EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y.

2018-2019
People vs. Pioquinto De Joya; guilty. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision convicting
De Joya of the crime charged.
November 8, 1991
ISSUE: WON the statement made by Eulalia qualifies as a
FACTS:
dying declaration
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-
HELD: We turn first to the dying statement made by the
Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin
victim when the 10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his
Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother,
grandmother who was sprawled on the floor of their
Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag,
house drenched with blood: "Apo, Apo, what happened?"
BulacanBoth spouses are teachers by profession. In the
The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those
afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia
two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is
left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was
the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be
then sitting at their sofa watching the television set.
noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not
constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two
At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day,
words could have been intended to designate either (a)
the spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria
the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they
Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the former's
had been intended to designate the subject, we must note
house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong
that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they
looked back to the direction of the Valencia's house. She
were designed to designate the object of a verb, we must
noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding
note once more that no verb was used by the deceased.
a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's.
The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the
question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?"
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother
Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to
Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with
you?"
her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran
towards her. He then held her hands and asked her:
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible
"Apo, Apo, what happened?" Eulalia Diamse held his
must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does
hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these
not mean that the declarant must recite everything that
words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away.
constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement,
but that his statement of any given fact should be a full
In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
de Joya y Cruz was charged before the Regional Trial
meaning in respect of such fact. The doctrine of
Court. At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not

Page 1 of 27

completeness has also been expressed in the following
terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here
peculiar. The statement as offered must not be merely
apart of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant;
it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial
how much of the whole affair of the death is related,
provided the statement includes all that the declarant
wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an
interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a
statement which thus remains clearly less than that
which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the
intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a
very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the
dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it
is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he
might have been able to tell.
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are
generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no
weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by
death or other circumstance) from saying all that he
wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified
by the statements which he was prevented from making.
That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to
the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the
basis upon which dying declarations are received.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the
deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a
complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial
court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person
who had thrust some sharp instrument through and
through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself
did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of
her communication might have been had death not
interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying
statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as
the doer of the bloody deed.
ISSUE: WON the supposed attempt to settle the criminal
charge amicably by Pioquinto constitutes an implied
admission of his guilt
HELD:
We find the above testimony quite impalpable and
inconclusive so far as a supposed attempt of appellant,
through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the
criminal charge is concerned. We are aware of the
provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
which provides that
Sec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of
compromise is not an admission that anything is due, and
is not admissible in evidence against the person making
the offer. However, in criminal cases which are not
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the
above testimony from a member of the (extended) family
of the deceased victim that "an offer of compromise" had
been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied
admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be
reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial court
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itself made no mention of any attempt on the part of
appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the
defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court
either did not believe that appellant had tried to
compromise the criminal case or considered that
appellant could not fairly be deemed to have impliedly
admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia
Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific
detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused
had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as
robbery with homicide.
The totality of the case made out against appellant De
Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying
declaration and a number of circumstances which, singly
or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling
inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain
Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny,
that the sum total of the evidence in the instant case is
insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which
characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled
after considering the nature and speculative character of
the evidence supporting the judgment of conviction.
Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of
reasonable doubt.
EMETERIA VILLAFLOR vs. RICARDO
SUMMERS;
G.R. No. 16444 September 8, 1920
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FACTS:
In a criminal case pending before the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and
Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of
adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the Hon.
Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, the court
ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor to submit her
body to the examination of one or two competent doctors
to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused
refused to obey the order on the ground that such
examination of her person was a violation of the
constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination.
Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was
ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she
should permit the medical examination required by the
court.
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to
restore her to her liberty.
ISSUE: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit
her body to be examined by physicians to determine if
she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill
of Rights that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself
HELD: The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby
denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner.
The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body
as evidence when it may be material. The Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has seemed to
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limit the protection to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The constitutional
limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition against
legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips,
against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Even in the opinion Mr. Justice Holmes, to which we
have alluded, there was inserted the careful proviso that
"we need not consider how far a court would go in
compelling a man to exhibit himself." Other courts have
likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact
location of the dividing line between what is proper and
what is improper in this very broad constitutional field.
But here before us is presented what would seem to be
the most extreme case which could be imagined. While
the United States Supreme Court could nonchalantly
decree that testimony that an accused person put on a
blouse and it fitted him is not a violation of the
constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court of
Nuevada could go so far as to require the defendant to
roll up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks, and
while the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands could
permit substances taken from the person of an accused to
be offered in evidence, none of these even approach in
apparent harshness an order to make a woman, possibly
innocent, to disclose her body in all of its sanctity to the
gaze of strangers. We can only consistently consent to the
retention of a principle which would permit of such a
result by adhering steadfastly to the proposition that the
purpose of the constitutional provision was and is merely
to prohibit testimonial compulsion.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum
accusare, was recognized in England in early days, but
not in the other legal systems of the world, in a revolt
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was
raised against odious inquisitorial methods of
interrogating an accused person by which to extort
unwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to
commit the crime of perjury. The kernel of the privilege
as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial
compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness against
himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of
republican government, the principle was taken into the
American Constitutions, and from the United States was
brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide —
but no wider — a scope as it existed in old English days.
The provision should here be approached in no blindly
worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and a judicial
appreciation of both its benefits and its abuses.
Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to
a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be
avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule
with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided
as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by
reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be
taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient
any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
objection to the physical examination being made by the
family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex
can be seen.
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Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the
request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the
person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in
absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as
subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and
therefore legal.
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs. People of the
Philippines;
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
FACTS:
While eating at a Jollibee branch, Petitioner was arrested
allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the
NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be
done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was,
however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call
his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no
avail.
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation
of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165,
or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by
the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman – Visayas. When arraigned,
petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. The records do not reveal whether
De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II
of R.A. 9165. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the drug test conducted upon the petitioner
is legal.
HELD: We declare that the drug test conducted upon
petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or
jurisprudence.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was
only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia,
and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous
drugs. This Court thus calls on law enforcers and
prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper
discretion in filing charges when the presence of
dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue
and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is
positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to
afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing
of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs
should only be done when another separate quantity of
dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the
possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended
or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all persons
arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only
under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to
a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or
arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of
this provision would run counter to our pronouncement
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in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,25 to wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of
being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case,
do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this
case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial
compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and
raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is
deemed to have waived his right to question the validity
of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended
his arrest. However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."
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We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial
compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such
proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion
has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of
evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause
of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused
and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may
be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in
the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand ofcounsel is
not required. The essence of the right against self-
incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial
act. Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with
adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be
compelled to submit to physical examination and to have
a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs.
Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his
mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to
have the outline of his foot traced todetermine its identity
with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337
[1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
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foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil.
244 [1950])28(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample
could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and
the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the
extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug
testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his
urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a
lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in
exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile,
because he was still compelled to submit his urine for
drug testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution
are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot
condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of
the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement
agents as they vigorously track down offenders in their
laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious
effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must,
however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits
of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their
clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they
may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the
protected rights of its citizens including even members of
its own police force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
Decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED.
PRIMITIVO LOVINA vs HON.
FLORENCIO
MORENO;
G.R. No. L-17821 November 29,
1963
FACTS:
The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of
the said municipality to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, complaining that appellees had
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blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in
Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions
be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said
Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance
in navigable waters, and, in his decision ordered the land
owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of
Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their
removal at the expense of the respondent. After receipt of
the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from
enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing,
granted a permanent injunction, The Court of First
Instance found that "according to the location plan,
Exhibit "C", the "Bulati creek, on which dikes and dams
in question were constructed was a mere estero and could
not be considered a navigable stream then."
ISSUE: WON trial court erred in substituting its
judgment for that of defendant Secretary of Public Works
and Communications and in reversing the latter's finding
that the stream in question is a navigable river which was
illegally closed by plaintiffs.
HELD:
The conclusion of lower court is not supported by its
premises. The plan, Exhibit ―C‖corroborates the
previously summarized testimony laid before the
investigator, Yonzon, and relied upon by the Secretary in
his administrative decision. Even more, spouses' own
caretaker, Yambao, showed investigator Yonzon the old
course of the Bulati within the fishpond itself; and this
evidence is, likewise, confirmed by the cross-section
profile of the ground near the dams in question (See plan
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
Annex "AA" of Yonzon's Report), where the old channel
of the creek is clearly discernible. To be sure, spouses
contend that they were not shown this plan; but in their
evidence before the court of first instance, they never
attempted, or offered, to prove that said plan is incorrect.
That the creek was navigable in fact before it was closed
was also testified to by the government witnesses, whose
version is corroborated as we have seen.
Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact
in executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction
are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of
fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion, none of
which has been shown to exist in this case, we agree with
appellant that the court below erred in rejecting the
findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works.
The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new
evidence not laid down before him, for that would be
tantamount to holding a new investigation, and to
substitute for the discretion and judgment of the
Secretary the discretion and judgment of the court, to
whom the statute had entrusted the case. It is immaterial
that the present action should be one for prohibition or
injunction and not one for certiorari, in either event the
case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the
Secretary, since a judicial review of executive decisions
does not import a trial de novo, but only an
ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not
in violation of the constitution or of the laws, and are free
from fraud or imposition, and whether they find
reasonable support in the evidence. Here, the proof
preponderates in favor of the Secretary's decision.
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Finally, there being a possibility that when they
purchased the property in question the appellees Lovina
were not informed of the illegal closure of the Bulati
creek, their action, if any, against their vendor, should be,
and is hereby, reserved.
In resume, we rule, among others, that the findings of
fact of the Secretary of Public Works under Republic Act
No. 2056 should be respected in the absence of illegality,
error of law, fraud, or imposition, so long as the said,
findings are supported by substantial evidence submitted
to him.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the writs of
injunction issued therein are annulled and set aside.
Costs against appellees Lovina.
MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY
vs. People of the Philippines; G.R. No.
126480 August 10, 2001
FACTS:
At the trial, private complainant Dr. Francisca Santiago
testified that she and Aurora Jose went to Mady's
Pawnshop owned by petitioner to pawn some pieces of
jewelry. She initially asked for P250,000.00 but
petitioner offered only P220,000.00, P200,000.00 first
and then the P20,000.00 a week later. A list of the
jewelries was typewritten by a helper of the petitioner.
This list was signed by petitioner as evidence of her
receipt of the said jewelries.2 Dr. Santiago also averred
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that from 1980 to 1982, she made 19 payments of various
amounts totaling P95,600.00.3 She said that the loan
was under a "white-paper" system where there is no
maturity/expiration date and where the jewelry can be
redeemed anytime provided the interests were paid.
In the next days, Dr. Santiago said, she went to the
pawnshop, with a certain Mrs. Dava and a Mrs. Zuñiga to
redeem her jewelry. She brought with her the amount of
P450,000.00 to settle her loan. However, petitioner told
her that the jewelries were already sold.5 This prompted
Dr. Santiago to consult Atty. German Abaya Sipin, who
wrote to Maria Tin6 asking her to allow Dr. Santiago to
redeem the pieces of jewelry. Petitioner replied through
her counsel, Atty. Marcelo T. Dy, confirming that Dr.
Santiago has an unsettled obligation of P220,000.00 and
demanding payment. The letter also stated that no
jewelries were received as collateral for the loan.7 In a
handwritten letter dated March 7, 1984, Dr. Santiago
pleaded for the redemption of her jewelries.8 Maria Tin,
also in a handwritten letter dated March 16, 1984, replied
that she merely acted as guarantor of the loan and since
she was made to pay the loan she now was demanding
payment therefor.9 In said letter, Tin narrated the
circumstances behind the loan, and alleged that it was
another person who gave the loan and received the
jewelry as collateral.
Petitioner testified that the real parties to the loan were
Dr. Santiago and her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan. She
merely introduced them to one another and it was Mia
Chan who signed the acknowledgment receipt and who
actually received the pieces of jewelry.
Page 9 of 27

Mia Chan, for her part, corroborated the testimony of
petitioner, her mother-in-law. She stated that she was the
one who extended the loan to Dr. Santiago and that she
merely asked petitioner to appraise the pieces of jewelry
for her. She also requested petitioner to collect payments
from Dr. Santiago. According to Mia Chan, the loan was
for a three-month term with 14 percent interest per
annum. She stated she signed the receipt upon request of
Dr. Santiago.
The trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner
guilty of Estafa. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.
ISSUE: (1) WON the letter wrote by Aurora Jose to Fiscal
Jumino - one Aurora Jose who had allegedly introduced
Dr. Santiago to Maria Tin and who was present when the
transaction took place - corroborated Dr. Santiago's
testimony;
HELD: A careful review of the records, however, reveals
that, first, it was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to
consider in evidence the letter which a certain Aurora
Jose sent to Fiscal Jumino.17 Aurora Jose was never
presented to testify on the veracity of said letter, much
less its contents. A private certification is hearsay where
the person who issued the same was never presented as a
witness.18 The same is true of letters. They are hearsay
evidence. Here, Aurora Jose's alleged letter is obviously
hearsay. While hearsay evidence may be admitted
because of lack of objection by the adverse party's
counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value.19
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ISSUE: (2) WON the signature of appellant [petitioner]
appears on the document16 acknowledging receipt of the
pieces of jewelry.
HELD: The signature appearing in the receipt, Exhibit
"A", apparently differs from the specimen signatures
provided by petitioner Maria Tin in open court.20 But it
has striking and obvious similarities to Mia Chan's
specimen signatures.21 The differences and similarities
are so obvious to the eye. They could not be casually
disregarded. Expert handwriting analysis is probably
useful here, but it is not indispensable.22 As said
in People vs Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226:
When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and
denied upon the other to be the writing of a particular
person, any other writing of that person may be admitted
in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the
writing in dispute. It is also recognized that a comparison
of writing is a rational method of investigation;
similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have
probative value in the search for truth. Thus, it has been
held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may be
made by the court, with or without the aid of expert
witnesses. The court may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a
basis for comparison. For, the handwriting of a person is
characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the
genuineness of other offered writings alleged to be the
work of the same writer becomes a question for the trier
of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this task by
experts.
Page 10 of 27

In the present case, the prosecution bears the burden of
proving that the signature in Exhibit "A" was the
petitioner's, not Mia Chan's. This the prosecution did not
do.
ISSUE: (3) WON the receipts evidencing payments made
by Dr. Santiago and which appeared to be signed by the
petitioner were not denied by the latter;
HELD: Petitioner did not deny that she received
payments and made demands for payment from private
complainant. They do not show, however, that she was
the one who extended the loan and accepted the
jewelries. Note that even Mia Chan received certain
payments from Dr. Santiago, as shown by Exhibits "8",
"8-A", "10" and "10-A". A certain "Viring" also received
payment from Dr. Santiago.24 These instances only
prove that a person who received payments from another
is not necessarily the person who extended the loan.
ISSUE: (4) WON Petitioner did not deny that she sent a
note (Exh. "M-2") to Dr. Santiago reminding her to
update her payments, or else she would auction the
pieces of jewelry.
HELD: Exhibit "M-2"25 which the Court of Appeals
considered proof that petitioner was in possession of the
jewelry, deserves serious scrutiny. Said exhibit was not
properly identified or introduced as evidence at the trial.
It was marked as an exhibit upon mere manifestation of
counsel.26 It was not touched upon during the testimony
of the private complainant nor listed in the list of exhibits
for the prosecution,27 hence deemed inadmissible in
evidence.28
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
ISSUE: (5) WON Mia Chan’s admission was an admission
HELD: Yes. Mia Chan's admission, that she was the one
who extended the loan and received the jewelries,
deserves weighty consideration and could not be ignored.
That admission is one against self-interest, amounting to
an incriminatory statement, which the witness could not
have volunteered if not the truth.
Petitioner claims that the loan was for a three-month
period only. But private complainant averred that it was
extended under a so-called "white-paper" system, or a
loan with an indefinite term. Petitioner presented her
daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the loan was
only for a three-month period. Private complainant did
not present evidence to substantiate her claim, other than
her self-serving testimony. Private complainant relied' on
the acknowledgment receipt allegedly, signed by
petitioner in the presence of two witnesses; However, the
prosecution did not present Aurora Jose, who allegedly
witnessed the transaction. Nor did it present Mrs. Dava
and Mrs. Zuñiga who allegedly accompanied Dr. Santiago
when the latter tried to redeem her jewelries. While non-
presentation of certain witnesses is not a valid defense
nor does it work against the prosecution's cause,29 this
holds true only if the evidence of the prosecution is
sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption of
innocence of the accused. If the prosecution evidence is
not strong, then it becomes mandatory for the
prosecution to present evidence which can help further
its case, or explain why such evidence is not presented.
When the sole testimony of the complainant is met by an
equally credible evidence of the defense, then the
Page 11 of 27
 EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
prosecution must present credible corroborative is ACQUITTED of the charge against her under Article
witnesses to buttress its case. Its failure to present 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, for lack of evidence
corroborative witnesses, without any explanation why sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
they were not produced, weakens the testimony of the doubt.
witness who named those corroborating witnesses in her
testimony.30 In this case, the prosecution's failure to ROBERTO SORIANO vs. Atty. MANUEL
present the corroborative witnesses, without any DIZON; January 25, 2006
explanation for their non-appearance, makes private
complainant's testimony weak.
FACTS:
Before Supreme Court is a Complaint-Affidavit for the
Further, since it was private complainant who asserted
disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto
that the loan was for an indefinite term under the so-
Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of
called "white-paper system" of the pawnshop, she had the
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).In his
burden of proving that fact as true. In this she failed, and
Complaint-Affidavit, Complainant Robert Soriano alleged
her failure undermines the case for the prosecution.
that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the
Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the
conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, which
equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the evidence on an
involved moral turpitude, should result in his
issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which
disbarment.
side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof loses.31 The equipoise rule finds
Accordingly, the accused was driving his brown Toyota
application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car
other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does
driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the
not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice
car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer
to produce a conviction.32Briefly stated, the needed
and a prominent member of the Baguio community who
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime
was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused
charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner
tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a
must be declared innocent and set free.
turn. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi
driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression,
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused
Appeals, affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, is
to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Tin
Page 12 of 27

accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor.
Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi
driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the
accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was
about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter
boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a
second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi
driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm
around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he
could be pacified and then released him. The accused
went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi
driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed
the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked
them up intending to return them to the accused. But as
he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by
the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and
shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of
the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off.
The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose
testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who
came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the
hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid
artery on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received
timely medical assistance, according to the attending
surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained
a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi
driver.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner of
the CBD, Herbosa, recommended that respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law for having been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only
been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also
exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character.
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final
action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
ISSUE: 1) Whether his crime of frustrated homicide
involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt
warrants disbarment.
HELD:
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis
of his conviction for homicide. The Court explained therein
that it was not for the employer to determine conclusively whether
a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the
courts, as explained thus:
Page 13 of 27

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is
not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute,
but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly
found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral
turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice
law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued
and shot complainant when the latter least expected it.
The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be
mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm
twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those
were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
lawyers assault. The trial court’s finding of treachery is a
further indication of the skewed morals of respondent.
He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to
defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the
assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was
merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the
latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing,
he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his
crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks
of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed
his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his
civil liabilities.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may
relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but
certainly to their good moral character. Where their
misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so
gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and
unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their
license and the law, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing them from that office.
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed
an utter lack of good moral character, which is an
essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the
practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not
merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
Considering the depravity of the offense he committed,
we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect
the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function be competent, honorable
Page 14 of 27
 EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is
repose confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of
odious members. People of the Philippines vs. Gloria
Umali; G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should
FACTS: Francisco Manalo, was investigated by operatives
never be decreed when any lesser penalty would
of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for which a
accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however,
case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed
the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent.
against him. He was likewise facing other charges such as
His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his
concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes against
duties to society and his profession. We are convinced
property. Pat. FelinoNoguerra went to the Tiaong
that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable
Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco to
with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that
identify the source of the marijuana. In return he asked
every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
the policeman to help him in some cases pending against
him. He didnot negotiate his case for violating the
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a
dangerous drug act, as he has entered a plea of guilty.
privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission,
Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division gave
but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of
Manalo four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buymarijuana
law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the
from sources known to him. Few minutes there after,
exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the
Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana
legal profession.
which were allegedly bought from the accused Gloria
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide,
Umali. Thereafter, he was askedby the police
the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their
investigators to give a statement on the manner and
conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the
circumstances of how he wasable to purchase marijuana
legal profession. In the present case, the appalling
foils from accused Gloria Umali. After securing a
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of
search warrant, with the help of Manalo’s affidavit,
respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a
supported by the toils of marijuana, the police operatives,
member of the bar.
went to the house of Gloria Umali, in the presence of
Brgy. Capt. Punzalan, served the search warrant and
wereable to confiscate from the person of Gloria Umali

Page 15 of 27

the four P5.00 bills with serial numbers as reflected inthe
police blotter and a can of milo, containing sixteen (16)
foils of dried marijuana leaves.
Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.Upon
arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty"
as accused Suzeth Umali remained atlarge. After trial, the
lower court rendered a decision finding accused Gloria
Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
ISSUE: Whether or not Manalo’s testimony should be
given credit
HELD: The appellant vehemently denied the findings of
the lower court and insisted that said court committed
reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that
witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be
taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said
witness has several charges in court and because of his
desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely
to tell falsehood.
Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make
known their perception to others may be witnesses.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the
case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law, shall not be aground for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the
Civil Code which states that persons convicted of
falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony"
are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." Since the
witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the
above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness
and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We
rule that the fact that said witness is facing several
criminal charges when he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness. The testimony of a witness
should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of
evidence that he was actuated by improper motive.
Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness
Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his
testimony must be accorded full credence.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs. TIA FONG alias AH SAM
[G.R. No. L-7615. March 14, 1956.]
FACTS: This is an appeal by Tia Fong alias Ah Sam
against a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental finding the said Ah Sam, Maximo
Alcantar, Florencio Bahala and Rufino Palarca guilty of
homicide for killing a Chinaman named Lian Kao, 28
years of age, son of Chinaman Wong Kiat.
Page 16 of 27

The authors of the crime could not be immediately
determined until a lieutenant of the Constabulary by the
name of Alberto N. Chavez was detailed to conduct the
investigation. He suspected Florencio Bahala, who was
living in the neighborhood, and subjected him to a rigid
questioning. Subsequently, Bahala made a confession and
the confession of Maximo Alcantar and Rufino Palarca
were also secured. So an information was filed against the
three above-mentioned accused who have confessed, and
Heracleo Limbaco and the Appellant Tia Fong alias Ah
Sam.
The evidence mainly relied upon for the conviction of Ah
Sam is his silent participation in the reenactment of the
crime by his co- accused Florencio Bahala, Maximo
Alcantar and Rufino Palarca. With the confessions of
these three accused on hand, Lt. Chavez and a
subordinate of his, Sgt. Fernandez, asked the accused to
reenact the crime and photography of the acts reenacted
were caused to be taken. In all the most important
incidents and details of the commission of the crime. Ah
Sam took part, although silently, under the direction of
the Constabulary and his three co-accused.
The witnesses for the prosecution especially Lt. Chavez,
testified that Ah Sam took part in the reenactment of the
crime and without any opposition on his (Ah Sam’s) part.
He (Ah Sam) neither opposed nor denied to take part. On
one occasion Ah Sam himself, according to Lt. Chavez,
corrected his co-accused as they were reenacting their
respective positions as Exhibit ―K‖ was being taken.
The trial judge held that the guilt of Ah Sam was proved
by his participation in the reenactment of the crime. His
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
counsel, on this appeal, argues that it was error for the
trial court to consider said participation as an evidence
against him, because all that the Appellant did during the
entire period of the reenactment was to remain silent and
do what he was told and directed to do. Against this
contention the Solicitor General argues that
the Appellant himself voluntarily took part in the
reenactment and in one instance corrected the position
which he was directed to take.
ISSUE: WON Ah Sam admitted his participation in the
commission of the crime by silence
HELD: SC finds no evidence to sustain the claim that Ah
Sam was forced against his will to participate therein. We
have searched the record in vain for any act or word of
protest from Appellant, either before the reenactment or
during the entire period thereof, against his taking part
therein. Appellant’s counsel himself admits that
the Appellant was silent, doing what he was told to do.
But counsel for the Appellant contends that as
the Appellant was under arrest at the time of the
reenactment, his taking part therein should not be
considered as evidence against him.
The principle that may govern the relevancy and
admissibility of Appellant’s participation in the
reenactment is stated in section 8 of Rule 123 of the
Rules, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
―SEC. 8. Admission by silence. — Any act or declaration
made in the presence and within the observation of a
party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
Page 17 of 27

comment if not true, may be given in evidence against
him.‖
In one case decided by us, U. S. vs. Bay, 27 Phil., 495,
the Defendant was accused before the councilman of a
barrio with having criminally assaulted the offended
party. The Defendant kept silent as the latter explained
the assault, neither admitting nor denying the
imputation. At the trial he allege that the imputation was
false, but we held that if it were so, he would have
instantly and indignantly denied the imputation when
made before the councilman.
But in another case, we also said that if
a Defendant remains silent during an official
investigation by a Fiscal, such silence is no evidence of his
guilt, as said official investigation was no occasion for
denying the imputation then being made against him (U.
S. vs. De la Cruz, 12 Phil., 87).
There are other related principles, in connection with the
silence of an accused in criminal cases, namely, that his
failure or refusal to testify may not be taken as evidence
against him (Rule 111, section 1 [c], and that he may
refuse to answer an incriminating question E Rule 123,
section 79]. It has also been held that while an accused is
under custody his silence may not be taken as evidence
against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence
when in custody may not be used as evidence against
him, otherwise his right of silence would be illusory.
―Section 1259 (d) Silence under Arrest. Some of the
courts have held that the fact that one is under arrest and
in the custody of an officer, when he is silent under
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
accusation, prevents his silence or the statements
themselves from being admissible against him, on the
ground that under such circumstances he is not called
upon to speak. Other courts have held that this
circumstance alone does not render the evidence
inadmissible, and that an accusation of crime calls for
reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of
an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him
indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses so to
do cralaw .‖, (16 C.J. 633.)
―SEC. 574. Accused under Arrest or in custody. — The
authorities are divided as to the effect on the
admissibility of an incriminating statement made in the
presence of an accused, and not denied by him, of the fact
that he was under arrest or in custody under a criminal
charge at the time the statement was made. According to
some decisions, the mere fact of arrest, alone, is not
sufficient to render the testimony inadmissible, but such
fact deserves consideration only as one of the
circumstances under which the accusation was made, in
determining whether the accused was afforded an
opportunity to deny and whether he was naturally called
to do so. Another view supported by many authorities is
that the mere fact that an accused was under arrest is
sufficient to render inadmissible the fact of the failure of
the accused to deny accusatory statements made in his
presence and bearing. According to this view, it is
common knowledge and belief of men in general that
silence while under arrest is most conducive to the
welfare of an accused, whether he is guilty or
innocent cralaw .‖ (20 Am. Jur. 486.)
Page 18 of 27

But the better rule is to consider the circumstances in
each case and decide the admissibility of the silence
accordingly.
―(4) Certain situations in particular may furnish a
positive motive for silence without regard to the truth or
falsity of the statement. Whether the fact that the party is
at the time under arrest creates such a situation has been
the subject of opposing opinions; a few Courts (for the
most part in acceptance of an early Massachusetts
precedent), by a rule of thumb exclude the statement
invariably; but the better rule is to allow some flexibility
according to circumstances: ―(IV Wigmore, pp. 80-81.)
Let us now examine the facts and circumstances of the
reenactment in view of the above principles.
The reenactment of the crime was not a part of a formal
official investigation like one conducted by a justice of the
peace or a provincial fiscal. The reenactment was a police
contrivance, designed to test the truthfulness of the
statements of the witnesses who had confessed the
commission of the offense. If the Appellant herein had
not really taken part in the commission of the crime, his
immediate reaction when he became aware that the crime
was to be reenacted, should have been to protest against
the implication of the reenactment or to refuse his
indicated participation therein. One of the accused,
Heracleo Limbaco, did not admit participation in the
crime. Like the Appellant, he did not confess yet he was
not asked to participate in the reenactment. On the other
hand the Appellant readily took part therein. If he did
own participation in the offense he should have refused,
at least in the beginning, to participate in the
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
reenactment or to follow the directions indicated. Far
from doing so, he acquiesced and willingly took part in
the reenactment as directed. If the Appellant had the
courage to refuse to own his guilt when he was boxed on
the solar plexus, or when he was forced to put his face in
the toilet bowl, why did he not have the courage to
protest his participation in the reenactment before or
while it was being conducted?
It is to be noted that the implication of guilt in the case at
bar is not derived from mere silence; it is inferred
from Appellant’s silent acquiescence in participating in
the reenactment of the crime. More than mere
silence, Appellant committed positive acts without
protest or denial when he was free to refuse. Had he not
actually participated in the commission of the offense for
which he is charged, he would have protested being made
to take part in the reenactment thereof; he would have
informed the public officials at the time of the
reenactment, or immediately prior thereto, that he did
not actually take part in the commission of the offense.
We, therefore, find that the trial court committed no
error in taking into account Appellant’s participation in
the reenactment as voluntary and in considering it as
evidence against him.
The circumstances or evidence submitted against
the Appellant in this case are as follows: he was the only
one among the accused who had a motive for causing the
death of Lian Kaw; had he not actually participated in the
commission of the offense he would have been able to
introduced positive evidence that he was either not
present or was somewhere else and, therefore, could not
have taken part in the said crime; the confession of his
Page 19 of 27

co-accused as to the reason for the killing and as to the
manner in which the offense was committed corroborates
or indicates the probability of the Appellant having
participated therein; and his silent acquiescence in taking
part in the reenactment and his voluntary and ready
participation therein produce conviction as to his actual
participation in the commission of the offense. The above
circumstances convince us that the Appellant Ah Sam
participated in the commission of the crime, inducing his
co- accused to help him perpetrate it, he himself actually
taking direct part therein. We find, therefore, that the
trial court committed no error in finding him guilty as
charged.
The Solicitor General calls attention to the fact that the
crime committed is not mere homicide, but murder.
Thus, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified
and instead of homicide the Appellant Tia Fong alias Ah
Sam is found guilty of murder, without any aggravating
or mitigating circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JOELITO DELA TORRE, et al.
FACTS:
In an Information dated January 15, 1993, accused
Joelito dela Torre, Damaso Job, Manuel Gallego, Macario
Diamante and Vicente Padrones, were charged with the
crime of kidnapping. The said accused were all arrested.
Assisted by counsel, Damaso Job and Manuel Gallego
executed extra-judicial confessions in connection with the
crime. They named their co-conspirators in the plot to
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
kidnap Charlene Sy and demand a P10-million ransom
from her parents. Gallego, in particular, identified as
their co-plotters those arrested in Cabuyao, namely
Diamante, Dela Torre, and Padrones.
After trial, all of the accused were convicted of the crime
of kidnapping. Thereafter, Dela Torre filed an appeal
whereby he claims that the extrajudicial confession
executed by accused Gallego and Job cannot be used to
establish his culpability, but only of the confessants
themselves. However, the Solicitor General contends that
the extrajudicial confessions of Gallego and Job are in the
nature of interlocking confessions that can be used
against all their co-accused.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession by Gallego and
Job may be given in evidence against him
HELD:
As a general rule, an extrajudicial confession by an
accused may be given in evidence only against him, but
not against his co-accused. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions. Where several extrajudicial confessions had
been made by several persons charged with the same
offense, without the possibility of collusion among them,
the fact that the statements are in all material respects
identical is confirmatory of the confessions of the co-
defendants and is admissible against other persons
implicated therein. Such confessions are commonly
known as interlocking confessions.
The extrajudicial confessions of accused Gallego and Job
are in the nature of interlocking confessions. They were
made independently of each other. They contain similar
Page 20 of 27

material details which only persons involved in their
criminal plot could have known: the vehicle used by the
group, how the kidnapping was committed, the amount
of ransom which would have been demanded from the
victim's parents, the location of the group's safehouse,
and the names of the other members of the group.
Therefore, as an exception to the general rule, these
confessions may properly be used in evidence against
herein appellant, being one of several persons implicated
therein.
Moreover, also as an exception to the general rule, the
extrajudicial confessions may be used by way of
circumstantial evidence regarding the actual criminal
participation of the co-conspirator named in the
confession.[35] In this regard, apart from being tagged by
his co-conspirator as among those involved in kidnapping
Charlene Sy, appellant was found in the kidnappers'
safehouse in Cabuyao, Laguna, where the victim was
planned to be brought, on the same day the crime was
committed. Appellant offered no plausible reason for his
presence at the safehouse. His claim that he went there
only to borrow money from Mike Decir, on the exact
same day that the kidnapping was perpetrated, was found
unworthy of belief.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, finding appellant Joelito Dela Torre
guilty of kidnapping and imposing upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CABAIS vs CA
[G.R. Nos. 106314-15. October 8, 1999]
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
FACTS:
Petitioners are legal heirs of Pedro Cabais, who died
leaving a parcel of land situated Albay. The said property
was inherited by Pedro Cabais from his grandmother
Eustaquia Caeta by right of representation. His mother,
Felipa Caeta Buesa, who was the only daughter of
Eustaquia Caeta, predeceased the latter, leaving him as
the only legal heir of Eustaquia. Thus, Pedro Cabais
executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication, adjudicating in his
favor subject property. Questions on ownership of the
subject property were raised by the Heirs of Victoria
Caeta and Heirs of Anastacio Caeta against Pedro Cabais.
They presented the baptismal certificate of Felipa Caeta
Buesa to prove that Felipa was the daughter of one
Gregoria Caeta and not of Eustaquia Caeta, the original
registered owner of the property under controversy.
Thus, Pedro Cabais and his heirs have no right over the
subject property.
ISSUE: WON a baptismal certificate is a conclusive proof
of filiation
HELD:
A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima
facie evidence of filiation[9]and a high degree of proof is
needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained
in such public document.[10]This is pursuant to the rule
that entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.[11] The evidentiary nature of such
document must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of
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strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity.
On the contrary, a baptismal certificate, a private
document, which, being hearsay, is not a conclusive proof
of filiation. It does not have the same probative value as a
record of birth, an official or public document.[14] In US
vs. Evangelista, this Court held that church registers of
births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the
promulgation of General Orders No. 68[15] and the
passage of Act No. 190,[16] are no longer public writings,
nor are they kept by duly authorized public
officials.[17] Thus, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of
baptism such as the one herein under controversy is no
longer regarded with the same evidentiary value as
official records of birth. Moreover, on this score,
jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in ruling that the
canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove
recognition.
The unjustified failure to present the birth certificate
instead of the baptismal certificate now under
consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by any of the
means recognized by law weigh heavily against
respondents. In Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,[19] this Court declared that a baptismal certificate is
evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the
veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to
his kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism
administered, according to the rites of the Catholic
Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it
does not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained in the certificate concerning the
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
relationship of the person baptized. It is indispensable
that such declarations and statements are shown by proof
recognized by law.
There is thus no reason to further sustain respondents
stance in the face of the aforecited rulings explaining the
significance of baptismal certificates. The lower court
erred in giving too much credence on the baptismal
certificate of Felipa Caeta Buesa to prove that Felipa was
the daughter of one Gregoria Caeta and not of Eustaquia
Caeta, the original registered owner of the property under
controversy.
The grant by the lower court of the motion for
reconsideration from its own decision, quieting the title
of Pedro Cabais (and consequently of herein petitioners-
successors in interest) to the said property, on the basis
mainly of such proof was unwarranted. To repeat, a
baptismal certificate, like all documents in general,
attests the fact leading to its execution and the date
thereof, the administration of the sacrament on the day
therein specified, but not to the veracity of the statements
therein contained regarding the kinsfolk of the person
baptized.
Furthermore, the above findings of the courts below
relying on the baptismal certificate in question to
establish the filiation of Pedro Cabais mother must of
necessity yield to the inherent inconsistency and
unbelievable nature of the baptismal certificate in
question. It appears that said baptismal certificate of
Felipa C. Buesa states that she was born on September 13,
1899, while the baptismal certificate of Gregoria Caeta,
the supposed mother of Felipa, indicated that Gregoria
Page 22 of 27

was born on May 9, 1898, or only a little more than one
year ahead of her alleged daughter.
This Court need not overstress the point that it is simply
improbable under the above circumstances for Gregoria
to have been the mother of Felipa, and thus, to have been
the real grandmother of Pedro.The lower court should
have readily taken judicial notice of this fact, being one of
those matters which come to the ordinary experiences of
life and which is generally accepted as true and is capable
of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
RUDY LAO vs STANDARD INSURANCE
CO.
[G.R. No. 140023. August 14, 2003]
FACTS:
Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck.The
truck was insured with respondent Standard Insurance
Co., Inc.
While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred
whereby the insured truck bumped another truck, also
owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running
ahead of the insured truck and was bumped from the
rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to
be around P110,692, while the damage to the other truck
and to properties in the vicinity of the accident, were
placed at P35,000 more or less.
Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for
the proceeds from his policy. However, the claim was
denied by the insurance company on the ground that
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
when its adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was
found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit,
did not possess a proper drivers license at the time of the
accident. The restriction[4] in Leonardo Anits drivers
license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled
vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the
insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500
kgs., he therefore violated the authorized driver
clause[5] of the insurance policy. In addition, respondent
presented the police blotter of the Iloilo INP to support
its contention.
Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in
fact another driver named Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was
driving the insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a drivers
license authorizing him to drive vehicles such as the truck
which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As evidence,
petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle Accident
Report[7] wherein the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D.
Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie Boy driving the
insured truck and not Leonardo Anit. The said report was
made three days after the accident or on April 27, 1985.
However, respondent insurance company was firm in its
denial of the claim.
Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC. After
trial, the trial court dismissed the case. The CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the police blotter may be admitted as
evidence.
HELD:
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The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section
44 of the Rules of Court.[18] Under the said rule, the
following are the requisites for its admissibility:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person, specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official
information.[19]
We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding
that the police blotter was properly admitted as they form
part of official records.[20] Entries in police records made
by a police officer in the performance of the duty
especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the
fact therein stated, and their probative value may be
either substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence.[21] Although police blotters are of little
probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and
considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute
the facts stated therein.
In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the
information subject of the controversy. Stated therein
was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the insured
truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People
v. Mejia,[22] where we said that entries in the police
blotters should not be given undue significance or
probative value, since the Court there found that the
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
entries in question are sadly wanting in material
particulars.
Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified
and formally offered as evidence. The person who made
the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified
and certified as correct the entries he made on the
blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by
the investigating officer who did not protest about any
inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No
explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer
for the alleged interchange of names.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees is hereby DELETED.
ROBERT SIERRA vs. People of the
Philippines;
G.R. No. 182941 July 3, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted for the crime of rape rendered
by the RTC. On appeal, he invoked paragraph 1, Section 6
of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006)[9] to exempt him from criminal liability
considering that he was only 15 years old at the time the
crime was committed.
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from
criminal liability, the CA held:
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As to the penalty, We agree with the
Office of the Solicitor General that
Robert is not exempt from liability.
First, it was not clearly established and
proved by the defense that Robert was
15 years old or below at the time of the
commission of the crime. It was
incumbent for the defense to present
Roberts birth certificate if it was to
invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No.
9344.
ISSUE: WON the determination of who bears the burden
of proof for purposes of determining exemption from
criminal liability based on the age of the petitioner at the
time the crime was committed should be on the
Prosecution
HELD: No.
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on
Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue in order to establish his or her claim
or defense. In a criminal case, the burden of proof to
establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the
prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential
ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes its
case as soon as it has presented the evidence it believes is
sufficient to prove the required elements. At this point,
the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove
what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove
by evidence the circumstances showing that the accused
did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be
held liable therefor. In the present case, the prosecution
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
completed its evidence and had done everything that the
law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now
shifted to the defense which now claims, by an
affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty,
should be exempt from criminal liability because of his
age when he committed the crime. The defense,
therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden of showing
by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less
when he committed the rape charged.
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that
minority and age are not elements of the crime of rape;
the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these
circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the
prosecution would make minority and age integral
elements of the crime when clearly they are not. [31] If the
prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden
relates to proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance
that qualifies the crime of rape.
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence to Prove the
Accused’s Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial
evidence showing that the petitioner was only 15 years
old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7 of R.A.
No. 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in
conflict with the law may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information
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from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the
child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be
resolved in his/her favor. [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
R.A. No. 9344 provides the implementing details of this
provision by enumerating the measures that may be
undertaken by a law enforcement officer to ascertain the
childs age:
(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the childs age,
such as
(a) Childs birth certificate;
(b) Childs baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not
limited to the childs school records, dental records, or
travel papers.
(2) x x x
(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or
pending receipt of such documents, the law enforcement
officer shall exhaust other measures to determine age by:
(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information
that indicate age (e.g. date of birthday, grade level in
school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that
indicate[s] age of the child (e.g. relatives, neighbors,
teachers, classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height,
built) of the child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
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xxx
Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law
(having been passed only in 2006), does not depart from
the jurisprudence existing at that time on the evidence
that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of the accuseds
minority and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino, we accepted
testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of the
accused in the absence of any document or other
satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. This was
followed by U.S. v. Roxas[34] where the defendants
statement about his age was considered sufficient, even
without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was a
minor of 16 years at the time he committed the offense
charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,[35] the Court
appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the
basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense in the absence of any
contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the
prosecution. Then, in People v. Villagracia,[36] we found
the testimony of the accused that he was less than 15
years old sufficient to establish his minority. We
reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v.
Morial[37] and David v. Court of Appeals,[38] and ruled
that the allegations of minority and age by the accused
will be accepted as facts upon the prosecutions failure to
disprove the claim by contrary evidence.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial
evidence on the accuseds minority and age upon the
concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the absence
of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth
Page 26 of 27

certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents
that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2)
the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative
on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the
complained incident without any objection on the part of
the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence
showing that the accuseds and/or his relatives
testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the
petitioner and CCC both testified regarding his minority
and age when the rape was committed.[39] Second, the
records before us show that these pieces of testimonial
evidence were never objected to by the prosecution.
And lastly, the prosecution did not present any contrary
evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15 years
old when the crime was committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 9344 provides that any doubt on the age of the child
must be resolved in his favor.[40] Hence, any doubt in this
case regarding the petitioners age at the time he
committed the rape should be resolved in his favor. In
other words, the testimony that the petitioner as 15 years
old when the crime took place should be read to mean
that he was not more than 15 years old as this is the more
favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its
implementing rules, and established jurisprudence in
accord with the latest statutory developments, the CA
therefore cannot but be in error in not appreciating and
giving evidentiary value to the petitioners and CCCs
testimonies relating to the formers age.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS S.Y. 2018-2019
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 29,
2008 and Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal
Case No. 120292-H for rape filed against petitioner
Robert Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioner is REFERRED to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer who shall proceed in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9344.
Petitioner is ORDERED topay the victim,
AAA, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Unless there are other valid causes for petitioners
continued detention, we
hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RELEASE under
the above terms.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five
days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council.
SO ORDERED.
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