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Changing Leaders and Changing Policies: The Impact of Elite Succession on Budgetary Priorities

in Democratic Countries
Author(s): Valerie Bunce
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Aug., 1980), pp. 373-395
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110824
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ChangingLeadersand ChangingPolicies:
TheImpactofEliteSuccessionon Budgetary
inDemocratic
Priorities Countries*

Valerie Bunce, Northwestern


University

Leadershipsuccessionis a topicof immediateconcernforpoliticalscientistsand


laypeoplealike. However,mostscholarlystudiesof electionshave analyzedtheproc-
ess as a dependentvariable.This paper takes up wherethese studiesof leadership
changehave leftoff,by assessingthepolicyimpactof leadershipchangeoverin dem-
ocraticpolities.My guidingconcern,then,is not "who rules,"but whetherwho rules
mattersin termsof government policy.
I assessedthe impactof electoralsuccessionby examininghow changesin the
top leadershipof sevenadvancedindustrial democraciesaffected theirbudgetaryallo-
cationsfromapproximately 1950 to 1976. The guidinghypothesis was thatelections
do not disturbthe essentiallylinearand incremental natureof budgetarychangein
democraticstates.This hypothesis, however,was not upheldby the analysis;the im-
pact of successionwas strongand pervasiveacross time and across nations.Thus,
successionwas foundto be an important politicalvariablethatoperatesas a mech-
anismof policychangein democraticstates.

From the viewpointof the mass publics,leadershipsuccessionis the


mostvisibleand salientaspectof thepoliticalprocess.The changingof the
politicalguard,whetherthroughelectionor coup d'etat,is consideredim-
portantnot only because it concernspower and the powerfulbut also be-
cause of its implicationsforchange. New leaders may mean new policies,
a new politicalstyle,or a change in government performanceand respon-
siveness. By contrast,continuityin political leadershipis understoodto
implycontinuityin public policies as well. Thus, fromthe perspectiveof
thepublic,the centralimportanceof leadershipsuccessionis not theproc-
ess itself,but ratherits expectedimpact.And the key questionseems to be
notwho wins,but whetherwho winsmakesa difference.
Politicalscientists,however,have analyzedleadershipsuccessionfrom

:.'This paper is a revisedversionof one presentedat the AmericanPoliticalSci-


ence AssociationConventionin Chicago,September1-5, 1976. I would like to thank
JohnEchols, StephanieCameron,and Jack Walker for theircommentson earlier
draftsof thispaper.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 3, August 1980


? 1980 by the Universityof Texas Press 0092-5853/80/030373-20$1.70

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374 Valerie Bunce

a ratherdifferent perspective.Scholars have focusedprimarily on theproc-


ess and outcome of succession,ratherthan on the effectsof leadership
turnover(see, forexample,Polsbyand Wildavsky,1971; Butlerand Stokes,
1974). The bulk of scholarlyresearch,then,has treatedleadershipchange
as a dependentvariable,as a processto be explainedratherthanone which
acts on thepoliticalenvironment. Thus, forpoliticalscientistsat least,the
studyof successionseems to end withthe electionof the successor.
This imbalance is nowheremore pronouncedthan in the studyof
electionsin the West. A great deal has been writtenabout who rules in
Westerndemocracies,what factorsdeterminevotingbehavior, and the
effectiveness of rivalcampaignstrategies.However,considerablyless atten-
tionhas been paid to policychange and stasisafterthe election.We think
we know,forexample,whyRichard Nixon succeeded Lyndon Johnsonin
the presidency,but we can speak farless authoritatively about the amount
of policy change that accompanied that transferof power. Nor can we,
given our presentemphasis in research,really assess the importanceof
successionas a politicalvariable. If it does not affectpublic policy,then
one obviousrationaleforstudyingsuccession-that it is somehowan influ-
entialpoliticalprocess-would be subjectto question.If elections,in fact,
routinelycontinuethe policy prioritiesof the past, thentheymerelyserve
to legitimateprevailingpractices.
It is thisissue-the impactof democraticelectionson public policy-
that I will address in this paper. Once the campaigningis over and one
leader has succeeded another,whathappens to government policy?Does it
marchon as before,as much of the literatureon electionsand decision-
makingwould predict,cordo prioritieschange once a new leader comes to
office?Put anotherway,do new leaders make a difference in termsof pol-
icy,or are they,instead,"dispensibleactors" (and actresses) in the policy
process (Greenstein,1969, p. 50)?

Electionsand PolicyChange
Surprisingly enough (and thisis indeed rare in social science), politi-
cal scientistsare in substantialagreementon thisissue-they tend to con-
cur thatelectionsdo not disturbtheessentiallyincrementalpatternof pol-
icy changein democraticsystems.For instance,KennethDolbeare (1974,
p. 80), a sharpcriticof the Americansystem,considerselections"useful
diversionswhichcontributeto thedefenseof thingsas theyare." Similarly,
Nelson Polsbyand Aaron Wildavsky(1971, p. 209) stressthat"presiden-

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CHANGING LEADERS AND CHANGING POLICIES 375

tialelectionsare not issuereferenda" and thattheimpactof electionson


publicpolicyis minimal.
By farthemostcommonvariableused to explainthelack of policy
changefollowing electionshasbeentheerosionofdifferences amongpoliti-
cal partieswithindemocratic statesto thepointwhereone rulingparty
seemsindistinguishable fromanother(Downs,1957; Kirchheimer, 1966).
Thisblurring of partydifferences has beenattributed primarilyto theim-
perativeofcompetition: inthequestforvotespartiesmutetheirdifferences
in orderto appealto a broaderstratum oftheelectorate.The resultis both
a reduction of policydifferences amongpartiesand a corresponding de-
clinein theimpactthatelitesuccession can exerton publicpolicy.
This prediction wouldevenseemto hold whereone partytendsto
dominate, as in Japan,Sweden,and Germany(in the 1950s) (Sartori,
1968). Undersuchconditions therewouldbe a prevailing policybiasinthe
system, and thedominant partywouldbe underfewelectoralpressures to
alterexistingpolicyarrangements. Thus,justas highcompetition between
partieswouldseemtoencourage policyimitation,so lowcompetition would
seemto ruleout anynecessity forsuchimitation-the rulingpartycould
simplypursuepastpriorities withno fearof electoralrecriminations. In
eithercase,theprospects forpolicyinnovation wouldseemremote(King,
1969).
The questforvotesmayalso forcecandidates toblurtheirdifferences.
Duringa presidential campaign, forexample,contenders tryto avoidtak-
ingextreme or evendistinctpolicypositions. Thisis because:
Candidates. . . viewwinningoffice,not issue referenda, as the primaryoutcome
of elections,because theycontendfor officethroughan adversarysystemthat
treatsissues as a politicalfootball,the vehiclefor scoringpoints;because they
contendforofficewithina framework of two majorpartieswithelectoralincen-
tivesforblurringdisagreements; and because theyrespondto an electoratethat
at times is neitherknowledgeableabout issues nor highlypoliticized(Hess,
1974, p. 46).

The veryprocessby whichelectoralcoalitionsare formed, then,militates


againstpolicychangeaftertheelection.
Once thecampaignis overand thenewleaderinaugurated, thepros-
pectsforpolicychangedo notseemto improve greatly,sincenewleaders,
liketheirpredecessors,
apparently lack anydesireto changepublicpolicy
priorities.
David Braybrookeand CharlesLindblom(1963, pp. 73-76)
havecontended thatdemocraticpoliticalcultureis hostileto radicalpolicy

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376 Valerie Bunce

changeandfavors, instead,slow,predictable, consensual changesin public


policy.In theirview,democracies resistradicalchangebecauseoftherisks
it entails,thecentralization ofpowerit requires, and themasscompliance
it necessitates. Democracieschoose limitedchange,then,because their
valuesystem prefers it,and becausethelack of powerin thesystem pro-
videsno otherrealpolicyoption(Rose, 1969).
It mightalso be contended thatincrementalism-that is, smalland
consistent policychangeovertime-arisesin responseto theverycom-
plexityof decision-making in democratic states.Theseconstraints include
thecognitive andfiscallimitations ofthedecision-makers, as wellas those
imposedby inter-elite and interest-group conflict.
Braybrooke and Lind-
blom (1963), alongwithAaronWildavsky (1974), have enumerated in
detailthe time,information, and resourceconstraints thatbind policy-
makersin democratic states.The resultis a decisionstrategy of disjointed
incrementalism, in whichthesearchforideasis limited, onlya fewalter-
nativesforactionare ranked,and in whichdecision-makers settlefora
satisfactory ratherthantheidealsolution.
Thus,all signsseemto pointto one conclusion:decision-making in
democratic systems invariablyproducesincremental policychange.More-
over,analysesofelitesuccession do notalterthisconclusion. The minimal
policydifferences amongpartiesand candidates whichdiscourage thedis-
cussionof issuesand encouragetheconvergence of candidatesand plat-
forms,and theforceswhichlimitpolicyinnovation once a newleaderis
inaugurated, wouldall constrain theelectoralcyclein democratic nations
fromdisturbing theessentially incremental natureof policychangein the
West.If all thisliteratureis correct,changesinpersonnel shouldnotusher
inchangesingovernment policyindemocratic politicalsystems. This,then,
willbe theguiding hypothesis.

Methods
In ordertobeginto testtheimpactofelitesuccession
on publicpolicy
in democraticpolities,I havecollectedbudgetaryexpenditure
and succes-
sion data forsevendemocracies(Austria,Britain,Canada, the Federal
Republicof Germany, Sweden,Japan,and theUnitedStates)from1950
to 1976.1This particular groupof politieswas chosenbecauseit incor-
poratesa widerangeofvariables, suchas partycompetition
and leftism
of

1 The difficulties
of procuringcomparable,reliable,annual time-series
budgetary
data meantthat: (1) I had to rely primarilyon ratherbroad categories,such as

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CHANGING LEADERS AND CHANGING POLICIES 377

thegovernment party,thathave been hypothesized to affectthe linkage


betweenelectionsand thepolicyprocessin democratic nations.For ex-
ample,do competitive partysystems such as thosein theUnitedStates,
GreatBritain,Canada,Austria,and Germany since 1965 producemore
policychangeafterelectionsthandominant systems, suchas thosein the
GermanFederalRepublicpriorto 1965, Japan,and Sweden(see Dahl,
1966;Arianand Barnes,1974)? Whatabouttheeffects of theideological
complexion of the rulingparty:are leftist partiesmorechange-oriented
thanrightist
ones (see Sundquist, 1968,p. 207)?
The independent variablein theanalysis-elitesuccession-wasop-
erationalized
in twoways: (1) all changesin thetop leadership postof
eachunit(i.e., thepresident,theprimeminister, and thechancellor);and
(2) electionswhichreturned incumbents to office.
These twonotionsof
successionwereemployed in orderto testwhether an actualturnover in
leadershipwas necessary fortheelectionto alterbudgetary
(or sufficient)
policy(Neustadt,1960; Holtand Turner,1969). If bothtypesof succes-
sionhavesimilareffects,thenitwouldappearthattheelectionperse, not
the changein leadership, is thevariablethatinfluences theevolutionof
policy.
I definedand measuredthe dependent variable,policyoutputs,by
lookingat howtheshareof thebudgetallocatedto health,education, and
welfarechangedin thesesevennationsin response to succession.2I decided

health,education,and welfare(whichdid not changein definition fortheentiretime


series); (2) I was limitedto 20 to 27 yearsforeach polity,due to changesin bud-
getarystructures and definitions; and (3) I was sometimesunable to get identical
yearsforeach nation,althoughall the data embracesthe 1950s,the 1960s,and the
1970s. Whiletheselimitations did undercutthe generalizability of the findings, I do
not thinktheydetractfromthe powerof the analysis.The aggregatenatureof the
categoriesprobablyunderstates, if anything, the impactof elections,since it is easier
forleadersto alterprogramsthanto altersuchbroadcategoriesas educationoutlays.
In fact,in trialrunsand previousresearch(Bunce, 1976), I did findthatothermore
narrowlyfocusedbudgetary categories,and othertypesof publicpolicysuch as wel-
fareprogramsin theUnitedStatesand social-security benefits,
weresensitiveto lead-
ershipchangeover. I shouldalso notethattheanalysisdependedon strictintranational
comparability of the data over time,since I am interested in within-system change.
As for cross-national comparability, I reliedon close but not perfectcorrelationsin
budgetary categories.
2 Severalthingsabout the data shouldbe noted.First,all currency changesand
categoryredefinitions were takeninto account.Second,I dealt only withactual,not
planned,expenditures and correctedforinflation and logarithmicgrowthpatternsby

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378 Valerie Bunce

to focuson budgetsas theindicator of publicpolicyforseveralreasons,


beyondtheirobviousamenability to quantitativeanalysis.First,whilebud-
getsobviously do notencompassall thatis subsumed underpublicpolicy
(and thisanalysisdoes notassumetheydo), theydo includea variety of
important government programs. Moreover,the problemof establishing
functional equivalence acrossnationalboundaries, a continuing problem in
comparative policyanalysis,is minimized whenbudgetary outlaysareused
as the definitionof policy.Budgetsare in factrathersimilaracrossthe
advancedindustrial democracies interms ofhowtheyareconstructed, their
revenueconstraints, and theirimpacton society(see Wildavsky, 1975;
Bunce,1976, ch. 2). In addition,I choseto look at budgetary priorities
becauseoftheirseeming sensitivity
to changesinpoliticalleadership. What
KermitGordon(1969, p. 58) has said abouttheAmericanbudget,that
"it is thePresident's
planand theimpliedpriorities are hispriorities,"
can
be said aboutotherchiefexecutives as well.Becausethebudgetis, more
thanmostpublicpolicies,a directreflection of theleader'spolicyprefer-
ences,therotation of leadersshouldat leastincreasethelikelihoodof an
accompanying rotation inbudgetary priorities.
Finally,itshouldbe empha-
sizedthatbudgetsare highlypoliticaldocuments in thattheyrecord"the
struggle of men[sic] overwhogetswhat"(Dye, 1973,p. 528). Thus,a
goodplaceto beginassessing theimpactofelectoralchangein democratic
nationsis withbudgets, preciselybecausetheyare sucha politicized policy
area.
In orderto assesssystematically the impactof elitesuccessionon
budgetary expenditure shares,I have utilizedan interrupted time-series
design(Caporaso,1974). As JamesCaporaso (1974, pp. 17-18) points
out,thisdesignis wellattunedto analyzing theeffects of an intermittent
variableon a continuous dependent variable:

This designis appropriate. . . wherethereis theoreticalreason to believethat


some eventshouldcause a changein the behaviorof the series.. . . The key
questioninvolvedin thisdesignis whethertheoccurrenceof theeventsin ques-
tion had an effector whetherthe behaviorof the series. . . represents a con-
tinuationof theseriesfromits previousstate.

examiningthe stabilityof changesin sharesof the budgeteach categoryenjoyed.I


did not,therefore,
use levelsof expenditure.
Finally,I looked at a numberof other
budgetarycategoriesbesideshealth,education,and welfare,some of whichwereex-
cludedfromthispaper (due to space limitations),
and foundsimilarresults.

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CHANGING LEADERS AND CHANGING POLICIES 379

The question, then,is howto assessimpact.In thetheoretical litera-


tureon successionand policyinnovation thereare twonotionsof policy
change.The first, whichis themostcommonin theorganization literature,
is thatinnovation mustcomeearlyin theadministration beforetheforces
of resistance gainpowerand themomentum forchangediesout (Thomp-
son,1965). Thiswouldsuggest thattheimpactofsuccession is immediate
and short-term, a tendency whichanymeasureof changeshouldtakeinto
account.
However,a secondpattern of changeis equallyplausible-thatinno-
vationdoes not require"newness"so muchas experience(Gouldner,
1954). Whereasnew personnellack the contactsand expertiseto put
through policychange,thosewithsometenuremayhavegreater capacity
to innovate. Thismodelimpliesthatchangewilloccurgradually, notearly
in theadministration butincreasingly throughout thetermof office. Thus,
anymeasureofpolicychangeshouldallowfortheoperation ofthispattern
ofinnovation as well.
I therefore decidedtouse twomeasures ofimpact:onewhichfocused
on thebehaviorof expenditures immediatelyaftersuccession(thatis, the
first
yearthenewlyelectedleaderexerted controloverthebudget)and one
whichcomparedwholeadministrations witheach other.In thefirst case,I
utilizedthesametechnique as Caporaso:I regressed expenditure sharesof
thebudgetagainsttimefortheperiodpriorto succession(i.e., theprevious
administration) and thencalculatedtheexpenditure shareone wouldex-
pect,givenpreviouspatterns, in thefirstyearof thenewadministration.3
This prediction was thensubtracted fromtheshareactuallyspentin the
newbudget,and thedifference (whether positiveor negative)was treated
as theimpactof succession. The likelihoodofsucha shiftwas thencalcu-
lated,byplacingthedifference in sharesoverthestandard errorofthere-
gression (i.e.,thepredicting)equation,withtheresultgiving us a t testand,
of course,levelsof significance foreach prioritychange.4Thus,whenI

3 For example,in the Americancase, 1978 would be PresidentCarter's"first"


budgetary year.I shouldalso mentionthatin cases wherethepreviousadministrations
had only a fewtimepoints (two or three,forexample,such as withthe data for the
firstadministrations I examinedin each country-Eisenhower, Adenauer,and the
like), I was carefulto check that none of the expenditureswere outliersand thus
unrepresentative of the generalexpenditure pattern.I should also note that,in the
analysis,previousexpenditures weredefinedbothas all thosepriorto thenew admin-
istrationand as just thoseof thepreviousadministration;bothapproachesgave very
similarresults.
4 I shouldnote thatthe t testdoes controlfor varianceof previousadministra-

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380 ValerieBunce

measuredimmediate impact,I was concerned withhowtypicalpriorities


werein thenewadministration; theextentto whichtheydeviatedfromthe
pastand thestatistical ofthosevariations
significance indicatedhowmuch
impactelectionsdidhaveon budgetary priorities.5
I testedthesecondmodelof change,whichpositsthatchangewill
comelate (if at all) in a newadministration,by comparing theextentto
whichthepriorities of entireadministrationsvariedfromeachother.Here
I subdividedthe data intoadministration blocks,comparing theirdiver-
gencesthrough a difference-of-meanstest.6
Thus, whilethe testindi-
first
cates the immediate effectsof succession,the secondtesttellsus about
long-term impact.

The Findings
Table 1 presents theresultsofthetestthatassessedtheimmediate im-
pactofsuccession on budgetary in thesevendemocratic
priorities nations.
Giventheclearpattern of budgetary following
fluctuations successionex-
hibitedin thistable,itis evidentthatleadershipturnoverdoes indeedlead
to immediate budgetary innovation.7Moreover,it is strikinghow much
(and how frequently) successionseemsto affectbudgetary outlays.In
everycountry (eventheFederalRepublicof Germany, wherethepattern

tions.If the varianceis large,the standarderrorwill be large and thiswill reduce


the possibilityof a statistically result.Of course,if the annual sharesare
significant
steadywithinadministrations (whichtheygenerallyare), the standarderrorwill be
small,and small deviationsfromthe past will resultin a significant t test.All of this
is to say, then,that the methodologytakes both incrementaland nonincremental
patternsinto account,and that the amountof change aftersuccessiondependson
how muchthe administration deviatesfrompast practice-whetherthatpracticewas
a stableor unstabletreatment of shares.
5Of course,the level of significance does not indicatethe significance of the
findings and will notbe assumedto do so in theanalysis.Rather,significance will be
used as one indicatorof impactalongwiththe actual size of theshifts.
6 Of course,I was sometimes unableto makesuchcomparisonsdue to the small
numberof timepointsin some administrations-Harold Wilson'sfirstterm (1964-
1966) versushis second (1966-1970), forexample.In thesesituations(whichwere
not verynumerous),I simplydroppedthe cases fromthe analysisand reliedon the
resultsof the firstshort-term test.
7 I should note thatwhen I use the term"policy innovation"to describethe
policyimpactof elections,I meanchangesin expenditures whichdiffer fromprevious
patterns of change.Thus,innovationis "unexpected change,"eithermoreor less than
anticipated.While thisformulation may not conformto some readers'definitions of
innovation, it does concurwiththatofferedby Nelson Polsby (1975).

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TABLE 1
The ImmediateImpact of Successionon BudgetaryAllo cationsin

Total
Country Administrationa Expendituresb Healthc

Austria Raab (1953) +8221* +.3%


Raab (1956) +6126 +.8*
Raab (1960) +3623 +.3
Gorbach (1962) +4111 +.2
Klaus (1966) +4000* -.3
Kreisky(1970) +19644* +.3*
Kreisky(1971) +21230 -.5*
Kreisky(1975) +22067* +.4*
Canada St. Laurent (1957) -158 +2.0*
Diefenbaker(1958) +192 +1.5*
Diefenbaker(1962) +320 +1.0*
Pearson (1963) -600 -1.5
Pearson (1965) -601 +1.0*
Trudeau (1968) +2365* +1.3*
Trudeau (1972) +2295* 0.3
Trudeau (1974) +2120* +.9*
Germany Adenauer(1957) +300 -2.0
Adenauer (1961) +400 +1.0
Erhard(1962) +200 + 1.0
Kiesinger(1965) +301 +2.0
Brandt(1969) +509* +3.0*
Brandt(1972) +692* +4.0*

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TABLE 1 (continued)

Total
Country Administrationa Expendituresb Healthc Ed

Great Britain Macmillan(1959) +2002* -3.1%*


Wilson (1964) +2009* -3.2*
Wilson (1966) +700* +4.0*
Heath (1970) -202 -3.4*
Wilson (1974) +3005* +4.3*
Japan Kishi (1958) +2391* +3.2* +
Ikeda (1960) +5001* +1.1
Sato (1963) -200 +1.4
Sato (1967) +2341 * -1.6
Sato (1969) -202 -1.6
Tanaka (1972) +211 +5.4*
Miki (1974) +2599* +4.5*
Sweden Erlander(1956) +388* +1.3*
Erlander(1958) +462* +2.2* +
Erlander(1960) +508* +3.6*
Erlander(1964) +609* -3.4*
Erlander(1968) +731* +4.3*
Palme (1970) +520 -1.3
Palme (1973) +668* -4.6*

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TABLE 1 (continued)

Total
Country Administrationa Expendituresb Healthc E

UnitedStates Eisenhower(1952) -284* -.2%*


Eisenhower(1956) +1159* +.1*
Kennedy(1960) +1272* +.1
Johnson(1963) + 1489* +.3*
Johnson(1964) +929 +.3*
Nixon (1968) +4068 +1.0*
Nixon (1972) +3265* +1.1*
a These are thenew administrations; the yearin parentheses is theyeartheywereelected.N
year was the firstthe new administration controlledthe budgetand, hence,all the calculation
Americancase, however,thereis a two-yearlag). Underscoring designatesa turnoverin the ch
b These numbers represent the difference betweenthe allocationexpected(roundedoffto d
the firstbudgetaryyear of the new administration, if previouslevels were to continue,minus
c These figures werecalculatedas in columnone, exceptthattheyrepresent sharesof the bu
turelevels.
* Significant at (at least) the .05 level. Significancewas determined by takingthe resultof
expectedlevels and dividingthisby the standarderrorof the regression equation.This gave a t
thedifference is, takingthevarianceof past outlaysintoaccount.The sourcesforthesedata are

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384 Valerie Bunce

is leastpronounced),thechanging of thepoliticalguardwas translated


intosome,and sometimes a greatdeal of,policychange.Austria, Britain,
Canada, Sweden,and theUnitedStatesall featurea striking amountof
expenditure change,whileJapanandtheFederalRepublicshowsomewhat
less impact.Thus,contrary to expectations, I havefoundthatchangesin
politicalleadership do affect budgetary prioritiesin democratic nations.
But does thisinnovation last or is it simplya symbolic gesturethat
fadeswiththeagingof theadministration? Table 2 presents theresultsof
the testthatcomparedthe priorities of contiguous administrations.The
tablesupports theinitialconclusionthatleadership changemeanspolicy
change;thisagainis particularly trueof theUnitedStatesand leasttrue
fortheGermanFederalRepublic.Thistable(alongwiththescatterplots)
also pointsto an interesting difference in how countriesachievepolicy
innovation. In Table 1 innovation is assumedto be immediate and dra-
matic,whereasTable 2 allowsforlong-term innovation. Whilethe ap-
proachesneed notbe mutually exclusive(and usuallyare not; one can
alwaysreorderpriorities earlyand maintain themomentum) theysome-
timesseemseparatein practice. Thisis mostobviousin thecase ofBritain,
wherethetendency is to innovate earlyand thenfallbackintopastexpen-
diturepatterns. Japanis quitethe opposite-succession therehas little
immediate impactbut,on a long-term basis,different administrations
have
significantly differentbudgetary priorities.In America(as wellas Sweden),
however, innovation is quickanddurable,a finding whichis rathersurpris-
ingin that, American electionsare oftendescribed in termsof theirissue-
lessflavorand their"catch-all"candidates.
The factthatleadersin theUnitedStatesand Swedeninnovateearly
and maintain theirnewpriorities untilthenextelectionsuggests thatsuc-
cessionhas thestrongest impactin thosecountries, followedby Austria,
Canada,Japan,andBritain.Giventherelatively weakimpactofsuccession
in Germany, one can concludethatchangesin politicalleadersin thatna-
tiononlyrarelyalterbudgetary expenditures. (The emergence of Willy
Brandtin 1969, of course,is an important exception[Edinger,1969;
Gunther,1970]). Thus, the hypothesis thatchangesin administrations
merelycontribute to thegenerally incremental patternof policychangein
Westerndemocracies is rejectedin thisanalysis.In thecase of budgets,
politicalleadersarenotTweedledum and Tweedledee butdifferentpersons
withidentifiably different policyobjectives.
But thisconclusionmaybe premature; perhapsthefocusshouldbe
expandedto see whether thisgeneralization holdsbeyondhealth,educa-
tion,andwelfare. Table 3 presents theshort-term analysisforsomeother

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CHANGING LEADERS AND CHANGING POLICIES 385

TABLE 2
AverageBudgetaryPrioritiesby Administration,
in Seven Countries

Country Administrationa Healthb Educationb Welfareb

Austria Rabb (1953) .1 6.5 22.1


Raab (1956) .2* 8.2* 20.1*
Raab (1960) .2 8.5 19.3*
Gorbach (1962) .3 8.4 23.1*
Klaus (1966) .4 8.9* 25.7*
Kreisky(1970) .5* 10.3* 24.8*
Kreisky(1971) .6* 11.1.* 24.2
Kreisky(1975) .5* 12.2* 24.5
Canada St. Laurent(1957) 1.1 .9 14.1
Diefenbaker(1958) 2.9* 1.9* 17.2*
Diefenbaker(1962) 4.7* 1.2 21.1*
Pearson (1963) 5.2* 3.6* 23.2*
Pearson (1965) 5.1 2.9* 22.8
Trudeau (1968) 5.9* 4.3* 22.0*
Trudeau (1972) 5.8 4.2 21.0*
Trudeau (1974) 6.1* 4.1 21.1
Germany Adenauer (1957) 3.3 1.4 22.3
Adenauer (1961) 3.2 1.6 24.5
Erhard (1962) 3.4 2.1* 20.2*
Kiesinger(1965) 3.2* 3.4* 18.3*
Brandt (1969) 3.9* 6.8* 22.1*
Brandt(1972) 4.8* 7.8* 21.4*
Great Britain Macmillan (1959) 8.7 10.8 15.5
Wilson (1964) 8.9* 11.5* 16.3*
Wilson (1966) 8.8 12.1* 16.2
Heath (1970) 9.2* 12.5* 17.1*
Wilson (1974) 9.6* 13.1* 17.5
Japan Kishi (1958) 2.3 12.3 7.6
Ikeda (1960) 1.8* 11.9 6.9*
Sato (1963) 2.2* 12.2 8.9*
Sato (1967) 1.9* 12.1 9.2
Sato (1969) 1.7 12.3 9.5
Tanaka (1972) 1.6 13.1* 11.3*
Milki (1974) 1.8* 13.0 13.4*

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386 Valerie Bunce

TABLE 2 (continued)

Country Administrationa Healthb Educationb Welfareb

Sweden Erlander(1956) 3.4%* 9.5% 22.1%*


Erlander(1958) 3.6* 10.9* 22.2
Erlander(1960) 3.4* 10.7 23.1
Erlander(1964) 3.8 12.3* 24.5*
Erlander(1968) 4.1* 13.2* 25.4
Palme (1970) 4.6* 15.0* 26.6*
Palme (1973) 4.7 15.4 28.2*
UnitedStates Eisenhower(1952) 2.8* 8.1* 15.5*
Eisenhower(1956) 2.8 9.4* 17.6*
Kennedy(1960) 3.3* 12.1* 15.5*
Johnson(1963) 4.2* 14.7* 15.6
Johnson(1964) 6.4* 16.3* 14.9*
Nixon (1968) 7.1* 18.0* 15.6*
Nixon (1972) 7.4 19.2* 16.0

a These are the new administrations; thoseunderscoredrepresenta turnoverin


the chiefexecutive.The year in parenthesesis the electionyear,and in mostcases
the year afterthis was the firstbudgetaryyear of the new administration (in the
Americancase, the lag is two years). All data sourcesare reportedin the Appendix.
b These are the averagesharesof the budgetforthoseyearsthe administration
exertedcontrolover expenditures. Othercategories,such as transportation,
housing,
and agriculture also showedsimilarpatterns.
* Significant
at the .05 level, as calculatedfroma difference-of-means test.

budgetaryallocations.Once again, the impact of succession seems clear;


mannerafterleadershipturnoverthanbe-
prioritiesfluctuatein a different
fore.The consistencyof thisresult(and the permanenceof those changes
as revealedin longer-term tests,deleteddue to space limitations)buttress
the conclusionthatelectionsdo influencebudgetarydecision-making and
outputs.8
The issue then centerson the interpretation of the patternsin the
data. How can one explain the different impactsof various electionson

8 Due to space limitations,


I excludeda similaranalysisfor gubernatorial
rota-
tionin theAmericanstates,whereI foundsimilarpatterns operating(Bunce, 1976).
I shouldalso mentionthat,withinadministrations,priorityshiftsare incremental
at
the stateand nationallevels.

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TABLE 3
The ImmediateImpact of Successionin Four Countries: Some Extr

Public
Country Succession Safety Housing Industry

Germany Kiesinger(1965) -1.3% +.53%* +2.2%


Brandt(1969) -1.4 +.79* +2.4
Brandt(1972) -2.0* +.89* +1.3
Great Britain Wilson (1964) +1.3 +3.5*
Wilson (1966) +2.2* +3.8*
Heath (1970) -2.1* -1.2
Japan Sato (1969) +2.4*
Tanaka (1972) +3.2*
Miki (1974) +3.0*
Sweden Erlander(1958) +3.3*
Erlander(1960) +2.4*
Erlander(1964) +2.2*
Erlander(1968) +2.6*
Palme (1970) +2.3*
Palme (1973) -1.1

aThe sourcesforthesedata are in the Appendix.The administrations namedare thenew o


* Significant
at (at least) the .05 level. The same t testprocedureas in Table 1 was used.

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388 Valerie Bunce

budgetary priorities?First,itis clearfromTable 4 (whereimportant politi-


cal variablesand the resultsare summarized)thatpartycompetition is
indeedan important variable,butthatitsinfluence is curvilinear; thatis,
close electionsand electionswhichprovidelargegoverning mandatesare
bothmoreconduciveto changesin priorities thanelections in whichcom-
petitionis moderate. This wouldseemto suggestthatinnovation occurs
whenleaderseitherfeelrelatively freeto innovate or whentheyfeelpres-
sureto provethemselves and/orto use newpriorities to expandtheirsup-
port.Thus,whiletheanalysisprovides somesupport forV. 0. Key'shypo-
thesis(1949, p. 307) thatcompetition shouldencourageinnovation, it at
the same timelendscredenceto theviewcommonly heldby elitesthat
innovations requirelargemajorities (Schlesinger, 1969; Sundquist, 1968);
whatis not upheldis thecommonhypothesis in thecomparative literature
thatcompetition worksagainstchangesin publicpolicy (Kirchheimer,
1966).
It is also clearin thedatathatpartyand personnel turnover are con-
duciveto innovation, thoughneither (as was thecase withpartycompeti-
tion)is decisiveinitsimpact.The American and Britishcasesindicatethe
influence ofthesetwofactors. Sweden,a dominant-party system withlittle
executiveturnover, also exhibitsa stronglinkagebetweenelectionsand
shiftsin budgetary priorities."Newness,"therefore, is notmandatory, as
Swedenillustrates, andintheextreme-such as withJapan'srevolving door
ofprimeministers-may hinderchangesin priorities.
The Swedishcase does, however,illustrate the importance of two
othervariables, an expanding electoral mandateand theleftism ofthegov-
erning party, forbudgetary innovation. To takethemandateargument first,
theresultsshowthatleaderswhoreceiveincreasedsupport in theirreelec-
tionsdo tendto shiftpriorities more.One can look,forexample,at Eisen-
hower's, Wilson's, or Adenauer's secondterms; Erlander's victoryin 1968;
or Johnson's sizeablewinin 1964 (if one stretches thenotionof reelec-
tion). By contrast, Trudeau'sand Sato's declining supportseemedto dis-
couragechangesinbudgetary priorities.Thus,thedataindicatethatleaders
interpret an expansionof publicsupportas a mandateforchange,and a
contraction of thatsupportas an indication thattheyshouldcontinuethe
priorities ofthepast(see Crossman, 1976;Wilson,1976;Sundquist, 1968).
The secondimportant factoris theideologicalcomplexion of thegov-
erning party.Whether one comparesleftversusright parties(as defined by
theparticular politicalcontext)or looksat moreleftist partiesin general,
it is clearthatleftist partiesare morelikelyto changebudgetary shares
thanrightist ones.Thisexplains, forexample,thecontrast between Sweden

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TABLE 4
The Impactof Succession: A NationalSummary

Average
Average Spreadbe- El
Average Leader tweenTop Party Tu
Competitiona Mandateb Two Partiesd Turn- ov
Country Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats overe Ra

Austria 55c 51c 58.5c 72.1c 3.7 4.3 Yes


Canada 67 67 43.3 53.0 9.1 23.3 Yes
Germany 82 89 49.6 52.6 9.4 10.4 Yes
Great Britain 85 87 45.3 52.5 2.5 8.4 Yes
Japan 50 55 46.6 52.5 24.4 31.0 No
Sweden 36 41 46.3 48.0 27.5 28.1 No
United States 85 - 54.6 12.3 - Yes

a Operationalized as twicethe votes/seatsof the second-placeparty.The sourcesforthist


b Operationalized as the votes/seatsof the winningpartyaveragedovertime.
C These figuresunderplaythe high competition in Austria,becauseof theinfluence of t
comparableaveragecompetition figuressince 1966 would be 86 and 89; and theaveragemand
d I.e., the averagepercentage spread in votes and seats betweenthetop twoparties.
e This measureshowswhetherthe systemis turnover(at least one partychange) or domin
fI.e., the numberof chiefexecutivesfrom1952 to 1975.
g I.e., the percentage of timethe mostleftistpartywas in powerforthedata pointsanaly
h These rankings are based on a compositeof thesize of share shiftsfollowingsuccession
ciatedwiththeseshifts.For example,"highimpact"indicatesthat over 60 percentof the shar
statistically and thatthegreatmajorityof theseshiftswere over two percent.The r
significant
the readercan referback to Tables 1-3 to get a senseof thedifferences in impact.The figur
job of deciphering the table.

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390 Valerie Bunce

and Japan,betweentheSPD and theConservatives in Germany, and be-


tweentheSocialistsand thePeople'sPartyin Austria.However,in less
ideologicalsystems suchas theUnitedStatesand Canada suchdistinctions
are clearlyless important, as one wouldexpect.
Ideologyalso says something aboutthe direction of priority shifts.
Leftistpartiesdo in factexpandthewelfaresector,whilerightist parties
holdit steadyor contract it (see Table 1). This finding, of course,is in
keepingwiththe ideologiesof theparties,and withrecentworkon the
differentpolicysaliencesofvariouspartiesinWestern democracies (Hibbs,
1977).
Thus,whileI cannotpronounce anyone variablemandatory forthe
impactof succession, I can listseveralfactorswhichseemto enhancethe
effectofelections on budgetary Thereareindeedmanyroadsto
priorities.9
policychangeafteran election-anexpanding mandate, thepresenceof a
newrulingpartyor a newleader,and leftist partydominance all seemto
encouragepriority changes.The variancein theresults, then,can be ex-
plainedto a degreebysomeratherstraightforward politicalvariablesthat
workto enhancea newlyelectedchiefexecutive's desireor abilityto shift
budgetary priorities.
I shouldemphasize first,
however, thatthereis onegeneralconclusion
in thisanalysis:electionsseemto haveimportant effects on publicpolicy
wherever theyoccur-in Austria,or Sweden,or eventheUnitedStates.
The mostcriticalfactaboutelectionsis thattheyoccurat all; whenthey
do, policychangewillin all likelihood follow,thoughtheextentofchange
willvaryin responseto certainpoliticalfactors. The impactofsuccession
on budgetary policy,then,is clearand consistent acrosstimeand across
nationalboundaries, a finding thatchallenges manywidelyacceptedargu-
mentsabout the "non-role"of electionsin generating policychangein
democratic states.Certainly, giventheconsistency of theresultsand the
ofpolicypriorities
stability in lieuofan election(Bunce,1976), it can be
concludedthatdemocratic electionsdo in factlead to budgetary innova-
tion.

Conclusions
Overthepasttenyears,politicalscientists
havebuilta strong
case for
"actordispensibility"-i.e.,
thatpublicpoliciesare madeby organizations

9 I also looked at the effectsof typeof system(presidentialversusparliamen-


tary) and theimpactof coalitiongovernments, butthesehad littleimpact.

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CHANGING LEADERS AND CHANGING POLICIES 391

not by decision-makers
and past priorities, (Greenstein,1969, pp. 49-58).
As MartinHeislerand RobertKvavik (1974, p. 40) summarize:

In modernizedsystemselitesare usuallyof one mindin termsof goals, and the


replacementof one man [sic] by anotherhas the effectof replacingone techni-
cian with another.Moreover. . . the structuralparametersconstituting the
decision-makingsystemand the natureof the decisionto be made leave little
roomforinnovationby whoeveris selectedto fillthe position.

At the same time,electionsin democraticdecision-making have been char-


acterizedas "symbolicexerciseswhose primarygoal is to tie the masses to
the system" (Edelman, 1964, p. 22). Thus public policy, purportedly,
developsalmostby itself,unencumbered by the electoralprocess,the mass
publics,or even the politicalleaders.
This analysis,however,challengestheseargumentsby suggesting that
chiefexecutivesand electionsin generaldo influencethe policyprocessin
democraticstates."The routinesof politics,"to borrowSharkansky's(1970)
phrase,are disturbedby electionsand changesin administrations; elections
rotatepolicies as well as leaders in nationsas diverseas Sweden and the
UnitedStates.In fact,wherethe tie betweenelectionsand public policyis
concerned,incremental decision-making (and all theconstraintson change
it implies) seems the exception,not the rule. Different administrations are
different; therefore,elections and elites should not be bracketedout of
analyses of the budgetary(and perhaps the policy) process. Neitherare
"dispensible"influences.
WhileI cannot,on thebasis of a groupof budgetarycategories,reject
theincremental modelof budgetarypolicy-making as incorrect(nor would
I wantto in viewof the generallyincremental patternof budgetarychange
withinadministrations), I would argue thatincrementalism as a model of
policy-making does tendto underplaythepivotalrole of thetop leadership
and of theelectoralprocessin budgetarypolicy-making in democraticpoli-
ties. While elites certainlyuse decision rules and do tend to relyon past
decisionsas a guideto formulating budgets,theirown values and interests,
and pressuresfromotherelites and groups,nonethelessdo enterinto the
calculus of decision-making, particularlyduringthe honeymoonperiod.
This firstyearin officein factoffersan optimalclimateforinnovation.
Firstthereis the impactof the campaign.Political scientistshave tended
to focus on public rhetoric,which "treatsissues as a political football"
(Hess, 1974, p. 46), and to extrapolatefromthisissue opportunismthat
electionscan have no impact on public policy. What theyignoreis the

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392 ValerieBunce

effectof thecampaignon thecandidate;thatis, theextentto whichthe


candidateis surrounded bydemandsfromtheelectorate
byideologies, and
groups,and by constant critiques
ofprevailing fromtheopposi-
priorities,
tion,supporters, and themoreamorphous masspublic.In theprocessof
acquiring votes,thecandidateformsan agendaof actionand a storehouse
ofideas;he or sheformsa pictureof whatneedsto be done.
But the agendais vague: campaignsdemandendurancemorethan
reflection.The honeymoon thusis a criticalperiod,wherethecandidate
tries fillin theblankswhilevariousgroupscompeteto carveouta role
to
forthemselves in thenewadministration. Justas thenewlyelectedleader
is desperate forideas-he or sheafterall knowsonlyvoters, notpolicies-
so everyone aroundhimor heris desperate fora pieceofthenewpie.Thus
thehoneymoon is a timewhenpriorcommitments are limited;thechief
executive is unusually optimistic,
open,and powerful; thenewteamis con-
sensualand desirousof makinga mark;thelegislature and thepublicare
uniquely supportive; andwhennewdirections inpublicpolicyaretherefore
morelikely(Hess, 1977). Laterin theadministration, of course,power
dissipates,frictionincreases,factions commitments
solidify, expand,policy
defeatsoccur,theoptimism turnsintopessimism, and thepolicyprocess
becomesmorecomplexand conflictual. Incrementalism, therefore, returns
untilthenexthoneymoon period.
WhatI am suggesting, then,is thatwhileincrementalism describes
muchof thebudgetary process,it does notdescribeall of it. It does not
reflectthosetimes,such as the honeymoon, whenleadersare uniquely
willingandableto shiftpriorities. As Jimmy Carterputit: "The first com-
plete budgetof any new administration
is its mostimportant.It is . . . the
fullstatement
first ofpriorities,policiesand proposalsformeeting national
needs"(quotedin Newsweek, October15, 1977,p. 15). As thefindings
ofthisstudyindicate, shouldbe moresensitive
politicalscientists to change
and to electionsas agentsofchange.We needto considermoreoftenthan
we havein thepastthepossibility thatpublicpolicyhas predictablecycles
of stabilityand flux,and thatthesecyclesmaybe regulated by changes
(createdbytheelectoralprocess)in thedesireand thepowerof elitesto
maketheirmark.
Becauseit does seemto matterwhorulesand electionsdo seemto
reorder budgetary priorities,
weneedto reconsider theroleofelections and
politicalleadersin thebudgetary (and perhapsmoregenerally, thepolicy)
process.The electoralcycleseemsto be a majorsourceof budgetary
change,as wellas of continuity in democraticpoliticalsystems.

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CHANGING LEADERS AND CHANGING POLICIES 393

APPENDIX
Data Sources
Country Data Sources
Austria UnitedNationsstatistical yearbook(New York: UnitedNations): 1976,
690; 1973,680; 1971, 676; 1966, 653; 1956,523.
Britain UnitedNationsstatistical yearbook(New York: UnitedNations): 1976,
808; 1973, 680; 1971,696; 1968, 686; 1966, 631; 1961, 549.
Canada Canada yearbook(Ottawa:Ministerof Industry, Trade,and Commerce):
1976,764; 1975,789.
Historicalstatisticsof Canada, M. C. Urquhart,ed. (Toronto: MacMil-
lan), 1965,200, 202.
UnitedNationsstatistical yearbook(New York: UnitedNations): 1970,
642; 1965, 604.
German Statistiches jahrbuchfur die bundesrepublik Deutschland(Bonn: Weis-
Federal baden Verlag): 1977,483; 1976,403; 1973,410; 1968,388; 1965, 342-
Republic 344.
Japan Japan statisticalyearbook(Tokyo: Bureau of GovernmentStatistics):
1972,450; 1968,469; 1963,423.
UnitedNationsstatistical yearbook(New York: UnitedNations): 1976,
772.
Sweden UnitedNationsstatistical yearbook(New York: UnitedNations): 1976,
805; 1973,697; 1966,656; 1961,544.
United UnitedNationsstatistical yearbook(New York: UnitedNations): 1976,
States 764; 1971,696; 1966,646; 1959,584.
ElectoralStatistics
M. C. Urquhart,ed. Historicalstatisticsof Canada (Toronto: MacMil-
lan), 1965, 200-202.
Statistiches
jahrbuc/h fuirdie bundesrepublik
Deutschland(Bonn: Weis-
baden Verlag): 1977, 483; 1976,403; 1973,410; 1968, 388; 1965, 342-
344.
Japanistatisticalyearbook(Tokyo: Bureau of GovernmentStatistics):
1972,450; 1968,469; 1963,423.
Robin Bidwell,ed. Bidwell'sguideto government ministers(Cambridge,
England: Cass), 1973, 1-54.
F. W. W. Craig,ed. Britishparliamentary electionstatistics(Chichester:
PoliticalReferencePublications),1971, 14-20.
Dolf Stemberger and GerhardVogel,eds. Die wahl der parlamenteund
andere staatsorgane:Ein handbuch(Berlin: De Gruyer), 1969, 1128-
1349.
Japanalmanac (Tokyo: Marnichi),1976,63.
Thomas Mackie and RichardRose. Electiondata: General electionsin
Westernnationsduring1973. EuropeanJournalof PoliticalResearch,2
(September1974): 293-298.
and . Electiondata: Generalelectionsin Westernnations

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394 ValerieBunce

during 1974. European Journalof Political Researclh,3 (September


1975): 322-327.
and . Electiondata: Generalelectionsin Westernnations
during 1975. European Jouirnalof Political Researclh,4 (September
1976): 329-332.
and . The internationalalmanacof electoralhistoty(Lon-
don: MacMillan), 1974, 65-166.
Statisticalabstractof the UnitedStates (Washington, D.C.: Department
of Commerce): 1976,461; 1972,370; 1966,377; 1964,379; 1960,357.

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Manuscriptsubmitted9 Januaty1979
Final manuscriptreceived29 October 1979

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