it
outlaws share tenancy and envisions the
agricultural leasehold system as its replacement. Thus,
Chapter I of the Code, comprising sections 4 to 38,
extensively deals with the establishment of
"agriculturalleasehold relation," defines the parties thereto
and the rights and obligations of the "agricultural lessor"
and of the "agricultural lessee" (without the slightest
mention of leasehold tenants) and the statutory
consideration or rental for the leasehold to be paid by the
lessee. There is a studied omission in the Code of the use
of the term tenant in deference to the "abolition of tenancy"
as proclaimed in the very title of the Code, and the
elevation of the tenant's status to that of lessee.
Then, the terms "agricultural lessor" and "agricultural
lessee" are consistently used throughout the Chapter and
carried over the particular sections (11 and 12) on pre-
emption and redemption. The agrarian court's literal
construction would wreak havoc on and defeat the
proclaimed and announced legislative intent and policy of
the State of establishing owner-cultivatorship for the
farmers, who invariably were all share tenants before the
enactment of the Code and whom the Code would now
uplift to the status of lessees.
A graphic instance of this fallacy would be found in section
11 providing that "In case the agricultural lessordecides to
sell the landholding the agricultural lessee shall have the
preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms
and conditions." It will be seen that the term "agricultural
lessor" is here used interchangeably with the term
"landowner"; which conflicts with the Code's definition of
"agricultural lessor" to mean "a person natural or juridical,
who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or
legal possessor, lets or grants to another the cultivation
and use of his land for a price certains." 8 Obviously, the
Code precisely referred to the "agricultural lessor (who)
decides to sell the landholding," when it could have more
precisely referred to the "landowner," who alone as such,
rather than a civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor, could sell the landholding, but it certainly
cannot be logically contended that the imprecision should
defeat the clear spirit and intent of the provision.
4. We have, here, then a case of where the true intent of
the law is clear that calls for the application of the cardinal
rule of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must
prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the
spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to
the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose
of the statute.
Section 11 of the Code providing for the "agricultural
lessee's" preferential right to buy the land he cultivates
provides expressly that "the entire landholding offered for
sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the
landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees
object to such acquisition," presumably for being beyond
their capabilities. Taken together with the provisions of
Chapter III of the Code on the organization and functions
of the Land Authority and Chapter VII on the Land Project
Administration and the creation and functions of the
National Land Reform Council, (in which chapters the
legislature obviously was not laboring under the inhibition
of referring to the term tenants as it was in Chapter I
establishing the agricultural leasehold system and
decreeing the abolition of share tenancy, 9 the Code's
intent, policy and objective to give both agricultural lessees
and farmers who transitionally continue to be share
tenants notwithstanding the Code's enactment, the same
priority and preferential rights over the lands under their
cultivation, in the event of acquisition of the lands, by
expropriation or voluntary sale, for distribution or resale
that may be initiated by the Land Authority or the National
Land Reform Council, are clearly and expressly stated.
Thus Chapter III, section 51 of the Code decrees it the
responsibility of the Land Authority "(1) To initiate and
prosecute expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of
private agricultural lands as defined in Section one
hundred sixty-six of chapter XI of this Code for the purpose
of subdivision into economic family — size farm units and
resale of said farm units to bona fide tenants, occupants
and qualified farmers ... and "(2) To help bona fide
farmers without lands of agricultural owner-cultivators of
uneconomic-size farms to acquire and own economic
family-size farm units ...."
Similarly, Chapter VII, section 128 of the Code, in
enjoining the National Land Reform Council to formulate
the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
Code's provisions for selection of agricultural land to be
acquired and distributed and of the beneficiaries of the
family farms, ordains the giving of the same priority "to the
actual occupants personally cultivating the land either as
agricultural lessees or otherwise with respect to the area
under their cultivation."
5. It would certainly result in absurdity, contradictions and
injustice if a share tenant would be denied the rights of
pre-emption and redemption which he seeks to
exercise on his own resources, notwithstanding that the
National Land Reform Council has not yet proclaimed that
all the government machineries and agencies in the region
or locality envisioned in the Code are operating — which
machineries and agencies, particularly, the Land Bank
were precisely created "to finance the acquisition by the
Government of landed estates for division and resale to
small landholders, as well as the purchase of the
landholding by the agricultural lessee from the
landowner." 10 The non-operation in the interval of the
Land Bank and the government machineries and agencies
in the region which are envisioned in the Code to assist
the share tenant in shedding off the yoke of tenancy and
afford him the financial assistance to exercise his option of
electing the leasehold system and his preferential right of
purchasing the land cultivated by him could not possibly
have been intended by Congress to prevent the exercise
of any of these vital rights by a share tenant who is able to
do so, e.g. to purchase the land, on his own and without
government assistance. It would be absurd and unjust that
while the government is unable to render such assistance,
the share tenant would be deemed deprived of the very
rights granted him by the Code which he is in a position to
exercise even without government assistance.
6. Herein lies the distinction between the present case
and Basbas vs. Entena 11 where the Court upheld the
agrarian court's dismissal of the therein tenant's action to
redeem the landholding sold to a third party by virtue of the
tenant's failure to tender payment or consign the purchase
price of the property. There, the tenant-redemptioner was
shown by the evidence to have no funds and had merely
applied for them to the Land Authority which was not yet
operating in the locality and hence, the Court held that no
part of the Code "indicates or even hints that the 2-year
redemption period will not commence to run (indefinitely)
until the tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or
stops the tenant from securing redemption funds from
some other source." 12 In the present case, the petitioners-
tenants' possession of funds and compliance with the
requirements of redemption are not questioned, the case
having been submitted and decided on the sole legal issue
of the right of redemption being available to them as share
tenants. The clear and logical implication of Basbas is
where the tenant has his own resources or secures
redemption funds from sources other than the Land Bank
or government agencies under the Code, the fact that the
locality has not been proclaimed a land reform area and
that such government machineries and agencies are not
operating therein is of no relevance and cannot prejudice
the tenant's rights under the Code to redeem the
landholding.
7. Even from the landowner's practical and equitable
viewpoint, the landowner is not prejudiced in the least by
recognizing the share tenant's right of redemption. The
landowner, having decided to sell his land, has gotten his
price therefor from his vendees. (The same holds true in
case of the tenant's exercise of the pre-emptive right by
the tenant who is called upon to pay the landowner the
price, if reasonable, within ninety days from the
landowner's written notice.) As for the vendees, neither are
they prejudiced for they will get back from the tenant-
redemptioner the price that they paid the vendor, if
reasonable, since the Code grants the agricultural lessee
or tenant the top priority of redemption of the landholding
cultivated by him and expressly decrees that the same
"shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption." In the absence of any provision in the Code
as to manner of and amounts payable on redemption, the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code apply in a suppletory
character. 13 Hence, the vendees would be entitled to
receive from the redemptioners the amount of their
purchase besides "(1) the expenses of the contract, and
any other legitimate payments made by reason of the sale;
(and) (2) the necessary and useful expenses made on the
thing sold." 14
8. The historical background for the enactment of the
Code's provisions on pre-emption and redemption further
strengthens the Court's opinion. It is noted by Dean
Montemayor 15 that "(T)his is a new right which has not
been granted to tenants under the Agricultural Tenancy
Act. It further bolsters the security of tenure of the
agricultural lessee and further encourages agricultural
lessees to become owner-cultivators.
In the past, a landlord often ostensibly
sold his land being cultivated by his
tenant to another tenant, who in turn
filed a petition for ejectment against
the first tenant on the ground of
personal cultivation. While many of
such sales were simulated, there was
a formal transfer of title in every case,
and the first tenant was invariably
ordered ejected.
There is indication in this case of the same pattern of sale
by the landowner to another tenant, 16 in order to effect the
ejectment of petitioners-tenants. This is further bolstered
by the fact that the sales were executed by respondent-
vendor on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1954 shortly
after the enactment on August 8, 1963 of the Land Reform
Code — which furnishes still another reason for upholding
... petitioners-tenants' right of redemption, for certainly a
landowner cannot be permitted to defeat the Code's clear
intent by precipitately disposing of his lands, even before
the tenant has been given the time to exercise his newly
granted option to elect the new agricultural leasehold
system established by the Code as a replacement for
the share tenancy outlawed by it.
9. Clearly then, the Code intended, as above discussed, to
afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share
tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be
agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed
abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right
as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of
the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by
fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire
the lands under their cultivation in the event of their
voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by
expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then
becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of
the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute
prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-
10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute
'should be construed according to its spirit or intention,
disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.'
(Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil.
855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature,
but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.'
(Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil.
850)." 17 The Court has consistently held in line with
authoritative principles of statutory construction that, it will
reject a narrow and literal interpretation, such as that given
by the agrarian court, that would defeat and frustrate
rather than foster and give life to the law's declared policy
and intent. 18 Finally, under the established jurisprudence
of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and labor
legislation, it will be guided by more than just an inquiry
into the letter of the law as against its spirit and will
ultimately resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenant and
worker. 19
The agrarian court's dismissal of the cases at bar should
therefore be reversed and petitioners-tenants' right to
redeem the landholdings recognized section 12 of the
Code.
In Case L-25326, however, the deed of sale executed by
respondent-vendor in favor of respondents-vendees for the
price of P4,000.00 covers three parcels of land, while what
is sought to be redeemed is only the first parcel of land of
22,876 square meters, described in the deed. Petitioners-
tenants' allegation that the proportionate worth of said
parcel "taking into account the respective areas,
productivities, accessibilities and assessed values of the
three lots," is P1,500.00, was traversed by respondents in
their answer, with the claim that "the said land is fairly
worth P20,000.00. 20 While the vendor would be bound by,
and cannot claim more than, the price stated in the deed,
and the Code precisely provides that the farmer shall have
"the preferential right to buy the (landholding)
under reasonable terms and conditions" or "redeem the
same at a reasonable price and consideration" 21 with a
view to affording the farmer the right to seek judicial
assistance and relief to fix such reasonable price and
terms when the landowner places in the notice to sell or
deed an excessive or exorbitant amount in collusion with
the vendee, we note that in this case the deed of sale itself
acknowledged that the selling price of P4,000.00 therein
stated was not the fair price since an additional
consideration therein stated was that the vendees would
support the vendor during his lifetime and take care of him,
should he fall ill, and even assumed the expenses of his
burial upon his death:
Ang halagang P4,000.00 ay hindi
kaulat sa tunay na halaga ng mga
lupa subalit ang mga bumili ay may
katungkulan na sostentohin ako
habang ako'y nabubuhay, ipaanyo at
ipagamot ako kung ako ay may sakit,
saka ipalibing ako kung ako ay
mamatay sa kanilang gastos at ito ay
isa sa alang-alang o consideracion ng
bilihang ito.
Under these circumstances, since the agrarian court did
not rule upon conflicting claims of the parties as to what
was the proportionate worth of the parcel of land in the
stated price of P4,000.00 — whether P1,500.00 as
claimed by petitioners or a little bit more, considering the
proportionate values of the two other parcels, but the
whole total is not to exceed the stated price of P4,000.00,
since the vendor is bound thereby — and likewise, what
was the additional proportionate worth of the expenses
assumed by the vendees, assuming that petitioners are
not willing to assume the same obligation, the case should
be remanded to the agrarian court solely for the purpose of
determining the reasonable price and consideration to be
paid by petitioners for redeeming the landholding, in
accordance with these observations.
In Case L-25327, there is no question as to the price of
P750.00 paid by the vendees and no additional
consideration or expenses, unlike in Case L-25326, supra,
assumed by the vendees. Hence, petitioners therein are
entitled to redeem the landholding for the same stated
price.
ACCORDINGLY, the decisions appealed from are hereby
reversed, and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted.
In Case L-25326, however, the case is remanded to the
agrarian court solely for determining the reasonable price
to be paid by petitioners therein to respondents-vendees
for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the
observations hereinabove made.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Per answer of respondents and the parties'
stipulation of facts, respondents-vendees
Saturnino Hidalgo and Bernardina Marquez,
together with petitioners-spouses Igmidio
Hidalgo and Martina Resales in Case L-25326
and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a
Hidalgo in Case L-25327 compose the three leasehold relationship under the provisions of
sets of tenants working on their lands. this Code, without prejudice to the right of the
landowner and the former tenant to enter into
any other lawful contract in relation to the land
2 "SEC. 13. Affidavit Required in Sale of Land
formerly under tenancy contract, as long as in
Subject to Right of Pre-emption. — No deed of
the interim the security of tenure of the former
sale of agricultural land under cultivation by an
tenant under Republic Act Numbered Eleven
agricultural lessee or lessees shall be recorded
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, and as
in the Registry of Property unless accompanied
provided in this Code, is not impaired: Provided,
by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
finally, That if a lawful leasehold tenancy
the written notice required in Section eleven of
contract was entered into prior to the effectivity
this Chapter or that the land is not worked by an
of this Code, the rights and obligations arising
agricultural lessee." (R.A. No. 3844.)
therefrom shall continue to subsist until modified
by the parties in accordance with the provisions
3 "SEC. 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share of this Code." R.A. 3844, emphasis supplied.
Tenancy. — Agricultural share tenancy, as
herein defined, is hereby declared to be contrary
4 Section 2, pars. (1), (2), and (6), R.A. 3844;
to public policy and shall be abolished: Provided,
emphasis supplied.
That existing share tenancy contracts may
continue in force and effect in any region or
locality, to be governed in the meantime by the 5 "(2) 'Agricultural lessee' means a person who,
pertinent provisions of Republic Act Numbered by himself and with the aid available from within
Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, his immediate farm household, cultivates the
until the end of the agricultural year when the land belonging to, or possessed by another with
National Land Reform Council proclaims that all the latter's consent for purposes of production,
the government Machineries and agencies in for a price certain in money or in produce or
that region or locality relating to leasehold both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as
envisioned in this Code are operating, unless understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines."
such contracts provide for a shorter period or the Sec. 166, R.A. 3844.
tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the
leasehold system: Provided, further, That in
"(25) 'Share tenancy' as used in this Code
order not to jeopardize international
means the relationship which exists whenever
commitments, lands devoted to crops covered
two persons agree on a joint undertaking for
by marketing allotments shall be made the
agricultural production wherein one party
subject of a separate proclamation that
furnishes the land and the other his labor, with
adequate provisions, such as the organization of
either or both contributing any one or several of
cooperatives, marketing agreements, or other
the items of production, the tenant cultivating the
similar workable arrangements, have been made
land personally with the aid of labor available
to insure efficient management on all matters
from members of his immediate farm household,
requiring synchronization of the agricultural with
and the produce thereof to be divided between
the processing phases of such
the landholder and the tenant." Idem.
crops: Provided,furthermore, That where the
agricultural share tenancy contract has ceased
to be operative by virtue of this Code, or where 6 "See. 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption. — In
such a tenancy contract has been entered into in case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the
violation of the provisions of this Code and is, landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have
therefore, null and void, and the tenant the preferential right to buy the same under
continues in possession of the land for
reasonable terms and conditions: Provided, That
the entire landholding offered for sale must be
pre-empted by the Land Authority if the
landowner so desires, unless the majority of the
lessees object to such acquisition: Provided,
further, That where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to
said preferential right only to the extent of the
area actually cultivated by him. The right of pre-
emption under this Section may be exercised
within ninety days from notice in writing, which
shall be served by the owner on all lessees
affected." R.A. 3844, emphasis supplied.
7 Section 51, R.A. 3844.
8 Sec. 166, par. (3), R.A. 3844.
9 Supra, paragraph 3.
10 Sec. 74, R.A. 3844.
11 L-26255, June 30, 1969; 28 SCRA 665.
12 Id., emphasis and notes in parenthesis
supplied.
13 Art. 18, Civil Code.
14 Art. 1616, Civil Code.
15 Vol. 3, Montemayor's Labor, Agrarian and
Social Legislation 2d Ed. 1967, p.246.
16 Respondents-vendees, the spouses
Saturnino Hidalgo and Bernardina Marquez; see
fn. 1.
17 City of Baguio vs. Marcos L-26100, Feb. 28,
1969; 27 SCRA 342.
18 Automotive Parts & Equipment Co., Inc. vs.
Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248;
U.P. Bd. of Regents vs. Auditor-General, L-
19617, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 5: and
Pagdanganan vs. Galleta L-23564, Nov. 28,
1969; 30 SCRA 426; Sarcos vs. Castillo, L-
29755, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853 and cases
cited.
19 Maniego vs. Castelo, 101 Phil. 293, (1959) ;
Vda. de Santos vs. Garcia, L-16894, May 31,
1963, 8 SCRA 194; Quimson vs. de Guzman, L-
18240, Jan. 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 158; and
Pagdangan vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-
13858, 108 Phil. 590 (1960).
20 Annex B, Petition.
21 Secs. 11 and 12, R.A. 3844; See
Montemayor, op. cit. Vol. 3, p. 246.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8888 November 29, 1957
SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and VICENTE
GELLA, in his capacity as Treasurer of the
Philippines, defendants-appellees.
Rogelio M. Jalandoni for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and
Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee, Vicente Gella.
Nat. M. Balbao and F. E. Evangelista for appellee, Central
Bank of the Philippines.
BENGZON, J.:
The question in this appeal is whether cocoa beans may
be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of
exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by
Republic Act No. 601 as amended.
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9,
1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa
beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per
cent totalling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said
tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank
that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it
included the Treasurer of the Philippines. The suit was
filed in the Manila Court of First Instance, wherein
defendants submitted in due time a motion to dismiss on
the grounds: first, the complaint stated no cause of action
because cocoa beans were not "chocolate"; and second, it
was a suit against the Government without the latter's
consent. .
The Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge, sustained the
motion, and dismissed the case by his order of November
19, 1954. Hence this appeal.
The lower court, appellant contends, erred in dismissing
the case and in holding that the term "chocolate" does not
include sun dried cocoa beans.
SEC. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that "the tax collected
or foreign exchange used for the payment of costs
transportation and/or other charges incident to importation
into the Philippines of rice, flour ..soya beans, butterfat,
chocolate, malt syrup .. shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of
actual importation . . ."
In support of its contention appellant quotes from
dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably using the
words "chocolate", "cacao" and "cocoa". Yet we notice that
the quotations refer to "cocoa" as chocolate nut"
"chocolate bean" or "chocolate tree." And the legal
exemption refers to "chocolate" not the bean, nor the nut
nor the tree. We agree with the Solicitor General and the
other counsel of respondents that in common parlance the
law is presumed to refer to it1 — chocolate is a
manufactured or finished product made out of cocoa
beans, or "cacao" beans as they are locally known. We
may take notice of the fact that grocery stores sell
powdered cocoa beans as chocolate, labeled "cocoa
powder", or simply "cocoa". They are, however, really
chocolate; they are not cocoa beans. The manufacture of
chocolate involves several processes, such as selecting
and drying the cocoa beans, then roasting, grinding,
sieving and blending.2 Cocoa beans do not become
chocolate unless and until they have undergone the
manufacturing processes above described. The first is raw
material, the other finished product.
The courts regard "chocolate" as
"Chocolate" is a preparation of roasted cacao
beans without the abstraction of the butter and
always contains sugar and added cacao butter.
Rockwood & Co., vs. American President Lines,
D. C. N. J., 68 F. Supp. 224, 226.
Chocolate is a cocoa bean roasted, cracked,
shelled, crushed, ground, and molded in cakes.
It contains no sugar, and is in general use in
families. Sweetened chocolate is manufactured
in the same way but the paste is mixed wit
sugar, and is used by confectioners in making
chocolate confections. In re Schiling, 53 F. 81,
82, 3 C. C. A. 440.
In view of the foregoing, and having in mind the principle of
strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3we
are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for
"chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa
beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured
consumer product; the latter is ready for human
consumption; the former is not.
However, we cannot stop here, because in August 1954 —
suit was brought in May 1954 — Congress approved
Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting
"cocoa beans" for "chocolate." This shows, maintains the
appellant, the Legislature's intention to include cocoa
beans in the word "chocolate." In fact, it goes on, the
Committee Chairman who reported House Bill No. 2676
which became Republic Act 1197, declared before the
House.
Mr. ROCES: Mr. SPEAKER, on line 8 page 1, view of the information, this seems to be
after the word 'canned', strike out the words, inconsistent we allow chocolate to come here
'fresh, frozen and' and also the words 'other exempt and not exempt cocoa beans which is
beef', on line 9 and on the same line, line 9, after used by our manufacturers in making chocolate
the word 'chocolate', insert the words '(COCOA candy.
BEANS)' in parenthesis ( ). I am proposing to
insert the words '(COCOA BEANS)' in
And Senator Puyat is quoted as saying, in the same
parenthesis ( ) after the word chocolate, Mr.
connection:
Speaker, in order to clarify any doubt and
manifest the intention of the past Congress that
the word 'chocolate' should mean 'cocoa beans. MR. PRESIDENT, On the same page (page 1),
line 9, delete "cocoa beans". The text as it came
to the Senate was misleading. In the original law
In reply to this, appellees point out that said chairman
the exemption is for chocolate and the version
could not have spoken of the Congressional intention in
that we got from the Lower House is "(cocoa
approving Republic Act 601 because he was not a
beans)" giving the impression that chocolate and
member of the Congress that passed said Act. Naturally,
cocoa beans are synonymous. Now I think this is
all he could state was his own interpretation of such piece
a sort of a rider, so your committee recommends
of legislation. Courts do not usually give decisive weight to
the deletion of those words. (Journal of the
one legislator's opinion, expressed in Congressional
Senate, July 30, 1954, re H. B. No. 2576,
debates concerning the application of existing laws.4 Yet
Emphasis ours.)
even among the legislators taking part in the consideration
of the amendatory statute (Republic Act 1197) the
impression prevailed that, as the law then stood5 chocolate Other parts of the Congressional record quoted in the
candy or chocolate bar was exempted, but cocoa briefs would seem to show that in approving House Bill No.
beans were not. Here are Senator Peralta's statements 2576, the Congress agreed to exempt "cocoa
during the discussion of the same House Bill No. 2576: beans" instead of chocolate with a view to favoring
localmanufacturers of chocolate products.6 A change of
legislative policy, as appellees contend7 — not a
SENATOR PERALTA: I signed that conference
declaration or clarification of previous Congressional
report and I am really bound by it, but, Mr.
purpose. In fact, as indicating, the Government's new
President, a few hours ago I received some
policy of exemptingfor the first time importations of "cocoa
information which maybe the chairman would
beans," there is the President's proclamation No. 62 of
like to know, to the effect that we allow chocolate
September 2, 1954 issued in accordance with Republic
bar, chocolate candy to come this country
Act No. 1197 specifying that said exemption (of cocoa
except from the 17 per cent tax when we do not
beans) shall operate from and after September 3, 1954 —
allow cocoa beans, out of which our local
not before. As a general rule, it may be added, statutes
manufacturers can make chocolate candy,
operate prospectively.
exempted. So why do we not take off that
exemption for chocolate and instead put 'cocoa
beans' so as to benefit our manufacturers of Observe that appellant's cocoa beans had been imported
chocolate candy? during January-October 1953, i.e. before the exemption
decree.
xxx xxx xxx.
After the foregoing discussion, it is hardly necessary to
express our approval of the lower court's opinion about
Senator PERALTA: Yes, I agree with the
plaintiff's cause of action, or the lack of it. And it becomes
chairman, only I was just wondering if the
unnecessary to consider the other contention of
chairman, might not consider the fact that in

defendants that this is a suit against the Government
without its consent.
The order of dismissal is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia,
and Felix, JJ., concur.
Footnote
6
Whereas the exemption of "chocolate" aimed Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C.
to benefit the consumers thereof. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias,
Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis,
7 Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of
See footnote 5.
the National Center for Mental Health. The petition also
asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify
Republic of the Philippines Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero,
SUPREME COURT of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the
Manila preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner
(Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).
EN BANC
The questioned order was issued in connection with the
administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-
ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the
petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993 Practices Act.

1
"As a general rule words used in a statute are
to be given their usual and commonly
understood meaning .. ." C.J.S. p. 639.
2 against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director
CF. Encyclopedia Americana (1954) Vol. V, p.
129, 130; Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 5 (1945
ed.) p. 948.
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO
BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms.
CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO
M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION,
represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon
the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording
petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges filed
Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality
and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).

3 On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents'

Exemptions are never presumed, the burden is
on the claimant to establish clearly his right to
exemption and an alleged grant of exemption
will be strictly construed and cannot be made out
by inference or implication but must be beyond
reasonable doubt. In other words, since taxation
is the rule and exemption the exception, the
intention to make an exemption ought to be
expressed in clear and unambiguous terms.
(Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed. Vol. 2. 1303.).
4
Interpretation of laws is for the Courts (See 82
C. J. S. pp. 745, 746). Even statutes declaring
"what the law was before" are not binding on
courts. Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil., 696, 49 Off.
Gaz., 4825.
5 (Rollo, p. 177).
Section 2 of Republic Act 601 was amended
first by Republic Act 814 and later by Republic
Act 871. In both amendments "chocolate" was
retained.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private
respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the
Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners,
Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners
filed a "Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp. 124-130);
Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and
an "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation" (Rollo,
pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation; Rollo, pp. 173-176), respectively, averring
developments that transpired after the filing of the petition
and stressing the urgency for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
On September 22, 1992, this Court ". . . Resolved to
REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in the meantime,
theSTATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said
respondents on the original supplemental manifestation"
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct
respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192,
Annexes, pp. 192-203). In a Resolution dated October 1,
1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health
to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus
Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association
submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental
Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included
in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of
petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-
267). Attached to the "Omnibus Submission" as annexes
were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case
No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp.
268-480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of
petitioners with:
(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing
their clients — petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly
defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate,
maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order of
July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully
interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the
said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp.
259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and
unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious
falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing
subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their
pleadings (Omnibus Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp.
261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation
and Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary
of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'"
(Manifestation attached to Rollo without pagination
between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).
On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its
Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that: (a)
"despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992
Resolution directing respondents to maintain the status
quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension; (b)
the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension,
the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant
petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to hold
in abeyance implementation of petitioners' preventive
suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr.
Abueva, the OIC appointed to replace petitioner
Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992; and
(d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to
comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992
immediately, by restoring the status quo
ante contemplated by the aforesaid resolution" (Comment
attached toRollo without paginations between pp. 613-614
thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court
required respondent Secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante
litem motam, or the last peaceable
uncontested status which preceded
the present controversy was the
situation obtaining at the time of the
filing of the petition at bar on
September 7, 1992 wherein
petitioners were then actually
occupying their respective positions,
the Court hereby ORDERS that
petitioners be allowed to perform the
duties of their respective positions and
to receive such salaries and benefits
as they may be lawfully entitled to,
and that respondents and/or any and
all persons acting under their authority
desist and refrain from performing any
act in violation of the aforementioned
Resolution of September 22, 1992
until further orders from the Court
(Attached to Rollo after p. 615
thereof).
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting
on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Supplemental
Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the
Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has
no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a
government official or employee, there are conditions
required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said
conditions have not been met in the instant case"
(Attached to Rollo without pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners
adopted the position of the Solicitor General that the
Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or
employees connected with his office. Petitioners also
refuted private respondents' motion to disbar petitioners'
counsel and to cite them for contempt (Attached
to Rollowithout pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman
has the power to suspend government officials and
employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials and
employees.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively
suspend petitioners, respondents (Urgent Motion to
LiftStatus Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11),
invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. —
The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending
an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b)
the charge would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against
him.
 The preventive suspension shall
continue until the case is terminated
by the Office of Ombudsman but not
more than six months, without pay,
except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of
the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period
of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension
herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive
suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the
Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform
such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the
petitioners claim that under the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the
departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing
administrative investigation conducted by his office.
Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall haveinter
alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure or
prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of
the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has three distinct
powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against public officials or employees at
fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion
fine, censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance
with the recommendation (Comment dated December 3,
1992, pp. 9-10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call
that can easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that
what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a
punitive but only a preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the
power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official
or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as
a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
"suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine,
censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word
"suspension" should be given the same sense as the other
words with which it is associated. Where a particular word
is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371
[1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247
[1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the
Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges
before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The
preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with
the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly
authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or
employees. In order to make an intelligent determination
whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has
to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to
conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient
manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from
several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or
destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent;
the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should
be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing
administrative charges should be preventively suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural
statutes are liberally construed (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson
v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456 [1953]). The test in determining if
a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the
punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of
an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658;
Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code
prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal
statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler,
140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman
such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task
committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case,
said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with
procedure, should be given such interpretation that will
effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution.
Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the
Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it
was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas
Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213
[1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438
[1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court,
holding that a preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. If after
such investigation, the charges are
established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only
preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases
who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans
heavily on the phrase "suspend any officer or employee
under his authority" in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of
the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with
preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a
bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate or employee
in his bureau or under his authority pending an
investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266),
which superseded Section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau
or office to "suspend any subordinate officer or employees,
in his bureau or under his authority."
However, when the power to discipline government
officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service
Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No.
805), concurrently with the President, the Department
Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the
phrase "subordinate officer and employee in his bureau"
was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase "under his
authority." Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions
that the proper disciplining authority may preventively
suspend "any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation . . ." (Sec. 41).
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the
proper disciplining authority to "preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation" (Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words
"subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to
read "suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be
deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before
and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is
that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman
to preventively suspend all officials and employees under
investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are
employed "in his office" or in other offices of the
government. The moment a criminal or administrative
complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent
therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can
proceed to determine whether said respondent should be
placed under preventive suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without
affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the
charges against them during the preliminary conference
and even after petitioners had asked for the
disqualification of Director Arnaw and Atty. Villa-Rosero
(Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General
contends that assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman
has the power to preventively suspend erring public
officials and employees who are working in other
departments and offices, the questioned order remains null
and void for his failure to comply with the requisites in
Section 24 of the Ombudsman Law (Comment dated
December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the
questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued
even without a full-blown hearing and the formal
presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra,
petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health
could not preventively suspend him before he could file his
answer to the administrative complaint. The contention of
petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by
holding that the suspension meted out was merely
preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was
"nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his
investigation and before tho charges against him are heard
. . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive
suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is
strong and (1) the charts against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would
warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to
preventively suspend officials or employees under
investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining
authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section
24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman
on the basis of the administrative complaint. In the case at
bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of preventive
suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer
to the administrative complaint and the "Motion for the
Preventive Suspension" of petitioners, which incorporated
the charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex
3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-289; Annex
4, Rollo,
pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to
the answer of petitioners, specifying 23 cases of
harassment by petitioners of the members of the private
respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp.
309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference wherein the
complainant and the respondents in the administrative
case agreed to submit their list of witnesses and
documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list
of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp.
336-337) while private respondents submitted their list of
exhibits (Annex 9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-
348).
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director
Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted
with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the
suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the
Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
acting favorably on their recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of
petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing
their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive
suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the
Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261).
The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was
filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the
acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate
measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity
and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate
language used by counsel for private respondents hurled
against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1)
Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private
Respondent's Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp.
4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his
client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or
written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral
attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v.
Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive
language by counsel against the opposing counsel
constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of
the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned
language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more
heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in
the instant special civil action, which is confined to
questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the
purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of
judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of
procedure for the discipline of members of the bar
separate and apart from the present special civil action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status
quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Puno and
Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:
I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec.
24 of R.A.
No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official
or employee administratively charged before him pending
the investigation of the complaint, the reason being that
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
prosecution of the case.
However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts
thus far presented may not provide adequate basis to
reasonably place petitioners under preventive suspension.
For, it is not enough to rule that the Ombudsman has
authority to suspend petitioners preventively while the
case is in progress before him. Equally important is the
determination whether it is necessary to issue the
preventive suspension under the circumstances.
Regretfully, I cannot see any sufficient basis to justify the
preventive suspension. That is why, I go for granting oral
argument to the parties so that we can truthfully determine
whether the preventive suspension of respondents are
warranted by the facts. We may be suspending key
government officials and employees on the basis merely of
speculations which may not serve the ends of justice but
which, on the other hand, deprive them of their right to due
process. The simultaneous preventive suspension of top
officials and employees of the National Center for Mental
Health may just disrupt, the hospital's normal operations,
much to the detriment of public service. We may safely
assume that it is not easy to replace them in their
respective functions as those substituting them may be
taking over for the first time. The proper care of mental
patients may thus be unduly jeopardized and their lives
and limbs imperilled.
I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the
parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to
justify the preventive suspension of petitioners.
# Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:
I agree that the Ombudsman has the authority, under Sec.
24 of R.A.
No. 6770, to preventively suspend any government official
or employee administratively charged before him pending
the investigation of the complaint, the reason being that
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
prosecution of the case.
However, in the case before us, I am afraid that the facts
thus far presented may not provide adequate basis to
reasonably place petitioners under preventive suspension.
For, it is not enough to rule that the Ombudsman has
authority to suspend petitioners preventively while the
case is in progress before him. Equally important is the
determination whether it is necessary to issue the
preventive suspension under the circumstances.
Regretfully, I cannot see any sufficient basis to justify the
preventive suspension. That is why, I go for granting oral
argument to the parties so that we can truthfully determine
whether the preventive suspension of respondents are
warranted by the facts. We may be suspending key
government officials and employees on the basis merely of
speculations which may not serve the ends of justice but
which, on the other hand, deprive them of their right to due
process. The simultaneous preventive suspension of top
officials and employees of the National Center for Mental
Health may just disrupt, the hospital's normal operations,
much to the detriment of public service. We may safely
assume that it is not easy to replace them in their
respective functions as those substituting them may be
taking over for the first time. The proper care of mental
patients may thus be unduly jeopardized and their lives
and limbs imperilled.
I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the
parties if only to have enough factual and legal bases to
justify the preventive suspension of petitioners.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150917 September 27, 2006
ARTEMIO YADAO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review1 is the 18 April 2001 Decision2 and 13
November 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 19818, affirming in toto the 28 March
1996 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La
Union, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 1042-BG.
Petitioner Artemio Yadao (Yadao) prays for the reversal of
the decision finding him "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide as charged in the information x x
x,"5 defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code for the death of Deogracias Gundran
(Gundran), and sentencing him to suffer the "indeterminate
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period, as
Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor in its
minimum period, as Maximum, x x x."6
On 21 April 1989, petitioner Yadao was charged with the
crime of homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, for allegedly mauling one
Deogracias Gundran, in an Information,7 the accusatory
portion of which states:
That on or about the 1st day of October, (sic)
1989, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province of
La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and maul one DEOGRACIAS
GUNDRAN, thereby inflicting upon said victim
several injuries on the different parts of his body
which directly caused his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the victims.
CONTRARY TO ART. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1042-BG.
Upon arraignment, petitioner Yadao with assistance of a
counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime
charged. Thus, trial ensued, with the prosecution
presenting four witnesses, namely 1) Carmelita Limon,8 2)
Teofilo Gundran,9 3) Napoleon Estigoy10 and 4) Dr. Arturo
Llavore,11 to establish petitioner Yadao's culpability beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
To counter the evidence abovementioned, the defense
offered the testimonies of the following defense witnesses:
1) petitioner Artemio Yadao, 2) Reynaldo Feratero,12 3) Dr.
Magdalena Alambra,13 4) Calixto Chan14 and 5) Evelyn Uy,
as well as documentary evidence, i.e., the Autopsy Report
of Dr. Alambra.
From a review of the record of the case, we cull the
following established facts:
It was petitioner Yadao's birthday on 1 October 1988. As
such, he had a few guests over at his house to help him
celebrate it. The guests included defense witnesses
Reynaldo Feratero, Calixto Chan and Evelyn Uy. At
around 9:00 a.m., petitioner Yadao noticed the victim,
Gundran,15 albeit not invited, to be milling around with the
guests and was already drinking gin. At around 3:45 p.m.
of the said day, while petitioner Yadao was sitting on one
end of a bench, the victim, who happened to be lying down
on the other end of the same bench, suddenly stood up.
Because no one else was sitting on the middle, said bench
tilted due to the weight of petitioner Yadao, thus, causing
him to fall to the ground. Upon seeing him fall to the
ground, the victim went over to petitioner Yadao and
began boxing him on the stomach. Petitioner Yadao's wife
tried to pacify her nephew but this merely enraged the
latter who then got a can opener and tried to stab
petitioner Yadao with it. The latter deflected said attempt
and delivered a slap on the face of the victim in order to
"knock some sense" into him. But because he was already
intoxicated, as he had been drinking since early that
morning, the victim lost his balance, hit his head on the
edge of a table and fell to the ground landing on his
behind. The other guest helped the victim to stand up and
proceeded to show him to the door.
The victim, Gundran, left the house of petitioner Yadao,
between 4:00 to 5:00 p.m., and proceeded to the house of
Carmelita Limon who was the sister of one of his friends.
At that time, Limon was inside her house doing the
laundry. Upon seeing him, Limon noticed a one-inch in
diameter lump on the victim's forehead. The victim told her
that he came from the birthday party of petitioner Yadao
and that the latter "mauled" him. While she treated the
"wound" with "kutsay," an herb, the victim complained of
pain on his breast/stomach area, the area where he
claimed to have been hit by petitioner Yadao.
Two days later, or on 3 October 1988, Teofilo Gundran,
the father of the victim was informed by his granddaughter
that his son, the victim, was having difficulty breathing.
Teofilo Gundran then proceeded to where the victim was,
which happened to be in his (the victim's) sister's house, a
short distance away from Limon's house. When he got to
the house, Teofilo Gundran saw the victim sitting on an
"arinola" gasping for breath. He then held the victim's two
hands until the latter expired.
On the same day that he died, the body of the victim was
autopsied by Dr. Magdalena Alambra, Medical Specialist II
of the Rural Health Unit of Bauang, La Union. In her
Autopsy Report, she made the following findings:
PERTINENT PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
 1. Hematoma suboponeurotic layer of the scalp
rt. Fronto parietal area 10 cm. in length and 9
cm. in width.
2. Fibrocaseous necrosis of the right lung with
loss of lung parenchymal tissue and pleural
adhesion of the rt. Lateral wall of the chest.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardio respiratory arrest
due to pulmonary tuberculosis. Far advanced
with massive pleural adhesion rt. side.16
During the trial of the case, Dr. Alambra testified for the
defense. She stated under oath that immediately after the
death of the victim, she conducted the autopsy of the body
of said victim; that during the procedure, she made an
internal, as well as external, examination of the body of the
victim; that fibrocaseous meant that half of the victim's
lungs, the right one in particular, was already gone; that
she was only told that the victim had been mauled and that
the latter became weak thereafter; that although a
hematoma17 was present on the victim's forehead, she did
not consider it as the cause of death as hematoma alone
will not cause the death of a person especially seven to
eight days later; and, that when she opened the skull of
the victim to study the latter's brain, she did not see
anything unusual. Dr. Alambra then confirmed that the
cause of death of the victim was cardio-respiratory arrest
due to pulmonary tuberculosis that was already so far
advanced with massive pleural adhesions. On cross,
however, she stated that a person with only one lung left,
with proper medication, would still be able to live normally.
Disbelieving that cardiac arrest secondary to Tuberculosis
was the cause of death of his son; Teofilo Gundran had
the victim's body re-autopsied, this time by the National
Bureau of Investigation. The re-autopsy was conducted by
Dr. Arturo G. Llavore, a Medico-Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Regional Office,
San Fernando, La Union, on 11 October 1991, or eight
days after the first autopsy.18 Dr. Llavore's autopsy report
stated:
AUTOPSY REPORT NO. 88-26-LU
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Cadaver, embalmed.
I. Abrasions: Frontal region, left side. 0.9 x 0.2
cm.; Arm, left, upper third, anterior aspect, 2.0 x
0.6 cm.; Forearm, right, upper third,
anteromedial aspect, 0.2 x 0.2 cm.; Elbow, left,
posterior aspect, 0.6 x 0.4 cm., and right,
posters-medial aspect, 2.0 x 0.5 cm. in size.
II. Hematoma, Scalp, Interstitial; Fronto-
tempero-parietal region, right side, 13.0 x 10.0
cms., massive, extensive; Frontal region, slightly
to the right of the anterior medial line, 2.0 x 1.6
cms., mild; Occipital region, mid-aspect, 8.0 x
2.3 cms, moderate.
III. Brain, markedly congested, with flattening
and widening of gyri and narrowing of the sulci.
Cerebral blood vessels markedly engorged.
IV. Lungs, Left lung intact; right lung previously
dissected. Cut sections showed areas of fibrosis
at the right lung (focal) surrounded by atelectatic
and emphysematous changes, (Pleural
Adhesions, right. - B-2)19
V. Other internal visceral organs, markedly
congested.
VI. Stomach, with approximately 60 cc of dark
brownish fluid.
*** end ***
CAUSE OF DEATH: CEREBRAL EDEMA,
SEVERE, SECONDARY TO TRAUMATIC
INJURIES; HEAD/
REMARKS: Pls. see pathology Report No. P-88-
339. Old healed scars noted at Chest, anterior
and lateral aspects, right. Scalp incision,
postmortem, extending from above left ear, over
the superior midline and down to the front of
right ear, 36.0 cms. long. Postmortem incision,
Y-shaped, extending from anterior superior
portion of Chest to abdominal area, lower
quadrant, 53.0 cms. long.
During the trial, prosecution witness Dr. Llavore testified
that the cause of death of the victim was the collective
effect of all the injuries sustained by the latter on the head.
He explained that the forces that could have caused the
injuries to the victim's head were also the same forces that
could have caused the edema or swelling of the victim's
brain. He illustrated further that a human fist applied with
"sufficient" force on the fronto-temporo-parietalregion of
the head could cause an injury the same as that sustained
by the victim on his forehead. Similarly, the injury found at
the back of the head of the victim could have been caused
by an edge of a palm applied with sufficient force or it
could have been caused by hitting his head on the edge of
a table as the shape of said injury is somewhat elongated.
On cross examination, Dr. Llavore admitted that he did the
re-autopsy seven (7)20 days after the victim died but that
his Autopsy Report failed to indicate that the cadaver had
previously been autopsied by another physician; that the
blow inflicted on the head of the victim was strong enough
to have injured the "moorings" of the brain causing the
destruction of the brain cells and the shifting of the fluid in
the skull to one side; that the most serious wound between
the two injuries sustained by the victim on the head is the
one found on his right forehead; and that the process of
swelling became irreversible when the compression of the
brain had caused its center to become "imbalanced," so
that the victim's brain ceased to function.
After trial, in a Decision21 promulgated on 28 March 1996,
the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner Yadao guilty
of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Court, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as
charged in the information, and after considering
two (2) mitigating circumstances, hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its
 maximum period, as Minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS of prision mayor in its minimum period,
as Maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the sum of P50,000.00 for the death
of Deogracias Gundran and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC held that:
After a careful consideration and examination of
the testimonies of both medico-legal officers, this
Court is inclined to give more weight on the
testimony of Dr. Arturo Llavore that the cause of
death of Deogracias Gundran was "cerebral
edema, severe, secondary to traumatic injuries,
head" and not "Cardio respiratory Arrest due to
pulmonary tuberculosis. It is to be noted that
Dra. Magdalena Alambra testified and even
admitted that a person even if he has no (sic)
lungs can still live. Hence, the injuries which the
victim Deogracias Gundran sustained on his
head caused his death as he did not
immediately undergo medical treatment. And as
testified to by Dr. Arturo Llavore x x x the blow
inflicted was fatal or very serious that "if no
medical intervention is made, it will be untreated
(sic)" (T.S.N., September 25, 1991, p. 38).
Aggrieved, petitioner Yadao appealed the aforequoted
decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in
x x x [g]ranting for the sake of argument that
itsDecision22 of 18 April 2001, affirmed in toto the judgment
accused Artemio Yadao did not maul the victim
of conviction rendered by the RTC. The fallo of Court of
but only slapped him slightly which caused him
Appeals decision states that:
to fall down as he was very drunk, still accused
is liable for the consequences of his act.
xxxx
The case involves the application of Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any
person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. x x x "Pursuant to this provision, "an
accused is criminally responsible for the acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all
the natural and logical consequences resulting
there from". (sic) x x x.
xxxx
Under paragraph 1, Article 4, revised Penal
Code, a person committing a felony is still
criminally liable even if – "x x x
(c) the injurious result is greater than that
intended-prater-intentionem. x x x
Indeed the act of the accused in slapping the
victim Deogracias Gundran causing the latter to
fall down hitting his head which caused his
eventual death is something which the accused
cannot escape. This Court does not favor
making conjectures but looking at the body built
(sic) of the accused who is tall and sturdy as
compared to the body built (sic) of the victim
who was described to be tall and lanky, it is not
hard to believe that accused did not know that
natural and inevitable result of the act of
slapping the victim, considering the fact that
accused even admitted that the victim was then
very drunk.
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES
CONSIDERED, there being no reversible error
but instead being in accordance with law and
evidence, the appealed Decision dated March
28, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,
Bauang, La Union (sic) is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Yadao's ensuing motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 13
November 2001, seeing as no "new matters or issues
raised in (the) Motion for Reconsideration x x x."23
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner Yadao seeks the reversal of the decision of the
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Essentially, it is his contention that the evidence presented
by the prosecution was not sufficient to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the crime of
homicide. He maintains that the existence of two autopsy
reports entirely differing as to the cause of death of the
victim is tantamount to reasonable doubt respecting his
legal culpability thereto. Particularly, he argues that:
x x x [t]he trial court's finding "that the blow
inflicted was fatal and very serious" is not in
accord with the physical manifestations of
Gundran in going to and while in the house of
Carmelita. It is a matter of human experience
that when a person is struck with a fatal or
serious blow in the head to such an extent that
his brain becomes swollen with its moorings
injured as found by Dr. Llavore in this case, such
person will suffer serious, disabling or painful
consequences. Either he will be rendered
comatose or unconscious or suffer severe pain
in the head.
xxxx
And although Limon noticed a lump in (sic) his
forehead, Gundran did not complain of any pain
in the head and when asked what he felt he told
Limon that he felt pain in his chest and stomach
because that was where he was mauled.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that:
It is clear from the record that Dr. Alambra failed
to notice the brain injury sustained by the victim
 because she merely relied on "gross findings" of
said organ during her autopsy. After opening the
skull, she merely took a look at the brain, felt it,
and found nothing unusual about the organ. She
testified that she could not conduct further
laboratory examinations on the victim's brain for
lack of facilities (citation omitted).
This circumstance indicates that the findings of
the two (2) medico-legal experts, although
inconsistent, are not necessarily irreconcilable.
The threshold issue in this case, therefore, is whether or
not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner
Yadao beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially Dr.
Llavore's, and documentary evidence presented, i.e., the
Dr. Llavore's Autopsy Report.
The petition has merit.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines and
punishes the crime of homicide, viz:
ART. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not
falling within the provisions of Article 246,24 shall
kill another without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be guilty of homicide and be
punished by reclusión temporal.
From the abovequoted provision of law, the elements of
homicide are as follows: 1) a person was killed; and 2) the
accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; 3)
the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
and 4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide.25
The Constitution demands that every accused be
presumed innocent until the charge is proved. Before an
accused can be convicted of any criminal act, his guilt
must first be proved beyond reasonable doubt.26 In this
jurisdiction, proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a
moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand
absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of
error;27 it is that engendered by an investigation of the
whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let
the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.28
Basic is the principle in criminal law that the evidence
presented must be sufficient to prove the corpus delicti –
the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary
sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually
committed.29 The corpus delicti is a compound fact
composed of two things: 1) the existence of a certain act or
aresult forming the basis of the criminal charge, and 2) the
existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or
result.30 In all criminal prosecutions, the burden is on the
prosecution to prove the body or substance of the crime. In
the case at bar, was the prosecution able to prove the two
components of the corpus delicti?
We think not.
Though it was established that petitioner Yadao slapped
the victim, and as a result of which the latter fell down and
struck his head on the edge of a table, the prosecution
nonetheless failed to show the nexus between the injury
sustained by the victim and his death. It failed to discharge
the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
death of the victim resulted from the use of violent and
criminal means by petitioner Yadao.
The fact that the victim herein was wounded is not
conclusive that death resulted therefrom. To make an
offender liable for the death of the victim, it must be proven
that the death is the natural consequence of the physical
injuries inflicted. If the physical injury is not the proximate
cause31 of death of the victim, then the offender cannot be
held liable for such death.
It has been established in this case that on the afternoon
of 1 October 1988, at around 3:45 p.m., petitioner Yadao
slapped the victim once. This is based from the unrebutted
testimonies of defense witnesses – the only eyewitnesses
to the assault. It is also undisputed that the victim died on
3 October 1988, or two days later. What is in dispute,
however, is the cause of the latter's death.
In convicting Petitioner Yadao, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals principally relied upon the testimony of Dr. Llavore
in addition to the latter's autopsy report, both essentially
stating that the injury sustained by the victim in the head
caused massive hematoma and/or cerebral edema.
However, we find said testimonial and documentary
evidence utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment
of conviction for homicide. To our mind, his testimony, as
well as the Autopsy Report containing his findings, vis-à-
vis the first autopsy conducted by Dr. Alambra and the
factual circumstances surrounding the conduct of two
autopsies done on said cadaver, do not engender a moral
certainty, much less a belief, that the injury sustained was
the cause of his death. This Court's doubt is brought about
by Dr. Llavore's failure to account the effects of the
following facts: 1) that the cadaver had previously been
autopsied; 2) that during the first autopsy, Dr. Alambra
opened up the skull of the victim to physically examine his
brain and did not see anything out of the ordinary, neither
blood clot and/or pooling nor any swelling; 3) that the
cadaver of the victim had already been embalmed; 4) that
it had not been established for how long the embalming
fluid was supposed to stave off or delay the decomposition
of the cadaver of the victim; 5) that the re-autopsy was
conducted eight (8) days after the death of the victim; 6)
that when the cadaver of the victim was re-autopsied,
decomposition may have already set in despite the body
having been embalmed; and 7) that the only hematoma
noted inside of the cadaver's head was that on the
"suboponeurotic layer of the scalp rt. fronto parietal
region,"32or "scalp, interstitial; Fronto-temporo-parietal
region, right side."33 In layman's terms, the hematoma,
noted by both physicians, was merely on the scalp, just
below the skin, of the frontal right side of the head –
nowhere near the brain as the area was still outside of the
skull. Even Dr. Llavore recognized such fact as clearly
stated in his Autopsy Report and testified to in open
court, viz:
COURT:
Now, could you tell us – could you tell
this Court what is the cause of that
trauma?
xxxx
 Witness:
A x x x the cause of the trauma on the head is
physical contact as shown in paragraph 3, there
were injuries to these areas on the right side and
actually there were two (2) and one (1) at the
back of the head and the force or violence that
was applied to these areas caused the brain to
move suddenly also and the displacement of the
substances, the brain substances, because the
brain is very fragile, it is very soft, once they are
displaced from their place, because they move,
there is breaking of very minute blood vessels –
the very minute blood vessels if the force is
stronger, it could create breakage or rupture of
larger blood vessels which you can say grossly
as hemorrhage, but in this case, there is no
hemorrhage – there is no gross hemorrhage,
there is only minute blood vessels and since
there is destruction of the very minute blood
vessels, they swell individually, they swell and
collectively, the swelling becomes so great
because it already involves the whole brain and
the brain becomes swollen, it expands, it tries to
expand, but it cannot. Therefore, it compresses
in itself.
Consequently, the post mortem report and testimony of Dr.
Alambra should not be easily discounted. The same is
significant in that the testimony and the report on the
autopsy, which was done immediately after the death,
establishes the nature and extent of the "injury," sustained
as a result of the assault, as well as the state of the brain
and the surrounding area at the time of death. The
significance of said evidence will lead to the precise nature
of the injury sustained by the victim. From a legal
perspective, therefore, the examination of a wound should
lead to the determination as to the degree of danger of the
wound and the danger it poses to the life or bodily function
of the victim when the wound was inflicted.
Wharton and Stille's discussion on the importance of a
thorough and painstaking post-mortem examination or
assessment of the degree of injury sustained by the victim
is highly instructive, it reads:
x x x [a] careful post-mortem examination will From a medical perspective, the abovediscussed issues
usually show the violent cause of death, and it is are essentially significant and must be established first
the duty of the physician whose opinion is before any correlation of the injury to the victim's cause of
desired, to make that examination most death is done. It is an established fact that during
carefully, and to base his opinion entirely upon decomposition, numerous cellular changes occur in the
the findings of this examination; not upon body. A microscopic examination of the tissues (of the
previous notions of the probable nature and body) under the influence of "autolytic
effects of the wound. Moreover, it is necessary enzymes"36 enzymes shows disintegration, swelling or
not merely to make an examination of the shrinkage, vacuolization and formation of small granules
regions apparently involved in the injury, but also within the cytoplasm of the cells.37 Therefore, the swelling
a thorough examination of the entire body; for, of the brain, along with the other organs of the victim as
notwithstanding the immediate cause of death stated in the Pathology Report38 by the NBI, which reads:
may be evident, it is still advisable to be sure
that there was no cause of death in any other
FINDINGS
part. [Emphasis supplied.]
MICROSCOPIC DESCRIPTIONS:
This Court recognizes the fact that the most critical aspect
of head trauma is what happens to the brain; that the
immediate brain damage that results from head trauma is Brain (cerebral cortex): and cerebellum) :
dependent upon the force applied to the head, the area of sections show markedly widened spaces in the
its application, and whether the head is fixed or freely virchow in the white matter of the cerebrum and
movable; that when viable tissue receives an application of collapsed walls of the capillaries.
force strong enough to be injurious, it (the body) responds Cloudy swelling of neurons and interstitial
by alteration in intracellular and extracellular fluid content, edema, marked.
by extravasation of blood, by increasing blood supply to
the local area, and by mobilization of cells capable of
removing cellular debris and repairing any Kidneys: sections show focal infiltrations of
disruption.34 Moreover, it is acknowledged that tissues of chronic inflammatory cells in the interstitium
accompanied by tubular atrophy and glomeruler
the nervous system, the brain being one of its
sclerosis. Cloudy swelling of tubules in the
components, and like any other tissue of the body,
cortex, moderate. Medullary congestion,
responds to injury by the formation of edema or the
moderate. The cerebellum shows
retention of fluid.35 Hence, it is not quite farfetched that the
victim may have had cerebral edema as a result of the
injury he sustained in the head. But just the same, such a Liver: sections show moderate congestion of red
conclusion, as stated in the second post mortem report, blood cells in the sinusoids and
does not necessarily preclude the fact that the swelling or cloudy swelling of liver cells.
edema noted in the tissues of the brain may have been
due to other factors i.e., such as decomposition or the fact
Lungs: sections show marked congestion of
that the cadaver of the victim had already been embalmed.
pulmonary septae exhibiting numerous
The foregoing uncertainty is all the more reinforced by the
macrophages containing hemusiderin pigments.
testimony of Dr. Alambra and her findings stated in the
First Autopsy Report stating that there were no signs of Alternating atelectatic and hyperinflated lung
damage to the brain, external or internal. This, by itself, is alveoli with emphysematous and bullae
very much inconsistent with the allegation that the cerebral formation can be noted. Fibrosis in diffuse in
edema was the cause of death of the victim, which if it other areas with calcifications. The small bronchi
were so, would have already been manifest at the time of are irregularly dilated.
death.
 Myocardium: congestion of capillaries and
cloudy swelling of muscle fibers, moderate.
x x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
may have also been due to the decomposing state of the
cadaver of the victim and not just that caused by the head
injury he sustained from the hands of petitioner Yadao.
Additionally, to delay the onset of decomposition, cadavers
are embalmed. Embalming is the artificial way of
preserving the body after death by injecting 6 to 8 quarts of
antiseptic solutions of formalin, perchloride or mercury or
arsenic, which is carried into the common carotid and the
femoral arteries.39 However, a dead body must not be
embalmed before the autopsy.40 The embalming fluid may
render the tissue and blood unfit for toxicological
analyses.41 The embalming may alter the gross
appearance of the tissues or may result to a wide variety of
artifacts that tend to destroy or obscure evidence. 42 Thus,
in the case at bar, even if the cadaver of the victim may not
have started decomposing at the time of the re-autopsy, all
the same, the fact that such had already been embalmed,
any examination will likely lead to findings or conclusion
not at all accurate as to the true status of the tissues of the
body of the victim.
From the above, absent further clarifications, Dr. Llavore's
conclusion that the victim's cause of death is cerebral
edema is nothing but conjecture, being tenuous and
flawed. Consequently, the findings as stated in said
autopsy report is not decisive of the of the issue of whether
or not injury sustained by the victim in his head when he
was slapped by petitioner Yadao and/or when the victim hit
his head on the edge of the table were the sole cause of
the cerebral edema observed in the latter's brain during
the re-autopsy conducted eight (8) days after his death.
Again, it could have been caused by other factors, one of
which could have been the decomposition or the
breakdown of the cellular tissues of the body naturally
occurring after death, or the fact that the cadaver of the
victim had already been previously embalmed.
Dr. Llavore's testimony that the cause of death of the
victim was the collective effect of the blow sustained by the
latter's head; that the blow was strong enough to have
caused the displacement of the brain from its moorings
and the resultant swelling. Such conclusion was brought
about by the doctor's external and internal examination of
the brain of the victim. The records of the case, however,
is again bereft of any indication that the said inference or
conclusion took into account the fact that the cadaver of
the victim had been previously autopsied, more
importantly, that his brain had been already been removed
from its "moorings" by Dr. Alambra in order for her to take
the same out of the skull when she examined it.
Indeed, the evidence of the defense might not, by itself,
suffice to emphatically negate the causal relationship
between the actions of petitioner Yadao causing injury to
the victim and the cause of his death, but the same must
be considered in conjunction with the weakness of the
evidence given by the prosecution's witness discussed
above. Defense witness Dr. Alambra's Autopsy Report, on
top of her testimony that upon opening the skull of the
victim, she found nothing out of the ordinary in the brain,
tend to reinforce the doubt already engendered by the
weakness of the prosecution's evidence about the
fundamental correlation of the injury and the cause of
death. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to
demonstrate petitioner Yadao's culpability beyond a
reasonable doubt, independently of whatever the defense
has offered to exculpate the latter. Conviction must rest on
the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not merely on
conjectures or suppositions, and certainly not on the
weakness of the accused's defense; otherwise, the phrase
"constitutional presumption of innocence" will be reduced
to nothing but an innocuous grouping of words; worse, to a
conspicuous exercise in futulity. As a rule, findings of fact
of trial courts are accorded great weight, even finality, on
appeal, unless the trial court has failed to appreciate
certain facts and circumstances that, if taken into account,
would materially affect the result of the case.43 In this case,
prescinding from the above discussion, it is arrantly
manifest that the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals,
overlooked material and relevant facts that could affect the
outcome of the case. The constitutional presumption of
innocence aforementioned requires us to take "a more
than casual consideration" of every circumstance or doubt
favoring the innocence of the accused as court have the
imperative duty to "put prosecution evidence under severe
testing."44
The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench
and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not
synonymous with guilt.45 The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment.46 If the evidence is
susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, the accused must be acquitted.47The overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.48 If there exist even one
iota of doubt, this Court is "under a long standing legal
injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-
petitioner."49
From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the
guilt of petitioner Yadao has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The facts of the case, the autopsy
reports, as well as the testimony of Dr. Llavore do not
definitely establish that the assault was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. Even assuming for the
sake of argument that the blow inflicted on the head of the
victim resulted in an edematous condition of the brain,
petitioner Yadao would still not be held liable for the death
as the prosecution failed to present proof that said act was
the efficient and proximate cause of the victim's demise.
An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even
though the accused's innocence may be doubted. 50 It is
better to free a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison
one whose guilt has not been proved by the required
quantum of evidence. For only when there is proof beyond
any shadow of doubt that those responsible should be
made answerable.51
The heirs of the victim, however, have not completely lost
their case. Settled in jurisprudence is the principle that a
court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still
order payment of civil damages in the same case. 52 In this
case, though petitioner Yadao is acquitted, nonetheless,
his liability for damages is not considered extinguished
since the judgment of acquittal is not based on a
pronouncement that the facts from which civil claims might
arise did not exist. Accordingly, this Court
awards P50,000.00 as civil damages to the heirs of the
victim.

WHEREFORE, the 28 March 1996 Decision of the
Regional Tial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, as
well as the 18 April 2001 Decision and 13 November 2001
Resolution both of the Court of Appeals are
herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Artemio
Yadao is ACQUITTED of the charge of homicide on the
ground of reasonable doubt. His immediate release from
custody is hereby ordered unless he is being held for other
lawful causes. However, Petitioner Artemio Yadao is
ordered to pay the heirs of victim Deogracias Gundran in
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairman, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-
Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.
Footnotes
1
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court.
2
Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices
Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos concurring; Annex "A" of the
Petition; rollo, pp. 52-64.
3
Annex "C" of the Petition; rollo, p. 79.
4
Penned by Hon. Fortunato V. Panganiban,
Presiding Judge, RTC Bauang, La Union,
Branch 33; Annex "D" of the Petition; rollo, pp.
80-97.
5 18
Dispositve of the RTC Decision, p. 18; rollo, p.
97.
6
Id.
7 20
Records, p. 2. It was actually eight days after the first
autopsy, or on 11 October 1988.
8
42 yr. old resident of Dili, Bauang, La Union;
21
she testified that Gundran is considered a close Supra at note 4.
family friend, the latter being a "kabarkada" of
her brother. 22
Supra at note 2.
9
The father of the victim. 23
Supra at note 3.
10
Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, La 24
The article in the RPC defining and punishing
Union.
the crime of parricide.
11
The NBI physician who conducted the 2nd 25
L. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
autopsy on the body of the victim.
Book Two, p. 470 (15th ed., 2001).
12
A guest at petitioner Yadao's birthday party. 26
Calimutan v. People, G.R. No. 152133, 9
February 2006, 482 SCRA 44, 57.
13
Id.
27
REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 133,
14
Id. Section 2.
15 28
Deogracias Gundran happened to be a People v. Dramayo, 149 Phil. 107, 112-113
nephew of petitioner Yadao's wife. (1971).
16 29
Records, pp. 43-45. R. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE, p. 38 of the
Supplement (1999).
17
Hematoma is the extravasation or effusion of
blood in a newly formed cavity underneath the 30
23 C.J.S. 264.
skin. It usually develops when the blunt
instrument is applied in part of the body where 31
Proximate cause is that cause, which in
bony tissue is superficially located, like the head,
natural and continuous sequence of events,
chest and anterior aspect of the legs. The force
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
applied causes the subcutaneous tissue to
produces injury or death, and without which the
rupture on account of the presence of a hard
result would not have occurred.
structure underneath. The destruction of the
subcutaneous tissue will lead to the
accumulation of blood causing it to elevate. 32
Dr. Alambra's autopsy report.
Records, p. 12. 33
Dr. Llavore's autopsy report.
19 34
Handwritten by Dr. Llavore. S. I. Schwartz, et al., PRINCIPLES OF
SURGERY, p. 1787 (4th ed., 1984).
35 51
Id. at 1790. People v. Vidal, G.R. No. 90419, 1 June 1999, house was razed in a fire which gutted the entire
308 SCRA 1. neighborhood on February 8, 1981.
36
Enzymes that digests the cell in which it is
52
produced, usually marking the death of the cell. Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39999, On June 17, 1986, the private respondents applied for
It is produced during autolysis – the process by 31 May 1984. individual lot allocations with the NHA. The Awards and
which a cell, in dying tissues, self destructs (the Arbitration Committee (AAC) of West Crame, to whom the
cell then, in effect, digests itself). request was forwarded by the NHA, denied the
Republic of the Philippines
applications because the parties were disqualified for a lot
SUPREME COURT
37 award. Upon appeal to the NHA, this decision was
Id. at 136. Manila
reversed and the private respondents
were awarded the lots occupied by their respective
38
By NBI pathologist Dr. Nieto M. Salvador; THIRD DIVISION structures inside Lot 10, Block 17.
Records, p. 182.
Pacita Ting twice moved for a reconsideration of the
39
P. Solis, LEGAL MEDICINE, p. 220 (Revised award, but the NHA upheld its decision on both occasions,
ed., 1987). denying her second motion with finality in an order dated
G.R. No. 109216 October 27, 1994
May 29, 1989.
40
Id. at 169.
PACITA TING, petitioner, She then appealed to the Office of the President (OP),
vs.
41 which rendered a decision on August 15, 1990, affirming
Id. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA TANALEON the NHA's ruling, with the following observations:
EPIFANIA GOMILLA, ELIZA SUBALDO, and
42 ROBERTO/SHIRLEY YEBRA, respondents.
Id.
The appealed order, it bears stressing,
is primarily assayed on the factual and
43 Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. unrebutted findings of the office a
People v. Batidor, 362 Phil. 673, 681-682
(1999). quo anent the extent of and actual
Esmeralda R. Acorda for private respondents. occupancy by appellant and appellees
44
of their respective areas.
People v. Bautista, 368 Phil. 100, 120 (1999). Consequently, appellant's contention
that she alone is entitled to the award
45
Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 150439, 29 of the entire Lot 10, Block 17, with an
July 2005, 465 SCRA 190, 215. ROMERO, J.: area of 212 square meters, on the
strength of her allegation that the
46
other claimants are not qualified
People v. Mejia, 341 Phil. 118, 145 (1997). Sometime in 1965, the spouses Jose and Pacita Ting project beneficiaries, is untenable.
purchased a house standing on a 212-square meter lot
47 known as Lot 10, Block 17 of the West Crame ZIP (Zonal
People v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57, 100 (1997). That subject lot had been earlier
Improvement Program. The lot was bought by the
government under Presidential Decree No. 1517, awarded by the ZIP project's
48
People v. Vasquez, 345 Phil. 380, 399 (1997). otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Act," for Arbitration and Adjudication
disposition to qualified beneficiaries. These beneficiaries Committee (AAC) to appellant adds
49 were determined in the 1978 census conducted by the nothing in the way of conclusiveness
Supra at note 43. Municipality of San Juan. Jose Ting was listed as a to the legality of her claim to the whole
structure owner and was given Tag No. 80-0417-01. area, much more confers upon her a
50
People v. Fronda, 384 Phil. 732, 743 (2000). Pacita Ting allegedly allowed the private respondents vested right thereto, to the exclusion
herein to occupy portions of the lot in question after their of appellees who, as shown by the
evidence, are as much as qualified to
be lot awardees of the NHA. For, in
the first place, no formal award of the
controverted lot has been made by the
NHA to appellant for lack of Notice of
Award issued by the NHA General
Manager, and, more importantly, no
Conditional Contract to Sell of said lot
was even executed between appellant
and the NHA. And, in the second
place, the decision of the AAC is
merely recommendatory and subject
to the final approval of the NHA, thru
its General Manager. Hence, the
disapproval of appellee's applications
for lot award and their subsequent
elevation of the case to the NHA by
way of appeal is but in accord with the
NHA rule of proceedings, the AAC's
award to appellant not having yet
acquired the character of finality.
Appellant's lot allocation cannot, and
should not, extend to portions of the
lot where appellees' structures had
been constructed. Otherwise,
appellant would be the virtual owner of
the structures put up by appellees on
the portions of subject lot which the
former had leased to the latter without
the required prior approval by the
NHA. And worst, such arrangements
would constitute a palpable violation of
NHA policy against multiple ownership
of structures in its ZIP projects, as
defined under Section V, Paragraph 5
of NHA Circular No. 13, dated
February 19, 1982.
Were this Office to rule that appellant
is entitled to the award of the entire
Lot 10, Block 17 whereon several
other structures have been
constructed, the net result thereof
would be a stultification, if not
complete evisceration, of the NHA
policy of "one structure, one lot,"
which eventuality this Office cannot
legally countenance.
Appellant's claim that the NHA Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review with the
proceedings was punctuated with bias following assigned errors:
and partiality is a mere play on
emotion that cannot defeat the
I
overriding considerations of justice
and fair play. In so ruling for herein
appellees, the NHA simply fittingly THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
supplied its long standing policy of OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING
awarding NHA lots to the actual AUTHORITY, THAT PRIVATE
occupants thereof and within the RESPONDENTS SEASONABLY
permissible limits. What is more, FILED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
appellant had failed to overthrow the WITH THE NATIONAL HOUSING
presumption of regularity that the AUTHORITY FROM THE DECISION
courts attach to acts of administrative OF THE AWARD AND ARBITRATION
bodies/officers. COMMITTEE IS NOT SUPPORTED
WITH EVIDENCE.
Finally, considering that the NHA is
tasked with the determination of the II
technical aspects of mass housing,
which includes the feasibility of
subdividing lots for multiple ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING
allocations, the award of the contested THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
INTERPOSED THE APPEAL FROM
lot to all the contending parties in the
manner heretofore adjudged, on the THE DECISION OF THE AWARD
basis of their actual occupancy, is but AND ARBITRATION COMMITTEE
STILL, THE NATIONAL HOUSING
in consonance with the government's
declared policy under Section 3 of PD AUTHORITY HAS NO
757, "[t]o provide and maintain JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE
adequate housing for the greatest APPEAL, HAVING BEEN FILED OUT
possible number of people." OF TIME.
III
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of this decision was THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL
likewise denied. HOUSING AUTHORITY WHICH WAS
AFFIRMED BY THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT AND THE HONORABLE
Not satisfied with these pronouncements, petitioner RESPONDENT COURT OF
appealed to the Court of Appeals raising, as one of the APPEALS IS TAINTED WITH
issues, the lack of jurisdiction of the NHA to entertain the UNFAIRNESS AND
appeal of the private respondents from the decision of the ARBITRARINESS AMOUNTING TO
AAC. ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The appellate court dismissed the petition in its decision IV
dated
December 29, 1992, and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration on March 3, 1993.
 THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
UPON SEC. 3 OF P.D. 757 IS IN
VIOLATION OF NHA CIRCULAR NO.
13 KNOWN AS THE CODE OF
POLICY, PARTICULARLY SEC. V,
PAR. 3, THEREOF.
V jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from AAC's decision,
THE NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY GRAVELY ERRED IN
AWARDING LOTS TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WHO WERE
ADMITTEDLY UNCENSUSED
HOUSEHOLD OWNERS IN ZIP
WEST CRAME BECAUSE THEY (sic)
FOUR ARE ALL DISQUALIFIED.
VI
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE
DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED
PETITIONER'S ALLEGATION IN THE
PETITION FILED WITH THE COURT
OF APPEALS FOR FAILURE TO
FILE THEIR COMMENT/ANSWER
TO IT AS REQUIRED BY THE
COURT.
It must be noted at this juncture that this petition is actually
a special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65. A
perusal of the errors cited above instantly reveals that the
basis of this petition is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction allegedly committed, not
by the respondent Court of Appeals, but by the NHA and
the Office of the President. It even prays for the
reinstatement of the AAC's decision. Henceforth, we shall
treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner claims that the NHA has no jurisdiction to
reverse the AAC's decision and award the lot to the private
respondents because the latter's appeal was filed out of
time. It is also claimed, in the alternative, that there is no
proof as to the existence of said appeal by the
respondents. How then can petitioner allege the late filing
of an appeal which she claims does not even exist? Her
argument simply defies logic and must consequently be
stricken out.
The issue of lack of jurisdiction was first raised before the
Court of Appeals. It appears however, that whereas in the
proceedings below, petitioner claimed that the NHA lacked
the basis of the same allegation of lack of jurisdiction
raised in the instant petition is the NHA'sentertainment of
the appeal in spite of having been filed late.
This may be a desperate effort on the part of the petitioner
to overturn the unanimous decisions of the appellate court
and the administrative bodies concerned, considering that
the Court of Appeals has sufficiently and correctly rejected
the claim of lack of jurisdiction of the NHA to entertain the
appeal.
Under paragraph V(7) of NHA Circular No. 13, dated
February 19, 1982 upon which the petitioner also relies,
"All decisions of the AAC shall be subject to review and
approval of the General Manager of the Authority, the local
Mayors, and finally the Governor of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission."
It is clear from this provision that the NHA was acting
within its statutory authority when it reversed the decision
of the AAC and awarded the lot to the respondents. While
it is true that NHA Circular No. 13 does not provide for
any period within which to appeal, the 15-day period
applied to appeals from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court
of Appeals cannot apply to an appeal from the AAC's
decision to the NHA which is an intra-agency recourse.
Anyhow, the decision of the NHA in this case was reached
"after a judicious review and evaluation of the records and
the documentary evidence submitted." and "in consonance
with the mandate of the Authority to provide and maintain
adequate housing for the greatest number of people."
The petitioner also claims that the "construction given by
the National Housing Authority over Sec. 3 of P.D. 757 is
in violation of NHA Circular
No. 13," and that the NHA "gravely erred in awarding (the)
lot to private respondents who were admittedly
uncensused household owner(s) in ZIP West Crame."
This argument is untenable.
In the first place, the "construction given to a statute by an
administrative agency charged with the interpretation and
application of that statute is entitled to great respect and
should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless
such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict
with the governing statute or the Constitution and other
laws. . . . The Courts give much weight to
contemporaneous construction because of the respect due
the government agency or officials charged with the
implementation of the law, their competence, expertness,
experience and informed judgment, and the fact that they
frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret." 1
In the second place, these are factual issues already
touched upon and decided by the Court of Appeals which
may not be assailed in this petition, there being nothing on
record that would justify a relaxation of the rule that the
appellate court's findings of fact are conclusive upon the
Court, which may only review and correct errors of law. 2
On the issue that the challenged NHA decision is "tainted
with unfairness and arbitrariness amounting to lack of
jurisdiction," suffice it to say that the Court has consistently
declared that findings or conclusions of administrative
bodies which have gained expertise in their fields because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, supported
as they are by substantial evidence, are generally
respected and even given finality, in the absence of a
showing of unfairness or arbitrariness on the part of the
administrative body amounting to abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction. 3 Hence, the decision of the NHA, as
well as that of the Office of the President, should not be
disturbed on appeal.
Finally, petitioner alleges that the "private respondents are
deemed to have admitted petitioner's allegation in the
petition with the Court of Appeals for their failure to file
their comment/answer as required by the Court of
Appeals."
The non-filing of the comment/answer by the private
respondents cannot be interpreted as an admission of the
allegations in the petition. Under Section 8, Rule 65 (which
applies in this case instead of Section 1, Rule 9, stating
that allegations not specifically denied are deemed
admitted), upon the expiration of the period to file an
answer, "the court may order the proceedings complained
of to be forthwith certified up for review and shall hear the
case, and if after such hearing the court finds that the
allegations of the petition are true, it shall render judgment
for such of the relief prayed for as the petitioner is entitled
to . . . ." Conversely, if the court finds the allegations to be
false, then it is not duty bound to grant any of the reliefs
sought, and may dismiss the petition outright.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
for review (properly certiorari) is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 203 SCRA 504
[1991], citing Asturias Sugar Central,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29
SCRA 617 [1969].
2 Godines v. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 338 [1993], citing Ronquillo v.
Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 433
[1991].
3 Tiatco v. Civil Service Commission,
216 SCRA 749 [1992], citing Filipinas
Manufacturers Bank v. NLRC, 182
SCRA 848 [1990], and Earth Minerals
Exploration, Inc. v. Macaraig, Jr., 194
SCRA 1 [1991]; Villanueva, Sr. v.
Leogardo Jr., 215 SCRA 835
[1992], citing Special Events & Central
Shipping Office Workers Union v. San
Miguel Corporation, 122 SCRA 557
[1983]; Sesbreno v. Ala, 208 SCRA
359 [1992].
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 99859. September 20, 1996]
PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS SECURITY &
INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and PORPING REGALADO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Does the Labor Code, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7641,[1] authorize the payment of
retirement pay in the absence of a provision therefor in a
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable
employment contract?
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the
Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission[2] promulgated January 10, 1991, in NLRC
Case No. 00-05-02236-89, entitled “Porping Regalado vs.
Phil. Scout Veterans Security & Investigation Agency, Inc.
and/or Col. Cesar Sa Macalalad”, affirming the labor
arbiter’s[3] award of retirement pay to private respondent.
The Antecedent Facts
Private respondent worked for the petitioner as a
security guard since September 1963 until his retirement at
the age of 60 on March 20, 1989, with a monthly salary
of P1,480.00. He formally requested petitioner for
payment of his retirement pay, but petitioner refused,
stating that it would give him financial assistance instead,
without specifying the amount, which offer was refused by
the private respondent.
On May 11, 1989, private respondent filed a
complaint for non-payment of retirement benefits against
petitioner, docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-05-02236-
89. Petitioner, in its position paper, alleged that private
respondent was not entitled to retirement pay since there
was no company policy which provided for nor any
collective bargaining agreement granting it.
On September 19, 1989, the arbiter rendered his
decision in favor of private respondent.[4] Inasmuch as his
ratiocination may be indicative of the mind-set of our labor
officialdom, we quote the same below:
“It is admitted that it is provided in Article 287 of the Labor
Code that in case of retirement, the employee shall be
entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have
earned under existing laws and any CBA or other
agreement. Since there is no CBA nor company policy
granting the same, we have to look into other articles of
the Labor Code. Article 283 of the Labor Code requires
employer to give separation pay to employees who were
retrenched at the rate of one month salary for every year of
service when the termination is a result of installation of
labor saving device and one-half month pay for every year
of service in case of retrenchment due to prevent losses
(sic), closure or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses. Article 284 of the Labor Code also requires
employer to pay an employee his separation pay at the
rate of one-half month salary for every year of service
when terminated due to incurable disease. An analysis of
this article will reveal that it is the intention of the Code to
provide same financial assistance to these people who are
dislocated either because of loss of employment or due to
disease and yet, an employee who retires and ironically
whose company does not have any CBA nor policy
providing for retirement pay will not receive any retirement
pay for him to augment and supply his needs during his
old age. This matter has to be correct(ed) and it will be an
injustice if such retirement pay will be denied to
complainant. After all, the company has benefitted from
the service of the employee, hence, it is only fitting for the
company to provide him some funds for his old age. Also,
equity demands that in cases where there is no CBA nor
company policy providing a retirement pay, an employer
must pay its employee the needed retirement pay.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondent Phil. Scout Veterans Security and Investigation
Agency, Inc. to pay complainant his retirement pay at the
rate of one-half month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one year
of service.”
Petitioner appealed to the respondent National
Labor Relations Commission, which in its now-assailed
Decision[5] affirmed the arbiter:
“An employee is entitled to retirement benefits even in the
absence of a company retirement plan or collective
bargaining agreement. This is the import of Article 287 of
the Labor Code, as amended, and implemented by
Sections 13 and 14, Rule I, Book V (sic) of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. Thus in a case, this
Commission (1st Division) ruled:
‘With respect to the award of retirement benefits, the
contention of respondent-appellant that complainant is not
entitled to his claim of retirement benefits or to his
termination or separation pay because he was not retired
under the bonafide retirement plan or under an individual
or collective bargaining agreement or under company
policy, is highly untenable because Rule I, Sections 13 and
14, Book VI of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code
taken together clearly states that, with or without a
retirement plan, individual or collective bargaining
agreement or company policy, an employee who retires or
is retired at the age of sixty (60) or over, is entitled to
termination pay equivalent to one-half month salary for
every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months
being considered as one whole year.
Moreover, if social justice and compassion to labor
demand that termination pay be granted to victims of
mechanization, redundancy, retrenchment to avoid losses
and which are, from the standpoint of affected employees
usually temporary contingency that do not prevent them
from sooner or later being gainfully employed again, we
feel that there is far greater need to cushion retired
employees from the difficulties attendant to old age and
permanent idleness. And in protecting retired employees,
we are also protecting their dependents. This is the
essence of social justice. (Angel T. Tolentino vs. Standard
Wood Products Company, Inc., NLRC Case No. NCR-5-
3847-82, NLRC First Division, Promulgated July 8, 1987.)’”
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but respondent
Commission denied the same for lack of merit. Hence, this
recourse.
This Court issued a temporary restraining order on
June 10, 1991, enjoining respondent Commission and its
representatives from enforcing its January 10, 1991
Decision. In a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment
dated July 25, 1991, the Solicitor General agreed with the
petitioner’s position.
The Issues
Petitioner alleges that respondent Commission acted
with grave abuse of discretion:
A
“x x x IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 283
AND ARTICLE 284 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED, AS THE LAW THAT
PROVIDE FOR RETIREMENT PAY TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
B agreement or established employer policy shall be entitled
x x x IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
WHICH RESULTED IN ADMINISTRATIVE
LEGISLATION.”
In a nutshell, the issue here is whether or not private
respondent is legally entitled to retirement benefits.
The Court’s Ruling
The main contention of both petitioner and the
Solicitor General is that there is no contractual nor
statutory basis for the grant of retirement pay, hence, said
award is improper.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The applicable provisions of the Labor Code on the
matter of retirement are Art. 287 of the Labor Code, and
Sections 13 and 14(a) of Rule I, Book VI of the
Implementing Rules, which read as follows:
“Article 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired
upon reaching the retirement age established in the
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable
employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to
receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned
under existing laws and any collective bargaining or other
agreement.”
xxx xxx
xxx
“Sec. 13. Retirement. In the absence of any collective
bargaining agreement or other applicable agreement
concerning terms and conditions of employment which
provides for retirement at an older age, an employee may
be retired upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years.
Sec. 14. Retirement Benefits. (a) An employee who is
retired pursuant to a bona-fide retirement plan or in
accordance with the applicable individual or collective
to all the retirement benefits provided therein or to
termination pay equivalent at least to one-half month
salary for every year of service, whichever is higher, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one
whole year.”
It is at once apparent from a cursory reading of the
arbiter’s decision that, in making the award of retirement
pay, he was confronted by the lack of contractual or
statutory basis therefor. Undaunted, he scavenged for a
basis from among the other provisions of the Labor
Code. Seizing upon Articles 283 and 284, he concluded
that it is ironical and unjust that some financial assistance
is provided for people who are dismissed from their jobs
and who can presumably still find other work and continue
to earn a livelihood, but not for those who are retired and
facing the difficulties attendant to old age and permanent
idleness. This reflection exudes wisdom; unfortunately, it
lacks legal basis.
Going even deeper, respondent Commission,
instead of clearing up the confusion, added to it by
construing Sections 13 and 14(a) of Rule I, Book VI of the
Implementing Rules in relation to Art. 287 as basis for the
grant of retirement benefits to private respondent.
But far from being novel, this issue had already been
settled in Abaquin Security and Detective Agency, Inc. vs.
Atienza,[6] where this Court held:
“Construing these provisions in relation to the same issue
presented in this petition, this Court in the case of Llora
Motors, Inc., and/or Constantino Carlota, Jr. vs. Hon.
Franklin Drilon, et al., (G.R. No. 82895, November 7, 1989)
clarified that Article 288 (now 287) ‘does not itself purport
to impose any obligation upon employers to set up
a retirement scheme for their employees over and above
that already established under existing laws. In other
words, Article 287 recognizes that existing laws already
provide for a scheme by which retirement benefits may be
earned or accrue in favor of employees, as part of a
broader social security system that provides not only for
retirement benefits but also death and funeral benefits,
permanent disability benefits, sickness benefits and
maternity leave benefits.”
In Llora Motors, Inc. vs. Drilon,[7] this Court sought to
end the confusion caused by the wording of Section 14
abovequoted, and differentiated between the concepts of
“termination pay” and “retirement benefits”. We clarified
that the phrase “pay equivalent at least one-half month
salary for every year of service, whichever is higher”
pertains to termination pay:
“x x x Section 14 (a) refers to ‘termination pay equivalent to
at least one-half (1/2) month for every year of service’
while Section 14 (b) mentions ‘termination pay to which the
employee would have been entitled had there been no
such retirement fund’ as well as ‘termination pay the
employee is entitled to receive.’ It should be recalled that
Sections 13 and 14 are found in Implementing Rule I
which deals with both ‘termination of employment’ and
‘retirement.’ It is important to keep the two (2) concepts of
‘termination pay’ and ‘retirement benefits’ separate and
distinct from each other. Termination pay or separation
pay is required to be paid by an employer in particular
situations identified by the Labor Code itself or by
Implementing Rule I. Termination pay where properly due
and payable under some applicable provision of the Labor
Code or under Section 4 (b) of Implementing Rule I, must
be paid whether or not an additional retirement plan has
been set up under an agreement with the employer or
under an ‘established employer policy.’
What needs to be stressed, however, is that Section 14 of
Implementing Rule I, like Article 287 of the Labor Code,
does not purport to require ‘termination pay’ to be paid to
an employee who may want to retire but for whom no
additional retirement plan had been set up by prior
agreement with the employer. Thus, Section 14 itself
speaks of an employee ‘who is retired pursuant to a
bonafide retirement plan or in accordance with
theapplicable individual or collective
agreement or established employer policy’ x x x.” (italics in
the original text.)
Consequently, the Decision in question has to be
struck down for being legally indefensible.
While Article 287 has since been amended by
Republic Act No. 7641 (approved on December 9, 1992) to
read as follows:
“x x x xxx xxx
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing
for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment,
an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or
more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby
declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served
at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire
and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at
least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service,
a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as
one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term
‘one half (1/2) month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days
plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash
equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service
incentive leaves.
x x x x x x x x
x”
nevertheless, the aforequoted provisions, which could
have saved the day for the private respondent, cannot be
applied in this case, since private respondent retired on
March 20, 1989, or about three years prior to the approval
of the new retirement law. RA 7641 is to be effective
prospectively, absent a clear intention on the part of the
legislature to give it retroactivity.[8] “It is a rule of statutory
construction that all statutes are to be construed as having
only a prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective
effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from
the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must
be resolved against the retrospective effect.”[9]
The fact that respondent Commission had a prior
ruling in a similar case[10]granting retirement benefits is of
no moment. Although it may be true that the
contemporaneous construction of a statute by executive
officers tasked to enforce and implement said statute
should be given great weight by the courts, nevertheless, if
such construction is erroneous[11] or is clearly shown to be
in conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution or
other laws,[12] the same must be declared null and void. “It
is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary,
correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in
the context of the interactions of the three branches of the
government.”[13]
Had respondent Commission simply followed our
ruling in Llora Motors, this problem would not have
reached this far. Besides, with Llora’s promulgation in
1989, the ruling in the Tolentinocase was effectively
superseded.
 It has been held that “(i)t is axiomatic that retirement [10]
Tolentino vs. Standard Wood Products Co., Inc., NLRC The instant case emanated from the two complaints-
laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of Case No. NCR-5-3847-82. affidavits filed by respondent Cecille S. Abalos on 18
the persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as to the January 2001 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
[11]
intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree Abaquin, supra, p. 466, citing Insular Bank of Asia and Iligan City, against petitioner for Estafa.
to achieve its humanitarian purposes.”[14] The intention is to America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 132
provide for the retiree’s sustenance and hopefully even SCRA 663, October 23, 1984..
Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that
comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue [12]
Nestle Phil., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 504, petitioner, through deceit, received and encashed two
earning his livelihood. Unfortunately, such interpretation
510, November 13, 1991. checks issued in the name of respondent without
cannot be made in this case in the light of the clear lack of
respondent’s knowledge and consent and that despite
consensual and statutory basis of the grant of retirement [13]
Abaquin, supra, pp. 466-467. repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and
benefits to private respondent.
[14]
refused to pay the proceeds of the checks.
Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes, 216 SCRA 720, 725,
In all, it has been sufficiently shown that respondent December 21, 1992, citing Borromeo vs. Civil Service
Commission acted in grave abuse of discretion by Commission, 199 SCRA 924, (1991). On 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit
affirming the grant of retirement benefits to private admitting that she received and encashed the two checks
respondent despite our pronouncements on the matter. issued in favor of respondent.
Republic of the Philippines
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is SUPREME COURT
hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET Manila In her Supplemental Affidavit filed on 29 March 2001,
ASIDE. No costs. petitioner, however, recanted and alleged instead that it
was a certain Bebie Correa who received the two checks
SO ORDERED. THIRD DIVISION which are the subject matter of the complaints and
encashed the same; and that said Bebie Correa left the
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., country after misappropriating the proceeds of the checks.
Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 168617 February 19, 2007

BERNADETTE L. ADASA, petitioner, On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office of
vs. the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable cause
CECILLE S. ABALOS, Respondent. against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate
[1]
Approved on December 9, 1992. Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial
[2]
Document by a Private Individual, under Article 315 in
Second Division, composed of Comm. Rustico L. DECISION relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Diokno, ponente, and Pres. Comm. Edna Bonto-Perez and Code, as amended.
Comm. Domingo H. Zapanta.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
[3]
Labor Arbiter Eduardo G. Magno. Consequently, two separate criminal cases were filed
[4] This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of against petitioner docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8781
Rollo, pp. 35-38. and No. 8782, raffled to Branches 4 and 5, Regional Trial
Court, filed by petitioner Bernadette L. Adasa, seeks to
[5] nullify and set aside the 21 July 2004 Decision1 and 10 Court of Iligan City, respectively.
Rollo, pp. 16-20.
June 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
[6]
190 SCRA 460, 465, October 15, 1990. SP No. 76396 which nullified the Resolutions of the This instant petition pertains only to Criminal Case No.
Department of Justice (DOJ). The Resolutions of the DOJ 8782.
[7]
179 SCRA 175, 183-184, November 7, 1989. reversed and set aside the Resolution of the Office of the
[8]
City Prosecutor of Iligan City, which found on
See Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419, 426, reinvestigation probable cause against petitioner, and On 8 June 2001, upon motion of the petitioner, the trial
January 27, 1992; also, Article 4, Civil Code. directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to court in Criminal Case No. 8782 issued an order directing
[9] withdraw the information for Estafa against petitioner. the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to conduct a
Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Nilo vs.
reinvestigation.
Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, 525, April 2, 1984, in
turn quoting Mr. Justice Moreland
After conducting the reinvestigation, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution dated 30
August 2001, affirming the finding of probable cause
against petitioner.
Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1 October 2001 in
Criminal Case No. 8782, petitioner entered an
unconditional plea of not guilty.3
Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner filed a Petition for
Review before the DOJ on 15 October 2001.
In a Resolution dated 11 July 2002, the DOJ reversed and
set aside the 30 August 2001 resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to
withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner.
The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a "Motion to Withdraw
Information" on 25 July 2002.
On 26 July 2002, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ arguing that
the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for
review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates
that when an accused has already been arraigned and the
aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ,
the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take
cognizance of the petition, or even give due course
thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed
Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the
grounds for the dismissal of the petition for review before
the DOJ.
In a resolution dated 30 January 2003, the DOJ denied the
Motion for Reconsideration opining that under Section 12,
in relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the
Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any
appeal taken to him even where the accused has already
been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive
language "may" utilized in Section 12 whereby the
Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed
resolution notwithstanding the fact that the accused has
been arraigned.
Meanwhile, on 27 February 2003, the trial court issued an
order granting petitioner’s "Motion to Withdraw
Information" and dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782. No
action was taken by respondent or any party of the case
from the said order of dismissal.
Aggrieved by the resolution of the DOJ, respondent filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Respondent raised the following issues before the
appellate court:
1. Whether or not the Department of Justice
gravely abused its discretion in giving due
course to petitioner’s petition for review despite
its having been filed after the latter had already
been arraigned;
2. Whether or not there is probable cause that
the crime of estafa has been committed and that
petitioner is probably guilty thereof;
3. Whether or not the petition before the Court of
Appeals has been rendered moot and academic
by the order of the Regional Trial Court
dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782.
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 21 July 2004
granted respondent’s petition and reversed the
Resolutions of the DOJ dated 11 July 2002 and 30
January 2003.
In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals, relying
heavily on Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 which states
"[i]f an information has been filed in court pursuant to the
appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due
course if the accused had already been arraigned," ruled
that since petitioner was arraigned before she filed the
petition for review with the DOJ, it was imperative for the
DOJ to dismiss such petition. It added that when petitioner
pleaded to the charge, she was deemed to have waived
her right to reinvestigation and right to question any
irregularity that surrounds it.
Anent the second issue, the Court of Appeals declared
that the existence of probable cause or the lack of it,
cannot be dealt with by it since factual issues are not
proper subjects of a Petition for Certiorari.
In disposing of the last issue, the Court of Appeals held
that the order of the trial court dismissing the subject
criminal case pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the
DOJ did not render the petition moot and academic. It said
that since the trial court’s order relied solely on the
resolutions of the DOJ, said order is void as it violated the
rule which enjoins the trial court to assess the evidence
presented before it in a motion to dismiss and not to rely
solely on the prosecutor’s averment that the Secretary of
Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case.
Dissatisfied by the Court of Appeals’ ruling, petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration setting forth the following
grounds:
1. that the over-all language of Sections 7 and
12 of Department Circular No. 70 is permissive
and directory such that the Secretary of Justice
may entertain an appeal despite the fact that the
accused had been arraigned;
2. that the contemporaneous construction by the
Secretary of Justice should be given great
weight and respect;
3. that Section 7 of the Circular applies only to
resolutions rendered pursuant to a preliminary
investigation, not on a reinvestigation;
4. that the trial court’s order of dismissal of the
criminal case has rendered the instant petition
moot and academic;
5. that her arraignment was null and void it being
conducted despite her protestations; and
6. that despite her being arraigned, the
supposed waiver of her right to preliminary
investigation has been nullified or recalled by
virtue of the trial court’s order of reinvestigation.4
The Court of Appeals stood firm by its decision. This time,
however, it tried to construe Section 7 side by side with
Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 and attempted to
reconcile these two provisions. According to the appellate
court, the phrase "shall not" in paragraph two, first
sentence of Section 7 of subject circular, to wit:
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the
appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due
course if the accused had already been arraigned. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
employed in the circular denotes a positive prohibition.
Applying the principle in statutory construction - that when
a statute or provision contains words of positive
prohibition, such as "shall not," "cannot," or "ought not" or
which is couched in negative terms importing that the act
shall not be done otherwise than designated, that statute
or provision is mandatory, thus rendering the provision
mandatory – it opined that the subject provision simply
means that the Secretary of Justice has no other course of
action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when
arraignment of an accused had already taken place prior
to the filing of the petition for review.
On the other hand, reading Section 12 of the same circular
which reads:
The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed
resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss
the petition for review on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the
appeal was taken; x x x.
the Court of Appeals opined that the permissive word
"may" in Section 12 would seem to imply that the
Secretary of Justice has discretion to entertain an appeal
notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been
arraigned. This provision should not be treated separately,
but should be read in relation to Section 7. The two
provisions, taken together, simply meant that when an
accused was already arraigned when the aggrieved party
files a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice cannot,
and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even
give due course thereto, but instead dismiss or deny it
outright. The appellate court added that the word "may" in
Section 12 should be read as "shall" or "must" since such
construction is absolutely necessary to give effect to the
apparent intention of the rule as gathered from the context.
As to the contemporaneous construction of the Secretary
of Justice, the Court of Appeals stated that the same
should not be given weight since it was erroneous.
Anent petitioner’s argument that Section 7 of the
questioned circular applies only to original resolutions that
brought about the filing of the corresponding informations
in court, but not to resolutions rendered pursuant to a
motion for reinvestigation, the appellate court simply
brushed aside such contention as having no basis in the
circular questioned.
It also rejected petitioner’s protestation that her
arraignment was forced upon her since she failed to
present any evidence to substantiate the same.
It is petitioner’s contention that despite her being
arraigned, the supposed waiver of her right to preliminary
investigation has been nullified by virtue of the trial court’s
order or reinvestigation. On this score, the Court of
Appeals rebuffed such argument stating that there was no
"supposed waiver of preliminary investigation" to speak of
for the reason that petitioner had actually undergone
preliminary investigation.
Petitioner remained unconvinced with the explanations of
the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition.
Again, petitioner contends that the DOJ can give due
course to an appeal or petition for review despite its having
been filed after the accused had already been arraigned. It
asserts that the fact of arraignment of an accused before
the filing of an appeal or petition for review before the DOJ
"is not at all relevant" as the DOJ can still take cognizance
of the appeal or Petition for Review before it. In support of
this contention, petitioner set her sights on the ruling of this
Court in Crespo v. Mogul,5 to wit:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
To bolster her position, petitioner cites Roberts v. Court of
Appeals,6 which stated:
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ
from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition
for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely
advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action
of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals7 where this Court declared:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority
of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is
only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action
of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in
court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which
the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice
reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the
discretion of the court.
The Court is unconvinced.
A cursory reading of Crespo v. Mogul reveals that the
ruling therein does not concern the issue of an appeal or
petition for review before the DOJ after arraignment. Verily,
the pronouncement therein has to do with the filing of a
motion to dismiss and the court’s discretion to deny or
grant the same. As correctly pointed out by respondent,
the emphasized portion in the Crespo ruling is a parcel of
the entire paragraph which relates to the duty and
jurisdiction of the trial court to determine for itself whether
or not to dismiss a case before it, and which states that
such duty comes into play regardless of whether such
motion is filed before or after arraignment and upon whose
instructions. The allusion to the Secretary of Justice as
reviewing the records of investigation and giving
instructions for the filing of a motion to dismiss in the cited
ruling does not take into consideration of whether the
appeal or petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed
after arraignment. Significantly, in the Crespo case, the
accused had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or
petition for review was filed before the DOJ. Undoubtedly,
petitioner’s reliance on the said case is misplaced.
Also unavailing is petitioner’s invocation of the cases of
Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals. As in Crespo v. Mogul, neither Roberts v. Court
of Appeals nor Marcelo v. Court of Appeals took into
account of whether the appeal or petition before the
Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment. Just like in
the Crespo case, the accused in both Roberts v. Court of
Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals had not yet been
arraigned when the appeal or petition for review was filed
before the DOJ.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals’
interpretation of the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70
violated three basic rules in statutory construction. First,
the rule that the provision that appears last in the order of
position in the rule or regulation must prevail. Second, the
rule that the contemporaneous construction of a statute or
regulation by the officers who enforce it should be given
weight. Third, petitioner lifted a portion from Agpalo’s
Statutory Construction8 where the word "shall" had been
construed as a permissive, and not a mandatory language.
The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this
case, an administrative rule9 of procedure, is that when a
statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation
need not be resorted to.10 Since Section 7 of the subject
circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss
outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after
arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary.
Petitioner’s reliance to the statutory principle that "the last
in order of position in the rule or regulation must prevail" is
not applicable. In addition to the fact that Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 70 needs no construction, the cited principle
cannot apply because, as correctly observed by the Court
of Appeals, there is no irreconcilable conflict between
Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Section
7 of the circular provides:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. – The Secretary of
Justice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the
same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended
for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. If an information
has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution,
the petition shall not be given due course if the accused
had already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after
the filing of the petition shall not bar the Secretary of
Justice from exercising his power of review. (Italics
supplied.)
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same circular states:
SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. – The Secretary
may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He
may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for
review on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the petition was filed beyond the period
prescribed in Section 3 hereof;
(b) That the procedure or any of the
requirements herein provided has not been
complied with;
(c) That there is no showing of any reversible
error;
(d) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory
in nature, except when it suspends the
proceedings based on the alleged existence of a
prejudicial question;
(e) That the accused had already been
arraigned when the appeal was taken;
(f) That the offense has already prescribed; and
(g) That other legal or factual grounds exist to
warrant a dismissal. (Emphases supplied.)
It is noteworthy that the principle cited by petitioner reveals
that, to find application, the same presupposes that "one
part of the statute cannot be reconciled or harmonized with
another part without nullifying one in favor of the other." In
the instant case, however, Section 7 is neither
contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be
seen above, Section 7 pertains to the action on the petition
that the DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates the
options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a
petition for review or of an appeal.
As aptly observed by respondent, Section 7 specifically
applies to a situation on what the DOJ must do when
confronted with an appeal or a petition for review that is
either clearly without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or
filed after an accused has already been arraigned, i.e., he
may dismiss it outright if it is patently without merit or
manifestly intended to delay, or, if it was filed after the
acccused has already been arraigned, the Secretary shall
not give it due course.
Section 12 applies generally to the disposition of an
appeal. Under said section, the DOJ may take any of four
actions when disposing an appeal, namely:
1. reverse the appealed resolution;
2. modify the appealed resolution;
3. affirm the appealed resolution;
 4. dismiss the appeal altogether, depending on
the circumstances and incidents attendant
thereto.
As to the dismissal of a petition for review or an appeal,
the grounds are provided for in Section 12 and,
consequently, the DOJ must evaluate the pertinent
circumstances and the facts of the case in order to
determine which ground or grounds shall apply.
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the
DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due
course and must dismiss the same. This is bolstered by
the fact that arraignment of the accused prior to the filing
of the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of the
grounds for its dismissal. Therefore, in such instance, the
DOJ, noting that the arraignment of an accused prior to the
filing of an appeal or petition for review is a ground for
dismissal under Section 12, must go back to Section 7 and
act upon as mandated therein. In other words, the DOJ
must not give due course to, and must necessarily dismiss,
the appeal.
Likewise, petitioner’s reliance on the principle of
contemporary construction, i.e., the DOJ is not precluded
from entertaining appeals where the accused had already
been arraigned, because it exercises discretionary power,
and because it promulgated itself the circular in question,
is unpersuasive. As aptly ratiocinated by the Court of
Appeals:
True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous
interpretation or construction by the officers charged with
the enforcement of the rules and regulations it
promulgated is entitled to great weight by the court in the
latter’s construction of such rules and regulations. That
does not, however, make such a construction necessarily
controlling or binding. For equally settled is the rule that
courts may disregard contemporaneous construction in
instances where the law or rule construed possesses no
ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous,
where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where the
court has previously given the statute a different
interpretation.
If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or
administrative officer called upon to implement it has
erroneously applied or executed it, the error may be
corrected when the true construction is ascertained. If a
contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous,
the same must be declared null and void. Such principle
should be as it is applied in the case at bar.11
Petitioner’s posture on a supposed exception to the
mandatory import of the word "shall" is misplaced. It is
petitioner’s view that the language of Section 12 is
permissive and therefore the mandate in Section 7 has
been transformed into a matter within the discretion of the
DOJ. To support this stance, petitioner cites a portion of
Agpalo’s Statutory Construction which reads:
For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act
304 which states that "banks or other financial institutions
owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to
availability of funds xxx, accept at a discount at not more
than two per centum for ten years such (backpay)
certificate" implies not a mandatory, but a discretionary,
meaning because of the phrase "subject to availability of
funds." Similarly, the word "shall" in the provision to the
effect that a corporation violating the corporation law
"shall, upon such violation being proved, be dissolved by
quo warranto proceedings" has been construed as
"may."12
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes
apparent that the same is not applicable to the provision in
question. In the cited passage, the word "shall" departed
from its mandatory import connotation because it was
connected to certain provisos/conditions: "subject to the
availability of funds" and "upon such violation being
proved." No such proviso/condition, however, can be found
in Section 7 of the subject circular. Hence, the word "shall"
retains its mandatory import.
At this juncture, the Court of Appeals’ disquisition in this
matter is enlightening:
Indeed, if the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to
give the Secretary of Justice a discretionary power to
dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its
being outrightly dismissible, such as when the accused
has already been arraigned, or where the crime the
accused is being charged with has already prescribed, or
there is no reversible error that has been committed, or
that there are legal or factual grounds warranting
dismissal, the result would not only be incongruous but
also irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the
Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition
would serve no purpose and would only allow a great
waste of time. Moreover, to give the second sentence of
Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory
application would not only subvert the avowed objectives
of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient
administration of justice, but would also render its other
mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.13
In her steadfast effort to champion her case, petitioner
contends that the issue as to whether the DOJ rightfully
entertained the instant case, despite the arraignment of
the accused prior to its filing, has been rendered moot and
academic with the order of dismissal by the trial court
dated 27 February 2003. Such contention deserves scant
consideration.
It must be stressed that the trial court dismissed the case
precisely because of the Resolutions of the DOJ after it
had, in grave abuse of its discretion, took cognizance of
the petition for review filed by petitioner. Having been
rendered in grave abuse of its discretion, the Resolutions
of the DOJ are void. As the order of dismissal of the trial
court was made pursuant to the void Resolutions of the
DOJ, said order was likewise void. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that a void judgment is a complete nullity and
without legal effect, and that all proceedings or actions
founded thereon are themselves regarded as invalid and
ineffective for any purpose.14 That respondent did not file a
motion for reconsideration or appeal from the dismissal
order of the trial court is of no moment. Since the dismissal
was void, there was nothing for respondent to oppose.
Petitioner further asserts that Section 7 of DOJ Circular
No. 70 applies only to appeals from original resolution of
the City Prosecutor and does not apply in the instant case
where an appeal is interposed by petitioner from the
Resolution of the City Prosecutor denying her motion for
reinvestigation. This claim is baseless.1avvphi1.net
A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of REYNATO S. PUNO
qualification given by the same provision to limit its the Court of Appeals dated 21 July 2004 and its Resolution Chief Justice
application to appeals from original resolutions and not to dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 are
resolutions on reinvestigation. Hence, the rule stating that AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
"when the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish"15 finds application in this regard.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and void
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
as the same was improvidently conducted. Again, this
Associate Justice 1
contention is without merit. Records reveal that petitioner’s Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A.
arraignment was without any restriction, condition or Camello with Associate Justices Estela Perlas
reservation.16 In fact she was assisted by her counsels WE CONCUR: M. Bernabe and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
Atty. Arthur Abudiente and Atty. Maglinao when she Rollo, pp. 40-48.
pleaded to the charge.17
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
2
Associate Justice Id. at 49-67.
Moreover, the settled rule is that when an accused pleads Chairperson
to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to 3
preliminary investigation and the right to question any Records, pp. 64-65.
irregularity that surrounds it.18 This precept is also MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
applicable in cases of reinvestigation as well as in cases of MARTINEZ SR. 4
Id. at 50.
review of such reinvestigation. In this case, when petitioner Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she effectively 5
waived the reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as G.R. No. L-53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA
well as the right to appeal the result thereof to the DOJ On Leave 462, 471.
Secretary. Thus, with the arraignment of the petitioner, the ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or Associate Justice 6
G.R. No. 113930, 5 March 1996, 254 SCRA
petition for review because petitioner had already waived 307, 330-332.
or abandoned the same. ATTESTATION
7
G.R. No. 106695, 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA
Lastly, while there is authority19 permitting the Court to I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were 39, 48-49.
make its own determination of probable cause, such, reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
however, cannot be made applicable in the instant case. the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. 8
As earlier stated, the arraignment of petitioner constitutes Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990), pp. 240-
a waiver of her right to preliminary investigation or 241, citing Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance
reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Corporation, 91 Phil. 608, 611 (1952) and
probable cause. For this reason, there is no need for the Associate Justice Government v. El Hogar Filipino, 50 Phil. 399
Court to determine the existence or non-existence of Chairperson, Third Division (1927).
probable cause.
9
CERTIFICATION When an administrative agency promulgates
Besides, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with
questions of law may be raised in, and be subject of, a the force and effect of a valid law. (Victorias
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and
Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission,
petition for review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified
of facts. This being the case, this Court cannot review the 114 Phil. 555, 558 [1962].)
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
evidence adduced by the parties before the prosecutor on consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the issue of the absence or presence of probable cause. 20 the opinion of the Court’s Division.
 10
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. CONSUELO VALDERRAMA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74851, 9 LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIRST
December 1999, 320 SCRA 279, 289. DIVISION AND MARIA ANDREA
SAAVEDRA,respondents.
11
Rollo, p. 58. SYLLABUS
12 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULE ON
Supra note 5.
FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS; EXCEPTIONS;
WHERE CIRCUMSTANCES RENDER ITS
13
Rollo, p. 57. EXECUTION IMPOSSIBLE. - The rule that once a
judgment becomes final it can no longer be
14 disturbed, altered, or modified is not an inflexible
Gorion v. Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
one. It admits of exceptions, as where facts and
Branch 17, G.R. No. 102131, 31 August 1992,
circumstances transpire after a judgment has
213 SCRA 138, 147.
become final and executory which render its
execution impossible or unjust. In such a case the
15
Philippine Free Press, Inc. v. Court of modification of the decision may be sought by the
Appeals, G.R. No. 132864, 24 October 2005, interested party and the court will modify and alter
473 SCRA 639, 662. the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the
facts.
16
Records, pp. 64-65.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT IN
LABOR CASE APPROPRIATE AS WHERE CLAIM
17
Id. IN COMPANY NO LONGER FEASIBLE,
EMPLOYEE CAN GO AFTER ITS OFFICERS. -
Modification of the judgment is appropriate
18
Kuizon v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 140619-24, 9
considering that the company is no longer in
March 2000, 354 SCRA 158, 176-177; Gonzales operation and there is no showing that it has filed
v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 297, 304-305
bankruptcy proceedings in which private respondent
(1997); People v. Baluran, 143 Phil. 36, 44 might file a claim and pursue her remedy under
(1981).
Article 110 of the Labor Code. Holding petitioner
officer personally liable for the judgment in this case
19
Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. is eminently just and proper considering that,
137010, 29 August 2003, 410 SCRA 148, 159. although the dispositive portion of the decision
mentions only the “respondent company,” the text
repeatedly mentions “respondents” in assessing
20
Chan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159922, liability for the illegal dismissal of private
28 April 2005, 457 SCRA 502, 512. respondent. There can be no doubt of their personal
liability. The mere happenstance that only the
company is mentioned should not, therefore, be
allowed to obscure the fact that in the text of the
SECOND DIVISION decision petitioner and her corespondents below
were found guilty of having illegally dismissed
private respondent and of claiming that private
respondent’s employment was terminated because
of retrenchment, when the truth was that she was
[G.R. No. 98239. April 25, 1996] dismissed for pregnancy. Hence they should be
held personally liable for private respondent’s
reinstatement with backwages. “Indeed it is well
said that to get the true intent and meaning of a
decision, no specific portion thereof should be
resorted to but same must be considered in its
entirety.
3. LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION;
EMPLOYER CORPORATION AND ITS OFFICERS;
LIABILITY. - Under the Labor Code, petitioner officer
is herself considered an employer. In A. C. Ransom
Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC, we held: “Employer”
includes any person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly. Since RANSOM is
an artificial person, it must have an officer who can
be presumed to be the employer, being the “person
acting in the interest of (the) employer.” The
corporation, only in the technical sense, is the
employer. The responsible officer of an employer
corporation can be held personally, not to say even
criminally, liable for the non-payment of
backwages. A corporation can only act through its
officers and agents. Any decision against the
company can be enforced against the officers in
their personal capacities should the corporation fail
to satisfy the judgment against it. “Where the
employer corporation is no longer existing and [is]
unable to satisfy the judgment in favor of the
employee, the officer should be held liable for acting
on behalf of the corporation.” In this case,
documents show that petitioner controlled the
company owning 1,993 of its 2,000 shares.
4. ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE MAY BE
DISREGARDED FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LABOR. - There was really no amendment of the
decision but only a clarification. But even if appeal
was required in order to correct the error, in the
interest of substantial justice, especially in cases
involving rights of workers, the procedural lapse in
this case may be disregarded.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Chaves Hechanova Lim Law Offices for petitioner.
Ramon A. Gonzales for private respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
 On October 27, 1983, Maria Andrea Saavedra,
herein private respondent, filed a complaint against the
COMMODEX (Phils.), Inc., petitioner Consuelo
Valderrama as owner, Tranquilino Valderrama as
executive vice president and Jose Ma. Togle as vice
president and general manager, for reinstatement and
backwages.[1] On December 2, 1986, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision, finding private respondent to have
been illegally dismissed and holding the respondent
COMMODEX liable. It was shown that private respondent
had been dismissed from her employment due to her
pregnancy, contrary to allegations of petitioner and her
corespondents therein that the termination of her
employment was due to redundancy and
retrenchment.[2] The dispositive portion of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
respondent company:
1. to reinstate complainant to her former position with full
backwages at the rate of P1,474.00 per month from the
date she was illegally dismissed on 16 March 1983 until
actually reinstated without loss of seniority right and other
benefits which she could have earned were it not for her
illegal dismissal;
2. to pay complainant moral and exemplary damages in
the amount of P20,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively;
and,
3. to pay complainant attorney’s fees equivalent to ten
(10%) percent of the total award.
A writ of execution was granted, but it was returned
unsatisfied.[3] The sheriff reported that COMMODEX had
ceased operation, while the individual officers, who were
corespondents in the case, took the position that the writ
could not be enforced against them on the ground that the
dispositive portion of the decision mentioned only
COMMODEX.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Clarification in
which she prayed:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the
dispositive part of the decision be clarified to read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondents jointly and severally:
1. to reinstate complainant to her former position with
full backwages at the rate of P 1,474.00 per month from
the date she was illegally dismissed on 16 March 1983
until actually reinstated without loss of seniority right and
other benefits which she could have earned were it not for
her illegal dismissal;
2. to pay complainant moral and exemplary damages
in the amount of P20,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively;
and
3. to pay complainant attorney’s fee equivalent to ten
(10%) percent of the total award.
Private respondent contended that the body of the
decision clearly held the petitioner and her corespondents
therein to be liable and that
[t]herefore, this Office is not precluded from correcting the
inadvertence by clarifying the words “respondent
company” which ought to have been “respondents jointly
and severally” in order to make the fallo or dispositive part
correspond or correlate with the body of the final decision,
considering that the unjust dismissal of the complainant
constitutes tort or quasidelict. (Article 2176, New Civil
Code).
Petitioner and her corespondents therein filed an
opposition to the motion for clarification. They contended
that the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become final and
executory and could no longer be amended.[4]
In reply private respondent argued that no
amendment of a final decision was being sought but only
the correction of a mistake or a clarification of an ambiguity
because “the exclusion [of the other respondents] in the
dispositive part of the decision is merely a clerical error or
mistake, since in the body of the decision they [petitioner
and corespondents therein] were included, hence said
error or mistake can yet be corrected even if the decision
is already final.”[5]
On April 12, 1988, the Labor Arbiter, citing our ruling
in A. C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC,[6] which held
the president of a corporation responsible and personally
liable for payment of backwages, granted the private
respondent’s motion and set it for hearing for reception of
evidence of the relationship of the petitioner and her
corespondents therein to COMMODEX. Private
respondent then presented the Articles of Incorporation,
List of Stockholders and the General Information Sheet of
COMMODEX,[7] which showed that of the 2,000 shares of
stocks of the corporation, Consuelo Valderrama owned
1,993[8] and that she was chairman of the board and
president of respondent company.[9]
On July 25, 1988, the Labor Arbiter declared
petitioner Consuelo Valderrama liable for the payment of
the monetary awards contained in the dispositive portion of
the decision dated December 2, 1986,[10] thus:
WHEREFORE, respondent Consuelo Valderrama, as
Chairman of the Board and President of respondent
COMMODEX (Phils.), Inc. who is originally impleaded is
hereby deemed included as party respondent and she
should, as she is hereby held liable for the awards to
complainant Maria Andrea L. Saavedra.
To obviate the further issuance of a Writ of Execution
against her, she should, as she is hereby ordered to pay
aforenamed complainant the monetary awards ordained in
the Decision herein.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC. In a resolution
dated February 26, 1991, the First Division of the NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s order and dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit.[11]Hence, this petition. Petitioner
alleges that:
1. The Decision dated 02 December 1986 has become
final and executory, and, hence, can no longer be
substantially amended as to include liability on the part of
herein Petitioner, who was originally not named as liable in
the dispositive portion of the said Decision; and
2. Petitioner cannot and should not be held personally
liable jointly and severally with Commodex (Phils.), Inc. for
the awards adjudged in favor of herein Private Respondent
Saavedra.
We find these contentions to be without merit.
First. The rule that once a judgment becomes final it
can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified is not an
inflexible one. It admits of exceptions, as where facts and
circumstances transpire after a judgment has become final
and executory which render its execution impossible or
unjust. In such a case the modification of the decision
may be sought by the interested party and the court will
modify and alter the judgment to harmonize it with justice
and the facts.[12]
In the case at bar, modification of the judgment is
appropriate considering that the company is no longer in
operation and there is no showing that it has filed
bankruptcy proceedings in which private respondent might
file a claim and pursue her remedy under Article 110 of the
Labor Code. Holding petitioner personally liable for the
judgment in this case is eminently just and proper
considering that, although the dispositive portion of the
decision mentions only the “respondent company,” the text
repeatedly mentions “respondents” in assessing liability for
the illegal dismissal of private respondent. For indeed
petitioner and others were respondents below and there
can be no doubt of their personal liability. The mere
happenstance that only the company is mentioned should
not, therefore, be allowed to obscure the fact that in the
text of the decision petitioner and her corespondents
below were found guilty of having illegally dismissed
private respondent and of claiming that private
respondent’s employment was terminated because of
retrenchment, when the truth was that she was dismissed
for pregnancy. Hence they should be held personally
liable for private respondent’s reinstatement with
backwages.[13]
“Indeed it is well said that to get the true intent and
meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should
be resorted to but same must be considered in its entirety
(Escarella vs. Director of Lands, 83 Phil. 491; 46 Off. Gaz.
No. 11 p. 5487; I Moran’s Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1957 ed., p. 478).”[14]
Second. Not only is it clear by reference to the text
of the decision of the Labor Arbiter that COMMODEX as
well as its officers were being held liable so that no
substantial amendment of the decision was really made by
the Labor Arbiter in ordering petitioner to comply with that
decision, but under the Labor Code, petitioner is herself
considered an employer. In A. C. Ransom Labor Union-
CCLU v. NLRC,[15] we held:
(a) Article 265 of the Labor Code, in part, expressly
provides:
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages.
Article 273 of the Code provides that:
Any person violating any of the provisions of Article
265 of this Code shall be punished by a fine of not
exceeding five hundred pesos and/or imprisonment for not
less than one (1) day nor more than six (6) months.
(b) How can the foregoing provisions be implemented
when the employer is a corporation? The answer is found
in Article 212 (c) of the Labor Code which provides:
(c) “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest of
an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not
include any labor organization or any of its officers or
agents except when acting as employer.
The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602,
the Minimum Wage Law. Since RANSOM is an artificial
person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be
the employer, being the “person acting in the interest of
(the) employer” RANSOM. The corporation, only in the
technical sense, is the employer.
The responsible officer of an employer corporation
can be held personally, not to say even criminally, liable
for the non-payment of back wages. That is the policy of
the law. In the Minimum Wage Law, Section 15 (b)
provided:
(b) If any violation of this Act is committed by
a corporation, trust, partnership or association, the
manager or in his default, the person acting as such when
the violation took place, shall be responsible. In the case
of a government corporation, the managing head shall be
made responsible, except when shown that the violation
was due to an act or commission of some other person,
over whom he has no control, in which case the latter shall
be held responsible.
In P.D. 525, where a corporation fails to pay the
emergency allowance therein provided, the prescribed
penalty “shall be imposed upon the guilty officer or officers”
of the corporation.
(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise,
the corporation employer can have devious ways for
evading payment of backwages. In the instant case, it
would appear that RANSOM, in 1969, forseeing the
possibility or probability of payment of backwages to the
22 strikers, organized ROSARIO to replace RANSOM, with
the latter to be eventually phased out if the 22 strikers win
their case. RANSOM actually ceased operations on May 1,
1973, after the December 19, 1972 Decision of the Court
of Industrial Relations was promulgated against RANSOM.
(d) The record does not clearly identify “the
officer or officers” of RANSOM directly responsible for
failure to pay the back wages of the 22 strikers: In the
absence of definite proof in that regard, we believe it
should be presumed that the responsible officer is the
President of the corporation who can be deemed the chief
operation officer thereof. Thus, in R.A. 602, criminal
responsibility is with the “Manager or in his default, the
person acting as such.” In RANSOM, the President
appears to be the Manager.
(e) Considering that non-payment of the
back wages of the 22 strikers has been a continuing
situation, it is our opinion that the personal liability of the
RANSOM President, at the time the back wages were
ordered to be paid should also be a continuing joint and
several personal liabilities of all who may have thereafter
succeeded to the office of president; otherwise the 22
strikers may be deprived of their rights by the election of a
president without leviable assets.
 [2]
Petitioner seeks to distinguish that case from the Third. Petitioner says the failure of private Id.
one at bar on the ground that the dispositive portion of the respondent to make a timely appeal bars her from
[3]
decision in that case actually ordered the “officers and enforcing the decision in her favor against her (petitioner) Rollo, p. 30.
agents” of A. C. Ransom to cease and desist from and the officers of the corporation because the decision of [4]
Rollo, p. 38.
committing further acts of certain labor practice thus: December 2, 1986 of the Labor Arbiter is now final and
can no longer be amended. [5]
Rollo, p. 41.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, . . . the A. C. We have already explained that there was really no [6]
Ransom Philippine Corporation is guilty of unfair labor 142 SCRA 269 (1986).
amendment of the decision but only a clarification. But
practice of interference and discrimination hereinabove even if appeal was required in order to correct the error, in [7]
Rollo, p. 43.
held and specified, ordering its officers and agentsto cease the interest of substantial justice, especially in cases
and desist from committing the same, finding the strike involving rights of workers, the procedural lapse in this [8]
Rollo, p. 53.
legal and justified; and to reinstate immediately . . . to their case may be disregarded. As held in General Baptist Bible [9]
respective positions with backwages from July 25, 1969 College v. NLRC:[19] Order of Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela, pp. 4-5,
until actually reinstated, without loss of seniority rights and Rollo, pp. 66-67.
other privileges appurtenant to their employment.[16] [10]
Technicalities have no room in labor cases, where the Rollo, pp. 63-68.
Rules of Court are applicable only in order to effectuate [11]
A corporation can only act through its officers and the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat Per Commissioner Romeo B. Putong and concurred in
agents. That is why the cease and desist order was them. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of by Presiding Commissioner Bartolome S. Carale, and
directed to the “officers and agents” of A. C. Ransom, Court of the Philippines and prevailing jurisprudence may Commissioner Vicente S. E. Veloso III.
which was actually found guilty of unfair labor be applied by analogy or in a suppletory character to effect [12]
practice. But that case clearly also holds that any decision Medado v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 80 (1990);
an expeditious resolution of labor controversies in a
against the company can be enforced against the officers Mabuhay Vinyl Corp. v. NLRC, 214 SCRA 135 (1992);
practical and convenient manner. We are inclined to
in their personal capacities should the corporation fail to Sampaguita Garments Corp. v. NLRC, 233 SCRA
overlook a procedural defect if only to promote substantial
satisfy the judgment against it. The quoted portion of that 260(1994).
justice.
decision explaining the basis for such ruling makes that [13]
See Chua v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 353 (1990).
clear. Agreeably with the ruling in A. C. Ransom Labor
Union-CCLU it was held in another case that “where the General rules of procedure are merely suppletory in [14]
character vis-a-vis labor disputes which are primarily Policarpio v. P. V. B. and Associated Ins. & Surety Co.,
Employer corporation is no longer existing and [is] unable Inc., 106 Phil. 125, 131 (1959).
to satisfy the judgment in favor of the employee, the officer governed by labor laws.[20] Furthermore, as provided in Art.
should be held liable for acting on behalf of the 4 of the Labor Code, “all doubts in the implementation and [15]
Supra, note 6 at 273-75.
corporation.”[17] interpretation of this code, including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor.”[21] The [16]
Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11.
Similarly it was held in Carmeicraft Corp. v. NLRC:[18] rule that the NLRC may disregard technical rules of
[17]
procedure in order to give life to the constitutional mandate Gudez v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 645, 650(1990).
We also find untenable the contention of Carmen for the protection of labor is well settled.[22] [18]
Yulo that she is not liable for the acts of the petitioner 186 SCRA 393 (1990).
company, assuming it had acted illegally, because the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of [19]
Carmelcraft Corporation is a distinct and separate entity merit. 219 SCRA 549 (1993).
with a legal personality of its own. Yulo claims she is only [20]
SO ORDERED. Art. 221 of the Labor Code.
an agent of the company carrying out the decisions of its
board of directors. We do not agree. Our finding is that [21]
Montoya v. Escayo, 171 SCRA 442 (1989).
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres,
she is in fact and legal effect the corporation, being not
only its president and general manager but also its owner. Jr., JJ., concur. [22]
Principe v. Philippine-Singapore Transport Services,
Inc., 176 SCRA 514 (1989).
In this case, the documents presented by the private
respondent show that petitioner controlled the company SECOND DIVISION
owning 1,993 of its 2,000 shares, with the rest of the [1]
stockholders owning only nominal amounts. Decision of Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati, p. 1; Rollo, p. 25.
[G.R. No. 98310. October 24, 1996] (P10,000,000.00).[1] The incorporators/stockholders of Matuguina, thus giving her seventy percent (70%) stock
MIWPI, and their stock subscriptions were as follows: ownership of MIWPI.

Name No. Of Shares In an undated letter[2] to the Director of Forest

Subscribed Amount of Capital Development (BFD) on November 26, 1974, Milagros
MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, Matuguina requested the Director for a change of name
INC., petitioner, vs. The HON. COURT OF and transfer of management of PTL No. 30, from a single
APPEALS, DAVAO ENTERPRISES Stock Subscribed proprietorship under her name, to that of MIWPI.
CORPORATION, The HON. MINISTER, (NOW 1. Henry
SECRETARY) of NATURAL RESOURCES AND This request was favorably endorsed on December
Wee 1,160,000 2, 1974[3] by the BFD’s Acting Director, Jose Viado to
PHILLIP CO, respondents. 1,160,000.00 respondent Secretary of Natural Resources, who approved
the same onSeptember 5, 1975.[4]
DECISION 2. Ma. Milagros
Matuguina 400,000 On July 17, 1975, Milagros Matuguina and petitioner
TORRES, JR., J.: 400,000.00 MIWPI executed a Deed of Transfer[5] transferring all of the
former’s rights, interests, ownership and participation in
3. Alejandro Chua Provincial Timber License No. 30 to the latter for and in
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. (MIWPI, Chun 200,000 consideration of 148,000 shares of stocks in MIWPI.
for brevity) filed this action for prohibition, Damages and 200,000.00
Injunction, in order to prevent the respondent Minister A copy of said deed was submitted to the Director of
(now Secretary) of Natural Resources from enforcing its 4. Bernadita Forest Development and Petitioner MIWPI had since been
Order of Execution against it, for liability arising from an Chua 120,000 acting as holder and licensee of PTL No. 30.
alleged encroachment of the petitioner over the timber 120,000.00
concession of respondent DAVENCOR located in Mati, On July 28, 1975, pending approval of the request to
Davao Oriental. 5. Domingo transfer the PTL to MIWPI, DAVENCOR, through its
Herrera 40,000 Assistant General Manager, complained to the District
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, 40,000.00
Forester at Mati, Davao Oriental that Milagros
ruled in favor of the petitioner, but on appeal, was reversed Matuguina/MLE had encroached into and was conducting
by the respondent Court of Appeals in its decision 6. Manuel
Hernaez 40,000 logging operations in DAVENCOR’s timber concession.
dated February 25, 1991, which found MIWPI, as an alter
40,000.00
ego of Milagros Matuguina and/or Matuguina Logging After investigation of DAVENCOR’s complaint, the
enterprises (MLE, to be liable to DAVENCOR for illegal 7. Luis Investigating Committee which looked into DAVENCOR’s
encroachment. complaint submitted its report to the Director, finding that
Valderama 40,000
40,000.00 MLE had encroached on the concession area of
The following are the antecedent facts: DAVENCOR. In line with this, the Director of Forest
----------------- Development issued an Order[6] on July 15, 1981, finding
On June 28, 1973, the Acting Director of the Bureau
------------------ and declaring MLE to have encroached upon, and
of Forest Development issued Provisional Timber License
conducted illegal logging operations within the licensed or
(PTL) No. 30, covering an area of 5,400 hectares to Ms. 2,000,000 concession area of DAVENCOR.
Milagros Matuguina who was then doing business under
2,000,000.00
the name of MLE, a sole proprietorship venture. A portion, MLE appealed the Order to the Ministry of Natural
covering 1,900 hectares, of the said area was located =========== Resources, which appeal was docketed as MNR CASE
within the territorial boundary of Gov. Generoso in Mati, =========== No. 6450. During the pendency of the appealed case with
Davao Oriental, and adjoined the timber concession of the Minister of Natural Resources, Ma. Milagros Matuguina
Davao Enterprises Corporation (DAVENCOR), the private Milagros Matuguina became the majority disposed of her shares in petitioner MIWPI, thereby
respondent in this case. stockholder of MIWPI on September 24, 1974, when the ceasing to be a stockholder of the petitioner of March 16,
latter’s Board of Directors approved by Resolution the 1986.[7]
On July 10, 1974, petitioner Matuguina Integrated transfer of 1,000,000 shares from Henry Wee to Milagros
Wood Products, Inc. (MIWPI), was incorporated, having an
authorized capital stock of Ten Million Pesos
 On October 1, 1986, The Minister of Natural
Resources, Hon. Ernesto M. Maceda rendered his
Decision,[8] affirming the aforesaid order of the Director of
Forest Development, stating thus:
DECISION
“For our Resolution is the appeal by MATUGUINA
LOGGING ENTERPRISES (MLR, for short) of the Order
dated 15 July 1991 of the Director of Forest Development
finding and declaring MLE to have encroached upon, and
conducted illegal logging operations within the license or
concession area of DAVAO ENTERPRISES
CORPORATION. The aforesaid Order dispositively states:
“WHEREFORE, there being a clear and convincing proof
that Matuguina Conducted illegal operation within the
licensed area of DAVENCOR, above named respondent is
hereby ordered to pay to the complainant the equivalent
value in pesos of 2,352.04 cubic meters of timber based
on the market price obtaining, at the logpond of the
respondent at the time of cutting, minus the cost of
production, or to restitute to the complainant equal volume
of 2,352.04 cubic meters of logs owned by respondent to
be taken at respondent’s logpond. The respondent is
hereby directed to comply with this Order within a period of
ninety (90) days from receipt of this Order and after the
lapse of the said period, no compliance has been made by
the respondent, its logging operations shall ipso
facto become automatically suspended until respondent
shall have complied as directed.
The Regional Director of Region II, Davao City is hereby
instructed to implement this Order and to submit his
compliance report within ten (10) days after the lapse of
the ninety (90) days period within which the respondent is
directed to comply with this order.”
And that the dispositive portion of the said decision
states;
“WHEREFORE, the Order dated 15 July 1981 of the
Director of Forest Development is hereby AFFIRMED.”
When the Decision of the Minister of Natural
Resources became final and executory, Philip Co and
DAVENCOR requested the respondent Minister
on October 30, 1986 to issue immediately a writ of
execution against MLE and/or MIWPI.[9] The Order of
Execution[10] was issued on January 6, 1987 by the
Minister through the latter’s Assistant on Legal
Affairs. The said Order directed the issuance of a writ of
execution, not only against MLE, but likewise against
MIWPI. The dispositive portion of the order provides:
“WHEREFORE, let a Writ of Execution be issued against
Matuguina Logging Enterprises and/or Matuguina
Integrated Wood Products, Inc. For the satisfaction of the
Decision of the Bureau of Forest Development dated15
July 1981, and the Order of this office dated 1 October
1986.
SO ORDERED.”
Subsequently, a writ of execution[11] dated January
8, 1987 was issued in favor of the respondent
DAVENCOR, which states:
“The City/Provincial Sheriff
Davao City
GREETINGS:
You are hereby directed to enforce, implement and
execute the Order of Execution dated 06 June 1987 of this
Office in the above-entitled case against Matuguina
Logging Enterprises and/or Matuguina Integrated Wood
Products, Inc. its officers or any person or corporation in
its behalf and conformably with the Order dated 15 July
1981 of the Director of Forest Development, stating
dispositively.
xxx
You are hereby requested to submit your return to this
Office within the period of sixty (60) days from your receipt
hereof as to action taken hereon.
SO ORDERED."
On February 11, 1987, MIWPI filed the instant
complaint[12] for prohibition, damages and injunction, with
prayer for restraining order, which case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 18,457-87 in the Regional Trial Court –
Davao City, Branch 17. MIWPI stated its primary cause of
action, the relevant portion of which reads, viz.:
“5. That plaintiff which has a distinct and separate
personality of its own under the law, and was never a party
to the case between DAVENCOR and MLE, suddenly
became a party to the case after the decision became final
and executory with the issuance of Annex “B” hereof for
reasons known to the defendants alone:
6. That the issuance of Annex ‘B’ hereof (the order of
execution) by the defendant Minister has been made not
only without or in excess of his authority but that the same
was issued patently without any factual or legal basis,
hence, a gross violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights
under the due process clause;
7. That plaintiff, in the face of the order (Annex ‘B’)
complained of, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, does
not have any alternative but to ventilate the present
recourse;
8. That defendant Minister is doing, threatens or is about
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
which definitely is in violation of the plaintiff’s rights
respecting the subject matter of the action, and unless said
act or acts are restrained or prohibited at least during the
pendency of this case, said act or acts would probably
work not only injustice to plaintiff but world tend to render
the judgment of this Honorable court ineffectual;
9. That the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of during the present litigation would not only
cause great and irreparable injury, but will also work
injustice to the plaintiff, and would complicate, aggravate
and multiply the issues in this case;
10. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consist in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in
the performance of acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
11. That great and irreparable injury would inevitably result
to the plaintiff before the matter can be heard on notice,
hence, immediate issuance of a restraining order is
necessary and proper;
12. That the plaintiff is willing and able to file the necessary
bond executed to the defendants, in an amount to be fixed
by the Court, to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the
defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason
of the injunction if the court should finally decide that the
plaintiff was not entitled thereto.”
MIWPI, likewise alleges that in wantonly and
imprudently procuring the Writ of Execution against it,
which DAVENCOR and Philip Co seek to enforce a 2.5
Million Peso liability of plaintiff, the latter has been
constrained to bring the present action, thereby incurring
damages in the sum of P500,000.00 in concept of actual
and compensatory damages, and P250,000.00 in
attorney’s fees, which amount petitioner now seeks to
recover.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order
the next day, February 12, 1987, restraining and/or
enjoining the private respondents and the Hon. Secretary
of Natural Resources from enforcing, implementing and/or
carrying into effect, the decision of the respondent
Secretary dated October 1, 1986, as well as the order of
execution dated January 6, 1987.
On February 17, 1987, private respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss[13] alleging that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case under Presidential Decree No.
705, to which Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed an
Opposition[14] dated February 1987. On March 9, 1987,
the trial court issued an order[15] denying private
respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. Hence, private
respondents filed their Answer[16] dated March 13, 1987
and an Amended Answer[17]
In the latter pleading, private respondents raised the
following special and affirmative defenses:
“7. That neither Milagros Matuguina nor Matuguina
Integrated Wood Products, Inc. advised defendant
Davencor of the change of name, and transfer of
management of PTL No. 30. From Milagros Matuguina to
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc., during the
pendency of MNR Case No. 6540 before the Bureau of
Forest Develoment and the Ministry of Natural Resources,
notwithstanding that the lawyer of matuguina Integrated
Wood Products, Inc., who was also a stockholder thereof,
had appeared for Milagros Matuguina in said
administrative case.
8. That plaintiff has acted in bad faith and is now in
estoppel from questioning the Writ of Execution issued
against Milagros Matuguina (now Matuguina Integrated
Wood Products, Inc.) to satisfy the judgment in MNR Case
No. 6540.
9. This Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the nature
and subject matter of this action, especially because:
(a) The plaintiff has not exhausted
administrative remedies available to it
before initiating this action;
(b) In the guise of entertaining an action for
damages, this Court is being misled
by the plaintiff into deciding questions
properly for the Department of Natural
Resources to decide exclusively in the
lawful exercise of its regulatory
jurisdiction;
(c) The plaintiff is now precluded and
estopped from filing this action.
10. The plaintiff has no cause of action against the
defendants and has not stated any in its complaint,
especially because:
(a) Having failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, plaintiff is without a ripe
cause of action that can be pleaded
before this Honorable Court;
(b) In substance, there is no justifiable
question raised under the facts and
circumstances of this case.
Meanwhile, on June 2, 1987, the trial court issued an
order[18] granting the petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction against the private
respondents and the Secretary of Natural Resources,
ordering them to desist, refrain and prevent from enforcing
respondent Secretary’s Decision dated October 1, 1986 as
well as the writ of execution dated January 8, 1987.
On May 10, 1989, the trial court rendered its
Decison[19] in favor of the petitioner, disposing of the action
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, finding the
evidence of plaintiff, Matuguina Integrated Wood Products,
Inc. sufficient to sustain a preponderance of evidence,
showing that the order of execution dated January 6, 1987,
issued by the Minister of Natural Resources, through
Alexander C. Castro, Assistant Minister for Legal Affairs,
included therein, plaintiff Matuguina Integrated Wood
Products, Inc., despite non-inclusion of plaintiff in the
decision of the then Minister of Natural Resources, dated
October 1, 1986, already final and executory before the
issuance of the order and execution, said order or
execution is hereby declared null and void and without any
legal effect.
As a consequence thereof, the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by this court, dated June 2, 1987 is
hereby made permanent.
Moreover, as a result of the filing of this case, defendant
Philip Co and Davencor Corporation, are ordered to jointly
and severally pay the amount of P100,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages, along with another amount
of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of this action,
in favor of plaintiff Matuguina Integrated Wood Products,
Inc.
SO ORDERED.”
Private respondents appealed the trial court’s
decision on May 19, 1989. Their notice of appeal was
approved by the trial court. The appealed case was THE FAILURE TO AFFORD PETITIONER THE SECRETARY OF NATURAL
docketed with respondent Honorable Court of Appeals as OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IN THE RESOURCES.
CA-G.R. SP No. 19887. ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL (MNR CASE NO.
6540) COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CURED BY
On February 25, 1991, the respondent Court B. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THERE
THE INSTITUTION OF THE ACTION FOR
rendered its Decision,[20] reversing the lower court’s WAS AN EFFECTIVE TRANSFER OF
PROHIBITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
pronouncement. The dispositive portion of the decision PTL NO. 30 FROM MILAGROS/MLE
BECAUSE SAID COURT HAD NO
reads: TO PETITIONER, THE TRANSFER
JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER
COULD NOT MAKE PETITIONER
PETITIONER WAS GUILTY OF
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision ENCROACHMENT ON PRIVATE
LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED
appealed from is reversed and set aside and the Order of ENCROACHMENT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DAVENCOR’S TIMBER
Execution issued by the Minister of Natural Resources RESPONDENT DAVENCOR’S
CONCESSION; FURTHERMORE, THE
dated January 6, 1987 is affirmed. Without TIMBER CONCESSION, SINCE:
QUESTION ON WHETHER PETITIONER WAS
pronouncement as to costs.
GUILTY OF ENCROACHMENT WAS NEVER
PUT IN ISSUE IN THE CASE BEFORE THE 1. SAID TRANSFER WAS
SO ORDERED.” TRIAL COURT. EXECUTED PRIOR TO
THE COMMISSION OF
III THE ALLEGED
In due time, petitioner filed a motion for ENCROACHMENT AND
reconsideration.[21] Private respondents filed their THE LIABILITY OF MILAGROS/MLE AS
THE FILING OF THE
opposition[22] to the same on April 2, 1991. In a FOUND BY RESPONDENT SECRETARY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE
Resolution[23] dated April 12, 1991, the motion was denied ITS DECISION DATED 01 OCTOBER 1986
COMPLAINT FOR
by the respondent Court. (EXHIBIT “A” OF THE ATTACHMENT “0”)
ENCROACHMENT DATED
CANNOT BE IMPUTED AGAINST PETITIONER
Not content with the court’s pronouncement, 28 JULY 1975; THUS,
SINCE THE LATTER IS A CORPORATION
petitioner is now before us on a Petition for Review PETITIONER CANNOT BE
HAVING A PERSONALITY SEPARATE AND
on Certiorari,[24] alleging that the respondent court acted MADE LIABLE FOR
DISTINCT FROM MILAGROS/MLE.
with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned OBLIGATONS OF
decision and its companion resolution, denying the motion IV MILAGROS/MLE WHICH
for reconsideration. WERE INCURRED AFTER
DATE OF THE SAID
The reasons relied upon by the Petitioner in filing its PETITIONER CANNOT BE MADE LIABLE TO TRANSFER.
petition are hereby restated: PRIVATE RESPONDENTS UNDER THE DEED OF
TRANSFER DATED 18 JULY 1975 (EXHIBIT “3”
I OF ATTACHMENT “P”) AND SECTION 61 OF THE 2. SAID TRANSFER COVERED
REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE ONLY FORESTRY
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS PHILIPPINES (P.D. 705, AS AMENDED): CHARGES AND OTHER
OF LAW WHEN IT WAS MADE LIABLE BY GOVERNMENT FEES,
RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF NATURAL AND DID NOT INCLUDE
RESOURCES IN HIS ORDER OF EXECUTION A. THE ALLEGED TRANSFER OF PTL THE PERSONAL LIABILITY
DATED 06 JANUARY 1987 (EXHIBIT “B” OF NO. 30 FROM MILAGROS/MLE TO OF MILAGROS/MLE THAT
ATTACHMENT “O”) ISSUED IN MNR CASE PETITIONER NEVER BECAME AROSE FROM THE
NO. 6540 DESPITE THE FACT THAT BINDING AND EFFECTIVE SINCE ENCROACHMENT OF THE
PETITIONER WAS NEVER A PARTY NOR A PTL NO. 30 REMAINED IN THE TIMBER CONCESSION OF
PARTICIPANT IN THE SAID CASE: IN FACT, NAME OF MILAGROS/MLE UNTIL RESPONDENT
PETITIONER NEVER HAD NOTICE OF THE ITS EXPIRATION ON 30 JUNE DAVENCOR.[25]
PROCEEDINGS IN MNR CASE NO. 6540. 1977: THIS IS DUE TO THE FACT
THAT SAID TRANSFER WAS
II NEVER APPROVED BY THE Private Respondent DAVENCOR and the public
respondent Hon. Minister (now Secretary) of Natural
Resources filed separate Comments[26] on September 5,
1991 and June 8, 1992 respectively.
The essential issues of the present controversy boil
down to the following:
Was the Petitioner denied due process when it was
adjudged liable with MLE for encroaching upon the timber
concession of DAVENCOR in the respondent Minister's
order of Execution?
Is the petitioner a transferee of MLE's interest, as to
make it liable for the latter’s illegal logging operations in
DAVENCOR’s timber concession, or more specifically, is it
possible to pierce the veil of MIWPI’s corporate existence,
making it a mere conduit or successor of MLE?
Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall
be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment
rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution
can be issued only against a party and not against one
who did not have his day in court. In Lorenzo vs.
Cayetano, 78 SCRA 485 [1987], this Court held that only
real parties in interest in an action are bound by judgment
therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued
pursuant thereto.[27]
Indeed a judgment cannot bind persons who are not
parties to the action.[28] It is elementary that strangers to a
case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court
and such judgment is not available as an adjudication
either against or in favor of such other person. A decision
of a court will not operate to divest the rights of a person
who has not and has never been a party to a litigation,
either as plaintiff or as defendant. Execution of a judgment
can only be issued against one who is a party to the
action, and not against one who, not being a party in the
action has not yet had his day in court.[29]
The writ of execution must conform to the judgment
which is to be executed, as it may not vary the terms of the
judgment it seeks to enforce.[30] Nor may it go beyond the
terms of the judgment which sought to be
executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro
tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore
the constitutional provision against depriving a person of
his property without due process of law.[31]
The writ of execution issued by the Secretary of
Natural Resources on January 8, 1987 clearly varies the
term of his Decision of October 1, 1986, inasmuch as the
Writ includes the MIWPI as party liable whereas the
Decision only mentions Milagros Matuguina/MLE.
There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of
Execution against the petitioner. The same was issued
without giving the petitioner an opportunity to defend itself
and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of
a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear
that petitioner was at all furnished with a copy of
DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Execution of the
Honorable Secretary’s decision against it. Petitioner was
suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the
respondent Secretary’s expedient conclusions that MLE
and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis
merely of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Order,
and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the
issuance of the Order of execution, petitioner was not
included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any
participation in the encroachment in DAVENCOR’s timber
concession. This action of the respondent Secretary
disregards the most basic tenets of due process and
elementary fairness.
The liberal atmosphere which pervades the
procedure in administrative proceedings does not
empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact
before hearing all the parties concerned.[32] In Police
Commission vs. Hon Judge Lood,[33] we held that the
formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be
present in an administrative investigation, provided that the
parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their
evidence. The right to notice and hearing is essential to
due process and its non-observance will, as a rule,
invalidate the administrative proceedings.
As observed by the appellate court, to wit:
“the appellant should have filed a Motion with the Minister
with Notice to the appellee to include the latter as party
liable for the judgment in order to afford the appellee an
opportunity to be heard on its liability for the judgment
rendered against Ma. Milagros Matuguina doing business
under the name Matuguina Logging Enterprises.[34]
Continuing, the said court stated further that:
“Nevertheless, the failure to comply with the procedure in
order to satisfy the requirements of due process was cured
by the present action for prohibition where the liability of
appellee has been ventilated.”
We do not agree. Essentially, Prohibition is a
remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or
persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power
with which they have not been vested by law[35] As we held
in Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Ople, et al,[36] in
a certiorari or prohibition case, only issues affecting the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, board and offices involved may
be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts.
The issue of whether or not petitioner is an alter ego
of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one of fact, and which
should have been threshed out in the administrative
proceedings, and not in the prohibition proceedings in the
trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the respondent
Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by
law in the execution of its order which is under scrutiny.
Assuming, arguendo, that prohibition is the proper
remedy for determining the propriety of piercing the
separate personality of petitioner with its stockholders, the
evidence presented at said trial does not warrant such
action.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a
personality separate and distinct from that of persons
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of
the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the
personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the
entities connected with it. Conversely, a stockholder
cannot be made to answer for any of its financial
obligations even if he should be its president.[37] But when
the juridical personality of the corporation is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend
crime, the corporation shall be considered as a mere
association of persons (Koppel, Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil 496,
Palay, Inc. vs. Clave, G.R. No. 56076, September 21,
1983, 124 SCRA 638), and its responsible officers and/or
stockholders shall be individually liable (Namarco vs.
Associated Finance Co., Inc., G.R. No. L- 20886, April 27,
1967, 19 SCRA 962). For the same reasons, a
corporation shall be liable for the obligations of a
stockholder (Palacio vs. Fely Transportation Co., G.R. No.
L-15121, August 31, 1963, 5 SCRA 1011), or a corporation
and its successor-in-interest shall be considered as one
and the liability of the former attach to the latter.[38]
But for the separate juridical personality of a
corporation to be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed.[39]
In the case at bar, there is, insufficient basis for the
appellate court’s ruling that MIWPI is the same as
Matuguina. The trial court’s observation is enlightening.
“Despite apparently opposing evidence of both parties, the
Court gathered and finds, that defendant’s attempt to
pierce the veil of corporate personality of plaintiff
corporation, as to consider plaintiff corporations merely an
adjunct or alter ego of Maria Milagros Matuguina Logging
Enterprises, to justify defendants claim against plaintiff
corporation, suffers heavily from insufficiency of evidence.
It is the vehement contention of defendants, to bolster its
claim, that plaintiff corporation is the alter ego of Maria
Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises, because when
Milagros Matuguina became the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of plaintiff corporation, she requested for the
change of name and transfer of management of PTL No.
30, from her single proprietorship, to plaintiff corporation.
Secondly, when Milagros Matuguina executed the deed of
transfer, transferring her forest concession under PTL No,
30, together with all the structures and improvements
therein, to plaintiff corporation, for a consideration
of P14,800.00 representing 148,000 shares of stocks of
plaintiff corporation actually all existing shares of stocks of
Milagros Matuguina, in plaintiff corporation represents
77.4% therein; suffice to say that plaintiff corporation
practically became an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina.
Defendants’ arguments on this peripheral aspect of
corporate existence, do not at all indicate that such a legal
fiction, was granted.
In the first place the alleged control of plaintiff corporation
was not evident in any particular corporate acts of plaintiff
corporation, wherein Maria Milagros Matuguina Logging
Enterprises using plaintiff corporation, executed acts or
powers directly involving plaintiff corporation.
Neither was there any evidence of defendants, that Maria
Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises, using the
facilities and resources of plaintiff corporation, involved
itself in transaction using both single proprietorship and
plaintiff corporation in such particular line of business
undertakings.
As stated by this court in resolving plaintiff’s prayer for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, said:
‘There is actually, no evidence presented by defendant,
showing that sometime on March 15, 1986, to January
1987, during which period, the subject decision of Hon.
Secretary of Natural Resources and corresponding writ of
execution, Maria Milagros Matuguina was a stockholder of
plaintiff corporation in such amount or was she an officer of
plaintiff corporation in whatever capacity.’
The above circumstances is relevant and significant to
assume any such justification of including plaintiff
corporation in the subject writ of execution, otherwise as
maintained by defendants, what matters most was the
control of Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises of
plaintiff corporation in 1974 and 1975, when the
administrative case was pending, this circumstance alone
without formally including plaintiff corporation in said case,
will not create any valid and sufficient justification for
plaintiff corporation, to have been supposedly included in
the suit against defendants and Maria Milagros Matuguina
Logging Enterprises, in the administrative case.
Yet, granting as claimed by defendants, that in 1974 or in
1975, Maria Milagros Matuguina became the controlling
stockholder of plaintiff corporation, on account of the
change of name and transfer of management of PTL No.
30, this circumstance, we repeat, does not of itself prove
that plaintiff corporation was the alter ego of Maria
Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprise, as enunciated in
various decisions of this Court, to wit:
‘It is important to bear in mind that mere ownership by a
single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly
all of the capital stocks of the corporation, is not itself a
sufficient warrant for disregarding the fiction of separate
personality. (Liddel and Co. vs. Collector of Internal
revenue, G.R. No. 9687, June 30, 1961).’
It is recognized as lawful to obtain a corporation charter,
even with a single substantial stockholder, to engage in
specific activity and such activity may co-exist with other
private activities of the stockholders.
If the corporation is substantial one, conducted lawfully;
without fraud on another, its separate identity is to be
respected.[40]
In this jurisdiction, it is a settled rule that conclusions
and findings of fact by trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a
better position to examine real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in
the case.[41]
It is likewise improper to state that the MIWPI is the
privy or the successor-in-interest of MLE, as the liability for
the encroachment over DAVENCOR’s timber concession
is concerned, by reason of the transfer of interest in PTL
No. 30 from MLE to MIWPI.
First at all, it does not appear indubitable that the
said transfer ever became effective, since PTL No. 30
remained in the name of Milagros Matuguina/MLE until it
expired on June 30, 1977.[42]
More importantly, even if it is deemed that there was
a valid change of name and transfer of interest in the PTL
No. 30, this only signifies a transfer of authority, from MLE
to MIWPI, to conduct logging operations in the area
covered by PTL No. 30. It does not show indubitable proof
that MIWPI was a mere conduit or successor of Milagros
Matuguina/MLE, as far the latter’s liability for the
encroachment upon DAVENCOR’s concession is
concerned. This is the only conclusion which we can
discern from the language of Section 61 of P.D.
705,[43] and the letters of the Acting Minister of Natural
Resources to Milagros Matuguina/MLE and to MIWPI, on
September 16, 1975.[44] In Soriano vs. Court of Appeals,
this Court stated in clear language, that-
“It is the general rule that the protective mantle of a construed according to the spirit and reason, disregarding affording the same an opportunity to be heard before
corporation’s separate and distinct personality could only if necessary the letter of the law.[45] it was adjudged liable.
be pierced and liability attached directly to its officers
and/or members – stockholders, when the same is used In construing statutes, the terms used therein are (b) The petitioner is a corporate entity
for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purpose. In the case at bar, generally to be given their ordinary meaning, that is, such separate and distinct from Milagros
there is no showing that the Association entered into the meaning which is ascribed to them when they are Matuguina/Matuguina Logging Enterprises, there
transaction with the private respondent for the purpose of commonly used, to the end that absurdity in the law must being no clear basis for considering it as a mere
defrauding the latter of his goods or the payment be avoided.[46] The term “obligations” as used in the final conduit or alter ego of Matuguina/MLE, and
thereof. xxx. Therefore, the general rule on corporate clause of the second paragraph of Section 61 of P.D. 705 therefore, cannot be made liable for the obligations
liability, not the exception, should be applied in resolving is construed to mean those obligations incurred by the of the same for encroachment over the timber
this case. (G.R. No. 49834, June 22, 1989) transferor in the ordinary course of business. It cannot be concession of private respondent DAVENCOR.
construed to mean those obligations or liabilities incurred
by the transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
The respondents cite Section 61 of P.D. 705 to as these are personal obligations of the transferor, and hereby GRANTED, and the Decision dated February 25,
establish MIWPI’s succession to the liability of Milagros could not have been included in the term “obligations” 1991 is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial
Matuguina/MLE: absent any modifying provision to that effect. Court is hereby REINSTATED, and correspondingly, Order
of Execution of the respondent Secretary of Natural
“SEC. 61. Transfer. –Unless authorized by the In the September 16, 1975 letters of Acting Director Resources is declared Null and Void and without effect.
Department Head, no licensee, lessee, or permittee may of the Bureau of Forest Development to Milagros
transfer, exchange, sell, or convey his license agreement, Matuguina and MIWPI informing them of the approval of No pronouncement as to cost.
license, lease or permit, or any of his rights or interest Matuguina's request for the change of name and transfer
therein, or any of his assets used in connection therewith. SO ORDERED.
of management of PTL No. 30, the following statements
were made by the Acting Director: Regalado (Chairman), Romero,
The licensee, lessee, or permittee shall be allowed to Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
transfer or convey his license agreement, license, lease, or "In view hereof, (Matuguina Integrated Wood Products,
permit only if he has not violated any forestry law, rule or Inc.) shall assume the responsibility of paying whatever
regulation; has been faithfully complying with the terms pending liabilities and/or accounts remaining unsettled, if
and conditions of the license agreement, license, lease or [1]
any, by the former licensee, Milagros Matuguina, with the Articles of Incorporation of MIWPI are on p. 232 of Rollo.
permit; the transferee has all the qualifications and none of government." (Emphasis ours)[47]
[2]
Rollo, p. 222.
the disqualifications to hold a license agreement, license, [3]
Ibid., p. 227.
lease or permit; there is no evidence that such transfer or [4]
Ibid., p. 228.
conveyance is being made for purposes of speculation; Accordingly, the letter's language implies that the [5]
Ibid., p. 250.
and the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the obligations which MIWPI are to assume as transferee of [6]
Infra.
transferor. Milagros Matuguina/MLE are those obligations in favor of [7]
Rollo, p. 194.
the government only, and not to any other entity. Thus this [8]
Ibid., p. 172.
would include Forestry Charges, Taxes, Fees, and similar [9]
Ibid., 188.
The transferor shall forever be barred from acquiring accountabilities. [10]
another license agreement, license, lease or permit.” Ibid., 93.
[11]
Ibid., 191.
In sum, the Court makes the following [12]
Ibid., p. 77.
pronouncements: [13]
Even if it is mandated in the abovestated provision Ibid., p. 102.
that “the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the (a) The respondent Honorable Minister of
[14]
Ibid., p. 106.
transferor” this does not mean that all obligations are Natural Resources gravely abuse its discretion when
[15]
Ibid., p. 109.
[16]
assumed, indiscriminately. it issued its Order of Execution on January 6, 1987, Ibid., p. 117.
[17]
including therein as one of the parties liable the Ibid., p. 159.17 dated July 16, 1987
Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law [18]
Ibid, p. 122.
petitioner Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc.,
and intent of the legislature that is important. When the [19]
Ibid., p. 309.
which was never a party to the assailed proceeding
interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal [20]
Ibid., p. 63.
resulting in the issuance of such Order and, without
import of its words would lead to absurdity, it should be [21]
Ibid., p. 383.
[22]
Ibid., p. 388.
[23]
Ibid., p. 72. RAMON C. TAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE Rosita Lim, which he knew or should have known to have
[24]
Ibid., p. 10. PHILIPPINES, respondent. been derived from the proceeds of the crime of theft.
[25]
Petition, Rollo, 26.
[26]
Comment of DAVENCOR, Rollo, p. 409; Comment of
DECISION Contrary to law.”
respondent Minister (Secretary) of Natural
Resources, Rollo, p. 497. PARDO, J.:
[27]
Vda. De Medina vs. Hon Fernando A. Cruz, etc., G.R. Upon arraignment on November 23, 1992, petitioner
No. L-39272, May 4, 1988, 161 SCRA 36. Ramon C. Tan pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and
[28] The case before the Court is an
Buazon, et. al. vs. Court of appeals, et. al., G.R. No. waived pre-trial. To prove the accusation, the prosecution
97749, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 182. appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of presented the testimonies of complainant Rosita Lim,
[29] *
St Dominic Corp. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, etc., Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Victor Sy and the confessed thief, Manuelito Mendez.
G.R., Nos. L-70623, L-48630, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA Manila, Branch 19,** convicting petitioner of the crime of
577. fencing. On the other hand, the defense presented Rosita
[30]
Buan vs. court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101614, Lim and Manuelito Mendez as hostile witnesses and
August 17, 1994, 235 SCRA 424. Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno petitioner himself. The testimonies of the witnesses were
[31]
Moran, M., Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St., summarized by the trial court in its decision, as follows:
vol. 2, p. 278. Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturing
[32]
Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil 635. propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was
[33] one of the employees working for her. Sometime in “ROSITA LIM stated that she is the owner of Bueno Metal
G.R. No. 34637, February 24, 1984, 127 SCRA 757. Industries, engaged in the business of manufacturing
[34]
RTC Decision, supra. February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the
[35] company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the propellers, bushings, welding rods, among others (Exhibits
3 Moran, p. 183. A, A-1, and B). That sometime in February 1991, after one
[36]
G.R. No. L-37790, March 25, 1976, 70 SCRA 139. welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as
[37] bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were of her employees left the company, she discovered that
Laperal Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, some of the manufactured spare parts were missing, so
G.R. No. 96354, June 8, 1993, 223 SCRA 261. missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that
[38] propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less, that on February 19, 1991, an inventory was conducted
Koppel vs. Yatco, supra; Liddell & Co. vs. CIR, G.R. No. and it was found that some welding rods and propellers,
L-9687, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 632. were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy,
[39] uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently, among others, worth P48,000.00 were
Del Rosario vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 85416, July 24, 1990, missing. Thereafter, she went to Victor Sy, the person
187 SCRA 777. Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he
[40] admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop who recommended Mr. Mendez to her. Subsequently, Mr.
RTC Decision, supra. Mendez was arrested in the Visayas, and upon arrival in
[41]
Bael, et al., vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 74423, January 30, stole from the complainant’s warehouse some boat spare
parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass Manila, admitted to his having stolen the missing spare
1989, 169 SCRA 617. parts sold then to Ramon Tan. She then talked to Mr. Tan,
[42]
See BFD Certification to that effect, Rollo, p. 193. screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainant’s
[43] forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the who denied having bought the same.
71 O.G. No. 28, 4289, July 14, 1975.
[44]
Rollo, pp. 229-230. one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount
[45]
Lopez vs. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 9274, of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they When presented on rebuttal, she stated that some of their
February 1, 1957, 100 Phil 850. split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file stocks were bought under the name of Asia Pacific, the
[46]
82 C.J.S. p. 639, cited in Martin R., Stutory a case against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop. guarantor of their Industrial Welding Corporation, and
Construction, 1979 ed., p. 83. stated further that whether the stocks are bought under the
[47] On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City name of the said corporation or under the name of William
Rollo, pp. 229-230.
Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Tan, her husband, all of these items were actually
Manila, Branch 19, an information against petitioner delivered to the store at 3012-3014 Jose Abad Santos
FIRST DIVISION charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. Street and all paid by her husband.
1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) committed as follows:

That for about one (1) year, there existed a business

[G.R. No. 134298. August 26, 1999]
“That on or about the last week of February 1991, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously knowingly receive,
keep, acquire and possess several spare parts and items
for fishing boats all valued at P48,130.00 belonging to
relationship between her husband and Mr. Tan. Mr. Tan
used to buy from them stocks of propellers while they
likewise bought from the former brass woods, and that
there is no reason whatsoever why she has to frame up
Mr. Tan.
MANUELITO MENDEZ stated that he worked as helper at
Bueno Metal Industries from November 1990 up to
February 1991. That sometime in the third week of
February 1991, together with Gaudencio Dayop, his co-
employee, they took from the warehouse of Rosita Lim
some boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless
propellers, brass screws, etc. They delivered said stolen
items to Ramon Tan, who paid for them in cash in the
amount of P13,000.00. After taking his share (one-half
(1/2) of the amount), he went home directly to the
province. When he received a letter from his uncle, Victor
Sy, he decided to return to Manila. He was then
accompanied by his uncle to see Mrs. Lim, from whom he
begged for forgiveness on April 8, 1991. On April 12,
1991, he executed an affidavit prepared by a certain
Perlas, a CIS personnel, subscribed to before a Notary
Public (Exhibits C and C-1).
VICTORY [sic] SY stated that he knows both Manuelito
Mendez and Mrs. Rosita Lim, the former being the nephew
of his wife while the latter is his auntie. That sometime in
February 1991, his auntie called up and informed him
about the spare parts stolen from the warehouse by
Manuelito Mendez. So that he sent his son to Cebu and
requested his kumpadre, a police officer of Sta. Catalina,
Negros Occidental, to arrest and bring Mendez back to
Manila. When Mr. Mendez was brought to Manila,
together with Supt. Perlas of the WPDC, they fetched Mr.
Mendez from the pier after which they proceeded to the
house of his auntie. Mr. Mendez admitted to him having
stolen the missing items and sold to Mr. Ramon Tan in
Sta. Cruz, Manila. Again, he brought Mr. Mendez to Sta.
Cruz where he pointed to Mr. Tan as the buyer, but when
confronted, Mr. Tan denied the same.
ROSITA LIM, when called to testify as a hostile witness,
narrated that she owns Bueno Metal Industries located at
301 Jose Abad Santos Street, Tondo, Manila. That two (2)
days after Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop left,
her husband, William Tan, conducted an inventory and
discovered that some of the spare parts worth P48,000.00
were missing. Some of the missing items were under the
name of Asia Pacific and William Tan.
MANUELITO MENDEZ, likewise, when called to testify as
a hostile witness, stated that he received a subpoena in
the Visayas from the wife of Victor Sy, accompanied by a
policeman of Buliloan, Cebu on April 8, 1991. That he
consented to come to Manila to ask forgiveness from
Rosita Lim. That in connection with this case, he executed
an affidavit on April 12, 1991, prepared by a certain Atty.
Perlas, a CIS personnel, and the contents thereof were
explained to him by Rosita Lim before he signed the same
before Atty. Jose Tayo, a Notary Public, at Magnolia
House, Carriedo, Manila (Exhibits C and C-1).
That usually, it was the secretary of Mr. Tan who accepted
the items delivered to Ramon Hardware. Further, he
stated that the stolen items from the warehouse were
placed in a sack and he talked to Mr. Tan first over the
phone before he delivered the spare parts. It was Mr. Tan
himself who accepted the stolen items in the morning at
about 7:00 to 8:00 o’clock and paid P13,000.00 for them.
RAMON TAN, the accused, in exculpation, stated that he
is a businessman engaged in selling hardware (marine
spare parts) at 944 Espeleta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
He denied having bought the stolen spare parts
worth P48,000.00 for he never talked nor met Manuelito
Mendez, the confessed thief. That further the two (2)
receipts presented by Mrs. Lim are not under her name
and the other two (2) are under the name of William Tan,
the husband, all in all amounting to P18,000.00. Besides,
the incident was not reported to the police (Exhibits 1 to 1-
g).
He likewise denied having talked to Manuelito Mendez
over the phone on the day of the delivery of the stolen
items and could not have accepted the said items
personally for everytime (sic) goods are delivered to his
store, the same are being accepted by his staff. It is not
possible for him to be at his office at about 7:00 to 8:00
o’clock in the morning, because he usually reported to his
office at 9:00 o’clock. In connection with this case, he
executed a counter-affidavit (Exhibits 2 and 2-a).[1]
On August 5, 1996, the trial court rendered decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused
RAMON C. TAN is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise
known as Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision
mayor and to indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen
merchandise purchased by him in the sum of P18,000.00.
“Costs against the accused.
“SO ORDERED.
“Manila, Philippines, August 5, 1996.
“(s/t) ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA
“Judge”
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
After due proceedings, on January 29, 1998, the
Court of Appeals rendered decision finding no error in the
judgment appealed from, and affirming the same in toto.
In due time, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals
a motion for reconsideration; however, on June 16, 1998,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution
has successfully established the elements of fencing as
against petitioner.[2]
We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner.
“Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is
‘the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft.’”[3]
 “Robbery is the taking of personal property
belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using
force upon things.”[4]
The crime of theft is committed if the taking is
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things.[5]
“The law on fencing does not require the accused to
have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to
have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the
crime of robbery or theft.”[6]
Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the
fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory after the
fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19
of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it
was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the
principal.[7]
P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to “impose heavy
penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes
of robbery and theft.” Evidently, the accessory in the
crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such
under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No.
1612. However, in the latter case, the accused ceases to
be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime
of fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and
theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are
separate and distinct offenses.[8] The State may thus
choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal
Code or P. D. No. 1612, although the preference for the
latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing
is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 creates a
presumption of fencing[9] and prescribes a higher penalty
based on the value of the property.[10]
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines,
we set out the essential elements of the crime of fencing
as follows:
“1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
“2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in
the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
“3. The accused knows or should have known that the
said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and
“4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for
himself or for another.”[11]
Consequently, “the prosecution must prove the guilt
of the accused by establishing the existence of all the
elements of the crime charged.” [12]
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable
doubt the existence of the essential elements of fencing,
there can be no conviction for such offense. [13] “It is an
ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be
found guilty of crime except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9).”[14]
In this case, what was the evidence of the
commission of theft independently of fencing?
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain
items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those
items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim
never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former
employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items,
she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a
public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even
without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a
victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we
cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is
absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking
of another’s property. True, witness Mendez admitted in
an extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he
had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an
admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense
may be given in evidence only against the person
admitting or confessing.[15] Even on this, if given extra-
judicially, the confessant must have the assistance of
counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in
evidence against the person so admitting.[16] Here, the
extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given
with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible
against the witness. Neither may such extra-judicial
confession be considered evidence against
accused.[17] There must be corroboration by evidence
of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt.[18]Corpus
delicti means the “body or substance of the crime, and, in
its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been
actually committed.”[19] The “essential elements of theft are
(1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property
belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with
intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil.
1000).”[20] In theft, corpus delicti has two elements,
namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and
(2) that it was lost by felonious taking.[21] In this case, the
theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did
not complain to the public authorities of the felonious
taking of her property. She sought out her former
employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole
certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and
sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to
convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.[22]
What is more, there was no showing at all that the
accused knew or should have known that the very stolen
articles were the ones sold to him. “One is deemed to
know a particular fact if he has the cognizance,
consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the
existence of something, or has the acquaintance with
facts, or if he has something within the mind’s grasp with
certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of
a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence unless he actually believes that
it does not exist. On the other hand, the words “should
know” denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his
conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness
about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of
an accused and state with certainty what is contained
therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from
the overt acts of that person. And given two equally
 [9]
plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the Section 5, P. D. No. 1612. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
court should choose the one which sustains the DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE
[10]
constitutional presumption of innocence.”[23] Section 3, P.D. No. 1612. VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 386 OF THE CITY OF
[11] BAGUIO, BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION INC., and JUNIOR
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen 234 SCRA 63, on p. 72 [1994].
CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY, INC., petitioners-
articles, he can not be guilty of “fencing”.[24] [12] appellants,
People vs. Aranda, 226 SCRA 562 [1993].
vs.
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish [13]
People vs. Escalona, 227 SCRA 325 [1993]. THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY
the essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is OF BAGUIO, respondents-appellees.
entitled to an acquittal. [14]
People vs. Escalona, supra, on p. 328.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS [15]
People vs. Januario, 335 Phil. 268 [1997].
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 20059 and hereby ACQUITS petitioner of the [16]
People vs. Januario, supra.
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 92-108222 of the DE CASTRO, J:
[17]
Regional Trial Court, Manila. People vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 [1979].
[18] In this petition for declaratory relief originally filed in the
Costs de oficio. People vs. de la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245, 256 [1997],
Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch II, what is
citing People vs. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 [1995].
SO ORDERED. involved is the validity of Ordinance 386 passed by the
[19]
People vs. Roluna, 231 SCRA 446, 452 [1997]; City Council of Baguio City which took effect on February
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, People vs. Madlangbayan, 94 SCRA 685 23, 1967, quoted together with the explanatory note, as
Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. [1979]; People vs. Taruc, 16 SCRA 834, 837 [1966]. follows:
[20]
People vs. Rodrigo, 123 Phil. 310, 312-313 [1966];
ORDINANCE 386
Santos vs. People, 181 SCRA 487, 492 [1990];
* Abundo vs. Sandiganbayan, 205 SCRA 193, 196 [1992].
In CA-G.R. CR No. 20059, promulgated on January 29,
1998, Montoya, J., ponente, Vidallon-Magtolis and AN ORDINANCE CONSIDERING ALL
[21]
Cosico, JJ., concurring.* Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, 1988, SQUATTERS OF PUBLIC LAND,
**
In Criminal Case No. 92-108222, decision dated August p. 218. OTHER THAN THOSE EARMARKED
5, 1996, Judge Zenaida R. Daguna, presiding.** [22] FOR PUBLIC USE IN THE CITY OF
People vs. de la Cruz, supra. BAGUIO WHO ARE DULY
[23]
Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, supra., REGISTERED AS SUCH AT THE
on pp.73-74, citing Diong-an vs. Court of Appeals, 138 TIME OF THE PROMULGATION OF
SCRA 39 [1985]. THIS ORDINANCE AS BONAFIDE
[1]
Rollo, pp. 69-71. OCCUPANTS OF THEIR
[2]
[24]
Cf. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. III, 1988 ed. RESPECTIVE LOTS AND WHICH
Petition, Rollo, p. 11. SHALL HEREAFTER BE EMBRACED
p. 212; People vs. de Guzman, supra.
[3] AS A CITY GOVERNMENT
Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People, 234 SCRA 63, 71 [1994];
People vs. de Guzman, 227 SCRA 64, 67 [1993]. HOUSING PROJECT AND
Republic of the Philippines PROVIDING FOR OTHER
[4] SUPREME COURT PURPOSES.
Article 293, Revised Penal Code; People vs. de Manila
Guzman, supra, on p. 67.
[5] Upon strong recommendation of the
Article 308, Revised Penal Code. EN BANC Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer, on
[6]
People vs. de Guzman, supra, on p. 68. Motion of all the Councilors, seconded
G.R. No. L-27247 April 20, 1983 by the same, be it ordained by the City
[7] Council assembled:
Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People, supra.
[8]
People vs. de Guzman,, supra.
Section l.—All public lands within
Baguio townsite which are occupied
by squatters who are duly registered
as such at the time of the
promulgation of this Ordinance such
public lands not designated by city
and national authorities for public use,
shall be considered as embraced and
comprising a City Government
Housing Project; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, That areas covered by
Executive Orders or Presidential
Proclamations but the city had made
official representation for the lifting of
such orders or proclamation shall be
deemed to be part of the Baguio
Townsite for the purposes of this
ordinance;
Section 2.—Building permits shall
have been deemed issued to all
squatters as contemplated by this
Ordinance, giving such squatters five
years from the approval of this
Ordinance to satisfactorily comply with
city building specifications and
payment of the corresponding city
building permit fees;
Section 3.—All cases pending in court
against squatters be dropped without
prejudice to the full prosecution of all
subsequent violations in relation to the
provisions of existing city ordinances
and/or resolutions;
Section 4.—All squatters be given all
the necessary and needed protection
of the City Government against the
stringent provisions of the Public Land
Act, particularly on public bidding, in
that the lots occupied by said
squatters be awarded to them by
direct sale through Presidential
Proclamation;
Section 5.—The City Government entrusted with the duty of: (1)
shall not be interested in making Consolidating a list of all city squatters
financial profit out of the project and who shall be benefitted in
that the appraisal and evaluation of contemplation and under the
the said lots shall be made at provisions of this Ordinance; (2) To
minimum cost per square meters, the assist and help the squatters in the
total cost of the lots made payable preparation of all the necessary and
within the period of ten years; required paper work and relative items
in connection with their application
over their respective lots; (3) To seek
Section 6.—The minimum lot area
and locate other areas within the
requirements shall be disregarded in
Baguio Townsite conveniently situated
cases where it could not be
and which will be earmarked as
implemented due to existing
subsequently housing projects of the
congestion of houses, and that, if
city for landless bonafide city
necessary, areas applied for under
residents; and (4) To carry out and
this ordinance shall be reduced to that
implement the provisions of this
which is practical under the
Ordinance without the least possible
circumstances; PROVIDED,
delay.
HOWEVER, That squatters in
congested areas shall be given
preference in the transfer to EXPLANATORY NOTE
resettlement areas or government
housing projects earmarked as such
This ordinance is primarily designed to
under the provisions of this ordinance,
extend a helping hand to the
if and when it becomes necessary to
numerous landless city residents and
ease congestion or when their lots
the called 'Squatters' within the Baguio
shall be traversed by the laying of
Townsite in their desire to acquire
roads or are needed for public use;
residential lots which they may rightly
call their own.
Section 7.—The amount of
P20,000.00 or so much as is
The reported people who have
necessary, for the lot survey of each
violated the City's building ordinances
squatter's lot be appropriated, such
were not so guarded by any criminal
survey of which shall be conducted by
perversity, but where given to it more
licensed private surveyors through
by circumstances of necessity and
public biddings; PROVIDED, That,
that they are, therefore, entitled to a
said expenses for survey shall be
more human treatment, more of
included in the overall cost of each lot;
understanding and more of pity rather
than be herded before the courts,
Section 8.—The three-man control likened to hardened criminals and
committed for the Quirino-Magsaysay deliberate violators of our laws and
housing project which was previously ordinances.
created under City Ordinance No. 344,
shall exercise administration and
PRESENT AND VOTING:
supervision of the city government
housing projects created under this
Ordinance shall, furthermore, be
 Hon. Norberto de Guzman — Vice
Mayor Presiding Officer Hon.
Gaudencio Floresca — Councilor Hon.
Jose S. Florendo — Councilor Hon.
Francisco G. Mayo — Councilor Hon.
Braulio D. Yaranon — Councilor Hon.
Sinforoso Fañgonil — Councilor
The petition for declaratory relief filed with the Court of
First Instance of Baguio, Branch II, prays for a judgment
declaring the Ordinance as invalid and illegal ab initio. The
respondents-appellees, the City Council and the City
Mayor, filed motions to dismiss the petition which were
denied. Nonetheless, in the decision thereafter rendered,
the petition was dismissed on the grounds that: 1) another
court, the Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, had
declared the Ordinance valid in a criminal case filed
against the squatters for illegal construction, and the
Branch II of the same court cannot, in a declaratory
proceeding, review and determine the validity of said
judgment pursuant to the policy of judicial respect and
stability; 2) those who come within the protection of the
ordinance have not been made parties to the suit in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 64 and it has been held
that the non-joinder of such parties is a jurisdictional
defect; and 3) the court is clothed with discretion to refuse
to make any declaration where the declaration is not
necessary and proper at the time under all circumstances,
e.g. where the declaration would be of no practical help in
ending the controversy or would not stabilize the disputed
legal relation, citing Section 5 of Rule 64; ICJS 1033-1034;
16 AM. JUR 287-289; Hoskyns vs. National City Bank of
New York, 85 Phil. 201.
Hence, the instant appeal which was perfected in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 42, before the
approval of Republic Act No. 5440 on September 9, 1968.
1. The case before the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
Branch 1, dealt with the criminal liability of the accused for
constructing their houses without obtaining building
permits, contrary to Section 47 in relation to Section 52 of
the Revised Ordinances of Baguio, which act the said
court considered as pardoned by Section 2 of Ordinance
386. The court in said case upheld the power of the
Municipal Council to legalize the acts punished by the
aforesaid provisions of the Revised Ordinances of Baguio,
stating that the Municipal Council is the policy determining
body of Baguio City and therefore it can amend, repeal,
alter or modify its own laws as it did when it enacted
Ordinance 386. In deciding the case, the first branch of the
court a quo did not declare the whole Ordinance valid. This
is clear when it stated that "had the issue been the
legalization of illegal occupation of public land, covered by
Republic Act No. 947, ... the Ordinance in question should
have been ultra vires and unconstitutional." 1 Said court
merely confined itself to Sections 2 and 3 of Ordinance
386. It did not make any definite pronouncement whether
or not the City Council has the power to legalize the illegal
occupation of public land which is the issue in the instant
case. It is noteworthy that the court, in passing upon the
validity of the aforesaid sections, was apparently guided by
the rule that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to
the organic law, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid may stand and be
enforced. Contrary to what was said in the decision under
review, the second branch of the court a quo was not
called upon to determine the validity of the judgment of the
first branch.
2. The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the
Ordinance in question as party defendants in this case
cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Baguio. There is nothing in Section 2 of Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court which says that the non-joinder of persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by
the declaration is a jurisdictional defect. Said section
merely states that "All persons shall be made parties who
have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration; and no declaration shall, except or otherwise
provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the action." This section contemplates a situation
where there are other persons who would be affected by
the declaration, but were not impleaded as necessary
parties, in which case the declaration shall not prejudice
them. If at all, the case may be dismissed not on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the reason stated in
Section 5 of the same Rule stating that "the Court may
refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to
construe instruments in any case where a decision would
not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave
rise to the action, or any case where the declaration or
construction is not necessary and proper at the time under
all circumstances."
It must be noted that the reason for the law requiring the
joinder of all necessary parties is that failure to do so
would deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying
function the action for declaratory relief is calculated to
subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration
and may raise the Identical issue. 2 In the case at bar,
although it is true that any declaration by the court would
affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parties
because the question involved is the power of the
Municipal Council to enact the Ordinances in question.
Whether or not they are impleaded, any determination of
the controversy would be binding upon the squatters.
A different situation obtains in the case of Degala v.
Reyes 3 cited in the decision under review. The Degala
case involves the validity of the trust created in the will of
the testator. In the said case, the Roman Catholic Church
which was a necessary party, being the one which would
be most vitally affected by the declaration of the nullity of
the will was not brought in as party. The Court therefore,
refused to make any declaratory judgment on ground of
jurisdictional defect, for there can be no final judgment that
could be rendered and the Roman Catholic not being
bound by such judgment might raise the Identical issue,
making therefore the declaration a mere exercise in futility.
This is not true in the instant case. A declaration on the
nullity of the ordinance, would give the squatters no right
which they are entitled to protect. The party most
interested to sustain and defend the legality of the
Ordinance is the body that passed it, the City Council, and
together with the City Mayor, is already a party in these
proceedings.
3. The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It
considered all squatters of public land in the City of Baguio
as bona-fide occupants of their respective lots. As we have
stated in City of Manila v. Garcia, 4 et al.:
Squatting is unlawful and no amount
of acquiescence on the part of the city
officials will elevate it into a lawful act.
In principle, a compound of illegal
entry and official permit to stay is
obnoxious to our concept of proper
official norm of conduct. Because,
 such permit does not serve social
justice; it fosters moral decadence. It
does not promote public welfare; it
abets disrespect for the law. It has its
roots in vice; so it is an infected
bargain. Official approval of squatting
should not, therefore, be permitted to
obtain in this country where there is an
orderly form of government.
In the same case, squatting was characterized as a
widespread vice and a blight Thus:
Since the last global war, squatting on
another's property in this country has
become a widespread vice. It was and
is a blight Squatter's areas pose
problems of health, sanitation. They
are breeding places for crime. They
constitute proof that respect for the
law and the rights of others, even
those of the government are being
flouted. Knowingly, squatters have
embarked on the pernicious act of
occupying property whenever and
wherever convenient to their interests
without as much as leave, and even
against the will, of the owner. They are
emboldened seemingly because of
their belief that they could violate the
law with impunity. The
pugnaciousness of some of them has
tied up the hands of legitimate owners.
The latter are thus prevented from
recovering possession by peaceful
means. Government lands have not
been spared by them. They know, of
course, that instrusion into property,
government or private, is wrong. But,
then the wheels of justice grind slow,
mainly because of lawyers who, by
means, fair or foul, are quite often
successful in procuring delay of the
day of reckoning. Rampancy of
forcible entry into government lands
particularly, is abetted by the apathy of
some public officials to enforce the
government's rights. Obstinacy of
these squatters is difficult to explain circumstances of necessity and that they are, therefore,
unless it is spawned by official entitled to a more human treatment, more understanding
tolerance, if not outright and more of pity rather than be herded before the courts,
encouragement or protection. Said likened to hardened criminals and deliberate violators of
squatters have become insensible to our laws and ordinances." 6
the difference between right and
wrong. To them, violation of law
Our pronouncement in Astudillo vs. Board of Directors of
means nothing. With the result that
PHHC 7 is relevant to this case. Thus—
squatters still exists, much to the
detriment of public interest. It is high
time that, in this aspect, sanity and the In carrying out its social re-adjustment
rule of law be restored. It is in this policies, the government could not
environment that we look into the simply lay aside moral standards, and
validity of the permits granted aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and
defendants herein. intruders, unmindful of the lawful and
unlawful origin and character of their
occupancy. Such a policy would
In the above cited case, the land occupied by the squatters
perpetuate conflicts instead of
belongs to the City of Manila. In the instant case, the land
attaining their just solution. (Bernardo
occupied by the squatters are portions of water sheds,
vs. Bernardo, 96 Phil. 202, 206.)
reservations, scattered portions of the public domain within
the Baguio townsite. Certainly, there is more reason then
to void the actions taken by the City of Baguio through the Indeed, the government has
questioned ordinance. enunciated a militant policy against
squatters. Thus, Letter of Instruction
No. 19 dated October 2, 1972 orders
Being unquestionably a public land, no disposition thereof
city and district engineers 'to remove
could be made by the City of Baguio without prior
all illegal constructions including
legislative authority. It is the fundamental principle that the
buildings ... and those built without
state possesses plenary power in law to determine who
permits on public or private property'
shall be favored recipients of public domain, as well as
and providing for the relocation of
under what terms such privilege may be granted not
squatters (68 O.G. 7962. See Letter of
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of exercising
Instruction No. 19-A). As noted by
what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. And
Justice Sanchez, since the last global
the law has laid in the Director of Lands the power of
war, squatting on another's property in
exclusive control, administrations, disposition and
this country has become a widespread
alienation of public land that includes the survey,
vice. (City of Manila vs.. Garcia, L-
classification, lease, sale or any other form of concessions
26053, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 413,
or disposition and management of the lands of public
418).
domains. 5
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Ordinance 386 is
Nor could the enactment of Ordinance 386 be justified by
hereby rendered nullified and without force and effect.
stating that "this Ordinance is primarily designed to extend
a helping hand to the numerous landless city residents and
the so called squatters within the Baguio townsite in their SO ORDERED.
desire to acquire residential lots which they may rightly call
their own and that the reported people who have violated
the City's building ordinances were not so guided by any
criminal perversity, but were given to it more by
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Armeña-Hidalgo-Luna Law Offices for petitioner. The Civil Service Commission referred the matter to the
Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Vasquez, Relova Malilipot Mayor, who replied with a firm expression of his
and Gutierrez, JJ., concur. refusal to reinstate petitioner for the reason that there was
Alfredo Kallos for private respondent.
actually no acquittal which could be the basis of
petitioner's reinstatement with back salaries. While the
Teehankee, J., took no part.
matter was pending in the Commission, petitioner filed an
action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Albay
Aquino, J., is on leave. to compel reinstatement and payment of back salaries.
PLANA, J.: The court dismissed the action. Hence this petition seeking
reversal of the said decision.
Footnotes
Some years back, petitioner, a policeman of Malilipot
Albay, was suspended by respondent Mayor Marciano The petition has no merit. The law predicates
1 Record on Appeal (Decision of the Bitara because of four criminal cases filed against him in reinstatement with entitlement to back salaries on
CFI of Baguio, Branch I in Criminal the Municipal Court of Tabaco, Albay, to wit: assault upon
"acquittal". The dismiss of the criminal cases filed against
Case Nos. 2553 to 2690), p. 93. an agent (another policeman) of a person in authority with petitioner after he had paid the offended parties, without
homicide; less serious physical injuries thru reckless trial on the merits, was not an acquittal.
imprudence; illegal possession of firearm; and alarm and
2 Degala v. Reyes, 87 Phil. 649 citing
scandal .
Hoskyns v. National City Bank of New It is obvious that when the statute
York, 85 Phil. 201. speaks of the suspended officer being
Before the cases could be tried on the merits, the
"acquitted" it means that after due
prosecution moved for their provisional dismissal on hearing and consideration of the
3 Ibid, citing 7 C.J.S., 1049.
account of the desistance of the offended parties who had evidence against him the court is of
been paid by petitioner. The motion was granted by the
the opinion that his guilt has not been
4 19 SCRA 413. court. Petitioner later sought a modification of the proved beyond reasonable doubt.
provisional dismissal to an absolute dismissal, which was Dismissal of the case against the
also granted by the court.
5 Francisco v. Rodriguez, 67 SCRA suspended officer will not suffice
212, 217. because dismissal does not amount to
Petitioner then filed with the Civil Service Commission a acquittal. As aptly stated in People vs.
petition for reinstatement and payment of the salaries he Salico, 84 Phil. 722, 732-733 [1949]:
6 Record on Appeal (Explanatory note failed to receive during his suspension, invoking the
of ordinance 386 pp. 87- 88.)
second paragraph of Section 16, Republic Act No. 4864, "Acquittal is
otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, which always based on
7 73 SCRA 15. provides: the merits, that is,
the defendant is
Republic of the Philippines When a member of the police force or acquitted because
SUPREME COURT agency is accused in court of any the evidence does
Manila felony or violation of law . . ., the city not show that
mayor or municipal mayor concerned, defendant's guilt
shall immediately suspend the is beyond a
FIRST DIVISION accused from office pending the final reasonable doubt;
decision by the court, and in case of but dismissal
G.R. No. L-31753 July 31, 1984 acquittal the accused shall be entitled does not decide
to immediate reinstatement and the the case on the
Payment of the entire salary he failed merits or that the
JOSE V. BONAFE petitioner, to receive during his suspension . ... defendant is not
vs. (emphasis supplied.) guilty. Dismissal
HON. ROBERTO ZURBANO, et al., respondents. terminates the
proceeding, either committed within Republic of the Philippines
because the court the territorial SUPREME COURT
is not a court of jurisdiction of the Manila
competent court and the
jurisdiction or the case is dismiss
FIRST DIVISION
evidence does not the dismissal is
show that the not an acquittal,
offense was inasmuch as if it G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
committed within were so the
the territorial defendant could
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
jurisdiction of the not be again
court, or the prosecuted before vs.
complaint or the court of THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
information is not competent
valid or sufficient jurisdiction; and it
in form and is elemental that
substance, etc. in such case the
The only case in defendant may
which the word again be DE CASTRO, J.:
dismissal is prosecuted for the
commonly but not same offense In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna
correctly used, before a court of seeks the reversal of the decision dated August 14,
instead of the competent 19741 in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People of the
proper term jurisdiction." Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna,
acquittal, is when, (Malanyaon vs. defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of Appeals
after the Lising, 106 SCRA affirming the judgment of the City Court of
prosecution has 237 at 239.) Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2, 1971 which found the
presented all its petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the
evidence, the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced
It is also noted that as regards the charge of assault upon
defendant moves her to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment
an agent of a person in authority with homicide, the case
for the dismissal in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
was before the municipal court only for preliminary
and the court
investigation. Certainly, the petitioner could not have been
dismisses the
acquitted therein. Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of
case on the
ground that the Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance
evidence fails to Apart from the foregoing, petitioner has failed to exhaust Act on November 21, 1970 in an information 3 which reads
show beyond a administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. as follows:
reasonable doubt When he filed with the court a quo the case subject of the
that the defendant instant petition, his petition for reinstatement was pending That on or before the 21st day of
is guilty; for in in Civil Service Commission, as it still is. June, 1969, in the City of Cabanatuan,
such case the Republic of the Philippines, and within
dismissal is in the jurisdiction of this Honorable
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
reality an acquittal Court, the above-named accused, did
because the case then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
is decided on the SO ORDERED. feloniously act as agent in the
merits. If the solicitation or procurement of an
prosecution fails application for insurance by soliciting
to prove that the Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Relova,
therefor the application of one
offense was Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
 Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a
duly organized insurance company,
registered under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting
in the issuance of a Broad Personal
Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in
the amount not exceeding FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
dated June 21, 1969, without said
accused having first secured a
certificate of authority to act as such
agent from the office of the Insurance
Commissioner, Republic of the
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals
are quoted hereunder:
IT RESULTING: That there is no
debate that since 7 March, 1969 and
as of 21 June, 1969, appellant's
husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was
duly licensed by Insurance
Commission as agent to Perla
Compania de Seguros, with license to
expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on
that date, at Cabanatuan City,
Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was
issued by Perla thru its author
representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna,
for a period of twelve (12) months with
beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for
P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by
violence during lifetime of policy, and
for reasons not explained in record,
present information was filed by
Fiscal, with assistance of private
prosecutor, charging wife of Rodolfo
with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance
Law for having, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously acted, "as agent in the
solicitation for insurance by soliciting
therefore the application of one
Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of
Perla Compaña de Seguros, ... 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
without said accused having first APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
secured a certificate of authority to act RECEIPT OF COMPENSATION IS
as such agent from the office of the NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
Insurance Commission, Republic of THE CRIME DEFINED BY THE
the Philippines." FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION
189 OF THE INSURANCE ACT.
and in the trial, People presented
evidence that was hardly disputed, 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
that aforementioned policy was issued APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE
with active participation of appellant WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-
wife of Rodolfo, against which 17, INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO
appellant in her defense sought to ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S GUILT
show that being the wife of true agent, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in
his work, as clerk, and that policy was
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
merely a renewal and was issued
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
because Isidro had called by
ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER.
telephone to renew, and at that time,
her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and
so she left a note on top of her We find the petition meritorious.
husband's desk to renew ...
The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be
Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section
as charged. On appeal, the trial court's decision was 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second
affirmed by the respondent appellate court finding the paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is
petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of necessary to determine whether or not the agent
Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, this present mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is
recourse was filed on October 22, 1974. 5 governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on
its second paragraph.
In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved,
without giving due course to this instant petition, to require The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
the respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. In reads as follows:
the comment 7 filed on December 20, 1974, the
respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, submitted that petitioner may not be considered No insurance company doing
business within the Philippine Islands,
as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 8 On
April 3, 1975, petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the nor any agent thereof, shall pay any
Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a commission or other compensation to
any person for services in obtaining
manifestation 10 in lieu of a Brief on May 3, 1975 reiterating
his stand that the petitioner has not violated Section 189 of new insurance, unless such person
the Insurance Act. shall have first procured from the
Insurance Commissioner a certificate
of authority to act as an agent of such
In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner company as hereinafter provided. No
assigns the following errors 11 allegedly committed by the person shall act as agent, sub-agent,
appellate court: or broker in the solicitation of
procurement of applications for Any person or company violating the company or
insurance, or receive for services in provisions of this section shall be fined transmits for a
obtaining new insurance, any in the sum of five hundred pesos. On person other than
commission or other compensation the conviction of any person acting as himself an
from any insurance company doing agent, sub-agent, or broker, of the application for a
business in the Philippine Islands, or commission of any offense connected policy of
agent thereof, without first procuring a with the business of insurance, the insurance to or
certificate of authority so to act from Insurance Commissioner shall from such
the Insurance Commissioner, which immediately revoke the certificate of company or offers
must be renewed annually on the first authority issued to him and no such or assumes to act
day of January, or within six months certificate shall thereafter be issued to in the negotiating
thereafter. Such certificate shall be such convicted person. of such insurance,
issued by the Insurance shall be an
Commissioner only upon the written insurance agent
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that
application of persons desiring such within the intent of
the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting
authority, such application being this section, and
as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or
approved and countersigned by the shall thereby
procurement of applications for insurance without first
company such person desires to become liable to
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the
represent, and shall be upon a form all the duties,
Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph
approved by the Insurance requirements,
defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this
Commissioner, giving such liabilities, and
section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes
information as he may require. The penalties, to
the penalty to be imposed for its violation.
Insurance Commissioner shall have which an agent of
the right to refuse to issue or renew such company is
and to revoke any such certificate in The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is subject.
his discretion. No such certificate shall prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section paragraph 2, Sec.
be valid, however, in any event after 189 of the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. Thus 189, Insurance
the first day of July of the year — Law,
following the issuing of such
certificate. Renewal certificates may
... it can no longer be denied that it now it is true that information does not
be issued upon the application of the
was appellant's most active endeavors even allege that she had obtained the
company.
that resulted in issuance of policy to insurance,
Isidro, she was there and then acting
Any person who for as agent, and received the pay thereof
for compensation
compensation solicits or obtains — her defense that she was only
insurance on behalf of any insurance acting as helper of her husband can
company, or transmits for a person no longer be sustained, neither her which is the gist of the offense in
other than himself an application for a point that she received no Section 189 of the Insurance Law in
policy of insurance to or from such compensation for issuance of the its 2nd paragraph, but what appellant
company or offers or assumes to act policy because apparently overlooks is that she is
in the negotiating of such insurance, prosecuted not under the 2nd but
shall be an insurance agent within the under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189
any person who
intent of this section, and shall thereby wherein it is provided that,
become liable to all the duties, for compensation
requirements, liabilities, and penalties solicits or obtains
insurance on No person shall
to which an agent of such company is
subject. behalf of any act as agent, sub-
insurance agent, or broker,
 in the solicitation We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed specific by considering the company in which it is found or
or procurement of out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance with which it is associated. 17
applications for agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is
insurance, or intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as
receive for and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More
found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the
services in significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly
agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a
obtaining new provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within
compensation by the agent is an essential element for a
insurance any the intent of Section 189. Hence —
violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The
commission or
appellate court has established ultimately that the
other
Any person who for compensation ... petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for
compensation
shall be an insurance agent within the the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
from any
intent of this section, ... Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate
insurance
court for, according to the latter, the receipt of
company doing
compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not an
business in the Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the
essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of
Philippine Island, second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
or agent thereof, mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section.
without first The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and
procuring a interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent" We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911,
certificate of mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for
authority to act aforesaid section. direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without
from the a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an
insurance information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive
commissioner, Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second
compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no
paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
which must be offense. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the provision
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three
renewed annually of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma
on the first day of paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be
1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as
January, or within ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.
insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in
six months The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance
thereafter. studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with
therefore, there was no technical produce harmonious whole. 13 A statute must be so
Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation
defect in the wording of the charge, so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
that Errors 2 and 4 must be provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the law, it
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
overruled. 12 must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of
single part, portion or section or from isolated words and
the crime must be alleged and proved. 20
phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent
consideration or view of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of
appellate court seems to imply that the definition of an
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the After going over the records of this case, We are fully
insurance agent under the second paragraph of Section
context. This means that every part of the statute must be convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that
189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in
considered together with the other parts, and kept accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
the first paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment,
concludes that under the second paragraph of Section
not separately and independently. 16 More importantly, the
189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed
doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides
obtains an insurance for compensation, but, in its first and the accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with
that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is
paragraph, there is no necessity that a person solicits an costs de oficio.
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
insurance for compensation in order to be called an
meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
insurance agent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Acting C.J.,) Makasiar, De Castro, Fernandez, 14 People vs. Polmon 86 Phil. 350. DIVINAGRACIA, ALAN ALINSUGAY and
Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. CLAUDIO AGAN, respondents.
15 82 C.J.S., Section 345, pp. 699-
Plana, J., took no part. 700. DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:
16 Tamayo vs. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953.

Before the Court is a petition for review

Footnotes 17 Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh on certiorari of the Decision, dated 16 May 1996 of the
& Dizon, 75 Phil. 371. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46554 and of its
1 p. 21, Rollo. Resolution, dated November 1996 denying petitioners’
18 Jasper vs. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R motion for reconsideration of said decision. The Court of
197; 164 S.W. 851. Appeals’ decision reversed and set aside the resolution of
2 p. 11, CA Rollo. the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 19, in Civil Case
No. CEB-15310, dismissing for lack of jurisdiction
19 149 p. 1074, 11 Okla. Crim. 594. respondents’ complaint for damages against petitioners for
3 p. 10, CA Rollo.
terminating their employment by fraudulently inducing
20 People vs. Sy Gesiong, 60 Phil. them to accept petitioners’ “retrenchment program.”
4 pp. 21-22, Rollo.
614.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
5 p. 7, Rollo. In 1981, San Miguel Corporation (SMC) informed its
FIRST DIVISION
Mandaue City Brewery employees that it was suffering
6 p. 36, Rollo. from heavy losses and financial distress which could
eventually lead to its total closure. In several meetings
convened by SMC with its employees, it was explained to
7 p. 51, Rollo. [G.R. No. 127639. December 3, 1999] them that the distressed state of SMC was caused by its
poor sales performance which, in order to survive, called
8 p. 58, Rollo. for a cutback in production and a corresponding reduction
in the work force. Because of this, SMC offered its
“Retrenchment to Prevent Loss Program” to its
9 p. 69, Rollo. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION and BERNARDO NOEL in employees. The offering of the retrenchment program was
his capacity as Industrial Relations coupled with an unsolicited advise from SMC that it would
10 p. 71, Rollo. Manager, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO ETCUBAN, be in the best interest of the affected employees to avail of
BERNABE ETCUBAN, NORBERTO LABUCA, the said program since, by doing so, they would be able to
FELIPE ECHAVEZ, BERNARDINO obtain their retrenchment benefits and privileges with
11 p. 69, Rollo; p. 6, Brief for the ENJAMBRE, ROGELIO ABELLANOSA, ease. SMC admonished its employees that their failure to
Petitioner. ROMULO CATALAN, PEDRO EBOT, avail of the retrenchment program might lead to difficulty in
ANATOLIO GERALDIZO, JOSE ALFANTA, following-up and obtaining their separation pay from
12 pp. 25 and 26, Rollo. EDUARDO LOFRANCO, LECERIO PARBA, SMC’s main office in Manila.
RAFAEL AGUILAR, RICARDO LACUAREN,
BENJAMIN ALESNA, ANTONIO BACUS, Convinced by the representations and importunings
13 Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. PRIMO SOTEROL, JESUS JADORMEO, of SMC, respondents, who had been employees of SMC
709; Tamayo vs. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953; MANUEL MANKIKIS, APRONIANO ANG, since the 1960s, availed of the retrenchment program at
Lopez vs. El Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil. RENATO VILLALON, SAMUEL OUANO, JOSE various times in 1981, 1982 and 1983. After their inclusion
249; Chartered Bank vs. Imperial, 48 DELA, JESUS BASILGO, CATALINO COLE, in the retrenchment program, respondents were given their
Phil. 931. SR., ALFREDO GONZALES, RAMON FLORES, termination letters and separation pay. In return,
MARCOS VITO CRUZ, JACINTO
respondents executed “receipt and release” documents in
favor of SMC.
Sometime in May of 1986, respondents got hold of
an SMC publication allegedly revealing that SMC was
never in financial distress during the time when they were
being retrenched but was, in fact, enjoying a growth in
sales. Respondents also learned that, during their
retrenchment, SMC was engaged in hiring new
employees. Thus, respondents concluded that SMC’s
financial distress story and retrenchment program were
merely schemes to rid itself of regular employees and,
thus, avoid the payment of their actual benefits.
On 17 October 1988, respondents filed a complaint
before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the
declaration of nullity of the retrenchment program. In their
complaint, respondents alleged that they were former
regular employees of SMC who were deceived into
severing their employment due to SMC’s concocted
financial distress story and fraudulent retrenchment
program. Respondents prayed for reinstatement,
backwages and damages. On 25 July 1989, the Labor
Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, stating:
What is apparent from their allegations, however, is that
complainants are contesting their respective terminations
pursuant to the Retrenchment Program effected by San
Miguel Corporation in 1981, 1982, and 1983. These then
are claims for illegal dismissal which fall within the ambit of
Article 291 of the New Labor Code. It provides:
ART. 291. Money claims. – All money claims arising from
employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity
of this Code, shall be filed within three (3) years from the
time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be
forever barred. x x x
Under the aforequoted provision therefore, complainants’
causes of action have already prescribed.
Even if this Office were to apply the more liberal
interpretation of the above provisions enunciated by the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of
Callanta vs. Carnation Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 70615, Nov. 3,
1986, an interpretation that views illegal dismissal as an
injury upon the rights of a person, hence, under Article
1146 of the Civil Code prescribes in 4 years, those who
were retrenched in 1983, at the very latest, had only until
1987 to institute a complaint against SMC.
The records will show that all the above captioned cases
were filed in 1988.
Clearly, therefore, complainants’ causes of action have
already prescribed.[1]
Respondents then appealed to the NLRC which, on 20
December 1990, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the labor arbiter.
On 14 December 1993, respondents, who were
thirty-one (31) in number, again filed a complaint[2] against
SMC, but this time before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 19. Although their complaint was captioned
as an action for damages, respondents sought the
declaration of nullity of their so-called collective “contract of
termination” with SMC. Respondents theorized that SMC’s
offer of retrenchment and their acceptance of the same
resulted in the consummation of a collective “contract of
termination” between themselves and SMC. Respondents
asserted that since the cause of their “contract of
termination” was non-existent,i.e., the claim of SMC that it
was under financial distress, the said contract is null and
void. In this regard, respondents claimed that they were
entitled to damages because of the deception employed
upon them by SMC which led to their separation from the
company. They further asseverated that their separation
from employment resulted in the loss of earnings and other
benefits. Hence, they prayed that petitioners jointly and
severally be ordered, among others, to pay each of them
the sum of P650,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and 25% of whatever may be
awarded to them as attorney’s fees.
Instead of filing an answer, SMC filed a motion to
dismiss on the bases of lack of jurisdiction, res
judicata, payment, prescription and failure to state a cause
of action. On 21 June 1994, the RTC issued a resolution
granting SMC’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and prescription. The pertinent portion of the
resolution reads:
Although plaintiffs, among others, pray for the declaration
of nullity of the contract of termination, their main cause is
for damages, actual, compensatory and moral damages in
the “aggregate amount of P650,000.00 each
and P1,200,000.00 each” for plaintiffs Bernabe Etcuban
and Jose Dela. The alleged acts leading to their signing of
the contract of termination are acts constituting labor
disputes. It is a case for damages resulting from illegal
termination. Under Article 217 of the Labor Code, such
cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission. In fact, in 1988, plaintiffs instituted the same
case for “Implementation of Art. 217, par. 5, now (sic)
Labor Code and Declaration of Nullity of ‘Retrenchment’
Program, and Damages” (see annex “A” to motion to
Dismiss) with the National Labor Relations
Commission. Their cases were dismissed, not because of
lack of jurisdiction, but because their cause of action
already prescribed, the cases having been filed after the
three-year prescriptive period. Plaintiffs have already
submitted to the jurisdiction of the NLRC when they filed
their cases with that agency. And they prayed for the
declaration of nullity of the retrenchment program of
defendant corporation. It was only after the dismissal of
those cases that they instituted this present suit.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the contract of termination which plaintiffs were
allegedly induced to sign is not void from the beginning. At
most, such contract is voidable, plaintiffs’ consent thereto
being allegedly vitiated by fraud and deceit.
Thus plaintiffs allege that “the brainwashing conducting
(ted) on the affected employees through briefings and
pulong-pulongs relative to the actual economic condition of
defendant corporation finally led plaintiffs to believe that
indeed said defendant was incurring losses and has opted
to reduce its production to arrest an immediate collapse of
its operations. Thus, the corresponding need to cut down
on its work force;” (par. 11, complaint); “This distressed
state of affairs of the defendant corporation inculcated into
their (sic) minds of defendants and the worry of non-
recovery of their benefits in the event defendant
corporation closes down, induced plaintiffs to accept the
“offer of retrenchment”. Thereupon, they were paid their
so-called “separation pay”. Hence, the contract of
termination evidenced by individual termination letters and
benefits paid to each plaintiff was consummated.” (par.
12). But that “records, however, revealed that from 1973
up to 1983, inclusive, defendant corporation never suffered
any business reverses or losses in its operation.”; (par. 13,
complaint).
When the consent of one of the contracting parties is
vitiated by fraud or deceit, the resulting contract is only
voidable or annulable, not void or inexistent. The action to
annul the same should be filed within four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud or deceit. According to plaintiffs’
complaint, they “acquired knowledge of the actual
business condition of defendant corporation only in May
1986 when one of them got hold of a copy of the
company’s publication. That was the time they discovered
that indeed, defendants deceived them x x x. (par. 14,
complaint.) From May 1986 to January 14, 1993, more
than six (6) years have already elapsed. Clearly, the
action, has already prescribed.
The rest of the grounds need not be discussed.
WHEREFORE, for want of jurisdiction, and on the further
ground of prescription, the above-entitled case is
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Respondents seasonably appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA). In its Decision dated 16 May 1996, the CA
reversed and set aside the lower court’s order of dismissal
and remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
A scrutiny of the allegations of the present complaint
reveals that plaintiffs’ cause of action is not actually based
on an employer-employee relationship between the
plaintiffs and the defendants. It primarily involves a civil
dispute arising from the claim of plaintiffs that the cause for
the contract of termination of their services is inexistent
rendering said contract as null an void from the
beginning. x x x
xxx xxx x x x.
Guided thereby, we find that recourse by plaintiffs-
appellants to the civil law on contracts by raising the issue
[of] whether or not the contract of termination of services
entered into by plaintiffs with defendants is void from the
beginning due to inexistent cause of action under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, places the case within the
jurisdiction of the civil courts.
As refined by the Supreme Court, where the resolution of
the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management
relations nor in wage structures and other terms and
conditions of employment, but rather in the application of
the general civil law, such claim falls outside the area of
competence of expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC. Thus, the trial court erred in
finding that it has no jurisdiction over the case.
Secondly, the trial court erred in ruling that the complaint of
plaintiffs-appellants has prescribed. Article 1410 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 1409 as herein before
quoted, specifically provides that the action for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract on ground (3)
above does not prescribe.
Thirdly, one of the requisites for the application of the
principle of res judicata is that there must be a judgment
on the merits in the earlier case involving the same parties
and the same issues. Plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint was
dismissed by the NLRC on the ground that their cause of
action had prescribed; no trial has been held on the first
complaint. Thus, the dismissal of the first complaint is not
a judgment on the merits and therefore not applicable to
the present case.
xxx xxx x x x.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set
aside. Let the original records of Civil Case No. CEB-
15310, be remanded to the Regional Trial Court (Branch
19), Cebu City for further proceedings. Costs against
defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
SMC filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied in the CA’s Resolution dated 14 November
1996[5]. Hence, this petition.
In its petition, SMC contends that the CA erred:
I
IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CEBU, BRANCH 19, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT CASE AND THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ACTUALLY BASED ON AN
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP WHEN THE
COMPLAINT SHOWS THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
CLAIMING TO HAVE BEEN UNJUSTLY SEPARATED
FROM THEIR REGULAR EMPLOYMENTS (sic) BY THE
PETITIONERS AND ARE DEMANDING TO BE PAID
ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
CONSISTING OF “THEIR EXPECTED INCOME BY WAY
OF SALARIES AND OTHER FRINGE BENEFITS DUE
THEM UNDER THE LAW FROM THE TIME OF THEIR
SEPARATION AND UNTIL THEIR RETIREMENT DUE TO
AGE OR LENGTH OF SERVICE . . . SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM BENEFITS . . . RETIREMENT BENEFITS.”
II
IN RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT OF THE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT YET PRESCRIBED WHEN
THE RESPONDENTS HAVE CLAIMED IN THEIR
COMPLAINT THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ALLEGEDLY
BRAINWASHED BY THE PETITIONERS AND THEIR
COMPAINT (sic) WAS FILED ONLY AFTER MORE THAN
SIX (6) YEARS HAVE LAPSED FROM THE TIME THAT
THE RESPONDENTS CLAIMED TO HAVE
“DISCOVERED THAT INDEED, DEFENDANTS
(Petitioners) DECEIVED THEM INTO BELIEVING THAT
DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS INCURRING
LOSSES IN ITS OPERATION HENCE, THE NECESSITY
TO TRIM DOWN ITS WORK FORCE TO INDUCE THEM
TO ACCEPT THE “OFFER OF RETRENCHMENT (sic).”
III
IN RULING THAT “THE DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST
COMPLAINT IS NOT A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS
AND THEREFORE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
PRESENT CASE” WHEN IT IS THE SAID DIVISION’S
OWN FINDING THAT: “THE COMPLAINT FILED BY
HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS (Respondents)
WITH THE REGIONAL ARBITRATION BRANCH
PRAYED FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE
TERMINATION SCHEME ALLEGEDLY DECEPTIVELY
FORCED UPON THEM TO BE NULL AND VOID WITH
THE SAME PRAYER THAT THEY BE REINSTATED TO
THEIR REGULAR EMPLOYMENT WITHJOUT ANY LOSS
OF ANY RIGHTS (sic) AND BENEFITS (sic) AS WELL AS
PAYMENT OF THEIR BACKWAGES AND DAMAGES.”[6]
We find the petition impressed with merit.
The demarcation line between the jurisdiction of
regular courts and labor courts over cases involving
workers and their employers has always been the subject
of dispute. We have recognized that not all claims
involving such groups of litigants can be resolved solely by
our labor courts.[7] However, we have also admonished
that the present trend is to refer worker-employer
controversies to labor courts, unless unmistakably
provided by the law to be otherwise.[8] Because of this
trend, jurisprudence has developed the “reasonable causal
connection rule.” Under this rule, if there is a reasonable
causal connection between the claim asserted and the
employer-employee relations, then the case is within the
jurisdiction of our labor courts.[9] In the absence of such
nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.[10]
The jurisdiction of labor courts is provided under
Article 217 of the Labor Code, to wit:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission.-- (a) Except as otherwise provided under this
Code the Labor Arbiter shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar
days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement, those cases that
workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of
Article 264 of this Code including
questions involving the legality of
strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees
Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all
other claims, arising from employer-
employee relations, including those of
persons in domestic or household
service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether
accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and those
arising form the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel
policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to
the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration as may be
[11]
provided in said agreements.
With regard to claims for damages under paragraph
4 of the above article, this Court has observed that:
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for
damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217, to be
cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable
causal connection with any of the claims provided for in
that article. Only if there is such a connection with the
other claims can the claim for the damages be considered
as arising from employer-employee relations.[12]
In the present case, while respondents insist that
their action is for the declaration of nullity of their “contract
of termination,” what is inescapable is the fact that it is, in
reality, an action for damages emanating form employer–
employee relations. First, their claim for damages is
grounded on their having been deceived into serving their
employment due to SMC’s concocted financial distress
and fraudulent retrenchment program – a clear case of
illegal dismissal. Second, a comparison of respondents’
complaint for the declaration of nullity of the retrenchment
program before the labor arbiter and the complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their “contract of termination” before
the RTC reveals that the allegations and prayer of the
former are almost identical with those of the latter except
that the prayer for reinstatement was no longer included
and the claim for backwages and other benefits was
replaced with a claim for actual damages. These are
telltale signs that respondents’ claim for damages is
intertwined with their having been separated from their
employment without just cause and, consequently, has a
reasonable causal connection with their employer-
employee relations with SMC. Accordingly, it cannot be
denied that respondents’ claim falls under the jurisdiction
of the labor arbiter as provided in paragraph 4 of Article
217.
Respondent’s assertion that their action is for the
declaration of nullity of their “contract of termination” is
merely an ingenious way of presenting their actual action,
which is a claim for damages grounded on their having
been illegal terminated. However, it would seem that
respondents committed a Freudian slip when they
captioned their claim against SMC as an action for
damages.[13] Even the term used for designating the
contract, i.e. “contract of termination,” was formulated in a
shrewd manner so as to avoid a semblance of employer-
employee relations. This observation is bolstered by the
fact that if respondents’ designation for the contract were
to be made complete and reflective of its nature, its proper
designation would be a “contract of termination of
employment.”
The Court is aware that the Civil Code provisions on
contracts and damages may be used as bases for
addressing the claim of respondents. However, the fact
remains that the present action primarily involves an
employer-employee relationship. The damages incurred
by respondents as a result of the alleged fraudulent
retrenchment program and the allegedly defective
“contract of termination” are merely the civil aspect of the
injury brought about by their illegal dismissal.[14] The civil
ramifications of their actual claim cannot alter the reality
that it is primordially a labor matter and, as such, is
cognizable by labor courts. In Associated Citizens Bank
vs. Japson,[15] we held:
For the unlawful termination of employment, this Court in
Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, ruled that
the Labor Arbiter had the exclusive and original jurisdiction
over claims for moral and other forms of damages, so that
the employee in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
should prosecute his claims not only for reliefs specified
under the Labor Code but also for damages under the Civil
Code. This is because an illegally dismissed employee
has only a single cause of action although the act of
dismissal may be a violation not only the Labor Code but
also of the Civil Code. For a single cause of action, the
dismissed employee cannot institute a separate action
before the Labor Arbiter for backwages and reinstatement
and another action before the regular court for the
recovery of moral and other forms of damages because
splitting a single cause of action is procedurally unsound
and obnoxious to the orderly administration of
justice. (Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra,
citing Gonzales v. Province of Iloilo, 38 SCRA 209; Cyphil
Employees Association-Natu v. Pharmaceutical Industries,
77 SCRA 135; Calderon v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA
459, etc.)[16]
Even assuming arguendo that the RTC has Resolution dated 14 November 1996 are hereby
jurisdiction, it is obvious from respondents’ own pleadings REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Resolution dated 21
that their action for the declaration of nullity of the “contract June 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 19,
of termination” will not prosper. Respondents allege that in CEB-15310, REINSTATED.
they were deceived by SMC into believing that it was
under financial distress which, thus, led them into SO ORDERED.
concluding the “contract of termination” with the
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
latter.[17] Respondents then posit that since the cause of
the contract, SMC’s alleged financial distress, was Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ. concur.
inexsistent, the contract is null and void. The argument is
flawed.
The fact that SMC was never in financial distress [1]
does not, in any way, affect the cause of their “contract of Rollo, pp. 49-50.
termination.” Rather, the fraudulent representations of [2]
Id., at 52-62.
SMC only affected the consent of respondents in entering
into the said contract.[18] If the consent of a contracting [3]
Id., at 26-28.
party is vitiated by fraud, the contract is not void but,
[4]
merely, voidable.[19] In Abando vs. Lozada,[20] we ruled: Id., at 37-41.
[5]
Id., at 42.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the
[6]
strategem (sic), the deceit, the misrepresentations Id., at 8-9.
employed by Cuevas and Pucan are facts constitutive of
[7]
San Miguel Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
fraud which is defined in Article 1338 of the Civil Code as
that (sic) insidious words or machinations of one of the Commission, 161 SCRA 719, 724 (1988).
contracting parties, by which the other is induced to enter [8]
National Federation of Labor vs. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419,
into a contract which, without them, he would not have
428 (1984).
agreed to. When fraud is employed to obtain the consent
of the other party to enter into a contract, the resulting [9]
Dai-ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. vs. Villarama,
contract is merely a voidable contract, that is, a valid and Jr., 238 SCRA 267, 271 (1994).
subsisting contract until annulled or set aside by a
competent court. x x x[21] [10]
Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phils., Inc. vs. Gal-lang,
201 SCRA 695, 699 (1991).
An action to annul a voidable contract based on [11]
Underscoring supplied.
fraud should be brought within four (4) years from the
discovery of the same.[22] In the present case, respondents [12]
Supra, note 9.
discovered SMC’s fraud in May 1986. However, the action
[13]
Rollo, p. 52.
to question the validity of the contract was only brought on
14 December 1993, or more than seven (7) years after the
[14]
National Union of Bank Employees vs. Lazaro, 157
discovery of the fraud. Clearly, respondents’ action has
SCRA 123, 127 (1988).
already prescribed.
[15]
The issue of jurisdiction and prescription having 196 SCRA 404 (1991).
been resolved, it is no longer necessary to discuss the [16]
Id., at 407-408.
issue on res judicata raised in this petition.
[17]
Rollo, p. 91.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 16 May 1996 and its [18]
See Art. 1338, Civil Code.
[19]
Art. 1330, Civil Code. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any
success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its violation of such existing business
[20]
178 SCRA 509 (1989). operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a permit as defined in the preceding
[21] portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties section shall suffer the following
Id., at 514.
Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, penalties, to wit:
[22]
Art. 1391, Civil Code; Bael vs. Intermediate Appellate renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
Court, 169 SCRA 617, 624 (1989). inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
a
)
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
Republic of the Philippines de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it S
SUPREME COURT enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows: u
Manila s
p
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
e
EN BANC n
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE s
ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT i
AND CANCELLING EXISTING o
BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY n
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING
AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS o
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF f
CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.
t
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & h
BE IT ORDAINED by the
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING e
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
CORPORATION,respondents. of Cagayan de Oro, in session b
assembled that: u
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners. s
Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy i
of the city banning the operation of n
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
casino within its territorial jurisdiction, e
no business permit shall be issued to s
any person, partnership or corporation s
for the operation of casino within the
city limits. p
CRUZ, J.:
e
r
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of m
existing business permit by any i
the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
persons, partnership or corporation to t
organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious
elements echoed the objection and so did the women's use its business establishment or
portion thereof, or allow the use f
groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the
mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the thereof by others for casino operation o
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare and other gambling activities. r
of the city.
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 Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take
effect ten (10) days from publication
thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner
Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
OPERATION OF CASINO AND
PROVIDING PENALTY FOR
VIOLATION THEREFOR.
WHEREAS, the City Council
established a policy as early as 1990
against CASINO under its Resolution
No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the
City Council passed another
Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its
policy against the establishment of
CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter,
it likewise passed Ordinance No.
3353, prohibiting the issuance of
Business Permit and to cancel existing
Business Permit to any establishment
for the using and allowing to be used
its premises or portion thereof for the
operation of CASINO;
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458,
No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act
7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4),
Paragraph VI of the implementing
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of
rules of the Local Government Code,
Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
the City Council as the Legislative
and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded.
Body shall enact measure to suppress
On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
any activity inimical to public morals
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
and general welfare of the people
and/or regulate or prohibit such
activity pertaining to amusement or
entertainment in order to protect social
and moral welfare of the community;
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council
in session duly assembled that:
Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling
CASINO in the City of Cagayan de
Oro is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. — Any violation of this
Ordinance shall be subject to the
following penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00
shall be imposed against the
proprietor, partnership or corporation
undertaking the operation, conduct,
maintenance of gambling CASINO in
the City and closure thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six
(6) months nor more than one (1) year
or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or
both at the discretion of the court
against the manager, supervisor,
and/or any person responsible in the
establishment, conduct and
maintenance of gambling CASINO.
Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take
effect ten (10) days after its
publication in a local newspaper of
general circulation.
their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was
denied on July 13, 1993. 2
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in
this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in holding that:
1. Under existing laws, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
of Cagayan de Oro does not have the
power and authority to prohibit the
establishment and operation of a
PAGCOR gambling casino within the
City's territorial limits.
2. The phrase "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance" found in
Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v)
of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal
gambling."
3. The questioned Ordinances in
effect annul P.D. 1869 and are
therefore invalid on that point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are
discriminatory to casino and partial to
cockfighting and are therefore invalid
on that point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not
reasonable, not consonant with the
general powers and purposes of the
instrumentality concerned and
inconsistent with the laws or policy of
the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the
ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v.
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14,
1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of
the issues presented in this present
case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, e
help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including Functions and Compensation. — (a) d
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the
the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and legislative body of the city, shall enact t
Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the ordinances, approve resolutions and o
constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits appropriate funds for the general
of the entity to the national economy as the third highest welfare of the city and its inhabitants p
revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR pursuant to Section 16 of this Code r
and the Bureau of Customs. and in the proper exercise of the e
corporate powers of the city as v
provided for under Section 22 of this e
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions,
Code, and shall: n
is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
t
indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
,
vested with the police power under what is known as the (1) Approve ordinances and pass
General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as resolutions necessary for an efficient
s
follows: and effective city government, and in
u
this connection, shall:
p
Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every p
local government unit shall exercise xxx xxx xxx r
the powers expressly granted, those e
necessarily implied therefrom, as well s
(
as powers necessary, appropriate, or s
v
incidental for its efficient and effective
) a
governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the n
E d
general welfare. Within their
n
respective territorial jurisdictions, local
a i
government units shall ensure and
c m
support, among other things, the
t p
preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, o
o s
enhance the right of the people to a
r
balanced ecology, encourage and e
d
support the development of
i a
appropriate and self-reliant scientific
n
and technological capabilities, improve p
a p
public morals, enhance economic
n r
prosperity and social justice, promote
c
full employment among their o
e p
residents, maintain peace and order,
s r
and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. i
i a
n t
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically t
e
declares that: e
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e b determine and adopt the measures best expected to
s i promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with
t the policies of the State.
i a
n n
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly
i t
authorized the local government units to prevent and
m s
suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance,
i
like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it
c o
meant allforms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non
a f
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it
l
would have expressly excluded from the scope of their
t
power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by
t h
special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it
o e
did not do so simply means that the local government units
are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their
t c
territories, including the operation of casinos.
h i
e t
y The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed
w ; out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the
e PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than
l P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of
This section also authorizes the local government units to
f inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers
regulate properties and businesses within their territorial
a of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly
limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5
r discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform
e to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the repealing clause reading as follows:
a Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of
n casinos because they involve games of chance, which are
d (f) All general and special laws, acts,
detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by
city charters, decrees, executive
general law and even by the Constitution itself. The
m orders, proclamations and
legislative power conferred upon local government units
o administrative regulations, or part or
may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only
parts thereof which are inconsistent
r over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously
a with any of the provisions of this Code
argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been
l are hereby repealed or modified
permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de
accordingly.
s Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its
territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the
o Local Government Code. It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt
f regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on
P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
t It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the
petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code
policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section
h calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local
e 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various
government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically
other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the
provides:
character of the nation. In giving the local government
i
n units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other
h social problems, the Local Government Code has Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In
recognized the competence of such communities to the interpretation of the provisions of
a
 this Code, the following rules shall
apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the lower local
government unit. Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence
of the power shall be interpreted in
favor of the local government unit
concerned;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in
this Code shall be liberally interpreted
to give more powers to local
government units in accelerating
economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people in the
community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically
harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and
several decisions of this Court expressive of the general
and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the
State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of
the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the
old case of U.S. v. Salaveria, 7 which sustained a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The
petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also
impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as
"a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and
authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is
nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it
at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it
sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature
may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and
allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but
permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making
such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to
resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the
prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility
of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be
resolved only by the legislative and executive
departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme
of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way
these branches decide, they are answerable only to their
own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately
judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition
is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No.
3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the
criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on
the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long
line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance
must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the
constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial
discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate
trade.
5) It must be general and consistent
with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local
Government Code, local government units are authorized
to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this
provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners
are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could
have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it
does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or
phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the
same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is
associated with "and other prohibited games of chance,"
the word should be read as referring to only illegal
gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance,
must be prevented or suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the
problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous
efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of
Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their
advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that
they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied
therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising
the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to
this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that
have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly
cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the
change has been made by the Local Government Code
itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
or
authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really
repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in
the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino
over the objection of the local government unit concerned.
This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government
Code is permissible because one law can change or
repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 the assumption that if the act of later
While insisting that the decree has only been "modifiedpro regarding the Special Education Fund; date clearly reveals an intention on the
tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, Presidential Decree No. 144 as part of the lawmaking power to
repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because amended by Presidential Decree Nos. abrogate the prior law, this intention
the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree must be given effect; but there must
and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may No. 231 as amended; Presidential always be a sufficient revelation of this
now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in Decree No. 436 as amended by intention, and it has become an
fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary Presidential Decree No. 558; and unbending rule of statutory
but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, construction that the intention to
"shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are repeal a former law will not be imputed
Local government units have now no choice but to prevent hereby repealed and rendered of no to the Legislature when it appears that
and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view force and effect. the two statutes, or provisions, with
includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this reference to which the question arises
construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of bear to each other the relation of
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is
chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be general to special.
hereby repealed insofar as it governs
prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the
locally-funded projects.
mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D.
situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as
1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points
a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be (e) The following provisions are
out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two
able to exercise its powers as a prime source of hereby repealed or amended insofar
later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a
government revenue through the operation of casinos. as they are inconsistent with the
Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the
provisions of this Code: Sections 2,
benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of
16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for
704; Sections 12 of Presidential
of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are
Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections
the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the
52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local
and 74 of Presidential Decree No.
by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were
463, as amended; and Section 16 of
reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems
Presidential Decree No. 972, as
below, will disclose the omission: of the government.
amended, and

Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting
(f) All general and special laws, acts,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
city charters, decrees, executive
known as the "Local Government confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
orders, proclamations and
Code," Executive Order No. 112 them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming
administrative regulations, or part or
(1987), and Executive Order No. 319 respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
parts thereof which are inconsistent
(1988) are hereby repealed. government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D.
with any of the provisions of this Code
1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
are hereby repealed or modified
and annul the other but to give effect to both by
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, accordingly.
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case
1191, 1508 and such other decrees,
before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is
orders, instructions, memoranda and
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
issuances related to or concerning the
not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
barangay are hereby repealed.
unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except
v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained: only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
The cases relating to the subject of effective and mutually complementary.
regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a
repeal by implication all proceed on
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two
kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized
by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is
probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so.
The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them
to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction
between these two forms of gambling without a clear
indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly,
following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere
ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A.
1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro
Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of
arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners
that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary,
we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has
the character and force of a statute, as well as the public
policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of
certain games of chance despite the prohibition of
gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can
undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived
their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin
to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes
into them the breath of life, without
which they cannot exist. As it creates,
so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it
may abridge and control. Unless there
is some constitutional limitation on the
right, the legislature might, by a single
act, and if we can suppose it capable
of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the
municipal corporations in the State, and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,
and the corporation could not prevent remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by
it. We know of no limitation on the the Local Government Code, which empowers the local
right so far as to the corporation government units to prevent or suppress only those forms
themselves are concerned. They are, of gambling prohibited by law.
so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will
of the legislature. 11
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree
has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
This basic relationship between the national legislature nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent
and the local government units has not been enfeebled by for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.
that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
of the local government units although in significantly praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
reduced degree now than under our previous P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power therefore ultra vires and void.
to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
on the local government units of the power to tax, 12which
with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the principal of the
local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado,
or violate it. Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the
petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their
apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will
be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the
view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without
special effort, turns the head of the workman"13 and that
"habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and
ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social
scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws
against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Separate Opinions
Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the
brother of iniquity and the father of mischief."
Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the
legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain
PADILLA, J., concurring:
forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly
affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can
be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances
Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do in question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's
not find such contravention here. general authority to establish and maintain gambling
casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and Decree No. 1869.
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a
separate opinion that:
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as
it holds that the prohibition, control,
and regulation of the entire activity
known as gambling properly pertain to
"state policy". It is, therefore, the
political departments of government,
namely, the legislative and the
executive that should decide on what
government should do in the entire
area of gambling, and assume full
responsibility to the people for such
policy." (Emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent
PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any
form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-
establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which
is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing
erosion.
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon
government to carefully weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the
country.
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the
government is not enough reason for setting up more
gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help
improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino
moral character.
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal
is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify
the means.
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par
with gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not
render it any less reprehensible even if substantial
revenue for the government can be realized from it. The
same is true of gambling.
In the present case, it is my considered view that the
national government (through PAGCOR) should re-
examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the
gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City;
for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is
very much against it, and again the question must be
seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be
realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of
the Filipino sense of values?
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to
express my views on certain aspects of this case.
I.
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce
Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the
Court of Appeals its so-called petition
for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original
jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1)
of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal cause
of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null
and unconstitutional — for, inter alia, having been enacted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the
obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with
public policy — the challenged ordinances enacted by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de
Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) further underscores the "declaratory relief"
nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the ordinances for
being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution, violative of the Local
Government Code, and against the State's national policy
declared in P.D. No. 1869. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the
action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is one
for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy
relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have
been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not
filed with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the
thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict
therefrom, in which case the filing of the petition with the
Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical
considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of
Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our
decisions in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989])
and Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633
[1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:
A last word. This court's original
jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as
prohibition,mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared
by this Court with Regional Trial
Courts (formerly Courts of First
Instance), which may issue the writ,
enforceable in any part of their
respective regions. It is also shared by
this court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals
(formerly, Intermediate Appellate
Court), although prior to the effectivity
ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 129 on
August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary
writs was restricted by those "in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction." This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the
revenue of appeals, and should also
serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court
of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
 Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This
is established policy. It is a policy that
is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court's docket.
Indeed, the removal of the restriction
of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in this regard, supra —
resulting from the deletion of the
qualifying phrase, "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently
intended precisely to relieve this
Court pro tanto of the burden of
dealing with applications for
extraordinary writs which, but for the
expansion of the Appellate Court's
corresponding jurisdiction, would have
had to be filed with it. (citations
omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:
One final observation. We discern in
the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner,
and, for that matter, the same may be
said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before us, to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our
judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court despite the fact
that the same is available in the lower
courts in the exercise of their original
or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated by law to be sought therein.
This practice must be stopped, not
only because of the imposition upon
the previous time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often
has to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
therefore, reiterate the judicial policy
that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
II.
The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of
Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit
To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be
Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of
Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and
Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were
enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled,
"Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit
and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling
Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was
promulgated on 19 November 1990 — nearly two years
before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of
lease under which the latter leased a portion of the
former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling
casino — which resolution was vigorously reiterated in
Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the
Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by
Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii),
and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and
pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the
general welfare clause) which reads:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every
local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific
and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting
local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro)
the above powers and functions, the Local Government
Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as
PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain
gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is
concerned.
I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot
repeal P.D. No. 1869.
III.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged
ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in
contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A
contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of
the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand
even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869.
They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So
reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not
applying to PAGCOR.
 IV.
From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and
the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious
reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling
casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be
inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
City, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a
government-owned corporation, must consider the valid
concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and
should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not
despotic, manner.
# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances
in question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's
general authority to establish and maintain gambling
casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 1869.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a
separate opinion that:
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as
it holds that the prohibition, control,
and regulation of the entire activity
known as gambling properly pertain to
"state policy". It is, therefore, the
political departments of government,
namely, the legislative and the
executive that should decide on what
government should do in the entire
area of gambling, and assume full
responsibility to the people for such
policy. (emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent
PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any
form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-
establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which
is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing
erosion.
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon
government to carefully weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the
country.
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the
government is not enough reason for setting up more
gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help
improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino
moral character.
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal
is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify
the means.
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par
with gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not
render it any less reprehensible even if substantial
revenue for the government can be realized from it. The
same is true of gambling.
In the present case, it is my considered view that the
national government (through PAGCOR) should re-
examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the
gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City;
for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is
very much against it, and again the question must be
seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be
realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of
the Filipino sense of values?
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to
express my views on certain aspects of this case.
I.
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce
Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the
Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition,
thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to
issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg.
129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action
therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
unconstitutional — for, inter alia, having been enacted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the
obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with
public policy — the challenged ordinances enacted by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro.
The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further
underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action.
PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being contrary to the
non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and
against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No.
1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have
jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even
assuming arguendo that the case is one for prohibition,
then, under this Court's established policy relative to the
hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no
special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the
said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that
PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which
case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may
have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal
of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in
order pursuant to our decisions in People vs.
Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-
Santiago vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]).
In Cuaresma, this Court stated:
A last word. This court's original
jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as
prohibition,mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared
by this Court with Regional Trial
Courts (formerly Courts of First
Instance), which may issue the writ,
enforceable in any part of their
respective regions. It is also shared by
this court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals
(formerly, Intermediate Appellate
Court), although prior to the effectivity
ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 129 on
August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary
And in Vasquez, this Court said:
writs was restricted by those "in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction." This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the
revenue of appeals, and should also
serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court
of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This
is established policy. It is a policy that
is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court's docket.
Indeed, the removal of the restriction
of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in this regard, supra —
resulting from the deletion of the
II.
qualifying phrase, "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently
intended precisely to relieve this
Court pro tanto of the burden of
dealing with applications for
extraordinary writs which, but for the
expansion of the Appellate Court's
corresponding jurisdiction, would have
had to be filed with it. (citations
omitted)
One final observation. We discern in
the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner,
and, for that matter, the same may be
said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before us, to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our
judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court despite the fact
that the same is available in the lower
courts in the exercise of their original
or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated by law to be sought therein.
This practice must be stopped, not
only because of the imposition upon
the previous time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often
has to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
therefore, reiterate the judicial policy
that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of
Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit
To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be
Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of
Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and
Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were
enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled,
"Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit
and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling
Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was
promulgated on 19 November 1990 — nearly two years
before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of
lease under which the latter leased a portion of the
former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling
casino — which resolution was vigorously reiterated in
Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the
Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by
Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii),
and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and
pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the
general welfare clause) which reads:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every
local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific
and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their
 residents, maintain peace and order, 2 Ibid., pp. 53-62. THIRD DIVISION
and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
3 Pryce was dropped as private [G.R. No. 119122. August 8, 2000]
respondent in the resolution of the
The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting Court dated June 13, 1994.
PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro)
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
the above powers and functions, the Local Government
4 197 SCRA 53. AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as
REVENUE,respondents.
PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain
gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is 5 Sec. 458, [2(vi-xv)]; [3(ii-vii)]; [4(i-ix)],
concerned. Local Government Code, 1991. DECISION

I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot
repeal P.D. No. 1869.
III.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged
ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in
contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A
contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of
the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand
even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869.
They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So
reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not
applying to PAGCOR.
IV.
6 Where the law does not distinguish,
neither ought we to distinguish.
7 39 Phil. 102.
8 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 204
SCRA 516, quoting Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
379-380.
9 Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, 207
SCRA 157; Solicitor General v.
Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204
SCRA 837; De la Cruz v. Paras, 123
SCRA 569; U.S. v. Abandan, 24 Phil.
165.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review
of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 34095 which affirmed the decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No.
4419.
The facts that matter are as follows:
On June 21, 1989, the petitioner received an
assessment letter from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (respondent Commissioner)
for the payment of deficiency amusement tax
computed thus:

From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and 10 44 Phil. 138. Deficiency Amusement Tax
the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious
reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling
casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be 11 Clinton v. Ceder Rapids, etc.
Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455. Total gross receipts 1987 P19,9
inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
City, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a 15% tax due thereon 2,995
government-owned corporation, must consider the valid 12 Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution.
concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and Less: Tax paid 602,0
should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not
despotic, manner. 13 Planiol, Droit Civil, Vol. 2, No.
2210. Deficiency amusement tax P 2,39
#Footnotes
14 Ibid. Add:....75% surcharge 1,795

1 Rollo, pp. 64-94. 20% __1,6

15 77 Phil. 88. interest

Total Amount
Collectible
On July 18, 1989, petitioner contested the
assessment by filing a protest with respondent
Commissioner who denied the same on
November 6, 1989.
On January 8, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for
review[2] with the Court of Tax Appeals
(respondent CTA) questioning the denial by
respondent Commissioner of its tax protest.
On December 24, 1993, respondent CTA
dismissed petitioner’s petition, holding:
"WHEREFORE, in all the foregoing,
herein petition for review
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the Petitioner
hereby ORDERED to PAY to the
Respondent the amount
P5,864,260.84 as deficiency
amusement tax for the year 1987 plus
20% annual delinquency interest from
July 22, 1989 which is the due date
appearing on the notice and demand
of the Commissioner (i.e. 30 days
from receipt of the assessment) until
fully paid pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 248 and 249 (c) (3) of the
Tax Code, as amended."[3]
Petitioner presented a motion for
reconsideration[4] of the said decision but the
same was denied by respondent CTA in a
resolution[5] dated April 8, 1994. Thereafter and
within the reglementary period for interposing
appeals, petitioner appealed the CTA decision to
the Court of Appeals.
On November 21, 1994, the Court of Appeals "7. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in
(2 years) rendered its questioned Decision,[6] affirming the holding that the cession of advertising and
decision of the CTA and dismissing petitioner’s streamer spaces inside the venue is embraced
Due & P 5,864,260.84
appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for within the term ‘gross receipts’ as defined in
Reconsideration of said decision but to no avail. Section 123 (6) of the Tax Code.
The same was denied by the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution[7] dated January 31, 1995. Hence,
"8. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in
this petition.
holding that the amusement tax liability of
Petitioner is subject to a 75% surcharge."
Undaunted, petitioner found its way to this Court
via the present petition, contending that:
The issues for resolution in this case may be
simplified as follows:
"1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the jurisdiction to collect amusement
1. Is the amusement tax on admission tickets to
taxes of PBA games is vested in the national
PBA games a national or local tax? Otherwise
government to the exclusion of the local
put, who between the national government and
governments.
local government should petitioner pay
amusement taxes?
"2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding that Section 13 of the Local Tax Code of
2. Is the cession of advertising and streamer
1973 limits local government units to theaters,
spaces to Vintage Enterprises, Inc. (VEI) subject
cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and
to the payment of amusement tax?
other places of amusement in the collection of
is the amusement tax.
3. If ever petitioner is liable for the payment of
is deficiency amusement tax, is it liable to pay a
"3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in
seventy-five percent (75%) surcharge on the
holding that Revenue Regulations No. 8-88
of deficiency amount due?
dated February 19, 1988 is an erroneous
interpretation of law.
Petitioner contends that PD 231, otherwise
known as the Local Tax Code of 1973,
"4. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in giving
transferred the power and authority to levy and
retroactive effect to the revocation of Revenue
collect amusement taxes from the sale of
Regulations 8-88.
admission tickets to places of amusement from
the national government to the local
"5. Respondent Court of Appeals erred when it governments. Petitioner cited BIR Memorandum
failed to consider the provisions of P.D. 851 the Circular No. 49-73 providing that the power to
franchise of Petitioner, Section 8 of which levy and collect amusement tax on admission
provides that amusement tax on admission tickets was transferred to the local governments
receipts of Petitioner is 5%. by virtue of the Local Tax Code; and BIR Ruling
No. 231-86 which held that "the jurisdiction to
levy amusement tax on gross receipts from
"6. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in
admission tickets to places of amusement was
holding that the cession of advertising and
transferred to local governments under P.D. No.
streamer spaces in the venue to a third person is
231, as amended."[8] Further, petitioner opined
subject to amusement taxes.
that even assuming arguendo that respondent
Commissioner revoked BIR Ruling No. 231-86,
the reversal, modification or revocation cannot
be given retroactive effect since even as late as
1988 (BIR Memorandum Circular No. 8-88),
respondent Commissioner still recognized the
jurisdiction of local governments to collect
amusement taxes.
The Court is not persuaded by petitioner’s
asseverations.
The laws on the matter are succinct and clear
and need no elaborate disquisition. Section 13
of the Local Tax Code provides:
"Sec. 13. Amusement tax on
admission. -The province shall impose
a tax on admission to be collected
from the proprietors, lessees, or
operators of theaters,
cinematographs, concert halls,
circuses and other places of
amusement xxx."
The foregoing provision of law in point indicates
that the province can only impose a tax on
admission from the proprietors, lessees, or
operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement.
The authority to tax professional basketball
games is not therein included, as the same is
expressly embraced in PD 1959, which
amended PD 1456 thus:
"SEC. 44. Section 268 of this Code,
as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
‘Sec. 268. Amusement taxes. -- There
shall be collected from the proprietor,
lessee or operator of cockpits,
cabarets, night or day clubs, boxing
exhibitions, professional basketball
games, Jai-Alai, race tracks and
bowling alleys, a tax equivalent to:
‘1. Eighteen per centum in the case of
cockpits;
‘2. Eighteen per centum in the case of
cabarets, night or day clubs;
‘3. Fifteen per centum in the case of
boxing exhibitions;
‘4. Fifteen per centum in the case of
professional basketball games as
envisioned in Presidential Decree No.
871. Provided, however, That the tax
herein shall be in lieu of all other
percentage taxes of whatever nature
and description;
‘5. Thirty per centum in the case of
Jai-Alai and race tracks; and
‘6. Fifteen per centum in the case of
bowling alleys of their gross receipts,
irrespective of whether or not any
amount is charged or paid for
admission. For the purpose of the
amusement tax, the term gross
receipts’ embraces all the receipts of
the proprietor, lessee or operator of
the amusement place. Said gross
receipts also include income from
television, radio and motion picture
rights, if any. (A person or entity or
association conducting any activity
subject to the tax herein imposed shall
be similarly liable for said tax with
respect to such portion of the receipts
derived by him or it.)
‘The taxes imposed herein shall be
payable at the end of each quarter
and it shall be the duty of the
proprietor, lessee, or operator
concerned, as well as any party liable,
within twenty days after the end of
each quarter, to make a true and
complete return of the amount of the
gross receipts derived during the
preceding quarter and pay the tax due
thereon. If the tax is not paid within the
time prescribed above, the amount of
the tax shall be increased by twenty-
five per centum, the increment to be
part of the tax.
‘In case of willful neglect to file the
return within the period prescribed
herein, or in case a false or fraudulent
return is willfully made, there shall be
added to the tax or to the deficiency
tax, in case any payment has been
made on the basis of the return before
the discovery of the falsity or fraud, a
surcharge of fifty per centum of its
amount. The amount so added to any
tax shall be collected at the same time
and in the same manner and as part
of the tax unless the tax has been paid
before the discovery of the falsity or
fraud, in which case, the amount so
assessed shall be collected in the
same manner as the tax."
(underscoring ours)
From the foregoing it is clear that the "proprietor,
lessee or operator of xxx professional basketball
games" is required to pay an amusement tax
equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of their
gross receipts to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, which payment is a national tax. The
said payment of amusement tax is in lieu of all
other percentage taxes of whatever nature and
description.
While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code
mentions "other places of amusement",
professional basketball games are definitely not
within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem
generis, where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned.[9] Thus, in
determining the meaning of the phrase "other
places of amusement", one must refer to the
prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls and circuses with artistic
expression as their common characteristic.
Professional basketball games do not fall under
the same category as theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls and circuses as the latter basically
belong to artistic forms of entertainment while
the former caters to sports and gaming.
A historical analysis of pertinent laws does
reveal the legislative intent to place professional
basketball games within the ambit of a national
tax. The Local Tax Code, which became
effective on June 28, 1973, allowed the province
to collect a tax on admission from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and
other places of amusement. On January 6,
1976, the operation of petitioner was placed
under the supervision and regulation of the
Games and Amusement Board by virtue of PD
871, with the proviso (Section 8) that "xxx all
professional basketball games conducted by the
Philippine Basketball Association shall only be
subject to amusement tax of five per cent of the
gross receipts from the sale of admission
tickets." Then, on June 11, 1978, PD 1456 came
into effect, increasing the amusement tax to ten
per cent, with a categorical referral to PD 871, to
wit, "[t]en per centum in the case of professional
basketball games as envisioned in Presidential
Decree No. 871 xxx." Later in 1984, PD 1959
increased the rate of amusement tax to fifteen
percent by making reference also to PD 871.
With the reference to PD 871 by PD 1456 and
PD 1959, there is a recognition under the laws of
this country that the amusement tax on
professional basketball games is a national, and
not a local, tax. Even up to the present, the
category of amusement taxes on professional
basketball games as a national tax remains the
same. This is so provided under Section
125[10] of the 1997 National Internal Revenue
Code. Section 140[11] of the Local Government
Code of 1992 (Republic Act 7160), meanwhile, xxx.....xxx.....xxx
retained the areas (theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls, circuses and other places of
of their gross receipts,
amusement) where the province may levy an
irrespective of whether or
amusement tax without including therein
not any amount is charged
professional basketball games.
or paid for admission. For
the purpose of the
Likewise erroneous is the stance of petitioner amusement tax, the term
that respondent Commissioner’s issuance of BIR gross receipts’ embraces all
Ruling No. 231-86[12] and BIR Revenue the receipts of the
Memorandum Circular No. 8-88[13] -- both proprietor, lessee or
upholding the authority of the local government operator of the amusement
to collect amusement taxes -- should bind the place. Said gross receipts
government or that, if there is any revocation or also include income from
modification of said rule, the same should television, radio and motion
operate prospectively. picture rights, if any. (A
person, or entity or
association conducting any
It bears stressing that the government can never
activity subject to the tax
be in estoppel, particularly in matters involving
herein imposed shall be
taxes. It is a well-known rule that erroneous
similarly liable for said tax
application and enforcement of the law by public
with respect to such portion
officers do not preclude subsequent correct
of the receipts derived by
application of the statute, and that the
him or it.)" (underscoring
Government is never estopped by mistake or
ours)
error on the part of its agents.[14]
The foregoing definition of gross receipts is
Untenable is the contention that income from the
broad enough to embrace the cession of
cession of streamer and advertising spaces to
advertising and streamer spaces as the same
VEI is not subject to amusement tax. The
embraces all the receipts of the proprietor,
questioned proviso may be found in Section 1 of
lessee or operator of the amusement place. The
PD 1456 which states:
law being clear, there is no need for an
extended interpretation.[15]
"SECTION 1. Section 268 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of
The last issue for resolution concerns the liability
1977, as amended, is hereby further
of petitioner for the payment of surcharge and
amended to read as follows:
interest on the deficiency amount due. Petitioner
contends that it is not liable, as it acted in good
‘Sec. 268. Amusement taxes. -- There faith, having relied upon the issuances of the
shall be collected from the proprietor, respondent Commissioner. This issue must
lessee or operator of cockpits, necessarily fail as the same has never been
cabarets, night or day clubs, boxing posed as an issue before the respondent court.
exhibitions, professional basketball Issues not raised in the court a quo cannot be
games, Jai-Alai, race tracks and raised for the first time on appeal.[16]
bowling alleys, a tax equivalent to:
 All things studiedly considered, the Court rules
that the petitioner is liable to pay amusement tax
to the national government, and not to the local
government, in accordance with the rates
prescribed by PD 1959.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the
Decisions of the Court of Appeals and Court of
Tax Appeals dated November 21, 1994 and
December 24, 1993, respectively AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Melo, (Chairman), and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez and
concurred by Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos,
Jr. and Eugenio S. Labitoria.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 44-62.
[3]
CTA Decision penned by Associate Judge Ramon O. de
Veyra and concurred by Presiding Judge Ernesto D.
Acosta and Associate Judge Manuel K. Gruba; Rollo, pp.
70-78.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 79-89.
[5]
Ibid., p. 90.
[6]
Ibid., pp. 33-40.
[7]
Ibid., p. 43.
[8]
See also BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 8-88.
[9]
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 297 SCRA 402, 422 citing:
Republic vs. Migriño, 189 SCRA 289, 296-297.
[10]
SEC. 125. Amusement taxes. - There shall
be collected from the proprietor, lessee or
operator of cockpits, cabarets, night or day
clubs, boxing exhibitions, professional basketball
games, Jai-Alai and race tracks, a tax equivalent
to:
a) Eighteen percent (18%) in the case of
cockpits;
b) Eighteen percent (18%) in the case of
cabarets, night or day clubs;
c) Ten percent (10%) in the case of boxing
exhibitions, provided, however, that boxing
exhibitions wherein World or Oriental
Championships in any division is at stake shall
be exempt from amusement tax; provided,
further, that at least one of the contenders for
World or Oriental Championship is a citizen of
the Philippines and said exhibitions are
promoted by a citizen/s of the Philippines or by a
corporation or association at least sixty percent
(60%) of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens;
d) Fifteen percent (15%) in the case of
professional basketball games as envisioned in
Presidential Decree No. 871; provided, however,
that the tax herein shall be in lieu of all other
percentage taxes of whatever nature and
description; and
e) Thirty percent (30%) in the case of Jai-Alai
and race tracks of their gross receipts,
irrespective of whether or not any amount is
charged for admission.
For the purpose of the amusement tax, the term
"gross receipts" embraces all the receipts of the
proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement
place. Said gross receipts also include income
from television, radio and motion picture rights, if
any. A person or entity or association conducting
any activity subject to the tax herein imposed
shall be similarly liable for said tax with respect
to such portion of the receipts derived by him or
it.
The taxes imposed herein shall be payable at the end of
each quarter or month and it shall be the duty of the
proprietor, lessee or operator concerned, as well as any
party liable, within twenty (20) days after the end of each
quarter, to make a true and complete return of the amount
of the gross receipts derived during the preceding quarter
and pay the tax due thereon. (Effective January 1, 1998)
[11]
SEC. 140. Amusement Tax. - (a) The
province may levy an amusement tax to be
collected from the proprietors, lessees, or
operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of
amusement at a rate of not more than thirty
percent (30%) of the gross receipts from
admission fees.
(b) In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax
shall first be deducted and withheld by their
proprietors, lessees, or operators and the
distributors of the cinematographic films.
(c) The holding of operas, concerts, dramas,
recitals, painting and art exhibitions, flower
shows, musical programs, literary and oratorical
presentations, except pop, rock, or similar
concerts shall be exempt from the payment of
the tax herein imposed.
(d) The sangguniang panlalawigan may
prescribe the time, manner, terms and
conditions for the payment of tax. In case of
fraud or failure to pay the tax, the sangguniang
panlalawigan may impose such surcharges,
interests and penalties as it may deem
appropriate.
(e) The proceeds from the amusement tax shall be shared
equally by the province and the municipality where such
amusement places are located.
[12]
["xxx.....xxx.....xxx
xxx this Office is of the opinion and hereby holds that the
jurisdiction to levy amusement tax on gross receipts from
admission tickets to places of amusement was indeed
transferred to local government under P.D. No. 231, as
amended. xxx"
[13]
["xxx the sole jurisdiction for collection of amusement
tax on admission receipts in places of admission rests Should the courts grant a petition for
exclusively on the local government to the exclusion of the
national government." reconstitution of a certificate of title on the basis of a tax
[14]
E. Rodriguez, Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 28
SCRA 1119; United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social declaration, survey plan and technical description? This is
Security Commission, 30 SCRA 982.
[15]
Domingo vs. Commission on Audit, 297 SCRA 163; the question that confronts the Court in this petition for
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199.
[16]
Ruby Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 284 review of the Court of Appeals (CA)
SCRA 445; Salao vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 493; [1]
Heirs of Pascasio Uriarte vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA Decision dated September 23, 2002.
511.

THIRD DIVISION

THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 155703

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

DOMINADOR SANTUA, Promulgated:

Respondent.
September 8, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
 The facts of the case are undisputed: Attached to the petition were a tax declaration, survey Exh. “D” - Technical description
of Lot 5358-A-3-0-
[2]
plan, and technical description of each lot. 8-B, (LRC) PSD-
257136;
On February, 16, 1999, respondent Dominador
Exh. “E” - Technical description
Santua filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of On February 25, 1999, the RTC issued an of Lot 5358-A-3-0-
8-C, (LRC) PSD-
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, a petition for judicial Order[3] setting the initial hearing of the case. It also 257136;
reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- directed the publication of the order in the Official Gazette, Exh. “F” - Technical description
of Lot 5358-A-3-0-
22868. Respondent alleged that he is the registered owner its posting at the main entrance of the Capitol Building and 8-D, (LRC) PSD-
257136;
of certain parcels of land with an area of 3,306 square in the Municipal Building of Victoria, Calapan City, and
Exh. “G” - Technical description
meters, situated inPoblacion, Victoria, Oriental Mindoro, sending of copies thereof to all adjoining owners of Lot 5358-A-3-0-
8-E, (LRC) PSD-
and covered by TCT No. T-22868; the original copy of TCT mentioned in the petition, the Register of Deeds, Provincial 257136;
No. T-22868 was among those destroyed by the fire that Prosecutor, Director of Lands, Solicitor General and the
Exh. “H” - Technical description
of Lot 5358-A-3-0-
completely razed the Capitol Building then housing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority.
8-F, (LRC) PSD-
257136;
Office of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on

August 12, 1977; the owner’s duplicate copy was lost while Respondent complied with the jurisdictional Exh. “I” - Blue print plan
of Lot 5358-A-3-0-
in respondent’s possession and all efforts exerted to locate requirements. The court thus commissioned the Clerk of 8, (LRC) PSD-
251540 as
the same proved futile; there are no co-owner’s, Court to receive the respondent’s evidence and submit his surveyed for
Dominador
mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of said certificate of title; findings to the court. Aside from the documents that delved Santua, et al.

there are no buildings or improvements existing on said into the jurisdictional aspect of the petition, respondent Exh. “J” - Certification
dated September
land which do not belong to respondent; respondent and offered the following documents in support of his petition: 24, 1982 issued
by the Acting
his family are in actual possession of the property and Register of Deeds
Exh. “C” - Tax Declaration No. of this province,
have been paying taxes thereon; and there exists no 15003-816 certifying to the
indicating the effect that all
deeds or instrument affecting the property which have name of original
Dominador certificates of title
been presented for and pending registration in the Office Santua as owner on file with the
of the lots Registry were
of the Register of Deeds. The names and addresses of the covered by TCT destroyed by
No. 22868; reason of the fire
adjoining property owners were enumerated in the petition. that hit
 the Capitol Buildin
g housing the never been offered as a bail bond or as collateral to secure
Office of the
Register of Deeds a loan with any banking institution or any person. It has not
on August 12,
1977. been declared as null and void by any court or competent

authority. It is not a subject of attachment.

Respondent testified that he is the registered

owner of certain parcels of land known as Lot No. 5358-A- The Provincial Assessor, Mr. Onisimo Naling,

3-0-8-B, with an area of 730 square meters; Lot No. 5358- testified that the tax declaration submitted in evidence is a

A-3-0-8-C, with an area of 731 square meters; Lot No. true and genuine tax declaration issued by their office.

5358-A-3-0-8-D, with an area of 731 square meters; Lot Mrs. Flordeliza Villao, Records Officer III of the Register of

No. 5358-A-3-0-8-E, with an area of 731 square meters, Deeds, testified that the Certification issued by her office is

and Lot No. 5358-A-3-0-8-F, with an area of 383 square a true and genuine certification.

meters, or a total area of 3,306 square meters, situated in

Poblacion, Victoria, Mindoro. The original copy of this title The adjoining property owners were notified of

was among the documents destroyed on August 12, the hearing of the petition but no one interposed any

1977 when fire razed the entire Capitol Building then objection thereto.

housing the Office of the Register of Deeds, while the

owner’s duplicate copy in the respondent’s possession

was lost when their house was destroyed by the Intensity 7

earthquake that hit the province on November 15, 1994.

There is no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate

copy of said title previously issued by the Register of

Deeds. There exist no deeds of instruments affecting the

property, which have been presented to, or pending

registration with, the Office of the Register of Deeds. It has

 WHETHER OR NOT TAX SEC. 3. Transfer
On December 15, 2000, the RTC granted the DECLARATIONS, TECHNICAL certificates of title shall be
DESCRIPTION AND LOT PLANS reconstituted from such of the sources
petition, thus: ARE SUFFICIENT BASES FOR THE hereunder enumerated as may be
RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR available, in the following order:
DESTROYED CERTIFICATES OF
ACCORDINGLY, finding the TITLE[6] (a) The owner’s duplicate of
instant petition to be well-taken and the certificate of title;
there being no opposition thereto,
same is hereby granted. The Register (b) The co-owner’s,
of Deeds of this province is hereby In a Comment/Manifestation[7] dated September mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate of
directed to reconstitute the original the certificate of title;
and the owner’s duplicate copies of 11, 2003, respondent’s counsel manifested that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- (c) A certified copy of the
22868 in the name of “DOMINADOR respondent is submitting the petition for review for certificate of title, previously issued by
SANTUA, married to Natividad Paner, the register of deeds or by a legal
of legal age, Filipino citizen and a resolution without any comment from him. custodian thereof;
resident of Poblacion, Victoria,
Oriental Mindoro” on the basis of the (d) The deed of transfer or
tax declaration, technical descriptions other document on file in the registry
and plan of Lot No. 5358-A-3-0-8-B, Respondent’s waiver of the filing of a comment of deeds, containing the description of
Lot No. 5358-A-3-0-8-C, Lot No. 5358- the property, or an authenticated copy
A-3-0-8-D, Lot No. 5358-A-3-0-8-E, is unfortunate considering that we find the petition thereof, showing that its original had
and Lot No. 5358-A-3-0-8-F, (LRC) been registered, and pursuant to
Psd 257136, thirty (30) days after meritorious. which the lost or destroyed transfer
receipt of this Order by the Register of certificate of title was issued;
Deeds of this province and the Land
Registration Authority. (e) A document, on file in
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes the registry of deeds, by which the
SO ORDERED.[4] property the description of which is
restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or
given in said documents, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or
destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a
an authenticated copy of said
On January 16, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor document showing that its original had
piece of land.[8] It partakes of a land registration
been registered; and
General filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due
proceeding.[9] Thus, it must be granted only upon clear
(f) Any other
course by the RTC. document which, in the judgment of
proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued
the court, is sufficient and proper basis
to the petitioner.[10] In this regard, Section 3 of Republic Act for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
On September 23, 2002, the CA affirmed the
(RA) No. 26 enumerates the documents regarded as valid
RTC Decision.[5] Petitioner filed this petition for review
and sufficient bases for reconstitution of a transfer
The instant petition for reconstitution is anchored
raising the sole issue —
certificate of title:
on Section 3(f) of RA No. 26, with respondent proffering
three significant documents — a tax declaration, survey and Land Registration Commission Circular No.
[17]
plan and technical descriptions of each lot. The tax declaration obviously does not serve as 35. Moreover, a survey plan or technical description

a valid basis for reconstitution. For one, we cannot safely prepared at the instance of a party cannot be considered

The Court has already settled in a number of rely on Tax Declaration No. 15003-816 as evidence of the in his favor, the same being self-serving.[18] Further, in Lee

cases that, following the principle of ejusdem generis in subject property being covered by TCT No. T-22868 in the v. Republic,[19] the Court declared the reconstitution based

statutory construction, “any document” mentioned in name of respondent because a tax declaration is executed on a survey plan and technical descriptions void for lack of

Section 3 should be interpreted to refer to documents for taxation purposes only and is actually prepared by the factual support.
[11] [14]
similar to those previously enumerated therein. As aptly alleged owner himself. In fact, in Heirs of Eulalio Ragua

observed by the petitioner, the documents enumerated in v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court pronounced that a tax Once again, we caution the courts against the

Section 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are documents that had declaration is not a reliable source for the reconstitution of hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution.

been issued or are on file with the Register of Deeds, thus, a certificate of title. Strict observance of the rules is vital to prevent parties

highly credible. from exploiting reconstitution proceedings as a quick but

At most, the tax declaration can only be prima illegal way to obtain Torrens certificate of titles over

Moreover, they are documents from which the facie evidence of possession or a claim of ownership, parcels of land which turn out to be already covered by

particulars of the certificate of title or the circumstances which however is not the issue in a reconstitution existing titles.[20] Courts should bear in mind that should the

which brought about its issuance could readily be proceeding. A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the petition for reconstitution be denied for lack of sufficient

ascertained. After all, the purpose of reconstitution ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed basis, the petitioner is not left without a remedy. He may
[16]
proceedings under RA No. 26 is the restoration in the title but merely determines whether a re-issuance of still file an application for confirmation of his title under the

original form and condition of a lost or destroyed such title is proper. provisions of the Land Registration Act, if he is in fact the

instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of lawful owner.[21]

land.[12] Consequently, a petitioner’s documentary As for the survey plan and technical

evidence should be able to establish that the lost or descriptions, the Court has previously dismissed the same WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

destroyed certificate of title has, in fact, been issued to the as not the documents referred to in Section 3(f) but merely petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

petitioner or his predecessor-in-interest and such title was additional documents that should accompany the petition Appeals dated September 23,

in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.[13] for reconstitution as required under Section 12 of RA 26
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO property or has an interest therein, that the said certificate
2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for Associate Justice of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and
that the description, area and boundaries of the property
reconstitution is DENIED. Chairperson, Third Division
are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or
destroyed certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall
be issued. The clerk of court shall forward to the register of
CERTIFICATION deeds a certified copy of said order and all the documents,
SO ORDERED. which pursuant to said order, are to be used as the basis
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the of the reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no
Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I sufficient evidence or basis to justify the reconstitution, the
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been petition shall be dismissed, but each dismissal shall not
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to preclude the right of the party or parties entitled thereto to
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. file an application for confirmation of his or their title under
NACHURA the provisions of the Land Registration Act. (Emphasis
Associate Justice supplied.)
[14]
See Section 202, Chapter II, Local Government
REYNATO S. PUNO Code.
[15]
Chief Justice 381 Phil. 7 (2000).
WE CONCUR: [16]
Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., G.R. No. 142766, June
15, 2007, 524 SCRA 641, 653.
[17]
Heirs of Dizon v. Discaya, supra note 11, at 545.
[18]
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, No. L-
Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Conrado M. 30272, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 15, 23, reiterated
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Vasquez, Jr. (now Presiding Justice) and Regalado E. in Republic v. El Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas, 459 SCRA
Associate Justice 533, 547 (2005).
Maambong, concurring; rollo, pp. 51-60.
Chairperson [19]
Supra note 8.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 61-62.
[20]
[3]
Id. at 73. Republic v. Sanchez, supra note 10.
[21]
[4]
Id. at 100. Section 15, RA No. 26, supra note 13.
[5]
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- MINITA V. CHICO- Id. at 51-60.
[6]
Id. at 38.
MARTINEZ NAZARIO [7]
Id. at 138-139. Republic of the Philippines
Associate Justice Associate Justice [8]
Lee v. Republic, 418 Phil. 793, 803 (2001).
[9]
SUPREME COURT
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Manila
No. L-68303, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 62, 66.
[10]
Republic v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 146081, July 17,
2006, 495 SCRA 248, 274. SECOND DIVISION
RUBEN T. REYES [11]
Republic v. Holazo, G.R. No. 146846, August
Associate Justice
31, 2004, 437 SCRA 345; Heirs of Dizon v. Discaya, 362
Phil. 536, 544 (1999); Republic v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra note 9.
ATTESTATION [12] G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994
Republic v. Sanchez, supra note 10.
[13]
Section 15 of RA 26 states:
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision SEC. 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner,
were reached in consultation before the case was documents presented, as supported by parole evidence or
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. vs.
otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the
Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.
REGALADO, J.:
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who
were moved by their desire to devote their remaining years
to the service of their Creator by forming their own civic
organization for that purpose, should find themselves
enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from
a community member allegedly without the required permit
from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last
quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known
as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched
a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of
Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno,
the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco,
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of
Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It
is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit
from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge
Angeles, an information 1 was filed against petitioner
Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente
Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the
Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information 2 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential
Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for
charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made
for a religious purpose such as the construction of a
chapel. This was denied 3 by the trial court, and petitioner's
motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial
on the merits ensued.
On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered
judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner
Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing
them to each pay a fine of P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial
court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the
basis of its finding that they acted in good faith, plus the
fact that it believed that the latter should not have been
criminally liable were it not for the existence of Presidential
Decree
No. 1564 which the court opined it had the duty to apply in
the instant case.
Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10. However,
accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the
case proceeded only with respect to petitioner Centeno.
On May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos
affirmed the decision of the lower court but modified the
penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act
committed which caused damage and prejudice to the
complainant, by sentencing petitioner Centeno to suffer an
increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a fine
of P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. 5 The motion for reconsideration of the
decision was denied by the court. 6
Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by
the lowest court in the judicial hierarchy eventually
reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue
of whether solicitations for religious purposes are within
the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively,
the financial sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a
question of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is
gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final
adjudication.
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree
No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for
religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term
"religious purpose" is not expressly included in the
provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not
include, it excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to
State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose
would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of
religion guaranteed under the Constitution.
Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No.
4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law),
provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation,
organization, or association desiring to
solicit or receive contributions for
charitable or public welfare purposes
shall first secure a permit from the
Regional Offices of the Department of
Social Services and Development as
provided in the Integrated
Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of
a written application for a permit in the
form prescribed by the Regional
Offices of the Department of Social
Services and Development, the
Regional Director or his duly
authorized representative may, in his
discretion, issue a permanent or
temporary permit or disapprove the
application. In the interest of the
public, he may in his discretion renew
or revoke any permit issued under Act
4075.
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase
"charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the
negative.
I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction
that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in
the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned. 7
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as
several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and
"religious" separately and independently of each other.
Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three descriptive
words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
which provides that "charitable institutions, churches and
personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in
statutes wherein these two terms are likewise dissociated
and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26
(e) (corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E)
(exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal
Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the organization
of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the
Local Government Code.
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out
"charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or
public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so
stated expressly.
All contributions designed to promote the work of the
church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities
depend for their support on voluntary
contributions. 8 However, "religious purpose" is not
interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose."
While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is
not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not
equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which
is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term. 9 Although
the term "charitable" may include matters which are
"religious," it is a broader term and includes matters which
are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction
between "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose,"
except where the two terms are obviously used
synonymously, or where the distinction has been done
away with by statute.10 The word "charitable," therefore,
like most other words, is capable of different significations.
For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from
taxation, it has a very wide meaning, but under
Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it
cannot be given such a broad application since it would be
prejudicial to petitioners.
To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally
construed strictly against the taxpayer. However, there are
cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious
purposes" have been liberally construed as covered in the
law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes."
Thus, the term "charitable purposes," within the meaning
of a statute providing that the succession of any property
passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes
only of public charity shall not be subject to succession tax,
is deemed to include religious purposes. 11A gift for
"religious purposes" was considered as a bequest for
"charitable use" as regards exemption from inheritance
tax.12
On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of
the solicitation within the concept of "charitable" purpose
which under Presidential Decree
No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of
Social Services and Development, under paid of penal
liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to
petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be
strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for
"religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the
fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal
legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as
would favor the accused.
For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by
implications, intendments, analogies or equitable
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction
to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or
multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal
statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and
to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the
rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and
admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions,
that which operates in favor of a party accused under its
provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in
and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to
be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal
expression of the legislative intent to make them such.
Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal
statute should be regarded as without its intendment. 13
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word
"charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise
definition, and each case involving a determination of that
which is charitable must be decided on its own particular
facts and circumstances. 15 The law does not operate in
vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by
circumstances in the abstract.
Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the
statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein given
which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make
use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as
used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an
alternative. It often connects a series of words or
propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is
used, the various members of the enumeration are to be
taken separately. 16 Accordingly, "charitable" and
"religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration
using the disjunctive "or" should be given different, distinct,
and disparate meanings. There is no compelling
consideration why the same treatment or usage of these
words cannot be made applicable to the questioned
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious
purposes cannot be penalized under the law for,
otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on
the free exercise clause guaranteed under the
Constitution.
It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a
social concern of the people and, consequently,
solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve
public welfare. Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the
regulatory powers of the State may, to a certain degree,
extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering,
however, that such an activity is within the cloak of the free
exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion
guaranteed by the Constitution, it becomes imperative to
delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the
power to regulate the exercise of this constitutional right
and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be
imposed thereon.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience
and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the
constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society. The
freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to
preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case,
the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a
permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom. 17
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at
some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may
protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may
protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring
a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly
to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity
and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to
represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time
and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of
public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. 18
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional
guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything
which may be so called can be tolerated. 19 It has been
said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental
interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the
"free exercise" of religion merely because it also
incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of
one or more religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in the
public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any
religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay
the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional
objection, even though the collection be for a religious
purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited
previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or
interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. 21
Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is
surprising how many operations are carried on by persons
and associations who, secreting their activities under the considering that the complainant in this case is herself a
guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and judge of the Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears
defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how stressing at this point that a judge is required to so behave
profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
people who manipulate them. The State has authority and impartiality of the judiciary, 25 should be vigilant
under the exercise of its police power to determine against any attempt to subvert its independence, and must
whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by resist any pressure from whatever source. 26
unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for
fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of contributions
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Martin
grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge.
Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with
Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for
costs de oficio.
worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere
should be lodged the power to determine within
reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. 22 The SO ORDERED.
objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are
prejudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally
suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for Narvasa, C.J. and Puno, JJ., concur.
the raising of money for charity is lessened or
destroyed. 23 Some regulation of public solicitation is,
therefore, in the public interest. 24
To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be
subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that Separate Opinions
solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within
the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable
therefor.
MENDOZA, J.:
As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by
respondent judge for increasing the penalty imposed by I concur in the result reached in this case that the
the trial court, premised on the supposed perversity of solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is not
petitioner's act which thereby caused damage to the covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the
complainant. It must be here emphasized that the trial solicitation of contributions for "charitable or public welfare
court, in the dispositive portion of its decision, even purposes." My reasons are three-fold.
recommended executive clemency in favor of petitioner
and the other accused after finding that the latter acted in First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a
good faith in making the solicitation from the complainant, church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare
an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious
upon a doubtful and difficult question of law can be the purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare
basis of good faith, especially for a layman. purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of
a church is not like fund drives for needy families or victims
of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the
There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent
judge which would indicate, impliedly or otherwise, that like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines,
petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or it is part of the propagation of religious faith or
malevolently. This could be reflective upon her objectivity, evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of

faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or
aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor.
Such solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as
much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited
for contribution.
Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public
against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns
for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand,
since religious fund drives are usually conducted among
those belonging to the same religion, the need for public
protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in
as great a degree as does the need for protection with
respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to
justify state regulation.
Third. To require a government permit before solicitation
for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior
restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if
followed, may well justify requiring a permit before a
church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But
in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely
held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee
before one may engage in business could not be applied
to the appellant's sale of bibles because that would impose
a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for
the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from
the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and
other uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the
Decree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations
for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner
that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the
Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is not fairly
possible by which a constitutional violation may be
avoided.
For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed
from and to acquit petitioner.
Padilla, J., concurs.
# Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J.:
other uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the
Decree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations
for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner
I concur in the result reached in this case that the
that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the
solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is not
Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to
covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is not fairly
solicitation of contributions for "charitable or public welfare
possible by which a constitutional violation may be
purposes." My reasons are three-fold.
avoided.
First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a
For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed
church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare
from and to acquit petitioner.
purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious
purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare
purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of Padilla, J., concurs.
a church is not like fund drives for needy families or victims
of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the #Footnotes
like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines,
it is part of the propagation of religious faith or
evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of 1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 25.
faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or
aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor.
Such solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as 2 Annex B, id.; ibid., 20.
much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited
for contribution. 3 Annex D, id.; ibid., 34.
Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public 4 Annex G, id.; ibid., 40.
against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns
for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand,
5 Annex H, id.; ibid., 44.
since religious fund drives are usually conducted among
those belonging to the same religion, the need for public
protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in 6 Annex J, id.; ibid., 64.
as great a degree as does the need for protection with
respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to
7 Commissioner of Customs vs. Court
justify state regulation.
of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos.
48886-88, July 21, 1993, 224 SCRA
Third. To require a government permit before solicitation 665.
for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior
restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if
8 Scobey vs. Beckman, 41 N.E. 2d 84.
followed, may well justify requiring a permit before a
church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But
in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely 9 See Adye vs. Smith, 26 Am. Rep.
held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee 424.
before one may engage in business could not be applied
to the appellant's sale of bibles because that would impose
a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for 10 See Read vs. McLean, 200 So.
the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from 109.
the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and
11 In re Seaman's Estate, 139 N.E. 2d MENDOZA, J., concurring: Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor
17. whereas Pilando was a candidate for congressional
representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998
1 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
elections.[6]
12 In re Clark's Estate, 159 A. 500.
2 B.P. Blg. 880, § 3(a). The Provincial Board of Canvassers held the
13 Martin, Statutory Construction, canvassing of election returns at the second floor of the
1979 ed., 183. Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province
EN BANC from May 11, 1998 to May 15, 1998.[7]

14 Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a
Court, et al., G.R. No. 69809, October complaint with the COMELEC’s Law Department for
16, 1986, 145 SCRA 112. violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232
[G.R. No. 146943. October 4, 2002] and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez,
Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan,
15 Topeka Presbyterian Manor, Inc.
Jose Bagwan who was then Provincial Election
vs. Board, 402 P. ed. 802.
Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers. Victor Dominguez (“Dominguez” for brevity)
16 Martin, op. cit., 81. SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion,
ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz (“Corpuz”
TANGILAG and VICTOR for brevity) was then the Provincial Director of the
17 Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 301 U.S. DOMINGUEZ,respondents. Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while
296 (1940). Anacleto Tangilag (“Tangilag” for brevity) was then the
DECISION Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain
18 Id., loc. cit. Province.
CARPIO, J.:
Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a
19 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain
283. Province blocked their supporters who were on their way
to Bontoc, and prevented them from proceeding to the
The Case
20 Ibid., id., 282. Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further
alleged that policemen, upon orders of private
respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless
21 Cantwell vs. Connecticut, supra. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC” entering the capitol grounds.
for brevity) en banc[2] dated June 10, 1999 and October 26,
22 Id., loc. cit. In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested
2000. The assailed Resolutions dismissed the
complaint[3] filed by petitioner Sario Malinias (“Malinias” for the COMELEC and its Law Department to investigate and
23 City of Seattle vs. Rogers, 106 P. brevity) and Roy S. Pilando (“Pilando” for brevity) for prosecute private respondents for the following alleged
2d 598. insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for unlawful acts.
violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646[4] and
Sections 232 and 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.[5]
24 Commonwealth vs. Creighton, et “3. That on May 15, 1998 at the site of the canvassing of
al., 170 A. 720. election returns for congressional and provincial returns
located at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol
Building the public and particularly the designated
25 Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial The Facts representatives/watchers of both affiants were prevented
Conduct. from attending the canvassing.

26 Rule 1.03. id.

xxx
4. That the aforementioned “Mass-affidavits” support our
allegations in this affidavit-complaint that we and our
supporters were prevented from attending the provincial
canvassing because of the illegal checkpoint/blockade set-
up by policemen in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mt.
Province and as an evidence to these allegations,
Certification of the Police Station is hereto attached as
Annex “D” and affidavits of supporters hereto attached as
Annex “E”, both made an integral part of this affidavit-
complaint; and that said “mass-affidavits” show that the
Provincial canvassing were not made public or (sic)
candidates and their representatives/watchers prevented
because of barricade, closure of canvassing rooms,
blockade by armed policemen that coerce or threaten the
people, the candidates or their representatives from
attending the canvassing;[8]
In support of the complaint, several supporters of
Malinias and Pilando executed so-called “mass affidavits”
uniformly asserting that private respondents, among
others, (1) prevented them from attending the provincial
canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and (3)
threatened the people who wanted to enter the canvassing
room. They likewise alleged that the Provincial Board of
Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made
public and consented to the exclusion of the public or
representatives of other candidates except those of
Dominguez.[9]
Consequently, the COMELEC’s Law Department
conducted a preliminary investigation during which only
Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-
Affidavit.
In their Counter-Affidavit, Corpuz and Tangilag
admitted ordering the setting up of a checkpoint at
Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province and securing
the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building, to wit:
“3. We admit having ordered the setting up of check points
in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province;
as in fact, this is not the only checkpoint set up in the
province. There are other checkpoints established in other
parts of the province, to enforce the COMELEC gun ban
and other pertinent rules issued by the Commission on
Election during the election period.
4. Policemen were posted within the vicinity of the capitol
grounds in response to earlier information that some
groups were out to disrupt the canvass proceedings which
were being conducted in the second floor of the Provincial
Capitol Building. This is not remote considering that this
had happened in the past elections. In fact, during the
canvass proceeding on May 15, 1998 a large group of
individuals identified with no less than affiants-
complainants Roy S. Pilando and Sario Malinias was
conducting a rally just in front of the capitol, shouting
invectives at certain candidates and their leaders. This
group likewise were holding placards and posted some in
front of the capitol building.
x x x”[10]
After the investigation, in a study dated May 26,
1999, the COMELEC’s Law Department recommended to
the COMELEC en banc the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of probable cause.[11]
In a Resolution dated June 10, 1999, the
COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint of Malinias
and Pilando for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause against private respondents. On October
26, 2000, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, Malinias filed the instant petition.
The Comelec’s Ruling
In dismissing the complaint against private
respondents, the COMELEC ruled as follows:
“As appearing in the Minutes of Provincial Canvass,
complainant Roy Pilando was present during the May 15,
1998 Provincial Canvass. He even participated actively in
a discussion with the members of the Board and the
counsel of Congressman Dominguez. The minutes also
disclosed that the lawyers of LAMMP, the watchers,
supporters of other candidates and representatives of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines were present at one time
or another during the canvass proceedings. The minutes
does not indicate any charges of irregularities inside and
within the vicinity of the canvassing room.
Pursuant to Comelec Res. No. 2968 promulgated on
January 7, 1998, checkpoints were established in the
entire country to effectively implement the firearms ban
during the election period from January 11, 1998 to June
10, 1998. In Mountain Province, there were fourteen (14)
checkpoints established by the Philippine National Police
way before the start of the campaign period for the May
11, 1998 elections including the subject checkpoint at
Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Thus, the checkpoint at Sabangan, Mountain
Province was not established as alleged only upon request
of Congressman Dominguez on May 15, 1998 but way
before the commencement of the campaign
period. Granting arguendo that the Congressman did
make a request for a checkpoint at Sitio Nacagang, it
would be a mere surplusage as the same was already
existing.
Furthermore, an alleged text of a radio message
requesting advice from the PNP Provincial Director at
Bontoc, Mt. Province was attached to complainants’
affidavit-complaint. However, said person by the name of
Mr. Palicos was never presented to affirm the truth of the
contents and the signature appearing therein.”[12]
Finding that Malinias failed to adduce new evidence,
the COMELEC dismissed Malinias’ Motion for
Reconsideration.[13]
The Court’s Ruling
The sole issue for resolution is whether the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
Malinias and Pilando’s complaint for insufficiency of
evidence to establish probable cause for alleged violation
of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261
(i) of B.P. 881.
 We rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.
For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, the tribunal or administrative body must have
issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a
capricious and despotic manner.
“There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance
of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act
at all in contemplation of law.”[14]
Such is not the situation in the instant case. The
COMELEC dismissed properly the complaint of Malinias
and Pilando for insufficient evidence, and committed no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
First, Malinias charged private respondents with
alleged violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646,
quoted, as follows:
“Sec. 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the
Canvass. – Any registered political party, coalition of
parties, through their representatives, and any candidate
has the right to be present and to counsel during the
canvass of the election returns; Provided, That only one
counsel may argue for each political party or
candidate. They shall have the right to examine the
returns being canvassed without touching them, make
their observations thereon, and file their challenge in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Commission. No dilatory action shall be allowed by the
board of canvassers.”
In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to
substantiate his claim that private respondents denied him
his right to be present during the canvassing. There was
even no showing that Malinias was within the vicinity of the
Provincial Capitol Building or that private respondents
prevented him from entering the canvassing room.
As found by the COMELEC and admitted by
Malinias, Pilando was present and even participated
actively in the canvassing.[15] Malinias failed to show that
his rights as a gubernatorial candidate were prejudiced by
the alleged failure of his supporters to attend the
canvassing. Malinias claimed that even though Pilando
was present during the canvassing, the latter was only
able to enter the room after eluding the policemen and
passing through the rear entrance of the Provincial Capitol
Building.[16] This allegation, however, is not supported by
any clear and convincing evidence. Pilando himself, who
was purportedly prevented by policemen from entering the
canvassing room, failed to attest to the veracity of this
statement rendering the same self-serving and baseless.
In an analogous case where a political candidate’s
watcher failed to attend the canvass proceedings, this
Court held:
“Another matter which militates against the cause of
petitioner is that he has not shown that he suffered
prejudice because of the failure of his watcher to attend
the canvassing. Had the watcher been present, what
substantive issues would he have raised? Petitioner does
not disclose. Could it be that even if the watcher was
present, the result of the canvassing would have been the
same?”
There is therefore no merit in petitioner’s claim that
respondent Commission on Elections gravely abused its
discretion in issuing its questioned decision. And, as
emphatically stated in Sidro v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 853,
this Court has invariably followed the principle that “in the
absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of
the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by the
respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its
competence is entitled to the utmost respect, xxx.” There
is justification in this case to reiterate this principle.”[17]
Assuming that Pilando in fact entered the
canvassing room only after successfully evading the
policemen surrounding the Provincial Capitol grounds,
Pilando could have easily complained of this alleged
unlawful act during the canvass proceedings. He could
have immediately reported the matter to the Provincial
Board of Canvassers as a violation of Section 25 of R.A.
No. 6646. However, Pilando opted simply to raise
questions on alleged irregularities in the municipal
canvassing.[18] While he had the opportunity to protest the
alleged intimidation committed by policemen against his
person, it is quite surprising that he never mentioned
anything about it to the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Surprisingly, the COMELEC and private respondents
apparently overlooked that R.A. No. 6646 does not punish
a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election
offense. Section 25 merely highlights one of the
recognized rights of a political party or candidate during
elections, aimed at providing an effective safeguard
against fraud or irregularities in the canvassing of election
returns. Section 27[19] of R.A. No. 6646, which specifies
the election offenses punishable under this law, does not
include Section 25.
Malinias further claims that, in violation of this right,
his supporters were blocked by a checkpoint set-up at
Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province. This allegation
is devoid of any basis to merit a reversal of the
COMELEC’s ruling. Malinias’ supporters who were
purportedly blocked by the checkpoint did not confirm or
corroborate this allegation of Malinias.
Moreover, the police established checkpoints in the
entire country to implement the firearms ban during the
election period. Clearly, this is in consonance with the
constitutionally ordained power of the COMELEC to
deputize government agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.[20]
Second, Malinias maintains that Corpuz and
Tangilag entered the canvassing room in blatant violation
of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881. His sole basis for this
allegation is the affidavit of his supporters who expressly
stated that they saw Dominguez and Corpuz (only) enter
the canvassing room.[21] Malinias likewise contends that
“Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted that they were
inside or at least within the fifty (50) meter radius of the
canvassing room as they were able to mention the names
of the persons who were inside the canvassing room in
their Counter-Affidavit.”[22]
The provision of law which Corpuz and Tangilag
allegedly violated is quoted as follows:
“Sec. 232. Persons not allowed inside the canvassing
room. – It shall be unlawful for any officer or member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the Philippine
Constabulary, or the Integrated National Police or any
peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging
to an extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction
forces, strike forces, home defense forces, barangay self-
defense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the
security or police organizations or government ministries,
commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities,
or government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries or of any member of a privately owned or
operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence
agency performing identical or similar functions to enter
the room where the canvassing of the election returns are
held by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty
meters from such room: Provided, however, That the
board of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems
necessary, may make a call in writing for the detail of
policemen or any peace officers for their protection or for
the protection of the election documents and paraphernalia
in the possession of the board, or for the maintenance of
peace and order, in which case said policemen or peace
officers, who shall be in proper uniform, shall stay outside
the room within a radius of thirty meters near enough to be
easily called by the board of canvassers at any time.”
Again, the COMELEC and private respondents
overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of
the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261
and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically
states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to
enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the
election offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261
and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section
232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal
election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides
that the penalty for an election offense under Sections 261
and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but not
more than six years.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the
COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged
violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because
this is a non-criminal act.
“It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in
the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule
is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that
which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus,
where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.
xxx
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its
variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are
based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. They are predicated upon one’s own
voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed
from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.”[23]
Also, since private respondents are being charged
with a criminal offense, a strict interpretation in favor of
private respondents is required in determining whether the
acts mentioned in Section 232 are criminally punishable
under Sections 261[24] and 262[25] of B.P. Blg. 881. Since
Sections 261 and 262, which lists the election offenses
punishable as crimes, do not include Section 232, a strict
interpretation means that private respondents cannot be
held criminally liable for violation of Section 232.
This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of
B.P. Blg. 881 is without any sanction. Though not a
criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232
certainly warrants, after proper hearing, the imposition
of administrative penalties. Under Section 2, Article IX-C
of the Constitution, the COMELEC may recommend to the
President the imposition of disciplinary action on any
officer or employee the COMELEC has deputized for
violation of its directive, order or decision.[26] Also, under
the Revised Administrative Code,[27] the COMELEC may
recommend to the proper authority the suspension or
removal of any government official or employee found
guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with
COMELEC orders or rulings.
In addition, a careful examination of the evidence
presented by Malinias shows that the same are insufficient
to justify a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the COMELEC. Obviously, the evidence relied upon by
Malinias to support his charges consisted mainly of
affidavits prepared by his own supporters. The affidavits of
Malinias’ own supporters, being self-serving, cannot be
accepted at face value under the circumstances. As this
Court has often stated, “reliance should not be placed on
mere affidavits.”[28]
Besides, if Corpuz really entered the canvassing
room, then why did Pilando and the representatives of
other candidates, who were inside the room, fail to
question this alleged wrongful act during the
canvassing? Malinias’ contention that Corpuz and
Tangilag impliedly admitted they were inside the
canvassing room because they mentioned the names of
the persons present during the canvassing deserves scant
consideration as the same is not supported by any
evidence.
Finally, Malinias asserts that private respondents
should be held liable for allegedly violating Section 261 (i)
of B. P. Blg. 881 because the latter engaged in partisan
political activity. This provision states:
“Sec. 261 (i) Intervention of public officers and employees.
– Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those
holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force,
special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-
defense units and all other para-military units that now
exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or
indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages
in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to
preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.”
Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 defines the
term “partisan political activity” as an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office.”[29] Malinias asserts that, in
setting up a checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan,
Sabangan, Mountain Province and in closing the
canvassing room, Corpuz and Tangilag unduly interfered
with his right to be present and to counsel during the
canvassing. This interference allegedly favored the other
[1]
candidate.
While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the
setting up of the checkpoint, they did so to enforce the
COMELEC’s firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2968, among others.[30] There was no clear
[2]
indication that these police officers, in ordering the setting
up of checkpoint, intended to favor the other
candidates. Neither was there proof to show that Corpuz
and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their authority in
implementing the COMELEC rules. Further, there is no [3]
basis to rule that private respondents arbitrarily deprived
Malinias of his right to be present and to counsel during [4]
the canvassing.
[5]
The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the
checkpoint was plainly in accordance with their avowed [6]
duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the
vicinity of the canvassing site. Thus, the act is untainted [7]
with any color of political activity. There was also no
[8]
showing that the alleged closure of the provincial capitol
grounds favored the election of the other candidates. [9]
In summary, we find that there is no proof that the [10]
COMELEC issued the assailed resolutions with grave
abuse of discretion. We add that this Court has limited [11]
power to review findings of fact made by the COMELEC
pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and [12]
prosecute actions for election offenses.[31] Thus, where
[13]
there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness,
fraud or error of law, this Court may not review the factual
[14]
findings of the COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings
on the sufficiency of evidence.[32] [15]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is [16]
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of public
respondent COMELEC are AFFIRMED. Costs against [17]
petitioner.
SO ORDERED. [18]
Bellosillo, Acting C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, [19]
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., on official leave.
Since the instant petition is grounded on grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC, the same is
considered as a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 64.
Composed of Harriet O. Demetriou as Chairperson with
Manolo B. Gorospe, Luzviminda G. Tancangco,
Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, Japal M. Guiani and
Julio F. Desamito as Commissioners.
Docketed as E.O. 98-262.
Otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law.
Otherwise known as The Omnibus Election Code.
Rollo, p. 17.
Ibid., pp. 61-72.
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
Ibid., pp. 19-24.
Ibid., pp. 25-26.
Rollo, p. 14.
Rollo, pp. 14-16.
Ibid., pp. 12-13.
People vs. Marave, 11 SCRA 618 (1964).
Rollo, pp. 15, 32-33.
Rollo, p. 32.
Quilala vs. Commission on Elections, 188 SCRA 502
(1990).
Rollo, pp. 73-79.
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6646 provides as follows:
“Election Offenses. – In addition to the prohibited
acts and election offenses enumerated in
Section 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of
an election offense:
(a) Any person who causes the printing of official ballots
and election returns by any printing
establishment which is not under contract with
the Commission on Election and any printing
establishment which undertakes such
unauthorized printing.
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or
board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in
any election or any member of the board who
refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to
credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered
votes.
(c) Any member of the board of election inspectors who
refuses to issue to duly accredited watchers the
certificate of voters provided in Section 16
hereof.
(d) Any person who violates Section 11 hereof regarding
prohibited forms of election propaganda. Any
chairman of the board of canvassers who fails to
give notice of meetings to other members of the
board, candidate or political party as required
under Section 23 hereof.
(e) Any person declared a nuisance candidate as defined
under Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
or is otherwise disqualified, by final and
executory judgment, who continues to
misrepresent himself out, as a candidate, such
as by continuing to campaign thereafter, and/or
other public officer or private individual, who
knowingly induces or abets such
misrepresentation, by commission or omission,
shall be guilty of an election offense and subject
to the penalty provided in Section 262 of the
same code.
[20]
See Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
[21]
Rollo, p. 23.
[22]
Petition, pp. 7-8.
[23]
Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, (1990), pp.
160-161, citing the cases of Canlas vs. Republic,
103 Phil. 712 (1958); Lao Oh Kim vs. Reyes,
103 Phil. 1139 (1958); People vs. Aquino, 83
 Phil. 614 (1949); Escribano vs.Avila, 85 SCRA G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006 resolution, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
245 (1978); People vs. Lantin, 30 SCRA 81 principal ground5 that the verification attached to it was
(1969); Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. Court of signed merely by SPMC’s chief financial officer ― without
SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING
Appeals, 73 SCRA 162 (1976); Santos vs. Court the corporate secretary’s certificate, board resolution or
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
of Appeals, 96 SCRA 448 (1980); power of attorney authorizing him to sign the verification
vs.
Lerum vs. Cruz, 87 Phil. 652 and certification against forum shopping. SPMC sought a
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
(1950); Velasco vs. Blas, 115 SCRA 540 (1982). reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied.
REVENUE,* Respondent.
Hence, this petition.
[24]
See Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881.
DECISION
[25]
Section 262 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides as follows: “Other Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed SPMC’s
election offenses. — Violation of the provisions, appeal?
or pertinent portions, of the following sections of CORONA, J.:
this Code shall constitute election offenses:
SPMC contends that its appeal should have been given
Sections 9, 18, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84,
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of due course since it substantially complied with the
85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
Court, San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) requirements on verification and certification against forum
102, 103, 104, 105, 106 107, 108, 109, 110,
assails the July 19, 20001 and April 3, 2001 resolutions of shopping. It insists on the liberal application of the rules
111, 112, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134,
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59139. because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not
135, 145, 148, 150, 152, 172, 173, 174, 178,
liable for the 3% miller’s tax. It maintains that the crude oil
180, 182, 184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192,
which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by
194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 203, 204, 205, SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine,
206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and hence, not subject to miller’s tax pursuant to Section 168
215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 229, 230, other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay of the 1987 Tax Code.
231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239 and 240.” by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total amount
[26]
of P8,182,182.852 representing deficiency miller’s tax and
See People vs. Basilla, 179 SCRA 87 (1989). manufacturer’s sales tax,3 among other deficiency For SPMC, Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code
[27] taxes,4 for taxable year 1987. The deficiency miller’s tax contemplates two exemptions from the miller’s tax: (a) the
See Section 2 (3), Title I (C), Executive Order No. 292.
was imposed on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United milled products in their original state were actually
[28]
Casimiro vs. Commission on Elections, 171 SCRA 468 Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency exported by the miller himself or by another person, and
(1989) citing Pimentel, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 140 sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as (b) the milled products sold by the miller were actually
SCRA 126 (1985). manufactured products. exported as an ingredient or part of any manufactured
article by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled
[29]
See Section 79 of B.P. Blg. 881. products. The exportation may be effected by the miller
SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner himself or by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled
[30]
Rollo, pp. 15-16. denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest products. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled
to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC
[31]
Section 2 (6), Art. IX-C of the 1987 Philippine review docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. should be exempted from the miller’s tax.
Constitution.
[32]
Domingo vs. Commission on Elections, 313 SCRA 311 In its March 10, 2000 decision, the CTA cancelled SPMC’s
The petition must fail.
(1999). liability for deficiency manufacturer’s tax on the sales of
corn and edible oils but upheld the Commissioner’s
assessment for the deficiency miller’s tax. SPMC moved Under Rule 43, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, appeals
for the partial reconsideration of the CTA affirmation of the from the CTA and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
miller’s tax assessment but it was denied. Appeals should be verified. A pleading required to be
Republic of the Philippines verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as
SUPREME COURT an unsigned pleading.6
Manila SPMC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review of the CTA decision insofar as it upheld
the deficiency miller’s tax assessment. In its July 19, 2000
SECOND DIVISION
Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 43 requires a
sworn certification against forum shopping.7 Failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of a
petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.8
A corporation may exercise the powers expressly
conferred upon it by the Corporation Code and those that
are implied by or are incidental to its existence through its
board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and
agents.9 Hence, physical acts, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly
authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by
specific act of the board of directors.10 In the absence of
authority from the board of directors, no person, not even
the officers of the corporation, can bind the corporation. 11
SPMC’s petition in the Court of Appeals did not indicate
that the person who signed the verification/certification on
non-forum shopping was authorized to do so. SPMC
merely relied on the alleged inherent power of its chief
financial officer to represent SPMC in all matters regarding
the finances of the corporation including, among others,
the filing of suits to defend or protect it from assessments
and to recover erroneously paid taxes. SPMC even
admitted that no power of attorney, secretary’s certificate
or board resolution to prove the affiant’s authority was
attached to the petition. Thus, the petition was not properly
verified. Since the petition lacked proper verification, it was
to be treated as an unsigned pleading subject to
dismissal.12
In PET Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 the Court upheld
the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition on the
ground that the verification and certification against forum
shopping was signed by PET Plans, Inc.’s first vice-
president for legal affairs/corporate secretary without any
certification that he was authorized to sign in behalf of the
corporation.
In BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,14 the
Court ruled that the petition should be dismissed outright
on the ground that the verification/certification against
forum shopping was signed by BPI Leasing Corporation’s
counsel with no specific authority to do so. Since the
counsel was purportedly acting for the corporation, he
needed a resolution issued by the board of directors that
specifically authorized him to institute the petition and
execute the certification. Only then would his actions be
legally binding on the corporation.15
In this case, therefore, the appellate court did not commit
an error when it dismissed the petition on the ground that it
was signed by a person who had not been issued any
authority by the board of directors to represent the
corporation.
Neither can the Court subscribe to SPMC’s claim of
substantial compliance or to its plea for a liberal
application of the rules. Save for the most persuasive of
reasons, strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined
to facilitate the orderly administration of
justice.16 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter
involving strict observance such as the requirement on
non-forum shopping,17 as well as verification. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harping on the policy of liberal construction.18
But even if the fatal procedural infirmity were to be
disregarded, the petition must still fail for lack of merit.
As the CTA correctly ruled, SPMC’s sale of crude coconut
oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller’s tax. Section
168 of the 1987 Tax Code provided:
Sec. 168. Percentage tax upon proprietors or operators of
rope factories, sugar central mills, coconut oil mills, palm
oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories.
Proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central
and mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills
and desiccated coconut factories, shall pay a tax
equivalent to three percent (3%) of the gross value in
money of all the rope, sugar, coconut oil, palm oil, cassava
flour or starch, dessicated coconut, manufactured,
processed or milled by them, including the by-product of
the raw materials from which said articles are produced,
processed or manufactured, such tax to be based on the
actual selling price or market value of these articles at the
time they leave the factory or mill warehouse:Provided,
however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil,
palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is
produced or manufactured and dessicated coconut, if such
rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and
dessicated coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by
the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller
himself, and are actually exported without returning to the
Philippines, whether in their original state or as an
ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products:
Provided further, That where the planter or the owner of
the raw materials is the exporter of the aforementioned
milled or manufactured products, he shall be entitled to a
tax credit of the miller's taxes withheld by the proprietor or
operator of the factory or mill, corresponding to the
quantity exported, which may be used against any internal
revenue tax directly due from him: and Provided, finally,
That credit for any sales, miller's or excise taxes paid on
raw materials or supplies used in the milling process shall
not be allowed against the miller's tax due, except in the
case of a proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory
as provided hereunder. (emphasis supplied)
The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of
the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied
only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra
by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their
original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or
operator of the factory or by the miller himself.
The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the
interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide
that the exportation made by the purchaser of the
materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the
manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was
covered by the exemption. Since SPMC’s situation was not
within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3%
miller’s tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax
Code.
SPMC’s proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the
scope of the exemption clause. The rule is that the
exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since
the reasonable presumption is that the State has granted
in express terms all it intended to grant and that, unless
the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute, the
favor would be intended beyond what was meant.19
 2
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had Inclusive of interest, surcharge and other
which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its been reached in consultation before the case was penalties.
effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the 3
Covered by assessment nos. FAS-4-87-90-
enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that
REYNATO S. PUNO 000-511 in the amount of P4,596,093.58 and
does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very
Associate Justice FAS-4-87-90-000-512 in the amount
language of the statute cannot be placed therein.20 The
Chairperson, Second Division of P3,586,089.27, respectively.
rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would
not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had
4
the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its CERTIFICATION SPMC was also assessed for the following
terms to those expressly mentioned.21 deficiency taxes for taxable year 1987: miller’s
tax forP215,476.18 (FAS-4-87-90-000-510),
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and
percentage taxes for P42,221.92 (FAS-4-87-90-
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
000-513) andP35,300.29 (FAS-4-87-90-000-
of restrictive interpretation.22 Its application in this case is conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
514), increment of P2,298.78 on late payment
consistent with the construction of tax exemptions consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
(FAS-4-87-90-000-515) and fixed taxes
in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s the opinion of the Court’s Division.
for P495.78, P495.00 and P1,090.44 (FAS-4-87-
claim for tax exemption will violate these established
90-000-516 to FAS-4-87-90-000-518). These
principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN deficiencies were settled through payment.
Chief Justice
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. 5
Another ground for the dismissal of the petition
was SPMC’s failure to attach copies of all
Costs against petitioner. pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations in the
petition.
SO ORDERED. Footnotes
6
* Section 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court.
RENATO C. CORONA The petition names both the Court of Tax
Associate Justice Appeals and the Court of Appeals as
7
respondents. However, under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of Cf. Section 6, Rule 43, Rules of Court.
the Rules of Court, the lower court need not be
WE CONCUR:
impleaded as a party in the petition for review 8
Cf. Section 7, Rule 43, Rules of Court.
filed with the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court
REYNATO S. PUNO of Tax Appeals should not have been impleaded
9
Associate Justice in the action filed with the Court of Appeals. On BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of
Chairperson the other hand, under Sec. 4, Rule 45, the lower Appeals, G.R. No. 127624, 18 November 2003,
court need not be impleaded in petitions for 416 SCRA 4.
review filed before this Court. Hence, both the
ANGELINA SANDOVAL- Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA 10
Id.
GUTIERREZ were excluded from the title.
Asscociate Justice
Associate Justice
11
1 Public Estates Authority v. Uy, 423 Phil. 407
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Mabutas,
(2001).
CANCIO C. GARCIA Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. of
12
the Eighth Division of the Court of Soller v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
Appeals; rollo, p. 31. 139853, 5 September 2000, 339 SCRA 685.
ATTESTATION
 13
G.R. No. 148287, 23 November 2004, 443 DECISION
SCRA 510.
PUNO, J.:
14
Supra at note 9.
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set
aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent
15
Id. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected
16 Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San
PET Plans, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
17
Spouses Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang
95 (1998). Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be
held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner
applied for registration as member and voter of the
18
Chua v. Santos, G.R. No. 132467, 18 October
Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
2004, 440 SCRA 365.
Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however,
denied her application on the ground that petitioner, who
19
Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old,
G.R. No. 144104, 29 June 2004, 433 SCRA exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan
119. ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824.
20
Singapore Airlines Local Employees v. On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for
National Labor Relations Commission, 215 Phil.
Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter"
420 (1984). with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-
Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April
21
Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, 20 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and
January 2004, 420 SCRA 388. ordered her registration as member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan.[1] The Board of Election Tellers
appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos
22
Malinias v. COMELEC, 439 Phil. 319 (2002). Norte.[2] The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due
EN BANC to his close association with petitioner.[3]
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang
Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui,
Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996,
[G.R. No. 124893. April 18, 1997]
respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of
Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo,[4] disapproved
petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her
age.[5] Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the
SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.[6]
ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a
DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility
SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.
and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of
candidacy should not be disapproved.[7] Earlier and without
the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private
respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the
COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner
Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her
certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by
facsimile[8] and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the
Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios
issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en
banc issued an order directing the Board of Election
Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San
Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the
event she won in the election. The order reads as follows:
"Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" by
petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against
Lynette G. Garvida, received on April 29,
1996, the pertinent allegations of which reads:
xxx
5. That the said respondent is disqualified to
become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason
that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on
May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can
be gleaned from her birth certificate, a copy of which is
hereto attached and marked as Annex "A";
6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as
candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, she made material representation which is false and
as such, she is disqualified; that her certificate of
candidacy should not be given due course and that said
candidacy must be cancelled;
x x x."
the Commission, it appearing that the petition
is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of
Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte,
to suspend the proclamation of Lynette G.
Garvida in the event she garners the highest
 number of votes for the position of
Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].
Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to
submit immediately ten (10) copies of his
petition and to pay the filing and legal research
fees in the amount of P510.00.
SO ORDERED."[9]
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78
votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. [10] In
accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the
COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not
proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant
petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election
Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of
SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte.[11] The proclamation was "without prejudice to any
further action by the Commission on Elections or any other
interested party."[12] On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the
Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan
for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as
Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of
the Pederasyon.[13]
Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first
concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to act
on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of
candidacy; the second, the cancellation of her certificate of
candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age
requirement to run as an elective official of the SK.
I ordinary actions, special actions, special
Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of
1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is
under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be
governed by the Omnibus Election Code.[14] The Omnibus
Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the
procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy, viz:
"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before election."
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may
be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the
ground that the candidate has made a false material
representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard
and evidence received by any official designated by the
COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the
COMELEC itself.[15]
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction
over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with
the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases
before a Division may only be entertained by the
COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to
reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained
in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider
decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC
in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc.[16] It is
therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear
and decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of
the said Rules thus:
"Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions.
-- The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions
to hear and decide protests or petitions in
cases, provisional remedies, contempt and
special proceedings except in accreditation of
citizens' arms of the Commission."[17]
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not
refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the
petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and
issued the order of May 2, 1996.[18]
II
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to
note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal
requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. These requirements are:
"Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. -- Every pleading,
motion and other papers must be filed in ten
(10) legible copies. However, when there is
more than one respondent or protestee, the
petitioner or protestant must file additional
number of copies of the petition or protest as
there are additional respondents or protestees.
Sec. 2. How Filed. -- The documents referred
to in the immediately preceding section must
be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court
of the Commission personally, or, unless
otherwise provided in these Rules, by
registered mail. In the latter case, the date of
mailing is the date of filing and the requirement
as to the number of copies must be complied
with.
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. -- (a) All
pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be
printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal
size bond paper and shall be in English or
Filipino.
x x x."
Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and
filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be
filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the
COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in
proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed
with the COMELEC.[19] Also, the COMELEC en banc
issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition
transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving
the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic
matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at
a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by
a specified amount of electric current.[20] The current is
transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via
microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce
an image of the elemental area in the proper position and
the correct shade.[21] The receiver is equipped with a stylus
or other device that produces a printed record on paper
referred to as a facsimile.[22]
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not
sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much
less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine
and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original.[23]
Without the original, there is no way of determining
on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and
authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The
uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading
should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting
on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The
COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received
the petition filed by registered mail.
III
To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve
the issue of petitioner's age.
The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created
by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang
Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all
residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but
less than 18 years of age.[24]
The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its
members a medium to express their views and opinions
and participate in issues of transcendental
importance.[25] Its affairs were administered by a barangay
youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders
who were actual residents of the barangay and were at
least 15 years but less than 18 years of age.[26] In 1983,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government
Code, raised the maximum age of the Kabataang
Barangay members from "less than 18 years of age" to
"not more than 21 years of age."
The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the
Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It,
however, retained the age limit of the members laid down
in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old.[27] The
affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman
and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan
ng Kabataan.[28]
The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio
member of the Sangguniang Barangay.[29] A member of
the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless
sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently
incapacitated, dies or resigns from office.[30]
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject
to specific qualifications laid down by the Local
Government Code of 1991, viz:
"Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. -- The
katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of
all citizens of the Philippines actually residing
in the barangay for at least six (6) months,
who are fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-
one (21) years of age, and who are duly
registered in the list of the sangguniang
kabataan or in the official barangay list in the
custody of the barangay secretary."
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a
candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan if he possesses
the following qualifications:
"Sec. 428. Qualifications. -- An elective
official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a
citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of
the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the
barangay for at least one (1) year immediately
prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but
not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on
the day of his election, able to read and write
Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must
not have been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude."
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a
Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for
at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of
age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the
Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay
list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective
official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a
Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15
years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his
election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC
interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a
qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:
"Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. -- To be
qualified to register as a voter in the SK
elections, a person must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day, that is, he must have been born
between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and
c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and
actually residing in the barangay wherein he proposes to
vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections."
xxx
"Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. --
An elective official of the SK must be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year
immediately prior to the elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine
language or dialect or English.
Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of
candidates shall be decided by the
city/municipal Election Officer (EO) whose
decision shall be final."
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a
qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK elections if he
is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years
of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be born
between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and
(c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year
and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate
for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications
of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able
to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the
qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang
Kabataan. Petitioner's age is admittedly beyond the limit
set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No.
2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of
Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the
scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not
provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on
election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn
twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of
age on election day and therefore qualified as a member
and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate
for the SK elections.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will
reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a
member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum
age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets
a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no
further provision as to when the member shall have turned
21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides
that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years
old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase
"on the day of his election" is an additional
qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of
age on election day or on the day he registers as member
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official,
however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day
of election. The distinction is understandable considering
that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an
elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio.[31] The courts
may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances
showing that the legislature intended a distinction or
qualification.[32]
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections
must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of the
election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. In fact the term "qualified
voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No.
2824.[33] Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an
elective official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified
voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not provide that
the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan is determined on the day of the
election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824
is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a
voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day
of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK
should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his
election is very clear. The Local Government Code
speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law
speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365
days each.[34] One born on the first day of the year is
consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day
after his birth -- the last day of the year.[35] In computing
years, the first year is reached after completing the first
365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the
second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the
second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle
goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old
on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means
on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of
21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle
for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is
the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22
years old on the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means
not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-
day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some
days or a fraction of a year because that would be more
than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is
not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to
petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the
candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang
Barangay, the age qualification of a barangay youth official
was expressly stated as "x x x at least fifteen years of age
or over but less than eighteen x x x."[36] This provision
clearly states that the youth official must be at least 15
years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but
should not reach the age of eighteen years. When the
Local Government Code increased the age limit of
members of the youth organization to 21 years, it did not
reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth
"at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of
the Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22
years old, they should have stated so expressly instead of
leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt.[37]
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor
and principal author of the Local Government Code of
1991 declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan
ng Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay
discontinued was because most, if not all, Kabataang
Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of age by
the time President Aquino assumed power.[38] They were
not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government Code of
1991 fixed the maximum age limit at not more than 21
years[39] and the only exception is in the second paragraph
of Section 423 which reads:
"Sec. 423. Creation and Election. -- a) x x x;
b) A sangguniang kabataan official who,
during his term of office, shall have passed
the age of twenty-one (21) years shall be
allowed to serve the remaining portion of the
term for which he was elected."
The general rule is that an elective official of
the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21
years of age on the day of his election. The only exception
is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his
incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to
serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was
elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader
must have "been elected prior to his 21st
birthday."[40] Conversely, the SK official must not have
turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section
423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest
date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is
on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth
official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election
day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the
maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his
election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11,
1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter

for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-
one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the
elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days
old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was
21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten
(10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may
have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective
SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government
Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No.
2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May
6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
The requirement that a candidate possess the age
qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the
age on the day of the election, he can be declared
ineligible.[41]
In the same vein, if the candidate is over the
maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is
ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not
make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his
election.[42] The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.[43]
The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private
respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be
declared elected.[44] A defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.[45] Moreover, despite his
claims,[46] private respondent has failed to prove that the
electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's
ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the
intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing
away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate.[47]
Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section
435 of the Local Government Code petitioner should be
succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who
obtained the next highest number of votes in the May 6,
1996 elections.[48] Section 435 applies when a
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify,[49] is convicted of a felony, voluntarily
resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed
from office, or has been absent without leave for more
than three (3) consecutive months."
The question of the age qualification is a question of
eligibility.[50]
Being "eligible" means being "legally
qualified; capable of being legally chosen."[51]
Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of
the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office.[52] Ineligibility is not one of
the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of
the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the
Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be
filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK
members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte
by simple majority from among themselves. The member
chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the
powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges
appurtenant to said office.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and
petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for
being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6,
1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is
ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted
by simple majority by and from among the incumbent
Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office
of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of
the term.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, J., on leave.
[1]
Annex "D" to Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor
Noli Pipo, Rollo, pp. 57-58; Annex "A" to Petition, Rollo,
pp. 15-16
[2]
Annex "3" to the Comment for the Private
Respondent, Rollo, pp. 109-112.2
[3]
The judge was then boarding in the house of petitioner
(Comment for the Private Respondent, p. 2, Rollo, p. 89).
[4]
Annex "F" to the Comment of Provincial Election
Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, pp. 61-62.
[5]
Annex "C" to the Petition, Rollo p. 18; Annex "G" to the
Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli
Pipo, Rollo, p. 63.5
[6]
Annex "D" to the Petition, Rollo, p. 19; Annex "H" to the
Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli
Pipo, Rollo, p. 64.
[7]
Annex "I" to the Comment of Provincial Election
Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 66.
[8]
Through the PT & T.
[9]
Annex "L" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 71-73
[10]
Comment of Private Respondent Florencio Sales, Jr., p.
14, Rollo, p. 101.
[11]
Comment of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo,
par. 18, Rollo, p. 41.
[12]
Annex "R" to the Comment of Provincial Election
Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 82.
[13]
Annex "S" to the Comment of Provincial Election
Supervisor Noli Pipo, Rollo, p. 83.
[14]
Section 532 (a) of the Code (B.P. 881) was amended
by R.A. 7808 which in pertinent part reads:
"Sec. 1. x x x
The conduct of the sangguniang kabataan elections shall
be under the supervision of the Commission on Elections.
The Omnibus Election Code shall govern the elections of
the sangguniang kabataan."
[15]
Rule 23 provides:
"Section 1. Ground for Denial of Certificate of
Candidacy. -- A petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy for any elective office may be filed
with the Law Department of the Commission by any citizen
of voting age or a duly registered political party,
organization, or coalition of political parties on the
 [22] [42]
exclusive ground that any material representation Facsimile," The New Webster's International Sanchez v. del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102, 1106 [1961];
contained therein as required by law is false. Encyclopedia, p. 375 [1996]; "Facsimile," Webster's Third Feliciano v. Aquino, Jr., 102 Phil. 1159, 1160 [1957].
New International Dictionary, p. 813 [1971].
[43]
Section 2. Period to File Petition. -- The petition Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245,
[23]
must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for Black's Law Dictionary, p. 531, 5th ed. [1979]. 255 [1989].
the filing of certificates of candidacy.
[24] [44]
Sections 1 and 4, P.D. 684. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 400,
Section 3. Summary Procedure. -- The petition 423, 429 [1995]; Labo, Jr. v. Commission on elections,
[25]
shall be heard summarily after due notice. Whereas clauses, Sec. 1, P.D. 684; Mercado v. Board 211 SCRA 297, 311 [1992]; Sanchez v. del
of Elections Supervisors of Ibaan, Batangas, 243 SCRA Rosario, supra, at 1105.
Section 4. Delegation of Reception of Evidence. -- 422, 426 [1995].
[45]
The Commission may designate any of its officials who are Id.
[26]
members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to Section 2, P.D. 684.
[46]
receive evidence." Comment of Private Respondent Florencio Sales, Jr.,
[27]
Section 423, Chapter 8, Title I, Bk. III, R.A. 7160. pp. 14-15, Rollo, 101-102.
[16]
Section 5 [b] and [c], Rule 3, COMELEC Rules of [28]
Procedure provides: Sections 423, 428, Chapter 8, Title I, Bk. III, R.A. 7160. [47]
cf. Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra, at 311.
[29]
Section 430, Id. [48]
Section 435 of the Local Government Code provides:
"Sec. 5. x x x
[30]
(b)When sitting in Divisions, two (2) Members of a Section 429, Id. "Sec. 435. Succession and Filling of Vacancies. -- (a) In
Division shall constitute a quorum to transact [31] case a sangguniang kabataan chairman refuses to
Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar. assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony,
business. The concurrence of at least two (2) Members of
a Division shall be necessary to reach a decision, [32]
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 142-143 [1990]. voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is
resolution, order or ruling. If this required number is not removed from office, or has been absent without leave for
obtained, the case shall be automatically elevated to the [33]
The Local Government Code speaks of the more than three (3) consecutive months, the sangguniang
Commission en banc for decision or resolution. requirements for membership in the Katipunan ng kabataan member who obtained the next highest number
Kabataan, not the qualifications of a voter. of votes in the election immediately preceding shall
(c)Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, assume the office of the chairman for the unexpired
[34]
order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Civil Code, Article 13; National portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, 29 SCRA 70, 74 [1969]. duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to
orders of the Division which shall be resolved by the [35]
the office. In case the said member refuses to assume the
Division which issued the order." Erwin v. Benton, 87 S.W. 291, 294; 120 Ky. 536 [1905]. position or fails to qualify, the sangguniang kabataan
[36] member obtaining the next highest number of votes shall
[17]
See also Section 3, Article IX [C] of the Constitution. Section 2, P.D. 684.
assume the position of the chairman for the unexpired
[18]
[37]
Feliciano v. Aquino, 102 Phil. 1159-1160 [1957]. portion of the term.
Sarmiento v. Commission On Elections, 212 SCRA
307, 131-134 [1992]. [38] x x x."
Pimentel, A.Q., The Local Government Code of 1991,
[19]
One copy was filed by registered mail and the other by The Key to National Development, p. 440 [1993]. [49]
"Failure to qualify" means a public officer's or
facsimile. Third and fourth copies were sent by registered [39] employee's failure to take the oath and/or give the bond
It is worth noting that it is only in the case of SK
mail to petitioner Garvida and the COMELEC officer required by law to signify his acceptance of the office and
candidates that the Local Government Code sets a
(Annex 5-B to the Comment of Private Respondent, Rollo, the undertaking to execute the trust confided in him (Martin
maximum age limit. It sets a minimum age for the rest of
p. 116). and Martin, Administrative Law, Law of Public Officers and
the elective officials, e.g., members of the sangguniang
[20] barangay, sangguniang panglungsod or bayan, Election Law, p. 140 [1983]; Mechem, A Treatise on the
Facsimile Transmission," The New Encyclopaedia
sangguniang panlalawigan, mayor and governor (Sec. 39, Law of Public Offices and Officers, Sec. 253, p.
Britannica, p. 651, vol. 4, 15th ed. [1992]. 162; Words and Phrases, "Failure to Qualify," citing State
Chapter I, Title II, Bk. I, Local Government Code of 1991).
[21]
Id. v. Boyd, 48 N.W. 739, 751, 31 Neb. 682).
[40]
Pimentel, supra, at 440. [50]
Gaerlan v. Catubig, 17 SCRA 376, 378
[41] [1966]; Feliciano v. Aquino, Jr., supra.
Castaneda v. Yap, 48 O.G. 3364, 3366 [1952].
[51]
People v. Yanza, 107 Phil. 888, 890 [1960].
[52]
Separate Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 248
SCRA 300, 398 [1995].
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001]
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF
CEBU, Represented by Provincial Auditor ROY
L. URSAL, petitioner, vs. PROVINCE OF CEBU,
Represented by Governor PABLO P.
GARCIA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the salaries and personnel-related benefits of
public school teachers appointed by local chief executives
in connection with the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes; as well as the expenses for college
scholarship grants, be charged to the Special Education
Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned?
The instant petition for review, which raises a pure
question of law, seeks to annul and set aside the
decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20,
in a petition for declaratory relief, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-24422.
The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as
chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of
the Local Government Code, appointed classroom
teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to
handle extension classes that would accommodate
students in the public schools.
In the audit of accounts conducted by the
Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, for
the period January to June 1998, it appeared that the
salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers
appointed by the province for the extension classes were
charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to
the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the
province. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of
Suspension to the province of Cebu,[2] saying that
disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship
grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.
Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the
COA, the province of Cebu, represented by its governor,
filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court.
On December 13, 1999, the court a quo rendered a
decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized
expenditures of the SEF. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered giving due
course to this instant petition for declaratory relief declaring
and confirming that petitioner is vested with the authority to
disburse the proceeds from the Special Educational Fund
[SEF] for the payment of salaries, allowances or honoraria
for teachers and non-teaching personnel in the public
schools in the Province of Cebu and its component cities,
and, municipalities, as well as the expenses for
scholarship grants of petitioners specially to poor but
deserving students therein.
Declaring, further, respondent's audit findings on pages 36
and 37 in the Annual Audit Report on the Province of Cebu
for the year ending December 31, 1999 as null and void.[3]
Hence, the instant petition by the Commission on
Audit.
The Special Education Fund was created by virtue of
R. A. No. 5447, which is An act creating a special
education fund to be constituted from the proceeds of an
additional real property tax and a certain portion of the
taxes on Virginia-type cigarettes and duties on imported
leaf tobacco, defining the activities to be financed, creating
school boards for the purpose, and appropriating funds
therefrom, which took effect on January 1, 1969. Pursuant
thereto, P.D. No. 464, also known as the Real Property
Tax Code of the Philippines, imposed an annual tax of 1%
on real property which shall accrue to the SEF.[4]
Under R. A. No. 5447, the SEF may be expended
exclusively for the following activities of the DECS -
(a) the organization and operation of such
number of extension classes as may be
needed to accommodate all children of
school age desiring to enter Grade I,
including the creation of positions of
classroom teachers, head teachers and
principals for such extension classes x x x;
(b) the programming of the construction and
repair of elementary school buildings,
acquisition of sites, and the construction
and repair of workshops and similar
buildings and accessories thereof to
house laboratory, technical and similar
equipment and apparatus needed by
public schools offering practical arts, home
economics and vocational courses, giving
priority to elementary schools on the basis
of the actual needs and total requirements
of the country x x x;
(c) the payment and adjustment of salaries of
public school teachers under and by virtue
of Republic Act Numbered Five Thousand
One Hundred Sixty-Eight and all the
benefits in favor of public school teachers
provided under Republic Act Numbered
Four Thousand Six Hundred Seventy;
(d) preparation, printing and/or purchase of
textbooks, teacher's guides, forms and
pamphlets x x x;
(e) the purchase and/or improvement, repair
and refurbishing of machinery, laboratory,
technical and similar equipment and
apparatus, including spare parts needed
by the Bureau of Vocational Education
and secondary schools offering vocational
courses;
(f) the establishment of printing plant to be
used exclusively for the printing needs of
the Department of Education and the
improvement of regional printing plants in
the vocational schools;
 (g) the purchase of teaching materials such as
work books, atlases, flip charts, science
and mathematics teaching aids, and
simple laboratory devices for elementary
and secondary classes;
(h) the implementation of the existing program
for citizenship development in barrio high
schools, folk schools and adult education
classes;
(i) the undertaking of education research,
including that of the Board of National
Education;
(j) the granting of government scholarships to
poor but deserving students under
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Ninety; and
(k) the promotion of physical education, such
as athletic meets. (Emphasis supplied)
With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of
1991, petitioner contends that R.A. No. 5447 was
repealed, leaving Sections 235, 272 and 100 (c) of the
Code to govern the disposition of the SEF, to wit:
SEC. 235. Additional Levy on Real Property for the
Special Education Fund (SEF). – A province or city or a
municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy
and collect an annual tax of one percent (1%) on the
assessed value of real property which shall be in addition
to the basic real property tax. The proceeds thereof shall
exclusively accrue to the Special Education Fund (SEF).
SEC. 272. Application of Proceeds of the Additional One
Percent SEF Tax. – The proceeds from the additional one
percent (1%) tax on real property accruing to the SEF shall
be automatically released to the local school boards:
Provided, That, in case of provinces, the proceeds shall be
divided equally between the provincial and municipal
school boards: Provided, however, That the proceeds shall
be allocated for the operation and maintenance of public
schools, construction and repair of school buildings,
facilities and equipment, educational research, purchase of
books and periodicals, and sports development as
determined and approved by the local school
board. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 100. Meeting and Quorum; Budget
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The annual school board budget shall give priority to
the following:
(1) Construction, repair, and maintenance of school
buildings and other facilities of public elementary
and secondary schools;
(2) Establishment and maintenance of extension
classes where necessary; and
(3) Sports activities at the division, district, municipal,
and barangay levels. (Emphasis supplied)
Invoking the legal maxim “expressio unius es
exclusio alterius,” petitioner alleges that since salaries,
personnel-related benefits and scholarship grants are not
among those authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF
under the Local Government Code, they should be
deemed excluded therefrom.
Moreover, petitioner claims that since what is
allowed for local school boards to determine under Section
99[5] of the Local Government Code is only the
“annual supplementary budgetary needs for the operation
and maintenance of public schools,” as well as the
“supplementary local cost to meet such needs,” the budget
of the local school boards for the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes should be construed to
refer only to the upkeep and maintenance of public school
buildings, facilities and similar expenses other than
personnel-related benefits. This is because, petitioner
argued, the maintenance and operation of public schools
pertain principally to the DECS.
The contentions are without merit. It is a basic
precept in statutory construction that the intent of the
legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a
statute.[6] In this connection, the following portions of the
deliberations of the Senate on the second reading of the
Local Government Code on July 30, 1990 are significant:
Senator Guingona. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Guingona is recognized.
Senator Guingona. Just for clarification, Mr. President. In
this transfer, will it include everything eventually -- lock,
stock and barrel, including curriculum?
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, our stand in the
Committee is to respect the decision of the National
Government in terms of curriculum.
Senator Guingona. But, supposing the Local Education
Board wishes to adopt a certain curriculum for that
particular region?
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, pursuant to the wording
of the proposed transfer of this elementary school system
to local government units, what are specifically covered
here are merely the construction, repair, and maintenance
of elementary school buildings and other structures
connected with public elementary school
education, payment of salaries, emoluments, allowances
et cetera, procurement of books, other teaching materials
and equipment needed for the proper implementation of
the program. There is nothing here that will indicate that
the local government will have any right to alter the
curriculum. (Emphasis supplied)
Senator Guingona. Thank you, Mr. President.
Similarly instructive are the foregoing deliberations in
the House of Representatives on August 16, 1990:
INTERPELLATION OF MS. RAYMUNDO
(Continuation)
Continuing her interpellation, Ms. Raymundo then
adverted to subsection 4 of Section 101 [now Section 100,
paragraph (c)] and asked if the budget is limited only to the
three priority areas mentioned. She also asked what is
meant by the phrase “maintenance of extension classes.”
In response, Mr. De Pedro clarified that the provision is not
limited to the three activities, to which may be added other
sets of priorities at the proper time. As to extension
classes, he pointed out that the school boards may provide
out of its own funds, for additional teachers or other
requirements if the national government cannot provide
funding therefor. Upon Ms. Raymundo’s query, Mr. de
Pedro further explained that support for teacher tools could
fall under the priorities cited and is covered by certain
circulars.
Undoubtedly, the aforecited exchange of views
clearly demonstrates that the legislature intended the SEF
to answer for the compensation of teachers handling
extension classes.
Furthermore, the pertinent portion of the repealing
clause of the Local Government Code, provides:
SEC. 534. Repealing Clause. - x x x
(c) The provisions of . . . Sections 3, a (3) and b (2) of
Republic Act No. 5447, regarding the Special Education
Fund … are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and
effect.
Evidently, what was expressly repealed by the Local
Government Code was only Section 3, of R.A. No. 5447,
which deals with the “Allocation of taxes on Virginia type
cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco.” The
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws, such
that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or specific
provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add a
specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the
statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to
repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the
terms of the new and the old laws.[7] Hence, the provisions
allocating funds for the salaries of teachers under Section
1, of R.A. No. 5447, which are not inconsistent with
Sections 272 and 100 (c) of the Local Government Code,
remain in force and effect.
Even under the doctrine of necessary implication,
the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes logically implies the
hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be
compensated for their services. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions
as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose,
or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis.[8] Verily, the
services and the corresponding compensation of these
teachers are necessary and indispensable to the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes.
Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public
schools is lodged principally with the DECS. This is the
reason why only salaries of public school teachers
appointed in connection with the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes, inter alia, pertain to the
supplementary budget of the local school boards. Thus, it
should be made clear that not every kind of personnel-
related benefits of public school teachers may be charged
to the SEF. The SEF may be expended only for the
salaries and personnel-related benefits of teachers
appointed by the local school boards in connection with
the establishment and maintenance of extension
classes. Extension classes as referred to mean additional
classes needed to accommodate all children of school age
desiring to enter in public schools to acquire basic
education.[9]
With respect, however, to college scholarship grants,
a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government
Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects
for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated. It
should be noted that Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local
Government Code substantially reproduced Section 1, of
R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike payment of salaries of teachers
which falls within the ambit of “establishment and
maintenance of extension classes” and “operation and
maintenance of public schools,” the “granting of
government scholarship to poor but deserving students”
was omitted in Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local
Government Code. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an
enumeration in a statute must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such
grant of scholarship where the legislature has omitted it.[10]
In the same vein, however noble the intention of the
province in extending said scholarship to deserving
students, we cannot apply the doctrine of necessary
implication inasmuch as the grant of scholarship is neither
necessary nor indispensable to the operation and
maintenance of public schools. Instead, such scholarship
grants may be charged to the General Funds of the
province.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63[11] of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, a petition for declaratory relief may be
filed before there is a breach or violation. The Solicitor
General claims that the Notices of Suspension issued by
the COA to the respondent province amounted to a breach
or violation, and therefore, the petition for declaratory relief
should have been denied by the trial court.
We are not convinced. As held in Shell Company of
the Philippines, Ltd. v. Municipality of Sipocot,[12] any
breach of the statute subject of the controversy will not
affect the case; the action for declaratory relief will prosper
because the applicability of the statute in question to future
transactions still remains to be resolved. Absent a definite
ruling in the instant case for declaratory relief, doubts as to
the disposition of the SEF will persist. Hence, the trial
court did not err in giving due course to the petition for
declaratory relief filed by the province of Cebu.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
20, in Civil Case No. CEB-24422, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The salaries and personnel-related
benefits of the teachers appointed by the provincial school
board of Cebu in connection with the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes, are declared
chargeable against the Special Education Fund of the
province. However, the expenses incurred by the
provincial government for the college scholarship grants
should not be charged against the Special Education
Fund, but against the General Funds of the province of
Cebu.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, De
Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.
[1]
Penned by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos.
[2]
Annex "1" - "1-h", Records, pp. 31-39 and Annex "8",
Records, p. 64.
[3]
Rollo, p. 38.
[4]
Sec. 41. An additional one percent tax on real property
for the Special Education Fund. -- There is hereby
imposed an annual tax of one percent of real property to
accrue to the Special Education Fund created under
Republic Act No. 5447, which shall be in addition to the
real property tax which local governments are authorized
to levy, assess and collect under this Code; x x x.
[5]
SEC. 99. Function of Local School Boards. - The
provincial city or municipal school board shall:
(a) Determine, in accordance with the criteria set
by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, the
annual supplementary budgetary needs for the operation
and maintenance of public schools within the province,
city, or municipality, as the case may be, and the
supplementary local costs of meeting such needs x x x.
[6]
National Tobacco Administration v. Commission on
Audit, 311 SCRA 755, 769 [1999].
[7]
R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 314-315 [1995]; citing
Mecano v. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500 [1992].
[8]
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor, 312 SCRA 104, 117 [1999].
[9]
Joint Circular No. 01 s. 1998 of the Department of
Education Culture and Sports, the Department of Budget
and Management, and the Department of Interior and
Local Government.
[10]
S. Alcantara, Statutes, 67 [1993].
Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person
[11]
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder x x x.
[12]
Vol. III, O. Herrera, Remedial Law, 109 [1991]; citing
105 Phil. 1263 [1959].
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166735 September 5, 2006
SPOUSES NEREO and NIEVA DELFINO, petitioners,
vs.
ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, INC. and HON. RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
60495, dated 20 January 2003, which affirmed the
Decision2of the Office of the President, dated 26 March
1999, and the Resolution3 dated 11 August 2000,
reinstating the grant to respondent St. James Hospital, Inc.
of a Locational Clearance and a Certificate of Locational
Viability (CLV) for its expansion as a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity hospital.
St. James Hospital was established in 1990 as a two-
storey, ten-bed capacity hospital in Mariquita Pueblo
Subdivision in Santa Rosa, Laguna. In 1994, it applied for
a permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) to expand its hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity medical institution. Thus, on 23 November 1994,
Reynaldo Pambid, HLURB Deputized Zoning Administrator
for Santa Rosa, Laguna, issued a "temporary" clearance
for the expansion of said hospital. Said issuance was
challenged by herein petitioners spouses Nereo and Nieva
Delfino, residents of Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, on the
ground that the proposed expansion is in violation of the
provisions of the 1981 Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning
Ordinance. Thereafter, Mr. Pambid referred the matter for
evaluation by his superiors.
On 19 April 1995, HLURB Regional Office No. IV Director
Alfredo M. Tan II issued a letter explaining that the
issuance of a "temporary" clearance is not allowed under
existing laws for it may be erroneously construed as a
permit to start construction. Director Tan, however, opined
that under existing HLURB guidelines, CLVs may be
issued to certain projects for purposes of securing an
Environment Compliance Certification (ECC) from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
On the strength of said opinion, Mr. Pambid revoked the
temporary clearance issued to St. James Hospital and
declared the expansion as not viable. The municipal
engineer of Santa Rosa, Laguna, also suspended the
hospital's building permit, while DENR Regional Executive
Director Antonio Principe issued a cease and desist order
on 16 August 1995. Nevertheless, upon written
representation of the hospital's operator, Dr. Jose P.
Santiago, that the St. James Hospital will retain the same
number of beds maintained in the hospital, Mr. Pambid
issued a CLV dated 29 October 1995 for the hospital's
expansion project. Upon protest from the petitioners, Mr.
Pambid thereafter suspended the issued CLV.
In the interim, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
passed on 11 December 1995 Resolution No. 811,
approving the 1991 Comprehensive Land Use Plan
(CLUP) or the Comprehensive Zoning new Zoning
Ordinance, hospitals are now excluded from the list of
viable institutions within the residential zone of Santa
Rosa, Laguna.
Oblivious of the approval of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance,
Mr. Pambid issued on 1 February 1996 a Certificate of
Zoning Compliance or Locational Clearance for the two-
storey, ten-bed St. James Hospital citing as basis the
provisions of the 1981 Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning
Ordinance. On 14 March 1996, Mr. Pambid likewise issued
a CLV for a four-storey, forty-bed hospital expansion
project in favor of St. James Hospital.
These issuances of Mr. Pambid were, however, invalidated
by HLURB Director Ordinance of the Municipality of Santa
Rosa, Laguna. Under the Tan on 25 April 1996, as it
violated, according to Director Tan, the provisions of the
1991 Zoning Ordinance. As a result thereof, Mr. Pambid further work and construction of the hospital's of P20,000.00, aside from the other
suspended the locational clearance issued to St. James expansion building pending the resolution of the fines previously imposed;
Hospital and elevated the matter to the HLURB for case.4
disposition. According to Mr. Pambid, he received a copy
5. Ordering private respondent to pay
of the new Zoning Ordinance only on 14 February 1996,
On 4 March 1997, Dr. Santiago filed before the HLURB this Board P5,000.00 per day
two weeks after issuing the locational clearance.
Board of Commissioners a Motion seeking the inhibition of beginning February 4, 1997 until the
Arbiter Daga for partiality, which was subsequently denied. day that it ceased or finished the
On 16 May 1996, petitioners filed before the HLURB construction of its expansion building
Regional Office No. IV a letter-complaint against Mr. as determined by the Board's
On 16 July 1997, after the parties have submitted their
Pambid for issuing the CLV in violation of both the 1981 Regional Office No. IV;
respective position papers and draft decisions, Arbiter
and 1991 Zoning Ordinances, and against Dr. Santiago for
Daga rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners, the
continuing with the expansion project despite the
dispositive portion of which reads: 6. Ordering private respondent to pay
invalidation of the CLV issued by Mr. Pambid.
complainants FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS as moral
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
In reply to petitioners' complaint, St. James Hospital damages, TWO MILLION PESOS
is hereby rendered, to wit:
maintained that there is a need to expand the existing exemplary damages, TWO
hospital to address the acute deficiency of medical HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS as
facilities in the municipality, and that the project is 1. The Locational Clearance dated attorney's fees, and FIFTY
permissible under the new Zoning Ordinance. February 1, 1996 issued by public THOUSAND PESOS cost of litigation;
Furthermore, it pointed out that the project has been respondent Reynaldo Pambid to the
favorably endorsed not only by the residents of Mariquita expansion hospital building of private
The motion of private respondent dated 24 June
Pueblo Subdivision, but also by the residents of other respondent St. James Hospital, Inc. is
1997 is hereby DENIED and its Counterclaim is
neighboring communities. St. James Hospital also argued hereby revoked and set aside;
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
that it has already incurred millions of pesos in losses for
every day of delay in the construction.
2. Ordering private respondent to
Without prejudice to the filing of criminal action
demolish its two-storey hospital
that may be filed with the proper court.5
Pursuant to HLURB Rules, the case was elevated to the expansion building within ONE
HLURB Legal Services Group (LSG), and was assigned to MONTH at its cost and upon failure to
Arbiter Erwin T. Daga. During the course of the comply within the period given, pay Aggrieved by the aforecited Decision, St. James Hospital
proceedings, Arbiter Daga issued the following Orders: complainants P10,000.00 per day of appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners asserting
delay; that the proposed expansion of the hospital conforms to
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. Resolving said appeal, the
1. Order dated December 6, 1996 (temporary
HLURB effectively modified Arbiter Daga's Decision, ruling
restraining order) enjoining St. James [Hospital] 3. Ordering private respondent to
that the existing hospital, with its original two-storey, ten-
from continuing with its expansion project; relocate its existing ten-bed capacity
bed capacity, is allowable under the old 1981 Zoning
hospital within ONE YEAR and
Ordinance and may be allowed to continue as a medical
thereafter to permanently cease and
2. Order dated December 11, 1996 ordering St. institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision even
desist from operating a hospital/clinic
James [Hospital] to cease and desist from after the effectivity of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
within a residential zone, particularly in
proceeding with its expansion project; However, the HLURB opined that the new construction of
Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, Dita,
commercial buildings within the said residential zone, such
Sta. Rosa, Laguna and failure to
as the forty-bed capacity expansion building of St. James
3. Order dated December 12, 1996 denying St. comply within the reglementary period
Hospital, is repugnant to Section 2, Article VI of the 1991
James [Hospital's] motion to lift the temporary given, pay complainants the amount
Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning Ordinance and, hence,
restraining order; and of P10,000.00 per day of delay;
should be disallowed. Thus, on 13 January 1998, the
HLURB Special Division rendered a Decision, to wit:
4. Order dated December 14, 1996 ordering St. 4. Ordering private respondent to pay
James [Hospital] to again cease and desist from this Board administrative fine
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the LSG dated
July 16, 1997, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new
decision entered:
1. Declaring the original two-storey,
ten-bed capacity St. James Hospital,
as allowable in the Mariquita Pueblo
Subdivision, Sta. Rosa, Laguna;
2. Ordering respondent St. James to
set-up an efficient hospital waste
disposal system in conformity with the
rules and regulations and standards of
the Department of Health, the
Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and all other
concerned government agencies; and
present a certification of compliance to
the Board from said agencies within
ninety (90) days from finality hereof;
and
3. Revoking the Locational Clerance
dated February 01, 1996 issued by
respondent Pambid for the expansion
Hospital building of respondent St.
James.6
The separate Motions for Reconsideration of both parties
having been denied by the HLURB, the parties elevated
the case to the Office of the President, which rendered a
decision on 26 March 1999 in favor of St. James Hospital.
According to the Office of the President:
Without doubt, the establishment of a ten-bed
capacity hospital, like the existing St. James
Hospital, is allowed within a residential zone.
This is expressly provided under Section 2,
paragraph 1(d), Article VI of the 1981 Sta. Rosa
Municipal Zoning Ordinance, the law existing at
the time of the founding of the said hospital. The
term "hospital" was, however, deleted from the
list of conforming establishments within a
residential zone in the recently approved 1991
CLUP or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance
of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The
question now is whether or not the proposed
expansion of St. James Hospital, which will
transform it into a four-storey, 40-bed capacity
hospital, is allowable under the 1991 zoning
ordinance. Stated differently, does the term
"institutional", as used in the said ordinance,
include hospitals and other medical
establishments.
In construing words or phrases used in a law,
the general rule is that, in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, they should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning (Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 160
SCRA 315). For, words are presumed to have
been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary
and common use and acceptation (People vs.
Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352).
Under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance, certain activities that are commercial
andinstitutional in character are allowed within
the residential zone. St. James maintained the
term "institutional" includes hospitals and other
medical establishments.
We agree. The word "institutional" used as it is
in said ordinance without qualification should be
understood in its plain and ordinary meaning. In
law, the word "institution" is understood to mean
an establishment or place, especially one of
public character or one affecting a community
(Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th edition,
1968, p. 940). It may be private in character,
designed for profit to those composing the
organization, or public and charitable in its
purposes.
From the above definition, it is clear that
hospitals fall within the pale of the term
"institution", a hospital being a public
establishment and that the nature of its business
is for profit. The fact that hospitals are not
categorized as dwelling unit does not inevitably
mean that it is already a non-conforming
establishment within a residential zone. As
provided under aforecited provision of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance, settlement activities that are
"institutional in character" are allowed within the
residential zone. Even the HLURB recognized
St. James as a medical institution within the
residential zone of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. Be that as it may, St. James Hospital
may be allowed to continue its business within
the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision. To limit the
term "institutional" to activities conducted within
the dwelling units of the residents would be
unrealistic and would contemplate undue
restrictions to existing and lawful establishments,
like the St. James Hospital.
As a conforming establishment within the
residential zone, St. James Hospital may also be
allowed to expand its present structure. It is not
disputed that the new zoning ordinance does not
expressly prohibit expansion of existing buildings
within the residential zone. As correctly
observed by St. James, it would be an absurd
requirement if such establishment, like hospitals,
would have the appearance of residential units
or that its use be incidental and subordinate to
its residential purposes. The parameters
mentioned in the said ordinance should only be
applied to residential units.
Foregoing considered, the locational clearance
and the complementary certificate of locational
viability may now be issued in favor of St. James
Hospital.
WHEREFORE, the grant to St. James Hospital,
Inc., of a Locational Clearance and a Certificate
of Locational Viability (CLV) relative to its
expansion as a 4-storey, 40-bed capacity
hospital dated February 1, 1996, is hereby
REINSTATED. In all other respects, the
Decision of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board dated January 13, 1998 is
AFFIRMED in toto.7
The Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioners
having been denied in a Resolution dated 11 August 2000,
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. In the Section 2, Article VI of the 1981 Zoning Ordinance states: interference or outside the
assailed Decision dated 20 January 2003, the appellate dwelling unit if conducted in
court affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President, a place other than a single-
SECTION 2. REGULATIONS FOR URBAN
adopting the latter's conclusion that the family residence. In the
CORE ZONE. – This zone shall be devoted to
establishment/expansion of the St. James Hospital is not a case of electrical
various settlement activities that are residential
proscribed land use in the designated residential zone interference, no equipment
and commercial, or institutional in character,
known as Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision. or process shall be used
subject to the following terms and conditions:
which creates visual or
audible interference in any
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently
1. In the Residential Sector, only the following radio or television receiver
denied in a Resolution dated 14 January 2005. Hence, the
uses shall be allowed: or causes fluctuation in line
instant Petition.
voltage off the premises.
a) All types of dwelling units (one-
From the facts of the case, it is undisputed that the
family detached, two-family detached, a) Elementary
Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision located at Barangay Dita,
one-family semi-detached, two-family schools
Santa Rosa, Laguna, is located within an area classified
semi-detached and multi-family of not
as a residential zone under both the 1981 and 1991
more than 5 doors)
Zoning Ordinances. There is also no question that a two- b) High Schools
storey, ten-bed capacity hospital, such as St. James and vocational
Hospital, was allowed to be constructed within a residential b) Home occupation, or the practice of schools
zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance. Likewise, it is one's profession or occupation, such
apparent that under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance, the as tailoring, dressmaking, banking,
c) Chapels,
proposed expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four- and like provided that:
churches, and
storey, forty-bed capacity hospital would be disallowed as
other place of
it violates the restriction set by said Zoning Ordinance
b.1. Not more than five (5) worship
regarding permissible activities within a residential zone,
outside assistants or
which specifically limits any medical institution built within a
residential zone to a two-storey, ten-bed capacity helpers shall be employed;
d) Clinics,
structure. hospitals with not
b.2. The use of the dwelling more than ten
unit for the home occupation (10) capacity
Nonetheless, with the passage of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance, the proposed expansion of the St. James shall be clearly incidental
Hospital must now be decided in light of the provisions of and subordinate to its use
e) Drugstores
the new Zoning Ordinance. Hence, the pivotal issue now for residential purpose by its
to be resolved in this Petition is whether or not the occupants;
proposed expansion of St. James Hospital into a four- f) Backyard
storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution may be gardens and
b.3. As much as possible
raising of pigs,
permitted under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. However, in there shall be no change in
order to settle the present controversy, it is essential that poultry and other
the outside appearance of
we determine the effect of the enactment of the 1991 animals and fowls
the building or premises;
provided:
Zoning Ordinance with respect to the proposed expansion
of the St. James Hospital in view of the deletion therein of
the phrase "hospitals with not more than ten capacity" from b.4. No equipment or
1. That
those enumerated as allowable uses in a residential zone process shall be used in
they are
as contained in Section 2, Article VI of the 1981 Zoning such home occupation
only for
Ordinance. which creates noise,
family
vibration, glare, fumes,
consum
odors, or electrical
ption
 2. No recreational pursuit and maintenance of twenty-five (25%) percent of
undue ecological balance of the municipality, subject to the floor area of the dwelling
noise the following terms and conditions: unit shall be used;
shall be
created
The following uses shall be allowed: 7.4. As much as possible
there shall be no change in
3. No the outside appearance of
1. Single detached family dwellings
foul the building premises;
smell
shall be 2. Semi-detached family dwelling
7.5. No home occupation
emitted
shall be conducted in any
3. Two detached family dwelling accessory building;
4. Other
sanitary
4. Two semi-detached family dwelling 7.6. No traffic shall be
require
generated by such home
ments
occupation in greater
enforce 5. Multi-family dwelling with not more
volume than would normally
d in the than five (5) families residing be expected in a residential
municip
neighborhood and any need
ality
6. Residential Subdivision Projects for parking generated by the
conduct of such home
g) Boarding occupation shall be met off
House 7. Home occupation for the practice of the street and in a place
one's profession or for engaging an in- other than in a required front
house business such as dressmaking, yard;
h) Parks and tailoring, baking, running a sari-sari
playground store and the like, provided that:
7.7. No equipment or
process shall be used in
i) Barangay tanod 7.1. Only members of the such home occupation
stations family residing within the which created noise,
premises shall be engaged vibration, glare, fumes,
j) Neighborhood in such home occupation; odors, or electrical
assembly hall interference detectable to
7.2. Maximum of five (5) the normal sense off the lot,
outside helpers or if the occupation is
k) Recreation conducted in a single family
centers8 assistants shall be
employed; residence or outside the
dwelling unit if conducted in
On the other hand, Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning a place other than a single-
Ordinance reads: 7.3. The use of the dwelling family-residence. In the
unit for home occupation case of electrical
shall be clearly incidental interference, no equipment
SECTION 2. REGULATIONS FOR and subordinate to its use or process shall be used
RESIDENTIAL ZONE. – This zone shall be for residential purpose by its which created visual or
devoted to various settlements, activities that are occupants and for the audible interference in any
residential, commercial, and institutional in conduct of the home radio or television receiver
character and other spaces designed for occupation, not more than
 or causes fluctuation in line
voltage off the premises.
8. Backyard gardens and raising of
pigs, poultry and other animals and
fowls provided:
8.1. That they are only for
family consumption;
8.2. No undue noise shall
be created;
8.3. No foul smell shall be
emitted; and
8.4. Other sanitary
requirements enforced in
the municipality are
complied with.
9. Barangay Tanod Stations.
10. Police outposts.9
The enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance effectively
repealed the 1981 Zoning Ordinance. This intent to repeal
is manifested in the very wordings of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance. The complete title of said Ordinance, "An
Ordinance Adopting a Comprehensive Zoning Regulation
for the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna and Providing
for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment
Thereof. And for the Repeal of all Ordinances in Conflict
Therewith," as well as the Repealing Clause10 of the same
Ordinance which states that "all other ordinances, rules or
regulations that are in conflict with the provisions of this
ordinance are hereby repealed,"11clearly express the intent
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Rosa, Laguna, to
repeal any enactment that is inconsistent with the new
Ordinance. The inclusion of this general repealing
provision in the Ordinance predicated the intended repeal
under the condition that a substantial conflict must be
found in existing and prior acts.
This is what is known as an implied repeal. Repeal by we conclude that the Sangguniang Bayan did intend to
implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute remove such building use from those allowed within a
of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the residential zone. As ruled by this Court, when both intent
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that and scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts
intention must be given effect.12 There are two categories and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the
of implied repeal. The first is where the provisions in the revised act are deemed repealed.16
two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the latter act to the extent of the
Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a
conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier
comprehensive scrutiny of both Ordinances will disclose
one.13 The second is if the later act covers the whole
that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools,
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 14 The
religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and
second category of repeal is only possible if the revised
hospitals have now been transferred to the institutional
statute was intended to cover the whole subject matter and
zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.17 This clearly
as a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that
demonstrates the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan to
a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the
delimit the allowable uses in the residential zone only to
former revises the whole subject matter of the former
those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of
statute.15
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no longer includes
hospitals.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance not only covers the same, but embraces the
It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and
whole subject matter contained in the 1981 Zoning
the Court of Appeals gave undue emphasis to the word
Ordinance, and was enacted to substitute the latter. A
"institutional" as mentioned in Section 2, Article VI of the
perusal of the two pieces of legislation will reveal that both
1991 Zoning Ordinance and even went through great
Ordinances were enacted to guide, control, and regulate
lengths to define said term in order to include hospitals
the future growth and development of the Municipality of
under the ambit of said provision. However, they neglected
Santa Rosa, Laguna, in accordance with the municipality's
the fact that under Section 4, Article VI of said
development plan, as well as to promote the general
Ordinance18, there is now another zone, separate and
welfare of the residents of the community by regulating the
distinct from a residential zone, which is classified as
location and use of all buildings and land within the
"institutional", wherein health facilities, such as hospitals,
municipality. However, unlike the 1981 Zoning Ordinance,
are expressly enumerated among those structures allowed
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance clearly identifies the
within said zone.
development plan to which it is patterned after, specifically
the development plan adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan
through Kapasiyahan Blg. 20-91, dated 20 February 1991. Moreover, both the Office of the President and the
Considering that the 1981 Zoning Ordinance was not in appellate court failed to consider that any meaning or
furtherance of the later development plan, consequently, interpretation to be given to the term "institutional" as used
there was the necessity to adopt a new statute to effect the in Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly limited by
changes contained therein, hence, the adoption of the the explicit enumeration of allowable uses contained in the
1991 Zoning Ordinance. same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body had
intended in employing the word "institutional" must be
discerned in light of the restrictive enumeration in the said
Since it is presumed that the Sangguniang Bayan knew of
article. Under the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio
the existence of the older Ordinance, by enacting the later
alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, means
law embracing the complete subject matter of the 1981
the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned.19 Thus, in
Zoning Ordinance, it must be concluded that the legislative
interpreting the whole of Section 2, Article VI, it must be
body had intended to repeal the former Ordinance. With
understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable
respect to the omission of the phrase "hospitals with not
uses within a residential zone, those not included in the
more than ten capacity" from the 1991 Zoning Ordinance,
enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence, since
hospitals, among other things, are not among those
enumerated as allowable uses within the residential zone,
the only inference to be deduced from said exclusion is
that said hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from
those structures permitted to be constructed within a
residential area in Santa Rosa, Laguna.
Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in
statutory construction, a thing omitted must be considered
to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the
omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten
capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the
corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another
zone classification, the only logical conclusion is that the
legislative body had intended that said use be removed
from those allowed within a residential zone. Thus, the
construction of medical institutions, such as St. James
Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
Be that as it may, even if the St. James Hospital is now
considered a non-conforming structure under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance as it is located in a residential zone
where such use is no longer allowed, said structure cannot
now be considered illegal. This is because the St. James
Hospital was constructed during the effectivity of the 1981
Zoning Ordinance, and, as earlier stated, under the said
Ordinance, the construction of a two-storey, ten-bed
capacity hospital within a residential zone is explicitly
allowed.
Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now
considered a non-conforming structure under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the issue of the
legality of the proposed expansion of said hospital into a
four-storey, forty-bed medical institution. We shall decide
this said issue in accordance with the provisions of the
1991 Zoning Ordinance relating to non-conforming
buildings, the applicable law at the time of the proposal. As
stated in Section 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance:
Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING
USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of any
building, structure or land at the point of
adoption or amendment of this Ordinance may Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-
be continued, although such does not conform Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.
with the provisions of this Ordinance.
1. That no non-conforming use shall [be]
enlarge[d] or increased or exten[ded] to occupy
a greater area or land that has already been
Footnotes
occupied by such use at the time of the adoption
of this Ordinance, or moved in whole or in part to
1
any other portion of the lot parcel of land where Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J.
such [non]-conforming use exist at the time of Valdez, Jr. with Associate Justices Eduardo P.
the adoption of this Ordinance.20 (Emphasis Cruz and Mario L. Guariña III, concurring. Rollo,
ours.) pp. 9-19.
2
It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 O.P. Case No. 98-J-8560. CA rollo, pp. 27-35.
Zoning Ordinance that the expansion of a non-conforming
building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve that
3
Id. at 36-38.
the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey,
forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita
4
Pueblo Subdivision is prohibited under the provisions of Id. at 30.
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
5
Id. at 32-33.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
6
Id. at 27.
in CA-G.R. SP No. 60495, dated 20 January 2003, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new Decision
entered: 7
Id. at 34-35.
1. Sustaining that the original two-storey, ten- 8
Id. at 153-154.
bed capacity St. James Hospital is allowable
within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, Sta. 9
Rosa, Laguna as long as it shall comply with the CA rollo, p. 50 and 52.
provisions on existing non-conforming buildings
under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, as well as the 10
Section 5, Article XIII.
rules and regulations and standards of the
Department of Health, Department of
11
CA rollo, p. 81.
Environment and Natural Resources and all
other concerned government agencies; and
12
Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
2. Prohibiting the proposed expansion of the St. 103982, 11 December 1992, 216 SCRA 500,
James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed 505, citingPosadas v. National City Bank, 296
capacity hospital, the proposed expansion being U.S. 497, 80 L. Ed. 351 (1936).
illegal under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
13
Id. at 506.
SO ORDERED.
14 19
Id. Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, 11
September 1980, 99 SCRA 651, 656.
15
People v. Almuete, 161 Phil. 534, 541 (1976).
20
CA rollo, p. 69.
16
People v. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208, 210 (1935).
amirez vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-38185, 144 SCRA 292 ,
17 September 24, 1986
Article VI, Section 4. USE REGULATIONS IN
G.R. No. L-38185 September 24, 1986
INSTITUTIONAL ZONE – In the Institutional
HILARIO RAMIREZ and VALENTINA
Zone, only the following shall be allowed:
BONIFACIO, petitioners,
vs.
1. Government center to move all HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCA
national, regional, or local offices in MEDINA, MATILDE MARTIN, EMILIO MARTIN, DELFIN
the area; GUINTO, TEOFILO GUINTO, PRUDENCIO GUINTO and
MARGARITA GUINTO, respondents.
Castro, Makalintal, Mendoza & Associates for petitioner.
2. Schools;
Flores, Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo Law Office for
respondents.
2.1. Public/Private elementary
schools. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the decision of the then Court of First
2.2. Municipal/Barangay/Private high instance of Rizal rendered in the petition for review of the
schools decree of registration issued in Land Registration Case
No. N-2597, L.R.C. Record No. N-17939.
3. Health facilities; On September 15,1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario
Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an application for
registration of a parcel of riceland in Pamplona, Las Pinas
3.1. Emergency hospital Rizal. After notice and publication nobody appeared to
oppose the application. An order of general default was
3.2 health centers issued and the court allowed the petitioners to present
evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter, the
petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the
3.3. Multi-purpose clinics land in question by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during
the early part of the American regime but the
3.4 Day-care centers corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or
record of the same was available.
On January 30, 1960, the court ordered the issuance of
4. Religious Facilities such as the decree of registration and consequently: Original
churches, chapels and other places of Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Registry of Deeds of
worships. Rizal was issued in the petitioners names.
On March 30, 1960, the private respondents Francisca
5. Scientific, cultural and academic Medina, Basilio Martin, Matilde Martin, Delfin Guinto,
centers and research facilities. Teofilo Guinto, Prudencio Guinto and Margarita Guinto,
(CA rollo, pp. 51 and 54) petitioners' nephews and nieces, filed a petition to review
the decree of registration on the ground of fraud. The
private respondents based their claim to the land on the
18
Id. following allegations: that they are the legal heirs of the
deceased Agapita Bonifacio who died intestate on March
11, 1936; that Valentina Bonifacio is a sister of the
deceased Agapita Bonifacio, they being the children of one
Gregoria Pascual; that Gregoria Pascual previously owned
the land in question as evidenced by Tax Declaration No.
6611 of Las Pinas Rizal issued on December 8, 1920; that
Agapita Bonifacio acquired the property in question by
purchase from Gregoria Pascual for which reason Tax
Declaration No. 8777 was issued in her name on May 21,
1928; that Gregoria Pascual during her lifetime, from 1916,
possessed the said property in the concept of owner,
publicly and uninterruptedly, which possession was
continued by Agapita Bonifacio in 1928; that in 1938
respondents obtained a loan of P400.00 from the
petitioners which they secured with a mortgage on the land
in question by way of antichresis; that for this reason, Tax
Declaration No. 8777 was cancelled and substituted by
Tax Declaration Nos. 9522 and 2385 issued in the names
of the petitioners; that, thereafter, the petitioners began
paying taxes on the land; that after several attempts to
redeem the land were refused by the petitioners, the
respondents filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 272-R for the
recovery of the possession and ownership of the said
property; that when they learned of the issuance of the
certificate of title to the land in the petitioners' names, they
also filed the instant petition for review. The previous
complaint, Civil Case No. 272-R, was subsequently
dismissed on a joint petition filed by the parties after they
agreed to have the determination of the question of
ownership resolved in the registration proceedings.
In their answer, the spouses Ramirez denied the material
allegations of the petition, they based their claim to the
land on two deeds of sale allegedly executed on April 15,
1937 and April 23, 1937 which they allegedly found
accidentally in March 1960.
After trial, the court found that deeds of sale spurious. It
further found that the respondents took possession of the
land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in
1938, mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the
payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00. It was agreed
that the respondents could not redeem the property within
a period of five years and that the petitioners would take
possession of the land, enjoy its fruits, and pay the land
taxes thereon. The written agreement was kept by the
petitioners as creditors. The trial court appreciated the fact
of the petitioners' failure, despite formal request, to
produce the document in court in favor of the respondents.
Finding the claims of the herein respondents sustained by
the evidence, it ordered the reconveyance of the property
in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
petitioners and against applicants as follows:
1) Setting aside its decision dated December 28, 1959
insofar as it found and declared applicants to be the
owners of the parcel of land described in Exhibits A, B and
C and insofar as it ordered the registration thereof in their
names;
2) Declaring the petitioners, all Filipinos, all of legal age,
and all residents of Ligas Bacoor, Cavite, to be the true
and absolute owners pro indiviso of the said parcel of land
described in Exhibits A, B and C in the following
proportions:
a. Francisca Medina, married to Tomas de Leon, one-third
(1/3) thereof;
b. Emilio Martin, married to Dolores Antonio, and Matilde
Martin, married to Federico Torres, one-third (1/3) thereof-,
c. Teofilo Guinto, married to Rocila de la Cruz, Delfin
Guinto, married to Gregoria Pamaran, Prudencio Guinto,
married to Ana Guinto, and Margarita Guinto, married to
Felix Calacala one- third (1/3) thereof;
3) Ordering the registration of the said parcel of land
described in Exhibits A, B and C in the names of
petitioners;
4) Setting aside its order for the issuance of the decree of
registration in favor of applicants dated January 30, 1959,
and ordering the issuance of the decree of registration in
the names of petitioners;
5) Cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of applicants and
the issuance in lieu thereof of another original certificate of
title in the names of petitioners in the proportion of their
ownership of the property as stated in paragraph 2 above;
6) Ordering applicants to pay P3,000.00 to petitioners as
and for attorney's fees;
7) Ordering applicants to pay the costs of this suit.
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On a
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, the
same appellate court, but with a new member,
promulgated a resolution setting aside the original
decision. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the
private respondents, this resolution was set aside and the
original decision was reinstated.
The petitioners went to this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari with the following questions:
ONE-HAS THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, ACTING
AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT, THE
JURISDICTION TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO A PETITION
FOR REVIEW OF DECREE UNDER SEC. 38 OF ACT
496 AND TO RE-OPEN THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS
WHEN THE PETITION IS ACTUALLY ONE OF
RECONVEYANCE AND NOT BASED ON ACTUAL OR
EXTRINSIC FRAUD?
TWO-DOES SEC. 38 OF ACT NO. 496 APPLY ON ALL
FORES (SIC) TO ORIGINAL LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS HAD UNDER PARAGRAPH B, SECTION
48 OF COM. ACT NO. 141 AS AMENDED BY REP. ACT
NO. 1942 WHEREIN THE LAND INVOLVED IS PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LAND?
THREE-HAS THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE,
ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT, THE
POWER AND AUTHORITY TO VEST TITLE ON THE
LAND INVOLVED TO HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND ORDER EVEN ITS PARTITION
AMONGST THEM IN THE FACE OF THE ADMITTED
FACT THAT THE LAND IS IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF
PETITIONERS WHILE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD
NOT POSSESSED THE SAME AT ALL?
FOUR-DO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE THE
LEGAL CAPACITY AND QUALIFICATION TO ACQUIRE
AND BE VESTED BY THE COURT WITH TITLE TO THE
LAND IN QUESTION?
We find the petition without merit.
The first question does not warrant favorable
consideration. The issue was submitted to the appellate
court and in our opinion, correctly resolved therein. The
Court of Appeals stated:
... The petition alleged that 'the applicants Hilario Ramirez
and Valentina Bonifacio willfully and fraudulently
suppressed the facts that the petitioners are the legal and
rightful owners of the ricefield in question and that they
possess the said ricefield merely as antichretic creditors as
security for the loan of P400.00; that the applicants are
guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment
when they declared in their application, in the case at bar,
that no other person had any claim or interest in the said
land.' These we believe are sufficient allegations of
extrinsic fraud.
In the applicant's application for registration, which
followed the form required by the Land Registration Act,
the applicants alleged that 'to the best of our knowledge
and belief, there is no mortgage or incumbrance of any
kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any other person
having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in
possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy.' This
allegation is false and made in bad faith, for, as We have
found, the applicants are not the owners of the land sought
to be registered and they are in possession thereof only as
antichretic creditors.
The averments in the petition for review of the decree of
registration constitute specific and not mere general
allegations of actual and extrinsic fraud. Competent proof
to support these allegations was adduced. We find no
compelling reason to disturb the findings of the two courts
below.
The petitioners in this case did not merely omit a statement
of the respondents' interest in the land. They positively
attested to the absence of any adverse claim therein. This
is clear misrepresentation. The omission and concealment,
knowingly and intentionally made, of an act or of a fact
which the law requires to be performed or recorded is
fraud, when such omission or concealment secures a
benefit to the prejudice of a third person (Estiva v. Alvero,
37 Phil. 497).
In the case of Libundan v. Palma Gil (45 SCRA 17), this
Court held:
The purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties,
deprived of land or any interest therein, through fraud in
the registration proceedings, the opportunity to review the
decree is to insure fair and honest dealing in the
registration of land. But the action to annul a judgment,
upon the ground of fraud, would be unavailing unless the
fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it
is based have not been controverted or resolved in the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished
from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme
executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from
presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.'
But intrinsicfraud takes the form of 'acts of a party in a
litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged
instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.
Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in
land where the fraud consists in a deliberate
misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in
fact they are, or in applying for and obtaining adjudication
and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which
he knows had not been alloted to him in the partition, or in
intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the land
inspector to include in the survey plan the bed of a
navigable stream, or in willfully misrepresenting that there
are no other claims, or in deliberately failing to notify the
party entitled to notice, or in inducing him not to oppose an
application, or in misrepresenting about the indentity of the
lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to
withdraw his opposition. In all these examples the
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court or from presenting his case, The fraud,
therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction
of the court.
The second question assigned as an error must also be
resolved against the petitioners.
Section 122 of Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the United States or to the
Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated,
granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act and shall become registered
lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the
instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of
the Government to cause such instrument before its
delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of
deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there
registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon
a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of
registered land, and an owner's duplicate certificate issued
to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of
conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as contract between the Government and the
grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or
register of deeds to make registration. The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect
the land, and in all cases under this Act, registration shall
be made in the office of the register of deeds for the
province where the land lies. The fees for registration shall
be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issue of
the certificate and owner's duplicate, such land shall be
registered land for all purposes under this Act.
The law is clear. We can apply it to the facts without need
for judicial interpretation. Once the deed, grant, or
instrument of conveyance of public land is registered with
the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate
and owner's duplicate title is issued, such land is deemed
registered land. It is brought within the scope and
operation of the Land Registration Law. This is the
doctrine laid down by this Court in a long line of cases.
(See Heirs of Deogracias Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 139
SCRA 293; Lahora v. Dayanghirang 37 SCRA 346;
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 30 SCRA 297; Director of
Lands v. Jugado 2 SCRA 32; Nelayan v. Nelayan, 109
Phil. 183; Republic v. Heirs of Carle 105 Phil. 1227; El
Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17; Manolo v. Lukban, 48
Phil. 973). The land in this case having been registered
and covered by an original certificate of title issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, it is within the provisions of the
Land Registration Act. Thus, the decree of registration
granted by the lower court in favor of the petitioners may
be reviewed on the ground of actual and extrinsic fraud
pursuant to Section 38 of the same Act.
There is likewise no merit in the third assigned error. While
there was an admission that the petitioners have been in
actual possession of the disputed land since 1938, it was
made to show and prove the fact that the petitioners are
only antichretic creditors. The respondents never admitted
that they have not possessed the land at all. On the
contrary, they alleged that they and their predecessors-in-
interest namely Gregoria Pascual and Agapita Bonifacio
have been in possession of the land since time
immemorial and that the petitioners were placed in
possession of the land pursuant to a contract of
antichresis.
The court below found that the petitioners are merely
antichretic creditors. This finding and its factual bases
were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On the basis of the
evidence supporting this conclusion, this finding is binding
on us as it is not our duty to weigh evidence on this point
all over again. This court has on several occasions held
that the antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by
prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor
(Trillana v. Manansala, et al., 96 Phil. 865; Valencia v.
Acala, 42 Phil. 177; Barreto v. Barreto, 3 Phil. 234). The
petitioners are not possessors in the concept of owner but
mere holders placed in possession of the land by its
owners. Thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for
acquiring dominion (See Art. 540, Civil Code).
The fourth issue raised by the petitioners is answered by a
referral to the detailed factual findings and conclusions of
the trial court. Ten pages of the record on appeal (Record
on Appeal, CA-G.R. No. 40425-R, pp. 56-66) state in
convincing detail the portion of the trial court's decision
which support its conclusion that Hilario Ramirez and
Valentina Bonifacio are not the owners of the disputed
land and have no registrable right over it and that the
respondents herein have established their ownership by a
strong preponderance of evidence. The respondents were
declared the true and real owners and entitled to
registration in their names. The final resolution of the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. We
see no reversible error in this finding.
The argument of laches is explained and countered by the
close relationship of the parties and the nature of a
contract of antichresis. The private respondents are
nephews and nieces, with their spouses, of the petitioners.
Moreover, there is evidence to show that long before the
filing of the cases, there had been attempts to recover the
property.
In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to affirm the
appellate court's decision. We note, however, that in spite
of the finding of an existing contract of antichresis between
the parties, the two courts below did not order the payment
of the principal amount of mortgage. Under Article 2136 of
the Civil Code, the debtor cannot reacquire the enjoyment
of the immovable without first having totally paid what he
owes the creditor.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with a modification that the respondents are
ordered to pay the petitioners the amount of P 400.00 as
principal for the contract of antichresis, the fruits obtained
from the possession of the land having been applied to the
interests on the loan.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141285 July 5, 2001
CEBU INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE and DR. JOSEFINA L.
POBLETE, petitioners,
vs.
CEBU INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE EMPLOYEES' UNION-
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
May the mandatory share of an educational institution in
the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums be charged
against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee
increase authorized under Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728?1
Cebu Institute of Medicine (CIM), petitioner, is a non-stock,
non-profit educational institution with Dr. Josefina L.
Poblete as its incumbent dean at the time the instant
petition was filed. Respondent Cebu Institute of Medicine
Employees' Union – National Federation of Labor (UNION)
is the duly certified bargaining representative of the
employees of CIM.
On 2 September 1997 the UNION asked CIM to stop its
practice of charging the employer's mandatory share in the
SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums against the
seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase
under Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728. CIM refused.
Eventually, the dispute was submitted to voluntary
arbitration.
On 6 January 1999 Voluntary Arbitrator Julius Z. Neri
rendered a decision2 in favor of the UNION holding that
charging the employer's share in the SSS, Medicare and
Pag-Ibig contributions against the seventy percent (70%)
incremental tuition fee increase contravened Sec. 19, of
RA 11613 thereof which provides –
Sec. 19. Employer's Contributions. – (a)
Beginning as of the last day of the month when
an employee's compulsory coverage takes effect
and every month thereafter during his
employment his employer shall pay, with respect
to such covered employee, the employer's
contribution in accordance with the schedule
indicated in section eighteen of this Act.
Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, an
employer shall not deduct, directly or indirectly,
from the compensation of his employees
covered by the SSS or otherwise recover from
them the employer's contributions with respect
to such employees.
In short, the Voluntary Arbitrator ordered CIM to refund the
UNION of the employer's share in the SSS and Pag-Ibig
premiums and to refrain from charging the employer's
share against the seventy percent (70%) incremental
tuition fee increase.
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, CIM
appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the
Voluntary Arbitrator gravely erred in disregarding the clear
tenor of Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728, and in disallowing
petitioners from deducting the employer's premiums for
SSS and Pag-Ibig benefits from the seventy percent (70%)
portion of the incremental tuition fee increase, and also in
ordering a refund of the employer's premiums taken from
the seventy percent (70%) portion.4
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Voluntary
Arbitrator that to pay the employer's share out of funds
allotted for the employees would make the employees
contribute the entire amount of the said premiums, aside
from the fact that it will reduce the portion of the tuition fee
increases intended for their benefit.5
Petitioners disagree and this Court sustains them. Section
5, par. (2), of RA 6728 provides –
x x x Assistance under paragraph (1),
subparagraphs (a) and (b), shall be granted and
tuition fees under subparagraph (c) may be
increased on the condition that seventy percent
(70%) of the amount subsidized allotted for
tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go
to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances
and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching
personnel x x x x Provided, That government
subsidies are not used directly for salaries of
teachers of non-secular subjects. At least twenty
percent (20%) shall go to the improvement or
modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries,
laboratories, gymnasia and similar facilities and
to the payment of other costs of operation.
As may be culled from the foregoing, salaries, wages,
allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-
teaching personnel are to be charged against the seventy
percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase. SSS,
Medicare and Pag-Ibig fall under the category of "other
benefits," hence, may very well be charged against the
seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase
which after all is for the benefit of petitioners' teaching and
non-teaching personnel.
The law speaks of payment of "salaries, wages,
allowances and other benefits." There is no specific
prohibition against charging the employer's share to the
incremental tuition fee increase. Hence, it cannot properly
be said that the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig
premiums could be charged against the seventy percent
(70%) incremental tuition fee increase but the employer's
share of the contribution should be deducted from the
remaining thirty percent (30%) or elsewhere. This would
seem absurd. As we can see it, the employer's share in
the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums is deemed
integrated in the amount to be allocated for these benefits
from the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee
increase. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus. Where the law does not distinguish courts
should not distinguish.6 For sure, the seventy percent
(70%) is not to be delivered whole to the employees but
packaged in the form of salaries, wages, allowances, and
other benefitswhich may be in the form of SSS, Medicare
and Pag-Ibig premiums, all intended for the benefit of the
employees. In other words, the private educational
institution concerned has the discretion on the disposition
of the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee
increase. It enjoys the privilege of determining how much
increase in salaries to grant and the kind and amount of
allowances and other benefits to give. The only
precondition is that seventy percent (70%) of the
incremental tuition fee increase goes to the payment of
salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching
and non-teaching personnel.
On the other hand, the remaining thirty percent (30%) is
intended, quite obviously, for the use of the educational
institution itself, otherwise, it will be a diminution of the
aliquot share of the employer which is specifically intended
under Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728, "for the improvement or
modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries,
laboratories, gymnasia and similar facilities and to the
payment of other costs of operation." Plainly, SSS,
Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums cannot be lumped in this
category.
The seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase
for salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits under

RA 6728 may be compared to the sixty percent (60%)
allocation contained in PD 4517 and BP Blg. 232.8
Under PD 451, the disposition of the sixty percent (60%)
incremental tuition fee increase was limited to salaries and
wages. No provision was made for allowances and other
benefits unlike in RA 6728. Thus the provision was
increased from sixty percent (60%) under PD 451 to
seventy percent (70%) under RA 6728 obviously because
of the inclusion of allowances and other benefits provided
in the latter law.
Under BP Blg. 232, which repealed PD 451, private school
institutions were granted the authority to determine tuition
fee increases on the condition that the application and use
thereof be subject to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports (MECS).9 In University of Pangasinan
Confesor,10decided under BP Blg. 232, this Court held -
x x x x salaries or wages, allowances and fringe
benefits of Faculty and other staff, including
accruals to cost of living allowance, 13th month
pay, social security, medicare and retirement
contribution and increases as may be provided
in mandated wage orders, collective bargaining
agreements or voluntary employer practices
should be charged against the 60% tuition fee
increase (underscoring supplied).
Corollarily, under PD 451, the forty percent (40%) balance
of the incremental tuition fee increase was to be devoted
for institutional development, student assistance and
extension services, and return on investments, the latter
not to exceed twelve percent (12%) of the incremental
proceeds, while under RA 6728 the balance is to be
disposed of in the following manner: at least twenty
percent (20%) of the incremental tuition fee increase shall
go to the improvement or modernization of buildings,
equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and other
similar facilities, and to the payment of other costs of
operation.
It may be noted in RA 6728 that there is no provision
for return on investments similar to that in PD 451. Also,
RA 6728 does not set a maximum limit as to the amount to
5
be used in the improvement or modernization of buildings, Id., p. 38.
equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and other
similar facilities, and to the payment of other costs of 6
Dominado v. Derayunan, 49 Phil. 457 (1926);
operation. What it provides instead is a minimum which is
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833,
twenty percent (20%). Therefore, not only twenty percent
28 September 1995, 248 SCRA 590.
(20%) of the incremental tuition fee increase but the entire
thirty percent (30%) balance from the incremental tuition
7
fee increase is allocated for the improvement or An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Education
modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries, and Culture to Regulate the Imposition of Tuition
laboratories, gymnasia and other similar facilities and to and Other School Fees, Repealing Republic Act
the payment of other costs of operation thus leaving No. 6139, and for Other Purposes."
nothing for return on investments, which would not be
attractive to educational institutions; more so, if they would 8
"The Education Act of 1982."
still be required to charge their share in the SSS, Medicare
and Pag-Ibig premiums from sources other than the
seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase. 9
Now Department of Education, Culture and
Sports.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
v.
the Court of Appeals of 17 August 1999 and its Resolution 10
G.R. No. 109977, 5 September 1997, 278
of 13 December 1999 are REVERSED and SET SCRA 591.
ASIDE and a new one is entered allowing petitioner Cebu
Institute of Medicine (CIM) to charge its share in the SSS,
Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums against the seventy Republic of the Philippines
percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase under Sec. SUPREME COURT
5, par. (2) RA 6728. No costs. Manila
THIRD DIVISION
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., G.R. No. 155282 January 17, 2005
JJ., concur.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner,
vs.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN
LEGARDA, respondents.
Footnotes:
DECISION
1
"Government Assistance to Students and
Teachers in Private Education Act."
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
2
Annex "H," Rollo, pp. 159-164.
For our resolution is the petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as
3
The Social Security Law. amended, filed by petitioner Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB) against ABS-CBN
4
Rollo, p. 37. Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) and former Senator
Loren Legarda, respondents, assailing the (a) Decision
dated November 18, 1997,1 and (b) Order dated August
26, 20022 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon
City, in Civil Case No. Q-93-16052.
The facts are undisputed.
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent
ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of the
television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and
hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students
moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their
tuition fees. In the course of the program, student
prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members
were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s University
(PWU) was named as the school of some of the students
involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue,
Manila conspicuously served as the background of the
episode.
The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the
PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor
and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and
Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner
MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the episode
besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the
harassment of some of its female students.
Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel
initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating
Committee, alleging among others, that
respondents (1) did not submit "The Inside Story" to
petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same without
its permission, thus, violating Section 74 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and Section 3,6 Chapter III and
Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations.8
In their answer,9 respondents explained that the "The
Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of
which is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly,
petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to
impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the
parties’ memoranda, the MTRCB Investigating Committee
rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the aforementioned premises, the
respondents are ordered to pay the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for non-submission of
the program, subject of this case for review and approval
of the MTRCB.
Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the ‘The Inside
Story’ and all other programs of the ABS-CBN Channel 2
of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of
Review and Approval before showing; otherwise the Board
will act accordingly."101awphi1.nét
On appeal, the Office of Atty. Henrietta S. Mendez,
Chairman of the MTRCB, issued a Decision dated March
12, 1993 affirming the above ruling of its Investigating
Committee.11 Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated April
12
14, 1993.
Respondents then filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
77, Quezon City. It seeks to: (1) declare as
unconstitutional Sections 3(b),13 3(c),14 3(d),15 4,16 7,17 and
1118 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3,19 7,20 and 2821 (a) of
the MTRCB Rules and Regulations;22 (2) (in the
alternative) exclude the "The Inside Story" from the
coverage of the above cited provisions; and (3) annul and
set aside the MTRCB Decision dated March 12, 1993 and
Resolution dated April 14, 1993. Respondents averred that
the above-cited provisions constitute "prior restraint" on
respondents’ exercise of freedom of expression and of the
press, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Furthermore, the
above cited provisions do not apply to the "The Inside
Story" because it falls under the category of "public affairs
program, news documentary, or socio-political editorials"
governed by standards similar to those governing
newspapers.
On November 18, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision23 in
favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the
assailed Decision and Resolution of MTRCB
dated March 12, 1993;
2. DECLARING AND DECREEING that Sections
3 (b), (c), and (d), 4, 7, and 11 of P.D. No. 1986
and Sections 3, 7, 28 (a) of its Implementing
Rules do not cover the TV Program "The Inside
Story" and other similar programs, they being
public affairs programs which can be equated to
newspapers; and
3. MAKING PERMANENT the Injunction against
Respondents or all persons acting in their
behalf.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.24
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General,
contends inter alia: first, all television programs, including
"public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-
political editorials," are subject to petitioner’s power of
review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant
to this Court’s ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of
Appeals ;25second, television programs are more
accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal
regulation of the latter cannot apply to the
former; third, petitioner’s power to review television
programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not
amount to "prior restraint;" and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D.
No. 1986 does not violate respondents’ constitutional
freedom of expression and of the press.
Respondents take the opposite stance.
The issue for our resolution is whether the MTRCB has the
power or authority to review the "The Inside Story" prior to
its exhibition or broadcast by television.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The present controversy brings into focus the provisions of
Section 3 of P. D. No. 1986, partly reproduced as follows:
"SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The BOARD shall have
the following functions, powers and duties:
xxxxxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as
herein defined, television programs, including publicity
materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills,
whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for
theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for television
broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in
the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for
local viewing or for export.1a\^/phi1.net
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions
from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation,
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease exhibition
and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials subject of the
preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the
BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or
with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission
of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited
to:
xxx
d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel,
permits for the importation, exportation, production,
copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or
television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end and that no
such pictures, programs and materials as are determined
by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with
paragraph (c) hereof shall be imported, exported,
produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased,
exhibited and/or broadcast by television;
x x x x x x."
Vis-a-vis the foregoing provisions, our task is to decide
whether or not petitioner has the power to review the
television program "The Inside Story." The task is not
Herculean because it merely resurrects this Court En
Banc’sruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of
Appeals.26 There, the Iglesia ni Cristo sought exception
from petitioner’s review power contending that the term
"television programs" under Sec. 3 (b) does not include
"religious programs" which are protected under Section 5,
Article III of the Constitution.27 This Court, through Justice
Reynato Puno, categorically ruled that P.D. No. 1986 gives
petitioner "the power to screen, review and examine "all
television programs," emphasizing the phrase "all
television programs," thus:
"The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and
examine all ‘television programs.’ By the clear terms of the
law, the Board has the power to ‘approve, delete x x x
and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television
broadcast of x x x television programs x x x.’ The law also
directs the Board to apply ‘contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard’ to determine those which are
objectionable for being ‘immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a
dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of
violence or of a wrong or crime.’"
Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the
law does not make any exception, courts may not except
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason
apparent in the law to justify it.28 Ubi lex non distinguit nec
distinguere debemos. Thus, when the law says "all
television programs," the word "all" covers all television
programs, whether religious, public affairs, news
documentary, etc.29 The principle assumes that the
legislative body made no qualification in the use of general
word or expression.30
It then follows that since "The Inside Story" is a television
program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over
which it has power of review.
Here, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of
the term "television programs" on the ground that the "The
Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial" protected under
Section 4,31 Article III of the Constitution. Albeit,
respondent’s basis is not freedom of religion, as in Iglesia
ni Cristo,32 but freedom of expression and of the press, the
ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo applies squarely to the instant
issue. It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this
Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded
a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws,
past and present, "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs x x x." Yet despite the
fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred
status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni
Cristo’s religious program from petitioner’s review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story"
is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
speech and of the press. However, there has been no
declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that
freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred
status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious
programs from the jurisdiction and review power of
petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no
justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which,
according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a
freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review
are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No.
1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. Thus:
"SEC. 7. Unauthorized showing or exhibition. – It shall be
unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or cause to be
exhibited in any moviehouse, theatre, or public place or by

television within the Philippines any motion picture,
television program or publicity material, including trailers,
and stills for lobby displays in connection with motion
pictures, not duly authorized by the owner or his assignee
and passed by the BOARD; or to print or cause to be
printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in any theater
or public place or by television a label or notice showing
the same to have been officially passed by the BOARD
when the same has not been previously authorized, except
motion pictures, television programs or publicity material
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or
its departments and agencies, and newsreels."
Still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents
contend that the "The Inside Story" falls under the category
of newsreels.
Their contention is unpersuasive.
P. D. No. 1986 does not define "newsreels." Webster’s
dictionary defines newsreels as short motion picture films
portraying or dealing with current events.33 A glance at
actual samples of newsreels shows that they are mostly
reenactments of events that had already happened. Some
concrete examples are those of Dziga Vertov’s
RussianKino-Pravda newsreel series (Kino-Pravda means
literally "film-truth," a term that was later translated literally
into the French cinema verite) and Frank Capra’s Why We
Fight series.34 Apparently, newsreels are straight
presentation of events. They are depiction of "actualities."
Correspondingly, the MTRCB Rules
Regulations35 implementing P. D. No. 1986 define
newsreels as "straight news reporting, as distinguished
from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk
shows on a given issue are not considered
newsreels."36 Clearly, the "The Inside Story" cannot be
considered a newsreel. It is more of a public affairs
program which is described as a variety of news treatment;
a cross between pure television news and news-related
commentaries, analysis and/or exchange
opinions.37 Certainly, such kind of program is within
petitioner’s review power.
It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether
petitioner MTRCB has authority to review "The Inside
Story." Clearly, we are not called upon to determine
whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution providing that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression or
the press. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing
of the program. Neither did it cancel respondents’ permit.
Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to
submit to petitioner "The Inside Story" for its review and
approval. Therefore, we need not resolve whether certain
provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations specified by respondents contravene the
Constitution.
Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTC’s ruling that
Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and
Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations are unconstitutional. It is settled that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must be
raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual
case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision
on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself.38
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED.l^vvphi1.net The assailed RTC Decision dated
November 18, 1997 and Order dated August 26, 2002 are
hereby REVERSED. The Decision dated March 12, 1993
of petitioner MTRCB is AFFIRMED. Costs against
and
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
of
Footnotes
1
Penned by Judge Normandie
Pizarro, Rollo at 73-81.
2
Id. at 86-91.
3
Dated October 28, 1991
4
"SECTION 7. Unauthorized showing or
exhibition. – It shall be unlawful for any person
or entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in
any moviehouse, theater or public place or
television within the Philippines any motion
picture, television program or publicity material,
including trailers, and stills for lobby displays in
connection with motion pictures, not duly
authorized by the owner or is assignee and
passed by the BOARD; or to print or cause to be
printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in
any theater or public place or by television a
label or notice showing the same to have been
officially passed by the BOARD when the same
has not been previously authorized, except
motion pictures, television programs or publicity
material imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine
Government and/or its departments and
agencies, and newsreels."
5
"Creating the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board."
6
"SECTION 3. Matters subject to review – All
motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials, as defined in Chapter 1
hereof, whether these be for theatrical or non-
theatrical distribution, for television broadcast or
general viewing, imported or produced in the
Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they
be for local viewing or for export, shall be subject
to review by the BOARD before they are
exported, imported, copied, distributed, sold,
leased, exhibited or broadcast by television;"
7
"SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR
REVIEW – No motion picture, television program
or related publicity material shall be imported,
exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold,
leased, exhibited or broadcast by television
B. without prior permit issued by the BOARD after
review of the motion picture, television program
or publicity material."
8 determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in
Approved on July 27, 1993.
9
Dated November 18, 1991.
10
Annex "D" at 1, Petition, Rollo at 92.
11
Rollo at 92-99.
12
Id. at 100-106.
13
b) To screen, review and examine all motion
pictures as herein defined, television programs,
including publicity materials such as
advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such
motion pictures and publicity materials be for
theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for
television broadcast or for general viewing,
imported or produced in the Philippines, and in
the latter case, whether they be for local viewing
or for export;
14
c) To approve or disapprove, delete
objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the
importation, exportation, production, copying,
distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or
television broadcast of the motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials
subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the
judgment of the board applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to
the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or
its people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:
15
d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or
cancel, permits for the importation, exportation,
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease,
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all
motion pictures, television programs and imported, exported, produced, copied,
publicity materials, to the end that no such distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcast
pictures, programs and materials as are by television without prior permit issued by the
BOARD after review of the motion picture,
accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be television program or publicity material."
imported, exported, produced, copied,
reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited 21
"SECTION 28. OFFENSES AND
and/or broadcast by television;
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES – Without
prejudice to the institution of appropriate criminal
16
"SECTION 4. Decision. – The decision of the action, violations of the laws and rules governing
BOARD either approving or disapproving for motion pictures, television programs, and related
exhibition in the Philippines a motion picture, publicity materials shall be administratively
television program, still and other pictorial penalized with suspension or cancellation of
advertisement submitted to it for examination permits and licenses issued by the BOARD,
and review must be rendered within a period of depending on the gravity of the offense or in lieu
ten (10) days which shall be counted from the thereof, the Chairman of the BOARD or the
date of receipt by the BOARD of an application Hearing and Adjudication Committee, in his or its
for the purpose, together with motion picture, discretion, allow the payment of an
television program, still or other pictorial administrative fine by the guilty party. The
advertisement to be reviewed." imposition of the administrative penalties for
violation of Presidential Decree 1986 of its rules
shall be in accordance with the table of penalties
17
Supra.
duly promulgated by the BOARD."
18
"SECTION 11. Penalty. – Any person who 22
Approved on December 19, 1985.
violates the provisions of this Decree and/or the
implementing rules and regulations issued by
23
the BOARD, shall, upon conviction, be punished Rollo at 73-81.
by a mandatory penalty of three (3) months and
one day to one (1) year imprisonment plus a fine 24
RTC Order dated August 26, 2002, Rollo at
of not less than fifty thousand pesos. The
82-85.
penalty shall apply whether the person shall
have committed the violation either as principal,
25
accomplice or accessory. If the offender is an G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA
alien, he shall be deported immediately. The 529.
license to operate the moviehouse, theater, or
television station shall also be revoked. Should 26
Supra.
the offense be committed by a juridical person,
the chairman, the president, secretary, treasurer,
or the partner responsible therefore, shall be the 27
"No law shall be made respecting an
persons penalized." establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and
19
Supra. enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed."
20
"SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR
REVIEW. – No motion picture, television 28
Tolentino vs. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948).
program or related publicity material shall be
29
See Olfato vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. a trolley system, the organization of VILLARAM
No. 52749, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741. farmers into communes, and the trial A, JR., JJ.**
of Social Revolutionaries; one story
30 shows starvation in the nascent UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Third Edition,
Marxist state. Vertov’s driving vision CLUB, INC. and JIMMY GOW,
1995, at 153.
was to capture "film-truth" – that is, Respondents. Promulgated:
fragments of actuality, which when
31
"SecTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging organized together, have a deeper December 14,
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the truth that cannot be seen with the 2009
press, or the right of the people peaceably to naked eye. (Dziga Vertov, Wikipedia
assemble and petition the government for Encyclopedia, December 21, 2004, x-----------------------------------------
redress of grievances." http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dziga- - - - - - - - - - -x
Vertov.)
32 RESOLUTION
Supra.
35
Promulgated on August 22, 1993.
CORONA, J.:
33
Merriam Webster’s Third New International
36
Dictionary (1993 Phil. Copyright). Section 1(m), Chapter I, 1993 Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
34
Documentary Film, Wikipedia Encyclopedia, This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the
37
December 21, 2004, http:// TSN, September 2, 1994 at 13-14;
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Documentary_film. see Rollo at 159.
February 9, 2005 decision[2] and June 28, 2005
38
The newsreel tradition is an important Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, G.
tradition in documentary film; R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 236. resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
newsreels were also sometimes
staged but were usually reenactments No. 85474.
THIRD DIVISION
of events that had already happened,
not attempts to steer events as they
were in the process of happening. For GINA M. TIANGCO and G.R. No. 168697
instance, much of the battle footage SALVACION JENNY MANEGO, Petitioners Gina M. Tiangco and Salvacion
from the early 20th century was Petitioners, Present:
staged – the cameramen would
CORONA, J., Jenny Manego[4] were employees of respondent Uniwide
usually arrive on site after a major
battle and reenact scenes to film Chairperson,
them. VELASCO, Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI), a domestic
JR.,
- - v e r s u s -
In the Kino-Pravda series, Vertov PERALTA, corporation. Respondent Jimmy N. Gow was the president
focused on everyday experiences, D
eschewing bourgeois concerns and
EL of the corporation.[5]
filming marketplaces, bars, and CA
schools instead, sometimes with a STI
hidden camera, without asking
LL
permission first. The stories were O* a Petitioner Tiangco was employed by respondent
typically descriptive, not narrative, and nd
included vignettes and exposes,
showing for instance the renovation of USWCI on June 10, 1997 as concession manager. In
1998, she was designated as group merchandising
manager for the fashion and personal care department
with a monthly salary of P45,000. On the other hand,
petitioner Manego was initially employed as buyer on
January 16, 1984 but was promoted as senior category
[6]
head with a monthly salary of P25,000.
On July 5, 2001 and July 13, 2001, petitioners
Tiangco and Manego respectively filed separate complaints
for illegal dismissal, payment of separation pay as well as
award of moral and exemplary damages in the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The complaints,
docketed as NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-09-03512-2001 and
00-09-04757-2001, were consolidated.[7]
In his order dated January 11, 2002, the labor
arbiter[8] considered the consolidated cases as submitted
[9]
for decision.
On February 13, 2002, the respondents filed a
manifestation and motion praying that the proceedings on
the consolidated cases be suspended on the ground that
respondent USWCI had been placed in a state of
suspension of payments by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as early as April 11, 2000 and a
[10]
receivership committee had in fact been appointed.
On February 26, 2002, the labor arbiter
suspended the proceedings until further orders from the
SEC.[11]
On March 23, 2004, petitioners filed a motion to
reopen case on the ground that the SEC, in its order dated
December 23, 2002, had already approved the second
amendment to the rehabilitation plan (SARP) of respondent
USWCI.[12]
In their opposition to the motion, respondents
argued that the proceedings in the consolidated cases
must remain suspended inasmuch as the mere approval of
the SARP did not constitute a valid ground for their
reopening.[13]
On June 16, 2004, the labor arbiter issued an
order directing the parties to file their memoranda. He
further stated that even without the memoranda, the cases
would be ordered submitted for decision after the lapse of
the period for filing.[14]
This prompted respondents to file a petition for
certiorari[15] with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) in the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the labor arbiter.
On September 17, 2004, the CA granted the
application for a TRO.[16] In its February 9, 2005 decision, it
granted the petition and reversed the June 16, 2004 order
of the labor arbiter. It ruled that proceedings on the cases
should remain suspended until further orders from the SEC
 Sec. 6. In order to
citing Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC[17] and Sections effectively exercise such jurisdiction, In Rubberworld, we held that a labor claim is a
[22]
the [SEC] shall possess the
6(b), 11 and 27, Rule 4 of the 2000 Interim Rules of following powers: “claim” within the contemplation of PD 902-A, as

xxx
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation.[18] It denied xxx x amended. This is consistent with the Interim Rules of
xx
reconsideration on June 28, 2005. Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation which came out in
c) To appoint one or
more receivers of the property, real
and personal, which is the subject of 2000.[25] Section 1, Rule 2 of the Interim Rules defines
Hence, this petition. the action pending before the [SEC] in
accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in “claims” as follows:
such other cases whenever necessary
The issue determinative of this case is whether in order to preserve the rights of the Sec. 1. Definition of Terms - For
parties-litigants and/or protect the purposes of these Rules:
the consolidated illegal dismissal cases can be reopened interest of the investing public and
creditors: xxx Provided, finally, xxx xxx
that upon appointment of a xxx
at this point of the SEC proceedings for respondent management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board, or body, pursuant to “Claim” shall include all claims or
this Decree, all actions demands of whatever nature or
USWCI’s rehabilitation. character against a debtor or its
for claims against corporations,
partnerships or associations under property, whether for money or
management or receivership pending otherwise.
This issue is far from novel. We resolved the before any court, tribunal, board or
body shall be suspended
accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
same question as early as 1999 in Rubberworld (Phils.),
Thus, labor claims are included among the actions

Inc. v. NLRC[19] and since then, we have reiterated the

suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of
The term “claim,” as contemplated in Section 6
ruling in several other cases.[20]
employer-corporations. We stated in Rubberworld:
(c), refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature.[23] It
It is plain from the foregoing
The relevant law dealing with the suspension of is the assertion of rights for the payment of provisions of law that "upon the
appointment [by the SEC] of a
management committee or a
payments for money claims against corporations under money.[24] Here, petitioners have pecuniary claims—the rehabilitation receiver," all actions for
claims against the corporation pending
rehabilitation is Presidential Decree No. (PD) 902-A,[21] as before any court, tribunal or board
payment of separation pay and moral and exemplary shall ipso jure be suspended. The
justification for the automatic stay of
amended. Section 6 (c) thereof provides: damages. all pending actions for claims "is to
enable the management committee or
the rehabilitation receiver to effectively
exercise its/his powers free from any
judicial or extra-judicial interference
that might unduly hinder or prevent the
'rescue' of the debtor company. To
allow such other actions to continue
would only add to the burden of the
management committee or
rehabilitation receiver, whose time,
effort and resources would be wasted
in defending claims against the
corporation instead of being directed
toward its restructuring and
rehabilitation."
xxx
xxx x PD 902-A is put into effect by the
xx
The law is clear: upon the creation of
a management committee or the
appointment of a rehabilitation
receiver, all claims for actions "shall
be suspended accordingly." No
exception in favor of labor claims is
mentioned in the law. Since the law
makes no distinction or exemptions,
neither should this Court. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Allowing labor cases to
proceed clearly defeats the purpose of
the automatic stay and severely
encumbers the management
committee's time and resources. The
said committee would need to defend
against these suits, to the detriment of
its primary and urgent duty to work
towards rehabilitating the corporation
and making it viable again. To rule
otherwise would open the floodgates
to other similarly situated claimants
and forestall if not defeat the rescue
efforts. Besides, even if the NLRC
awards the claims of private
respondents, as it did, its ruling could
not be enforced as long as the
petitioner is under the management
committee.
xxx
xxx
xx
Article 217 of the Labor
[26]
Code should be construed not in
isolation but in harmony with PD 902-
A, according to the basic rule in
statutory construction that implied
repeals are not favored. Indeed, it is
axiomatic that each and every statute
must be construed in a way that would
avoid conflict with existing laws. True,
the NLRC has the power to hear and
decide labor disputes, but such
authority is deemed suspended when
[SEC].
xxx
xxx
xx
This Court notes that PD
902-A itself does not provide for the
duration of the automatic stay. Neither
does the Order of the SEC. Hence,
the suspensive effect has no time limit
and remains in force as long as
reasonably necessary to accomplish
the purpose of the
Order.[27] (Emphasis supplied)
In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
emphasized that “this Court’s adherence
abovestated rule has been resolute and steadfast as
evidenced by its oft-repeated application in a plethora of
cases.”[29]
x Petitioners seek to have the suspension of
proceedings lifted on the ground that the SEC already
approved respondent USWCI’s SARP. However, there is
no legal ground to do so because the suspensive effect of
the stay order is not time-bound. As we held
in Rubberworld, it continues to be in effect as long as
reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose.[30] This is
clarified in the Interim Rules:
x Rule 4
xxx x
xx xxx
Sec. 6. Stay Order. – If the
court finds the petition to be sufficient
in form and substance, it shall, not
later than five (5) days from the filing
of the petition, issue an Order (a)
appointing a Rehabilitation Receiver
and fixing his bond; (b) staying
enforcement of all claims, whether for
money or otherwise and whether such
enforcement is by court action or
otherwise, against the debtor, its
Zamora,[28] we guarantors and sureties not solidarily
liable with the debtor; xxx
to the
xxx
xxx x
xx
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay
Order. – The stay order shall be
effective from the date of issuance
until the dismissal of the petition or the
 termination of the rehabilitation
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
xxx
xxx x We note that the Rules of Procedure on
xx No costs.
Corporate Rehabilitation was approved on December 2,
Sec. 27. Termination of
Proceedings. – In case of the failure
of the debtor to submit the 2008 and took effect on January 16, 2009. Section 2, Rule SO ORDERED.
rehabilitation plan, or the disapproval
thereof by the court, or the failure of RENATO C. CORONA
9 thereof provides: Associate Justice
the rehabilitation of the debtor
because of failure to achieve the Chairperson
Sec. 2. Transitory WE CONCUR:
desired targets or goals as set forth
Provision. – Unless the court orders
therein, or the failure of the otherwise to prevent manifest
said debtor to perform its obligations injustice, any pending petition for
under the said plan, or a
rehabilitation that has not undergone
determination that the rehabilitation the initial hearing prescribed under the
plan may no longer be implemented in PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Interim Rules or Procedure for
accordance with its terms, conditions, Associate Justice Associate
Corporate Rehabilitation at the time of
restrictions, or assumptions, the court effectivity of these Rules shall be Justice
shall upon motion, motu proprio, or governed by these Rules.
upon the recommendation of the
Rehabilitation Receiver, terminate the
proceedings. The proceedings shall
also terminate upon the successful MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
implementation of the rehabilitation Considering that respondent USWCI’s SARP had already Associate Justice Associate
plan. (Emphasis supplied) Justice
been approved before then, the 2000 Interim Rules still

We ruled in Sobrejuanite v. ASB Development govern this case.

ATTESTATION
Corporation[31] that the Interim Rules, under Section 1, Rule
In sum, when the labor arbiter proceeded with I attest that the conclusions in the above
Resolution were reached in consultation before the case
1 thereof, are applicable although (as in this case) the was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
the consolidated cases despite the SEC suspension order, Division.
petition for declaration of suspension of payments was filed
he exceeded his jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal

prior to the effectivity of such rules:[32]

Section 1. Scope — These dismissal cases and the CA correctly reversed his June RENATO C. CORONA
Rules shall apply to petitions for Associate Justice
rehabilitation filed by corporations, Chairperson
16, 2004 order.
partnerships, and associations
pursuant to [PD 902-A], as amended.
 [12] [31]
Id., p. 29. G.R. No. 165675, 30 September 2005, 471
[13]
Id. SCRA 763.
[14] [32]
CERTIFICATION Id. Id., p. 772.
[15]
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[16]
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Rollo, p. 30.
[17]
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I 365 Phil. 273 (1999).
[18]
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had Rollo, pp. 31-32. Republic of the Philippines
[19]
been reached in consultation before the case was Supra note 17. SUPREME COURT
[20]
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Philippine Airlines Manila
Employees Association (PALEA), G.R. No.
142399, 19 June 2007, 525 SCRA 29; Philippine EN BANC
Airlines, Inc. v. Zamora, G.R. No. 166996, 6
February 2007, 514 SCRA 584; Philippine G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123294, 4
REYNATO S. PUNO September 2000; Rubberworld [Phils.], Inc. v. JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
[NLRC], 391 Phil. 318 (2000). AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A.
Chief Justice [21]
Reorganization of the [SEC] with Additional AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
Powers and Placing the said Agency under the ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA,
Administrative Supervision of the Office of the SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and
President. MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
[22]
Under RA 8799 (the Securities Regulation vs.
Code), jurisdiction over rehabilitation and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN
*
Per Special Order No. 805 dated December 4, suspension of payments was transferred from JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P.
2009. the SEC to the Regional Trial Courts. However, DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA,
**
Per Special Order No. 802 dated November 25, the SEC, pursuant to Section 5.2 of the same PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians,
2009. law, retains jurisdiction over pending suspension MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of June VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO,
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon- 30, 2000 until finally disposed. respondents.
[23]
Magtolis (retired) and concurred in by Associate Uniwide Holdings, Inc. v. Jandecs
Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired) and Jose Transportation Co., Inc., G.R. No. 168522, 19 Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
C. Reyes, Jr. of the Fourth Division of the Court December 2007, 541 SCRA 158, 163, citations
of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 26-34. omitted. Padilla Law Office for respondents.
[24]
[3]
Id., p. 41. Id., citing Sobrejuanite v. ASB Development
[4]
“Salvacion Jenny Samañego” in some parts of Corporation, infra note 3.
[25]
the records. A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC.
[5]
Id., p. 27.
[26]
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of [LAs] and the [NLRC]. – CRUZ, J.:
[6]
Id. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this
[7]
Id. Code, the LAs shall have original and exclusive Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was
[8]
Melquiades Sol D. Del Rosario. Id., p. 236. jurisdiction to hear and decide, xxx the following looking forward to the commencement exercises where he
[9]
Id., p. 27. cases involving all workers, xxx would ascend the stage and in the presence of his
[10]
Id., pp. 28, 306-330. On June 25, 1999, xxx relatives and friends receive his high school diploma.
respondent USWCI filed a Petition for xxx xxx These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it
Declaration of Suspension of Payments, 2. Termination disputes; xxxx turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
[27]
Formation and Appointment of a Rehabilitation Supra note 17, pp. 280-285 awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in
[28]
Receiver/Committee and Approval of Supra note 20. the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-
[29]
Rehabilitation Plan docketed as SEC Case No. Id., p. 605. Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that
[30]
06-99-6340. Id., p. 289. Supra note 17, p. 285, citing BF Homes mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life
[11]
Id. Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
76879, 3 October 1990, 190 SCRA 262, 268.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu
held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the
sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation,
loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants
were completely absolved . 4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
respondent court found that Article 2180 was not
applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not
a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. It also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident as the
semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the
defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went
to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in
its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a
classmate. On the implications and consequences of these
facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to
show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his
graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the
private respondents. The private respondents submit that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the
purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was
no longer in their custody because the semester had
already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used
which the petitioners consider important because of an
earlier incident which they claim underscores the
negligence of the school and at least one of the private
respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on
April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys,
confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but
later returned it to him without making a report to the
principal or taking any further action . 6 As Gumban was
one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the
gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this
was the same pistol that had been confiscated from
Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it
had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say,
however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same
firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is
invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting
positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their
custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in
connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit:
Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and
Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this
opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended
a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school
supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took
over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned
turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante
was found guilty of double homicide with reckless
imprudence. In the separate civil action flied against them,
his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages
under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for
the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista
Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an
obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the
ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex
Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school
authorities who should be held liable Liability under this
rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and
(2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The
modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades"
should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an
elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade
during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in
Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the
culprits parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador,
the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself
had also not been sued that the school was not liable
because it was not an establishment of arts and trades.
Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved
as this "contemplates a situation where the student lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the control,
direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of
the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the
other members of the court concurred in this decision
promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-
year old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows
in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although
the wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not
boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in
charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court
declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" — means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long
as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10
including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to
the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age
were covered by the provision since they were equally in
the custody of the school and subject to its discipline.
Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and
submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed
by students not yet of age as the school would be acting
only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with
Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that
"since the school involved at bar is a non-academic
school, the question as to the applicability of the cited
codal provision to academic institutions will have to await
another case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be
held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is
not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution
of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the
question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts
and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is
supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court
has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to
the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of
reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the
words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments
of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion
expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he
said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old
Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to
academic ones. What substantial difference is there
between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision
and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously
contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the
duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the
detriment of third Persons, so long as they are in a position
to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In my
opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the
old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The phrase
is only an updated version of the equivalent terms
"preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French
Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to
have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would
seem clear that where the parent places the child under
the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason/that
the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of
the school nor with the authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is
no authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same
vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of
the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the
Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would
make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts
and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its
custody but if that same tort were committed in an
academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or
the school head. All other circumstances being the same,
the teacher or the head of the academic school would be
absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-
academic school would be held liable, and simply because
the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance
should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis
only of the nature of their respective schools. There does
not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature
and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-
academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused
by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result
of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of
the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly
should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing
that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the school
were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of
the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts
committed by his students, why is it the head of the school
only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic
or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the
head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of
the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades
were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to
their master who personally and directly instructed them on
the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the
school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students,
who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast,
the head of the academic school was not as involved with
his students and exercised only administrative duties over
the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with
the students. The head of the academic school had then
(as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the
acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and
trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at
present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and
trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and
the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal
contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the
provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into
account the charges in the situation subject to be
regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.

The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the
responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-
extensive with the period when the student is actually
undergoing studies during the school term, as contended
by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is
clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc
v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the
student should be within the control and under the
influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean
that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester,
beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the
close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such
period, such as the period of registration, and in the case
of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the
student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not yet
begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the
discipline of the school only upon the start of classes
notwithstanding that before that day he has already
registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither
should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day
of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain
requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such
as submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the
like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider
himself released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in
the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company
of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience
and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody
and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under
the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-
charge who must answer for his students' torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are responsible
for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-
charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or
other administrative superior to exercise supervision over
the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they
are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the
injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position
to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and
actual physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a
result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by
the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises
of the school at any time when its authority could be validly
exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed
by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the
school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may
be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the
head thereof under the general principle of respondeat
superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by
proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to
answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as
the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can
exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article
2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher
will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require that the offending
student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be
liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case,
liability attached to the teacher and the head of the
technical school although the wrongdoer was already of
age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions
expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in
Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability
under this article in view of the increasing activism among
the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting
injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be
sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly
liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available
to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as principal
for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its
employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in
selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate
supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the
pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases
now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help the
teacher physically enforce those rules upon the students.
Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be
committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it
would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable
for the damage caused by his students as long as they are
in the school premises and presumably under his
influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed not to
expect from the teacher the same measure of
responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence
over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent
can expect more obedience from the child because the
latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher.
It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the
child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the
teacher's influence, besides being coterminous with the
period of custody is usually enforced only because of the
students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill
more las discipline on the child than the teacher and so
should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher
for the tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in
question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice even if he is already of age — and
therefore less tractable than the minor — then there
should all the more be justification to require from the
school authorities less accountability as long as they can
prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. After
all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's
acts because he has reached majority age and so is no
longer under the former's control, there is then all the more
reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's
responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has
arrived at the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was
still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year
classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in
the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or
merely to submit his physics report for what is important is
that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously
observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his
friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate
purpose that would have also brought him in the custody
of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was
exercising only a general authority over the student body
and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections
and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The
evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-
in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily
make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon,
the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-
charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in
enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or
condoned their non-observance. His absence when the Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
tragedy happened cannot be considered against him Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
because he was not supposed or required to report to
school on that day. And while it is true that the offending Fernan, Padilla and Teehankee, C.J., JJ, took no part.
student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge
even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was
committed, it has not been established that it was caused
by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On
the contrary, the private respondents have proved that
they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement
of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
Separate Opinions
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the
dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view
of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated
an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning
clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves given the term "teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him as "teacher-in-charge." This would limit liability to
to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that occasions where there are classes under the immediate
he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the
the petitioners' son. intendment of the law.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that
Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties
article because only the teacher or the head of the school and obligations as parents whenever in such a standing.
of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in
to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory
respondents for none of them has been found to have custody.
been charged with the custody of the offending student or
has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons
connection with such custody. who stand in loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute
parental authority:
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the
record and in the light of the principles herein announced Art. 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute
that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted parental authority:
by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the
latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose- xxx xxx xxx
Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize
with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the 2) Teachers and professors
tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a xxx xxx xxx
balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any apprentices;'
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362. The relations between teacher and pupil,
professor and student, are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can
not contravene the concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs.
Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence,
it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance
in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the
necessary precautions to protect the students in their
custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably
be anticipated, including injuries that some students
themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on
their fellow students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the
responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since
Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads,
yet, by virtue of the same provision, the school, as their
employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers
or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts &
Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may
exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the
Civil Code, supra, it is apparent that the Code Commission
had already segregated the classification of "teachers and
professors" vis-a-vis their pupils, from "directors of trade
establishments, with regard to their apprentices."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and
crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to
stress the need for a major amendment to, if not a
complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments
of arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or
apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic
of the past and contemplates a situation long gone and out
of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation,
it is bound to result in mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in
schools of arts and trades. Students in "technological"
colleges and universities are no different from students in
liberal arts or professional schools. Apprentices now work
in regular shops and factories and their relationship to the
employer is covered by laws governing the employment
relationship and not by laws governing the teacher—
student relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps
early high school students, teachers are often no longer
objects of veneration who are given the respect due to
substitute parents. Many students in their late teens or
early adult years view some teachers as part of a
bourgeois or reactionary group whose advice on
behaviour, deportment, and other non-academic matters is
not only resented but actively rejected. It ,seems most
unfair to hold teachers liable on a presumption juris tantum
of negligence for acts of students even under
circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in
loco parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to prove
the contrary of negligence to be freed from solidary liability
for the acts f bomb-throwing or pistol packing students who
would just as soon hurt them as they would other members
of the so-called-establishment.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply to
teachers and schools of whatever nature insofar as grown
up students are concerned. The provision of Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its
purpose. The Court cannot make law. It can only apply the
law with its imperfections. However, the Court can suggest
that such a law should be amended or repealed.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning
given the term "teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
as "teacher-in-charge." This would limit liability to
occasions where there are classes under the immediate
charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the
intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that
whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties
and obligations as parents whenever in such a standing.
Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious
acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in
their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory
custody.
Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons
who stand in loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute
parental authority:
Art. 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute
parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
2) Teachers and professors
xxx xxx xxx
4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to
apprentices;'
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362. The relations between teacher and pupil,
professor and student, are fixed by government
regulations and those of each school or institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can
not contravene the concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs.
Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence,
it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance
in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the
necessary precautions to protect the students in their
custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably
be anticipated, including injuries that some students
themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on
their fellow students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the
responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since
Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads,
yet, by virtue of the same provision, the school, as their
employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers
or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts &
Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may
exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the
Civil Code, supra, it is apparent that the Code Commission
had already segregated the classification of "teachers and
professors" vis-a-vis their pupils, from "directors of trade
establishments, with regard to their apprentices."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: Footnotes
I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and 1 Rollo, pp. 63,157.
crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to
stress the need for a major amendment to, if not a 2 lbid., p. 38.
complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments 3 Id., p. 23.
of arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or
apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic 4 Id p. 31. Climaco, J., ponente, with Pascual and Agcaoili,
of the past and contemplates a situation long gone and out JJ.
of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation,
it is bound to result in mischief and injustice. 5 Id., pp. 30-31,
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in 6 Id., pp. 23, 272.
schools of arts and trades. Students in "technological"
colleges and universities are no different from students in 7 101 Phil, 843.
liberal arts or professional schools. Apprentices now work
in regular shops and factories and their relationship to the 8 108 Phil, 414,
employer is covered by laws governing the employment
relationship and not by laws governing the teacher— 9 41 SCRA 548.
student relationship.
10 Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Barredo, Villamor, and
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps Makasiar, JJ.
early high school students, teachers are often no longer
objects of veneration who are given the respect due to 11 Castro, Fernando, and Zaldivar, JJ.
substitute parents. Many students in their late teens or
early adult years view some teachers as part of a
bourgeois or reactionary group whose advice on The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
behaviour, deportment, and other non-academic matters is
not only resented but actively rejected. It ,seems most
unfair to hold teachers liable on a presumption juris tantum Republic of the Philippines
of negligence for acts of students even under SUPREME COURT
circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in Manila
loco parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to prove
the contrary of negligence to be freed from solidary liability FIRST DIVISION
for the acts f bomb-throwing or pistol packing students who
would just as soon hurt them as they would other members
of the so-called-establishment.
G.R. No. 93468 December 29, 1994
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply to
teachers and schools of whatever nature insofar as grown NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-
up students are concerned. The provision of Art. 2180 of REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS
the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its CHAPTER, petitioner,
purpose. The Court cannot make law. It can only apply the vs.
law with its imperfections. However, the Court can suggest HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR
that such a law should be amended or repealed. AND EMPLOYMENT and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK,
respondents.
Filemon G. Tercero for petitioner.

The Government Corporate Counsel for Republic Planters
Bank.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS CHAPTER
seeks nullification of the decision of public respondent
Secretary of Labor dated 23 March 1990, which modified
the order of Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz dated 17 August
1989 as well as his order dated 20 April 1990 denying
reconsideration.
On 17 March 1989, NATU filed a petition for certification
election to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of respondent Bank's employees occupying
supervisory positions. On 24 April 1989, the Bank moved
to dismiss the petition on the ground that the supposed
supervisory employees were actually managerial and/or
confidential employees thus ineligible to join, assist or form
a union, and that the petition lacked the 20% signatory
requirement under the Labor Code.
On 17 August 1989, Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz granted
the petition thus —
WHEREFORE, . . . let a certification election be ordered
conducted among all the regular employees of the
Republic Planters Bank occupying supervisory positions or
the equivalent within 20 days from receipt of a copy of this
Order. The choice shall be: (1) National Association of
Trade Unions (NATU)-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors
Chapter; and (2) No Union.
The payroll three months prior to the filing of this petition
shall be utilized in determining the list of eligible voters . . .
.1
Respondent Bank appealed the order to the Secretary of
Labor on the main ground that several of the employees
sought to be included in the certification election,
particularly the Department Managers, Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers were
managerial and/or confidential employees and thus
ineligible to join, assist or form a union. It presented
annexes detailing the job description and duties of the
positions in question and affidavits of certain employees. It
also invoked provisions of the General Banking Act and
the Central Bank Act to show the duties and
responsibilities of the bank and its branches.
On 23 March 1990, public respondent issued a decision
partially granting the appeal, which is now being
challenged before us —
WHEREFORE, . . . the appeal is hereby partially granted.
Accordingly, the Order dated 17 August 1989 is modified
to the extent that Department Managers, Assistant
Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers
are declared managerial employees. Perforce, they cannot
join the union of supervisors such as Division Chiefs,
Accounts Officers, Staff Assistants and OIC's (sic) unless
the latter are regular managerial employees . . . . 2
NATU filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied on 20 April 1990. 3 Hence this recourse assailing
public respondent for rendering the decision of 23 March
1990 and the order of 20 April 1990 both with grave abuse
of discretion.
The crucial issue presented for our resolution is whether
the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent
Bank are managerial and/or confidential employees hence
ineligible to join or assist the union of petitioner.
NATU submits that an analysis of the decision of public
respondent readily yields certain flaws that result in
erroneous conclusions. Firstly, a branch does not enjoy
relative autonomy precisely because it is treated as one
unit with the head office and has to comply with uniform
policies and guidelines set by the bank itself. It would be
absurd if each branch of a particular bank would be
adopting and implementing different policies covering
multifarious banking transactions. Moreover, respondent
Bank's own evidence clearly shows that policies and
guidelines covering the various branches are set by the
head office. Secondly, there is absolutely no evidence
showing that bank policies are laid down through the
collective action of the Branch Manager, the Cashier and
the Controller. Thirdly, the organizational setup where the
Branch Manager exercises control over branch operations,
the Controller controls the Accounting Division, and the
Cashier controls the Cash Division, is nothing but a proper
delineation of duties and responsibilities. This delineation
is a Central Bank prescribed internal control measure
intended to objectively establish responsibilities among the
officers to easily pinpoint culpability in case of error. The
"dual control" and "joint custody" aspects mentioned in the
decision of public respondent are likewise internal control
measures prescribed by the Central Bank.
Neither is there evidence showing that subject employees
are vested with powers or prerogatives to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. The bare allegations in the affidavits of
respondent Bank's Executive Assistant to the President 4
and the Senior Manager of the Human Resource
Management Department 5 that those powers and
prerogatives are inherent in subject positions are self-
serving. Their claim cannot be made to prevail upon the
actual duties and responsibilities of subject employees.
The other evidence of respondent Bank which purports to
show that subject employees exercise managerial
functions even belies such claim. Insofar as Department
Managers and Assistant Managers are concerned, there is
absolutely no reason mentioned in the decision why they
are managerial employees. Not even respondent Bank in
its appeal questioned the inclusion of Assistant Managers
among the qualified petitioning employees. Public
respondent has deviated from the real issue in this case,
which is, the determination of whether subject employees
are managerial employees within the contemplation of the
Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715; instead, he merely
concentrated on the nature, conduct and management of
banks conformably with the General Banking Act and the
Central Bank Act.
Petitioner concludes that subject employees are not
managerial employees but supervisors. Even assuming
that they are confidential employees, there is no legal
prohibition against confidential employees who are not
performing managerial functions to form and join a union.
On the other hand, respondent Bank maintains that the
Department Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and
Controllers are inherently possessed of the powers
enumerated in Art. 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code. It
relies heavily on the affidavits of its Executive Assistant to
the President and Senior Manager of the Human Resource
Department. The Branch Managers, Cashiers and
Controllers are vested not only with policy-making powers
necessary to run the affairs of the branch, given the
independence and relative autonomy which it enjoys in the
pursuit of its goals and objectives, but also with the
concomitant disciplinary authority over the employees.
The Solicitor General argues that NATU loses sight of the
fact that by virtue of the appeal of respondent Bank, the
whole case is thrown open for consideration by public
respondent. Even errors not assigned in the appeal, such
as the exclusion by the Med-Arbiter of Assistant Managers
from the managerial employees category, is within his
discretion to consider as it is closely related to the errors
properly assigned. The fact that Department Managers are
managerial employees is borne out by the evidence of
petitioner itself. Furthermore, while it assails public
respondent's finding that subject employees are
managerial employees, petitioner never questioned the
fact that said officers also occupy confidential positions
and thus remain prohibited from forming or joining any
labor organization.
Respondent Bank has no legal personality to move for the
dismissal of the petition for certification election on the
ground that its supervisory employees are in reality
managerial employees. An employer has no standing to
question the process since this is the sole concern of the
workers. The only exception is where the employer itself
has to file the petition pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor
Code because of a request to bargain collectively. 6
Public respondent, invoking RA 6715 and the inherent
functions of Department Managers, Assistant Managers,
Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, held that
these officers properly fall within the definition of
managerial employees. The ratiocination in his Decision of
23 March 1990 7 is that —
Republic Act No. 6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-
Veloso Law, restored the right of supervisors to form their
own unions while maintaining the proscription on the right
to self-organization of managerial employees. Accordingly,
the Labor Code, as amended, distinguishes managerial,
supervisory and rank-and-file employees thus:
Art. 212 (m) — Managerial employee is one who is vested
with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of
the employer, effectively recommend such managerial
actions, if the exercise of such managerial authority is not
routinary in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above
definitions are considered rank-and-file employees
(emphasis supplied).
At first glance, pursuant to the above-definitions and based
on their job descriptions as guideposts, there would seem
to be no difficulty in distinguishing a managerial employee
from that of a supervisor, or from that of a mere rank-and-
file employee. Yet, this task takes on a different dimension
when applied to banks, particularly the branches thereof.
This is so because unlike ordinary corporations, a bank's
organizational operation is governed and regulated by the
General Banking Act and the Central Bank Act, both
special laws . . . .
As pointed out by the respondent, in the banking industry,
a branch is the microcosm of a banking institution,
uniquely autonomous and
self-governing.
This relative autonomy of a branch finds legal basis in
Section 27 of the General Banking Act, as amended, thus:
. . . . The bank shall be responsible for all business
conducted in such branches to the same extent and in the
same manner as though such business had all been
conducted in the head office.
For the purpose of this Act, a bank and its branches shall
be treated as a unit (emphasis supplied).
Conformably with the above, bank policies are laid down
and/or executed through the collective action of the Branch
Manager, Cashier and Controller at the branch level. The
Branch Manager exercises over-all control and supervision
over branch operation being on the top of the branch's
pyramid structure. However, both the controller and the
cashier who are called in banking parlance as "Financial
Managers" due to their fiscal functions are given such a
share and sphere of responsibility in the operations of the
bank. The cashier controls and supervises the cash
division while the controller that of the Accounting Division.
Likewise, their assigned task is of great significance,
without which a bank or branch for that matter cannot
operate or function.
Through the collective action of these three branch officers
operational transactions are carried out like: The two (2)-
signature requirement of the manager, on one hand, and
that of the controller or cashier on the other hand as
required in bank's issuances and releases. This is the so-
called "dual control" through check-and-balance as
prescribed by the Central Bank, per Section 1166.6, Book
I, Manual of Regulations for Banks and Financial
Intermediaries. Another is in the joint custody of the
branch's cash in vault, accountable forms, collaterals,
documents of title, deposit, ledgers and others, among the
branch manager and at least two (2) officers of the branch
as required under Section 1166.6 of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries.
This structural set-up creates a triad of managerial
authority among the branch manager, cashier and
controller. Hence, no officer of the bank ". . . have (sic)
complete authority and responsibility for handling all
phases of any transaction from beginning to end without
some control or balance from some other part of the
organization" (Section 1166.3, Division of Duties and
Responsibilities, Ibid). This aspect in the banking system
which calls for the division of duties and responsibilities is
a clear manifestation of managerial power and authority.
No operational transaction at branch level is carried out by
the singular act of the Branch Manager but rather through
the collective act of the Branch Manager,
Cashier/Controller (emphasis supplied).
Noteworthy is the "on call client" set up in banks. Under
this scheme, the branch manager is tasked with the
responsibility of business development and marketing of
the bank's services which place him on client call. During
such usual physical absences from the branch, the cashier
assumes the reins of branch control and administration.
On those occasions, the "dual control system" is clearly
manifest in the transactions and operations of the branch
bank as it will then require the necessary joint action of the
controller and the cashier.
The grave abuse of discretion committed by public
respondent is at once apparent. Art. 212, par. (m), of the
Labor Code is explicit. A managerial employee is (a) one
who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies, or to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees; or (b) one who is vested with both powers or
prerogatives. A supervisory employee is different from a
managerial employee in the sense that the supervisory
employee, in the interest of the employer, effectively
recommends such managerial actions, if the exercise of
such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment.
Ranged against these definitions and after a thorough
examination of the evidence submitted by both parties, we
arrive at a contrary conclusion. Branch Managers,
Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are not
managerial employees but supervisory employees. The
finding of public respondent that bank policies are laid
down and/or executed through the collective action of
these employees is simply erroneous. His discussion on
the division of their duties and responsibilities does not
logically lead to the conclusion that they are managerial
employees, as the term is defined in Art. 212, par. (m).
Among the general duties and responsibilities of a Branch
Manager is "[t]o discharge his duties and authority with a
high sense of responsibility and integrity and shall at all
times be guided by prudence like a good father of the
family, and sound judgment in accordance with and within
the limitations of the policy/policies promulgated by the
Board of Directors and implemented by the Management
until suspended, superseded, revoked or modified" (par. 5,
emphasis supplied). 8 Similarly, the job summary of a
Controller states: "Supervises the Accounting Unit of the
branch; sees to the compliance by the Branch with
established procedures, policies, rules and regulations of
the Bank and external supervising authorities; sees to the
strict implementation of control procedures (emphasis
supplied). 9 The job description of a Cashier does not
mention any authority on his part to lay down policies,
either. 10 On the basis of the foregoing evidence, it is clear
that subject employees do not participate in policy-making
but are given approved and established policies to execute
and standard practices to observe, 11 leaving little or no
discretion at all whether to implement said policies or not.
12 It is the nature of the employee's functions, and not the
nomenclature or title given to his job, which determines
whether he has rank-and-file, supervisory or managerial
status. 13
Moreover, the bare statement in the affidavit of the
Executive Assistant to the President of respondent Bank
that the Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers
"formulate and implement the plans, policies and
marketing strategies of the branch towards the successful
accomplishment of its profit targets and objectives," 14 is
contradicted by the following evidence submitted by
respondent Bank itself:
(a) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's Assistant
Vice President to all Regional Managers and Branch
Managers giving them temporary discretionary authority to
grant additional interest over the prescribed board rates for
both short-term and long-term CTDs subject, however, to
specific limitations and guidelines set forth in the same
memorandum; 15
(b) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's Executive
Vice President to all Regional Managers and Branch
Officers regarding the policy and guidelines on drawing
against uncollected deposits (DAUD); 16
(c) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's President
to all Field Offices regarding the guidelines on domestic
bills purchased
(DBP); 17 and
(d) Memorandum issued by the same officer to all Branch
Managers regarding lending authority at the branch level
and the terms and conditions thereof. 18
As a consequence, the affidavit of the Executive Assistant
cannot be given any weight at all.
Neither do the Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers
have the power to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. The Senior
Manager of the Human Resource Management
Department of respondent Bank, in her affidavit, stated
that "the power to hire, fire, suspend, transfer, assign or
otherwise impose discipline among subordinates within
their respective jurisdictions is lodged with the heads of the
various departments, the branch managers and officers-in-
charge, the branch cashiers and the branch controllers.
Inherent as it is in the aforementioned positions, the
authority to hire, fire, suspend, transfer, assign or
otherwise discipline employees within their respective
domains was deemed unnecessary to be incorporated in
their individual job descriptions; By way of illustration, on
August 24, 1989, Mr. Renato A. Tuates, the Officer-in-
Charge/Branch Cashier of the Bank's Dumaguete Branch,
placed under preventive suspension and thereafter
terminated the teller of the same branch . . . . Likewise, on
February 22, 1989, Mr. Francis D. Robite, Sr., the Officer-
in-Charge of International Department, assigned the cable
assistant of the International Department as the concurrent
FCDU Accountable Forms Custodian." 19
However, a close scrutiny of the memorandum of Mr.
Tuates reveals that he does not have said managerial
power because as plainly stated therein, it was issued
"upon instruction from Head Office." 20 With regard to the
memorandum of Mr. Robite, Sr., it appears that the power
he exercised was merely in an isolated instance, taking
into account the other evidence submitted by respondent
Bank itself showing lack of said power by other Branch
Managers/OICs:
(a) Memorandum from the Branch Manager for the
AVP-Manpower Management Department expressing the
opinion that a certain employee, due to habitual
absenteeism and tardiness, must be penalized in
accordance with respondent Bank's Code of Discipline;
and
(b) Memorandum from a Branch OIC for the Assistant Vice
President recommending a certain employee's promotional
adjustment to the present position he occupies.
Clearly, those officials or employees possess only
recommendatory powers subject to evaluation, review and
final action by higher officials. Therefore, the foregoing
affidavit cannot bolster the stand of respondent Bank.
The positions of Department Managers and Assistant
Managers were also declared by public respondent as
managerial, without providing any basis therefor. Petitioner
asserts that the position of Assistant Manager was not
even included in the appeal filed by respondent Bank.
While we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that
it is within the discretion of public respondent to consider
an unassigned issue that is closely related to an issue
properly assigned, still, public respondent's error lies in the
fact that his finding has no leg to stand on. Anyway,
inasmuch as the entire records are before us, now is the
opportunity to discuss this issue.
We analyzed the evidence submitted by respondent Bank
in support of its claim that Department Managers are
managerial employees 21 and concluded that they are not.
Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers,
Department Managers do not possess the power to lay
down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. They occupy
supervisory positions, charged with the duty among others
to "recommend proposals to improve and streamline
operations." 22 With respect to Assistant Managers, there
is absolutely no evidence submitted to substantiate public
respondent's finding that they are managerial employees;
understandably so, because this position is not included in
the appeal of respondent Bank.
As regards the other claim of respondent Bank that Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers are confidential
employees, having control, custody and/or access to
confidential matters, e.g., the branch's cash position,
statements of financial condition, vault combination, cash
codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and other
negotiable instruments, 23 pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the
Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, 24 this claim
is not even disputed by petitioner. A confidential employee
is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or
with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the
employer's property. 25 While Art. 245 of the Labor Code
singles out managerial employees as ineligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of
necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly
disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed, as elucidated in several cases 26 the latest of
which is Chua v. Civil Service Commission 27 where we
said:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details
involved in its application. There is always an omission that
may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the
time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may
be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the
future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to
fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication . . . .
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all
such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly
and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate
legis . . . .
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took
into consideration the rationale behind the disqualification
of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing
Corporation v. Sanchez, 28 thus: ". . . if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union,
the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union
in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also
become company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership." Stated
differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the
employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that
its interests are well protected. The employer is not
assured of such protection if these employees themselves
are union members. Collective bargaining in such a
situation can become one-sided. 29 It is the same reason
that impelled this Court to consider the position of
confidential employees as included in the disqualification
found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential
employees were written in the provision. If confidential
employees could unionize in order to bargain for
advantages for themselves, then they could be governed
by their own motives rather than the interest of the
employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would
mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals
who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the employers.
30 It is not farfetched that in the course of collective
bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they
are duty-bound to protect. Along the same line of
reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja
31 reiterated in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v.
NLRC, 32 that "confidential employees such as accounting
personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having
access to confidential information, may become the source
of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or
spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement."
In fine, only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers of respondent Bank, being confidential
employees, are disqualified from joining or assisting
petitioner Union, or joining, assisting or forming any other
labor organization. But this ruling should be understood to
apply only to the present case based on the evidence of
the parties, as well as to those similarly situated. It should
not be understood in any way to apply to banks in general.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The
decision of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated 23
March 1990 and his order dated 20 April 1990 are
MODIFIED, hereby declaring that only the Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent
Republic Planters Bank are ineligible to join or assist
petitioner National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)-
Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter, or join,
assist or form any other labor organization.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that
respondent Bank's Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers, being confidential employees of the Bank, are
disqualified from joining or assisting petitioner labor union
or joining, assisting or forming any other labor
organization, including a supervisor's union.
However, I dissent from its conclusion that respondent
Bank's Department Managers and Department Assistant
Managers are not disqualified from joining a labor union
including a supervisors' union. My years of experience in
the banking industry (perhaps irrelevant to this case) have
shown that positions of such Department Heads
(Managers) are as confidential, if not more, than the
position of Branch Managers. In fact, most of such
Department Heads are Vice-Presidents of the Bank, which
underscores their status both as managerial employees
and confidential personnel of the Bank. It would be
incongruous for a Department Manager who, as already
stated, is usually a Vice-President, to be a member of the
same labor organization as his messenger or supervisory
account executives. It would be even more untenable and
dangerous for a Department Manager who usually is a
Vice-President, being a member of a labor union, to be
designated a union representative for purposes of
collective bargaining with the management of which he is a
part. I think the public respondent is correct in disqualifying
from membership in a labor union of supervisors, those #Footnotes 21 Records, pp. 112-115.
who are Department Managers and Assistant Managers.
1 Rollo, p. 33. 22 Rollo, p. 170.
I, therefore, vote for the affirmance in toto of public
respondent's decision of 23 March 1990 and order of 20 2 Id., p. 28. 23 Records, pp. 120-121.
April 1990.
3 Id., pp. 18-19. 24 Id., p. 265.

# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that
respondent Bank's Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers, being confidential employees of the Bank, are
disqualified from joining or assisting petitioner labor union
or joining, assisting or forming any other labor
organization, including a supervisor's union.
4 Id., pp. 103-106. 25 See Panday v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67664, 20 May 1992,
209 SCRA 122.
5 Id., pp. 112-113.
26 In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]; City of Manila v. Gomez,
6 Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. No. L-37251, 31 August 1981, 107 SCRA 98; Escribano v.
Laguesma, G.R. No. 101730, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA Avila, No. L-30375, 12 September 1978, 85 SCRA 245;
452. Go Chico v. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 [1923]; Gatchalian v.
COMELEC, No. L-32560, 22 October 1970, 35 SCRA 435;
7 Decision of public respondent Secretary of Labor People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 [1957]; People v.
promulgated 23 March 1990, Annex "B," Petition; Rollo, Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 [1949].
pp. 24-26.
27 G.R. No. 88979, 7 February 1992, 206 SCRA 65, and
8 Records, p. 111. cited cases therein.

However, I dissent from its conclusion that respondent 9 Id., p. 94. 28 G.R. No. 74425, 7 October 1986, 144 SCRA 628, 635.
Bank's Department Managers and Department Assistant
Managers are not disqualified from joining a labor union 10 Id., pp. 91-92. 29 Alcantara, Samson S., Philippine Labor and Social
including a supervisors' union. My years of experience in Legislation Annotated, 1991 Ed., p. 455.
the banking industry (perhaps irrelevant to this case) have 11 Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. Trajano,
shown that positions of such Department Heads G.R. No. 75039, 28 January 1988, 157 SCRA 416. 30 Pascual, Crisolito, Labor Relations Law, 1986 ed., p.
(Managers) are as confidential, if not more, than the 159.
position of Branch Managers. In fact, most of such 12 Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) v.
Department Heads are Vice-Presidents of the Bank, which Calleja, G.R. No. 80882, 24 April 1989, 172 SCRA 676. 31 G.R. No. 78755, 19 July 1989, 175 SCRA 471.
underscores their status both as managerial employees
and confidential personnel of the Bank. It would be 13 See Batongbacal v. Associated Bank, G.R. No. 72977, 32 G.R. No. 88957, 25 June 1992, 210 SCRA 339.
incongruous for a Department Manager who, as already 21 December 1988, 168 SCRA 600.
stated, is usually a Vice-President, to be a member of the
same labor organization as his messenger or supervisory 14 Records, pp. 249-250. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
account executives. It would be even more untenable and
dangerous for a Department Manager who usually is a 15 Rollo, pp. 201-203.
Vice-President, being a member of a labor union, to be Republic of the Philippines
designated a union representative for purposes of 16 Id., pp. 204-205. SUPREME COURT
collective bargaining with the management of which he is a Manila
part. I think the public respondent is correct in disqualifying 17 Id., pp. 206-207.
from membership in a labor union of supervisors, those THIRD DIVISION
who are Department Managers and Assistant Managers. 18 Id., p. 208.
G.R. No. 96663 August 10, 1999
I, therefore, vote for the affirmance in toto of public 19 Records, pp. 239-240.
respondent's decision of 23 March 1990 and order of 20 PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
April 1990. 20 Id., pp. 233-238. vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, MED-ARBITER
NAPOLEON V. FERNANDO & PEPSI-COLA
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-UOEF,
respondents,
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 103300 August 10, 1999
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND HON. CELENIO N. DAING, in his capacity as
Med-Arbiter Labor Regional Office No. X, Cagayan de Oro
City, CAGAYAN DE ORO PEPSI COLA SUPERVISORS
UNION (UOEF), respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
These are petitions for certiorari relating to three (3) cases
filed with the Med-Arbiter, to wit: MED ARB ROX Case No.
R100-9101-RU-002 for Certification Election filed by Pepsi
Cola Supervisors Union-UOEF (Union), MED ARB Case
No. R1000-9102-RU-008, Re: Petition to Set Aside,
Cancel and/or Revoke the Charter Affiliation of the Union,
and MED-ARB ROX Case No. R1000-9104-RU-012, for
Cancellation of Registration Certificate No. 11492-LC in
favor of the Union.
G. R. No. 96663
The facts that matter can be culled as follows:
Sometime in June 1990, the Pepsi-Cola Employees
Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification
election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive
bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines,
Inc. (PEPSI).
On July 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the Petition,
with the explicit statement that it was an affiliate of Union
de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (federation) together
with two (2) rank and file unions. Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity
(PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the
Philippines (PEUP).
On July 23, 1990, PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor
Relations a petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke
Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PCPPI v. PCEU-
UOEF and docketed as Case No. 725-90, on the grounds
that (a) the members of the Union were managers and (b)
a supervisors' union can not affiliate with a federation
whose members include the rank and file union of the
same company.
On August 29, 1990, PEPSI presented a motion to re-open
the case since it was not furnished with a copy of the
Petition for Certification Election.
On September 4, 1990, PEPSI submitted its position paper
to the BLR in Case No. 725-90.
On September 21, 1990, PEPSI received summons to
appear at the pre-trial conference set on September 25,
1990 but which the hearing officer rescheduled on October
21, 1990.1âwphi1.nêt
On October 12, 1990, PEPSI filed a Notice of Appeal and
Memorandum of Appeal with the Secretary of Labor,
questioning the setting of the certification election on the
said date and five (5) days after. It also presented an
urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Suspend the Certification
Election, which motion was granted on October 18, 1990.
On November 12, 1990, the Secretary of Labor denied the
appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. Even as the
Petition to Cancel, Revoke and Suspend Union Charter
Certificate was pending before the BLR, PEPSI found its
way to this Court via the present petition for certiorari.
On February 6, 1991, the Court granted the prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.
The pivot of inquiry here is: whether or not a supervisors'
union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two
(2) rank and file unions are likewise members, without
violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as
amended, by Republic Act 6715, which provides:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any
labor organization; right of supervisory employees. —
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or
form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall
not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of
the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own.
In its Comment dated March 19, 1991, the Federation
argued that:
The pertinent portion of Article 245 of the Labor Code
states that. "Supervisory employees shall not be eligible
for membership in a labor organization of the rank and file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organization of their own.
This provision of law does not prohibit a local union
composed of supervisory employees from being affiliated
to a federation which has local unions with rank-and-file
members as affiliates.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the Petition to Cancel, Revoke or Set Aside the Charter
Certificate of the private respondent is anchored on the
alleged ground that certain managerial employees are
included as members thereof. The grounds for the
cancellation of the registration certificate of a labor
organization are provided in Section 7 of Rule II, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, and the
inclusion of managerial employees is not one of the
grounds. . . . (in this case, the private respondent herein)
remains to be a legitimate labor organization.1
On April 8, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, sent in a
Comment, alleging inter alia, that:
. . . under Article 259 of the New Labor Code, only orders
of the Med-Arbiter can be appealed through the Secretary
of Labor and only on the ground that the rules and
regulations for the conduct of the certification election have
been violated. The Order of the Representation Officer is
"interlocutory" and not appealable. . . .
. . . until and unless there is a final order cancelling its
certificate of registration or charter certificate, a labor
organization remains to be a legitimate labor organization
entitled to exercised all the rights and duties accorded to it
by the Labor Code including the right to be certified as a
bargaining representative. . . .
. . . Public respondent cannot be deemed to have
committed grave abuse of discretion with respect to an
issue that was never presented before it for resolution. . . .
Art. 245 of the New Labor Code does not preclude the
supervisor's union and the rank-and-file union from being
affiliated with the same federation.
xxx xxx xxx
A federation of local union is not the labor organization
referred to in Article 245 but only becomes entitled to all
the rights enjoyed by the labor organization (at the
company level) when it has complied with the registration
requirements found in Articles 234 and 237. Hence, what
is prohibited by Article 245 is membership of supervisory
employees in a labor union (at the company level) of the
rank and file. . . .
. . . In other words, the affiliation of the supervisory
employee's union with the same federation with which the
rank and file employees union is affiliated did not make the
supervisory employees members of the rank and file
employee's union and vice versa.2 . . .
PEPSI, in its Reply dated May 7, 1991, asserted:
It is our humble contention that a final determination of the
Petition to Set-Aside, Cancel, Revoke Charter Union
Affiliation should first be disposed of before granting the
Petition for the Conduct of Certification Election. To allow
the conduct of the certification election to proceed would
make any decision arrived at by the Bureau of Labor
Relations useless inasmuch as the same would
necessarily be rendered moot and academic.3
On June 7, 1991, petitioner again filed a Supplemental
Reply stressing:
It is likewise stressed that officials of both the PCLU and
PEUP are top ranking officers of UOEF, the federation of
supervisors' union, to wit:
POSITION IN RANK AND FILE POSITION IN
FEDERATION UNION
1. Rogelio de la Cruz PCLU-President General Vice
President
2. Felix Gatela PEUP-President General Treasurer
3. Carlito Epino PCLU Board Member Educational
Research Director
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent supervisory union could do indirectly what
it could not do directly as the simple expedient of affiliating
with UOEF would negate the manifest intent and letter of
the law that supervisory employees can only "join, assist or
form separate labor organizations of their own" and cannot
"be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the
rank and file employees."4
On August 6, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment filed a Rejoinder, claiming thus:
. . . an employer has no legal standing to question the
validity of a certification election.
. . . For this reason, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that, as a rule, a certification election is the sole and
exclusive concern of the employees and that the employer
is definitely an intruder or a mere bystander (Consolidated
Farms vs. Noriel, L-47752, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469;
Filipino Metals Corporation vs. Ople, L-43861, September
4, 1981, 107 SCRA 211; Trade Unions of the Philippines
and Allied Services (TUPAS) vs. Trajano No. L-61153,
January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64].
xxx xxx xxx
In Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. CIR No. L-35120,
January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 268, the Supreme Court
(then dealing with the interpretation of Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act, from which Section 245 of the Labor
Code was derived) grappled with the issue in the case at
bar. It held that,
There is nothing in the provisions of the Industrial Peace
Act which provides that a duly registered local union
affiliating with a national union or federation loses its legal
personality, or its independence.
xxx xxx xxx
However, there is absolutely nothing in the Labor Code
that prohibits a federation from representing or exercising
influence over its affiliates. On the contrary, this is
precisely the reason why federations are formed and are
allowed by law to exist.5
On November 8, 1991, the Union also filed a Rejoinder.
On December 9, 1991, the Court resolved to DISMISS the
case for "failure to sufficiently show that the questioned
judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion."
In a Resolution dated March 2, 1992, the Second Division
of the Court resolved to grant the motion for
reconsideration interposed on January 28, 1992.
G. R. No. 103300
What are assailed in this case is Med-Arbiter Order dated
May 23, 1991 and the Decision and Order of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment, dated October 4, 1991 and
December 12, 1991, respectively.
The decretal portion of the Med-Arbiter Order under attack,
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, an order is hereby
issued:
1. Dismissing MED ARB ROX CASE NO. R1000-919104-
RU-012 and R1000-9102-RU-008 for lack of merit; and
2. Ordering the conduct of a Certification Election to be
participated by and among the supervisory workers of the
respondent company, Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Inc. at its plant at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City, including
all the satellite warehouse within the territorial coverage
and control of the Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-Cola Plant. The
choices are as follows:
1. Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-Cola Supervisors Union
(U.O.E.P.)
2. No union.
The parties are directed to attend a pre-election
conference on June 10, 1991, 2:30 p.m. at the Regional
Office to determine the qualification of the voters and to
thresh out the mechanics of the election.
Respondent/employer is directed to submit five (5) copies
of the names of the rank and file workers taken from the
payroll on October 1-31, 1991; alphabetically arranged
(sic) indicating their names and positions and dates of
employment and to bring the aforementioned payroll
during the pre-election conference for verification
purposes.6 . . .
The supervisory employees of the Union are:
POSITION
1. Felipe Valdehueza Route Manager
2. Gerberto Vertudazo C & C Manager
3. Paul Mendoza Sales Service Department Manager
4. Gilberto Emano, Jr. Route Manager
5. Jaime Huliganga Chief Checker
6. Elias Edgama, Sr. Accounting Manager
7. Romanico Ramos Route Manager
8. Raul Yacapin Route Manager
9. Jovenal Albaque Route Manager
10. Fulvio Narciso Route Manager
11. Apolinario Opiniano Route Manager
12. Alfredo Panas Route Manager
13. Simplicio Nelie Route Manager
14. Arthur Rodriguez Route Manager
15. Marco Ilano Warehouse Operations Manager and
16. Deodoro Ramos Maintenance Manager
On June 6, 1991, PEPSI appealed the said Order to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, docketed as Case No. OS-A-
232-91.
On October 4, 1991, the Secretary modified the appealed
decision, ruling thus:
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 23 May
1991 is hereby modified to the effect that MED ARB ROX
Case No. R1000-9104-RU-012 and R1000-9102-RU-008
are hereby referred to the Office of the Regional Director
which has jurisdiction over these cases. The call for
certification election among the supervisory workers of the
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. at its plant at Tin-ao,
Cagayan de Oro City is hereby sustained.7
On October 19, 1991, PEPSI presented a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid Order but the same was
denied on December 12, 1991.
Meanwhile, the BLR issued Registration Certificate No.
11492-LC in favor of the Union. Dissatisfied therewith,
PEPSI brought the instant petition for certiorari, contending
that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S OFFICERS AND MEMBERS ARE NOT
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES;
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS PROHIBITED FROM
AFFILIATING ITSELF WITH A FEDERATION ALREADY
AFFILIATED WITH THE RANK AND FILE UNION;
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE OF (SIC)
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE
INSTITUTION OF A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
UNION REGISTRATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO A PETITION
CERTIFICATION ELECTION.8
The petitions must fail for want of merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that on September 1,
1992, there was a Resolution of the Union withdrawing
from the Federation, to wit:
BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, that this
UNION WITHDRAW, as it hereby WITHDRAWS its
affiliation from the Union de Obreros Estivadores de
Filipinas, and at the same time, give our thanks to the said
federation for its help and guidance rendered to this Union
in the past.9
The issue in G.R. No. 96663, whether or not the
supervisors union can be affiliated with a Federation with
two (2) rank and file unions directly under the supervision
of the former, has thus become moot and academic in
view of the Union's withdrawal from the federation.
In a long line of cases (Narciso Nakpil, et. al., vs. Hon.
Crisanto Aragon, et. al., G.R. No. L-24087, January 22,
1980, 95 SCRA 85; Toribio v. Bidin, et. al., G.R. No. L-
37960, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 361; Gumaua v.
Espino, G.R. No. L-36188 — 37586 February 29, 1980, 96
SCRA 402), the Court dismissed the petition for being
moot and academic. In the case of F. C. Fisher v. Yangco
Steamship Co., March 31, 1915, the Court held:
It is unnecessary, however to indulge in academic
discussion of a moot question. . . .
. . . The action would have been dismissed at any time on
a showing of the facts as they were. The question left for
the court was a moot one. Its Resolution would have been
useless. Its judgment would have been impossible of
execution . . . .
However, in the case of University of San Agustin, Inc., et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the court resolved the case,
ruling that "even if a case were moot and academic, a
statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the
resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the
parties but of others similarly situated. . . .10
In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, 205
SCRA 121 [1992] decided by the Third Division with J.
Gutierrez, Jr., as ponente and JJ. Feliciano, Bidin, Romero
and now Chief Justice Davide, Jr., as members it was
ratiocinated:
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where
supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where
the supervisors' labor organization would represent
conflicting interests, then a local supervisors' union should
not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of
union of rank-and-file employees where that federation
actively participates in union activity in the company.
xxx xxx xxx
The prohibition against a supervisors' union joining a local
union of rank and file is replete with jurisprudence. The
Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a
case of supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file union.
The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union
applying for membership in a national federation the
members of which include local unions of rank and file
employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where,
as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling
with those employees whom they directly supervise in their
own bargaining unit.
Anent the issue of whether or not the Petition to
cancel/revoke registration is a prejudicial question to the
petition for certification election, the following ruling in the
case of Association of the Court of Appeals Employees
(ACAE) vs. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, in her capacity as
Director, Bureau of Labor Relations et. Al., 203 ACRA 597,
598, [1991], is in point, to wit:
. . . It is a well-settled rule that "a certification proceedings
is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily
understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and
fact finding character." (Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v.
Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Corporation v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451
[1990]. Thus, the technical rules of evidence do not apply if
the decision to grant it proceeds from an examination of
the sufficiency of the petition as well as a careful look into
the arguments contained in the position papers and other
documents.
At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly
followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a
certification election is proper despite the pendency of the
petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the
respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time
the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal
personality to perform such act absent an order directing
the cancellation.
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the issue of whether or not confidential
employees can join the labor union of the rank and file,
what was held in the case of National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU) — Republic Planters Bank Supervisors
Chapter vs. Hon. R. D. Torres, et. al., G.R. No. 93468,
December 29, 1994, applies to this case. Citing Bulletin
Publishing Corporation vs. Sanchez, 144 SCRA 628, 635,
Golden Farms vs. NLRC, 175 SCRA 471, and Pier 8
Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Hon. Nieves
Roldan-Confessor et al., G.R. No. 110854, February 14,
1995, the Court ruled:
. . . A confidential employee is one entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody,
handling, or care and protection of the employer's
property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out
managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary
implication, confidential employees are similarly
disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed, as elucidated in several case; the latest of
which is Chua v. Civil Service Commission where we said:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details
involved in its application. There is always an omission that
may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the
time of the enactment, to be an all embracing legislation
maybe inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of
the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to
fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication . . .,
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all
such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly
and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis . .
. report to their respective superior. The mere fact that an
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took
into consideration the rationale behind the disqualification
of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing
Corporation v. Sanchez, thus ". . . if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union,
the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union
in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also
become company — dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership." Stated
differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the
employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that
its interest are well protected. The employer is not assured
of such protection if these employees themselves are
union members. Collective bargaining in such a situation
can become one-sided. It is the same reason that impelled
this Court to consider the position of confidential
employees as included in the disqualification found in Art.
245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees
were written in the provision. If confidential employees
could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for
themselves, then they could be governed by their own
motives rather than the interest of the employers.
Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the
purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension
of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to
act "in the interest of" the employers. It is not farfetched
that in the course of collective bargaining, they might
jeopardize that interest which they are duty bound to
protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in
Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja reiterated in Philips
Industrial Development, Inc., NLRC, that "confidential
employees such as accounting personnel, radio and
telegraph operators who, having access to confidential
information, may become the source of undue advantage.
Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to
a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court finds merit in the submission of the OSG that
Route Managers, Chief Checkers and Warehouse
Operations Managers are supervisors while Credit &
Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly
confidential employees. Designation should be reconciled
with the actual job description of subject employees. A
careful scrutiny of their job description indicates that they
don't lay down company policies. Theirs is not a final
determination of the company policies since they have to
employee is designated manager does not necessarily
make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd
situation where one can be given the title just to be
deprived of the right to be a member of a union. In the
case of National Steel Corporation v. Laguesma, G.R. No.
103743, January 29, 1996, it was stressed that:
What is essential is the nature of the employee's function
and not the nomenclature or title given to the job which
determines whether the employee has rank and file or
managerial status, or whether he is a supervisory
employee.
WHEREFORE, the petitions under consideration are
DISMISSED but subject Decision, dated October 4, 1991,
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is MODIFIED in
that Credit and Collection Managers and Accounting
Managers are highly confidential employees not eligible for
membership in a supervisors' union. No pronouncement as
to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Footnotes
1 Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Employees Organization —
UOEF, Comment, pp. 4-6, Rollo, pp. 71-73.
2 Rollo, pp. 86-89, 92.
3 Rollo, p. 104.

4 Rollo, p. 110.
5 Rejoinder, pp. 2, 3, 10, 14; Rollo, pp. 125, 126, 133, 137.
6 OSG Comment, pp. 3-4, Rollo, pp. 145-146.
7 OSG Comment, p. 5, Rollo, p. 147.
8 Petition, pp. 8, 13, 14; Rollo, pp. 9, 14, 15.
In the realm of business and industry, we note that
"project" could refer to one or the other of at least two (2)
distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a project could
refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the
regular or usual business of the employer company, but
which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such,
from the other undertakings of the company. Such job or
undertaking begins and ends at determined or
determinable times. The typical example of this first type of
project is a particular construction job or project of a
construction company. A construction company ordinarily
carries out two or more discrete identifiable construction
projects: e.g., a twenty-five- storey hotel in Makati; a
residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a
domestic air terminal in Iloilo City. Employees who are
hired for the carrying out of one of these separate projects,
the scope and duration of which has been determined and
made known to the employees at the time of employment,
are properly treated as "project employees," and their
services may be lawfully terminated at completion of the
project.
The term "project" could also refer to, secondly, a
particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular
business of the corporation. Such a job or undertaking
must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the
ordinary or regular business operations of the employer.
The job or undertaking also begins and ends at
determined or determinable times. The case at bar
presents what appears to our mind as a typical example of
this kind of "project."
NSC undertook the ambitious Five Year Expansion
Program I and II with the ultimate end in view of expanding
the volume and increasing the kinds of products that it may
offer for sale to the public. The Five Year Expansion
Program had a number of component projects: e.g., (a) the
setting up of a "Cold Rolling Mill Expansion Project"; (b)
the establishment of a "Billet Steel-Making Plant" (BSP);
(c) the acquisition and installation of a "Five Stand TDM";
and (d) the "Cold Mill Peripherals Project." 8 Instead of
contracting out to an outside or independent contractor the
tasks of constructing the buildings with related civil and
electrical works that would house the new machinery and
equipment, the installation of the newly acquired mill or
plant machinery and equipment and the commissioning of
such machinery and equipment, NSC opted to execute
and carry out its Five Yeear Expansion Projects "in house,"
as it were, by administration. The carrying out of the Five
Year Expansion Program (or more precisely, each of its
component projects) constitutes a distinct undertaking
identifiable from the ordinary business and activity of NSC.
Each component project, of course, begins and ends at
specified times, which had already been determined by the
time petitioners were engaged. We also note that NSC did
the work here involved — the construction of buildings and
civil and electrical works, installation of machinery and
equipment and the commissioning of such machinery —
only for itself. Private respondent NSC was not in the
business of constructing buildings and installing plant
machinery for the general business community, i.e., for
unrelated, third party, corporations. NSC did not hold itself
out to the public as a construction company or as an
engineering corporation.
Which ever type of project employment is found in a
particular case, a common basic requisite is that the
designation of named employees as "project employees"
and their assignment to a specific project, are effected and
implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of
evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.
Thus, the particular component projects embraced in the
Five Year Expansion Program, to which petitioners were
assigned, were distinguishable from the regular or ordinary
business of NSC which, of course, is the production or
making and marketing of steel products. During the time
petitioners rendered services to NSC, their work was
limited to one or another of the specific component
projects which made up the FAYEP I and II. There is
nothing in the record to show that petitioners were hired
for, or in fact assigned to, other purposes, e.g., for
operating or maintaining the old, or previously installed
and commissioned, steel-making machinery and
equipment, or for selling the finished steel products.
We, therefore, agree with the basic finding of the NLRC
(and the Labor Arbiter) that the petitioners were indeed
"project employees:"
It is well established by the facts and evidence on record
that herein 13 complainants were hired and engaged for
specific activities or undertaking the period of which has
been determined at time of hiring or engagement. It is of
public knowledge and which this Commission can safely
take judicial notice that the expansion program (FAYEP) of
respondent NSC consist of various phases [of] project
components which are being executed or implemented
independently or simultaneously from each other . . .
In other words, the employment of each "project worker" is
dependent and co-terminous with the completion or
termination of the specific activity or undertaking [for
which] he was hired which has been pre-determined at the
time of engagement. Since, there is no showing that they
(13 complainants) were engaged to perform work-related
activities to the business of respondent which is steel-
making, there is no logical and legal sense of applying to
them the proviso under the second paragraph of Article
280 of the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
The present case therefore strictly falls under the definition
of "project employees" on paragraph one of Article 280 of
the Labor Code, as amended. Moreover, it has been held
that the length of service of a project employee is not the
controlling test of employment tenure but whether or not
"the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee". (See Hilario Rada v. NLRC, G.R. No. 96078,
January 9, 1992; and Sandoval Shipping, Inc. v. NLRC,
136 SCRA 674 (1985). 9
Petitioners next claim that their service to NSC of more
than six (6) years should qualify them as regular
employees. We believe this claim is without legal basis.
The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as
project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does
not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project
employees. 10 The second paragraph of Article 280 of the
Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee
who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be
considered a regular employee, relates to casual
employees, not to project employees.
In the case of Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 11 this Court ruled that the proviso in the
second paragraph of Article 280 relates only to casual
employees and is not applicable to those who fall within
the definition of said Article's first paragraph, i.e., project
employees. The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso
is to be construed with reference to the immediately
preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and
not to other sections thereof, unless the clear legislative
intent is to restrict or qualify not only the phrase
immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier
provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a
whole. No such intent is observable in Article 280 of the
Labor Code, which has been quoted earlier.
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for
Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Resolutions of the NLRC dated 8 January 1993 and 15
February 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes
1 NLRC Resolution, 8 January 1993, p. 7; Rollo, p. 75.
2 Petition for Certiorari, 7 May 1993, pp. 3-11, Rollo, pp. 4-
12.
3 NLRC Decision, 7 June 1991, Rollo, pp. 48-49;
underscoring and brackets supplied.
4 Petition for Certiorari, 7 May 1993, p. 15; Rollo, p. 16.
5 Beta Electric Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 182 SCRA 380 (1990); Cartagenas v.
Romago Electric Co., Inc., 177 SCRA 637 (1989);
Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 136 SCRA 674 (1985).
6 Articles 281-286, Labor Code, as amended.
7 Fortunato Mercado, Sr., et al. v. NLRC, et al. 201 SCRA
332 (1991); Philippine National Construction Corp. v.
NLRC, 174 SCRA 191 (1989); Sandoval Shipping, Inc. v.
NLRC, 136 SCRA 674 (1985); Ochoco v. NLRC, 120
SCRA 774 (1983).
8 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 3-11; Rollo, pp. 4-12. NLRC
Resolution of 8 January 1993, pp. 7-13; Rollo, pp. 75-81.
9 NLRC Decision, Rollo, pp. 65-66.
10 Rada v. National Labor Relations Commission, 205
SCRA 69 (1992).
11 201 SCRA 332 (1991).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978
ISIDRO G. ARENAS, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL
OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN
POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO,
CATALINA B. CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO RAMOS,
FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN,
MARCELO LAPEÑA, LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and
TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official capacities as City
Mayor, City Vice Mayor, City Councilors and City
Treasurer, respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS CITY
(PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, respondents.
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner.
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at San Carlos City,
Branch X, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil
Case No. SCC-182. 1
In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San
Carlos City (Pangasinan), instituted against the City of San
Carlos (Pangasinan), City Council of San Carlos City and
the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer
of San Carlos City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is
the incumbent City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan,
that the respondent City of San Carlos, from the time of its
creation in 1966 up to the present, has been classified as
a third class city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which
became effective on June 21, 1969 provides that the basic
salaries of city judges of second and third class cities shall
be P18,000.00 per annum; that the petitioner was then
actually receiving a monthly salary of P1,000.00 of which
P350.00 was the share of the national government and
P650.00 is the share of the city government, which salary
was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a City
Judge of a third class city; that under Republic Act No.
5967, the difference between the salary actually being
received by a City Judge and the basic salary established
in said act shall be paid by the city government; that from
June 21, 1969 up to the filing of the petition on January 21,
1971, the petitioner was entitled to a salary differential of
P9,500.00 with the respondent City of San Carlos
(Pangasinan); that the petitioner had repeatedly requested
the respondents to enact the necessary budget and to pay
him the said differential but the respondents, without any
justification, whatsoever, refused and still refuse to do the
same; that it is the clear duty of the respondent to enact
the necessary budget providing for the payment of the
salary of the petitioner as provided for in Republic Act No.
5967; that petitioner has no other plain, adequate and
speedy remedy except the present action for mandamus;
and that because of the refusal of the respondent to
comply with their obligation as provided in Republic Act
No. 5967, the petitioner was forced to engage the services
of a lawyer to file this action for which he was to pay the
sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees. 2
In their answer dated February 10, 1971, the respondents
admitted and denied the allegations in the petition and
alleged that Republic Act No. 5967 further provides,
among other things, that the salary of the city judge shall
at least be one hundred pesos per month less than that of
a city mayor; that the city judge receives an annual salary
of P12,000.00 which is P100.00 per month less than the
salary being received by the city mayor which is
P13,200.00 yearly; that assuming the existence of a salary
difference, in view of the provision of Republic Act No.
5967, that the payment of the salary difference shall be
subject to the implementation of the respective city
government, which is discretionary on the part of the city
government as to whether it would or would not implement
the payment of the salary difference, and in view of the
financial difficulties of the city which has a big overdraft,
the payment of the salary difference of the city judge
cannot be made; and that the petitioner should pay his
lawyer and should not charge the attorney's fees to the
respondents who have not violated any rights of the
petitioner. 3
The Court of First Instance of San Carlos City
(Pangasinan), Branch X, rendered its decision dated May
31, 1971 dismissing the petition, without pronouncement
as to costs.
The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967
reads:
Sec. 7. Unless the City Charter or any special law
provides higher salary, the city judge in chartered cities
shall receive a basic salary which shall not be lower than
the sums as provided thereinbelow:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand
pesos per annum;
xxx xxx xxx
For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first
class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand
pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for
second and third class cities, the city judge shall receive
one thousand five hundred pesos less than that fixed for
the district judge, and for other cities, the city judge shall
receive two thousand pesos less than that fixed for the
district judge: Provided, however, That the salary of a city
judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per month less
than that of the city mayor.
The petitioner contends that "... if the last proviso of said
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967 would be interpreted
as the controlling measure for fixing the salary of the city
judges, then the principal provision of Section 7 fixing the
salaries of City Judges at rate very much higher than that
of a City Mayor (particularly in the case of second and third
class cities) would be rendered totally useless." The
petitioner submitted "that since the principal intention of
the legislature in enacting Section 7 of Republic Act 5967
is to increase the salary of the city judges, then the last
proviso of said Section 7 should give way to the provisions
of said section preceding said proviso."
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took
effect on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City (Pangasinan)
was a third class city; that the petitioner as city judge
received an annual salary of P12,000.00; and that the city
mayor of San Carlos City received an annual salary of
P13,200.00 which was exactly P100.00 a month more than
the salary of the city judge.
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No.
17046, which became Republic Act No. 5967, the following
discussion took place:
SENATOR GANZON — Because with the bill as drafted, I
recall that there will be some cities where the city judges
will receive salaries higher than those of the mayors. And
in all charters, Your Honor, the city judge is considered a
department head — theoretically, at least, under the
mayor. It would not be fair for the purposes of public
administration that a city department head should receive
a salary higher than that of the chief executive of the city.
SENATOR LAUREL. That point is very well taken, and I
would like to congratulate Your Honor.
SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understand the
concern of the distinguished gentleman from Davao. But in
this particular amendment prepared by the distinguished
lady from La Union, this will not require the council to pay it
at P100.00 exactly less than the salary of the mayor. It is
just the limit — the maximum — but they may fix it at much
less than that. That is why the words "at least" were
suggested by the Committee. It need not be exactly just
P100.00 less. It may be P500.00 less.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example
the cities of Iloilo, Cebu, Bacolod or Manila for that matter.
The Mayors are receiving at least P1,500 a month. Now,
under the amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva
Ecija and
Davao — which has already been accepted by the
sponsor — does it mean that if the salary of the city mayor
is P1,500, the city judges will receive P1,400?
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR ANTONINO — I would like to call his attention
to lines 13 to 20. We presented this amendment because it
says here: "For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and
other first class cities, the city judge shall receive one
thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge".
So it will happen, and my attention was called by the
gentlemen from Iloilo — that the city judge win be receiving
more salary than the city mayor. Hence the amendment,
Mr. President.
xxx xxx xxx
I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas,
and this was their objection. We have proposed this
amendment to at least solve this problem, so that no city
judge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So they
will be receiving less than what is proposed in this Bill.
(Vol. IV, No. 61, Senate Congressional Records, pages
2773-2787. (Emphasis supplied .) 4
It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the
intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 5967
was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher
than the salary of the city mayor. The saving clause
"Provided, however, That the salary of a city judge shall be
at least P100.00 per month less than that of the city
mayor" qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary
of city judges for second and third class cities at
P18,000.00 per annum.
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general
language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable
repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the
statute the former is given precedence over the latter on
the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of
the legislature.
Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) was receiving an annual salary of
P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelled to
provide for an annual salary of P18,000.00 for the
petitioner as city judge of the said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed
and the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman) Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-24.
2 Annex "B" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 25-30.
3 Annex "C" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 31-32.
4 Answer, Rollo, pp. 41-42.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43182 November 25, 1986
MARCIAL F. SAMSON, City Mayor of Caloocan City, THE
CITY TREASURER, THE CITY AUDITOR, both of
Caloocan City, and HERMOGENES LIWAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CFI-RIZAL
and FELICIANO C. TALENS, respondents.
Hermenegildo V. Lopez and Amado B. Cresini, Jr. for
petitioners.
Dominador G. Magno for private respondent.
ALAMPAY, J.:
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is the legality of
Administrative Order No. 3, issued on January 10, 1972,
by the then mayor Marcial F. Samson, of Caloocan City,
one of the petitioners herein, whereby petitioner mayor
summarily terminated the services of the private
respondent, Feliciano C. Talens, who held the position of
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, on the ground of "lack
and loss of confidence" and appointing in place of the
latter Hermogenes Liwag, a co-petitioner in this case.
Cited in support of the challenged administrative order is
section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as
the Civil Service Act of 1959, as amended. The above-
cited provision declares the position of secretaries to city
mayors non-competitive and this was interpreted by herein
petitioner Mayor as to include the position of Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor.
In a resolution dated October 29, 1982, this Court granted
the motion of the widow of private respondent to substitute
the heirs of private respondent Feliciano C. Talens in place
of respondent, in view of the latter's death on August 28,
1982.
There is no dispute as to the factual antecedents of this
case. Private respondent Feliciano C. Talens, a civil
service eligible, was appointed on March 16, 1970 by then
City Mayor Macario Asistio of Caloocan City, as Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor. His appointment was attested to
as a permanent one under Section 24(b) of Republic Act
No. 2260, as amended by the Commissioner of Civil
Service. He performed the duties of Assistant Secretary to
the Mayor and even twice received increases in salary.
On January 11, 1972, City Mayor Marcial F. Samson, who
succeeded City Mayor Macario Asistio, furnished private
respondent herein with the questioned Administrative
Order No. 3, which is hereunder reproduced:
TO: Mr. Feliciano C. Talens
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor
Caloocan City
Pursuant to the provision of Sec. 5 (f) of R.A. No.2260,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, as
amended, making the positions of Secretaries of City
Mayors, among others, non-competitive, and it being the
inherent nature of your position to be primarily and highly
confidential, you are hereby informed and advised that
effective the closing hours of January 10, 1972, your
services as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are hereby
TERMINATED for lack and loss of confidence.
You are therefore directed to turnover all official
documents, papers and all other government records to
Atty. Casiano P. Anunciacion, Jr.
(SGD.) MARCIAL F. SAMSON City Mayor (Rollo, p. 20)
Private respondent acknowledging receipt of said order
demurred on the ground Sec. 5(f) of the Civil Service Law,
which specifies as non-competitive only the positions of
"secretaries of provincial city and municipal boards and
councils." He asked that the administrative order be
recalled as he was permanently appointed to a classified
position in the city government and that in accordance with
Section 32 of the Civil hat his position as Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor was not covered by Sec. Service
Law, he can be removed only for cause and after due
process has been observed.
On January 17, 1972, petitioner Mayor, in a letter-reply
sent to private respondent, declined to recall
Administrative Order No. 3, reiterating the reasons set
forth in the order. Consequently, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto was filed with the
then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City on January
21, 1972 by the private respondent in order to annul the
disputed administrative order, to enjoin the petitioner
mayor, treasurer and auditor from enforcing the same, and
to compel all the said public officials to pay to private
respondent the salaries and emoluments due to him as
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor. He also sought the,
ouster from the disputed position of Hermogenes Liwag,
one of the petitioners herein, who was appointed by Mayor
Samson as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, in place of
private respondent.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the plaintiff
Feliciano C. Talens, by declaring Administrative Order No.
3 null and void, and granting all the aforestated reliefs
claimed by Feliciano C. Talens. On Appeal of the siad
judgment to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed. Hence the petition.
According to petitioners, the only issue which this Court
has to resolve is the legality of the termination private
respondent Talens' services as assistant secretary to the
Mayor of Caloocan City (Petitioners' Brief, p. 4).
Petitioners' contention is that the termination of private
respondent's services is authorized by Section 5(f) of
Republic Act No. 2260, as amended by Republic Act No.
6040 which declares the position of Secretaries of City
Mayors as belonging to the non-competitive service.
Petitioners further aver that termination of the services of
private respondent Talens is justified by the fact that the
disputed position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor is
inherently and primarily highly confidential in nature.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6040 provides that "That non-competitive
service shall be composed of positions expressly declared
by law to be in the non-competitive service and those
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical in nature" and continues with an
enumeration of specific officers and employees embraced
within the scope of non-competitive service. Among those
included in the enumeration are heads of departments
created in charters of cities and secretaries of provincial
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors.
Although the position of assistant secretary to the city
mayor is not among those expressly declared in Section 5
of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, to be within the
non-competitive service, petitioners, however, argue that
an assistant secretary is also a secretary, and thus
comprised within the general term "secretaries" as
provided for in Section 5(f).
We are not persuaded and find unacceptable such
submission of the herein petitioners. As may be noted, the
general purpose of the Civil Service Law (Republic Act No.
2260) is "to insure and promote the consitutional mandate
regarding appointment only according to merit and fitness,
and to provide within the public service a progressive
system of personal administration to insure the
maintenance of an honest and efficient progressive and
courteous civil service in the Philippines." (Section 2, R.A.
2260).
As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions
and instrumentalities of the governmentalities of the
government, including those in government owned or
controlled corporations, belong to the competitive service.
The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law
to be in the non-competitive service and those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
in nature. (Section 3, R.A. 2260, as amended by R.A. No.
6040).
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule
is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not
curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication ...
(Francisco, Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J.,
Section 643, pp. 1092-1093, emphasis supplied).
Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on
which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding
from its effects all those not expressly mentioned (Martin,
Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., p. 71 citing Dave's Place
vs. Liquor Control Comm., 269 N.W., p, 504).
The exceptions provided for in Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 2260, as amended should be, therefore, strictly
construed. It follows then that on this general governing
principle, the position of assistant secretary to the City
Mayor of Caloocan City should be considered as
belonging to the non-competitive service.
The parties are agreed that the nature of the functions
attaching to officer position ultimately determines whether
such position is policy-detrermining, primarily confidential
or higly technical. It is the nature of the position which
finally determines a position to be primarily confidential
(Leon A. Pinero, et al. vs. Rufino Hechanova, et al., 18
SCRA 421). Stated differently, it is not the powers and
duties exercised and discharged by the Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor as may be delegated and assigned
by the Mayor that makes the position of Assistant
Secretary primarily confidential. While duties possibly
involving confidential matters are sometimes handled by
the Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, this does not
necessarily transform the nature of the position itself as
one that is primarily and highly confidential.
It should be stressed that the position of Secretary to the
Mayor and that of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are two
separate and distinct positions. While both individuals may
be called "secretary," nevertheless, one is certainly of a
higher category and rank than the other with the added
distinction that a Secretary must enjoy the confidence of
the Mayor. However, the position of Assistant Secretary
being of a lower rank, need not carry the requisites
attaching to the primarily confidential position of the actual
Secretary to the Mayor.
Moreover, if it was the intention of Congress to include the
Assistant Secretaries within the purview of Section 5(f) of
R.A. No. 2260, as amended, so that Assistant Secretaries
are also embraced in the non-competitive service, the law
could have been easily worded "secretaries and their
assistance."
Petitioners also contend that an assistant secretary is also
a secretary and thus included in the general term
"secretaries as provided for in Section 5(f) in the above-
quoted provision. From this premise, the conclusion drawn
by petitioners is that the position of Assistant Secretary to
the Mayor should be considered as in the non-competitive
service and that the tenure of assistant secretary lasts only
as long as the Mayor's confidence in him remains.
Petitioners' submission is that the assistant secretary is no
less a secretary to the mayor.
We are not disposed to agree with petitioners. What
petitioners fail to consider is that an "assistant secretary,"
although described as secretary, technically differs in
function from the "Secretaries." An "assistant" merely
helps, aids or serves in a subordinate capacity to the
person who is actually clothed with all the duties and
responsibilities of "secretary." Needless to say, the
functions strictly attributable to a "secretary" and which
w•uld repose on such person the trust and confidence of
the employer, is not automatically vested or transferred to
an "assistant secretary," because the latter simply assists
or aids the former in the accomplishment of his duties.
The rulings of this Court in De Los Santos vs. Mallare, 87
Phil. 289 and Besa vs. PNB, 33 SCRA 330 which have
been invoked by the petitioners do not provide support to
petitioners' case. The aforestated cases have no parallel to
the case at bar. The case of De los Santos vs. Mallare,
relates to a quo warranto proceeding, questioning the
legality of the appointment of the respondent therein to the
office of the City Engineer for the City of Baguio which
petitioner De los Santos was then occupying. Said position
was in fact declared to be neither primarily confidential,
policy-determining, nor highly technical and petitioner
therein was adjudged to be entitled to remain in office and
the respondent's appointment was declared ineffective.
Neither would the other case of Besa vs. PNB find any
application to the instant case because the position therein
involved was that of Chief Legal Counsel which, by its very
nature, was rightfully ruled to be both impressed with a
highly technical aspect and confidential character. It can
be readily noted that the facts and circumstances in the
present case and even the principal issue involved in the
case at bar are distinctly different from the cases cited by
petitioners.
More pertinent and relevant are the pronouncements in
Ingles vs. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 177. wherein We stated:
. . . . On the contrary, the compensation attached and the
designation given thereto suggest the purely, or, at least,
mainly clerical nature of their work. The fact that they, at
times, handle 'confidential matters' does not suffice to
characterize their 'positions' as primarily confidential.
Indeed, it is admitted that plaintiffs, likewise, handle 'other
routine matters,' and it has not even been shown that their
work is, at least, principally confidential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED but considering the notice of death given to
this Court of the death of the herein private respondent
Feliciano C. Talens, on August 28, 1982 (Rollo, p. 184),
the dispositive portion of the subject decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. C-2308, is hereby MODIFIED, to
now read as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of Petitioner
Feliciano C. Talens, and against the Respondents, and
1) Declaring Administrative Order No. 3, dated January
10, 1972, of Respondent City Mayor Marcial F. Samson,
null and void;
2) Ordering Respondents, except private respondent
Hermogenes Liwag, to pay Petitioner Feliciano C. Talens,
all the salaries and emoluments appurtenant to and due to
the latter as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of Caloocan
City, but for a limited period of three years. Without costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32293 January 24, 1974
ROBERTO OCAMPO, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO BUENAVENTURA, JOSE VASQUEZ,
ADOLFO BELDEROL, POTENCIANO ADOBAS, JR., and
JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, respondents.
Rafael D. de la Victoria for petitioner.
Seno, Mendoza and Associates for respondents.
ESGUERRA, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul the
order dated June 1, 1970, of respondent Judge Hon.
Mateo Canonoy, then of Branch III, Court of First Instance
of Cebu, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or
suspend the trial of its Civil Case No. R-11320, entitled
"Fernando Buenaventura, et al. v. Roberto Ocampo",
including the order denying his motion for reconsideration
thereof. Petitioner further prays this Court to make
permanent the preliminary injunction issued on October 9,
1970, restraining respondent Judge from further
proceeding with Civil Case No. R-11320.
The records of this case establish the following facts:
On September 11, 1966, respondents Fernando
Buenaventura, Jose Vasquez, Adolfo Belderol and
Potenciano Adobes, Jr., all members of the Cebu Police
Department, arrested and detained in the City Jail of Cebu,
Edgar Ocampo (petitioner's son) and Paul, Jade, Cesar
and Julius, all surnamed Ocampo (his nephews), together
with one George Namok (a friend of the Ocampo boys), all
minors, for an alleged violation of Section 1 of Ordinance
No. 345 which amended Ordinance No. 228 fixing curfew
hours. This Ordinance penalizes the "wandering,
sauntering or loitering of minors in any street, wood or
alley." Pursuant to said arrest, the City Fiscal of Cebu filed
an information in the city court and the minors were
convicted for violation of the said ordinance. On appeal to
the Court of First Instance, however, Judge Tantuico, on
March 3, 1969, noting the exception under Section 3 of
Ordinance 228 which provides:
The provisions of Section 1 hereof shall not be applicable
to minors attending or participating in, or going home from,
purely scholastic functions, commencement exercises,
convocations, educational and religious programs or in
wholesome and decent assemblage, and during yuletide
masses, New Year's eve and Holy Week cults, during the
hours mentioned therein.
acquitted the accused minors, ruling that since they came
from a birthday party considered as a wholesome and
decent assemblage, the minors fell within the exception
and committed no violation of the ordinance in question.
Meanwhile, petitioner Roberto Ocampo on September 19,
1966, filed a complaint with the City Mayor's office
charging the respondents policemen with serious
misconduct, grave abuse of authority and commission of a
felony. On August 8, 1967, the Mayor issued
Administrative Order No. 157 exonerating the policemen.
On March 17, 1969, a complaint was lodged with the
Police Commission (POLCOM) for serious misconduct,
abuse of authority and commission of an act constituting a
felony, which administrative case is still pending up to the
present.
On June 4, 1969, respondents herein filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner. On May 22, 1970, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial of
the case on the merits on the following grounds: (1)
existence of a prejudicial question and (2) that the action is
premature. This motion was denied by respondent Judge
in an order dated June 1, 1970. The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof having been also denied, the
instant petition was filed.
In the meantime respondent Fernando Buenaventura died
and he was substituted herein by his widow, Guillerma
Cosca Buenaventura, and his heirs, Carlos, Cora, Eva
Araceli, Fernando, Jr., Rene Victor, Helen Grace, Flora
Vicente, and Jose Adolfo, all surnamed "Buenaventura".
The main question to be resolved is whether or not the
court a quo abused its discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss and/or suspend the trial of the case on
the merits. The first ground thereof (prejudicial question) is
entirely inapplicable. In accordance with Article 36 of the
Civil Code, a prejudicial question must be decided before
any criminal prosecution based on the same facts may
proceed.<äre||anº•1àw> There is no prejudicial question
here since there is no criminal prosecution involved, the
petitioner's case before the POLCOM being administrative
in nature and the respondents' case before the Court of
First Instance of Cebu is a simple civil suit for damages not
based on a crime but on alleged harassment by the
petitioner in charging them administratively before the City
Mayor and before the POLCOM. A careful consideration of
the record discloses that the principal issue in the
complaint for damages is the alleged malicious filing of the
administrative cases by the petitioner against the
policemen respondents. The determination of this question
is primarily dependent on the outcome of the
administrative case before the POLCOM. The
respondents' complaint for damages is based on their
claim that the administrative case filed against them before
the POLCOM is malicious, unfounded and aimed to harass
them. The veracity of this allegation is not for us to
determine, for if We rule and allow the civil case for
damages to proceed on that ground, there is the possibility
that the court a quo in deciding said case might declare
the respondents victims of harassment and thereby
indirectly interfere with the proceedings before the
POLCOM. The respondents' case for damages before the
lower court is, therefore, premature as it was filed during
the pendency of the administrative case against the
respondents before the POLCOM. The possibility cannot
be overlooked that the POLCOM may hand down a
decision adverse to the respondents, in which case the
damage suit will become unfounded and baseless for
wanting in cause of action. Of persuasive force is the ruling
in William H. Brown vs. Bank Of the Philippine Islands and
Santiago Freixas, 101 Phil. 309, 312, where this Court
said:
... In effect, plaintiff herein seeks to recover damages upon
the ground that the detainer case has been filed, and is
being maintained, maliciously and without justification; but
this pretense affects the merits of said detainer case.
Should final judgment be eventually rendered in that case
in favor of the plaintiffs therein, such the one rendered in
the municipal court, the validity of the cause of action said
lessors against Brown, would thereby be conclusively
established, and, necessarily, his contention in the present
case would have to be rejected. Similarly, we can, not
sustain the theory of Brown in the case at bar, without
prejudging the issue in the detainer case, which is still
pending: Until final determination of said case, plaintiff
herein cannot, and does not, have, therefore, a cause of
action — if any, on which we do not express our opinion —
against the herein defendants. In short, the lower court has
correctly held that the present action is premature and,
that, consequently, the complaint herein does not set for a
cause of action against the defendants.
On the ground that the suit for damages is premature, the
trial court, instead of denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
and/or suspend the trial on the merits, should have held
action thereon in abeyance pending determination of the
case before the POLCOM.
Respondents likewise plead res judicata to defeat this
action, contending that the administrative case before the
POLCOM should have been dismissed as it is barred by a
prior judgment — that embodied in the City Mayor's
Administrative Order No. 157 — exonerating herein
respondents policemen. The argument is devoid of merit.
A review of the essential requisites of res judicata, 1 viz:
(1) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (2) the
former judgment must be final; (3) it must be a judgment
on the merits; (4) there must be between the 1st and 2nd
actions [a] identity of parties; [b] identity of subject matter;
and [c] identity of cause of action, exposes the glaring
weakness of respondents' contention. On the first requisite
alone, that of jurisdiction, respondents miserably failed to
meet the requirements of the rule invoked. The City Mayor
of Cebu was without jurisdiction to try, hear and decide
administrative cases either under Republic Act No. 557
(An Act Providing For the Suspension or Removal of the
Members of the Provincial Guards, City Police and
Municipal Police by the Provincial Governor, City Mayor Or
Municipal Mayor), or under Republic Act 4864 (An Act
Creating the Police Commission, Amending and Revising
the Laws Relative to the Local Police System, and For
Other Purposes). In Manuel v. De la Fuente, etc., et al., 2
this Court said: "Of course, it should not be understood
that the City Mayor, for the purpose of determining whether
he should exercise his power of suspension conferred by
Republic Act 557, may not conduct his own investigation;
but this inquiry cannot replace the investigation that should
be conducted under Republic Act No. 557 by the Municipal
Board and which should form the basis for final
administrative action or decision by said Board appealable
to the Commissioner of Civil Service." The Court further
said: "... the obvious innovations introduced by Republic
Act No. 557 lie in the fact that the Municipal Board had
been granted the exclusive power to investigate, with the
Mayor being conferred only the power to prefer charges
against a member of the city police ...; that the Municipal
Board, not the Mayor, decides the case; and that the
decision may be appealed to the Commissioner of Civil
Service, instead of to the Secretary of the Interior." 3
(Emphasis Ours). The power to investigate and decide
administrative cases involving police service and
personnel has been transferred to the POLCOM.
In the motion to dismiss filed before the Board of
Investigators of the Police Commission, 4 respondents
alleged that the proceedings in the city mayor's office
cannot be attacked, invoking for the purpose Section 26 of
the Police Commission Act, to wit:
Section 26. Saving Clause.— All pending administrative
cases involving police service and personnel shall be
absorbed by the Police Commission one hundred days
after the publication of the Police Manual containing rules
and regulations relative to such matters.
The trust of their argument is that the city mayor then had
jurisdiction because his decision was rendered on August
8, 1967, while the Police Manual was promulgated later on
December 30, 1967. But the ruling in Police Commission v.
Hon. Judge Eloy Bello,
et al. 5 where this Court had occasion to elucidate on the
"saving clause" of the POLCOM Act, is relevant to the
issue and disposes of the respondents' argument. This
Court said:
Section 26 of the Police Act is, as expressly stated therein,
a mere saving clause, and refers solely to the
administrative cases involving police service and
personnel which were pending at the time of the effectivity
of the Act.
The Police Commission was required to absorb the said
pending cases within 100 days after it shall have published
a Police Manual. The said Section 26 may not be
interpreted to mean that the Board of Investigators of each
city or municipality and the Police Commission could not
legally function to carry into effect the purposes of the Act
until after the lapse of the said 100 days, because Section
28 provides that '(t)his Act shall take effect upon its
approval.' Since the Act was approved on September 8,
1966, it became effective immediately on that date.
(Emphasis Ours.)
Lastly respondent Judge in his order in question dated
June 1, 1970, gave the following reason for denying the
motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial of the case
on the merits: "... considering that the said defendant has
already filed his answer, containing special defenses
embodying the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss
and/or suspension of the trial ..., the said motion to dismiss
and/or suspension of trial is hereby denied." The denial is
apparently predicated on the prior filing of an answer.
As a general rule a motion to dismiss is interposed before
the defendant pleads (Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court).
However, there is no rule or law prohibiting the defendant
from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been
filed. On the contrary, Section 2 of Rule 9, expressly
authorizes the filing of such motion at any stage of the
proceedings when it is based upon failure to state a cause
of action, 6 as in the case at bar where the complaint failed
to state a cause of action as alleged by petitioner in his
very motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial. The
respondent Judge therefore, erred in denying said motion.
The surrounding circumstance at the time of the filing of
said motion warranted suspension of the trial on the
merits.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from, dated June 1,
1970, denying the motion to dismiss and/or suspension of
the trial of the case on the merits, including the order
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, is hereby
set aside. The hearing of Civil Case R-11320 of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, shall be held in
abeyance pending determination of the administrative
case against the respondents before the POLCOM.
The Court's writ of preliminary injunction dated October 9,
1970, restraining respondent court from proceeding with
the damage suit against petitioner shall stand until the
POLCOM decides the said administrative case; if it is
decided adversely against respondents, the injunction
shall become permanent, while if it is decided in their
favor, then this damage suit may proceed to trial and
determination on its merits by respondent court.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muñoz
Palma, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Footnotes
1 Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals & Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 SCRA 72,
75.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the
order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal
from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration on the ground of failure to post the required
appeal bond. 1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223
of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in
an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions
rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is
not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for
overseas employment because they are already required
under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not
only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a
cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000,
thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a
license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of
P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding
company acceptable to the Administration and duly
accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall
answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations
of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The
bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the
provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and
regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the
Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the
Department and all liabilities which the Administration may
impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that
the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that
any judgment against the principal in connection with
matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding
and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be
co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis
supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow
the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in
compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same
Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or
money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the
appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited
by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor
Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of
the POEA, he says, are governed by the following
provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal
shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of
payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a
cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule;
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which
shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in
support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of
the date when the appellant received the appealed
decision and/or award and proof of service on the other
party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other
requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the
period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000
and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as required
by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post
an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the
POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily
shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and
the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an
appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal
bond is intended to further insure the payment of the
monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money
placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment
of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but
these claims are not limited to monetary awards to
employees whose contracts of employment have been
violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for
violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license,
the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules,
as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter
may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended
to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only
as a last resort and not to be reduced with the
enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers
that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount
may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if
it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after
satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a
monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed
employee, the herein private respondent. The standby
guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be
depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the
appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money,
making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other
obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the
employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the
sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the
recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed
on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is
a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas
recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement
because of the special risks to which our workers abroad
are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom
there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The
overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign
employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended
to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its
choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas
workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a
statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be
taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory
that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat
quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the
appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned
POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier
bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner
would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do
not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that
Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule
is that a construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary
obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section
4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow
agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is
necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section
6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for
perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of
the working class, conformably to the mandate of the
Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the
appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant
employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to
the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J, is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Order issued by NLRC Commissioner Domingo H.
Zapanta, Second Division, dated October 30, 1992.
SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996]
ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO A.
PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON
CITY and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA,
respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
A word or group of words conveys intentions. When used
truncatedly, its meaning disappears and breeds conflict.
Thus, it is written - “By thy words shalt thou be justified,
and by thy words shalt thou be condemned.” (Matthew,
12:37)
Construing the new words of a statute separately is the
raison d’etre of this appeal.
Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the
inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a
certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The
inscription was caused to be made by the private
respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of
the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of
the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin, and
was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry,
issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and
Conchita R. Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land
from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this
case.
The facts are not disputed, and are hereby reproduced as
follows:
“On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde
and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential land
located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas
and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22,
1983. The property was registered in the names of the
Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On August 27, 1984,
the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse
claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the
subject property, which was inscribed as Entry No.
116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the
Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property
in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4,
1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a
year after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-
appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection of
sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25,
1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the
parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde
acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo Pilares
amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two
years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde failed to
comply with his undertaking in the compromise agreement,
defendant-appellant Pilares moved for the issuance of a
writ of execution to enforce the decision based on the
compromise agreement, which the court granted in its
order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of
execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of
Quezon City where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to
the order of execution dated August 3, 1982, a notice of
levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On
February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of
Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution
before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same
was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No.
123283.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4 1984
was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was
ssued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of
levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was
carried over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the
Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of
Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the subject
property did not push through as scheduled.
On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the
cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon
defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their
lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand,
defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause the
cancellation of said annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-
appellees filed this complaint dated January 11, 1986 on
February 5, 1986.”[1]
The Sajonases filed their complaint[2] in the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against Domingo Pilares, the
judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The relevant portion
of the complaint alleges:
“7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the
defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of the
defendant, have already transferred, conveyed and
assigned all their title, rights and interests to the plaintiffs
and there was no more title, rights or interests therein
which the defendant could levy upon;
8. That the annotation of the levy on execution which was
carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegal and invalid
and was made in utter bad faith, in view of the existence of
the Adverse Claim annotated by the plaintiffs on the
corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses;
9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon the
defendant Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the cancellation of
the said notice of levy but the latter, without justifiable
reason and with the sole purpose of harassing and
embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and refused plaintiffs’
demand;
10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of the
defendant to cause the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution, the plaintiffs were compelled to litigate and
engage the services of the undersigned counsel, to protect
their rights and interests, for which they agreed to pay
attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000 and appearance
fees of P500 per day in court.”[3]

Pilares filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim[4] on
March 8, 1986, raising special and affirmative defenses,
the relevant portions of which are as follows:
“10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein
defendants;
11. Assuming, without however admitting that they filed an
adverse claim against the property covered by TCT No.
79073 registered under the name of spouses Ernesto
Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceases to have
any legal force and effect (30) days thereafter pursuant to
Section 70 of P.D. 1529;
12. The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No.
79073 being effected pursuant to the Writ of Execution
dated August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (now RTC)
of Quezon City proceeding from a decision rendered in
Civil Case No. 28859 in favor of herein defendant against
Ernesto Uychocde, is undoubtedly proper and appropriate
because the property is registered in the name of the
judgment debtor and is not among those exempted from
execution;
13. Assuming without admitting that the property subject
matter of this case was in fact sold by the registered owner
in favor of the herein plaintiffs, the sale is the null and void
(sic) and without any legal force and effect because it was
done in fraud of a judgment creditor, the defendant
Pilares.”[5]
Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplary damages in a
counterclaim against the Sajonas spouses. The parties
appeared at pre-trial proceedings on January 21, 1987,[6]
after which, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial court rendered its decision on February 15,
1989.[7] It found in favor of the Sajonas couple, and
ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
The court a quo stated, thus:
“After going over the evidence presented by the parties,
the court finds that although the title of the subject matter
of the Notice of Levy on Execution was still in the name of
the Spouses Uychocde when the same was annotated on
the said title, an earlier Affidavit of Adverse Claim was
annotated on the same title by the plaintiffs who earlier
bought said property from the Uychocdes.
It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs.
Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442) that actual notice of an adverse
claim is equivalent to registration and the subsequent
registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any legal
effect in any respect on account of prior inscription of the
adverse claim annotated on the title of the Uychocdes.
xxx xxx xxx
On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in good
faith of the property of the spouses Uychocde even
notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale
executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors,
the Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare of
any indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had notice
beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said
property or that the same is involved in a litigation between
said spouses and the defendant. Good faith is the
opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the existence of any
bad faith must be established by competent proof.[8] (Cai
vs. Henson, 51 Phil 606)
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares, as
follows:
1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on
Execution annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
109417.
2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000 as
attorney’s fees.
3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said
defendant.
Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs.”
Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals[9],
assigning errors on the part of the lower court. The
appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision, and
upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the
certificate of title, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated
February 15, 1989 is reversed and set aside and this
complaint is dismissed.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees."[10]
The Sajonas couple are now before us, on a Petition for
Review on Certiorari[11], praying inter alia to set aside the
Court of Appeals’ decision, and to reinstate that of the
Regional Trial Court.
Private respondent filed his Comment[12] on March 5,
1992, after which, the parties were ordered to file their
respective Memoranda. Private respondent complied
thereto on April 27, 1994[13], while petitioners were able to
submit their Memorandum on September 29, 1992.[14]
Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the appellate
court, to wit:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR ADVERSE CLAIM
UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE
INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE
THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO
RECONCILE THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITHIN
THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS
A WHOLE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING
SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IN SUCH WISE ON THE
GROUND THAT IT VIOLATES PETITIONERS’
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
Primarily, we are being asked to ascertain who among the
parties in suit has a better right over the property in
question. The petitioners derive their claim from the right
of ownership arising from a perfected contract of absolute
sale between them and the registered owners of the
property, such right being attested to by the notice of
adverse claim[15] annotated on TCT No. N-79073 as early
as August 27, 1984. Private respondent on the other
hand, claims the right to levy on the property, and have it
sold on execution to satisfy his judgment credit, arising
from Civil Case No. Q-28850[16] against the Uychocdes,
from whose title, petitioners derived their own.
Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of
real property where the registration of such interest or right
is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act
or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an interest on the
same or a better right than that of the registered owner
thereof. Such notice is registered by filing a sworn
statement with the Register of Deeds of the province
where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the
claimed right together with other dates pertinent
thereto.[17]
The registration of an adverse claim is expressly
recognized under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.*
Noting the changes made in the terminology of the
provisions of the law, private respondent interpreted this to
mean that a Notice of Adverse Claim remains effective
only for a period of 30 days from its annotation, and does
not automatically lose its force afterwards. Private
respondent further maintains that the notice of adverse
claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, hence, it will be
effective only up to September 26, 1984, after which it will
no longer have any binding force and effect pursuant to
Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the sale in favor of the
petitioners by the Uychocdes was made in order to
defraud their creditor (Pilares), as the same was executed
subsequent to their having defaulted in the payment of
their obligation based on a compromise agreement.[18]
The respondent appellate court upheld private
respondents’ theory when it ruled:
“The above stated conclusion of the lower court is based
on the premise that the adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-
appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days from
the date of registration. However, under the provisions of
Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be
effective only for a period of 30 days from the date of its
registration. The provision of this Decree is clear and
specific.
xxx xxx xxx
It should be noted that the adverse claim provision in
Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) does
not provide for a period of effectivity of the annotation of an
adverse claim. P.D. No. 1529, however, now specifically
provides for only 30 days. If the intention of the law was
for the adverse claim to remain effective until cancelled by
petition of the interested party, then the aforecited
provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of effectivity
would not have been inserted in the law.
Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27,
1984, it was effective only until September 26, 1984.
Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated the notice of
levy on execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse
claim was already ineffective. It cannot be said that actual
or prior knowledge of the existence of the adverse claim
on the Uychocdes’ title is equivalent to registration
inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective
when the notice of levy on execution was annotated.
Thus, the act of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice
of levy on execution was proper and justified.”
The appellate court relied on the rule of statutory
construction that Section 70 is specific and unambiguous
and hence, needs no interpretation nor construction.[19]
Perforce, the appellate court stated, the provision was
clear enough to warrant immediate enforcement, and no
interpretation was needed to give it force and effect. A
fortiori, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period
of thirty (30) days from the date of its registration, after
which it shall be without force and effect. Continuing, the
court further stated;
“. . . clearly, the issue now has been reduced to one of
preference- which should be preferred between the notice
of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4,
1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while
the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6)
months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12,
1985.
In the case of Landig vs. U.S. Commercial Co., 89 Phil 638
it was held that where a sale is recorded later than an
attachment, although the former is of an earlier date, the
sale must give way to the attachment on the ground that
the act of registration is the operative act to affect the land.
A similar ruling was restated in Campillo vs. Court of
Appeals (129 SCRA 513).
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for these rulings may be found in Section 51 of
P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, which provides as follows:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by the
registered owner.- An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with
the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use
such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary
instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed,
mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a
will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate
only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey
or affect the land in so far as third persons are concerned,
and in all cases under the Decree, the registration shall be
made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the
province or city where the land lies.” (Italics supplied by the
lower court.)
Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act
which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon
the land. A person dealing with registered land is not
required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of
the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of
the register or certificate of title.[20]
Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many
cases coming before us, the same, however, does not fit in
the case at bar. While it is the act of registration which is
the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar
as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the
subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of
Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to
and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the
sale.[21] While it is true that under the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree, deeds of conveyance of
property registered under the system, or any interest
therein only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land
upon its registration, and that a purchaser is not required
to explore further than what the Torrens title, upon its face,
indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right
that may subsequently defeat his right thereto,
nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus, one who buys
from the registered owner need not have to look behind
the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless, bound by the
liens and encumbrances annotated thereon. One who
buys without checking the vendor’s title takes all the risks
and losses consequent to such failure.[22]
In PNB vs. Court of Appeals, we held that “the subsequent
sale of the property to the De Castro spouses cannot
prevail over the adverse claim of Perez, which was
inscribed on the bank’s certificate of title on October 6,
1958. That should have put said spouses on notice, and
they can claim no better legal right over and above that of
Perez. The TCT issued in the spouses’ names on July,
1959 also carried the said annotation of adverse claim.
Consequently, they are not entitled to any interest on the
price they paid for the property.”[23]
Then again, in Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, we said that
“the statement of respondent court in its resolution of
reversal that ‘until the validity of an adverse claim is
determined judicially, it cannot be considered a flaw in the
vendor’s title’ contradicts the very object of adverse claims.
As stated earlier, the annotation of an adverse claim is a
measure designed to protect the interest of a person over
a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and
warning to third parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest on the same or has a
better right than the registered owner thereof. A
subsequent sale cannot prevail over the adverse claim
which was previously annotated in the certificate of title
over the property.”[24]
The question may be posed, was the adverse claim
inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417
still in force when private respondent caused the notice of
levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the
said title, considering that more than thirty days had
already lapsed since it was annotated? This is a decisive
factor in the resolution of this instant case.
If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents
are charged with knowledge of pre-existing interest over
the subject property, and thus, petitioners are entitled to
the cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the
certificate of title.
For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law
itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act
reads:
“Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered lands adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Act for registering the
same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired,
and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate
of title of the registered owner, and a description of the
land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant’s residence, and designate a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. The
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in
interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such
decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the
claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case, the court after notice and
hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous
or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or
treble the costs in its discretion.”
The validity of the above-mentioned rules on adverse
claims has to be reexamined in the light of the changes
introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides:
“Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or
interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the date of the original registration,
may, if no other provision is made in this decree for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting
forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under
whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of
title of the registered owner, the name of the registered
owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This statement
shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the
certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for
a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After
the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim
may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor
by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same
ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in
interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance
where the land is situated for the cancellation of the
adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing
upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim,
and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If
the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration
thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the
court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse
claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant
in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more
than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the
lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse
claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition
to that effect.” (Italics ours)
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect and a construction that
could render a provision inoperative should be avoided,
and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a harmonious whole.[25] For taken in
solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning
quite different from the one actually intended and evident
when a word or phrase is considered with those with which
it is associated.[26] In ascertaining the period of effectivity
of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in
its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70
of P.D. 1529 provides:
“The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty
days from the date of registration.”
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to
restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days.
But the above provision cannot and should not be treated
separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence
following, which reads:
“After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
therefor by the party in interest.”
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso
facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days,
then it would not have been necessary to include the
foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For
then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been
automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law
would not have required the party in interest to do a
useless act.
A statute’s clauses and phrases must not be taken
separately, but in its relation to the statute’s totality. Each
statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with
the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant,
provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed
pages of the published Act, its history, origin, and its
purposes may be examined by the courts in their
construction.[27] An eminent authority on the subject
matter states the rule candidly:
“A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or
sections, and is animated by one general purpose and
intent. Consequently, each part or section should be
construed in connection with every other part or section so
as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to
confine its intention to the one section construed. It is
always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to
divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into
separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated
from the context, some particular meaning to be attached
to any word or phrase usually to be ascertained from the
context.”[28]
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the
apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law
such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by
verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the
effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means
that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary
to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain
annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property.
For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective
upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer
necessary and the process of cancellation would be a
useless ceremony.[29]
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase “may
be cancelled”, which obviously indicates, as inherent in its
decision making power, that the court may or may not
order the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding
such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim
for thirty days from the date of registration. The court
cannot be bound by such period as it would be
inconsistent with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori,
the limitation on the period of effectivity is immaterial in
determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim
which is the principal issue to be decided in the court
hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a
proper hearing for the court to determine whether it will
order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not.[30]
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as
absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days
defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for
the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the
annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real
property where the registration of such interest or right is
not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or
Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing
with said property that someone is claiming an interest or
the same or a better right than the registered owner
thereof.[31]
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the
validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to
afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard,
providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed
interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose
of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance
on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in line
with the provision immediately following:
“Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second
adverse claim shall be registered by the same claimant.”
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in
the property, the adverse claimant will be precluded from
registering a second adverse claim based on the same
ground.
It was held that “validity or efficaciousness of the claim
may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the
immediate hearing thereof and make the proper
adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is
only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby
protecting the interest of the adverse claimant and giving
notice and warning to third parties.”[32]
In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was still in effect
on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto
Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto.
Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the
property sought to be levied upon on execution was
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that
of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy
cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on
the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners. This can be
deduced from the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
“Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons-
The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the
judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the
judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy,
subject to liens or encumbrances then existing.” (Italics
supplied)
To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their
property, who waited a long time to complete payments on
their property, convinced that their interest was amply
protected by the inscribed adverse claim.
As lucidly observed by the trial court in the challenged
decision:
“True, the foregoing section provides that an adverse claim
shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. Does this mean however, that the plaintiffs
thereby lost their right over the property in question?
Stated in another, did the lapse of the thirty day period
automatically nullify the contract to sell between the
plaintiffs and the Uychocdes thereby depriving the former
of their vested right over the property?
It is respectfully submitted that it did not.”[33]
As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good
faith of the subject property, the same should be made to
rest on the findings of the trial court. As pointedly
observed by the appellate court, “there is no question that
plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of the pending case
filed by Pilares against Uychocde at the time of the sale of
the property by the latter in their favor. This was clearly
elicited from the testimony of Conchita Sajonas, wife of
plaintiff, during cross-examination on April 21, 1988”.[34]
ATTY. REYES
Q - Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde and his wife
offered to you and your husband the property subject
matter of this case, they showed you the owner’s transfer
certificate, is it not?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - That was shown to you the very first time that this lot
was offered to you for sale?
A - Yes.
Q - After you were shown a copy of the title and after you
were informed that they are desirous in selling the same,
did you and your husband decide to buy the same?
A - No, we did not decide right after seeing the title. Of
course, we visited...
Q - No, you just answer my question. You did not
immediately decide?
A - Yes.
Q - When did you finally decide to buy the same?
A - After seeing the site and after verifying from the
Register of Deeds in Marikina that it is free from
encumbrances, that was the time we decided.
Q - How soon after you were offered this lot did you verify
the exact location and the genuineness of the title, as soon
after this was offered to you?
A - I think it’s one week after they were offered.[35]
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys
property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase,
or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some
other person in the property.[36] Good faith consists in an
honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another.[37] Thus, the claim
of the private respondent that the sale executed by the
spouses was made in fraud of creditors has no basis in
fact, there being no evidence that the petitioners had any
knowledge or notice of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor
of the private respondents, nor of any claim by the latter
over the Uychocdes’ properties or that the same was
involved in any litigation between said spouses and the
private respondent. While it may be stated that good faith
is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established by
competent proof by the party alleging the same. Sans
such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be purchasers in
good faith, and their interest in the subject property must
not be disturbed.
At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property
Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of
registered land in good faith that they can take and hold
the same free from any and all prior claims, liens and
encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate of
Title and those expressly mentioned in the ACT as having
been preserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of the
conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the Torrens
system seeks to insure would be futile and nugatory.[38]
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals dated October 17, 1991 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated February 15, 1989 finding for
the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby
REINSTATED.
The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT
No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001]
AKBAYAN – Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II –
Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR, MYLA
GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO,
JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN
DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI
MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 147179. March 26, 2001]
MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN
ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONERS MEHOL
SADAIN, RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO,
RALPH LANTION, FLORENTINO TUASON and
RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the Commission on
Election (COMELEC), respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated
petitions[1] before us is the exercise of a right so
indubitably cherished and accorded primacy, if not utmost
reverence, no less than by the fundamental law - the right
of suffrage.
Invoking this right, herein petitioners - representing the
youth sector - seek to direct the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the
May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to
21. According to petitioners, around four million youth
failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000
deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic
Act No. 8189.[2]
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders,
Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on
Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People’s Participation,
through a Letter dated January 25, 2001, invited the
COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of
discussing the extension of the registration of voters to
accommodate those who were not able to register before
the COMELEC deadline.[3]
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C.
Lantion, together with Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra
(now Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by
the Senate Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at
the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Pasay City.
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and
Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the
Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional
Registration of New Voters Only, excerpts of which are
hereto quoted:
“Please be advised that the undersigned attended the
public hearing called by the Senate Committee on
electoral Reforms, Suffrage and People’s Participation
presided over by the Hon. Sen. Raul Roco, its Committee
Chairman to date at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters
Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is the request
by youth organizations to hold additional two days of
registration. Thus, participating students and civic leaders
along with Comelec Representatives were in agreement
that is legally feasible to have a two-day additional
registration of voters to be conducted preferably on
February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. The deadline for
the continuing voters registration under R.A. 8189 is
December 27, 2000.
“To address the concern that this may open the flood parts
for ‘hakot system,’ certain restrictive parameters were
discussed. The following guidelines to serve as
safeguards against fraudulent applicants:
“1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of
age or less and will be registering for the first time on May
14, 2001;
“2. The applicants shall register in their places of
residences; and
“3. The applicants shall present valid identification
documents, like school records.
“Preparatory to the registration days, the following
activities are likewise agreed:
“1. Submission of the list of students and their addresses
immediately prior to the actual registration of the
applicants;
“2. The Comelec field officers will be given the opportunity
to verify the voters enumerator’s list or conduct ocular
inspection;
“3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and
“4. Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and
honest conduct of the registration and drum up interest to
register among the new voters.
“The rationale for the additional two-day registration is the
renewed political awareness and interest to participate in
the political process generated by the recent political
events in the country among our youth. Considering that
they failed to register on December 27, 2000 deadline,
they approved for special registration days.
“In view of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to
discuss all aspects regarding this request with directives to
the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified
available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy
Executive Director for Operations (DEDO) for the
estimated costs of additional two days of registration.
“The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly
for consultation on the practical side and logistical
requirements of such additional registration days. The
meeting will be set at 1:30 p.m. at the Office of ED.”[4]
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation
meeting among regional heads and representatives and a
number of senior staff headed by Executive Director
Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the
group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of
the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional
registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A.
8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-
election activities.[5]
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 3584, the decretal portion of which reads:
“Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
deny the request to conduct a two-day additional
registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.”
Commissioners Rufino S. B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain
voted to deny the request while Commissioners
Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to
accommodate the students’ request. With this impasse,
the Commission construed its Resolution as having taken
effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth,
SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et al. filed
before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147066, which seeks to
set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC’s Resolution
and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional
insofar as said provision effectively causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly
situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit
for registration petitioners and other similarly situated
young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001
General Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a
student of the University of the Philippines, likewise filed a
Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147179,
praying that this Court direct the COMELEC to provide for
another special registration day under the continuing
registration provision under the Election Code.
On March 13, 2001, this Court resolved to consolidate the
two petitions and further required respondents to file their
Comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring
at 10:00 A.M. of March 16, 2001. Moreover, this Court
resolved to set the consolidated cases for oral arguments
on March 16, 2001.[6]
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment,
recommended that an additional continuing registration of
voters be conducted at the soonest possible time “in order
to accommodate that disenfranchised voters for purposes
of the May 14, 2001 elections.”
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the
present petitions, is tasked to resolve a two-pronged issue
focusing on respondent COMELEC’s issuance of the
assailed Resolution dated February 8, 2001, which
Resolution, petitioners, by and large, argue to have
undermined their constitutional right to vote on the May 14,
2001 general elections and caused the
disenfranchisement of around four (4) million Filipinos of
voting age who failed to register before the registration
deadline set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a) Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution
dated February 8, 2001;
b) Whether or not this Court can compel respondent
COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus,
to conduct a special registration of new voters during the
period between the COMELEC’s imposed December 27,
2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of
suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy
of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be
exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the
Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws
skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all
intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate
such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the
democratic institutions our people have, for so long,
guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery
and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein
petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the
exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all
other rights, is subject to existing substantive and
procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to
the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution provides:
“SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL
CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE
DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE
RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE
YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE
TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY,
PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE
REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE
EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE.”
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote
is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural
requirements he must undergo: among others, the process
of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the
minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is
obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the “Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996.”
Stated differently, the act of registration is an
indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus,
contrary to petitioners’ argument, registration cannot and
should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere
statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of
registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote,
the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner –
one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the
pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances
of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic
operational considerations bear great weight in the
adjudication of the issues raised in the instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, which
provides a system of continuing registration, is explicit, to
wit:
“SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. –
The Personal filing of application of registration of voters
shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer
during regular office hours. No registration shall, however,
be conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90)
days before a special election.” (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others,
speaks of a prohibitive period within which to file a sworn
petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent
voter’s list, provides:
“SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List –
Any registered voter, representative of a political party x x
x may file x x x except one hundred (100) days prior to a
regular election xxx.”
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent
COMELEC in its Comment:
“x x x The petition for exclusion is a necessary component
to registration since it is a safety mechanism that gives a
measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified
registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the
other hand serves the purpose of securing the voter’s
substantive right to be included in the list of voters.
“In real-world terms, this means that if a special voter’s
registration is conducted, then the prohibitive period for
filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a
later date. If we do not, then no one can challenge the
Voter’s list since we would already be well into the 100-day
prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant breach of
the principles of due process, this would open the
registration process to abuse and seriously compromise
the integrity of the voter’s list, and consequently, that of the
entire election.
“x x x It must be remembered that the period serve a vital
role in protecting the integrity of the registration process.
Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be
deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the
application. We would be obliged to simply take them at
face value. If we compromise on these safety nets, we
may very well end up with a voter’s list full of flying voters,
overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with
shadows and ghosts x x x.
“x x x The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order
to fit the entire process of registration within the last 60
days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of
whom might not even be qualified to vote. x x x the very
possibility that we shall be conducting elections on the
basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of
doubt over the results of the polls. If that happens, the
unforgiving public will disown the results of the elections,
regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many
courts validate our own results. x x x”
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke
the so called “standby” powers or “residual” powers of the
COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of
Section 29, Republic Act No. 6646[7] and adopted
verbatim in Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436,[8] thus:
“SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-
election Acts - If it should no longer be possible to observe
the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-
election acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and
dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the activities
so voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage.”
On this matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its
very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A.
8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific
definition, precise meaning and coverage, thus:
“a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing
of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter
before the election officer of the city or municipality
wherein he resides and including the same in the book of
registered voters upon approval by the Election
Registration Board;”
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provisions of
Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent
COMELEC, far from contradicting each other, actually
share some common ground. True enough, both
provisions, although at first glance may seem to be at war
in relation to the other, are in a more circumspect perusal,
necessarily capable of being harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that
changes made by the legislature in the form of
amendments to a statute should be given effect, together
with other parts of the amended act. It is not to be
presumed that the legislature, in making such changes,
was indulging in mere semantic exercise. There must be
some purpose in making them, which should be
ascertained and given effect.[9]
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in
connection with those already existing in relation to the
same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize
and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and
reasonable interpretation.[10] Interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretandi, which means that the
best method of interpretation is that which makes laws
consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of justice,
when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes,
should endeavor to reconcile them instead of declaring
outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts
should harmonize them, if this is possible, because they
are equally the handiwork of the same legislature.[11]
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of
R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of
upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying
the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law
explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that
respondent COMELEC may validly and legally conduct a
two-day special registration, through the expedient of the
letter of Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the
provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play
in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of
performance within the available period prior to election
day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A.
8436 is, to our mind, anchored on the sound premise that
these certain “pre-election acts” are still capable of being
reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period
before the date of election and the conduct of other related
pre-election activities required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELEC—which is the
constitutional body tasked by no less than the fundamental
charter (Sec. 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution) to
decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including registration of
voters—painstakingly and thoroughly emphasized the
“operational impossibility”[12] of conducting a special
registration, which in its on language, “can no longer be
accomplished within the time left to (us) the
Commission.”[13]
Hence:
“xxx xxx xxx.
“19) In any case, even without the legal
obstacles, the last 60 days will not be a walk in the park for
the Comelec. Allow us to outline what the Commission
has yet to do, and the time to do it in:
“20) First we have to complete the Project of
Precincts by the 19th of March. The Projects of Precincts
Indicate the total number of established precincts and the
number of registered voters per precincts in a city or
municipality. Without the final Project of Precincts, we
cannot even determine the proper allocation of official
ballots, election returns and other election forms and
paraphernalia. More succinctly said, without the Project of
Precincts, we won’t know how many forms to print and so
we’re liable to come up short.
“21) More Importantly, without a completed
Project of Precincts, it will be impossible to complete the
rest of the tasks that must be accomplished prior to the
elections.
“22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors
must be constituted on or before the 4th of March. In
addition, the list of the members of the BEI — including the
precinct where they are assigned and the barangay where
that precinct is located - must be furnished by the Election
Officer to all the candidates and political candidates not
later than the 26th of March.
“23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the
approved Voter Registration Records of registered voters
in particular precinct, must be inspected, verified, and
sealed beginning March 30, until April 15.
“24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters’ List must
be finalized and printed out of use on election day; and
finally
“25) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and
distribution of the Voters Information Sheet must be
completed on or before April 15.
“26) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election
activities, the Comelec will have roughly a month that will
act as a buffer against any number of unforeseen
occurrences that might delay the elections. This is the
logic and the wisdom behind setting the 120-day
prohibitive period. After all, preparing for an election is no
easy task.
“27) To hold special registrations now would,
aside from being Illegal, whittle that approximately 30-day
margin away to nothing.
“28) When we say registration of voters, we do
not - contrary to popular opinion - refer only to the act of
going to the Election Officer and writing our names down.
Registration is, In fact, a long process that takes about
three weeks to complete not even counting how long it
would take to prepare for the registration in the first place.
“29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the
Comelec, the other Commissioners, prepared a time-table
in order to see exactly how the superimposition of special
registration would affect the on-going preparation for the
May 14 elections.
“30) We assumed for the sake of argument that
we were to hold the special registration on April 16 and 17.
These are not arbitrary numbers, by the way it takes in
account the fact that we only have about 800,000 Voters
Registration Forms available, as against an estimated 4.5
million potential registrants, and it would take about 14
days — If we were to declare special registrations today —
to print up the difference and to verify these accountable
forms. After printing and verification, the forms would have
to be packed and shipped - roughly taking up a further two
and a half weeks. Only then can we get on with
registration.
“31) The first step in registration is, of course,
filling the application for registration with the Election
Officer. The application, according to Section 17 of R.A.
8189, is then set for hearing, with notice of that hearing
being posted in the city or municipal bulletin board for at
least one week prior. Thus, if we held registrations on the
16th and the 17th the posting requirement would be
completed by the 24th. Considering that time must be
allowed for the filling of oppositions, the earliest that the
Election Registration Board can be convened for hearing
would be the May 1st and 2nd.
“32) Assuming — and this is a big assumption —
that there are nit challenges to the applicant’s right to
register, the Election registration Board can immediately
rule on the Applicant’s registration, and post notices of its
action by the 2nd until the 7th of May. By the 10th, copies
of the notice of the action taken by the Board will have
already been furnished to the applicants and the heads of
registered political parties.
“33) Only at this point can our Election Officers
once again focus on the business of getting ready for the
elections. Once the results of the special registration are
finalized, they can be encoded and a new Computerized
Voters’ List generated - at the earliest, by May 11, after
which the new CVL would be posted. Incidentally, it we
were to follow the letter of the law strictly, a May 11 posting
date for the new CVL would be improper since the R.A.
8189 provides that the CVL be posted at least 90 days
before the election.
“34) Assuming optimistically that we can then
finish the inspection, verification, and sealing of the Book if
Voters by May 15, we will already have overshot the May
14, election date, and still not have finished our election
preparations.
“35) After this point, we could have to prepare the
allocation of Official Ballots, Election Returns, and other
Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for the
new registrants. Once the allocation is ready, the
contracts would be awarded, the various forms printed,
delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to the different
municipalities. All told, this process would take
approximately 26 days, from the 15th of May until June 10.
“36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready
to hold the elections.
“xxx xxx xxx.”[14]
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the
determination of administrative agency as to the operation,
implementation and application of a law would be
accorded great weight considering that these specialized
government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in
the best position to know what they can possibly do or not
do, under prevailing circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not
require that the impossible be done.[15] The law obliges
no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the
maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible.[16] In other words,
there is no obligation to do an impossible thing.
Impossibilium nulla obligato est. Hence, a statute may not
be so construed as to require compliance with what it
prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally,
coincidentally[17], it must be presumed that the legislature
did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law
which is far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly,
in the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be
given must be such that it is in accordance with logic,
common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus,
we are of the considered view that the “stand-by power” of
the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436,
presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or
availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners’ bare allegation that they were
disenfranchised when respondent COMELEC pegged the
registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of
January 13, 2001 – the day before the period before the
May 14, 2001 regular elections commences – is, to our
mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation
in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft
of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed
an application to be registered as a voter which was
denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the
respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded
to the Office of the Election Officer to register between the
period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13,
2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by
respondent COMELEC from filing his application for
registration. While it may be true that respondent
COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27,
2000, this Court is of the Firm view that petitioners were
not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing
registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different manner,
the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or
blame. They admit in their petition[18] that they failed to
register, for whatever reason, within the period of
registration and came to this Court and invoked its
protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in
their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no
one come to court with unclean hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our
jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus
jura in re subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this court is of the firm view that
respondent COMELEC did not commit an abuse of
discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the
same in some patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in
issuing Resolution No. 3584 which, in respondent’s own
terms, resolved “to deny the request to conduct a two-day
additional registration of new voters on February 17 and
18, 2001.”
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of laws.[19]
Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC, in
denying the request of petitioners to hold a special
registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the
applicable law on the matter --Section 8 of RA 8189. In
issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC
simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election,[20] inter alia, questions relating to the
registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC
merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it
and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its
constitutionally-mandated powers. Hence, whatever action
respondent takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of
discretion, specifically on matters involving voters’
registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality
of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of
grave abuse of power of discretion on the part of
respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct
an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the
province of respondent COMELEC– a body accorded by
no less than the fundamental law with independence.
As to petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus, we hold that this Court cannot, in view of the
very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same
without transgressing the time-honored principles in this
jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies
only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not
a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in
reference to any manner in which he is required to act,
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court.[21]
Considering the circumstances where the writ of
mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case,
we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish,
to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the
issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively
compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special
registration of voters. For the determination of whether or
not the conduct of a special registration of voters is
feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period
before the actual date of election, involves the exercise of
discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related
cases,[22] we enunciated that the Court’s function, as
sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is “merely (to) check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not
that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing...(of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power... It has no power to look into
what it thinks is apparent error.”[23]
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact
that the President has issued Proclamation No. 15 calling
Congress to a Special Session on March 19, 2001, to
allow the conduct of Special Registration of new voters.
House Bill No. 12930 has been filed before the Lower
House, which bill seeks to amend R.A. 8189 as to the 120-
day prohibitive period provided for under said law.
Similarly, Senate Bill No. 2276[24] was filed before the
Senate, with the same intention to amend the aforesaid
law and, in effect, allow the conduct of special registration
before the May 14, 2001 General Elections. This Court
views the foregoing factual circumstances as a clear
intimation on the part of both the executive and legislative
departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way
of the conduct by the Commission on Elections of a special
registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions
for certiorari and mandamus are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, and
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., joined Mr. Justice Pardo in his
dissenting opinion.
Bellosillo, Melo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the majority
opinion as well as in the Separate Opinion of J. Kapunan.
Puno, J., on official business abroad.
Kapunan, J., see concurring opinion.
Pardo, J., see dissenting opinion.
[1] G.R. No. 147066 and G.R. No. 147179.
[2] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM
OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING
PROCEDURE THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE
APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR.
[3] Letter of Senator Raul Roco.
[4] G.R. No. 147066 Rollo, p. 24.
[5] See Resolution No. 3584.
[6] Resolution dated March 13, 2001.
[7] AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
[8] AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMELEC TO USE AN
AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL
EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[9] Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 265-266, Fourth
Edition, 1998; Tan Kim Kee vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA
670 (1963); Collector of Internal Revenue, 7 SCRA 872
(1963).
[10] Agpalo, Ibid., p. 271; City of Naga vs. Agna, 71 SCRA
176 (1976).
[11] Ibid., p. 271; Gordon vs. Veridaino II, 167 SCRA 51
(1988).
[12] Comment of respondent COMELEC, p. 14.
[13] Ibid., p. 9.
[14] G.R. No. 147179 Rollo, pp. 98-102.
[15] Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil. 889 (1958).
[16] Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
147 SCRA 447 (1987).

[17] Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 157-158, Fourth
Edition, 1998.
[18] Paragraphs 4 and 5 in G.R. No. 147066 and
Paragraph 9 in G.R. No. 147179.
[19] Cuison vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159 (1998);
Jardine vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 119268, February 23, 2000
citing Arroyo vs. de Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
[20] Article IX-C, Section 2.
[21] Sy Ha vs. Gulang 7 SCRA 797 [1963]; Aprueba vs.
Ganzon, 18 SCRA 8 [1966].
[22] G.R. No. 138570, promulgated on October 10, 2000.
[23] Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representative, 199 SCRA 692 (1991); Llamas vs. Orbos,
202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA
480-481 (1971).
[24] An Act Providing for the Conduct of Special
Registration of Voters before the May 14, 2001, National
and Local Elections.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000]
FIDEL M. BAÑARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M.
BAÑARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and FIDEL BESARINO,
petitioners, vs. ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER,
MERLINDA CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R. TEJONES,
ANDREA SAYAM, JENNY ISLA, WILMA ROGATERO,
PABLITO ALEGRIA, ROLANDO CANON, EDITHA
ESTORES, EDMUNDO DOROYA, TERESITA GUION,
DANNY ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY, ROGELIO
MANO, EVANGELINE CABILTES AND PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo, Rizal, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 71 dated August 26, 1997.[1]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners Fidel M. Bañares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M.
Bañares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the
accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa[2] filed by the
private respondents. The cases were assigned to the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II. Ncm
After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea
of not guilty,[3] they filed a Motion to Dismiss the
aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the
same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to
undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal.[4]
Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same
barangay as private respondents, and the amount involved
in each of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos
(P200.00), the said cases were required under Section
412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government
Code of 1991[5] and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure.[6] to be referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the
barangay concerned for conciliation proceedings before
being filed in court.[7]
The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17,
1995[8] denying petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the non-
referral of the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to
invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to a
waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as
basis for dismissing the cases.[9]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the
Revised Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of
prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[10]
On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an
Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against
petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[11] Scncm
More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private
respondents through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the
abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating
that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation
had already been complied with.[12] Attached to the
motion was a Certification dated February 13, 1996 from
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo,
Rizal[13] stating that the parties appeared before said
body regarding the charges of estafa filed by private
respondents against petitioners but they failed to reach an
amicable settlement with respect thereto. Petitioners filed a
Comment and Opposition to Motion to Revive claiming that
the Order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13,
1995 dismissing the cases had long become final and
executory; hence, private respondents should have re-filed
the cases instead of filing a motion to revive.[14]
On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an
Order[15] granting private respondents’ Motion to Revive.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the
aforementioned Order which was denied by the municipal
trial court.[17]
Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, a petition for certiorari, injunction and
prohibition assailing the Order dated March 18, 1996 of the
municipal trial court. They claimed that the said Order
dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the criminal cases
against them had long become final and executory
considering that the prosecution did not file any motion for
reconsideration of said Order.[18] In response thereto,
private respondents filed their Comment,[19] arguing that
the motion to revive the said cases was in accordance with
law, particularly Section 18 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.[20]
After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support
their respective contentions,[21] the Regional Trial Court
rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for
certiorari, injunction and prohibition, stating as follows:
Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and
respondents’ comment thereto, the Court regrets that it
cannot agree with the petitioner(sic). As shown by the
records the 16 criminal cases were dismissed without
prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of the
private respondent to comply with the mandatory
requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases
was without prejudice, the Court honestly believes that the
questioned order has not attained finality at all.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Sdaamiso
SO ORDERED.[22]
The Regional Trial Court, likewise, denied petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the aforementioned
Decision for lack of merit.[24]
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following questions of law:
1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action
without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within
the reglementary period, as in the present case;
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been
dismissed without prejudice may be revived by motion
after the order of dismissal had become final and
executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired
jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without
prejudice still has jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive
after the order of dismissal has become final and
executory.[25]
Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or
action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed
within the reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to
revive the case is filed within the reglementary fifteen-day
period within which to appeal or to file a motion for
reconsideration of the court’s order, the order of dismissal
becomes final and the case may only be revived by the
filing of a new complaint or information.[26] Petitioners
further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case
attains finality, the court which issued the same loses
jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the authority
to act on any motion of the parties with respect to said
case.[27]
On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases
covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
such as the criminal cases against petitioners are not
covered by the rule regarding finality of decisions and
orders under the Revised Rules of Court. They insist that
cases dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance with
the requirement of conciliation before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the
barangay concerned may be revived summarily by the
filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number of
days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case.[28]
Petitioners’ contentions are meritorious. Sdaad
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one
which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined by the court.[29] As distinguished
therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not
dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more
to be adjudicated upon.[30]
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a
case without prejudice is a final order[31] if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals,[32] we
stated thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not
however mean that said dismissal order was any less final.
Such order of dismissal is complete in all details, and
though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of
the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a
final disposition of the complaint.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15)
days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order
disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to
reconsider the same.[33]
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes
final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction
of the court which rendered it to further amend or
revoke.[34] A final judgment or order cannot be modified in
any respect, even if the modification sought is for the
purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court
which rendered the same.[35]
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has
become final, and therefore becomes outside the court’s
power to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate
the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.
This was explained in Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership vs. Velasco,[36] where we ruled thus: Scsdaad
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the
reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the
dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the
Court’s docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be without
prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or
"revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action,
but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of
course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees
prescribed by law.
xxx
[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action
does not attain finality until after fifteen (15) days
therefrom, and consequently within that time the action still
remains within the control of the Court, the plaintiff may
move and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive his
action before that period lapses. But after dismissal has
become final after the lapse of the fifteen-day
reglementary period, the only way by which the action may
be resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of a
subsequent action through the filing of another complaint
and the payment of fees prescribed by law. This is so
because upon attainment of finality of the dismissal
through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court
loses jurisdiction and control over it and can no longer
make a disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with
such dismissal.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to private respondents’ claim, the foregoing rule
applies not only to civil cases but to criminal cases as well.
In Jaca vs. Blanco,[38] the Court defined a provisional
dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without
prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of
dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a
new information for the offense."[39] Supremax
Thus, the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the
petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and ruled
that the order of the municipal trial court, dated November
13, 1995 dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases
against petitioners had not attained finality and hence,
could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.

Equally erroneous is private respondents’ contention that
the rules regarding finality of judgments under the Revised
Rules of Court[40] do not apply to cases covered by the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Private
respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases
which were dismissed for failure to submit the same to
conciliation at the barangay level, as required under
Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local
Government Code. The said provision states:
Referral to Lupon. – Cases requiring referral to the Lupon
for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1508[41] where there is no showing of compliance
with such requirement, shall be dismissed without
prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement
shall have been complied with. This provision shall not
apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested
without a warrant.[42]
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports
private respondents’ view. Section 18 merely states that
when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for
non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be
revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case
is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the
Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the
effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even
after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file
a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
expressly provides that the Rules of Court applies
suppletorily to cases covered by the former:
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. – The regular
procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to
the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory
capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.[43]
A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section
22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary Procedure and
Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and
10,[44] and Rule 36, Section 2[45] of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, leads to no other conclusion
than that the rules regarding finality of judgments also
apply to cases covered by the rules on summary
procedure. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule
that a judgment or order which is not appealed or made
subject of a motion for reconsideration within the
prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality.[46] Hence, the
principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence [47]
applies in interpreting both sets of Rules.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments
and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said
doctrine applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure:
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments
of the courts must become final at some definite date set
by law.[48] Misjuris
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also
applies to cases subject to summary procedure especially
since the objective of the Rule governing the same is
precisely to settle these cases expeditiously.[49] To
construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival of
dismissed cases by mere motion even after the lapse of
the period for appealing the same would prevent the courts
from settling justiciable controversies with finality,[50]
thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken
impression of petitioners and the municipal trial court that
the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as
required under the Local Government Code of 1991[51]
may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the
accused has been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay
conciliation when so required under the law[52] is not
jurisdictional in nature[53] and may therefore be deemed
waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[54]
The Court notes that although petitioners could have
invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action
against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to
Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they
received the complaints against them, petitioners raised
the said ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in
dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners on the
ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior
to the filing thereof in court although said ground was
raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be
revoked at present considering that the same had long
become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may no
longer be annulled[55] by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by
the Regional Trial Court or this Court.[56] Scjuris
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch II dated August 26, 1997 and its Order dated
January 29, 1998 in SCA Case No. 96-4092 are hereby
SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 94-0829, 94-0830,
94-0831, 94-0832, 94-0833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-0839,
94-0841, 94-0843, 94-0847, 94-0848, 94-0850, 94-0854
and 94-0058 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo are
ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice, pursuant to Sec.
18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
SO ORDERED. KAPUNAN
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
[1] SCA Case No. 96-4092.
[2] Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 94-0829, 94-0830, 94-
0831, 94-0832, 94-0833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-0839, 94-
0841, 94-0843, 94-0847, 94-0848, 94-0850, 94-0854 and
94-0058 in the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo Rizal,
Branch II.
[3] Rollo, p. 91.
[4] Motion to Dismiss, Id., at. 22-24.
[5] Sections 412 and 408 of the Local Government Code of
1991 state thus:
Section 412.......Conciliation.-- (a) Pre-condition to Filing of
Complaint in Court. -- No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any
other government office for adjudication, unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon
or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137904. October 19, 2001]
PURIFICACION M. VDA. DE URBANO, PEDRO DE
CASTRO, AURELIO I. ARRIENDA, ARNEL U.
ARRIENDA, ALBERT U. ARRIENDA, ALICE A. PEDRON
and MARILYN C. BILOG, petitioners, vs. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR., ZACARIAS BELTRAN, JR., MARCIAL
SECOQUIAN and CRISPINA DELA CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The petitioners in the case at bar have been fighting tooth
and nail for a roof above their heads. They have fought
long and hard but still not enough, for while as a succor
institution the respondent GSIS can bend back to
accommodate the needs of a member, it can only bend as
far as it can also assure the solvency of its funds for the
common good of its members.
This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set
aside the Court of Appeals' October 30, 1998 decision[1]
and March 4, 1999 resolution affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102,
dismissing petitioner's complaint for annulment of contract,
reconveyance and damages.
The facts, gathered mainly from the stipulation and
admissions of the parties,[2] are as follows:
In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200-square meter
property in Quezon City to the respondent GSIS to secure
a housing loan of P47,000.00. As petitioners failed to pay
their loan when it fell due, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage
on October 28, 1983. With a bid of P154,896.00, GSIS
emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction of the
property.
In a bid to redeem their property, petitioner Arnel Arrienda
wrote on September 26, 1984 to the Acquired Assets
Department (AAD) of the GSIS signifying the petitioners'
intention to redeem their property. Two days after or on
September 28, petitioner vda. de Urbano wrote the GSIS
Board of Trustees (the "Board") to inform them of her
desire to redeem the subject property and for advice on
the procedure for redemption.[3] GSIS responded on
October 16, 1984 advising her to pay the total redemption
price of P154,896.00 on or before the expiry date of
redemption on November 18, 1984 in full and in cash,
failing which the property would be offered for sale through
public bidding.
On October 29, 1984, petitioner vda. de Urbano requested
for more time to redeem the subject property. In a letter
dated January 10, 1985, AAD Manager Marcial Secoquian
informed petitioners that the Board adopted Resolution No.
929 on November 16, 1984 approving the "sale of the
subject property to petitioner Purificacion Urbano for the
sum of P174,572.62, provided that the aforesaid price
shall be paid in CASH, within sixty (60) days from notice of
this resolution, failing which, the property shall be sold thru
public bidding with the fair market value of the property as
the minimum bid price."
Unable to find financing to repurchase the subject
property, petitioners again wrote to the Board through AAD
Manager Secoquian on January 18, 1985 requesting for
re-mortgage through repurchase of the subject property.[4]
On February 27, 1985, AAD Manager Secoquian wrote to
petitioners that "the granting of real estate/housing loan to
the GSIS members is not within the province and
competence of this department, hence your request for a
re-mortgage of said property cannot be acted upon."[5] On
June 19, 1985, petitioner vda. de Urbano wrote to the
Board requesting approval to file a loan of P240,000.00
with the GSIS Real Estate Department to repurchase their
foreclosed property.
On June 20, 1985, then Deputy Minister and Vice
Governor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. interceded for the
petitioners and wrote to the Board requesting for a more
liberal arrangement to enable petitioners to repurchase
their property. In response to the letter, the Board adopted
Resolution No. 593 on July 6, 1985 granting petitioner
Aurelio Arrienda "60 days from notice within which to
purchase the subject property for P174,572.62 payable in
CASH. Should Mr. Arrienda fail to pay the same within the
time frame mentioned, the property shall be sold at public
auction without need of any further action by the Board."
Petitioners were notified of this Resolution in a letter dated
August 2, 1985.[6]
On August 21, 1985, months after the expiration of the
redemption period on November 18, 1984, GSIS
consolidated its title over the property, leading to the
cancellation of TCT No. 167532 covering the property and
the issuance of TCT No. 33418 in favor of GSIS.[7]
On September 5, 1985, respondent Crispina dela Cruz
commenced negotiations with respondent GSIS for her
purchase of the petitioners' foreclosed property for
P250,000.00 spot cash.
Unable to raise the entire amount of the property but still
persistent to reacquire it, petitioner Arnel Arrienda wrote to
the Board on October 4, 1985, offering a downpayment of
P50,000.00 to purchase their property, the balance of
P124,572.62 to be paid within five years in equal monthly
installments. He enclosed a cashier's check in the amount
of P10,000.00 as earnest money. On October 30, 1985,
AAD Manager Secoquian informed petitioners that the
Board adopted Resolution No. 881 on October 10, 1985
declining their offer to purchase the subject property under
their proposed terms and conditions.[8]
On November 11, 1985, petitioner Arnel Arrienda again
wrote to the Board requesting reconsideration of
Resolution No. 881 and abeyance of the public sale or
negotiation of the subject property.[9] Secoquian wrote
petitioner Arnel Arrienda on December 26, 1985 informing
him that the Board adopted Resolution No. 1022 dated
December 12, 1985 denying his request for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 881 and returning
petitioners' cashier's check of P10,000.00.[10] The Board
also directed the "Operating Unit Concerned to inform Ms.
Cristina Cruz (sic) that her offer to purchase the above-
mentioned property shall only be entertained by the GSIS
Board if accompanied by a Cashier's or Manager's check
in the amount equivalent to 10% of her offer, forfeitable in
favor of the System in case she fails to comply with the
terms and conditions proposed by the System."[11]
With no let up on their efforts to repurchase their property,
petitioner Aurelio Arrienda wrote to the Board on January
6, 1986 requesting a restructuring or a liberal arrangement
to purchase back the subject property. This was denied by
the Board in Resolution No. 36 dated January 16, 1986.
Meantime, GSIS continued negotiating with private
respondent dela Cruz. On January 28, 1986, Secoquian
recommended to the Board the approval of the sale to dela
Cruz.
Not having lost their resolve and pinning their hopes on the
new Board of Trustees under the new administration of
then President Corazon Aquino, petitioner vda. de Urbano
wrote on January 20, 1987 to Atty. Regalado
Resurreccion, Head of the Operation Pabahay of the
Government Investments and Loan Department of the
GSIS, requesting reconsideration of GSIS' position with
regard to the subject property.[12] As indicated in a GSIS
internal commmunication, Officer-in-Charge Rosales of the
Residential Loans Department initially handled the
request, then endorsed it to Atty. Resurreccion on January
19, 1987 and enclosed in his endorsement petitioner vda.
de Urbano's June 19, 1985 letter applying for a loan of
P240,000.00 to repurchase the subject property. The
matter was, in turn, endorsed by Atty. Resurreccion to
AAD Manager Secoquian on January 20, 1987 as "the
Operation Pabahay Task Force cannot undertake the
processing of this kind of loan unless a certificate of award
or sale is issued in favor of the applicant." Atty.
Resurreccion likewise noted in his endorsement that the
applicant for the loan was already 81 years old and no
longer a member of the GSIS. AAD Manager Secoquian
returned said application to the head of the Operation
Pabahay on March 3, 1987, enumerating the Board
resolutions relative to the subject property and stating that
"pending action by the Board on the offer of CRISPINA
VDA. DELA CRUZ to purchase the subject property for the
amount of P250,000.00, the request of Mrs. URBANO
cannot as yet be given due consideration."[13]
On August 11, 1987, GSIS approved under Resolution No.
342 the "sale of the subject property to respondent dela
Cruz for a consideration of P267,000.00 CASH." The
following day, respondent AAD & GRADE Acting Vice-
President Zacarias C. Beltran, Jr. wrote to petitioners
Zenaida/Aurelio Arrienda calling their attention to the
absence of a formal lease contract over the subject
property where petitioners continued to stay. He also
demanded payment of rental arrears on the property for 45
months as of July 31, 1987 amounting to P58,500.00[14]
and invited petitioners Zenaida and Aurelio Arrienda to the
GSIS Office to make arrangements for the payment of the
rental arrears and to execute the corresponding lease
contract. The letter did not mention the negotiation with
private respondent dela Cruz.
On September 1, 1987, GSIS wrote to private respondent
dela Cruz that the Board, through Board Resolution No.
342, approved the sale of the subject property payable in
full and in cash for P267,000.00, representing its current
market value, within thirty days from notice of the
resolution. On January 20, 1988, a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the subject property was executed between GSIS and
private respondent de la Cruz. The following day, TCT No.
374292 covering the subject property was issued to dela
Cruz.
Meantime, having learned about the sale of the subject
property to dela Cruz, petitioner Aurelio Arrienda wrote to
the GSIS on September 27, 1987 protesting the said sale
and requesting its reconsideration and recall. Respondent
Beltran, then already the Vice President of the AAMG &
GRADE Department of the GSIS, responded on October
27, 1987 informing him of Resolution No. 430, dated
October 13, 1987, which reiterated the approval of the sale
of the subject property to respondent dela Cruz as
previously approved under Board Resolution No. 342. On
November 4, 1987, petitioner Aurelio Arrienda again wrote
to the GSIS protesting the sale of the property to
respondent dela Cruz and requesting for a formal
investigation of the circumstances leading to the sale. The
GSIS' Department of Investigation manager wrote to
petitioner Aurelio Arrienda on January 11, 1988 requesting
petitioner Aurelio Arrienda to "come for conference" with
Atty. Gatpatan of the said department regarding his
complaint on the subject property.
Not satisfied with the investigation of GSIS, petitioners filed
the instant case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 102. The lower court dismissed the
complaint. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition for review with the following
assignment of errors:
"The Honorable Court of Appeals (Former Eleventh
Division) erred as follows:
1. In not finding that the alleged negotiated sale of
petitioners' foreclosed property was consummated by
respondent GSIS in favor of respondent Crispina Dela
Cruz, a non-GSIS member, in violation of its own Board
Resolution Nos. 929 and 593, existing laws and applicable
jurisprudence.
2. In not finding that respondent GSIS had consummated
the alleged negotiated sale in favor of respondent Dela
Cruz notwithstanding the failure of the latter to comply with
the terms and conditions of the alleged sale.
3. In not finding that respondent GSIS had committed
dishonesty and/or perjury by falsely alleging in their
Answer to the Complaint that it acted on the request of
petitioner Purificacion Vda. De Urbano to re-acquire her
former property through the GSIS Operation Pabahay by
transmitting said request to the Acquired Assets
Department.
4. In not finding that the case of Valmonte vs. Belmonte,
Jr., 170 SCRA 256 (1989), is applicable to the case at
bench.
5. In not finding that Section 35 of P.D. 1146, does not
provide any prerogative to the GSIS Board of Trustees to
authorize and/or approve the alleged negotiated sale in
favor of a non-GSIS member or an outsider without
complying with pertinent existing laws and established
jurisprudence.
6. In not finding that the appealed Decision of the lower
court did not faithfully comply with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court.
7. In not finding that the case of Maharlika Publishing
Corporation vs. Tagle, 142 SCRA 553 (1986), is a
precedent to the case at bench.
8. In not giving due consideration to the newly discovered
evidence of the petitioners (Annexes "A" and "B", Brief for
the Appellants) which showed that respondent Crispina
Dela Cruz had already withdrawn her offer to buy subject
property and the same was accepted by respondent
GSIS."
The petition is devoid of merit.
The smorgasbord of issues raised by the petitioner can be
reduced to three jugular issues, viz:
I. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject
property?
II. Does the GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject
property through public bidding?

III. Was GSIS in bad faith in dealing with
petitioners?
I.
We first deal with the issue of repurchase. At the time
petitioners offered to repurchase the subject property from
GSIS, the charter of the GSIS then in force was P.D. 1146
or the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977 (the
"Act"). Sections 35 and 36 of the Act provide in relevant
part as follows:
"Sec. 35. Powers and Functions of the System. The
System shall have the following powers and functions
specified in this Act and the usual general corporate
powers:
xxx
(d) To acquire, utilize or dispose of, in any manner
recognized by law, real or personal properties in the
Philippines or elsewhere necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." (emphasis supplied)
"Sec. 36. The Board of Trustees; Its Composition; Tenure
and Compensation.- The Corporate powers and functions
of the System shall be vested in, and exercised by the
Board of Trustees. . ."
P.D. 1146 was amended by P.D. 1981 dated July 19, 1985
as follows:
"WHEREAS, the GSIS Board of Trustees should be vested
with powers and authority necessary or proper to ensure a
fair and profitable return of the investments of the funds
administered by the GSIS, and, for this purpose, the GSIS
Board of Trustees should be given full and sole
responsibility of controlling and monitoring insurance
investments operations and fixing and determining the
terms and conditions of financial accomodations to its
members, including the power to compromise or release
any claim or settled liability to the GSIS;
WHEREAS, it has thus become necessary to amend
Presidential Decree No. 1146 to clarify some of its
provisions to make it more responsive to the needs of the
members of the GSIS and to assure the actuarial solvency
of the Fund administered by the GSIS during these times
of grave economic crisis affecting the country;
xxx
Sec. 7. There is hereby incorporated a new paragraph
after the third paragraph of Section 36, which shall read as
follows:
"The Board of Trustees has the following powers and
functions, among others:
(a) To formulate the policies, guidelines and programs to
effectively carry out the purposes and objectives of this
Act;
xxx
(f) The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, to compromise or release, in whole or in
part, any claim or settled liability to the System, regardless
of the amount involved, under such terms and conditions
as it may impose for the best interest of the System; . . ."
(emphasis supplied)
The above laws grant the GSIS Board of Trustees (the
"Board") the power, nay, the responsibility, to exercise
discretion in "determining the terms and conditions of
financial accomodations to its members" with the dual
purpose of making the GSIS "more responsive to the
needs of the members of the GSIS" and assuring "the
actuarial solvency of the Fund administered by the GSIS."
As mandated by P.D. 1146, this discretion may be
exercised in acquiring, utilizing or disposing of, in any
manner recognized by law, "real or personal properties in
the Philippines or elsewhere necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." Contrary to petitioners' position,
there is no restriction or qualification that the GSIS should
dispose of its real properties in favor only of GSIS
members. Based on these laws, the Board could exercise
its discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioners'
offer to repurchase the subject property taking into account
the dual purpose enunciated in the "whereas clause" of
P.D. 1981, i.e., making the GSIS "more responsive to the
needs of the members of the GSIS" and assuring "the
actuarial solvency of the Fund administered by the GSIS."
Jurisprudence also supports the Board's exercise of
discretion in case of repurchase, viz:
"The right to redeem becomes functus officio on the date
of its expiry, and its exercise after the period is not really
one of redemption but a repurchase. Distinction must be
made because redemption is by force of law; the
purchaser at public auction is bound to accept redemption.
Repurchase however of foreclosed property, after
redemption period, imposes no such obligation. After
expiry, the purchaser may or may not re-sell the property
but no law will compel him to do so. And, he is not bound
by the bid price; it is entirely within his discretion to set a
higher price, for after all, the property already belongs to
him as owner."[15] (emphasis supplied)
In response to petitioners' plea to repurchase the subject
property after the redemption period had expired, the
Board approved its sale to petitioners by virtue of
Resolution No. 929 dated November 16, 1984, provided
that the payment of its purchase price of P174,572.62 shall
be made in cash within sixty days from notice of the
resolution, otherwise the property would be sold through
public bidding. After petitioners' failure to purchase the
property within the prescribed period, the Board, through
Resolution No. 593 dated July 6, 1985, granted petitioners
another sixty days within which to purchase the property
for the same amount and under the same terms stated in
Resolution No. 929. Counting from the expiry date of
redemption on November 18, 1984, the petitioners were
given about ten months within which to repurchase the
subject property for the same price of P174,572.62. In
view of petitioners' repeated failure to repurchase coupled
with their failure to pay rent on the subject property, the
Board denied through Resolution No. 1022 dated
December 12, 1985 petitioners' subsequent request to
repurchase the subject property. The minutes of the
Board Meeting on December 12, 1985 show the comment
of the AAD Manager, viz:
"From the aforementioned background of the Case where
the family of Mr. Arrienda has repeatedly made different
and/or conflicting offers/requests, it seems that their family
apparently lack(sic) the capacity to reacquire their former
property, and are obviously delaying our final disposition of
the property. Moreover, since the expiry date of the
redemption period, Mr. Arrienda has not made any rental
payments on the property."[16]
The Board's denial of petitioners' request to purchase the
subject property was based not on whim or caprice, but on
a factual assessment of the financial capacity of the
petitioners to make good their repeated offers to purchase
the subject property. Respondent GSIS struck a balance
between being "responsive to the needs of the members of
the GSIS" and assuring "the actuarial solvency of the Fund
administered by the GSIS", and tilted the scale in favor of
the latter. Under the then GSIS charter or P.D. 1146, this
was well within the powers of the Board.
Petitioners, in addition, fault their failure to meet the GSIS'
terms for repurchase on the GSIS' inaction on their
January 20, 1987 request to re-acquire the subject
property through the GSIS Operation Pabahay. They
allege that instead of acting upon this letter, what was
acted upon was their letter of June 19, 1985. The
evidence on record, however, shows that Officer-in-Charge
Rosales of the Residential Loans Department endorsed
the matter raised by petitioners in their January 20, 1987
letter to Atty. Resurreccion, Head of the Operation
Pabahay. While the endorsement shows that enclosed
therewith was petitioner vda. de Urbano's June 19, 1985
letter applying for a loan of P240,000.00 to repurchase the
subject property, the endorsement itself stated that the
loan for reacquisition of the subject property was being
made under the "current Operations Pabahay." Thereafter,
the matter was endorsed by Atty. Resurreccion to the
Manager of the AAD on January 20, 1987 as "the
Operation Pabahay Task Force cannot undertake the
processing of this kind of loan unless a certificate of award
or sale is issued in favor of the applicant." AAD Manager
Secoquian returned said application to the head of the
Operation Pabahay on March 3, 1987, enumerating the
Board resolutions relative to the subject property and
stating that "pending action by the Board on the offer of
CRISPINA VDA. DELA CRUZ to purchase the subject
property for the amount of P250,000.00, the request of
Mrs. URBANO cannot as yet be given due
consideration."[17]
In sum, insofar as the petitioners' request for repurchase is
concerned, they are not entitled to repurchase as a matter
of right. The Board exercised its discretion in accordance
with law in denying their requests and the GSIS cannot be
faulted for petitioners' failure to repurchase as it acted
upon petitioners' application under the Operation Pabahay.
The sale of the subject property to respondent dela Cruz
cannot therefore be annulled on the basis of petitioners'
alleged right to repurchase.
Neither can petitioners invoke Maharlika Publishing
Corporation v. Tagle,[18] as a precedent insofar as the
Board's exercise of its discretion to grant loan restructuring
is concerned.[19] Petitioners point out that in that case, the
Supreme Court found that the GSIS "created an
agreement of binding nature" with the owner of the
foreclosed property when the owners proposed to
repurchase the property and the then GSIS General
Manager Roman Cruz, Jr. ordered that the public bidding
of the property be stopped and the repurchase be
discussed with him a day before the scheduled date of the
bidding. The case is not in point. In the Maharlika case,
this Court ruled that GSIS was deemed to have accepted
the offer to repurchase when it ordered the bidding to be
stopped pending discussion of the repurchase with the
owner of the property. In the case at bar, however, the
GSIS granted petitioners two opportunities under
Resolutions No. 929 dated November 16, 1984 and
Resolution No. 593 dated July 6, 1985 to repurchase the
subject property, but petitioners failed to comply with the
GSIS' terms of repurchase. Subsequently, when
petitioners offered to repurchase the subject property
under their own terms of payment, the GSIS under
Resolution No. 881 dated October 10, 1985 denied the
same. Unlike in the Maharlika case therefore, it cannot be
said that the GSIS "created an agreement (to repurchase)
of binding nature" with the herein petitioners.
II.
We come now to the second issue of whether the GSIS
should dispose of the subject property through public
bidding.
Petitioners aver that Section 79 of P.D. 1445[20] and
Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 86-264 mandate
the GSIS to dispose of its assets, such as the subject
property, primarily through public bidding and only upon its
failure, through a negotiated sale.
On the other hand, GSIS contends that Section 79 of P.D.
1445 does not apply to the case at bar as this provision
covers unserviceable government property and not
acquired assets like the subject property. Nor does the
sale of the subject property come within the purview of
COA Circular No. 86-264 as it is a "sale of
merchandise/inventory held for sale in the regular course
of business" which is carved out as an exception under the
circular. GSIS posits that this interpretation of COA
Circular No. 86-264 was made clear by the subsequent
COA Circular No. 89-296.
We uphold the position of the GSIS.
Section 79 of P.D. 1445 does not apply to the case at bar
as this provision applies only to unserviceable property,
viz:
"SECTION 79. Destruction or sale of unserviceable
property. - When government property has become
unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it
shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor,
be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative in the presence of the auditor
concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsalable, it
may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be
valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on
award or similar body in the presence of the auditor
concerned or other duly authorized representative of the
Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the
Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive
days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the
value of the property does not warrant the expense of
publication, by notices posted for a like period in at least
three public places in the locality where the property is to
be sold. In the event that the public auction fails, the
property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may
be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and
approved by the Commission."
That the subject property is not "unserviceable" or useless
is rather obvious. Petitioners are precisely fighting tooth
and nail to claim the subject property as they are still using
it as their family home. It still serves its purpose well.
Neither is it "no longer needed" by the GSIS. As a
financial institution extending housing loans, the
disposition of foreclosed properties - such as the subject
property - at a price beneficial to the GSIS helps maintain
the actuarial solvency of the GSIS fund. It cannot
therefore be said that the subject property is "no longer
needed" by the GSIS.
We turn now to the COA circulars cited by the parties.
COA Circular No. 86-264 dated October 16, 1986, the
"General guidelines on the divestment or disposal of
assets of government-owned and/or controlled
corporations, and their subsidiaries" provides in relevant
part, viz:
"1.0 Rationale and Scope
These guidelines shall govern the general procedures on
the divestment or disposal of assets of government-owned
and/or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, which
shall be supplemented by specific procedures as may be
adopted by the corporation concerned, provided they do
not contravene existing laws and the provisions of this
circular.
xxx
3.0 Modes of Disposal
3.1. Public Auction
As a rule, public auction or bidding shall be the primary
mode of disposal of assets.
3.2. Sale thru Negotiation
Disposal thru this mode, which is a sale without public
bidding, shall be resorted to only in case of failure of public
auction.
xxx
5.0 Exceptions and Effectivity
This Circular shall not apply to sales of
merchandise/inventory held for sale in the regular course
of business." (emphasis supplied)
On January 27, 1989, COA Circular No. 89-296 was
issued providing also for "Audit Guidelines on the
Divestment or Disposal of Property and Other Assets of
National Government Agencies and Instrumentalities,
Local Government Units and Government-Owned or
Controlled Corporations and their Subsidiaries." It provides
for the disposition of government assets, viz:
"III. DEFINITION AND SCOPE:
These audit guidelines shall be observed and adhered to
in the divestment or disposal of property and other assets
of all government entities/instrumentalities, whether
national, local or corporate, including the subsidiaries
thereof but shall not apply to the disposal of merchandise
or inventory held for sale in the regular course of business
nor to the disposal by government financial institutions of
foreclosed assets or collaterals acquired in the regular
course of business and not transferred to the National
Government under Proclamation No. 50. . .
xxx
V. MODES OF DISPOSAL/DIVESTMENT:
This Commission recognizes the following modes of
disposal/divestment of assets and property of national
government agencies, local government units and
government-owned and controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, aside from such modes as may be provided
by law.
1. Public Auction
Conformably to existing state policy, the divestment or
disposal of government property as contemplated herein
shall be undertaken primarily thru public auction. . .
2. Sale Thru Negotiation
For justifiable reasons and as demanded by the exigencies
of the service, disposal thru negotiated sale may be
resorted to and undertaken by the proper committee or
body in the agency or entity concerned taking into
consideration the following factors: . . ." (emphasis
supplied)
When the Board approved the sale of the subject property
to private respondent dela Cruz through Resolution No.
342 in August 1987 and Resolution No. 430 in October of
the same year, and when the Deed of Sale was executed
between GSIS and private respondent dela Cruz in
January 1988, Circular No. 86-264 was then in force.
The pivotal question is whether the subject property is
covered by COA Circular 86-264 or falls under the
exception in its paragraph 5 above. In construing this
exception, we derive insight from the exceptions provided
under the subsequent COA Circular 89-296, viz:
"III. DEFINITION AND SCOPE:
These audit guidelines shall be observed and adhered to
in the divestment or disposal of property and other assets
of all government entities/instrumentalities, whether
national, local or corporate, including the subsidiaries
thereof but shall not apply to the disposal of merchandise
or inventory held for sale in the regular course of business
nor to the disposal by government financial institutions of
foreclosed assets or collaterals acquired in the regular
course of business and not transferred to the National
Government under Proclamation No. 50. . ."
We refer to Circular No. 89-296 in interpreting Circular No.
86-264 in adherence to the rule in statutory construction,
viz:
"The correct rule of interpretation is, that if divers (sic)
statutes relate to the same thing, they ought all to be taken
into consideration in construing any one of them, and it is
an established rule of law, that all acts in pari materia are
to be taken together, as if they were one law. (Doug., 30;
2 Term Rep., 387, 586; 4 Maule & Selw., 210). If a thing
contained in a subsequent statute, be within the reason of
a former statute, it shall be taken to be within the meaning
of that statute. (Lord Raym., 1028); and if it can be
gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, what
meaning the Legislature attached to the words of a former
statute, they will amount to a legislative declaration of its
meaning, and will govern the construction of the first
statute. (Morris v. Mellin, 6 Barn. & Cress., 454; 7 Barn. &
Cress. 99)"[21]
In Riggs et al. v. Palmer et al.,[22] it was also ruled:
"It is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is
within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much
within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless it be within the intention of the makers. The
writers of the laws do not always express their intention
perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that
judges are to collect it from probable or rational
conjectures only, and this is called 'rational interpretation;'
and Rutherford, in his Institutes, (page 420,) says: 'Where
we make use of rational interpretation, sometimes we
restrain the meaning of the writer so as to take in less, and
sometimes we extend or enlarge his meaning so as to take
in more, than his words express.' Such a construction
ought to be put upon a statute as will best answer the
intention which the makers had in view, for qui haret in
litera, haret in cortice. In Bac. Abr. 'Statutes,' 1.5; Puff.
Law Nat. bk. 5, c. 12; Ruth. Inst. 422, 427, and in Smith's
Commentaries, 814, many cases are mentioned where it
was held that matters embraced in the general words of
statutes nevertheless were not within the statutes,
because it could not have been the intention of the law-
makers that they should be included. They were taken out
of the statutes by an equitable construction; and it is said
in Bacon: 'By an equitable construction a case not within
the letter of a statute is sometimes holden to be within the
meaning, because it is within the mischief for which the
remedy is provided. The reason for such construction is
that the law-makers could not set down every case in
express terms.'"[23]
In C&C Commercial Corporation v. National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority,[24] we ruled that statutes in pari
materia should be construed together to attain the purpose
of an expressed national policy, viz:
"On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts
a provision it has in mind the previous statutes relating to
the same subject matter, it is held that in the absence of
any express repeal or amendment therein, the new
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be
construed together. Provisions in an act which are omitted
in another act relating to the same subject matter will be
applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not
inconsistent with its purpose. Prior statutes relating to the
same subject matter are to be compared with the new
provisions; and if possible by reasonable construction,
both are to be construed that effect is given to every
provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in
apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably possible
construed to be in harmony with each other."[25]
Agpalo writes in his book, Statutory Construction, viz:
"Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed
together because enactments of the same legislature on
the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform
system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary
(sic) to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its
acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted its
new act with reference thereto."[26]
When both COA Circular No. 86-264 and COA Circular
No. 89-296 were issued, affording flexibility to government-
owned and controlled corporations (GOCC's) to allow them
to generate more revenue for national development was a
declared government policy. This policy is unmistakable in
laws executed before the issuance of Circular No. 86-264
in October 1986. P.D. 2029, "Defining Government-
Owned and Controlled Corporations and Indentifying Their
Role in National Development," dated February 4, 1986,
provides:
"WHEREAS, there is a need to assure the flexibility of
such government corporations consistent with the need for
public accountability by providing for differential treatment
for government corporations;
xxx
SECTION 1. General Policy. - It is the policy of the State
that the corporate form of organization, utilized judiciously,
is one of the valid forms through which the government
may participate in economic and social development.
xxx
SEC. 7. Provision of adequate operational flexiblity. -
Government corporations shall be provided with adequate
operational flexibility in order to function properly and
efficiently, especially under conditions of market
competition. Such flexibility shall nevertheless be
consistent with the requirements of public acountability.
xxx
SEC. 8. Differential treatment.- To implement the concept
of greater flexibility, government corporations in general
shall be accorded differential treatment which is more
consistent with coporate organizational requirements as
distinguished from regular government agencies, with
respect to the exercise by the various service-wide
agencies, such as the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, and the Office of Budget and
Management, of their respective jurisdiction."
Letter of Instructions No. 1520, issued on the same day as
P.D. 2029 on February 4, 1986, also provides for the role
of government corporations in national development, viz:
"WHEREAS, it is necessary that the limited resources of
government be utilized as efficiently, as effectively, and as
economically as possible to further national development
and to support the economic recovery program, for which
the judicious use of the corporate form of organization is
critical;
xxx"
P.D. 2030, Providing for the Orderly Disposition of Certain
Assets of Government Institutions, also issued on
February 4, 1986, made explicit the policy of the
government to divest government corporations of assets
as an aid to national development, viz:
"WHEREAS, the National Government, through the
agency of various financial and other government
institutions, has acquired or is otherwise the owner of a
large number of assets in the industrial, manufacturing and
commercial sectors of the economy which, as part of the
economic recovery program adopted by the National
Government, it has been deemed necessary and
appropriate for the National Government to divest in a
planned and orderly manner;
WHEREAS, as an integral part of this economic recovery
program and in order to facilitate the reorganization of
certain government financial institutions, it is necessary to
relieve those institutions of assets which adversely affect
their financial viability and liquidity, and for the National
Government to take over such assets and to assume the
realted liabilities of those institutions;
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the National Government to
realize on such assets within the shortest possible time
and, to such end, to dispose of such assets generally on
terms that would permit immediate substantial cash returns
to the National Government;
xxx"
Proclamation No. 50, "Proclaiming and Launching a
Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization
of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets
Thereof, and Creating the Committee on Privatization and
the Asset Privatization Trust," issued on December 8,
1986 after the issuance of COA Circular No. 86-264, but
prior to COA Circular No. 89-296, reiterates the continuing
policy of the government to encourage divestment of
assets as an aid to national development, viz:
"CONSIDERING that the government has decided to
adopt, as the twin cornerstones of the program, the
following parallel imperatives for the attainment of national
policy:
xxx
(b) reducing the number of government corporations which
has proliferated to unmanageable proportions;
circumscribing the areas of economic activities within
which the government corporations may operate; and
aiming to achieve these goals through the privatization of a
good number of government corporations, and the
disposition and liquidation of the non-relevant and non-
performing assets of retained corporations as the logical
first step to their rehabilitation."
The above-quoted laws on GOCC's and disposition of their
assets unmistakeably show the policy of the government to
allow flexibility to GOCC's and to promote disposition of
non-performing assets. This policy undergirds both COA
Circular No. 86-264 and 89-296. Thus, the exception
provided in COA Circular No. 86-264 should be, to the
widest extent possible, construed to accommodate this
policy and allow GOCC's wide latitude in the disposition of
their assets, including foreclosed assets or collaterals
acquired in the regular course of business. COA Circular
No. 89-296 provides for two exceptions to the requirement
of disposition primarily through public bidding, i.e., (1)
disposal of merchandise or inventory held for sale in the
regular course of business; and (2) disposal by
government financial institutions of foreclosed assets or
collaterals acquired in the regular course of business." In
light of the declared policy of the government on GOCC's
and their assets, COA Circular No. 89-296 should be
understood to have clarified the coverage of the exception
under COA Circular No. 86-264, i.e., sales of
merchandise/inventory held for sale in the regular course
of business.
The GSIS being a financial institution extending loans to its
members, the foreclosure of the subject property as
collateral to a loan was done in the regular course of
business. Its sale to private respondent dela Cruz falls
within the exception provided by COA Circular No. 86-264
as clarified by COA Circular 89-296, and thus does not
offend the requirements of the said COA circulars.
Instead, the policies and procedures of the GSIS on the
disposition of acquired assets govern the case at bar. Mr.
Romeo Tejedor, manager of the Acquired Assets
Department of GSIS, testified that at the time the disputed
transaction took place, the GSIS still did not have clear cut
policies on the sale of acquired assets. At that time, the
GSIS Board of Trustees had the prerogative to authorize
the sale of acquired assets. Petitioners aver that the GSIS
"Policy and Procedural Guidelines Acquisition,
Administration, and Disposition of Acquired Assets (PPG)",
a newspaper copy of which they annexed to their reply to
the GSIS' brief, provides that a negotiated sale may only
be entered into after two failed public biddings on the
acquired property. Petitioners, however, omitted to state
that the said newspaper copy was published and the PPG
took effect only on January 17, 1991, long after the sale of
the subject property.[27] In the absence of evidence of
policies and procedures contrary to the testimony of Mr.
Tejedor, we give credence to Mr. Tejedor's testimony that
at the time of the disputed sale to private respondent dela
Cruz, GSIS did not have clear cut policies on disposition of
assets that required it to first sell the subject property
through public bidding before a negotiated sale. The GSIS
precisely came out with a PPG in 1991 to set the policies
and procedures to govern the disposition of acquired
assets because these were not clear cut prior to 1991. We
therefore hold that the sale of the subject property to
private respondent dela Cruz was not contrary to law.
Neither can petitioners invoke the Maharlika case to lend
support to its contention that the Board is bound to fulfill its
representations in its letters to the petitioners that upon the
latter's failure to repurchase the property under Resolution
Nos. 929 and 593, the GSIS will dispose of the subject
property through public bidding. Petitioners claim that
these representations constituted a contract between them
and GSIS. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that there
was no contract between GSIS and the petitioners that
obligates the GSIS to sell the subject property through
public bidding, viz:
". . . the mortgage contract between the parties was not
novated as to the extension of the redemption period of
appellants since this is not sanctioned by law. What GSIS
did per Resolution 929 was to make a counter proposal to
appellants for the sale of the property at the price of
P174,572.62 payable in cash within 60 days from notice of
resolution with a warning that non-compliance thereof (sic)
will result to the sale of the property at public auction. At
this point in time, there was still no meeting of the minds
between the parties since the request of appellants thru
Purificacion Urbano is to extend the redemption period to
enable them to redeem the property while Resolution No.
929 is for outright sale for the price of P174,572.62. These
are two (2) separate and distinct legal transactions. Under
Article 1319 of the Civil Code, the offer must be certain.
The offer of Ms. Urbano is certain and explicit as to the
extension of time to redeem their property. The
acceptance of GSIS to this proposal must also be absolute
and clear in granting said extension. However, GSIS did
not agree to the extension due to legal constraints and
instead a qualified acceptance was given in the sense that
GSIS made a counter-offer for appellants to buy the
property under certain terms.
Was there an acceptance of the counter-offer of GSIS on
the part of appellants? Definitely none. On January 10,
1985, when appellants thru Purificacion Urbano was
notified by GSIS Manager M.M. Secoquian of the Acquired
Assets Department of the approval of the sale under Board
Resolution No. 929, appellant Urbano replied on January
18, 1985 that they cannot pay the price of P174,572.62 as
it may be difficult for a financial institution to accommodate
said obligation within the grace period of 60 days. (Exhibit
"E", Records). In turn, Ms. Urbano made another counter-
proposal "to have the said property be RE-MORTGAGE
(sic) through the process of repurchase with the GSIS".
(Exhibit "F", Records). . . A similar request was sent by
appellant Aurelio Arrienda on May 20, 1985 but the same
was denied in a Board Resolution No. 516 dated June 6,
1985. (Exhibit "H", Records).
From the foregoing, this Court rules that there was no
meeting of the minds between the parties as the counter-
offer of GSIS for the appellants to buy the property based
on terms and conditions laid down under Board Resolution
No. 929 was NOT accepted by appellants. Under Article
1319 of the Civil Code, there was no valid and perfected
contract. Hence, appellants cannot claim any right under
Board Resolution No. 929, more particularly on the sale at
public auction since they did not agree to the counter-offer
of GSIS as contained in Board Resolution 929.
. . . In response to the request of the First Lady Imelda
Marcos, the GSIS Board of Trustees approved Board
Resolution No. 593 which granted to "Mr. Aurelio Arrienda
sixty (60) days from notice within which to purchase the
property for P174,572.62 payable in cash. Should Mr.
Arrienda fail to pay the same within the time frame
mentioned, the property shall be sold at public auction,
without need of any further action from the Board." (Exhibit
"3", p. 232 Records). Mr. Arrienda was notified of the
Board Resolution 593 by Manager M.M. Secoquian on
August 2, 1985, asking him to remit the amount within 60
days from receipt of said letter (Exhibit "K", Records).
However, on October 4, 1985, appellants thru Atty. Ariel
Arrienda sent a letter to GSIS making a counter-offer to
purchase said property. . . On October 10, 1985, the GSIS
Board passed Board Resolution 818 declining the offer of
Mr. Arnel Arrienda to purchase the property for
P147,572,62 under the terms and conditions he proposed.
..
From the foregoing, We likewise conclude that there was
no perfected contract between the parties. The proposal
of appellants thru Mr. Aurelio Arrienda is for the extension
of the redemption period or to restructure their loan with
GSIS. (Exhibit "J", Records). The approval of GSIS is for
appellants to purchase the property at the price of
P174,572.62 within 60 days from receipt of notice. (Exhibit
"3", Res. No. 592, Records). This was NOT approved by
appellants and instead they made another counter-
proposal to pay said amount with a down payment of
P50,000.00 and the balance to be paid in 60 monthly
installments. (Exhibit "1", Records). This counter offer
was denied in Resolution 1022. . . It is clear from the
above-described events that the offer of appellants to
redeem the property or restructure the loan was met with a
qualified acceptance from GSIS which is for them to pay
the prescribed price within 60 days. Said qualified
acceptance constitutes a counter-offer under Article 1319
of the Civil Code and the appellants did not accept the
same by making another counter-offer to pay on staggered
basis. This counter offer was denied twice by GSIS and
therefore there was clearly no meeting of the minds and no
perfected contract.
If there is completely no acceptance or if the offer is
expressly rejected, there is no meeting of the minds.
(Leoquingco vs. Postal Savings Bank, 47 Phil. 772 and in
Gamboa vs. Gonzales, 17 Phil. 381)
If the acceptance be qualified or not absolute, there is no
concurrence of minds. There merely is counter-offer.
(Batangan vs. Cojuangco, 78 Phil. 481)
A counter-offer as a matter of fact extinguishes the offer. It
may or may not be accepted by the original offerer.
(Trillana vs. Quezon Colleges, L-5003, June 27, 1953)"
(emphasis supplied)[28]
III.
Finally, on the issue of whether or not GSIS was in bad
faith in dealing with the petitioners, we rule in the negative.
As earlier discussed, respondent GSIS' denial of
petitioners' further requests for repurchase of the subject
property was based on a factual determination of
petitioners' financial incapacity and the then GSIS charter,
P.D. 1146. It is also worth noting that GSIS sold the
subject property to respondent dela Cruz only after giving
petitioners an almost one year opportunity to repurchase
the property and only after ascertaining that the purchase
price proposed by private respondent dela Cruz in
payment of the subject property would benefit the GSIS.
Nor can petitioners, on the strength of Valmonte v.
Belmonte, Jr.,[29] impute bad faith on the part of GSIS
when the latter did not disclose to petitioners that it was
negotiating with private respondent dela Cruz for the sale
of the subject property as soon as it started the
negotiations. The Court ruled in the Valmonte case that
the constitutional right to information is limited to "matters
of public concern," to "transactions involving public
interest." The negotiation and subsequent sale of the
subject property by the GSIS to private respondent dela
Cruz was by no stretch of the imagination imbued with
public interest as it was a purely private transaction.
Petitioners cannot therefore demand that it be informed of
such negotiation and sale moreso since they no longer
had any interest on the subject property upon failure to
comply with GSIS' terms for repurchase and upon GSIS'
denial of petitioners' offer to repurchase under their
proposed terms and conditions. In the absence of proof of
bad faith on the part of the respondents, we deny
petitioners' prayer for moral damages and attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the impugned
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154616. July 12, 2004]
GOV. ANTONIO CALINGIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, Special 17th Division, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RENATO S. DE VILLA, DEPT. OF
INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY JOEY
LINA,* UNDERSECRETARY EDUARDO R. SOLIMAN,
JR., DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10, DIRECTOR
RODOLFO Z. RAZUL, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review seeking to annul the
Resolution[1] dated May 11, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 64583, which denied petitioner
Governor Antonio Calingin’s petition for prohibition with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or the issuance
of an order of status quo ante, as well as its Resolution[2]
dated July 1, 2002, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Court of
Appeals and borne by the records, are as follows:
The Office of the President issued a Resolution[3] dated
March 22, 2001 in OP Case No. 00-1-9220 (DILG ADM.
Case No. P-16-99) entitled Vice Governor Danilo P.
Lagbas, et al. versus Governor Antonio P. Calingin
(Misamis Oriental) suspending Gov. Calingin for 90 days.
On April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Eduardo R. Soliman of
the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG), by authority of Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr., issued
a Memorandum[4] implementing the said Resolution of the
Office of the President. On May 3, 2001, Gov. Calingin
filed before the Office of the President a Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]
The DILG Memorandum bore the authority of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which granted an
exemption to the election ban in the movement of any
public officer in its Resolution No. 3992[6] promulgated on
April 24, 2001. This was in pursuance to COMELEC
Resolution No. 3401 which provides in part that
Section 1. Prohibited Acts – (a) During the election period
from January 2, 2001 until July 13, 2001, no public official
shall make or cause any transfer/detail whatsoever of any
officer or employee in the civil service, including public
school teachers, or suspend elective provincial, city,
municipal or barangay official, except upon prior written
approval of the Commission.
On May 7, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed a petition for
prohibition before the Court of Appeals to prevent the
DILG from executing the assailed suspension order.
However, on May 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the said petition and by resolution issued on
July 1, 2002, denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari where petitioner asserts
that the Court of Appeals erred in
… FINDING THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE
SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DURING THE
ELECTION PERIOD IS WITH AUTHORITY FROM THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
… FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT IS FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS
PROVIDED IN SECTION 67, CHAPTER 4, OF REPUBLIC
ACT 7160, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991.[7]
In dispute is the validity of the DILG Memorandum
implementing the suspension order issued by the Office of
the President. We are asked to resolve in this connection
two issues: (1) Was the decision of the Office of the
President already final and executory? and (2) Was the
exemption from the election ban in the movement of any
public officer granted by COMELEC valid?
Petitioner contends that decisions of the Office of the
President on cases where it has original jurisdiction
become final and executory only after the lapse of 15 days
from the receipt thereof and that the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration shall suspend the running of the said
period[8] in accordance with Section 15,[9] Chapter 3,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner further contends that Section 67,[10] Chapter 4
of the Local Government Code (Rep. Act 7160), which
provides that decisions of the Office of the President shall
be final and executory, applies only to decisions of the
Office of the President on administrative cases appealed
from the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod of highly-urbanized cities and independent
component cities, and sangguniang bayan of
municipalities within the Metro Manila Area. It does not
cover decisions on cases where the Office of the President
has original jurisdiction such as those involving a
Provincial Governor.[11]
In Lapid v. Court of Appeals,[12] we held that it is a
principle of statutory construction that where there are two
statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was
specially intended for the said case must prevail. The
case on hand involves a disciplinary action against an
elective local official. Thus, the Local Government Code is
the applicable law and must prevail over the Administrative
Code which is of general application.[13] Further, the Local
Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than
the Administrative Code of 1987. In statutory construction,
all laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the
later law are repealed or modified accordingly.[14]
Besides, even though appeal to the Court of Appeals is
granted under Sec. 1,[15] Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court, Sec. 12,[16] Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court
in relation to Sec. 68[17] of the Local Government Code
provides for the immediate execution pending appeal.
Under the same case of Lapid v. Court of Appeals,[18] we
enunciated that the decisions of the Office of the President
under the Local Government Code are immediately
executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws
under which the decisions were rendered mandated them
to be so.
In sum, the decisions of the Office of the President are
final and executory. No motion for reconsideration is
allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to
the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay
the execution of the decision. Thus, the DILG Secretary
may validly move for its immediate execution.
As to the validity of the exemption granted by COMELEC
in its Resolution No. 3992, petitioner claims that the
exemption was invalid for being based on a mere draft
resolution. According to him, a draft resolution does not
operate as a final resolution of a case until the proper
resolution is duly signed and promulgated. Petitioner
maintains that a draft cannot produce any legal effect.
A perusal of the records, however, reveals that the
Resolution in O.P. Case No. 00-1-9220 was approved and
signed on March 22, 2001 by Executive Secretary Renato
de Villa by the authority of the President. Hence, the
approval was before the promulgation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3992 on April 24, 2001. The record also
shows that the request to implement the said suspension
order was filed on March 22, 2001 by the Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President pursuant
to the requirements stated in the Resolution.
Moreover, COMELEC Resolution No. 3529[19] – which
may be applied by analogy and in relation to Sec. 2[20] of
COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 – merely requires the
request to be in writing indicating the office and place from
which the officer is removed, and the reason for said
movement, and submitted together with the formal
complaint executed under oath and containing the specific
charges and the answer to said complaint. The request for
the exemption was accompanied with the Affidavit of
Complaint, Affidavit of Controversion, Reply and Draft
Resolution. The pertinent documents required by the
COMELEC to substantiate the request were submitted.
There being a proper basis for its grant of exemption,
COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 is valid.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari
is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals’ resolutions
dated May 11, 2002 and July 1, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
64583 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and
Tinga, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123037. March 21, 1997]
TEODORO Q. PEÑA, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
ALFREDO E. ABUEG, JR., respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution[1] of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
dismissing the Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner
Teodoro Q. Peña in HRET Case No. 95-014. Petitioner
questioned the election of the private respondent Alfredo
E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of Representatives
representing the Second District of the province of
Palawan.
Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for
the said Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections.
On May 12, 195, upon canvassing the votes cast, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the
private respondent as the winner.
On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the
HRET, wherein the petitioner, as protestant, averred that:
“7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of
Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread
vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious
irregularities committed before, during and after the voting,
and during the counting of votes and the preparation of
election returns and certificates of canvass which affected
the results of the election. Among the fraudulent acts
committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation
of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioner’s known
supporters through systematic deletion of names from the
lists of voters, allowing persons to vote in excess of the
number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading
and non-reading of protestant’s ballots and other
irregularities.
8. According to the Statement of Votes by
Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly obtained
52,967 votes, while the protestant allegedly obtained
46,023 votes, or a difference of 6,944 votes. A copy of
said document is attached hereto as Annex ‘B’.
9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and
terrorism and other serious irregularities not been
committed, the result of the elections for Member of the
House of Representatives would have been different and
the protestant would have garnered the highest number of
votes for the Office Member of the House of
Representatives in the Second District of Palawan, which
was the true expression of the will of the voters of the
Province of Palawan.
10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the protestee was
allegedly the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the Second District of Palawan is
contrary to law and to the true expression of the will of the
voters of the Province of Palawan.”[2]
Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With
Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and Counter-Protest[3]
on June 5, 1995, to which Peña filed a Reply on June 23,
1995. Subsequent to the filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a
Motion to Dismiss[4] the Petition on June 22, 1995,
averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over
the petition, the same being insufficient in form and
substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its
challenge on the fact that the petition failed to allege the
precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement
of voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes
would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss[5]
on July 10, 1995, attaching thereto a Summary of
Contested Precincts, naming 700 precincts where election
irregularities allegedly occurred.
In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent
HRET ruled that although it had jurisdiction over the
petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails
to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in
form and substance, meriting its dismissal.
The HRET states pertinently:
“There are 743 precincts in the second congressional
district of Palawan which is comprised of Puerto Princesa
City and the municipalities of Aborlan, Balabac, Bataraza,
Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon, and Marcos (Ordinance
appended to the 1973 Constitution). The Protestant failed
to specify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743
precincts, that are included in his protest; he even failed to
allege the municipalities where the protested precincts are
located. Worse, the body of the Petition does not even
mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them is made
only in the Prayer. These omissions prevent Protestee
from being apprised of the issues which he has to meet
and make it virtually impossible for the Tribunal to
determine which ballot boxes have to be collected.
The Supreme Court, in Fernando vs. Pastor M. Endencia,
Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, et. al. (No. 46099, 66
Phil 148, 150, August 30, 1938) observed that, ‘[w]hile the
election law does not say so directly, it is clearly inferred
from its relevant provisions that where the grounds of
contest are that legal votes were rejected and illegal votes
received, the motion of protest should state in what
precincts such irregularities occurred. xxx The specification
in the motion of protest of the election precinct or precincts
where the alleged irregularities occurred, is required in
order to apprise the contestee of the issues which he has
to meet. xxx’
In its more recent resolution in Grand Alliance for
Democracy (GAD) vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 78302, May
26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665), the Supreme Court held that
the petition therein ‘could have been dismissed outright as
deficient in form and substance, being couched in general
terms only, without precise indication of the time, place
and manner of the commission of the alleged
irregularities.’ xxx
Similarly, this Tribunal, in dismissing an election protest,
observed that the protest, in general language, “impugns,
contests and protests the illegal, improper and fraudulent
electoral practices, acts and deeds” of the protestee and
“impugns and contests all the election returns in the lone
district of Catanduanes.” The tribunal held that this
scattershot allegation is not allowed in election contests
and that “it is necessary to make a precise indication of the
precincts protested and a specification of the claimed
offenses to have been committed by the parties.” (Alberto
vs. Tapia, HRET Case No. 37, January 23, 1989)
While Protestant has attached as Annex “A” to his
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, filed on 10 July 1995,
a Summary of contested Precincts, the defects in his
Protest were not cured thereby as the Summary was
submitted only after the Motion to Dismiss had been filed.
The Opposition and the attached Summary do not amend
the original Petition. There is not even a prayer in the
Opposition suggesting such amendment.
Moreover, in a Resolution promulgated on 17 June 1995,
the Commission on Elections en banc (COMELEC)
dismissed herein Petitioner’s Petition (SPA Case No. 95-
258) to declare a failure of elections in the second district
of Palawan. Copy of said Resolution was sent to
Petitioner Peña’s Petition Ad Cautelam was thus
converted into a regular protest (not Ad Cautelam)
effective upon the finality of the official COMELEC
resolution, thereby providing him an opportunity to amend
it to cure the defects cited above, Protestant took no
positive and affirmative steps for that purpose.
Protestant alleges in his Opposition that Protestee has
likewise failed to specify the 47 precincts he contests in his
Counter-Protest. This omission merely renders
Protestee’s Counter-Protest defective for insufficiency in
form and substance and for failure to state a cause of
action. It does not cure the fatal defects in Protestant’s
Petition.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petition (Protest) to state a
cause of action because it is fatally insufficient in form and
substance, the Tribunal Resolved to GRANT Protestee’s
Motion to Dismiss and to DISMISS, as it hereby
DISMISSES, the instant Petition of Protest. As a logical
consequence thereof and also for the same reason,
Protestee’s Counter-Protest is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”[6]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution was denied by the respondent tribunal on
November 14, 1995.
In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995,
petitioner argues that the respondent HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to having acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the
election protest of petitioner considering that:
I has thus made a prior determination that the petition is
“THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995
STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS SUFFICIENT IN
FORM AND SUBSTANCE.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS
INITIALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO
SPECIFY THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID
DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER SUBMITTED
A SUMMARY OF THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS
WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE
RESPONDENT HRET.”
It is the Petitioner’s view that the instant election protest is
sufficient in form and substance even while failing to
specify the precincts where irregularities allegedly
occurred. Nowhere is it provided that the specification of
the precincts is a jurisdictional requirement that must be
complied with in order that an election protest can be
entertained by the HRET. To support his submission,
petitioner cites the cases of Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil
781, Arao vs. COMELEC, 210 SCRA 790 and Gallares vs.
Casenas, 48 Phil 362, the latter stating that:
“From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be
seen that frauds, irregularities and violations of the law are
alleged therein, which, if true, would undoubtedly change
the result of the elections.
The fact that in the protest the number of votes which
would result in favor of the protestant after the judicial
counting is not specified, does not affect the right of the
protestant, for it being known that said omission is a defect
of the protest, the same may be cured by a specification of
the votes mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the
protest, without thereby adding new grounds for those
already alleged by the protestant.”
Applying the same principle to the specification of
precincts in the instant case, the defect in the petition
should have been cured by the opposition to the private
respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.
Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily
dismiss the Petition Ad Cautelam, and instead, required
the private respondent Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET
sufficient in form and substance.
We do not agree.
In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to
answer the petition, the HRET was not ruling on the formal
and substantive sufficiency of the petition. The order to
require an answer is but a matter of course, as under the
Revised Rules of Procedure of the HRET, it is provided
that:
“RULE 22. Summons. - Upon the filing of the petition, the
Clerk of the Tribunal shall forthwith issue the
corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent
together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer.”
As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with
respondent HRET in ruling for the insufficiency of the
same.
A perusal of the petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that
Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts
where widespread election, fraud and irregularities
occured. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very
substance of the protest. Under Section 21 of the Revised
Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form and
substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the
immediate dismissal of the Petition.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form
and substance means that the petition must be more than
merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are
unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in
fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss
the petition, otherwise, the assumptions of an elected
public official may, and will always be held up by petitions
of this sort by the losing candidate.
Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a more
serious inadequacy than a mere failure to specify the
number of votes which would inure to the protestant, as
was the case in Gallares vs. Casenas, or the failure to
impugn the validity of some of the ballots cast, as in
Yalung vs. Atienza, supra, both of which cases were
decided in the 1920s. The defect in the instant case arises
from the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a
bare allegation of “massive fraud, widespread intimidation
and terrorism and other serious irregularities”, without
specification, and substantiation, of where and how these
occurences took place, appears in the petition. We cannot
allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments
to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will
deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each
other, racing to disembank from the water.
On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails
to impress. The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo
vs. HRET,[7] that substantial amendments to the protest
may be allowed only within the same period for filing the
election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules
of Procedure is ten (10) days after proclamation of the
winner.
While it is conceded that statutes providing for election
contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical questions, the rule likewise
stands, that in an election protest, the protestant must
stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or
amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory
period for filing of the protest.[8]
Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to
annul an election should be exercised with the greatest
care as it involves the free and fair expression of the
popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under
circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a
fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that
elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes
impossible to take any other step.[9] xxx This is as it
should be, for the democratic system is good for the many
although abhorred by a few.
In sum, this Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and
orders of electoral tribunals operates only upon a showing
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal.
Only where such a grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the electoral tribunal’s
judgment. There is such showing in the present petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
resolves to DISMISS the present petition for lack of merit.
The resolution of the respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal dated October 12, 1995
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., took no part (Chairman of
HRET).
Davide, Jr., Romero, and Melo, JJ., took no part (Members
of HRET).
Bellosillo, J., took no part due to relation to one party.
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104171. February 24, 1999]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs. B.F. GOODRICH PHILS., INC. (now SIME DARBY
INTERNATIONAL TIRE CO., INC.) and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notwithstanding the expiration of the five-year prescriptive
period, may the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) still
assess a taxpayer even after the latter has already paid
the tax due, on the ground that the previous assessment
was insufficient or based on a “false” return?
The Case
This is the main question raised before us in this Petition
for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated
February 14, 1992, promulgated by the Court of
Appeals[2] in CA-GR SP No. 25100. The assailed
Decision reversed the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)[3]
which upheld the BIR commissioner’s assessments made
beyond the five-year statute of limitations.
The Facts
The facts are undisputed.[4] Private Respondent BF
Goodrich Phils., Inc. (now Sime Darby International Tire
Co. Inc.), was an American-owned and controlled
corporation previous to July 3, 1974. As a condition for
approving the manufacture by private respondent of tires
and other rubber products, the Central Bank of the
Philippines required that it should develop a rubber
plantation. In compliance with this requirement, private
respondent purchased from the Philippine government in
1961, under the Public Land Act and the Parity
Amendment to the 1935 Constitution, certain parcels of
land located in Tumajubong, Basilan, and there developed
a rubber plantation.
More than a decade later, on August 2, 1973, the justice
secretary rendered an opinion stating that, upon the
expiration of the Parity Amendment on July 3, 1974, the
ownership rights of Americans over public agricultural
lands, including the right to dispose or sell their real estate,
would be lost. On the basis of this Opinion, private
respondent sold to Siltown Realty Philippines, Inc. on
January 21, 1974, its Basilan landholding for P500,000
payable in installments. In accord with the terms of the
sale, Siltown Realty Philippines, Inc. leased the said
parcels of land to private respondent for a period of 25
years, with an extension of another 25 years at the latter’s
option.
Based on the BIR’s Letter of Authority No. 10115 dated
April 14, 1975, the books and accounts of private
respondent were examined for the purpose of determining
its tax liability for taxable year 1974. The examination
resulted in the April 23, 1975 assessment of private
respondent for deficiency income tax in the amount of
P6,005.35, which it duly paid.
Subsequently the BIR also issued Letters of Authority Nos.
074420 RR and 074421 RR and Memorandum Authority
Reference No. 749157 for the purpose of examining
Siltown’s business, income and tax liabilities. On the basis
of this examination, the BIR commissioner issued against
private respondent on October 10, 1980, an assessment
for deficiency in donor’s tax in the amount of P1,020,850,
in relation to the previously mentioned sale of its Basilan
landholdings to Siltown. Apparently, the BIR deemed the
consideration for the sale insufficient, and the difference
between the fair market value and the actual purchase
price a taxable donation.
In a letter dated November 24, 1980, private respondent
contested this assessment. On April 9, 1981, it received
another assessment dated March 16, 1981, which
increased to P1,092,949 the amount demanded for the
alleged deficiency donor’s tax, surcharge, interest and
compromise penalty.
Private respondent appealed the correctness and the
legality of these last two assessments to the CTA. After
trial in due course, the CTA rendered its Decision dated
March 29, 1991, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue assessing petitioner deficiency gift tax is
MODIFIED and petitioner is ordered to pay the amount of
P1,311,179.01 plus 10% surcharge and 20% annual
interest from March 16, 1981 until fully paid provided that
the maximum amount that may be collected as interest on
delinquency shall in no case exceed an amount
corresponding to a period of three years pursuant to
Section 130(b) (1) and (c) of the 1977 Tax Code, as
amended by P.D. No. 1705, which took effect on August 1,
1980.
“SO ORDERED.”[5]
Undaunted, private respondent elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the CTA, as follows:
“What is involved here is not a first assessment; nor is it
one within the 5-year period stated in Section 331 above.
Since what is involved in this case is a multiple
assessment beyond the five-year period, the assessment
must be based on the grounds provided in Section 337,
and not on Section 15 of the 1974 Tax Code. Section 337
utilizes the very specific terms ‘fraud, irregularity, and
mistake’. ‘Falsity does not appear to be included in this
enumeration. Falsity suffices for an assessment, which is
a first assessment made within the five-year period. When
it is a subsequent assessment made beyond the five-year
period, then, it may be validly justified only by ‘fraud,
irregularity and mistake’ on the part of the taxpayer.”[6]
Hence, this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.[7]
The Issues
Before us, petitioner raises the following issues:
“I
Whether or not petitioner’s right to assess herein
deficiency donor’s tax has indeed prescribed as ruled by
public respondent Court of Appeals
II
Whether or not the herein deficiency donor’s tax
assessment for 1974 is valid and in accordance with law”
Prescription is the crucial issue in the resolution of this
case.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Main Issue: Prescription
The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the CTA on the issue of prescription, because its
ruling was based on factual findings that should have been
left undisturbed on appeal, in the absence of any showing
that it had been tainted with gross error or grave abuse of
discretion.[8] The Court is not persuaded.
True, the factual findings of the CTA are generally not
disturbed on appeal when supported by substantial
evidence and in the absence of gross error or grave abuse
of discretion. However, the CTA’s application of the law to
the facts of this controversy is an altogether different
matter, for it involves a legal question. There is a question
of law when the issue is the application of the law to a
given set of facts. On the other hand, a question of fact
involves the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.[9] In the
present case, the Court of Appeals ruled not on the truth or
falsity of the facts found by the CTA, but on the latter’s
application of the law on prescription.
Section 331 of the National Internal Revenue Code
provides:
“SEC. 331. Period of limitation upon assessment and
collection. – Except as provided in the succeeding section,
internal-revenue taxes shall be assessed within five years
after the return was filed, and no proceeding in court
without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall
be begun after expiration of such period. For the purposes
of this section, a return filed before the last day prescribed
by law for the filing thereof shall be considered as filed on
such last day: Provided, That this limitation shall not apply
to cases already investigated prior to the approval of this
Code.”
Applying this provision of law to the facts at hand, it is clear
that the October 16, 1980 and the March 1981
assessments were issued by the BIR beyond the five-year
statute of limitations. The Court has thoroughly studied
the records of this case and found no basis to disregard
the five-year period of prescription. As succinctly
pronounced by the Court of Appeals:
“The subsequent assessment made by the respondent
Commissioner on October 10, 1980, modified by that of
March 16, 1981, violates the law. Involved in this petition
is the income of the petitioner for the year 1974, the
returns for which were required to be filed on or before
April 15 of the succeeding year. The returns for the year
1974 were duly filed by the petitioner, and assessment of
taxes due for such year -- including that on the transfer of
properties on June 21, 1974 -- was made on April 13, 1975
and acknowledged by Letter of Confirmation No. 101155
terminating the examination on this subject. The
subsequent assessment of October 10, 1980 modified, by
that of March 16, 1981, was made beyond the period
expressly set in Section 331 of the National Intenal
Revenue Code xxx.”[10]
Petitioner relies on the CTA ruling, the salient portion of
which reads:
“Falsity is what we have here, and for that matter, we
hasten to add that the second assessment (March 16,
1981) of the Commissioner was well-advised having been
made in contemplation of his power under Section 15 of
the 1974 Code (now Section 16, of NIRC) to assess the
proper tax on the best evidence obtainable “when there is
reason to believe that a report of a taxpayer is false,
incomplete or erroneous.” More, when there is falsity with
intent to evade tax as in this case, the ordinary period of
limitation upon assessment and collection does not apply
so that contrary to the averment of petitioner, the right to
assess respondent has not prescribed.
“What is the considered falsity? The transfer through sales
of the parcels of land in Tumajubong, Lamitan, Basilan in
favor of Siltown Realty for the sum of P500,000.00 only
whereas said lands had been sworn to under Presidential
Decree No. 76 (Dec. 6, 1972) as having a value of
P2,683,467 (P2,475, 467 + P207,700) (see Declaration of
Real Property form, p. 28, and p. 15, no. 5, BIR
Record).”[11]
For the purpose of safeguarding taxpayers from any
unreasonable examination, investigation or assessment,
our tax law provides a statute of limitations in the collection
of taxes. Thus, the law on prescription, being a remedial
measure, should be liberally construed in order to afford
such protection.[12] As a corollary, the exceptions to the
law on prescription should perforce be strictly construed.
Section 15 of the NIRC, on the other hand, provides that
“[w]hen a report required by law as a basis for the
assessment of any national internal revenue tax shall not
be forthcoming within the time fixed by law or regulation, or
when there is reason to believe that any such report is
false, incomplete, or erroneous, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue shall assess the proper tax on the best
evidence obtainable.” Clearly, Section 15 does not
provide an exception to the statute of limitations on the
issuance of an assessment, by allowing the initial
assessment to be made on the basis of the best evidence
available. Having made its initial assessment in the
manner prescribed, the commissioner could not have been
authorized to issue, beyond the five-year prescriptive
period, the second and the third assessments under
consideration before us.
Nor is petitioner’s claim of falsity sufficient to take the
questioned assessments out of the ambit of the statute of
limitations. The relevant part of then Section 332 of the
NIRC, which enumerates the exceptions to the period of
prescription, provides:
“SEC. 332. Exceptions as to period of limitation of
assessment and collection of taxes. -- (a) In the case of a
false or fraudulent return with intent to evade a tax or of a
failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a
proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be
begun without assessment, at any time within ten years
after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or omission: xxx.”
Petitioner insists that private respondent committed
“falsity” when it sold the property for a price lesser than its
declared fair market value. This fact alone did not
constitute a false return which contains wrong information
due to mistake, carelessness or ignorance.[13] It is
possible that real property may be sold for less than
adequate consideration for a bona fide business purpose;
in such event, the sale remains an “arm’s length”
transaction. In the present case, the private respondent
was compelled to sell the property even at a price less
than its market value, because it would have lost all
ownership rights over it upon the expiration of the parity
amendment. In other words, private respondent was
attempting to minimize its losses. At the same time, it was
able to lease the property for 25 years, renewable for
another 25. This can be regarded as another
consideration on the price.
Furthermore, the fact that private respondent sold its real Romero (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,
property for a price less than its declared fair market value concur.
did not by itself justify a finding of false return. Indeed, Vitug, J., on official leave.
private respondent declared the sale in its 1974 return
submitted to the BIR.[14] Within the five-year prescriptive
period, the BIR could have issued the questioned
assessment, because the declared fair market value of
said property was of public record. This it did not do,
however, during all those five years. Moreover, the BIR THIRD DIVISION
failed to prove that respondent's 1974 return had been
filed fraudulently. Equally. significant was its failure to
prove respondent's intent to evade the payment of the PHILEX MINING G.R. No. 148187
correct amount of tax. CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
Ineludibly, the BIR failed to show that private respondent's
1974 return was filed fraudulently with intent to evade the Ynares-Santiago, J.
payment of the correct amount of tax.[15] Moreover, even (Chairperson),
though a donor's tax, which is defined as "a tax on the - versus - Carpio Morales, *
privilege of transmitting one's property or property rights to Chico-Nazario,
another or others without adequate and full valuable Nachura, and,
consideration,"[16] is different from capital gains tax, a tax Reyes, JJ.
on the gain from the sale of the taxpayer's property COMMISSIONER OF
forming part of capital assets,[17] the tax return filed by INTERNAL REVENUE, Promulgated:
private respondent to report its income for the year 1974 Respondent.
was sufficient compliance with the legal requirement to file April 16, 2008
a return. In other words, the fact that the sale transaction x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
may have partly resulted in a donation does not change ------------ x
the fact that private respondent already reported its
income for 1974 by filing an income tax return. DECISION
Since the BIR failed to demonstrate clearly that private YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
respondent had filed a fraudulent return with the intent to
evade tax, or that it had failed to file a return at all, the
period for assessments has obviously prescribed. Such This is a petition for review on certiorari of the June
instances of negligence or oversight on the part of the BIR 30, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
cannot prejudice taxpayers, considering that the SP No. 49385, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Court
prescriptive period was precisely intended to give them of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 5200. Also assailed is
peace of mind. the April 3, 2001 Resolution[3] denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Based on the foregoing, a discussion of the validity and
legality of the assailed assessments has become moot The facts of the case are as follows:
and unnecessary.
On April 16, 1971, petitioner Philex Mining Corporation
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED and the (Philex Mining), entered into an agreement[4] with Baguio
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Gold Mining Company (”Baguio Gold”) for the former to
No costs. manage and operate the latter’s mining claim, known as
the Sto. Nino mine, located in Atok and Tublay, Benguet
SO ORDERED. Province. The parties’ agreement was denominated as
“Power of Attorney” and provided for the following terms:

4. Within three (3) years from date thereof, the
PRINCIPAL (Baguio Gold) shall make available to the
MANAGERS (Philex Mining) up to ELEVEN MILLION
PESOS (P11,000,000.00), in such amounts as from time
to time may be required by the MANAGERS within the said
3-year period, for use in the MANAGEMENT of the STO.
NINO MINE. The said ELEVEN MILLION PESOS
(P11,000,000.00) shall be deemed, for internal audit
purposes, as the owner’s account in the Sto. Nino
PROJECT. Any part of any income of the PRINCIPAL from
the STO. NINO MINE, which is left with the Sto. Nino
PROJECT, shall be added to such owner’s account.
5. Whenever the MANAGERS shall deem it
necessary and convenient in connection with the
MANAGEMENT of the STO. NINO MINE, they may
transfer their own funds or property to the Sto. Nino
PROJECT, in accordance with the following arrangements:
(a) The properties shall be appraised and,
together with the cash, shall be carried by the Sto. Nino
PROJECT as a special fund to be known as the
MANAGERS’ account.
(b) The total of the MANAGERS’ account shall
not exceed P11,000,000.00, except with prior approval of
the PRINCIPAL; provided, however, that if the
compensation of the MANAGERS as herein provided
cannot be paid in cash from the Sto. Nino PROJECT, the
amount not so paid in cash shall be added to the
MANAGERS’ account.
(c) The cash and property shall not thereafter
be withdrawn from the Sto. Nino PROJECT until
termination of this Agency.
(d) The MANAGERS’ account shall not accrue
interest. Since it is the desire of the PRINCIPAL to extend
to the MANAGERS the benefit of subsequent appreciation
of property, upon a projected termination of this Agency,
the ratio which the MANAGERS’ account has to the
owner’s account will be determined, and the corresponding
proportion of the entire assets of the STO. NINO MINE,
excluding the claims, shall be transferred to the
MANAGERS, except that such transferred assets shall not
include mine development, roads, buildings, and similar
property which will be valueless, or of slight value, to the
MANAGERS. The MANAGERS can, on the other hand,
require at their option that property originally transferred by
them to the Sto. Nino PROJECT be re-transferred to them.
Until such assets are transferred to the MANAGERS, this
Agency shall remain subsisting.
xxxx
12. The compensation of the MANAGER shall be fifty
per cent (50%) of the net profit of the Sto. Nino PROJECT
before income tax. It is understood that the MANAGERS
shall pay income tax on their compensation, while the
PRINCIPAL shall pay income tax on the net profit of the
Sto. Nino PROJECT after deduction therefrom of the
MANAGERS’ compensation.
xxxx
16. The PRINCIPAL has current pecuniary obligation in
favor of the MANAGERS and, in the future, may incur
other obligations in favor of the MANAGERS. This Power
of Attorney has been executed as security for the payment
and satisfaction of all such obligations of the PRINCIPAL
in favor of the MANAGERS and as a means to fulfill the
same. Therefore, this Agency shall be irrevocable while
any obligation of the PRINCIPAL in favor of the
MANAGERS is outstanding, inclusive of the MANAGERS’
account. After all obligations of the PRINCIPAL in favor of
the MANAGERS have been paid and satisfied in full, this
Agency shall be revocable by the PRINCIPAL upon 36-
month notice to the MANAGERS.
17. Notwithstanding any agreement or understanding
between the PRINCIPAL and the MANAGERS to the
contrary, the MANAGERS may withdraw from this Agency
by giving 6-month notice to the PRINCIPAL. The
MANAGERS shall not in any manner be held liable to the
PRINCIPAL by reason alone of such withdrawal.
Paragraph 5(d) hereof shall be operative in case of the
MANAGERS’ withdrawal.
x x x x[5]
In the course of managing and operating the project,
Philex Mining made advances of cash and property in
accordance with paragraph 5 of the agreement. However,
the mine suffered continuing losses over the years which
resulted to petitioner’s withdrawal as manager of the mine
on January 28, 1982 and in the eventual cessation of mine
operations on February 20, 1982.[6]
Thereafter, on September 27, 1982, the parties
executed a “Compromise with Dation in Payment”[7]
wherein Baguio Gold admitted an indebtedness to
petitioner in the amount of P179,394,000.00 and agreed to
pay the same in three segments by first assigning Baguio
Gold’s tangible assets to petitioner, transferring to the
latter Baguio Gold’s equitable title in its Philodrill assets
and finally settling the remaining liability through properties
that Baguio Gold may acquire in the future.
On December 31, 1982, the parties executed an
“Amendment to Compromise with Dation in Payment”[8]
where the parties determined that Baguio Gold’s
indebtedness to petitioner actually amounted to
P259,137,245.00, which sum included liabilities of Baguio
Gold to other creditors that petitioner had assumed as
guarantor. These liabilities pertained to long-term loans
amounting to US$11,000,000.00 contracted by Baguio
Gold from the Bank of America NT & SA and Citibank N.A.
This time, Baguio Gold undertook to pay petitioner in two
segments by first assigning its tangible assets for
P127,838,051.00 and then transferring its equitable title in
its Philodrill assets for P16,302,426.00. The parties then
ascertained that Baguio Gold had a remaining outstanding
indebtedness to petitioner in the amount of
P114,996,768.00.
Subsequently, petitioner wrote off in its 1982 books
of account the remaining outstanding indebtedness of
Baguio Gold by charging P112,136,000.00 to allowances
and reserves that were set up in 1981 and P2,860,768.00
to the 1982 operations.
In its 1982 annual income tax return, petitioner
deducted from its gross income the amount of
P112,136,000.00 as “loss on settlement of receivables
from Baguio Gold against reserves and allowances.”[9]
However, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) disallowed
the amount as deduction for bad debt and assessed
petitioner a deficiency income tax of P62,811,161.39.
Petitioner protested before the BIR arguing that the
deduction must be allowed since all requisites for a bad
debt deduction were satisfied, to wit: (a) there was a valid
and existing debt; (b) the debt was ascertained to be
worthless; and (c) it was charged off within the taxable
year when it was determined to be worthless.
 Petitioner emphasized that the debt arose out of a
valid management contract it entered into with Baguio
Gold. The bad debt deduction represented advances
made by petitioner which, pursuant to the management
contract, formed part of Baguio Gold’s “pecuniary
obligations” to petitioner. It also included payments made
by petitioner as guarantor of Baguio Gold’s long-term
loans which legally entitled petitioner to be subrogated to
the rights of the original creditor.
Petitioner also asserted that due to Baguio Gold’s
irreversible losses, it became evident that it would not be
able to recover the advances and payments it had made in
behalf of Baguio Gold. For a debt to be considered
worthless, petitioner claimed that it was neither required to
institute a judicial action for collection against the debtor
nor to sell or dispose of collateral assets in satisfaction of
the debt. It is enough that a taxpayer exerted diligent
efforts to enforce collection and exhausted all reasonable
means to collect.
On October 28, 1994, the BIR denied petitioner’s protest
for lack of legal and factual basis. It held that the alleged
debt was not ascertained to be worthless since Baguio
Gold remained existing and had not filed a petition for
bankruptcy; and that the deduction did not consist of a
valid and subsisting debt considering that, under the
management contract, petitioner was to be paid fifty
percent (50%) of the project’s net profit.[10]
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
which rendered judgment, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition
for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assessment in question, viz: FAS-1-82-88-003067 for
deficiency income tax in the amount of P62,811,161.39 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioner Philex Mining Corporation is
hereby ORDERED to PAY respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue the amount of P62,811,161.39, plus,
20% delinquency interest due computed from February 10,
1995, which is the date after the 20-day grace period given
by the respondent within which petitioner has to pay the
deficiency amount x x x up to actual date of payment.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The CTA rejected petitioner’s assertion that the advances
it made for the Sto. Nino mine were in the nature of a loan.
It instead characterized the advances as petitioner’s
investment in a partnership with Baguio Gold for the
development and exploitation of the Sto. Nino mine. The
CTA held that the “Power of Attorney” executed by
petitioner and Baguio Gold was actually a partnership
agreement. Since the advanced amount partook of the
nature of an investment, it could not be deducted as a bad
debt from petitioner’s gross income.
The CTA likewise held that the amount paid by petitioner
for the long-term loan obligations of Baguio Gold could not
be allowed as a bad debt deduction. At the time the
payments were made, Baguio Gold was not in default
since its loans were not yet due and demandable. What
petitioner did was to pre-pay the loans as evidenced by the
notice sent by Bank of America showing that it was merely
demanding payment of the installment and interests due.
Moreover, Citibank imposed and collected a “pre-
termination penalty” for the pre-payment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CTA.[12]
Hence, upon denial of its motion for reconsideration,[13]
petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, alleging that:
I.
The Court of Appeals erred in construing that the
advances made by Philex in the management of the Sto.
Nino Mine pursuant to the Power of Attorney partook of the
nature of an investment rather than a loan.
II.
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the 50%-50%
sharing in the net profits of the Sto. Nino Mine indicates
that Philex is a partner of Baguio Gold in the development
of the Sto. Nino Mine notwithstanding the clear absence of
any intent on the part of Philex and Baguio Gold to form a
partnership.
III.
The Court of Appeals erred in relying only on the Power of
Attorney and in completely disregarding the Compromise
Agreement and the Amended Compromise Agreement
when it construed the nature of the advances made by
Philex.
IV.
The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to delve upon the
issue of the propriety of the bad debts write-off.[14]
Petitioner insists that in determining the nature of its
business relationship with Baguio Gold, we should not only
rely on the “Power of Attorney”, but also on the
subsequent “Compromise with Dation in Payment” and
“Amended Compromise with Dation in Payment” that the
parties executed in 1982. These documents, allegedly
evinced the parties’ intent to treat the advances and
payments as a loan and establish a creditor-debtor
relationship between them.
The petition lacks merit.
The lower courts correctly held that the “Power of Attorney”
is the instrument that is material in determining the true
nature of the business relationship between petitioner and
Baguio Gold. Before resort may be had to the two
compromise agreements, the parties’ contractual intent
must first be discovered from the expressed language of
the primary contract under which the parties’ business
relations were founded. It should be noted that the
compromise agreements were mere collateral documents
executed by the parties pursuant to the termination of their
business relationship created under the “Power of
Attorney”. On the other hand, it is the latter which
established the juridical relation of the parties and defined
the parameters of their dealings with one another.
The execution of the two compromise agreements can
hardly be considered as a subsequent or
contemporaneous act that is reflective of the parties’ true
intent. The compromise agreements were executed
eleven years after the “Power of Attorney” and merely laid
out a plan or procedure by which petitioner could recover
the advances and payments it made under the “Power of
Attorney”. The parties entered into the compromise
agreements as a consequence of the dissolution of their
business relationship. It did not define that relationship or
indicate its real character.
An examination of the “Power of Attorney” reveals that a
partnership or joint venture was indeed intended by the
parties. Under a contract of partnership, two or more
persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or
industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing
the profits among themselves.[15] While a corporation,
like petitioner, cannot generally enter into a contract of
partnership unless authorized by law or its charter, it has
been held that it may enter into a joint venture which is
akin to a particular partnership:
The legal concept of a joint venture is of common law
origin. It has no precise legal definition, but it has been
generally understood to mean an organization formed for
some temporary purpose. x x x It is in fact hardly
distinguishable from the partnership, since their elements
are similar – community of interest in the business, sharing
of profits and losses, and a mutual right of control. x x x
The main distinction cited by most opinions in common law
jurisdictions is that the partnership contemplates a general
business with some degree of continuity, while the joint
venture is formed for the execution of a single transaction,
and is thus of a temporary nature. x x x This observation is
not entirely accurate in this jurisdiction, since under the
Civil Code, a partnership may be particular or universal,
and a particular partnership may have for its object a
specific undertaking. x x x It would seem therefore that
under Philippine law, a joint venture is a form of
partnership and should be governed by the law of
partnerships. The Supreme Court has however recognized
a distinction between these two business forms, and has
held that although a corporation cannot enter into a
partnership contract, it may however engage in a joint
venture with others. x x x (Citations omitted) [16]
Perusal of the agreement denominated as the “Power of
Attorney” indicates that the parties had intended to create
a partnership and establish a common fund for the
purpose. They also had a joint interest in the profits of the
business as shown by a 50-50 sharing in the income of the
mine.
Under the “Power of Attorney”, petitioner and Baguio Gold
undertook to contribute money, property and industry to
the common fund known as the Sto. Niño mine.[17] In this
regard, we note that there is a substantive equivalence in
the respective contributions of the parties to the
development and operation of the mine. Pursuant to
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the agreement, petitioner and
Baguio Gold were to contribute equally to the joint venture
assets under their respective accounts. Baguio Gold
would contribute P11M under its owner’s account plus any
of its income that is left in the project, in addition to its
actual mining claim. Meanwhile, petitioner’s contribution
would consist of its expertise in the management and
operation of mines, as well as the manager’s account
which is comprised of P11M in funds and property and
petitioner’s “compensation” as manager that cannot be
paid in cash.
However, petitioner asserts that it could not have entered
into a partnership agreement with Baguio Gold because it
did not “bind” itself to contribute money or property to the
project; that under paragraph 5 of the agreement, it was
only optional for petitioner to transfer funds or property to
the Sto. Niño project “(w)henever the MANAGERS shall
deem it necessary and convenient in connection with the
MANAGEMENT of the STO. NIÑO MINE.”[18]
The wording of the parties’ agreement as to petitioner’s
contribution to the common fund does not detract from the
fact that petitioner transferred its funds and property to the
project as specified in paragraph 5, thus rendering
effective the other stipulations of the contract, particularly
paragraph 5(c) which prohibits petitioner from withdrawing
the advances until termination of the parties’ business
relations. As can be seen, petitioner became bound by its
contributions once the transfers were made. The
contributions acquired an obligatory nature as soon as
petitioner had chosen to exercise its option under
paragraph 5.
There is no merit to petitioner’s claim that the prohibition in
paragraph 5(c) against withdrawal of advances should not
be taken as an indication that it had entered into a
partnership with Baguio Gold; that the stipulation only
showed that what the parties entered into was actually a
contract of agency coupled with an interest which is not
revocable at will and not a partnership.
In an agency coupled with interest, it is the agency that
cannot be revoked or withdrawn by the principal due to an
interest of a third party that depends upon it, or the mutual
interest of both principal and agent.[19] In this case, the
non-revocation or non-withdrawal under paragraph 5(c)
applies to the advances made by petitioner who is
supposedly the agent and not the principal under the
contract. Thus, it cannot be inferred from the stipulation
that the parties’ relation under the agreement is one of
agency coupled with an interest and not a partnership.
Neither can paragraph 16 of the agreement be taken as an
indication that the relationship of the parties was one of
agency and not a partnership. Although the said provision
states that “this Agency shall be irrevocable while any
obligation of the PRINCIPAL in favor of the MANAGERS is
outstanding, inclusive of the MANAGERS’ account,” it
does not necessarily follow that the parties entered into an
agency contract coupled with an interest that cannot be
withdrawn by Baguio Gold.
It should be stressed that the main object of the “Power of
Attorney” was not to confer a power in favor of petitioner to
contract with third persons on behalf of Baguio Gold but to
create a business relationship between petitioner and
Baguio Gold, in which the former was to manage and
operate the latter’s mine through the parties’ mutual
contribution of material resources and industry. The
essence of an agency, even one that is coupled with
interest, is the agent’s ability to represent his principal
and bring about business relations between the latter and
third persons.[20] Where representation for and in behalf
of the principal is merely incidental or necessary for the
proper discharge of one’s paramount undertaking under a
contract, the latter may not necessarily be a contract of
agency, but some other agreement depending on the
ultimate undertaking of the parties.[21]
In this case, the totality of the circumstances and the
stipulations in the parties’ agreement indubitably lead to
the conclusion that a partnership was formed between
petitioner and Baguio Gold.
First, it does not appear that Baguio Gold was
unconditionally obligated to return the advances made by
petitioner under the agreement. Paragraph 5 (d) thereof
provides that upon termination of the parties’ business
relations, “the ratio which the MANAGER’S account has to
the owner’s account will be determined, and the
corresponding proportion of the entire assets of the STO.
NINO MINE, excluding the claims” shall be transferred to
petitioner.[22] As pointed out by the Court of Tax Appeals,
petitioner was merely entitled to a proportionate return of
the mine’s assets upon dissolution of the parties’ business
relations. There was nothing in the agreement that would
require Baguio Gold to make payments of the advances to
petitioner as would be recognized as an item of obligation
or “accounts payable” for Baguio Gold.
Thus, the tax court correctly concluded that the agreement
provided for a distribution of assets of the Sto. Niño mine
upon termination, a provision that is more consistent with a
partnership than a creditor-debtor relationship. It should
be pointed out that in a contract of loan, a person who
receives a loan or money or any fungible thing acquires
ownership thereof and is bound to pay the creditor an
equal amount of the same kind and quality.[23] In this
case, however, there was no stipulation for Baguio Gold to
actually repay petitioner the cash and property that it had
advanced, but only the return of an amount pegged at a
ratio which the manager’s account had to the owner’s
account.
In this connection, we find no contractual basis for the
execution of the two compromise agreements in which
Baguio Gold recognized a debt in favor of petitioner, which
supposedly arose from the termination of their business
relations over the Sto. Nino mine. The “Power of Attorney”
clearly provides that petitioner would only be entitled to the
return of a proportionate share of the mine assets to be
computed at a ratio that the manager’s account had to the
owner’s account. Except to provide a basis for claiming
the advances as a bad debt deduction, there is no reason
for Baguio Gold to hold itself liable to petitioner under the
compromise agreements, for any amount over and above
the proportion agreed upon in the “Power of Attorney”.
Next, the tax court correctly observed that it was unlikely
for a business corporation to lend hundreds of millions of
pesos to another corporation with neither security, or
collateral, nor a specific deed evidencing the terms and
conditions of such loans. The parties also did not provide
a specific maturity date for the advances to become due
and demandable, and the manner of payment was
unclear. All these point to the inevitable conclusion that
the advances were not loans but capital contributions to a
partnership.
The strongest indication that petitioner was a partner in the
Sto Niño mine is the fact that it would receive 50% of the
net profits as “compensation” under paragraph 12 of the
agreement. The entirety of the parties’ contractual
stipulations simply leads to no other conclusion than that
petitioner’s “compensation” is actually its share in the
income of the joint venture.
Article 1769 (4) of the Civil Code explicitly provides that the
“receipt by a person of a share in the profits of a business
is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the
business.” Petitioner asserts, however, that no such
inference can be drawn against it since its share in the
profits of the Sto Niño project was in the nature of
compensation or “wages of an employee”, under the
exception provided in Article 1769 (4) (b).[24]
On this score, the tax court correctly noted that petitioner
was not an employee of Baguio Gold who will be paid
“wages” pursuant to an employer-employee relationship.
To begin with, petitioner was the manager of the project
and had put substantial sums into the venture in order to
ensure its viability and profitability. By pegging its
compensation to profits, petitioner also stood not to be
remunerated in case the mine had no income. It is hard to
believe that petitioner would take the risk of not being paid
at all for its services, if it were truly just an ordinary
employee.
Consequently, we find that petitioner’s “compensation”
under paragraph 12 of the agreement actually constitutes
its share in the net profits of the partnership. Indeed,
petitioner would not be entitled to an equal share in the
income of the mine if it were just an employee of Baguio
Gold.[25] It is not surprising that petitioner was to receive
a 50% share in the net profits, considering that the “Power
of Attorney” also provided for an almost equal contribution
of the parties to the St. Nino mine. The “compensation”
agreed upon only serves to reinforce the notion that the
parties’ relations were indeed of partners and not
employer-employee.
All told, the lower courts did not err in treating petitioner’s
advances as investments in a partnership known as the
Sto. Nino mine. The advances were not “debts” of Baguio
Gold to petitioner inasmuch as the latter was under no
unconditional obligation to return the same to the former
under the “Power of Attorney”. As for the amounts that
petitioner paid as guarantor to Baguio Gold’s creditors, we
find no reason to depart from the tax court’s factual finding
that Baguio Gold’s debts were not yet due and
demandable at the time that petitioner paid the same.
Verily, petitioner pre-paid Baguio Gold’s outstanding loans
to its bank creditors and this conclusion is supported by
the evidence on record.[26]
In sum, petitioner cannot claim the advances as a bad
debt deduction from its gross income. Deductions for
income tax purposes partake of the nature of tax
exemptions and are strictly construed against the taxpayer,
who must prove by convincing evidence that he is entitled
to the deduction claimed.[27] In this case, petitioner failed
to substantiate its assertion that the advances were
subsisting debts of Baguio Gold that could be deducted
from its gross income. Consequently, it could not claim the
advances as a valid bad debt deduction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49385 dated
June 30, 2000, which affirmed the decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 5200 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner Philex Mining Corporation is ORDERED to PAY
the deficiency tax on its 1982 income in the amount of
P62,811,161.31, with 20% delinquency interest computed
from February 10, 1995, which is the due date given for
the payment of the deficiency income tax, up to the actual
date of payment.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114087. October 26, 1999]
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN NEGROS
INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO T. PONFERRADA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 42; HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT;
BINALBAGAN – ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, INC., and
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP),
respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
produced, to be pooled into a fund for subsequent
distribution as bonuses to sugar workers.[8]
Thus, before R.A. No.6982, there were two sets of
beneficiaries under the social amelioration program in the
sugar industry:
1) Beneficiaries under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621;
and
Private respondent Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company
(BISCOM) is engaged in the business of, among others,
milling raw sugar cane of various sugar plantations in their
milling district. For the crop year 1991–1992, the sugar
farm workers’ share in BISCOM, under R.A. No. 809
amounted to P30, 590,086.92.[10]
Under P.D. No.621, the workers’ benefit for the same crop
year amounted to P2,233,285.26, computed as follows:

“Nowhere is the economic disparity between labor and
capital so evident than in the sugar industry. While it is the
lowly farm worker who must toil in the field under the
harshness of conditions, it is the planter who gets to enjoy
more the fruits of production. While the planter lives in the
comfort of his palatial home, the living condition of the
sugar farm worker more often than not defies the basic
tenets of human dignity.”[1]
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the August 8, 1993 Decision[2] and January 21,
1994 Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Branch 42,[4] Bacolod City, in Civil Case No.
6894 for Declaratory Relief.
The antecedent facts that matter can be culled as follows:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An
Act Strengthening the Sugar Amelioration Program in the
Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its
Implementation, and for other Purposes, there were two
principal laws providing additional financial benefits to
sugar farm workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 and
Presidential Decree No. 621.
Republic Act No. 809[5] (implementable in milling districts
with an annual gross production of 150,000 piculs or
more), institutionalized production sharing scheme, in the
absence of any private agreement between the planters
and farm workers, depending on the mill’s total production
for each immediately preceding crop year; and specifically
providing that any increase in the planters’ share shall be
divided in the following manner: 40% of the increase shall
accrue to the planter and 60% to the farm workers.[6]
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621,[7] as
amended, charged a lien of P2.00 per picul on all sugar
2) Beneficiaries under P.D. No. 621 only. (In milling Gross production of BISCOM 1,595,184.46
districts where the annual gross production is less than
150,000 piculs) (In Piculs)
On May 24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It Less: 30% BISCOM Share 478,555.33
imposed a lien of P5.00 per picul on the gross production
of sugar beginning sugar crop year 1991-1992, with an 70% Planter Share 2,116,626.13
automatic additional lien of P1.00 for every two (2) years
for the succeeding ten (10) years from the effectivity of the Multiplied by P2.00 lien x P2.00
Act subject to the discretion of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment and upon recommendation of the Sugar TOTAL P2,233,258.26[11]
Tripartite Council.[9]
But considering that the P2.00 lien under P.D. No.621 is
Directly addressing the effect of the new P5.00 per picul obviously lesser than the P5.00 lien under R.A. No.6982,
lien vis-à-vis the two previously existing laws, Section 12 of the same was no longer imposed by BISCOM pursuant to
R.A. No. 6982, provides: R.A. No.6982.
“Section. 12. Benefits under Republic Act No. 809 and Hence, before R.A. No.6982 took effect, the total farm
P.D. 621, as Amended. - All liens and other forms of workers’ benefit was:
production sharing in favor of the workers in the sugar
industry under Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Under R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92
Decree No. 621, as amended, are hereby substituted by
the benefits under this Act: Provided, That cases arising Under P.D. No. 621 2,233,258.16
from such laws pending in the courts or administrative
bodies at the time of the effectivity of this Act shall not be
affected thereby. P32,823,345.18
In connection therewith, Section 14 of the same Act further Upon the effectivity of R.A. No.6982, the total workers’
states: benefit in BISCOM’s milling district was computed as
follows:
“Section 14. Non-Diminution of Benefits.-The provisions of
Section 12 hereof notwithstanding, nothing in this Act shall Gross Production of BISCOM 1,595,184.46
be construed to reduce any benefit, interest, right or
participation enjoyed by the workers at the time of the (In Piculs)
enactment of this Act, and no amount received by any
beneficiary under this Act shall be subject to any form of Less: 30% BISCOM share 478,555.34
taxation.”
70% Planter Share 1,116,629.12
Multiplied by P5.00 lien x P5.00
TOTAL FARMWORKERS’ BENEFIT P5,583,145.61[12]
Meanwhile, pending a definite ruling on the effect of R.A.
No. 6982 to R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621, respondent
Secretary of Labor issued Department Order No.2
(1992),[13] directing, inter alia, the three milling districts in
Negros Occidental, namely: SONDECO, San Carlos and
herein private respondent BISCOM, to continue
implementing R.A. No.809 per recommendation of the
Sugar Tripartite Council.
Consequently, the petitioner, Planters Association of
Southern Negros Inc. (PASON), an organization of sugar
farm plantation owners milling with private respondent
BISCOM, filed with the respondent court a Petition for
Declaratory Relief against the implementation of the said
D.O. No. 2. It theorized that in view of the substitution of
benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, whatever
monetary rewards previously granted to the sugar farm
workers under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 were
deemed totally abrogated and/or superseded.[14]
On August 18, 1993, the respondent Court came out with
the assailed Decision; the dispositive portion of which held:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
declares:
1. That the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot
supersede or substitute the benefits under RA 809 in
milling districts where the latter law was already in
implementation at the time of the effectivity of RA 6982;
and
2. That the sugarcane workers in the BISCOM milling
district shall continue to enjoy the benefits under RA 809 in
addition to the benefits that will henceforth be provided for
by RA 6982 now being implemented by private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.”[15]
With the denial of its motion to reconsider the aforesaid
Decision, petitioner found its way to this Court via the
present petition.
The petition is not visited by merit.
From a cursory reading of Section 12[16] of R.A. No. 6892,
the inevitable conclusion would be that the benefits under
R.A. No.809 and P.D. No. 621 have been superseded by
those granted under the new law. This substitution,
however, appears to be qualified by Section 14[17] which
disallows substitution if its effect would be to diminish or
reduce whatever financial benefits the sugar farm workers
are receiving under existing laws at the time of the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6289.
How then should Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982 be
interpreted in light of the qualification under Section 14 of
the same Act?
Petitioner insists that the word “substitution” in Section 12
should be taken in its literal sense considering that the
intention of Congress to effect a substitution of benefits is
clear and unequivocal. Under this interpretation of
“unqualified substitution”, the sugar farm workers in the
subject milling district will receive only P5,583,145.61
under R.A. No.6289, as against the P32,823,345.18 to
which the workers were entitled under P.D. 621 and R.A.
No. 809.
So also, invoking the Opinion[18] “It is believed that the
benefits conferred upon labor by RA 809 have been
superseded by those granted to it under RA 6982. This
conclusion is inescapable from a reading of Section 12 of
the latter law, as well as its repealing clause (Sec. 16).
Indeed, the production-sharing scheme decreed in RA 809
cannot remain in force upon the effectivity of the new
production-sharing procedure prescribed in RA 6982;
otherwise, sugar workers would be receiving two kinds of
financial benefits simultaneously.
The substitution, however, of sugar workers benefits under
RA 809 by RA 6982 is qualified by Section 14 of the latter.
This section provides that if the effect of such substitution
will be to diminish or reduce whatever monetary rewards
sugar industry laborers are receiving under RA 809, then
such workers shall continue to be entitled to the benefits
provided in such law. Expressed otherwise the production-
sharing scheme in RA 6982 does not apply to sugar
industry workers in milling districts where its application
would be financially disadvantageous to them, in which
case the existing production-sharing agreement based on
RA 809 shall still govern.” (Opinion No. 115, S. 1992 dated
September 2, 1992, signed by Justice Secretary Franklin
Drilon.)18 of the Secretary of Justice, petitioner contends,
in the alternative, that the application of R.A. No. 809 can
be maintained but in no case should the benefits
thereunder be implemented in addition to R.A. No. 6982.
Applying this interpretation, the share of the sugar farm
workers would amount to P30,590,086.92.
On the other hand, under the interpretation espoused by
the public respondent (that the benefits conferred by R.A.
No.6982 should complement those granted by R.A. No.
809 which cannot be superseded by the former Act since
Section 14 thereof prohibits diminution of benefits), the
total worker’s benefit would be as follows:
R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92
R.A. No. 6982 __,583,145.61
P36,173,232.53
It is a well-settled rule of legal hermeneutics that each
provision of law should be construed in connection with
every other part so as to produce a harmonious whole and
every meaning to be given to each word or phrase is
ascertained from the context of the body of the statute.[19]
Ut magis valeat quam pereat.[20] Consequently, laws are
given a reasonable construction such that apparently
conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect
by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving
spirit behind the enactment of the statute.[21]
Applying the abovestated doctrine, Section 12 therefore,
which apparently mandates a total substitution by R. A.
No. 6982 of all the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and P.D.
No. 621 existing at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No.
6982, can not be construed apart from Section 14 which
prohibits such substitution if the effect thereof would be to
reduce any benefit, interest, right or participation enjoyed
by the worker at the time R.A. No. 6982 took effect. The
Court finds as untenable the interpretation of the petitioner
based an unqualified substitution of the benefits under
R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 by the monertary rewards
conferred by R.A. No. 6982 in the amount of
P5,583,145.61 as against the P36,173,232.53 previously
enjoyed by the sugar farm workers under the former laws.
It bears stressing that the primordial objective behind the
enactment of R.A. No. 6982 was to augment the income of
sugar workers by establishing a social amelioration
program in cases where sugar farm workers had none,
and at the same time, to improve whatever amelioration
schemes already existing in the sugar districts
concerned.[22] In recognition of the avowed guarantee
under Section 3, Article 13 of the Constitution to uphold
the right of workers to a just share in the fruits of
production, the policy of R.A. No. 6982 states:
“Section 1. Policy. – It is the policy of the State to further
strengthen the rights of workers in the sugar industry to
their just share in the fruits of production by augmenting
their income and, among other schemes, institutionalizing
the mechanism among the partners in the sugar industry to
enable the workers and their families to enjoy a decent
living.” (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing studiedly considered, there can be no other
construction that would best promote the welfare of the
sugar farm workers, than the interpretation of the public
respondent, implementing R.A. No. 6982 as a complement
to R.A. No. 809.
Citing the floor deliberations of Congress,[23] petitioner
insists that the non-diminution of benefits referred to in
Section 14 pertains only to pending claims of the workers
at the time of the effectivity of the Act. Stated differently, it
is contended that the benefits to which the workers are
entitled under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 601 can be
validly diminished by virtue of the application of R.A. No.
6982, because the non-diminution provision in Section 14
thereof refers to pending claims accruing under P.D. 621
and R.A. No. 809, and not to the very benefits previously
enjoyed by the workers under the said laws. With this
construction, from a total benefit of P32,823,345.18
conferred by R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621, the sugar
workers would only be entitled to a meager amount of
P5,583,145.61.
The contention is barren of sustainable merit. To limit the
application of the non-diminution principle only to pending
claims would be repulsive not only to the policy of the Act
but also to the salutory provisions of the Constitution.
Verily, the glaring disparity of P27,240,199.57 between
P32,823,345.18 and P5,583,145.61 would not warrant
such an interpretation. As aptly ratiocinated[24] by the
respondent Court, the evolution of legislation in the sugar
industry had always had for its foremost concern the
advancement of the lot of the sugar farm worker. Hence,
through the years every law or decree enacted pursuant
thereto had always provided for an increase in wages and
benefits. The reason is obvious. Amidst the rapidly
changing, if not worsening, economic conditions prevalent
in the industry, the sugar worker can hardly cope with his
meager income to lean on.
Equally wanting of merit is the alleged double recovery
under the interpretation subscribed by the public
respondent. Note that had not R.A. No. 6982 been
enacted, sugar farmworkers would be entitled to a total a
share of P32,823,345.18 under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No.
621; whereas under the alternative view of the petitioner,
maintaining the benefits (P30, 509,086.92) granted by R.A.
No. 809 to the exclusion of the benefits provided by R.A.
No. 6982, sugar farm workers stand to lose the difference
of P2,233,258.56, from a total of P32,823,345.18 which
they were entitled before RA 6982 took effect. Certainly,
such a disadvantageous construction cannot be
countenanced, being violative of the non-diminution
principle under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6982.
In view of the foregoing, the addition of the monetary
rewards under R.A. No. 6982 to the benefits granted by
R.A. No. 809, is what is called for in the case under
consideration. While it is true that “addition” is different
from “substitution”, the circumstances involving subject
milling districts (where the sugar farm workers are enjoying
benefits both from R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 prior to
the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982), necessitate the grant of
pecuniary advantage under R.A. No. 809 as a complement
to R.A. No. 6982. Otherwise, the workers would suffer a
diminution of benefits. Therefore, the increase of
monetary advantage in favor of the sugar farm workers, as
a consequence of such interpretation, is merely incidental
to the application of the non-diminution policy of R.A. No.
6982, a labor provision which should be liberally construed
to further its purpose.[25]
Neither does the Court find convincing the interpretation
proposed by private respondent BISCOM. While
maintaining the application of R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No.
621 (where the total share of the workers is
P32,823,345.18), and disregarding R.A. No. 6892, would
be beneficial to the sugar farm workers, to the mind of the
Court, the assailed construction of the public respondent
(where the total share of the workers is P36,173,232.53),
would be more in keeping with the spirit of R.A. No. 6982
which is: to improve the living condition of workers in the
sugar industry. Between two statutory interpretations, that
which better serves the purpose of the law should
prevail.[26]
Premises studiedly considered, the Court is of the
ineluctable conclusion, and so holds, that the respondent
Court ventured not in any judicial legislation but merely
gave life to the avowed policy of the State under Section
18, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
“Sec. 18. The state affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall guarantee the rights of workers
and promote their welfare.”
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED; and the assailed
Decision in Civil Case No. 6894, dated August 18, 1993, of
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 42,
Bacolod City, AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-
Reyes, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125297. June 6, 2003]
ELVIRA YU OH, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR No.
16390, promulgated on January 30, 1996, affirming the
conviction of petitioner Elvira Yu Oh by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City and the resolution
dated May 30, 1996 which denied her motion for
reconsideration.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Petitioner purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold
International Traders, Inc., a company engaged in jewelry
trading. Due to her failure to pay the purchase price, Solid
Gold filed civil cases[2] against her for specific
performance before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. On
September 17, 1990, petitioner and Solid Gold, through its
general manager Joaquin Novales III, entered into a
compromise agreement to settle said civil cases.[3] The
compromise agreement, as approved by the trial court,
provided that petitioner shall issue a total of ninety-nine
post-dated checks in the amount of P50,000.00 each,
dated every 15th and 30th of the month starting October 1,
1990 and the balance of over P1 million to be paid in lump
sum on November 16, 1994 which is also the due date of
the 99th and last postdated check. Petitioner issued ten
checks at P50,000.00 each, for a total of P500,000.00,
drawn against her account at the Equitable Banking
Corporation (EBC), Grace Park, Caloocan City Branch.
Novales then deposited each of the ten checks on their
respective due dates with the Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC). However, said checks were
dishonored by EBC for the reason “Account Closed.”
Dishonor slips were issued for each check that was
returned to Novales.[4]
On October 5, 1992, Novales filed ten separate
Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-26243
to 92-36252 before the RTC of Quezon City charging
petitioner with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.[5] Except
for the dates and the check numbers, the Informations
uniformly allege:
That on or about the … in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to JOAQUIN P.
LOVALES III to apply on account or for value Equitable
Banking Corp. Grace Park Caloocan Branch Check No. …
dated … payable to SOLID GOLD INTERNATIONAL
TRADERS, INC. in the amount of P50,000.00, Philippine
Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of
issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment was subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds/Account Closed and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to
pay said SOLID GOLD INTERNATIONAL TRADERS, INC.
the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The cases were consolidated and subsequently raffled to
Branch 99 of the said RTC. Upon arraignment, accused
pleaded not guilty.[7] Trial then ensued. On December 22,
1993, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of ten
counts of violation of BP 22 and hereby sentences her to a
penalty of one year imprisonment for each count, or a total
of ten years, to be served in accordance with the limitation
prescribed in par. 4, Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code
and to indemnify complainant the amount of the checks in
their totality, or in the amount of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that:
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
ten informations; it overlooked the fact that no notice of
dishonor had been given to the appellant as drawer of the
dishonored checks; it failed to consider that the reason of
“closed account” for the dishonor of the ten checks in
these cases is not the statutory cause to warrant
prosecution, much more a conviction, under B.P. Blg. 22; it
failed to consider that there is only one act which caused
the offense, if any, and not ten separate cases; and it
disregarded the definition of what a ‘check’ is under Sec.
185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.[9]
Finding the appeal to be without merit, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with costs
against appellant.
Hence, herein petition raising the following errors:
I granting retroactive effect to Republic Act No. 7691[10] in
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RESOLVING THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE IN FAVOR
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BY UNJUSTLY
DEPRIVING HER OF THE LEGAL BENEFITS OF GIVING
RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF R.A.
NO. 7691 EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
INFERIOR COURTS TO COVER THE OFFENSES
INVOLVED IN THESE CASES PURSUANT TO ART. 22
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THUS IN EFFECT
RENDERING THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
PROMULGATED BY THE TRIAL COURT BELOW AND
AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
II
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RESOLVING IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE
FACT THAT NO NOTICE OF DISHONOR HAD BEEN
GIVEN HER AS DRAWER OF THE DISHONORED
“CHECKS” PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENT
EXPRESSLY PROVIDED UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 22.
III
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONSTRUING THE PROVISIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 CONTRARY TO THE WELL-
ESTABLISHED RULE OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION THAT “PENAL STATUTES,
SUBSTANTIVE AND REMEDIAL OR PROCEDURAL,
ARE, BY THE CONSECRATED RULE, CONSTRUED
STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE, OR LIBERALLY IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED” AND THAT “IT IS ALWAYS
THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO RESOLVE THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF EVIDENCE UPON A THEORY OF
INNOCENCE RATHER THAN UPON A THEORY OF
GUILT WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO DO SO”, AND IN SO
DOING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM INDULGED
ITSELF IN “JUDICIAL LEGISLATION” TO FAVOR THE
PROSECUTION AND TO WORK GRAVE INJUSTICE TO
THE ACCUSED.
Simply worded, the issues of this case may be stated as
follows: (1) whether or not the appellate court erred in not
view of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); (2)
whether or not notice of dishonor is dispensable in this
case; and (3) whether or not the appellate court erred in
construing B.P. Blg. 22.
We will resolve the first and third issues before considering
the second issue.
First issue – Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
not giving retroactive effect to R.A. 7690 in view of Article
22 of the RPC.
Petitioner argues that: the failure of the appellate court to
give retroactive application to R.A. 7691 is a violation of
Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of the felony; R.A. 7691 is a penal
law in the sense that it affects the jurisdiction of the court
to take cognizance of criminal cases; taken separately, the
offense covered by each of the ten Informations in this
case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court under Sec. 2 of R.A. 7691; and the
Court of Appeals is guilty of judicial legislation in stating
that after the arraignment of petitioner, said cases could no
longer be transferred to the MTC without violating the rules
on double jeopardy, because that is not so provided in
R.A. 7691.[11]
The Solicitor General, in its Comment, counters that the
arguments of petitioner are baseless contending that:
penal laws are those which define crimes and provides for
their punishment; laws defining the jurisdiction of courts
are substantive in nature and not procedural for they do
not refer to the manner of trying cases but to the authority
of the courts to hear and decide certain and definite cases
in the various instances of which they are susceptible; R.A.
No. 7691 is a substantive law and not a penal law as
nowhere in its provisions does it define a crime neither
does it provide a penalty of any kind; the purpose of
enacting R.A. No. 7691 is laid down in the opening
sentence thereof as “An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
and the Metropolitan Trial Court” whereby it reapportions
the jurisdiction of said courts to cover certain civil and
criminal case, erstwhile tried exclusively by the Regional
Trial Courts; consequently, Art. 22 of the RPC finds no
application to the case at bar; jurisdiction is determined by
the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint,
and once acquired, jurisdiction is not affected by
subsequent legislative enactments placing jurisdiction in
another tribunal; in this case, the RTC was vested with
jurisdiction to try petitioner’s cases when the same were
filed in October 1992; at that time, R.A. No. 7691 was not
yet effective;[12] in so far as the retroactive effect of R.A.
No. 7691 is concerned, that same is limited only to
pending civil cases that have not reached pre-trial stage as
provided for in Section 7 thereof and as clarified by this
Court in People vs. Yolanda Velasco[13], where it was
held: “[a] perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will show that its
retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have
not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an
express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as
having retroactive application to criminal cases pending or
decided by the RTC prior to its effectivity.”[14]
On this point, the Court fully agrees with the Solicitor
General and holds that Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code finds no application to the case at bar.
Said provision reads:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as
this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
sentence.
A penal law, as defined by this Court, is an act of the
legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes
penalties for its violations. It also defines crime, treats of
its nature and provides for its punishment.[15] R.A. No.
7691 does not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties
for its violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes
and its punishment. Consequently, R.A. No. 7691 is not a
penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of the RPC does not
apply in the present case.
B. P. Blg. 22, which took effect on April 24, 1979, provides
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days but
not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not
more then double the amount of the check which fine shall
in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994,
amended B.P. Blg. 129, and vested on the Metropolitan,
Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts jurisdiction to
try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six
(6) years.[16] Since R.A. No. 7691 vests jurisdiction on
courts, it is apparent that said law is substantive.[17]
In the case of Cang vs. Court of Appeals,[18] this Court
held that “jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court.”[19] R.A. No. 7691 was not yet in
force at the time of the commencement of the cases in the
trial court. It took effect only during the pendency of the
appeal before the Court of Appeals.[20] There is therefore
no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 7691
should be retroactively applied to this case and the same
be remanded to the MTC. The Court has held that a “law
vesting additional jurisdiction in the court cannot be given
retroactive effect.”[21]
Third issue – Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erroneously construed B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner insists that: penal statutes must be strictly
construed and where there is any reasonable doubt, it
must always be resolved in favor of the accused;[22] the
Court of Appeals, in construing that B.P. Blg. 22 embraces
cases of “no funds” or “closed accounts” when the express
language of B.P. Blg. 22 penalizes only the issuance of
checks that are subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for “insufficiency” of funds or credit, has enlarged by
implication the meaning of the statute which amounts to
judicial legislation;[23] a postdated check, not being drawn
payable on demand, is technically not a special kind of a
bill of exchange, called check, but an ordinary bill of
exchange payable at a fixed date, which is the date
indicated on the face of the postdated check, hence, the
instrument is still valid and the obligation covered thereby,
but only civilly and not criminally;[24] the trial court also
erroneously cited a portion in the case of Lozano vs.
Martinez[25] that the “language of B.P. Blg. 22 is broad
enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated
or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing
obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange
for something of value,” since the same is mere obiter
dictum;[26] in the interpretation of the meaning of a
“check”, where the law is clear and unambiguous, the law
must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.[27]
The Solicitor General counters that a postdated check is
still a check and its being a postdated instrument does not
necessarily make it a bill of exchange “payable at a fixed
or determinable future time” since it is still paid on demand
on the date indicated therein or thereafter just like an
ordinary check.[28] It also points out that the doctrine laid
down in Lozano vs. Martinez was reiterated in People vs.
Nitafan,[29] hence, it can no longer be argued that the
statement in the case of Lozano regarding the scope of
“checks” is mere obiter dictum.
Again, we agree with the Solicitor General and find
petitioner’s claim to be without merit.
The rationale behind B.P. Blg. 22 was initially explained by
the Court in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez[30]
where we held that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment …
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making or worthless checks and putting
them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on
the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The
law punished the act not as an offense against property,
but an offense against public order.[31]
...
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcend
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.[32]
The same is reiterated in Cueme vs. People[33] where we
pronounced that:
. . . B.P. Blg. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the
proliferation of worthless checks in the mainstream of daily
business and to avert not only the undermining of the
banking system of the country but also the infliction of
damage and injury upon trade and commerce occasioned
by the indiscriminate issuances of such checks. By its
very nature, the offenses defined under B.P. Blg. 22 are
against public interest.[34]
In Recuerdo vs. People, this Court also held that the terms
and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are
irrelevant since its primordial intention is to ensure the
stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual
substitutes for currency.[35]
Petitioner’s claim that cases of “closed accounts” are not
included in the coverage of B.P. Blg. 22 has no merit
considering the clear intent of the law, which is to
discourage the issuance of worthless checks due to its
harmful effect to the public. This Court, in Lozano vs.
Martinez, was explicit in ruling that the language of B.P.
Blg. 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks,
whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in
payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or
simultaneous exchange for something of value.[36]
In People vs. Nitafan,[37] the Supreme Court reiterated
this point and held that:
B.P. Blg. 22 … does not distinguish but merely provides
that “[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any
check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank … which
check is subsequently dishonored … shall be punished by
imprisonment … Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus.
But even if We retrace the enactment of the “Bouncing
Check Law” to determine the parameters of the concept of
“check”, we can easily glean that the members of the then
Batasang Pambansa intended it to be comprehensive as
to include all checks drawn against banks.[38]
In this light, it is easy to see that the claim of petitioner that
B.P. Blg. 22 does not include ‘postdated checks’ and
cases of ‘closed accounts’ has no leg to stand on. The
term “closed accounts” is within the meaning of the phrase
“does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank”.
Anent the second issue: whether or not notice of dishonor
is dispensable in the case at bar. Petitioner failed to show
any cogent reason for us to disturb the findings of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals.
B.P. Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Check’s Law seeks to
prevent the act of making and issuing checks with the
knowledge that at the time of issue, the drawer does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for payment
and the checks were subsequently dishonored upon
presentment.[39] To be convicted thereunder, the
following elements must be proved:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to
apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that
he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with,
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or it would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.[40]
For liability to attach under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough
that the prosecution establishes that checks were issued
and that the same were subsequently dishonored. The
prosecution must also prove that the issuer, at the time of
the check’s issuance, had knowledge that he did not have
enough funds or credit in the bank of payment thereof
upon its presentment.[41]
Since the second element involves a state of mind which is
difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a
prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. –
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds
or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements
for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five
(5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee.
Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into
existence only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from
receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or
to make arrangement for its payment.[42] The
presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this
section cannot arise, if such notice of non-payment by the
drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there
is no proof as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning
the crucial 5-day period.[43]
In this case, it is not disputed that checks were issued by
petitioner and said checks were subsequently dishonored.
The question however is, was petitioner furnished a notice
of dishonor? If not, is it sufficient justification to exonerate
petitioner from her criminal and civil liabilities for issuing
the bouncing checks?
The trial court ruled that the second element is present
because:
… the accused knew at the time of issuance of the checks
that she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with her
drawee bank for the payment of the checks in full upon
their presentment [as] admitted by her in the Counter-
Affidavit she executed during the preliminary investigation
of these criminal cases (itals. ours), to wit:
4. That the time of the issuance of the said checks,
due notice and information had been so given to Solid
Gold anent the actual status of the checks that the same
might not be able to cover the amount of the said checks
so stated therein … (Exhibit “N”, “1”, underscoring
supplied).
This fact became evident again during the cross-
examination by the accused’s counsel of the prosecution’s
witness, Joaquin Novales III:
ATTY. TAGANAS:
Q: And the reason you agreed to the terms and
conditions for the issuance of post-dated checks because
you are also aware the particular time the accused Mrs.
Elvira Yu Oh did not also have enough funds or money in
the bank within which to cover the amount of the checks?
A: I am not aware, sir.
...
Q: To your knowledge when the accused had already
admitted to you that she had not enough money to pay
you?
A: That is the terms and promise and agreed upon, sir.
Q: But inspite of the fact that she already told you about
that, that you never suspected that she did not have
enough money to cover the checks agreed upon and
issued to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And inspite of the fact she told you you never
suspected that she did not have enough money to cover
you . . .
Q: You still believe that although she does not have
enough money she still issued checks to you?
A: Yes, sir. (TSN, April 6, 1993, pp. 24-26)
At any rate, there is already prima facie evidence of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds on the part of the
accused from her failure to pay the amount due on the
checks or to make arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee bank within five banking days after she received
notice of their dishonor, each of the checks having been
presented within ninety days from their respective dated
(B.P. Blg. 22, Sec. 2). The defense did not controvert this
evidence. (itals. ours)[44]
Although the trial court in its decision, mentioned that
herein petitioner received notices of dishonor, nowhere in
the records is there proof that the prosecution ever
presented evidence that petitioner received or was
furnished a notice of dishonor. The notices of dishonor
that were presented in court and marked as Exhibits “D-2”,
“E-2”, “F-2”, “G-2”, “H-2”, “I-2”, “J-2”, “K-2”, “L-2”, “C-2”[45]
were all sent to the private complainant, Solid Gold, and
not to petitioner. In convicting petitioner, the trial court,
gave probative weight on the admission of petitioner in her
Counter-Affidavit which she submitted during the
preliminary investigation that at the time of issuance of the
subject checks, she was aware and even told private
complainant that the checks might not be able to cover the
amount stated therein.
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC, to wit:
. . . Neither can We agree that accused-appellant was still
entitled to notice of dishonor of the bouncing checks as
she had no more checking account with the drawee bank
at the time of the dishonor of the ten checks in question.
Accused-appellant must have realized that by closing her
checking account after issuing the ten postdated checks,
all of said checks would bounce. Knowing that she had
already closed her checking account with the drawee
bank, certainly accused-appellant would not have
expected, even in her wildest imagination, that her
postdated checks would be honored by the drawee bank.
Thus, accused-appellant need not be notified anymore of
the obvious dishonor of her rubber checks. (itals. ours)[46]
Based on the law and existing jurisprudence, we find that
the appellate court erred in convicting petitioner.
In cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, it is necessary that
the prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice
of dishonor. Since service of notice is an issue, the person
alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of
service. Basic also is the doctrine that in criminal cases,
the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, for cases of B.P. Blg. 22 there should be
clear proof of notice.[47]
Indeed, this requirement cannot be taken lightly because
Section 2 provides for an opportunity for the drawer to
effect full payment of the amount appearing on the check,
within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The
absence of said notice therefore deprives an accused of
an opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution. In other
words, procedural due process demands that a notice of
dishonor be actually served on petitioner. In the case at
bar, appellant has a right to demand – and the basic
postulate of fairness requires – that the notice of dishonor
be actually sent to and received by her to afford her to
opportunity to aver prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.[48]
The Solicitor General contends that notice of dishonor is
dispensable in this case considering that the cause of the
dishonor of the checks was “Account Closed” and
therefore, petitioner already knew that the checks will
bounce anyway. This argument has no merit. The Court
has decided numerous cases where checks were
dishonored for the reason, “Account Closed”[49] and we
have explicitly held in said cases that “it is essential for the
maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her
check, so she could pay the value thereof or make
arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed
by law”[50] and omission or neglect on the part of the
prosecution to prove that the accused received such notice
of dishonor is fatal to its cause.[51]
A perusal of the testimony of the prosecution witness
Joaquin Novales III, General Manager of complainant
Solid Gold, discloses that no personal demands were
made on appellant before the filing of the complaints
against her.[52] Thus, absent a clear showing that
petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and
was given the opportunity to make arrangements for
payment as provided for under the law, we cannot with
moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The
failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given
the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her
acquittal.[53]
Moreover, as understood by the trial court itself in the
herein aforequoted portion of its decision, General
Manager Novales knew of the non-availability of sufficient
funds when appellant issued the subject checks to him.
This Court has held that there is no violation of B.P. 22 if
complainant was told by the drawer that he has no
sufficient funds in the bank.[54]
For these reasons, we reverse the ruling of the Court of
Appeals affirming the trial court’s conviction of petitioner
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. This is without prejudice,
however, to her civil liability towards private complainant
Solid Gold in the amount of P500,000.00 plus interest
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from date of finality
of herein judgment.[55]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Elvira Yu Oh is ACQUITTED of the
offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on ten counts for
insufficiency of evidence. However, she is ordered to pay
complainant Solid Gold International Traders, Inc. the total
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
with 12% interest per annum from date of finality of herein
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63318 August 18, 1984
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO.,
respondents.
Tomas C. Llamas for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent NTC.
Eliseo Alampay, Jr., Graciano C. Regala and Augusto San
Pedro for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
MAKASIAR, J.:
I notice on the aforesaid supplemental motion for
On March 2, 1983, petitioner filed the instant petition
praying, among others, that the decision of respondent
NTC dated November 22, 1982 and the order dated
January 14, 1983 be annulled and set aside on the
grounds therein stated (pp. 2-19, rec.).
After the petitioner, the private respondent, and the
Solicitor General for public respondent NTC filed their
respective comments and memoranda (pp. 47-53, 96-106,
109-116, 127-142, 147-164, 206-221, rec.), on November
25, 1983, the decision sought to be reconsidered was
promulgated, annulling and setting aside the challenged
decision and order, respectively dated November 22, 1982
and January 14, 1983 (pp. 225-232, rec.).
Said decision is not unanimous as it bears the
concurrence of only 9 members of this Court, while 3
members took no part and 1 member reserved his vote (p
232, rec.)
In a resolution dated January 10, 1984 and released on
January 17, 1984, the Court granted respondent PLDT's
motion for 15-day extension from the expiration of the
reglementary period within which to file a motion for
reconsideration (pp. 233, 236, rec.).
On January 12, 1984, PLDT filed its motion for
reconsideration (pp. 237-268, rec.).
On February 27, 1984, respondent PLDT filed a motion to
admit attached supplemental motion for reconsideration
(pp. 281-301, rec.).
On February 27, 1984, public respondent NTC, thru the
Solicitor General, filed a manifestation and motion that it is
joining core, respondent PLDT in its motion for
reconsideration thereby adopting the same as its own (pp.
302-303, 305-306, rec.).
In a resolution dated March 1, 1984 and issued on March
2, 1984, the Court admitted the supplemental motion for
reconsideration of PLDT, noted the manifestation and
motion of the Solicitor General for and in behalf of
respondent NTC that it is joining the motion for
reconsideration of PLDT and adopting it as its own, and
required petitioner to convenient within 10 days from
reconsideration of PLDT (p. 304-A, rec.).
On March 28, 1984, petitioner filed its comment on
respondent's motion for reconsideration (pp. 310-317,
rec.).
In a resolution dated April 3, 1984 and issued on April 11,
1984, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration (p.
318A, rec.).
On April 6, 1984, respondent PLDT filed a motion to strike
out "discussion (e)" in petitioner's "comment on
respondents' motions" dated March 20, 1984 (pp. 319-321,
rec.).
In a resolution dated April 12, 1984 and issued on April 16,
1984, the Court required petitioner's counsel Atty. Tomas
Llamas to comment within 10 days from notice on the
aforesaid motion to strike out (p. 323, rec.).
On April 17, 1984, respondent PLDT, thru counsel, filed a
motion for leave to file within 15 days from date a second
motion for reconsideration (pp. 324-326, rec.).
On April 27, 1984, petitioner filed an opposition to the
aforesaid motion of PLDT for leave to file within 15 days to
file a second motion for reconsideration (pp. 328-330,
rec.).
On May 2, 1984, private respondent PLDT filed a second
motion for reconsideration with an annex (pp. 332-344,
rec.).
In a resolution dated May 8, 1984 but issued on May 11,
1984, the Court granted the motion of PLDT to file a
second motion for reconsideration within 15 days from
April 16, 1984, noted the opposition of petitioner to said
motion, and required petitioner to comment within 15 days
from notice on the aforesaid second motion for
reconsideration of PLDT for the reconsideration of the
decision of November 25, 1983 (p. 345, rec.).
On May 4, 1984, petitioner filed its comment on the
second motion for reconsideration of private respondent
(pp. 346-350, rec.).
In a resolution dated May 10, 1984 and issued on May 16,
1984, the Court required respondents to file a reply within
10 days from notice on the aforesaid comment of petitioner
on private respondent PLDT's motion praying that the
discussion (par. 3) in petitioner's comment on the first
motion for reconsideration and the supplemental motion
for reconsideration be deleted (p. 352, rec.).
On May 21, 1984, public respondent NTC filed a
manifestation joining private respondent PLDT and
adopting the latter's second motion for reconsideration (pp.
353-354, rec.), which the Court granted in a resolution
dated May 29, 1984 and issued on June 6, 1984 (p. 355-
A).
On May 28,1984, respondent PLDT filed a motion for
extension of 10 days or until June 7, 1984 within which to
submit the required reply in the resolution of May 10, 1984
and issued on May 16, 1984 (pp. 356-357, rec.), which
was granted in a resolution dated June 5, 1984 and issued
on July 3, 1984 (p. 357-A, rec.).
On June 1, 1984, petitioner filed its comment on PLDT's
second motion for reconsideration, with a motion to
declare final the decision with respect to public respondent
NTC (pp. 358362, rec.).
A day before June 1, 1984, or on May 31, 1984, private
respondent PLDT filed its reply to petitioner's "comment on
motion of private respondent" dated May 4, 1984 [motion
to strike] (pp. 366-369, rec.).
On July 16, 1984, after its motions for extension were
granted, public respondent NTC thru the Solicitor General,
finally filed its reply (pp. 370-371, 372-A, 373, 375-381,
rec.).
It should be emphasized that the resolution of this Court
dated April 3, 1984 but issued on April 11, 1984, denying
the first motion for reconsideration did not state that the
denial is final (see p. 318-A, rec.).
And the motion of May 29, 1984 but filed on June 1, 1984
of petitioner to declare as final the decision of November
25, 1983 (which motion was included in plaintiff's comment
on PLDT's second motion for reconsideration) with respect
to public respondent NTC (pp. 361-362, rec.), was not
acted upon by this Court, ostensibly because as early as
May 21, 1984, public respondent NTC, thru the Solicitor
General, filed a manifestation that it is joining private
respondent PLDT in its second motion for reconsideration
dated May 18, 1984 and adopting it as its own (pp. 353-
354, rec.).
II
It is not disputed — and should be emphasized that on
August 31, 1982, this Court set aside the NTC order dated
April 14, 1982 in the case of Samuel Bautista vs. NTC, et
al. (16 SCRA 411) provisionally approving the revised
schedule of rates for the Subscriber Investments Plan, on
the ground that there was necessity of a hearing by the
Commission before it could have acted on the PLDT
application for said revised schedule, to give opportunity to
the public, especially herein petitioner and the Solicitor
General to substantiate their objections to the said
schedule as excessive and unreasonable, especially for
the low-income and middle-income groups, which cannot
afford telephone connections and that there is no need to
increase the rate because PLDT is financially sound.
Thereafter, in NTC Case No. 82-87 entitled "Re Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co. respondent NTC conducted
several hearings on PLDT's revised Subscriber
Investments Plan schedule at which written oppositions
were filed by herein petitioner PCFI, the Solicitor General,
Atty. Samuel Bautista, Flora Alabanza, the municipality of
Marikina, and the Integrated Telecommunications
Suppliers' Association of the Philippines (ITESAP). Other
oppositors failed to file their written oppositions. The
hearings on the merits actually started on August 4, 1982
and continued for four (4) subsequent dates.
The oppositors, thru counsel, thoroughly cross-examined
the witness for the applicant, Mr. Romeo Sisteban
applicant's Vice-President for Budget and Financial
Planning.
None of the oppositors opted to present evidence but
merely filed Memoranda and thereafter manifested that the
case is submitted for decision Because PLDT made some
concessions in favor of the oppositors, oppositors ITESAP,
Eastern Telecommunications, Inc., Philippine Global
Communications, Inc. (Philcom), Globe-Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation (GMCR) withdrew their opposition and
manifested that they are no longer opposing the
application after which respondent NTC issued the
challenged decision of November 22, 1982.
Respondent NTC rendered the challenged decision dated
November 22, 1982, approving the revised schedule on
the ground that the rates are within the 50% of cost limit
provided in P.D. No. 217, that they are just and reasonable
and in consonance with the public policies declared in said
decree, and that such approval is in the public interest
(see NTC decision of Nov. 22, 1982, pp. 2-19, rec.).
It is undisputed therefore that petitioner and the other
oppositors were accorded due process.
From said decision dated November 22, 1982, petitioner
filed the instant petition.
III
The decision promulgated on November 25, 1983
interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2
of P.D. No. 217 to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications as mandatory, which
construction is not supported by the actual phraseology of
said Section 2, which reads thus:
The Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, through its Board of Communications
and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein
declared policies for the telephone industry are
immediately implemented and for this purpose, pertinent
rules and regulations may be promulgated (emphasis
supplied).
The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word
used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless
a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. Hence, the
phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to
mean "shall" or "must". It shall be interpreted in its ordinary
sense as permissive or discretionary on the part of the
delegate — department or the Board 6f Communications
then, now the National Telecommunications Commission
— whether or not to promulgate pertinent rules and
regulations. There is nothing in P.D. No. 217 which
commands that the phrase "may be promulgated" should
be construed as "shall be promulgated." The National
Telecommunications Commission can function and has
functioned without additional rules, aside from the existing
Public Service Law, as amended, and the existing rules
already issued by the Public Service Commission, as well
as the 1978 rules issued by the Board of Communications,
the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC. It should
be recalled that the PLDT petition for approval of its
revised SIP schedule was filed on March 20,1980.
P.D. No. 217 does not make the rules and regulations to
be promulgated by the respondent NTC as essential to the
exercise of its jurisdiction over applications for SIP
schedules. In Ang Tibay vs. CIR (69 Phil. 635), this Court,
through Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, did not include the
promulgation of rules and regulations as among the seven
(7) requirements of due process in quasi-judicial
proceedings before a quasi-judicial body such as the
respondent NTC.
What is patently mandatory on the ministry or National
Telecommunications Commission is the immediate
implementation of the policies declared in P.D. No. 217. To
repeat, the ministry or the NTC "shall see to it that the
herein declared policies for the telephone industry are
immediately implemented ..." The formulation of rules and
regulations is purely discretionary on the part of the
delegate.
Both words "shall and "may be" are employed in the lone
sentence of Section 2 of P.D. No. 217. This graphically
demonstrates that P.D. No. 217 preserves the distinction
between their ordinary, usual or nominal senses.
This is emphasized by the fact that under Section 3 of P.D.
No. 217, only "the pertinent provisions" of the Public
Service Act, as amended, which are in conflict with the
provisions of P.D. No. 217, had been repealed or modified
by said P.D. No. 217.
Section 3 of P.D. No. 217 states:
The pertinent provisions of the Public Service Act, as
amended, the franchise of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company under Act 3436, as amended, all
existing legislative and/or municipal franchises and other
laws, executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations or parts thereof, as are in conflict with the
provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
And under the Public Service Act, as amended (C.A. No.
146), the board of Communications then, now the NTC,
can fix a provisional amount for the subscriber's
investment to be effective immediately, without hearing
(par. 3 of Sec. 16, C.A. 146, as amended).
Section 16 (c) of C.A. No. 146, as amended, provides:
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll
charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as
communication, mileage, kilometrage, and oilier special
rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed
thereafter by any public service: Provided That the
Commission may, in its discretion approve rates proposed
by public services provisionally and without necessity of
any hearing, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty
days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the
concerns operating in the territory affects Provided further,
That in case the public service equipment of an operator is
used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a
private business, the net profits of said private business
shall be considered in relation with the public service of
such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates.
The Rules of Practice and Procedures promulgated on
January 25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the
immediate predecessor of respondent NTC, pursuant to
Section 11 of the Public Service Act, otherwise known as
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, govern the
rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then, now
respondent NTC. Section 2 of said Rules defines their
scope, including exempting parties from the application of
the rules in the interest of justice and to best serve the
public interest, and the NTC may apply such suitable
procedure to improve the service in the transaction of
public service. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 1 of said Rules
reads:
Sec. 2. Scope. — These rules govern pleadings, practice
and procedure before the Board of Communications in all
matters of hearing, investigation and proceedings within
the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader
interest of justice and in order to best serve the public
interest, the Board may, in any particular matter, except it
from these rules and apply such suitable procedure to
improve the service in the transaction of the public
business.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 2 of said rules insure the
appearance of the Solicitor General and other consumers
or users. The notice of hearing is required to be published
and to be served on the affected parties by Section 2 of
Rule 8; while Section I of Rule 9 allows the filing of written
oppositions to the application Under Section 3 of Rule 15,
the BOC then, now the NTC, may grant, on motion of the
applicant or on its own initiative, provisional relief based on
the pleading, supporting affidavits and other documents
attached thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after
completion of the hearing which shall be caged within thirty
(30) days from the grant of the provisional relief.
Finally, Section 1 of Rule 19 provides for the suppletory
application of the Rules of Court governing proceedings
before the Court of First Instance then, now the Regional
Trial Courts, which are not inconsistent with the rules of
practice and procedure promulgated by the BOC on
January 25, 1978.
There is nothing in P.D. No. 217 modifying, much less
repeating Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act, as
amended.
It is true that P.D. No. 1874 promulgated on July 21, 1983
amending Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 expressly authorizes
the National Telecommunications Commission (now the
successor of the Board of Communications) to approve
"such amounts for subscriber investments as applied for
provisionally and without the necessity of a hearing; but
shall call a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days
thereafter, upon publication and notice to all parties
affected." But such amendment merely reiterates or
confirms paragraph (c) of Section 16 of C.A. No. 146, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Law,
and serves merely to clarify the seeming ambiguity of the
repealing clause in Section 3 of P.D. No. 217 to dissipate
an doubts on such power of the National
Telecommunications Commission.
The construction of the majority decision of November 25,
1983 of the word "may" to mean "shall" is too strained, if
not tortured.
IV
WE cannot subscribe to the view that the National
Telecommunications Commission should or must
promulgate "pertinent rules and regulations because the
existing substantive and procedural laws as well as the
rules promulgated by the Public Service Commission
under and pursuant to the Public Service Law, otherwise
known as CA No. 146, as amended, are more than
adequate to determine the reasonability of the amounts of
investment of telephone subscribers, the viability of the
company and the other factors that go into determining
such amounts and such viability. The existing laws and
rules on rate-making are more than sufficient for a proper
determination of such amounts of investments of individual
subscribers and the profitability of the venture.
The adequacy of the existing Public Service Law,
otherwise known as C.A. No. 146, as amended, and rules
had been demonstrated, because they have been applied
in the following cases involving PLDT:
1. PLDT vs. PSC, G.R. No. L-26762, Aug. 31, 1970, 34
SCRA 609;
2. Republic vs. PLDT, G.R. No. L-18841, Jan. 27, 1969, 26
SCRA 620;
3. PLDT vs. PSC, G.R. Nos. L-24198 & L-24207-10, Dec.
18, 1968, 26 SCRA 427;
4. Republic Telephone Co. vs. PLDT, G.R. No. L-21070;
PLDT vs. Republic Telephone Co., G.R. No. L-21075, both
decided on Sept. 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 80;
5. PLDT vs. Medina, G.R. No. L-24658, April 3, 1968, 23
SCRA 1; and
6. PLDT vs. Medina, G.R. Nos. L-24340-44, July 18, 1967,
20 SCRA 669.
As heretofore stated, as early as January 25, 1978, other
pertinent rules of practice and procedure were
promulgated by the then Board of Communications, now
the respondent National Telecommunications Commission,
implementing P.D. No, 217, in addition to the applicable
provisions of the Public Service Law, as amended, and the
rules previously issue by the Public Service Commission
(Annex 2 to the Memo of respondent PLDT filed on August
15, 1983, pp. 147-165, rec.).
Even before 1978, respondent applied the procedure
prescribed by the Public Service Law, as amended, and
the rules previously issued by the Public Service
Commission, the NTC predecessor, in several cases
involving similar applications for SIP schedules of Filipino
Telephone Corporation (BOC Case No. 73-064; see BOC
decision in said cases dated December 5, 1974, May 11,
1978, March 15, 1977, Feb. 19, 1976 and Aug. 31, 1978
— Annexes 3, 4, 4-A, 5, pp. 166-195, rec.).
The majority opinion recognizes that for the last three
years, the PLDT had earned a yearly average net profit of
over P100 million and the existing subscribers have been
receiving their corresponding quarterly dividends on their
investments.
It should be stressed that Section 5 of Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution, as amended, expressly directs that "the
State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities
by the general public." As above-stated, the existing
individual subscribers of PLDT had been sharing in the net
profits of the company every quarter after the promulgation
of P.D. 217 on June 16, 1973.
The amount that is provisionally approved under the
subscriber's investment plan for PBX/PAEX trunks and for
business telephones in Metro Manila and the provinces,
whether new installations or transfers, appears to be
reasonable, including those for the leased lines or outside
local.
To lighten the burden of subscribers, investments may be
paid in installments or under some convenient
arrangements which the NTC may authorize, which is now
expressly provided for in Section 1 of P.D. 1874 amending
Sec. 6 of P.D. 217.
Section 1 of P.D. 1874 directs that:
Section 1, paragraph 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 217
is hereby amended to read as follows:
6. In any subscriber self-financing plan, the amount of
subscriber self-financing wilt in no case, exceed fifty per
centum (50%) of the amount which results from dividing
the telephone utility's gross investment in telephone plant
in service by its number of primary stations in service, both
as reported in the utility's latest audited annual report
rendered he National Telecommunications Commission;
PROVIDED, however, that the amount payable by the
telephone subscriber may be paid on installment or under
such payment arrangement as the National
Telecommunications Commission may authorize.
V
It should be likewise emphasized that pursuant to the
mandate of Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution,
as amended, the law-making authority, in issuing both P.D.
Nos. 217 and 1874, established the all-important policy of
making available on regular and uninterrupted basis the
telephone service because it is
a crucial element in the conduct of business activity ... and
is essential for the smooth and efficient function of
industry,
... efficient telephone service contributes directly to
national development by facilitating trade and commerce;
... the telephone industry is one of the most highly capital
intensive industries;
... the telephone industry has fundamentally different
financing characteristics from other utilities in that capital
requirements per telephone unit installed increase as the
number of customers serviced also increases instead of
decreasing in cost per unit as in power and water utilities;
... continued reliance on the traditional sources of capital
funds through foreign and domestic borrowing and through
public ownership of common capital stock will result in a
high cost of capital heavy cash requirements for
amortization and thus eventually in higher effective cost of
telephone service to subscribers;
... the subscribers to telephone service tend to be among
the residents of urban areas and among the relatively
higher income segment of the population;
... it is in the interest of the national economy to encourage
savings and to place these savings in productive
enterprises and
... it is the announced policies of the government to
encourage the spreading out of ownership in public utilities
(see Whereases of P.D. 217; emphasis supplied).
P.D. No. 217 further states as the basic policies of the
State concerning the telephone industry "in the interest of
social, economic and general well-being of the people ...
1. The attainment of efficient telephone service for as
wide an area as possible at the lowest reasonable cost to
the subscriber;
2. The expansion of telephone service shall be financed
through an optimal combination of domestic and foreign
sources of financing and an optimal combination of debt
and equity funds so as to minimize the aggregate cost of
capital of telephone utilities;
3. Consistent with the declared policy of the State to attain
widespread ownership of public utilities obtained from
ownership funds shall be raised from a broad base of
investors, involving as large a number of individual
investors as may be possible;
4. In line with the objective of spreading ownership among
a wide base of the people, the concept of telephone
subscriber self-financing is hereby adopted whereby a
telephone subscriber finances part of the capital
investments in telephone installations through the
purchase of stocks, whether common or preferred stock, of
the telephone company;
5. As part of any subscriber self-financing plan, when the
issuance of preferred stock is contemplated, it is required
that the subscriber be assured, in all cases of a fixed
annual income from his investment and that these
preferred capital stocks be convertible into common
shares, after a reasonable period and under reasonable
terms, at the option of the preferred stockholder; and Metro Manila
6. In any subscriber self-financing plan, the amount of Provincial
subscriber self-financing wig, in no case, exceed fifty per
centum (50%) of the cost of the installed telephone line, as
may be determined from time to time by the regulatory
bodies of the State.
The same policies and objectives are substantially re-
stated and capsulized in the three Whereases of P.D. No.
1874 amending P.D. No. 217 as pointed out in the basic I. New Installations —
policies aforestated in P.D. No. 217 that the cost per
telephone unit increases in proportion to the increase in
the number of customers served; and that foreign
borrowing will impose heavy cash requirements for
amortizations of such foreign loans which would result in
the higher effective costs of telephone service to 1. PBX/PABX Trunk
subscribers and ultimately would be a heavy drain on our
dollar reserves, which will result in our inability to meet our P5,000
other foreign commitments and mark the image of the
Republic of the Philippines in international trade relations. P3,000
Thus, P.D. No. 217 stresses that in the interest of the
national economy it is essential to encourage savings and 2. Phone:
to place these savings (subscriber's investments) in
productive enterprises.
PLDT is profitable for the subscribers-investors as shown
by its net profit and the dividends received quarterly by the
existing subscribers. Single line
There is no showing — not even an allegation — that the 3,500
net profits realized by PLDT all these years have been
dissipated and not plowed back into the firm to improve its 2,000
service.
Party line
But the rising cost of materials and labor needed to
improve the PLDT service, aggravated by the devaluation 2,000
of our currency, all the more justify the revised SIP
schedule approved by the respondent NTC. 1,500
The approved revised SIP schedule, which appears 3. Phone:
reasonable and fair is herein reproduced:
REVISED SIP SCHEDULE
Revised SIP Rates
Single line
Service Category
1,800 800

1,300 (pp. 34-35, rec.).

Single line
Party line With the dividends that will be received quarterly under the
800 revised SIP schedule, the subscribers (whether of phone
900 installations for business with or without trunk lines, as wen
600 as transfers of the same; or of residential phones whether
800 single or party line as well as transfers of the same), will
Party line recover their investments after some years and will
4. Leased line thereafter remain stockholders and part-owners of PLDT.
600 All the subscribers therefore, are assured not only of
2,500 profits from but also preservation of, their investments,
500 which are not donations to PLDT.
2,500
3. Residential Phone: There are always two sides — sometimes more — to a
5. Tie trunk or tie line case or proposition or issue. There are many cases
decided by this Court where this Court had reconsidered
2,500 Its decisions and even reversed Itself, conformably to the
environmental facts and the applicable law.
2,500
Single line After a re-study of the facts and the law, illuminated by
6. Outside local mutual exchange of views the members of the Court may
600 and do change their minds.
2,500
500 To repeat, the decision of November 25, 1983 was not a
2,500 unanimous decision for it has the concurrence of only nine
Party line (9) members of the Court, because three (3) took no part
and one (1) reserved his vote (p. 232, rec.).
500
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF NOVEMBER 25, 1983
300 SHOULD BE AS IT IS HEREBY RECONSIDERED AND
SET ASIDE AND THE PETTION IS HEREBY
4. Leased line DISMISSED. NO COSTS.
II. Transfers —
800 SO ORDERED.

800 Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Escolin, De la Fuente and

Cuevas, JJ., concur.
5. Tie trunk or tie line
1. PBX/PABX Aquino and Plana, JJ., concur in the result.
800
1,500 Fernando, C.J., took no part.
800
1,200
6. Outside local
2. Phone:
800
Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I join the dissents of Justices Abad Santos and Relova. I
only wish to add that there has been a departure here from
the Court's usual practice and rules (cf. Rule 52, sec. 2;
Rule 51, sec. 1; and Rule 56, Secs. 1 and 11) of setting
the case for rehearing and hearing the parties in oral
argument when a new majority (because of a change of
votes or new members or for whatever reason) is inclined
to reconsider and overturn the original majority; more so,
on a second motion for reconsideration, the first motion for
reconsideration having been denied without a dissenting
vote and the parties not having been previously heard in
oral argument.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:
My concurrence in Mr. Justice Makasiar's ponencia is not
without certain misgivings. I agree with the Court's views
on the powers of the National Telecommunications
Commission, the applicability of existing rules and
regulations, and the policy declarations in P.D. Nos. 217
and 1874. However, while now convinced that the increase
in mandatory investments for subscribers is based on law
and that there is no showing of arbitrariness in the law's
implementation, I must confess that I see no justification
for the continued inefficient services rendered by the
respondent telephone company. When the Court was
deliberating on the motion for reconsideration, my own
residential telephone was out of order. And I believe that
our experiences in our neighborhood do not represent
isolated cases. I have yet to hear from or about satisfied
PLDT customers.
My point is —increased rates and increases in the
"subscribers' self-financing plan" must be matched by
equivalent and demonstrably improved telephone service.
More than its duty to increase rates and subscribers' fees
whenever warranted, the respondent Commission has the
statutory and greater obligation to supervise "the
attainment of efficient telephone service for as wide an
area as possible at the lowest reasonable cost to the
subscribers."
I am aware that almost all major or components of our
telephone system must be imported from foreign sources.
Since the Philippine peso is now worth one American
nickel the cost of services based on imported materials
must increase. Loans contracted when the foreign
exchange rate was not so disadvantageous now require
double or treble amortizations in depreciated pesos. The
Court cannot assume the role of King Canute. Only the
financial experts in the political departments can return the
peso to a respectable value. Moreover, it is indeed to the
nation's advantage to look for local capital sources instead
of resorting to more foreign borrowings.
I must stress, however, that consumers would not mind
paying reasonable increases if they get satisfactory
services. The respondent telephone company has yet to
solve this elementary and glaringly obvious problem.
Pinpointing the cause and applying the solution should be
the company's number one concern.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
I vote to deny the second Motion for Reconsideration. I am
amazed that the decision which was promulgated as
recently as November 25, 1983, with no dissenting opinion
to dilute its acceptability should now be reconsidered. My
amazement is heightened by the fact that when the case
was discussed on July 26, 1984, I had the impression that
the motion was doomed so that a request to defer action
on it would have met the same fate had not the request
been put on a pag-bigyan basis.
The case involves a simple problem of statutory
construction — that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
217. It reads as follows:
The Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Commissions, through its Board of Communications and/or
appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared
policies for the telephone industry are immediately
implemented and for this purpose, pertinent rules and
regulations may be promulgated.
The issue is whether or not the National
Telecommunications (NTC) must first promulgate the rules
and regulations mentioned in the decree before it can
approve the Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of private
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.
(PLDT).
The decision, without any dissenting opinion, sustained the
petitioner's contention that it is the duty of NTC to first
Promulgate rules and regulations.
The resolution, which is not unanimous, does not
subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must
promulgate rules and regulations because, it is said, the
decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used
is the permissive "may" and not the mandatory "shall The
non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the canons index
animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a
verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of the
statute there should be no departure).
Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of
statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with
the canons above mentioned we have the following
opposite: verba intention, non e contra, debent incservice
(words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not
the intent to the words). Sutherland explains the limits of
literalism thus:
The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not
prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent
intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently
flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the
legislative intention The intention prevails over the letter,
and the letter must if possible be read so as to conform to
the spirit of the act. 'While the intention of the legislature
must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the
manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law should
not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words.
Thus words or clauses may be enlarged or restricted to
harmonize with other provisions of an act. The particular
inquiry is not what is the abstract force of the words or
what they may comprehend, but in what sense were they
intended to be understood or what understanding do they
convey as used in the particular act. (Vol. 2A Statutory
Construction, pp. 65-66 [1972].)
It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the
word "may" in a statute is permissive while the word "shall"
is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. Thus
Professor Luis J. Gonzaga states:
According to Black, 'Where the statute provides for the
doing of some act which is required by justice or public
duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or
officer with power and authority to take some action which
concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the
permissive language win be construed as mandatory and
the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty.
Thus, where the statute provided that 'the commissioners
may take into consideration the enhanced value to the
remaining land of an owner whose land was taken for
highway purposes it was held that the word may should be
given a mandatory meaning and is the same as the word
'shall', since it directs the doing of a thing for the sake of
justice or the public good. Similarly, a statute by which
municipal corporations are 'authorized and empowered to
provide for the support of indigent persons within their
limits or to make public improvements as to open and
repair streets, remove obstructions from highways,
construct sewers and the like, are to be construed as
mandatory although they only purport to grant permission
or authority since the public has an interest in such matters
and the grant of authority is therefore equivalent to the
imposition of duty." (Statutes and their Construction, pp.
98-99 [1969].)
In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the
provision of the decree should be construed as mandatory
mother than merely directory. They are stated in the
unanimous decision as follows:
1. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien innovative and
untested such that existing substantive and procedural
laws would not be applicable. Thus, the Subscriber
Investment Plan (SIP) was so set up precisely to ensure
the financial viability of public telecommunications
companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the
population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone
facility.
The SIP has never been contemplated prior to P.D. 217.
The existing law on the other hand, the Public Service Act,
diametrically runs counter to the split and intention, if not
the purpose of P.D. 217. It may even be gained that as
long as the Optimum number of individuals may enjoy
telephone service, there is no station on the profitability of
such companies. Hence, while P.D. 217 encourages the
profitability of public telecommunication companies, the
Public Service Act limits the same.
2. In the absence of such rules and regulations, there is
outright confusion among the rights of PLDT, the
consumers and the government itself. As may clearly be
after how can the Decision be said to have assured that
most of the population will enjoy telephone facilities? Did
the Decision likewise assure the financial viability of
PLDT? Was the government's duty to provide telephone
service to its constituents subserved by the Decision?
These questions can never be answered unless such rules
and regulations are set up.
3. Finally, it should be emphasized that NTC is estopped
from claiming that there is no need to promulgate such
rules and regulations. In the case of PCFI vs. NTC, G.R.
No. 61892, now pending resolution before this Honorable
Tribunal, NTC totally refused to act on a petition filed by
PLDT precisely for the promulgation of such rules and
regulations.
Why then did NTC refuse to act on such petition if and
when there is no need for the promulgation of such rules
and regulations? After all NTC could have simply ruled that
the petition in G.R. No. 618R2 is unnecessary because
such rules and regulations are also unnecessary. (pp. 135-
136, Rollo)
The above reasons also rebut the contention in the non-
unanimous resolution that the existing substantive and
procedure laws as well as the rules promulgated by the
Public Service Commission are more than adequate to
determine the reasonableness of the amounts of
investment of telephone subscribers, etc.
The PLDT's SIP is an unreasonable imposition by a utility
company on a captive public. The injury is compounded by
the fact that although the company makes mega profits its
service, to use a McEnroe expression, is the pits.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
RELOVA, J., dissenting:
For the reasons stated in my ponencia of November 25,
1983, I vote to DENY the second motion for
reconsideration, dated May 2, 1984, filed by private
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, through counsel. The argument advanced in the
motion that Presidential Decree No. 217 was amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1874 which was issued on July
21, 1983, is without merit. Section 4 of said PD 1874
specifically provides that "all decisions or orders of the
National Telecommunications Commission heretofore
issued approving subscribers investment plans or revisions
thereof, are hereby declared valid and legal in all respects,
excepting such decisions or orders as, on the date of this
decree, are pending review by the Supreme Court." The
case at bar was filed with this Court on March 3, 1983 or
before the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1874.
Besides, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 217 which
was promulgated on June 16, 1973 declares that "in the
interest of the social, economic and general well being of
the people, the State hereby adopts the following basic
policies of the telephone industry:
1. The attainment of efficient telephone service for as wide
an area as possible at the lowest reasonable cost to the
subsciber.
xxx xxx xxx
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I join the dissents of Justices Abad Santos and Relova. I
only wish to add that there has been a departure here from
the Court's usual practice and rules (cf. Rule 52, sec. 2;
Rule 51, sec. 1; and Rule 56, Secs. 1 and 11) of setting
the case for rehearing and hearing the parties in oral
argument when a new majority (because of a change of
votes or new members or for whatever reason) is inclined
to reconsider and overturn the original majority; more so,
on a second motion for reconsideration, the first motion for
reconsideration having been denied without a dissenting
vote and the parties not having been previously heard in
oral argument.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:
My concurrence in Mr. Justice Makasiar's ponencia is not
without certain misgivings. I agree with the Court's views
on the powers of the National Telecommunications
Commission, the applicability of existing rules and
regulations, and the policy declarations in P.D. Nos. 217
and 1874. However, while now convinced that the increase
in mandatory investments for subscribers is based on law
and that there is no showing of arbitrariness in the law's
implementation, I must confess that I see no justification
for the continued inefficient services rendered by the
respondent telephone company. When the Court was
deliberating on the motion for reconsideration, my own
residential telephone was out of order. And I believe that
our experiences in our neighborhood do not represent
isolated cases. I have yet to hear from or about satisfied
PLDT customers.
My point is —increased rates and increases in the
"subscribers' self-financing plan" must be matched by
equivalent and demonstrably improved telephone service.
More than its duty to increase rates and subscribers' fees
whenever warranted, the respondent Commission has the
statutory and greater obligation to supervise "the
attainment of efficient telephone service for as wide an
area as possible at the lowest reasonable cost to the
subscribers."
I am aware that almost all major or components of our
telephone system must be imported from foreign sources.
Since the Philippine peso is now worth one American
nickel the cost of services based on imported materials
must increase. Loans contracted when the foreign
exchange rate was not so disadvantageous now require
double or treble amortizations in depreciated pesos. The
Court cannot assume the role of King Canute. Only the
financial experts in the political departments can return the
peso to a respectable value. Moreover, it is indeed to the
nation's advantage to look for local capital sources instead
of resorting to more foreign borrowings.
I must stress, however, that consumers would not mind
paying reasonable increases if they get satisfactory
services. The respondent telephone company has yet to
solve this elementary and glaringly obvious problem.
Pinpointing the cause and applying the solution should be
the company's number one concern.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
I vote to deny the second Motion for Reconsideration. I am
amazed that the decision which was promulgated as
recently as November 25, 1983, with no dissenting opinion
to dilute its acceptability should now be reconsidered. My
amazement is heightened by the fact that when the case
was discussed on July 26, 1984, I had the impression that
the motion was doomed so that a request to defer action
on it would have met the same fate had not the request
been put on a pag-bigyan basis.
The case involves a simple problem of statutory
construction — that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
217. It reads as follows:
The Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Commissions, through its Board of Communications and/or
appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared
policies for the telephone industry are immediately
implemented and for this purpose, pertinent rules and
regulations may be promulgated.
The issue is whether or not the National
Telecommunications (NTC) must first promulgate the rules
and regulations mentioned in the decree before it can
approve the Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of private
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.
(PLDT).
The decision, without any dissenting opinion, sustained the
petitioner's contention that it is the duty of NTC to first
Promulgate rules and regulations.
The resolution, which is not unanimous, does not
subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must
promulgate rules and regulations because, it is said, the
decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used
is the permissive "may" and not the mandatory "shall The
non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the canons index
animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a
verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of the
statute there should be no departure).
Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of
statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with
the canons above mentioned we have the following
opposite: verba intention, non e contra, debent incservice
(words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not
the intent to the words). Sutherland explains the limits of
literalism thus:
The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not
prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent
intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently
flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the
legislative intention The intention prevails over the letter,
and the letter must if possible be read so as to conform to
the spirit of the act. 'While the intention of the legislature
must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the
manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law should
not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words.
Thus words or clauses may be enlarged or restricted to
harmonize with other provisions of an act. The particular
inquiry is not what is the abstract force of the words or
what they may comprehend, but in what sense were they
intended to be understood or what understanding do they
convey as used in the particular act. (Vol. 2A Statutory
Construction, pp. 65-66 [1972].)
It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the
word "may" in a statute is permissive while the word "shall"
is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. Thus
Professor Luis J. Gonzaga states:
According to Black, 'Where the statute provides for the
doing of some act which is required by justice or public
duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or
officer with power and authority to take some action which
concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the
permissive language win be construed as mandatory and
the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty.
Thus, where the statute provided that 'the commissioners
may take into consideration the enhanced value to the
remaining land of an owner whose land was taken for
highway purposes it was held that the word may should be
given a mandatory meaning and is the same as the word
'shall', since it directs the doing of a thing for the sake of
justice or the public good. Similarly, a statute by which
municipal corporations are 'authorized and empowered to
provide for the support of indigent persons within their
limits or to make public improvements as to open and
repair streets, remove obstructions from highways,
construct sewers and the like, are to be construed as
mandatory although they only purport to grant permission
or authority since the public has an interest in such matters
and the grant of authority is therefore equivalent to the
imposition of duty." (Statutes and their Construction, pp.
98-99 [1969].)
In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the
provision of the decree should be construed as mandatory
mother than merely directory. They are stated in the
unanimous decision as follows:
1. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien innovative and
untested such that existing substantive and procedural
laws would not be applicable. Thus, the Subscriber
Investment Plan (SIP) was so set up precisely to ensure
the financial viability of public telecommunications
companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the
population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone
facility.
The SIP has never been contemplated prior to P.D. 217.
The existing law on the other hand, the Public Service Act,
diametrically runs counter to the split and intention, if not
the purpose of P.D. 217. It may even be gained that as
long as the Optimum number of individuals may enjoy
telephone service, there is no station on the profitability of
such companies. Hence, while P.D. 217 encourages the
profitability of public telecommunication companies, the
Public Service Act limits the same.
2. In the absence of such rules and regulations, there is
outright confusion among the rights of PLDT, the
consumers and the government itself. As may clearly be
after how can the Decision be said to have assured that
most of the population will enjoy telephone facilities? Did
the Decision likewise assure the financial viability of
PLDT? Was the government's duty to provide telephone
service to its constituents subserved by the Decision?
These questions can never be answered unless such rules
and regulations are set up.
3. Finally, it should be emphasized that NTC is estopped
from claiming that there is no need to promulgate such
rules and regulations. In the case of PCFI vs. NTC, G.R.
No. 61892, now pending resolution before this Honorable
Tribunal, NTC totally refused to act on a petition filed by
PLDT precisely for the promulgation of such rules and
regulations.
Why then did NTC refuse to act on such petition if and
when there is no need for the promulgation of such rules
and regulations? After all NTC could have simply ruled that
the petition in G.R. No. 618R2 is unnecessary because
such rules and regulations are also unnecessary. (pp. 135-
136, Rollo)
The above reasons also rebut the contention in the non-
unanimous resolution that the existing substantive and
procedure laws as well as the rules promulgated by the
Public Service Commission are more than adequate to
determine the reasonableness of the amounts of
investment of telephone subscribers, etc.
The PLDT's SIP is an unreasonable imposition by a utility
company on a captive public. The injury is compounded by
the fact that although the company makes mega profits its
service, to use a McEnroe expression, is the pits.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
RELOVA, J., dissenting:
For the reasons stated in my ponencia of November 25,
1983, I vote to DENY the second motion for
reconsideration, dated May 2, 1984, filed by private
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, through counsel. The argument advanced in the
motion that Presidential Decree No. 217 was amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1874 which was issued on July
21, 1983, is without merit. Section 4 of said PD 1874
specifically provides that "all decisions or orders of the
National Telecommunications Commission heretofore
issued approving subscribers investment plans or revisions
thereof, are hereby declared valid and legal in all respects,
excepting such decisions or orders as, on the date of this
decree, are pending review by the Supreme Court." The
case at bar was filed with this Court on March 3, 1983 or
before the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1874.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY
ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in
an original land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural
and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus
filed this petition to set aside the Decision[1] promulgated
on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution[2]
promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court
of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive
portion of the challenged Decision reads:[4]
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of
dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new
one entered confirming the registration and title of
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of
Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro,
now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado,
represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos,
residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to
the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D
located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines
and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of
evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the
corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the
issuance of a decree be issued."
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro
Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title
over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529.[5] The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch
44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro.[6] However, during the pendency of his petition,
applicant died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado --
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as
applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13,
1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction.”
However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land
since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:[7]

"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to
comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529,
requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the
Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the
Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally
acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of
compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48,
Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:[8]
“It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under
Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first,
which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted
provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is
jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the
opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a
newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural.
Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first,
publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably
necessary because without it, the court would be
powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land
registration case. As to the second, publication of the
notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general
circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of
procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the
court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.”
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent
Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of
the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in
the challenged CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General
thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that
the petitioner’s counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65.
This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45
because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for
review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule
65.[9]
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals
committed “grave abuse of discretion”[10] in holding–
“x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title
in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper
of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No.
86 for want of such publication.”
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the
notice of initial hearing shall be “published both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation.”
According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is
“necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and
xxx in xxx a newspaper of general circulation to comply
with the notice requirement of due process.”[11]
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that
failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is a mere “procedural
defect.” They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.[12]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent
Court of Appeals ruled:[13]
“x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is
couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the
law also mandates with equal force that publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court.”
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were
afforded the opportunity “to explain matters fully and
present their side.” Thus, it justified its disposition in this
wise:[14]
“x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the
required procedure prejudiced them in any way.
Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the
Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at
the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with
and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded
to make any objection of the application for registration.”
The Court’s Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing
reads as follows:
“Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The
court shall, within five days from filing of the application,
issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the
application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. --
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for
initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall
cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the
Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in
the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall
also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a
certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said
application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx”
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and
categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette
suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration
court. However, the question boils down to whether,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm
and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is
impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the
due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be
done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the
latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute.[15] While
concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends
upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the
present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,[16] the
Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that
Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing
by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all
of which must be complied with. “If the intention of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons
named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree,
include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of
the land.” Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by
parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included
such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem.[17] Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests
in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. This being so, the process
must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who
may be interested or whose rights may be adversely
affected would be barred from contesting an application
which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a
party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the
land registration court must prove by satisfactory and
conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the
identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one
who institutes an action for recovery of realty.[18] He must
prove his title against the whole world. This task, which
rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all
persons concerned -- nay, “the whole world” -- who have
rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and
effectively invited to come to court and show cause why
the application should not be granted. The elementary
norms of due process require that before the claimed
property is taken from concerned parties and registered in
the name of the applicant, said parties must be given
notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general
circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official
Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which
have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official
Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as
newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation,
such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and
may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole
world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as
wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing
and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit
publication requirement of the law. Private respondents
did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not
have mattered because the statute itself allows no
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to
dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this
Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application.[19] There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to
reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall
have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The application of private respondent for land registration
is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 87134. January 20, 2000]
PHILIPPINE REGISTERED ELECTRICAL
PRACTITIONERS, INC. (PREPI), represented by BEN
ROSETE, HERMINIO S. RAMIREZ, CASIANO PAULINO,
NONATO VILLANUEVA, JR., RENATO AME, MARIO
BLAS, SAMUEL BRAVO, AMOR CRUZ, FRANCISCO
DULLER, BENITO ESPAÑOL, PABLO FERNANDEZ,
WILFREDO GORRICHO, GRACIANO LAPID, LUISITO
MAGANA, FERNANDO MALABANAN, MARTIN
MARTINEZ, EDGARDO MERIDA, ARNEL PALILIO,
GAUDIOSO SEURA, ZENON TUBIO, MARIANO YAPE,
AND NILO MONTALBAN, petitioners, vs. JULIO
FRANCIA, JR., in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION,
MEDERICO T. CORTEZ, in his capacity as CHAIRMAN
OF THE BOARD OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING, and
HONORABLE REBECCA SALVADOR, JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 1,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 1, which dismissed PREPI’s petition
for declaratory relief and/or prohibition, for lack of merit.
Petitioner is an organization composed of professional
electrical engineers, associate electrical engineers,
assistant electrical engineers, and master electricians. It is
represented in this case by several of its officers and
members. ScÓ lex
On July 6, 1988, petitioner filed before the RTC an action
for declaratory relief and/or prohibition, assailing the
constitutional validity of Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986,
issued by the Board of Electrical Engineering, then headed
by respondent Mederico T. Cortez. The Professional
Regulation Commission, then headed by respondent Julio
Francia, Jr., approved said resolution on February 10,
1986.
In said resolution, the Board adopted guidelines for the
implementation of the Continuing Professional Education
(CPE) Program for electrical engineers. Included therein is
a requirement that beginning January 1, 1988, every
electrical engineer must earn credit units of CPE before his
license could be renewed. To earn credit units, he must
first apply for accreditation with the Institute of Integrated
Electrical Engineers of the Philippines (IIEE).
Petitioner assailed before the trial court the resolution as
violative of the Constitution’s equal protection and due
process clauses, prohibition against bills of attainder and
ex post facto laws, and mandate for the protection of the
rights of workers.
Following are the relevant portions of the resolution:
"III. Possible Exemption to the CPE Guidelines
A. An electrical engineering practitioner who has reached
the age of 60.
B. A top government official of at least Vice-President or
Bureau Director level, or equivalent ranking position in
private sector.
C. A practitioner undergoing post-doctoral studies during
his current registration period.
D. Those recommended by the PRC or by [the] Board of
Electrical Engineering.
IV. Method of Evaluation and Credit Units
A. Basic Requirements
1. PRC requires that a registered Master Electrician or
Electrical Engineer [of] any grade shall renew his license
once every three (3) years.
2. As a condition precedent to the above, he shall first
secure from IIEE’s Continuing Professional Education
Committee a certificate that he has complied with PRC’s
requirements for Continuing Professional Education.
3. A duly registered electrical engineering practitioner
should have the following credit units for a period of three
(3) years: xä law
Registered Master Electrician 100 credit units
Registered Electrical Engineer 200 credit units (All
grades)."[1]
After hearing, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s action,
on the ground that petitioner failed to establish a clear and
unequivocal violation of the Constitution or statute. It
pointed out that all reasonable doubts should be resolved
in favor of the validity of a statute.
According to the trial court, the questioned resolution is a
valid implementation of Section 3, Republic Act No. 184,[2]
and Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 223.[3]
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for declaratory relief and/or
prohibition with prayer for injunction is hereby dismissed,
for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued
by this Court on July 13, 1988, is lifted and set aside. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."[4]
In this direct appeal to the Supreme Court on pure
questions of law, petitioner now raises the following
assignment of errors: Scä
I........THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 1 SERIES OF
1986, CONSTITUTIONAL.
II........THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS PRC AND BEE
ARE VESTED WITH POWERS TO ADOPT AND
PROMULGATE RULES SUCH AS THE RESOLUTION IN
QUESTION.
III........THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 1 SERIES OF
1986, IS VALID, LEGAL AND NOT TAINTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
IV........THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS’ FEAR AND
APPREHENSION THAT THE CPE PROGRAM WOULD
BE BURDENSOME AND A SOURCE OF RED TAPE IS
ONLY IMAGINARY THAN REAL.[5]
Essentially, petitioner raises the following issues in this
petition for review: (1) whether or not the Board of
Electrical Engineering had authority to issue the resolution
in question; and, if it did, (2) whether or not the resolution
issued pursuant to that authority is constitutionally valid.
Petitioner argues that the PRC and the Board did not have
the requisite authority to issue said resolution. Citing
Section 6(a) of P.D. No. 223, petitioner claims that the
Board only has visitation powers, "to see [to it] that proper
compliments of professionals are employed and given
proper responsibilities and remuneration." In other words,
petitioner contends that the Board may only conduct
inspections of sites where electrical engineering jobs are
conducted, primarily to safeguard the welfare of electrical
engineers.
Petitioner contends further that implementation of the
resolution would amount to deprivation of property without
due process of law, particularly because an electrical
engineer’s or electrician’s license will not be renewed if he
failed to obtain any or enough units under the CPE
program. Petitioner points out that under Section 32 of
R.A. No. 184, the Board has the power to suspend
licenses only upon proper notice and hearing. Sclawä
Petitioner argues that the license to practice a profession
is not a mere privilege but a property right. If it were,
indeed, only a privilege, it could not be taken away by the
simple expedient of passing a board resolution. Petitioner
asserts that such license may only be revoked after the
license holder is found guilty of the offenses specified in
R.A. No. 184 or P.D. No. 223. Since failure to earn units
under the CPE program is not among those enumerated, it
cannot be made a ground for the revocation of an
electrical engineer’s or electrician’s license.
Petitioner also argues that the classification of persons
who may be exempt from the CPE program requirement
appears to be arbitrary. Petitioner points out that
"…electrical engineers and master electricians who are in
the responsible practice of designing and constructing
electrical installations are excluded in the said exemptions
and are not given any credit or merit."[6]
Petitioner further contends that the questioned board
resolution does not provide any criteria for the PRC or
Board to follow in recommending exemptions to the CPE
requirement.
Petitioner also assails the resolution as violative of the
equal protection clause since only electrical engineers are
subject to the requirements mentioned therein. Members
of other professions are not similarly required.
For the respondents, the Solicitor General submits that,
contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Board had the
authority to promulgate the questioned resolution pursuant
to Section 3, R.A. No. 184 and Section 6, P.D. No. 223.
The latter law is not limited to the power of inspection and
visitation as petitioner contends. It includes the power to
formulate policies and programs as may be necessary to
improve the practice of a profession.
The Solicitor General further contends that Resolution No.
1, Series of 1986 is not violative of the Constitution. He
dismisses as unfounded petitioner’s fears regarding the
automatic revocation of license for non-compliance with
the CPE requirement. Nothing in the questioned resolution
provides for such automatic revocation, according to him;
there is, thus, no violation of the due process clause.
Neither does the resolution violate the equal protection
clause since not all electrical engineers are similarly
situated, he further argues. He claims that there are those
who, by reason of age and expertise, may reasonably be
exempted from the CPE requirement. Equal protection, he
concludes, does not require universal application of laws
but only equality among equals.
The Solicitor General likewise contends that the resolution
is not a bill of attainder since it does not seek to punish but
only to regulate the practice of a profession. Neither is it an
ex post facto law, he says, since the ex post facto principle
only applies to penal statutes and not to regulations
involving civil rights such as the practice of a profession.
Korteä
In his view also, there is no violation of Article VI, Section
28 of the Constitution, which states, in its second
paragraph as follows:
"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the government."
The Solicitor General opines that this provision is simply
not pertinent nor applicable in this case. For the fees that
may be charged electrical engineers in complying with the
CPE program, he argues, are not the duties or imposts
referred to in the preceding constitutional provision.
The issue before this Court boils down to (a) whether the
Board of Electrical Engineers in the light of the provisions
of R.A. No. 184, had the authority to issue the questioned
resolution; and (b) whether the resolution itself violates
certain provisions of the present Constitution.
We begin by noting that the Board issued the resolution as
a means purportedly to upgrade the knowledge and skills
of electrical engineers. Specifically, the resolution has the
following objectives:
1........To upgrade and update technical knowledge and
skills of Electrical Engineering Practitioners;
2........To effect transfer of technology from experts and
specialists to Electrical Engineering Practitioners;
3........To stimulate self-improvement, and thus enhance
practitioner’s competence and self-confidence; and
4........To broaden practitioner’s horizon to include
awareness of his social responsibility.[7]
Effectivity of the resolution has been expressly made
subject to the approval of the PRC and its publication in
the Official Gazette, as may be seen from its effectivity
clause. RtcÓ spped
"VI. Effectivity
These Rules shall take effect upon approval hereof by the
Commission and after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette."[8]
We further note that Section 3, of R.A. No. 184, mandates
the Board to recommend to the PRC the adoption of
"measures as may be deemed proper for the maintenance
of good ethics and standards in the practice of electrical
engineering in the Philippines…" (Underscoring supplied.)
Moreover, Section 6(a) of P.D. No. 223 gives the various
professional boards the power
"[t]o look from time to time into the conditions affecting the
practice of the profession or occupation under their
respective jurisdictions and whenever necessary, adopt
such measures as may be deemed proper for the
enhancement of the profession or occupation and/or the
maintenance of high professional, ethical and technical
standards…" (Underscoring supplied.)
For said purposes,
"the members of a Board may personally or through
subordinate employees of the Commission conduct ocular
inspection or visit industrial, mechanical, electrical or
chemical plants or works, hospitals, clinics and other
engineering works…"
On this point, petitioner now insists that the authority of the
Board is limited to the conduct of ocular inspections. But
nothing in said provision in any way imposes such an
interpretation. The Board in fact may even do away with
ocular inspections, as can be gleaned from the use of the
word "may", implying that the conduct of ocular inspections
is merely directory and not mandatory. For sure,
conducting ocular inspections is only one way of ensuring
compliance with laws and rules relative to the professional
practice of electrical engineering. But it certainly is not the
only way. ScmisÓ
We are, therefore, constrained to concede to the Board the
existence of the power to issue the assailed resolution, in
pursuance of its mandates under R.A. 184 and P.D. 223.
What now remains is a determination of whether or not
said resolution suffers from constitutional infirmities.
Supervening events, however, have rendered moot this
constitutional inquiry. On July 25, 1995, President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Executive Order No. 266, entitled
"Institutionalization of the Continuing Professional
Education (CPE) Programs of the Various Professional
Regulatory Boards (PRBs) under the Supervision of the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)." E.O. No. 266
found it imperative to impose upon registered
professionals the completion of the CPE as a pre-requisite
for the renewal of their licenses. Avowedly, CPE would
enable the professionals
"not only to upgrade or improve their technical knowledge
and skills but also to keep them abreast with modern
trends and technology in their respective professions,
thereby assuring the rendition of highly qualitative
professional service/s that will be globally competitive
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) and at the same time securing the safety and
protection of the public."[9]
In fact, E.O. No. 266 provides that:
"SECTION 1. The completion by professional licensees of
the Continuing Professional Education (CPE) programs
adopted by all Boards is hereby imposed as a mandatory
requirement for the renewal of professional licenses."
(Underscoring supplied.)
For its part, the PRC issued Resolution No. 507, Series of
1997,[10] entitled "Standardized Guidelines and
Procedures for the Implementation of the Continuing
Professional Education (CPE) Programs for all
Professions." This resolution expressly repealed
"other Resolutions, circulars or other issuances
promulgated by the PRC and Professional Regulatory
Boards providing for, or having any bearing on the
implementation of the CPE programs, activities or
sources…"[11]
Thus, the assailed BEE Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986,
providing for guidelines on CPE for electrical engineers, is
no longer in effect now.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for being
moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.2/22/00 9:43 AM
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122641. January 20, 1997]
BAYANI SUBIDO, JR. and RENE PARINA, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGAN-BAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the petitioners seek to set aside, on ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the
following acts of the respondent Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 22825: (a) the Resolution[1] of 25
October 1995 which denied the petitioners’ Motion to
Quash of 28 August 1995 and Supplementary Motion to
Quash of 7 October 1995; (b) the Order[2] of 10 November
1995 which denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration; and (c) the Order[3] of 10 November 1995
which entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioners and
set pre-trial on 12 January 1996.
In Criminal Case No. 22825, the petitioners were charged
with Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized by Article
124 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), under an
information dated 17 July 1995 (but filed on 28 July 1995),
the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about June 25, 1992, or sometime subsequent
thereto, in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Bayani Subido, Jr., being then a
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) and accused Rene Parina, being then a
BID Special Agent, while in the performance of their official
functions, and conspiring and confederating with each
other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause the issuance and implementation of a warrant of
arrest dated June 25, 1992 against James J. Maksimuk,
said accused knowing fully well that the BID Decision
dated June 6, 1991, requiring Maksimuk's deportation has
not as yet become final and executory considering the
pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration, resulting in the
detention of the latter for a period of forty-three (43) days
and, thus, causing him undue injury.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The arraignment was originally set for 28 August 1995.[5]
On 28 August 1995, however, the petitioners filed a Motion
to Quash,[6] contending that in view of the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7975[7] on 6 May 1995, amending §4 of P.D. No.
1606,[8] the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over both
the offense charged and the persons of the accused.
They argued that: (1) Arbitrary Detention did not fall within
Chapter II, §2, Title VII of the RPC, but within §1, Chapter
1, Title II (Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws of the
State), hence, not covered by R.A. No. 7975 and,
therefore, the case should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila; (2) R.A. No. 7975
should be given prospective application and at the time the
case was filed, petitioner Subido was already a private
person since he was separated from the service on 28
February 1995; while petitioner Parina did not hold a
position corresponding to salary grade “27”; and (3) penal
laws must be strictly construed against the State.
In compliance with the order of the Sandiganbayan, the
prosecution filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash[9]
on 28 September 1995. It contended that it was clear from
§4(b) of R.A. No. 7975 that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the persons
of the accused considering that “the basis of its jurisdiction
xxx is the position of the accused in the government
service when the offense charged was committed and not
the nature of the offense charged, provided the said
offense committed by the accused was in the exercise of
his duties and in relation to his office.” The fact then that
accused Subido was already a private individual was of no
moment.
In a Supplement to the Motion to Quash[10] filed on 9
October 1995, the petitioners further asserted that: (1) the
allegations in the information were vague; (2) under §1,
Rule VIII of Memorandum Order (MO) No. 04-92 (Rules of
Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings), the grant
or denial of bail to an alien in a deportation proceeding
was discretionary upon the Commissioner, hence could
not be subject to a charge of arbitrary detention; (3)
petitioner Subido was separated from the service before
the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975, hence retroactive
application thereof would be prejudicial to him; and (4) at
the time the information was filed, petitioner Parina was
not occupying a position corresponding to salary grade
“27” or higher, as prescribed by R.A. No. 6758.[11]
In its Rejoinder[12] filed on 20 October 1995, the
prosecution maintained that with §4 of MO No. 04-92,
Salazar v. Achacoso,[13] and Gatchalian v. CID,[14] the
only instance when an alien facing deportation
proceedings could be arrested by virtue of a warrant of
arrest was when the Commissioner issued the warrant to
carry out a final order of deportation, which was absent in
this case due to the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration timely filed. It further reiterated that the
basis of the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over the case
was the position of the accused when the crime was
committed, not when the information was filed; in any
event, petitioner Subido’s position as a Commissioner of
the Bureau of Immigration was classified even higher than
grade “27” under the Compensation and Classification Act
of 1989.
In its Resolution[15] of 25 October 1995, the
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners’ Motion to Quash
and the Supplement thereto, ruling:
1. [T]he jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan remains not
only over the specific offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of
P.D. 1606 as Amended by R.A. 7975 but over offenses
committed in relation to their office, regardless of the
penalty provided that the salary of the accused is at Grade
27 under [R.A. 6758] or that he is occupying any of the
position described in Sec. 4(a)e of the law, which includes
the position of Deputy Commissioner.
2. [A]t this time the position of the prosecution in response
to this Court's misgivings stated in its Order of August 28,
1995, appears to be that aliens may not be arrested
except upon execution of a deportation order, a matter
which can be taken up at further proceedings after the
arraignment of the accused.
It likewise set arraignment on 10 November 1995. To
abort arraignment, the petitioners filed on 9 November
1995 a motion for reconsideration[16] and submitted that
under the vast power of the Commissioner of the
Department of Immigration, he could authorize the arrest
and detention of an alien even though a deportation order
had not yet become final, in light of the preventive, not
penal, nature of a deportation order.[17]
On 10 November 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order[18] denying the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, and a second Order[19] entering a plea of
not guilty in favor of the petitioners since they objected to
arraignment, setting pre-trial on 12 January 1996, and
making of record that arraignment was conducted with the
reservation of the petitioners to seek redress with this
Court from the denial of their motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this special civil action, where the parties, in the
main, reiterate the arguments they raised before the
Sandiganbayan. In due time, we resolved to give due
course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda, which they subsequently complied
with.
The petition must be dismissed.
Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 7975 pertinently provide as
follows:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of [P.D. No. 1606] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade
“27” and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade “27” or
higher, as prescribed in said Republic Act No. 6758, or
PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in
which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
referred to the proper courts.
R.A. No. 7975 took effect on 16 May 1995,[20] or one
year, ten months and twenty-one days after the alleged
commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
22825 before the Sandiganbayan. The provisions of §4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by E.O. No. 184, but prior to
their further amendment by R.A. No. 7975, are then the
applicable provisions. §4 of P.D. No. 1606 then pertinently
provided as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) other offenses or felonies committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall
be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,[21] and subsequently in
Sanchez v. Demetriou,[22] Natividad v. Felix,[23] and
Republic v. Asuncion,[24] we ruled that for the
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over
offenses or felonies committed by public officers or
employees under the aforementioned §4(a)(2), it was not
enough that the penalty prescribed therefor was higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or
a fine of P6,000.00; it was likewise necessary that the
offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their
office.[25]
The information in Criminal Case No. 22825 before the
Sandiganbayan charged the petitioners with the crime of
arbitrary detention which was committed “while in the
performance of their official functions,” or, evidently, in
relation to their office. As the detention allegedly lasted for
a period of 43 days, the prescribed penalty is prision
mayor,[26] with a duration of six years and one day to
twelve years. Indisputably, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
22825.
The petitioners, however, urge us to apply §4 of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, the law in force at
the time of the filing of the information in Criminal Case No.
22825. They submit that under the new law, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged and their persons because at the time of the filing
of the information, petitioner Subido was already a private
individual, while the classification of petitioner Parina’s
position was lower than grade “27.”
We are not persuaded. The petitioners overlook the fact
that for purposes of §4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, the
reckoning point is the time of the commission of the crime.
This is plain from the last clause of the opening sentence
of paragraph (a), §4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended
by R.A. No. 7975.
Petitioner Subido never denied the respondents’ claim that
as “commissioner of Immigration and Deportation [now
Bureau of Immigration] at the time of the commission of
the crime [he was] classified as having a position even
higher than grade 27.”[27] Both parties are, however,
agreed that at such time petitioner Parina was holding a
position with a classification much lower than salary grade
“27.” There can, therefore, be no doubt that the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime allegedly
committed by Subido.
That petitioner Parina held a position with a salary grade of
less than “27” at the time of the commission of the alleged
arbitrary detention is of no moment. He is prosecuted as a
co-conspirator of petitioner Subido, a principal accused,
who held a position higher than grade “27.” The following
provision of §4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975, then applies:
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying the positions corresponding to salary grade “27”
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758
... exclusive jurisdiction therefor shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Finally, the petitioners’ invocation of the prohibition against
the retroactivity of penal laws is misplaced. Simply put,
R.A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal laws or statutes
are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts
and establish penalties for their violation;[28] or those that
define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.[29] R.A. No. 7975, in further amending P.D.
No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction,
mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, is clearly a
procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes rules and forms
of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for
their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice.[30] Moreover, the petitioners even
suggest that it is likewise a curative or remedial statute;
one which cures defects and adds to the means of
enforcing existing obligations.[31] As noted by the
petitioners, previous to the enactment of R.A. No. 7975:
As before, not [sic] matter what kind of offense, so long as
it is alleged that the crime is committed in relation to the
office of the public official, the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiciton to try and hear the case, such that in many
cases accused persons even from the far away parts of
the country, Mindanao, Visayas and the northern parts of
Luzon had to come personally to Manila to attend and
appear for cases filed against them, considering that the
Sandiganbayan has its office/court in Manila.
The said R.A. No. 7975 changed this lamentable situation.
For no as so provided in the said law, there ha[s] been a
modification that benefits [the] accused xxx in the sense
that now where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade “27” or
higher as prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758 xxx
exclusive jurisdiction there shall be vested now in the
proper Regional Trial and Metropolitan Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be xxx. [32]
All told, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No.
7975 may validly be given retroactive effect, there being
no impairment of contractual or vested rights. [33]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the
questioned resolution and orders of the respondent
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138137. March 8, 2001]
PERLA S. ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. ASIA BREWERY,
Inc., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When two or more cases involve the same parties and
affect closely related subject matters, they must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best
interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the
issues involved. Consolidation, when appropriate, also
contributes to the declogging of court dockets.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the August 4, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
45020; as well as the February 23, 1999 Resolution[2]
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The
decretal portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the instant petition is given due course.
The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 142 dated 13 February 1997 and 19 May
1997 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.”
The Facts
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the
manufacture, the distribution and sale of beer; while
Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer and an operator of an
outlet selling the former’s beer products. A Dealership
Agreement governed their contractual relations.
On March 30, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo, Branch 22, a Complaint against
respondent for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance
and Damages. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
20341 (hereafter referred to as the “Iloilo case”), was
grounded on the alleged violation of the Dealership
Agreement.
On July 7, 1994, during the pendency of the Iloilo case,
respondent filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
2110 (hereafter referred to as the “Makati case”). The
Complaint was for the collection of a sum of money in the
amount of P463,107.75 representing the value of beer
products, which respondent had delivered to petitioner.
In view of the pendency of the Iloilo case, petitioner moved
to dismiss the Makati case on the ground that it had split
the cause of action and violated the rule against the
multiplicity of suits. The Motion was denied by the Makati
RTC through Judge Eriberto U. Rosario.
Upon petitioner’s Motion, however, Judge Rosario
inhibited himself. The case was raffled again and
thereafter assigned to Branch 142 of the Makati RTC,
presided by Judge Jose Parentala Jr.
On January 3, 1997, petitioner moved for the consolidation
of the Makati case with the Iloilo case. Granting the
Motion, Judge Parentala ordered on February 13, 1997,
the consolidation of the two cases. Respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order
dated May 19, 1997.
On August 18, 1997, respondent filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing Judge
Parentala’s February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 Orders.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Setting aside the trial court’s assailed Orders which
consolidated the Iloilo and the Makati cases, the CA ruled
in this wise:
“There is no common issue of law or fact between the two
cases. The issue in Civil Case No. 94-2110 is private
respondent’s indebtedness for unpaid beer products; while
in Civil Case No. 20341, it is whether or not petitioner
(therein defendant) breached its dealership contract with
private respondent.
“Private respondent in her complaint aforequoted attempts
to project a commonality between the two civil cases, but it
cannot be denied that her obligation to pay for the beer
deliveries can exist regardless of any “stop payment” order
she made with regard to the checks. Thus, the rationale
for consolidation, which is to avoid the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered, (Active Wood
products, Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 774,
Benguet Corporation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA
27; Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Yap, 126 SCRA 503) does not
exist.”[3]
Hence, this Petition.[4]
The Issues
In her Memorandum,[5] petitioner interposes the following
issues for the consideration of this Court:
“a. Were the Orders of February 13, 1997 and May 19,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142 in Makati City
(ordering consolidation of Makati Civil Case No. 94-2110
with the Iloilo Civil Case No. 20341) already final and
executory when respondent filed its petition for certiorari
with the Hon. Court of Appeals such that said Court could
no longer acquire jurisdiction over the case and should
have dismissed it outright (as it originally did) x x x, instead
of due giving course to the petition?; and
“b. Independent of the first issue, did the Makati RTC,
Branch 142, correctly order the consolidation of the Makati
case (which was filed later) with the Iloilo Case (which was
filed earlier) for the reason that the obligation sought to be
collected in the Makati case is the same obligation that is
also one of the subject matters of the Iloilo case, x x x?”[6]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Propriety of Petition with the CA
Petitioner avers that the Makati RTC’s February 13, 1997
and May 19, 1997 Orders consolidating the two cases
could no longer be assailed. Allegedly, respondent’s
Petition for Certiorari was filed with the CA beyond the
reglementary sixty-day period prescribed in the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July
1, 1997. Hence, the CA should have dismissed it outright.
The records show that respondent received on May 23,
1997, the Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration. It
had, according to petitioner, only sixty days or until July 22,
1997, within which to file the Petition for Certiorari. It did
so, however, only on August 21, 1997.
On the other hand, respondent insists that its Petition was
filed on time, because the reglementary period before the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules was ninety days. It theorizes
that the sixty-day period under the 1997 Rules does not
apply.
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But
there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when
they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court
explained this exception in the following language:
“It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
“(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided.’ But there are settled exceptions to this
general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
xxx xxx xxx
“On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which
do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule
against the retrospective operation of statutes.”[7]
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to
pending proceedings even without express provision to
that effect.[8] Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to
cases pending at the time of their enactment.[9] In fact,
statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
applied on actions undetermined at the time of their
effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense
and to that extent.[10]
Clearly, the designation of a specific period of sixty days
for the filing of an original action for certiorari under Rule
65 is purely remedial or procedural in nature. It does not
alter or modify any substantive right of respondent,
particularly with respect to the filing of petitions for
certiorari. Although the period for filing the same may
have been effectively shortened, respondent had not been
unduly prejudiced thereby considering that he was not at
all deprived of that right.
It is a well-established doctrine that rules of procedure may
be modified at any time to become effective at once, so
long as the change does not affect vested rights.[11]
Moreover, it is equally axiomatic that there are no vested
rights to rules of procedure.[12]
It also bears noting that the ninety-day limit established by
jurisprudence cannot be deemed a vested right. It is
merely a discretionary prerogative of the courts that may
be exercised depending on the peculiar circumstances of
each case. Hence, respondent was not entitled, as a
matter of right, to the 90-day period for filing a petition for
certiorari; neither can it imperiously demand that the same
period be extended to it.
Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure on July 1, 1997, respondent’s lawyers still had
21 days or until July 22, 1997 to file a petition for certiorari
and to comply with the sixty-day reglementary period. Had
they been more prudent and circumspect in regard to the
implications of these procedural changes, respondent’s
right of action would not have been foreclosed. After all,
the 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were well-
publicized prior to their date of effectivity. At the very least
counsel should have asked for as extension of time to file
the petition.
Certification of Non-forum
Shopping Defective
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the sworn
certification against forum-shopping, arguing that the same
was signed by counsel and not by petitioner as required by
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. For his part,
respondent claims that even if it was its counsel who
signed the certification, there was still substantial
compliance with Circular No. 28-91 because, a corporation
acts through its authorized officers or agents, and its
counsel is an agent having personal knowledge of other
pending cases.
The requirement that the petitioner should sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to
corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of
the Circular and the Rules of Court make no distinction
between natural and juridical persons. In this case, the
Certification should have been signed “by a duly
authorized director or officer of the corporation,”[13] who
has knowledge of the matter being certified.[14] In Robern
Development Corporation v. Quitain,[15] in which the
Certification was signed by Atty. Nemesio S. Cañete who
was the acting regional legal counsel of the National
Power Corporation in Mindanao, the Court held that “he
was not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house
counsel and officer, whose basic function was to prepare
legal pleadings and to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal
cases. As regional legal counsel for the Mindanao area,
he was the officer who was in the best position to verify the
truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the
Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal
legal counsel, he was also in the best position to know and
to certify if an action for expropriation had already been
filed and pending with the courts.”
Verily, the signatory in the Certification of the Petition
before the CA should not have been respondent’s retained
counsel, who would not know whether there were other
similar cases of the corporation.[16] Otherwise, this
requirement would easily be circumvented by the signature
of every counsel representing corporate parties.
No Explanation for
Non-Filing by Personal Service
Citing Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules, petitioner
also faults respondent for the absence of a written
explanation why the Petition with the Court of Appeals was
served on her counsel by registered mail. In reply,
respondent points out that such explanation was not
necessary, because its counsel held office in Makati City
while petitioner and her counsel were in Iloilo City.
We agree with petitioner. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules, personal service of petitions and other
pleadings is the general rule, while a resort to other modes
of service and filing is the exception. Where recourse is
made to the exception, a written explanation why the
service and the filing were not done personally is
indispensable, even when such explanation by its nature is
acceptable and manifest. Where no explanation is offered
to justify the resort to other modes, the discretionary power
of the court to expunge the pleading becomes
mandatory.[17] Thus, the CA should have considered the
Petition as not having been filed, in view of the failure of
respondent to present a written explanation of its failure to
effect personal service.
In sum, the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA by
herein respondent, questioning the orders of consolidation
by the Makati RTC, should not have been given due
course. Not only was the Petition filed beyond the sixty-
day reglementary period; it likewise failed to observe the
requirements of non-forum shopping and personal service
or filing. All or any of these acts ought to have been
sufficient cause for its outright denial.
Second Issue:
Propriety of Consolidation
Apart from procedural problems, respondent’s cause is
also afflicted with substantial defects. The CA ruled that
there was no common issue in law or in fact between the
Makati case and the Iloilo case. The former involved
petitioner’s indebtedness to respondent for unpaid beer
products, while the latter pertained to an alleged breach of
the Dealership Agreement between the parties. We
disagree.
True, petitioner’s obligation to pay for the beer products
delivered by respondent can exist regardless of an alleged
breach in the Dealership Agreement. Undeniably,
however, this obligation and the relationship between
respondent and petitioner, as supplier and distributor
respectively, arose from the Dealership Agreement which
is now the subject of inquiry in the Iloilo case. In fact,
petitioner herself claims that her obligation to pay was
negated by respondent’s contractual breach. In other
words, the non-payment -- the res of the Makati case -- is
an incident of the Iloilo case.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership
Agreement was put in question, it would be more practical
and convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents
and their consequences. The issues in both civil cases
pertain to the respective obligations of the same parties
under the Dealership Agreement. Thus, every transaction
as well as liability arising from it must be resolved in the
judicial forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of
the two cases then becomes imperative to a complete,
comprehensive and consistent determination of all these
related issues.
Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely
related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and
jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed.[18]
The consolidation of cases is proper when they involve the
resolution of common questions of law or facts.[19]
Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests
of both parties in the two civil cases will best be served
and the issues involved therein expeditiously settled. After
all, there is no question on the propriety of the venue in the
Iloilo case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders of the Makati RTC (Br. 142) dated February 13,
1997 and May 19, 1997 are hereby REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141530. March 18, 2003]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the
NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CHRISTOPHER LOCK, in
his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 88 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, and FE A. MANUEL
and METROBANK, Cavite City Branch, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the
Resolution dated March 15, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals[1] which dismissed (1) the petition for certiorari
filed by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines for having
been filed out of time and (2) the subsequent resolution
which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts follow.
In line with the centennial celebration of Philippine
Independence on June 12, 1998, the government
embarked on several commemorative Centennial Freedom
Trail (CFT) projects. One of these projects was the
construction of the Tejeros Convention Center and the
founding site of the Philippine Army on the 3,497 sq. m.
property of respondent Fe Manuel located in Tejeros,
Rosario, Cavite. The said property was declared by the
National Historical Institute (NHI) as a historical landmark
in its Resolution No. 2 dated April 19, 1995.[2]
To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the
government, through the National Centennial Commission
(NCC), filed on December 4, 1997 a complaint for
expropriation against respondents Fe Manuel and
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank).[3]
The land was mortgaged by Fe Manuel to Metrobank and
was extrajudicially foreclosed by the latter on November
20, 1997.[4] Respondent Fe Manuel interposed no
objection to the expropriation as long as just compensation
was paid.[5]
On May 27, 1998, Presiding Judge Christopher Lock of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 88, dismissed
the complaint for expropriation on the ground of lack of
cause of action. The trial court ruled that, based on the
1987 Administrative Code,[6] there were: (1) no prior
determination by the President as to the necessity or
wisdom of the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and
(2) no prior written authority for the Solicitor General to
institute the expropriation case. Without such conditions
precedent, the trial court ruled that plaintiff had no cause of
action to file the expropriation case.[7] The trial court also
ruled that the NCC had no power under Executive Order
No. 128[8] to acquire real estate properties through
negotiated sale, nor to recommend to the President the
propriety of taking property through condemnation
proceedings. It explained that since the NCC’s life was
only up to the June 12, 1998 celebrations, the fear of
defendant Metrobank that there would be no more entity to
process its claim for just compensation was perfectly valid.
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint for
expropriation.[9]
On June 17, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order dismissing its
complaint. The trial court denied the motion in its order
dated October 6, 1998, a copy of which was received by
the petitioner on October 12, 1998.[10]
On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Christopher Lock
for summarily dismissing its complaint and denying its
motion for reconsideration.[11]
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, in its
resolution dated March 15, 1999, for having been filed out
of time. It also denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in its January 13, 2000 resolution.[12]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for review,
arguing that the Court of Appeals should not have applied
to its case the amendment made to Section 4, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on
September 1, 1998. Procedural rules, petitioner argued,
should not be given retroactive effect where their
application would result in injustice. Petitioner invoked
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that liberality should be observed in
construing the Rules of Court in order to promote its
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Petitioner also
called the Court’s attention to the case of Solar Team
Entertainment vs. Ricafort,[13] wherein we accorded
liberality to the implementation of Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[14] We ruled in the said
case that strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 13
thereof shall be required 1 month from the promulgation of
the Court’s decision or 2 years from the time the Rules
actually took effect. Petitioner said that Solar Team and its
case were similar in that both arose about the time when a
new amendment was being implemented; hence, its case
should be accorded the same consideration given in Solar
Team.[15]
In its Memorandum dated September 11, 2001, petitioner
invoked A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on
September 1, 2000, specifically amending Section 4, Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A.M. No. 00-2-03-
SC was the amendment reverting to the original rule that
the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be
reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.[16]
Private respondent Fe Manuel, owner and mortgagor of
the land subject of expropriation, interposed no objection
to the expropriation in her Comment to the petition for
review.[17] She in fact adopted the arguments of the
petitioner in her Memorandum.[18]
On the other hand, Metrobank asserted that the petition for
certiorari was correctly dismissed because it was filed out
of time. It argued that when petitioner received the order of
the trial court denying its motion for reconsideration on
October 12, 1998, the new Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Resolution of
the Supreme Court En Banc dated July 21, 1998 in Bar
Matter No. 803, was already in effect. Said amended rule,
effective as of September 1, 1998, provides that the 60-
day period shall be reckoned from receipt of the assailed
decision, order or resolution. Thus, based on this new rule,
the petition for certiorari was filed 14 days late.[19]
The sole issue at hand is whether or not the petition for
certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines before the
Court of Appeals was filed out of time.
The petition is meritorious.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari for having been filed
out of time, the Court of Appeals applied Section 4, Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by
the July 21, 1998 Bar Matter No. 803, effective September
1, 1998, which provides:
Sec. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. ─ The petition
may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in
the Supreme Court, or if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It
may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and
unless otherwise provided by the law or the Rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or
reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment,
order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be
interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party
may file the petition within the remaining period but which
shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned
from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the
petition shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
(Emphasis ours)
Strictly speaking, the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for having been filed out of time
because the prevailing rule at that time provided that the
60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be
reckoned from receipt of the assailed decision or order.
The period is interrupted when a motion for
reconsideration is filed but it starts to run again from
receipt of the denial of the said motion for reconsideration.
Based on this amendment, respondent Court of Appeals
ruled that the filing of the petition for certiorari was 14 days
late. The respondent Court of Appeals ruled:
In the petition at bench, records show that the Office of the
Solicitor General received a copy of the Court a quo’s
Order dated May 7, 1998 on June 3, 1998 and that a
motion for reconsideration was filed on June 17, 1998.
Therefore, there was a lapse of fourteen (14) days from
receipt of the assailed Order before the OSG filed a motion
for reconsideration.
Considering the material dates stated above, the Office of
the Solicitor General had only forty-six 46 days left from
October 12, 1988 (sic), date when it received the Order
denying the motion for reconsideration dated October 6,
1998 or until November 27, 1998 within which to file the
instant petition for certiorari. However, the petition was
filed only on December 11, 1998 by registered mail.
Therefore, it was filed fourteen (14) days late.[20]
However, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 effective
September 1, 1998, was recently amended by A.M. No.
00-2-03-SC effective September 1, 2000. The recent rule
no longer provides that the 60-day period shall be
reckoned from receipt of the assailed decision, order or
resolution. Instead, it provides that the 60-day period shall
be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion
for reconsideration. The rule at present reads as follows:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall
be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. It if involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted
except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding
fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis ours)
The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is
procedural or remedial in character. It does not create new
or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is
settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
retroactive operation of statutes. They may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure.[21]
The retroactive application of A.M. 00-2-03-SC has, in fact,
already been ordered by this Court in a number of recent
cases, such as Systems Factors Corporation vs. NLRC,
[22] Unity Fishing Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, [23] Docena et. al. vs. Lapesura, [24] Pfizer vs.
Galan [25] and Universal Robina Corporation et. al. vs.
Court of Appeals et. al. [26]
Thus, by virtue of this retroactive application of A.M. 00-2-
03-SC, we hold that the instant petition for certiorari was
filed on time. In fact, there is no dispute that the petition
was filed by petitioner on the 60th day from receipt of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
received the denial on October 12, 1998 and it filed the
petition for certiorari on December 11, 1998. Clearly
therefore the petition was filed on time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1999
and January 13, 2000 are hereby set aside and the case is
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and
Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and
concurred in by Associate Justice Oswald D. Agcaoili and
Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. Petition, Annex “A”,
Rollo, pp. 35-37.
[2] Rollo, pp. 13, 51.
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks
to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA,
for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January
16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as
amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis
from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which
he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total
amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director,
Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is
entitled to the benefits under Section 699 1 of the RAC,
the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness
incurred in performance of duty. — When a person in the
service of the national government of a province, city,
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the
performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual
physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department
may direct that absence during any period of disability
thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more
than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion
also authorize the payment of the medical attendance,
necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of
the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated
shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there
be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with
the performance of some act in the line of duty, the
Department head may in his discretion authorize the
payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st
Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of
Justice, along with the comment, bearing the same date,
of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, "recommending
favorable action thereof". Finding petitioner's illness to be
service-connected, the Committee on Physical
Examination of the Department of Justice favorably
recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello
III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990,
returned petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having
considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA in
its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with
a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April 26, 1991
of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary
Drilon, for brevity) stating that "the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate
in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including
the particular Section 699 of the latter".
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement
transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then Undersecretary
Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th
Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary Drilon
forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA Chairman,
recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman
Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January
16, 1992, however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground
that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the
same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however,
that the claim may be filed with the Employees'
Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of
Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by
Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director
Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with
the advice that petitioner "elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court if he so desires".
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative
Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the
RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration of this
Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as
amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S.
1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the
event that a claim is filed with the Employees'
Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent,
he would still not be barred from filing a claim under the
subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not
there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for
reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the
enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec.
Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its
entirety the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The
COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new
Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the
intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover,
the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid
opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter.
Lastly, the COA contends that employment-related
sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the
Employees' Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such
that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both
laws on account of the same contingency would be unfair
and unjust to the Government.
The question of whether a particular law has been
repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a
law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which
expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws,
and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. 3 A
declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that
a particular and specific law, identified by its number or
title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied
repeals. 4
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question,
the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the
legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code
partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of
the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book
VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of
this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate
the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. 5 Rather,
it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated
in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates
the intended repeal under the condition that substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure
to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent
was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the
new and old laws. 6 This latter situation falls under the
category of an implied repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where
a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the
part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect. 7 Hence,
before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear
showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in
enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The
intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8
otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the
first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the
same from the time of the first enactment. 9
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first
is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject
matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the
extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 10
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place
when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they
are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each
other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and
both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be
enforced without nullifying the other. 11
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new
Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire
subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters
treated in the old Code which are not found in the new
Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave
law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims
for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the
provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject
claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be
no such conflict because the provision on sickness
benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not
been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, the COA would have Us consider that the fact
that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been
repealed. It further maintained that to allow the particular
provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in
force argues against the Code itself. The COA anchored
this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code,
which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be
enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporate
in a unified document the major structural, functional and
procedural principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one
Code — the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention
is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same
subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since
the new statute may merely be cumulative or a
continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is a
manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 13
We come now to the second category of repeal — the
enactment of a statute revising or codifying the former laws
on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the
revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole
subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It is
the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a
prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of
the former statute. 14 When both intent and scope clearly
evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions
of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act are
deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can be an
implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear
intent of the legislature that the later act be the substitute
to the prior act. 16
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of
Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only
those aspects of government that pertain to administration,
organization and procedure, understandably because of
the many changes that transpired in the government
structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of
years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this
opinion carries in the determination of this controversy
inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with the
implementation of this particular provision has already
rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in
administrative law enunciated in the case of Sison vs.
Pangramuyen 17 that in the absence of palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency entrusted with the enforcement and
implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This
principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions
may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the
decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It
has been held that Opinions of the Secretary and
Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction
of statutes in pari materia. 19
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that
repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for
the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on
the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. 21
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as
follows: "Repeals by implication are not favored, and will
not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so
intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a
statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any
former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy
between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear
and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language
used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter
of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is
beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must
be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable
construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under
this subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under
the Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot
be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II,
Title II (dealing on Employees' Compensation and State
Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended
by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of
compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered
by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other
agencies of the government."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to
GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give
due course to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo
and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL
COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C.
CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory
preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of
the President as having been issued with grave abuses of
discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of
the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending
the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.
I
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against
respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi,
Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay, to wit:
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority
and/or oppression for non-payment of accrued leave
benefits due the petitioner amounting to P36,779.02.
(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and
abuse of authority for installing a water pipeline which is
being operated, maintained and paid for by the
municipality to service respondent's private residence and
medical clinic.
On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed
the two Administrative cases in the following manner:
(1) Administrative Case No. 02-92
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of
Tiwi, Albay, is hereby ordered to pay Achilles Costo
Berces, Sr. the sum of THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND AND
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE PESOS and TWO
CENTAVOS (P36,779.02) per Voucher No. 352, plus legal
interest due thereon from the time it was approved in audit
up to final payment, it being legally due the Complainant
representing the money value of his leave credits accruing
for services rendered in the municipality from 1988 to 1992
as a duly elected Municipal Councilor. IN ADDITION,
respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL is hereby ordered
SUSPENDED from office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi,
Albay, for a period of two (2) months, effective upon
receipt hereof for her blatant abuse of authority coupled
with oppression as a public example to deter others
similarly inclined from using public office as a tool for
personal vengeance, vindictiveness and oppression at the
expense of the Taxpayer (Rollo, p. 14).
(2) Administrative Case No. 05-92
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Mayor
NAOMI C. CORRAL of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of SUSPENSION from office as
Municipal Mayor thereof for a period of THREE (3)
MONTHS beginning after her service of the first penalty of
suspension ordered in Administrative Case No. 02-92. She
is likewise ordered to reimburse the Municipality of Tiwi
One-half of the amount the latter have paid for electric and
water bills from July to December 1992, inclusive (Rollo, p.
16).
Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of
the President questioning the decision and at the same
time prayed for the stay of execution thereof in accordance
with Section 67(b) of the Local Government Code, which
provides:
Administrative Appeals. — Decision in administrative
cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be
appealed to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of
the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities.
Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency
of the appeal, the Office of the President issued an Order
on July 28, 1993, the pertinent portions of which read as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The stay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of
R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No.
18 dated 12 February 1987, quoted below:
Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. — An appeal shall not
prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The
respondent shall be considered as having been placed
under preventive suspension during the pendency of an
appeal in the events he wins such appeal. In the event the
appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his
salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of
the appeal (R.A. No. 7160).
Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the
execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from is
stayed upon filing of the appeal within the period
prescribed herein. However, in all cases, at any time
during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the
President may direct or stay the execution of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm.
Order No. 18).
xxx xxx xxx
After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for
Review filed before this Office, we find that a stay of
execution pending appeal would be just and reasonable to
prevent undue prejudice to public interest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby
orders the suspension/stay of execution of:
a) the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay
in Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated 1 July 1993
suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period
of two (2) months, and
b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Albay in Administrative Case. No. 05-92 dated 5 July 1993
suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period
of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56).
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
questioning the aforesaid Order of the Office of the
President.
On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration
was denied.
Hence, this petition.
II
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case
is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a mandatory provision
that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming
final and executory." He argues that administrative Order
No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the
Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the
President") authorizing the President to stay the execution
of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency
of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took
effect on January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f),
R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts
thereof, which are incosistent with any of the provisions of
this Code, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of
Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed
to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that
are intended to be repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction 467 [1943]).
If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by
R.A. No. 7160, it is through implication though such kind of
repeal is not favored (The Philippine American
Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American
Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194
[1973]). There is even a presumption against implied
repeal.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found between
the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express
repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency
and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v.
Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible (Compania General de Tabacos v.
Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be
such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be
made to stand together (Crawford, Construction of
Statutes 631 [1940]).
We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160
and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not
irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws
must in fact be read together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an
"appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or
executory." As worded, there is room to construe said
provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to
stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is
nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are
deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed
order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6
of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more
direct language expressive of such intention.

The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural
and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove
from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of
execution, such authority can provided in the rules and
regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in
administrative cases.
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or
directory depending upon a consideration of the entire
provisions in which it is found, its object and the
consequences that would follow from construing it one way
or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533
[1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify
the construction of the word as mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the
execution of the decision of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan
suspending respondent Mayor from office might be
prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in order not to
disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the public,
a stay of the execution of the decision is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104215. May 8, 1996]
ERECTORS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. JULIO ANDRES, JR.
and FLORENCIO BURGOS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, DETERMINED BY LAW
IN FORCE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION;
LABOR ARBITER HAS JURISDICTION OVER MONEY
CLAIMS OF OVERSEAS WORKER FILED ON MARCH
31, 1982. - The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the
time private respondent filed his complaint against the
petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree
No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested
the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor
Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases involving employer-employee relations including
money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of
the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear
jurisdiction over the same.
2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 797 CREATING THE PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA);
WITHOUT RETROACTIVE APPLICATION; LABOR
ARBITER NOT DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION BY
EFFECTIVITY OF E.O. 797. - E.O. No. 797 did not divest
the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case
filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws
should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative
intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared
or is necessarily implied from the language used. We fail
to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to
give it retroactive effect. The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is
not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any
defect in the law. It created the POEA to assume the
functions of the Overseas Employment Development
Board, the National Seamen Board and the overseas
employment functions of the Bureau of Employment
Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money
claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out
of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment, including seamen." The
rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O.
No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed
prior to its effectivity.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES;
CURATIVE STATUTE; DEFINED. - A curative statute is
enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal
proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities
which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with
certain existing legal requirements.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Ardala, Pecson, Bengzon, and
Jimenez for petitioner.
Fabian Gappi for private respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Erectors, Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of
respondent Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr. to hear and
decide the complaint[1] for underpayment of wages and
non-payment of overtime pay filed by private respondent
Florencio Burgos, an overseas contract worker.
The facts are undisputed:
In September 1979, petitioner recruited private respondent
to work as service contract driver in Saudi Arabia for a
period of twelve (12) months with a salary of US$165.00
and an allowance of US$165.00 per month. They further
agreed that private respondent shall be entitled to a bonus
of US$ 1,000.00 if after the 12-month period, he renews or
extends his employment contract without availing of his
vacation or home leave. Their contract dated September
20, 1979, was duly approved by the Ministry of Labor and
Employment.
The aforesaid contract was not implemented. In
December, 1979, petitioner notified private respondent that
the position of service driver was no longer available. On
December 14, 1979, they executed another contract which
changed the position of private respondent into that of
helper/laborer with a salary of US$105.00 and an
allowance of US$105.00 per month. The second contract
was not submitted to the Ministry of Labor and
Employment for approval.
On December 18, 1979, private respondent left the country
and worked at petitioner's Buraidah Sports Complex
project in Saudi Arabia, performing the job of a
helper/laborer. He received a monthly salary and
allowance of US$210.00, in accordance with the second
contract. Private respondent renewed his contract of
employment after one year. His salary and allowance
were increased to US$231.00.
Private respondent returned to the Philippines on August
24, 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract.
He demanded from the petitioner the difference between
his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract,
and the amount actually paid to him, plus the contractual
bonus which should have been awarded to him for not
availing of his vacation or home leave credits. Petitioner
denied private respondent's claim.
On March 31, 1982, private respondent filed with the Labor
Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for underpayment
of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and
contractual bonus.
On May 1, 1982, while the case was still in the conciliation
stage, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 797 creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
took effect. Section 4(a) of E.O. No. 797 vested the POEA
with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employer-employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment.”[2]
Despite E.O. No. 797, respondent Labor Arbiter proceeded
to try the case on the merits. On September 23, 1983, he
rendered a Decision[3] in favor of private respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondent to pay the complainant as follows:
1. The sum of US$2,496.00 in its peso equivalent on
August 25, 1981 as difference between his allowance as
Service Driver as against his position as Helper/Laborer;
2. The sum of US$1,000.00 in its peso equivalent as of
the same date, as his contractual bonus.
The complaints for non-payment/underpayment of
overtime pay and unpaid wages or commission are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.”[4]
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). It questioned the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the case in view of the
enactment of E.O. No. 797.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1991,[5] respondent NLRC
dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the Labor
Arbiter's jurisdiction. It ruled:
"To begin with, the Labor Arbiter has the authority to
decide this case. On May 29, 1978, the Labor Arbiters
were integrated into the Regional Offices under P.D. 1391.
On May 1, 1980, P.D. 1691 was promulgated giving the
Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and Employment
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment. There is no dispute
that the Labor Arbiter had the legal authority over the case
on hand, which accrued and was filed when the two above
mentioned Presidential Decrees were in force.”[6]
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari
reiterating the argument that:
"The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Labor
Arbiter's void judgment in the case a quo."[7]
It asserts that E.O. No. 797 divested the Labor Arbiter of
his authority to try and resolve cases arising from overseas
employment contract. Invoking this Court's ruling in Briad
Agro Developinent Corp. vs. Dela Cerna,[8] petitioner
argues that E.O. No. 797 applies retroactively to affect
pending cases, including the complaint filed by private
respondent.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.[9] On March 31, 1982, at
the time private respondent filed his complaint against the
petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree
No. 1691[10] and Presidential Decree No. 1391[11] which
vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and
the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases involving employer-employee relations
including money claims arising out of any law or contracts
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."[12]
At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter
had clear jurisdiction over the same.
E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to
hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior
to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively
unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect
is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used.[13] We fail to perceive in the language of
E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect.
The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela
Cerna[14] cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the
case at bar. In Briad, the Court applied the exception
rather than the general rule. In this case, Briad Agro
Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp.
challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the
Department of Labor and Employment over cases
involving workers' money claims, since Article 217 of the
Labor Code, the law in force at the time of the filing of the
complaint, vested in the Labor Arbiters exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases. The Court dismissed the
petition in its Decision dated June 29, 1989.[15] It ruled
that the enactment of E.O. No. 111, amending Article 217
of the Labor Code, cured the Regional Director's lack of
jurisdiction by giving the Labor Arbiter and the Regional
Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving
money claims. However, on November 9,1989, the Court,
in a Resolution,[16] reconsidered and set aside its June 29
Decision and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for
proper proceedings, in view of the promulgation of
Republic Act (R.A.) 6715 which divested the Regional
Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears
emphasis that the Court accorded E.O. No. 111 and R.A.
6715 a retroactive application because as curative
statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the rule on
prospectivity of laws.
E.O. No.111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to
widen the workers' access to the government for redress
of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor
Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money
claims. This amendment, however, created a situation
where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the
Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715 further
amended Article 217 by delineating their respective
jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the Regional Director has
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money
claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer
or person employed in domestic or household service, or
househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer
being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the
aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper
does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases are within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative
statutes. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a
prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or
acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for
want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements.

The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It
was not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It
created the POEA to assume the functions of the
Overseas Employment Development Board, the National
Seamen Board and the overseas employment functions of
the Bureau of Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave
the POEA "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases, including money claims, involving employer-
employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment, including seamen."[17] The rule on
prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No.
797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed prior
to its effectivity.
Our ruling in Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. vs.
NLRC[18] is more apt to the case at bar. In this case,
PSPC hired Jardin to work in Saudi Arabia. Jardin filed a
complaint against PSPC for illegal dismissal and recovery
of backwages on January 31, 1979 with the Labor Arbiter.
PSPC questioned the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
because at that time, the power to hear and decide cases
involving overseas workers was vested in the Bureau of
Employment Services. We held:
"When Jardin filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on
January 31, 1979, Art. 217 (5) of the Labor Code provided
that Labor Arbiters and the NLRC shall have ‘exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide’ all cases arising from
employer-employee relations ‘unless expressly excluded
by this Code.’ At that time Art. 15 of the same Code had
been amended by P.D. No. 1412 which took effect on
June 9, 1978. The pertinent provision of the said
presidential decree states:
‘Article 15. Bureau of Employment Services. -
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) The Bureau shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-
employee relations including money claims, arising out of
or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment, except seamen. The
decisions of the Bureau shall be final and executory
subject to appeal to the Secretary of Labor whose decision
shall be final and inappealable.’
Considering that private respondent Jardin's claims
undeniably arose out of an employer-employee
relationship with petitioner PSPC and that private
respondent worked overseas or in Saudi Arabia, the
Bureau of Employment Services and not the Labor Arbiter
had jurisdiction over the case. x x x
Art. 15 was further amended by P.D. No. 1691 which took
effect on May 1, 1990. Such amendment qualifies the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Employment Services as
follows:
‘(b) The regional offices of the Ministry of Labor shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters
or cases involving employer-employee relations including
money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment except seamen: Provided that the Bureau of
Employment Services may, in the case of the National
Capital Region, exercise such power, whenever the
Minister of Labor deems it appropriate. The decisions of
the regional offices or the Bureau of Employment Services
if so authorized by the Minister of Labor as provided in this
Article, shall be appealable to the National Labor Relations
Commission upon the same grounds provided in Article
223 hereof. The decisions of the National Labor Relations
Commission shall be final and inappealable.’
Hence, as further amended, Art. 15 provided for
concurrent jurisdiction between the regional offices of the
then Ministry of Labor and Bureau of Employment Services
‘in the National Capital Region.’ It is noteworthy that P.D.
No. 1691, while likewise amending Art. 217 of the Labor
Code, did not alter the provision that Labor Arbiters shall
have jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-
employee relations ‘unless expressly excluded by this
Code.’
The functions of the Bureau of Employment Services were
subsequently assumed by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) on May 1, 1982 by
virtue of Executive Order No. 797 by granting the POEA
‘original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment, including
seamen.’ (Sec. 4 (a); Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration [POEA], 200 SCRA
663 [1991]). This development showed the legislative
authority's continuing intent to exclude from the Labor
Arbiter's jurisdiction claims arising from overseas
employment.
These amendments notwithstanding, when the complaint
for illegal dismissal was filed on January 31, 1979, under
Art. 15, as amended by P.D. No. 1412, it was the Bureau
of Employment Services which had jurisdiction over the
case and not the Labor Arbiters. It is a settled rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action (Municipality of Sogod
v. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632, 637 [1991]). P.D. 1691 which
gave the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor
concurrent jurisdiction with the Bureau of Employment
Services, was promulgated more than a year after the
complaint was filed. (Italics supplied)
In sum, we hold that respondent NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the jurisdiction of
respondent Labor Arbiter over the complaint filed by
private respondent against the petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
[1] Docketed as NLRC-NCR-3-3142-82.
[2] Official Gazette, Vol. 78, No. 21, May 24, 1982, pp.
2368-7 - 2638-13.
[3] Rollo, pp. 13-23.
[4] Rollo, p. 23.
[5] Rollo, pp. 26-30.
[6] Rollo, p. 28.
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127708. March 25, 1999]
CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA, CITY
TREASURER OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD OF SAN PABLO,
LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO V.
REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City and the MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
review on a pure question of law the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 29 in
Civil Case No. SP-4459(96), entitled “Manila Electric
Company vs. City of San Pablo, Laguna, City Treasurer of
San Pablo Laguna, and the Sangguniang Panglunsod of
San Pablo City, Laguna.” The RTC declared the
imposition of franchise tax under Section 2.09 Article D of
Ordinance No. 56 otherwise known as the Revenue Code
of the City of San Pablo as ineffective and void insofar as
the respondent MERALCO is concerned for being violative
of Act No. 3648, Republic Act No. 2340 and PD 551. The
RTC also granted MERALCO’S claim for refund of
franchise taxes paid under protest.
The following antecedent facts are undisputed:
Act No. 3648 granted the Escudero Electric Services
Company, a legislative franchise to maintain and operate
an electric light and power system in the City of San Pablo
and nearby municipalities Section 10 of Act No. 3648
provides:
“x x x In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby
granted, the grantee shall pay unto the municipal treasury
of each municipality in which it is supplying electric current
to the public under this franchise, a tax equal to two
percentum of the gross earnings from electric current sold
or supplied under this franchise in each said municipality.
Said tax shall be due and payable quarterly and shall be in
lieu of any and all taxes of any kind, nature or description
levied, established or collected by any authority
whatsoever, municipal, provincial or insular, now or in the
future, on its poles, wires, insulators, switches,
transformers, and structures, installations, conductors, and
accessories place in and over and under all public
property, including public streets and highways, provincial
roads, bridges and public squares, and on its franchise,
rights, privileges, receipts, revenues and profits from which
taxes the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.”
Escudero’s franchise was transferred to the plaintiff (herein
respondent) MERALCO under Republic Act No. 2340.
Presidential Decree No. 551 was enacted on September
11, 1974. Section 1 thereof provides the following:
“Section 1. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the
contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all
grantees of franchise to generate, distribute and sell
electric current for light, heat and power shall be two
percent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale
of electric current and from transactions incident to the
generation, distribution and sale of electric current.
Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative
on or before the twentieth day of the month following the
end of each calendar quarter or month as may be provided
in the respective franchise or pertinent municipal
regulation and shall, any provision of the Local Tax Code
or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, be in lieu
of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed
by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts,
income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of
electric current.”
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local
Government Code of 1991” (hereinafter referred to as the
LGC) took effect on January 1, 1992. The said Code
authorizes the province/city to impose a tax on business
enjoying a franchise at a rate not exceeding fifty percent
(50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for
the preceding calendar year realized within its jurisdiction.
On October 5, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San
Pablo City enacted Ordinance No. 56, otherwise known as
the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo. The said
Ordinance took effect on October 30, 1992:[1]
Section 2.09 Article D of said Ordinance provides:
“Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax – There is hereby imposed a
tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty
percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual
receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on
account realized during the preceding calendar year within
the city.”
Pursuant to the above-quoted Section 2.09, the petitioner
City Treasurer sent to private respondent a letter
demanding payment of the aforesaid franchise tax. From
1994 to 1996, private respondent paid “under protest” a
total amount of P1,857,711.67.[2]
The private respondent subsequently filed this action
before the Regional Trial Court to declare Ordinance No.
56 null and void insofar as it imposes the franchise tax
upon private respondent MERALCO[3] and to claim for a
refund of the taxes paid.
The Court ruled in favor of MERALCO and upheld its
argument that the LGC did not expressly or impliedly
repeal the tax exemption/incentive enjoyed by it under its
charter. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the imposition of a franchise tax under
Sec. 2.09 Article D of Ordinance No. 56 otherwise known
as the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo, is declared
ineffective and null and void insofar as the plaintiff
MERALCO is concerned for being violative of Republic Act
No. 2340, PD 551, and Republic Act No. 7160 and the
defendants are ordered to refund to the plaintiff the
amount of ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY
SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED ELEVEN &
67/100 (P1,857,711.67) and such other amounts as may
have been paid by the plaintiff under said Revenue
Ordinance No. 56 after the filing of the complaint.[4]
SO ORDERED.”
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
trial court[5] the petitioners filed the instant petition with
this Court raising pure questions of law based on the
following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT ACT NO. 3648, REPUBLIC ACT NO.
2340 AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 551 AS
AMENDED, INSOFAR AS THEY GRANT TAX
INCENTIVES, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT, HAVE NOT BEEN REPEALED
BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160.
II. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT SECTION 193 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160 HAS
NOT WITHDRAWN THE TAX INCENTIVES, PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES BEING ENJOYED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT UNDER ACT NO. 3648, REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 2340 AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 551, AS
AMENDED.
III. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE FRANCHISE TAX IN QUESTION
CONSTITUTES AN IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
Petitioners’ position is the RA 7160 (LGC) expressly
repealed Act No. 3648, Republic Act No. 2340 and
Presidential Decree 551 and that pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, the
province or city now has the power to impose a franchise
tax on a business enjoying a franchise. Petitioners rely on
the ruling in the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority vs. Marcos[6] where the Supreme Court held that
the exemption from real property tax granted to Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority under its charter has
been withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC.
In addition, the petitioners cite in their Memorandum dated
December 8, 1997 an administrative interpretation made
by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance in its 3rd indorsement dated
February 15, 1994 to the effect that the earlier ruling of the
Department of Finance that holders of franchise which
contain the phrase “in lieu of all taxes” proviso are exempt
from the payment of any kind of tax is no longer applicable
upon the effectivity of the LGC in view of the withdrawal of
tax exemption privileges as provided in Sections 193 and
234 thereof.
We resolve to reverse the court a quo.
The pivotal issue is whether the City of San Pablo may
impose a local franchise tax pursuant to the LGC upon the
Manila Electric Company which pays a tax equal to two
percent of its gross receipts in lieu of all taxes and
assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national
or local authority on savings or income.
It is necessary to reproduce the pertinent provisions of the
LGC.
Section 137 – Franchise Tax – Notwithstanding any
exemption granted by any law or other special law, the
province may impose a tax on business enjoying a
franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent 50% of one
percent 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding
calendar year based on the incoming receipts, or realized,
within its territorial jurisdiction. xxx”
Section 151 – Scope of Taxing Powers – Except as
otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the
taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality
may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and
charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and
independent component cities shall accrue to them and
distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the
maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by
not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of
professional and amusement taxes.
Section 193 – Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. –
Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, non-stock
and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
Section 534 (f) – Repealing Clause – All general and
special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 534 (f), the repealing clause of the LGC, provides
that all general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
This clause partakes of the nature of a general repealing
clause.[7] It is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to designate the specific act or acts
identified by number or title, that are intended to be
repealed.[8]
Was there an implied repeal by Republic Act No. 7160 of
the MERALCO franchise insofar as the latter impose a 2%
tax “in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever
nature”?
We rule affirmatively.
We are mindful of the established rule that repeals by
implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws
existing on the subject. A general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law by mere
implication unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest[9]
and it must be convincingly demonstrated that the two laws
are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that
they cannot co-exist.[10]
It is our view that petitioners correctly rely on the
provisions of Section 137 and 193 of the LGC to support
their position that MERALCO’s tax exemption has been
withdrawn. The explicit language of Section 137 which
authorizes the province to impose franchise tax
“notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or
other special laws" is all-encompassing and clear. The
franchise tax is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed
under special laws.
Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax
exemption privileges. By stating that unless otherwise
provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives
granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons whether
natural or juridical, including government-owned or
controlled corporations except 1) local water districts, 2)
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, (3) non-
stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions,
are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code, the obvious
import is to limit the exemptions to the three enumerated
entities. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that
the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others as expressed in the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exlcusio alterius.[11] In
the absence of any provision of the Code to the contrary,
and we find no other provision of the Code to the contrary,
and we find no other provision in point, any existing tax
exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under
existing law was clearly intended to be withdrawn.

Reading together Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we
conclude that under the LGC the local government unit
may now impose a local tax at a rate not exceeding 50%
of 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding
calendar year based on the incoming receipts realized
within its territorial jurisdiction. The legislative purpose to
withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing law or
charter is clearly manifested by the language used in
Section 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such
exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated.
Since it would be not only tedious and impractical to
attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for
special tax exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for
an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions
or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have
been used.
It is true that the phrase “in lieu of all taxes” found in
special franchises has been held in several cases to
exempt the franchise holder from payment of tax on its
corporate franchise imposed by the Internal Revenue
Code, as the charter is in the nature of a private contract
and the exemption is part of the inducement for the
acceptance of the franchise, and that the imposition of
another franchise tax by the local authority would
constitute an impairment of contract between the
government and the corporation.[12] But these “magic
words” contained in the phrase “shall be in lieu of all
taxes.”[13] Have to give way to the peremptory language
of the LGC specifically providing for the withdrawal of such
exemption privileges.
Accordingly in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
vs. Marcos,[14] this Court held that Section 193 of the LGC
prescribes the general rule, viz., the tax exemptions or
incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or
juridical persons are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the
LGC except with respect to those entities expressly
enumerated. In the same vein We must hold that the
express withdrawal upon effectivity of the LGC of all
exemptions only as provided therein, can no longer be
invoked by Meralco to disclaim liability for the local tax.
Private respondents further argue that the “in lieu of”
provision contained in PD 551, Act No. 3648 and RA 2340
does not partake of the nature of an exemption, but is a
“commutative tax”. This contention was raised but was not
upheld in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue[15] wherein the
Supreme Court stated:
“xxx Congress could impair petitioner’s legislative
franchise by making it liable for income tax from which
heretofore it was exempted by virtue of the exemption
provided for in section 3 of its franchise xxx
xxx Republic Act No. 5431, in amending section 24 of the
Tax Code by subjecting to income tax all corporate tax
payers not expressly exempted therein and in section 27
of the Code, had the effect of withdrawing petitioner’s
exemption from income tax xxx”
Private respondent’s invocation of the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution is accordingly unavailing. The
LGC was enacted in pursuance of the constitutional policy
to ensure autonomy to local governments[16] and to
enable them to attain fullest development as self-reliant
communities.[17] Thus in Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority vs. Marcos, supra, this Court pointed out,
in upholding the withdrawal of the real estate tax
exemption previously enjoyed by the Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority, as follows:
“Note that as reproduced in Section 234(a) the phrase
“and any government owned or controlled corporation so
exempt by its charter” was excluded. The justification for
this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious:
to limit further tax exemption privileges especially in light of
the general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges in Section 193 and the special provision on
withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property
taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234. These policy
considerations are consistent with the State policy to
ensure autonomy to local governments and the objective
of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them
effective partners in attainment of national goals. The
power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise
needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities
of local government units for the delivery of basic services
essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the
people. It may also be relevant to recall that the original
reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges
granted to government-owned or controlled corporations
and all other units of government were that such privilege
resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the
tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there
was a need for these entities to share in the requirements
of development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes
and other charges due from them.”[18]
The Court therein concluded that:
“nothing can prevent Congress from decreeing that even
instrumentalities or agencies of the Government
performing governmental functions may be subject to tax.
Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate
and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom.”[19]
The power to tax is primarily vested in Congress.
However, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local
legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid
delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution.[20]
Thus Article X, Section 5 of the Constitution reads:
“Section 5 – Each Local Government unit shall have the
power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the Local
Governments.”
The important legal effect of Section 5 is that henceforth,
in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal
powers, doubts will have to be resolved in favor of
municipal corporations.[21]
There is further basis for the conclusion that the non-
impairment of contract clause cannot be invoked to uphold
Meralco's exemption from the local tax. Escudero Electric
Co. was originally given the legislative franchise under Act.
3648 to operate an electric light and power system in the
City of San Pablo and nearby municipalities. The term of
the franchise under Act No. 3648 is a period of fifty years
from the Act’s approval in 1929. The said law provided
that the franchise is granted upon the condition that it shall
be subject to amendment, or repeal by the Congress of the
United States.[22] Under the 1935,[23] the 1973[24] and
the 1987[25] Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject
to amendment, alteration or repeal by the National
Assembly when the public interest so requires. With or
without the reservation clause, franchises are subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police
power; they are also subject to alteration by the power to
tax, which like police power cannot be contracted
away.[26]
Finally, while the matter is not of controlling significance,
the Court notes that whereas the original Escudero
franchise exempted the franchise holder from all taxes
levied or collected “now or in the future”[27] this phrase is
noticeably omitted in the counterpart provision of P.D. 551
that said omission is intended not to foreclose future taxes
may reasonably be deduced by statutory construction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and the
complaint of MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima,
JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 132378. January 18, 2000]
ROGELIO JUAN, PEDRO DE JESUS, DELFIN CARREON
and ANTONIO GALGUERRA, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Unlawful and unauthorized use of government property by
incumbent public officers constitutes fraud. Thus, the
provision on preventive suspension in the Anti-Graft Law
applies to such officers even if the alleged violations are
primarily considered as election offenses.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing
the October 14, 1997 Decision[1] and the January 26,
1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-GR
SP No. 43903.[3] The assailed Decision dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioners. In that
Petition, they questioned the April 3, 1997 Order[4] of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-96-64564-6, directing their immediate suspension from
office. On the other hand, the questioned CA Resolution
denied their Motion for Reconsideration. Esm
The Facts
The procedural and factual antecedents of this case are
summarized in the challenged Decision as follows:
"Petitioners Rogelio Juan, Barangay Chairman and Pedro
de Jesus, Delfin Carreon, and Antonio Galguerra,
Barangay Kagawads, of Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches,
Quezon City, were separately accused in Criminal Cases
Q-96-64564 to 66, for violation of Section 261-(o) of the
Omnibus Election Code, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, National Capital Judicial Region, Quezon City.
Barangay Chairman Juan, and Bgy. Kagawad De Jesus
were charged [with] willful and unlawful use of VHF radio
transceiver, an equipment or apparatus owned by the
barangay government of Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon
City, for election campaign or for partisan political activity.
And Barangay Kagawads Carreon and Galguerra were
charged with willful and unlawful use of a tricycle owned by
the same barangay government in their political
campaigns.
"Rodolfo Cayubit and Ricardo Galguerra, representing
themselves as "witnesses/private complainants," assisted
by Atty. Leonides S. Bernabe, Jr., representing himself as
"Private Prosecutor," filed a "Motion for Removal from
Office," dated December 5, 1996, for the removal of said
local elective officials, to which herein petitioners filed their
comment, on the ground that movants have no legal
standing in court, and neither was the public prosecutor
notified of the motion to which he did not conform, and
therefore, said motion should be expunged or stricken out
from the records, or peremptorily denied.
"In a Manifestation and Comment to the accused-
petitioners’ comment, the COMELEC prosecutor stated
that he "conforms" with the subject motion of private
complainants, hence, respectfully submit[s] the same for
the ruling of the court, followed by a Supplement to Motion
for Removal from Office, dated February 28, 1997, to
which petitioners also filed their opposition.
"On April 3, 1997, respondent court issued an Order,
directing the "xxx immediate suspension from office of all
the accused xxx for a period of sixty (60) days from service
of this Order."[5]
The CA Ruling
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s
discretion to order petitioners’ suspension from office. It
ruled:
"The preventive suspension of those officials is authorized
under Section 13 of RA 3019, as amended, which is
mandatory in character upon the filing of a valid
information in court against them. Such suspension can be
issued ‘x x x in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court x x x’ (see also Gonzaga
vs. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426). Said cases
stressed though that the Constitution rejects preventive
suspension for an indefinite duration as it constitutes a
denial of due process and equal protection of the law.
Nonetheless, preventive suspension is justifiable for as
long as its continuance is for a reasonable length of time.
This doctrine also finds expression in Luciano vs.
Provincial Governor, 28 SCRA 570, upholding the power
of courts to exercise the mandatory act of suspension of
local elective official[s] under Section 13 of RA 3019."[6]
(underscoring found in the original) Esmso
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners urge the Court to resolve
the following questions:
"1. Does Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), or Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160 (The Local
Government Code of 1991) confer upon a Regional Trial
Court, before which a criminal case for violation of Sec.
261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code is pending, the
power and authority to order the preventive suspension
from office of the accused therein upon the filing of a valid
Information against him?
"2. In a criminal case for violation of Sec. 261 (o) of the
Omnibus Election Code, where the INFORMATION does
not allege damages sustained by any private party by
reason thereof, has a person, representing himself to be a
"witness/private complainant," or a lawyer, representing
himself to be a "private prosecutor," the legal standing or
personality to file a motion for removal from office of the
accused in said criminal case?
‘2.1. Does a motion so filed, acquire legal standing before
the Court by the subsequent adoption thereof by the
COMELEC Prosecutor in said case? Msesm
‘2.2. Does a motion so filed, without compliance of the
notice requirements prescribed for motions under Rule 15
of the Revised Rules of Court, deserve judicial cognizance
by the court vis-a-vis Del Castillo v. Aguinaldo, 212 SCRA
169, 174, holding that such motion is "a useless piece of
paper with no legal effect" that should not be accepted for
filing and if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance?"
‘2.3. Is there substantial compliance [with] such notice
requirements by the mere fact that [the] adverse party filed
an opposition to said motion, precisely to question its non-
compliance [with] notice requirements, prescribed by Rule
15, Revised Rules of Court?"
‘2.4. Notwithstanding the foregoing defects of said motion,
is it proper for a Regional Trial Court to take cognizance
thereof and act favorably thereon, without setting said
motion for hearing?"
Citing RA 7691,[8] petitioners likewise assail the authority
of the trial court to hear the cases against them.
For the sake of clarity, the discussion of the case will
revolve around three points: first, the jurisdiction of
regional trial courts over violations of the Election Code;
second, the propriety of petitioners’ suspension; and third,
the alleged procedural lapses of the trial court.
The Court’s Ruling
We find no merit in the Petition.
First Issue: Jurisdiction over Election Cases
Petitioners insist that the RTC did not have the jurisdiction
to hear and decide the cases filed against them, because
the penalty for the offenses charged did not exceed six
years. Thus, they claim that the authority to hear the cases
is vested by RA 7691 in the first-level courts. Exsm
The argument does not persuade. It is evident from
Section 32, BP 129, as amended by Section 2 of RA 7691,
that the jurisdiction of first-level courts -- the metropolitan
trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial
courts -- does not cover those criminal cases which by
specific provision of law are cognizable by regional trial
courts. Section 32 provides:
"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city
or municipal ordinances, committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof;
Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Petitioners were charged with violating Section 261 (o) of
the Omnibus Election Code. Under Section 268 of the said
Code, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try
and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation
of the Code, "except those relating to the offense of failure
to register or failure to vote." The said provision reads:
"Sec. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. The regional trial court
shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code,
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote, which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of
the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
Worth noting also is this Court’s disquisition in COMELEC
v. Noynay:[9]
"We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals,
that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening
sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction
of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover criminal
cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty
prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those
excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years, (i.e., prision correccional, arresto
mayor, or arresto menor) jurisdiction thereon is retained by
the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the
case may be. Kyle
"Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the
exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section
32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of BP Blg. 129; (2)
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended; (3)
the Decree on Intellectual Property; and (4) the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
"Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, election offenses also fall within the
exception.
"As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the
Constitution or Congress. Outside the cases enumerated
in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress
has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus
provide by law that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law
would be a special law and must be construed as an
exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts,
namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. 7691 can by no
means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is
merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific
sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of
repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never
intended that RA 7691 should repeal such special
provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not
touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129 providing for the exception." (Itals supplied)
Clearly then, regional trial courts have jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases for violation of the Omnibus Election
Code, such as those filed against petitioners.
Second Issue: Preventive Suspension
Petitioners contend that their cases are not subject to
Section 13 of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which mandates the preventive suspension
of indicted public officials. We disagree.
Petitioners were accused of using barangay property for
election campaign purposes and other partisan political
activities during their incumbency as barangay officials, in
violation of Section 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code,
which reads as follows:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty
of an election offense:
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust,
equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the
government for an election campaign. - Any person who
uses under any guise whatsoever, directly or indirectly, (1)
public funds or money deposited with or held in trust by,
public financing institutions or by government offices,
banks, or agencies; (2) any printing press, radio, or
television station or audio-visual equipment operated by
the Government or by its divisions, sub-divisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; or (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility,
apparatus or paraphernalia owned by the government or
by its political subdivisions, agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign
or for any partisan political activity." Kycalr
On the other hand, Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended,
provides:
"SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under
a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether
as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage
of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement, and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have
already been separated from the service, has already
received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the
same to the government."
Interestingly, prior to its amendment by BP 195,[10] the
said provision had applied to public officers who, under a
valid information, were charged with violations of RA 3019
or with offenses covered by the Revised Penal Code
provision on bribery.[11] The amendatory law expanded
the scope of the provision; now, public officers may
likewise be suspended from office if, under a valid
information, they are charged with an offense falling under
Title 7 of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or with any
other form of fraud involving government funds or property.
True, the cases against petitioners involve violations of the
Election Code; however, the charges are not
unidimensional. Every law must be read together with the
provisions of any other complementing law, unless both
are otherwise irreconcilable. It must be emphasized that
petitioners were incumbent public officers charged with the
unauthorized and unlawful use of government property in
their custody, in the pursuit of personal interests. The
crime being imputed to them is akin to that committed by
public officers as laid down in the Revised Penal Code.
Certainly, petitioners’ acts constitute fraud against the
government; thus, the present case is covered by Section
13 of RA 3019. Calrky
The aforementioned proviso reinforces the principle that a
public office is a public trust. Its purpose is to prevent the
accused public officer from hampering his prosecution by
intimidating or influencing witnesses, tampering with
documentary evidence, or committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office.[12] Preventive suspension is
not a penalty;[13] petitioners, whose culpability remains to
be proven, are still entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
Third Issue: Allegations of Procedural Prejudice
Petitioners assail the trial court’s Order of suspension on
the ground that it was issued pursuant to the initial "Motion
for Removal From Office,"[14] received by the trial court on
December 6, 1996. The records show that this Motion
neither complied with the notice requirements provided
under the Rules of Court, nor was it filed by one who was a
party to their cases.
The Court has held time and again that a motion that does
not meet the notice requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court[15] is pro forma, and that the
trial court has no authority to act on it. The requisites laid
down in the aforementioned provisions are categorical and
mandatory, and the failure of the movants to comply with
them renders their Motions fatally defective.[16]
The Rules mandate the service of a copy of a motion
containing a notice of time and place of hearing, in order to
afford the adverse party time to study and answer the
arguments in the said motion before its resolution by the
court.
Considering the circumstances of the present Petition,
however, we believe that the requirements of procedural
due process were substantially complied with, and that
such compliance justifies a liberal interpretation of the
above-mentioned rules. Mesm
In his "Manifestation on Comment of the Accused," the
COMELEC prosecutor adopted the assailed Motion as well
as the February 28, 1997 "Supplement to Motion for
Removal from Office." This action should be considered to
have thus cured the procedural defect pointed out by
petitioners. More important, however, is the fact that the
trial court heard petitioners and considered their
arguments. In their six-page Memorandum[17] filed
pursuant to the directive of the trial court, petitioners were
able to ventilate their arguments against the Motion for
Removal from Office. They contended that neither RA
3019 nor Section 60 of the Local Government Code
justified their suspension from office. Indeed, the purpose
of a notice of hearing was served;[18] the pleadings that
were filed for and against them negated their allegations of
procedural prejudice.
Under Section 13 of RA 3019, the suspension of a public
officer is mandatory after the determination of the validity
of the information, as enunciated in Socrates v.
Sandiganbayan[19] which we quote:
"This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-
graft law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory
after the validity of the information has been upheld in a
pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This
pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine
basically the validity of the information, from which the
court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold
the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or
correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its
validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner
as a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a
motion to quash."

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension

hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations
that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the
numerous pleadings filed for and against them have
achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due
process is satisfied not just by an oral hearing but by the
filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’
pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.