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VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
B. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
2. Marriage When One Spouse is Absent
FAMILY CODE
Art. 41: A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
Art. 42: The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses
of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance
being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n)
Art. 43: The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall
be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case
may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
default of children, the innocent spouse.
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who
acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation
be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law. (n)
Art. 349, RPC: Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
CASES:
Jones v. Hortiguela
● Take note of the dates because what this case established is WHEN TO
START counting the period of absence by the first spouse to enable the
spouse present to validly remarry.
- The case involves a dispute over the rightful heirs of a the estate of
Marciana Escano, between her husband from a 2nd marriage
(Respondent-Felix Hortiguela) or her daughter from a first marriage
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(Petitioner Angelita Jones)
- Marciana Escaño died and a proceeding regarding her estate was
commenced. Felix and Angelita were appointed as the heirs.
- Jan. 1918: Marciana Escano’s husband Arthur W. Jones secured a
passport to go abroad never to return again
- Oct. 1919: Escano went to have her husband declared as an absentee.
On the 25th of the said month, the court issued an order declaring that
Arthur is an absentee and the declaration will not take effect until 6 months
after its publication. (it was published from Dec. 1919 until June 1920)
- April 1921: The court judicially declared Jones as an absentee
- May 1927: Escano married Felix Hortiguela
- Jones, in wanting to be declared sole heir of now contends that the
decree should be understood as not having taken effect from Oct 1919,
the date it was first published, but in April 1921, the date the court held
that the decree has taken effect.
- Therefore, from that date until the time of the second marriage, only 6 yrs
and 14 days has elapsed, thus, in accordance with sec 3 par 2 of GO no.
68, their marriage was void.
- WON the 2nd marriage was valid - YES
- WHEN to start COUNTING THE PERIOD OF ABSENCE BY THE FIRST
HUSBAND TO ENABLE THE SPOUSE PRESENT TO VALIDLY
REMARRY - Upon date of last contact
- For the purposes of remarriage, not necessary to have first spouse
judicially declared absent (Civil Code). Only requirements (1) first spouse
is absent for at least 7 consecutive years at the time of subsequent
marriage (2) spouse present does not know if former spouse is living (3)
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead (4) spouse present holds
this belief at time of subsequent marriage
- Court ruled that MARRIAGE IS VALID since Jones had been gone
(counting from date of last contact) for around 9 years when subsequent
marriage was celebrated
- Additional: no copy of marriage contract in local registrar (fault of
solemnizing officer + does not invalidate marriage). Angelita Jones, in
treating Felix as stepfather shows that she also believed Jones to be dead.
SSS v. Jarque
- On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon. On October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the CFI of
Sorsogon a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. The petition was
granted in 1970. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared
presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with
Teresita Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon. She was designated as SSS
beneficiary of Bailon. The two lived together until Clemente’s death in 1998.
Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were
granted to her.
- On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that she is the
daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they
be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who
shouldered the burial expenses of Bailon. They further claim that Clemente
contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with
Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice
subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Bailon obtained the declaration of
Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of
Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in
Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place.
- SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to
return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses. SSS
cancelled the claim of Jarque of her monthly pension for death benefits on the
basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with
Bailon was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s marriage
with Alice. And that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance
had terminated Bailon’s marriage with Jarque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s
decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Jarque
appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission. Jarque
protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits asserting
that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as
bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid. However, the SSC affirmed
SSS’ ruling. The CA however ruled the contrary.
ISSUE: WON the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared
presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.
- In this particular case, NO. There is no previous marriage to restore for it is
terminated upon Bailon’s death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to
terminate for the same is terminated upon Bailon’s death.
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- SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her
reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action
because she did not disappear in the first place. But it is not correct for the SSS
to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no
judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to
determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by
a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not include the
appellate power to review a court decision or declaration.
- In this case, since the subsequent marriage is not terminated by the registration
of an affidavit of reappearance of Alice or by judicial declaration, but by the death
of Bailon, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or
bad faith of Bailon can no longer be raised because, as in annullable or voidable
marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for
annulment. Such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot
be impeached, and is made good ab inito.
- In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify Bailon and Jargue’s
marriage, Jarque is proclaimed to be rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
Valdez v. Republic
- Petitioner Angelita Valdez was married to Sofio in 1971
- Sofio left the conjugal dwelling in 1972 and 3 years passed without any word from
him.
- In 1975, Sofio and petitioner met and agreed to separate. After that, there was no
news of his whereabouts or whether he was alive.
- 1985, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes. Reyes’ application for naturalization was
denied due to petitioner’s subsisting marriage to Sofio.
- RTC held that Angelita “was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that
Sofio was dead” under Art 41 of FC.
- RTC found that petitioner did not try to find Sofio as they agreed to live
separately.
- Petitioner argued that it is the Civil Code that applies, not the Family Code
W/N Sofio was rightly presumed dead
YES
W/N petitioner’s subsequent marriage is valid
YES
- Under Art 83 of the Civil Code, the absent spouse needs only to be “generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the present spouse at the time
of contracting the subsequent marriage.”
- under the Civil Code “death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh
year of absence”
- “to retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code (“well-founded belief”)
will result in the invalidation of her second marriage”
- no such requirement was imposed by law at the time her second marriage was
solemnized
Republic v. Granada
FACTS: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric
Company, got married in 1993. In May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines
closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that
from that time, she did not receive any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the
relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After 9 years of
waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with
the RTC in Lipa City. On February 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring
Cyrus presumptively dead. On 10 March 2005, OSG, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate
Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead.
The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the appeal.
Issue: W/N Cyrus can be presumed dead. - NO
Ruling: Based on the criteria established in Republic vs. CA and Alegro, a well-
founded belief should be:
1. Belief must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse, WON
spouse is alive or dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of
2. Death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
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drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.
- Cyrus’ relatives were not present in Court to strengthen the brother’s
testimony
- She did not exhaust all available means to find her husband: Taiwanese
consular office, government agencies of PH in Taiwan, (and this is the
kicker) and Mass Media.
- Diligence was not enough to establish the well-founded belief criteria.
Republic v. Tampus
- Respondent Nilda Tampus was married to Dante Del Mundo in 1975.
- The latter, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, left for Jolo, Sulu,
where he was assigned. He was never heard from again by Nilda.
- 33 years after, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante presumptively
dead for the purpose of remarriage. She claims that she exerted efforts to find him
through inquiring from his family, but to no avail.
- RTC granted the petition, but the Republic, through the OSG, filed an appeal to
the CA. The latter affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Hence, this petition.
I: W/N the CA erred in upholding the trial court’s decision declaring Dante
presumptively dead.
H: Yes.
- Under Article 41 of the FC, there are four essential requisites for the declaration
of presumptive death:
1) That the absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under circumstances laid
down in Art. 391 CC
2) That the present spouse wishes to remarry
3) That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead
4) That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee
- “Well-founded belief” requires the spouse present to prove that his or her belief
was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts, he or she believes that the absent spouse is
already dead.
- The Court held that Nilda did not exert due diligence and active effort in finding
Dante since she only inquired with his family when she could have asked
information from the AFP or the authorities as well.
- Petition to declare Dante presumptively dead was denied
3. Effects of Pending Action/Decree
FAMILY CODE
Art. 49: During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for
the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children.
The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of
said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as
provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the
other parent.
Art. 50: The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43
and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are
declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
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children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death
of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received
under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances
on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52: The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the
children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the
requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent
marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute
nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be
considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage
under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
CIVIL CODE
Art. 369: Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 371: In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she
shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she
may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Sec. 4, Rules on Provisional Orders (A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 15, 2003):
In determining the right party or person to whom the custody of the child of the
parties may be awarded pending the petition, the court shall consider the best
interests of the child and shall give paramount consideration to the material and
moral welfare of the child, the court may likewise consider the following factors:
a) Agreement of the parties
b) Desire and ability of each parent to foster an open and loving relationship
between the child and the other parent
c) Child’s health, safety and welfare
d) History of child or spousal abuse by the person seeking custody or who
has had any filial relationship with the child including anyone courting the parent
e) Nature and frequency of contact with both parents
f) Habitual use of alcohol or regulated substances
g) Marital misconduct
h) Most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological, and educational
environment
i) Preference of the child, of over 7, and of sufficient discernment, unless
parent chosen is unfit
CASE:
Yu v. Yu
- Jan 2002 - Eric filed a petition for habeas corpus, with prayer for custody (CA)
- Mar 2002 - Caroline filed for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of
ACP, on the ground of psychological incapacity (Pasig RTC)
- Mar 2002 - Eric is awarded full custody (CA)
- Dec 2002 - Caroline dismissed petition for nullity, with prayer for custody
(Pasig RTC)
- Jun 2003 - Eric filed his own declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution
of ACP, with prayer for custody again (Pasig RTC; forum shopping, accdg to
pasay RTC)
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- Jul 2003 - court dismissed Eric’s habeas corpus case (CA)
- Jul 2003 - Caroline filed a petition for habeas corpus, with prayer for custody
(Pasay RTC)
- Court granted Caroline’s habeas corpus case (Pasay RTC)
I: W/N the court that acquires jurisdiction over the petition for declaration of nullity
likewise exercises jurisdiction over the matter of custody of Bianca. YES
P: Art. 49, 50 FC, Sec. 21 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 21
Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the
petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the
appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
R:
- DOCTRINE: By petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of
marriage, he automatically submitted the issue of custody as an incident
thereof. Therefore, filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to such
issue of custody.
- Husband’s petition for declaration of nullity before the Pasig RTC is the action
that determines the issue of custody
H: Petition for declaration of nullity is GRANTED, custody belongs to the husband
4. Jurisdiction
Sec. 5, Republic Act 8369:
Jurisdiction of family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the
latter;
xxx
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and
those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those
living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution
of conjugal partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
xxx
CASE:
Tamano v. Ortiz
- In 1958, Sen. Abdul Jabar Tamano and Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano were
married in civil rites. Prior to Tamano’s death in 1994, he also married the
petitioner, Estrellita Tamano through civil rites in 1993. Because of this,
Zorayda and her son Adib filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that their marriage was
bigamous.
- They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as
divorced and single respectively. (Not important because topic is
jurisdiction but if asked: Tamano did not divorce Zorayda and Estrellita was
not single during their marriage because the decision annulling her marriage
with Romeo C. Llave was not final and executory)
- Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City has no jurisdiction over the case. She also alleged that only a
party to the marriage could file an action for annulment against the other
spouse. In addition to this, she contended that since she and Tamano were
both Muslims and married in Muslim rights, the jurisdiction to hear and try the
case was vested in shari’a courts in accordance with Art. 155 of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws.
- Lower court rejected the motion to dismiss and ruled that the case can be
tried by RTC of Quezon City because Tamano and Zorayda were married in
accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case would be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts only when filed in places where such
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courts are present. Since there are no shari’a courts in Quezon City, the RTC
can have jurisdiction over it.
Issue: W/N the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case filed by the
private respondents
Held: YES.
- Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, RTCs have jurisdiction
over actions involving contract of marriage and marital relations.
- Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code.
- Estrellita did not mention in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano
were married under Muslim Laws. She only specified it in her Motion for
Reconsideration.
- The court’s jurisdiction cannot depend on the defenses set up in the
answer, a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, only on the
allegations stated in the actual complaint.
- As stated in the complaint, Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code, and so it is applicable in this case.
- Art. 13 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws does not provide for a
situation where parties were married in civil and Muslim rights, therefore,
shari’a courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over marriages celebrated
both under civil rites and Muslim laws. Petition denied.
LEGAL SEPARATION
A. GROUNDS
FAMILY CODE
Art. 55: A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious
or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six
years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in
the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term “child” shall include a child by nature or by
adoption. (9a)
CIVIL CODE
Art. 97: A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the
husband as defined in the Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. (n)
CASES:
Munoz v. del Barrio
- Felicidad Munoz (petitioner) and Jose del Barrio(respondent) were married on
September 1942.
- During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels and during their arguments,
Jose would maltreat Felicidad by deed. Because she was unable to bear such
punishment, they unceremoniously separated in 1947, with her staying in
Meycawayan and Jose living in Manila
- They met again in Manila and she was again maltreated by her husband.
- This moved her to institute an action alleging in the petition that the system of
conjugal partnership of gains governs her marriage to the respondent; that no
property has been acquired during the marriage of petitioner of respondent
except a portion of land in Meycawayan and that the respondent has made
several attempts on her life which compelled her to live separately and has not
provided support for her and their children.
I: WON the maltreatments that appellant suffered at the hands of the responder
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after their separation of dwelling furnish ground for legal separation - NO
R:
- The maltreatment consisted merely in giving a fish blow on Felicidad’s
face. It was also noted that Jose boxed his wife on the abdomen, pulled
her hair, and had also twisted her neck. However, these do not constitute
attempts made on life. An attempt on the life of the person implies that
the actor in the attempt is moved by an intention to kill the person. In
this case, the alleged maltreatments were not moved by intent to kill and
was not proved by evidence.
- Jose only used at most his bare fists or hands and desisted from giving
further chastisements after the first blows were given at the spur of the
impulse and this was not indicative of his intent to kill her
- The court said that this is a civil case and that she is only bound to prove
her right of action by preponderance of evidence and not by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt upon which a conviction for attempted parricide
would rest.
- From the book: This is a ridiculous decision with the court ignoring the
gravity of the assault and discounting the fist as a powerful weapon
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong
F: Lucita Ong filed for legal separation alleging that her life with William Ong Eng
Kiam was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation, and grossly abusive
conduct. She claimed that after 3 years of marriage, they would often have
quarrels about petty things regarding their children and business. William shouted
expletives as he slaps, kicks, pulls her hair, and bangs her head on the concrete
wall. William would also punish his children by beating them with his belt buckle. At
some point, William even pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house.
William argues that Lucita only wants control of their properties in Hong Kong,
Manila, Baguio, and Dagupan.
I: WON the abuse constitutes the violence as grounds for legal separation as
stipulated in Art. 55. YES
R:
- Lucita and her sister Linda gave numerous accounts of the instances
when William was violent against her and her children. The court gives more
weight to this than to William’s denials since the RTC noted that William’s
witnesses were tainted with bias since they depended on him for livelihood.
- William assails the credibility of Lucita’s witness because of their
relationship with her. This is not reason enough to discredit their testimony.
Linda’s and Dr. Elinzano’s testimonies were detailed and straightforward
enough to be credible.
- Lucita cannot gain anything for pushing her family’s financial interests
at the expense of her marriage.
- Lucita abandoned William with a justifiable cause: his abusive conduct.
- These prove that the respondent inflicted physical violence on
petitioner during the marriage and that she has been subjected to grossly
abusive conduct.
- Denied.
People v. Zapata and Bondoc
- Andres Bondoc filed a complaint of adultery against his wife Guadalupe
Zapata and her paramour, Dalmacio Bondoc for engaging in repeated sexual
intercourse from 1946-1947
- Zapata plead guilty and was sentenced 4 months of arresto mayor as her
penalty
- Bondoc filed a new case of adultery against wife and paramour for engaging in
repeated sexual intercourse from 1947-1948
- Respondents Dalmacio and Guadalupe filed for a motion to quash on the
grounds of double jeopardy (being punished for same offense)
- WON Bondoc can charge his wife and her paramour of the same crime
they’ve already been punished for (adultery) - YES
- The Court held that “adultery is punishable for EVERY sexual intercourse bet.
wife and paramour”
- Even though the acts are against the same person (husband, insti. of
marriage, union), and identity is the same, a crime is still committed beacuse
the status of the marriage does not change. The 2 are still married.
- Adultery not a continuous crime. Each act is a different count which can be
punished separately.
- (a) plurality of facts performed during separate period of time (1946-1947 v
1947-1948)
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- (b) unity of penal provisions infringed upon
- 3) unity of criminal aim or purpose (to have sex with someone other than
husband)
What Andres forgave/condoned was the previous acts (1st case) and not the
subsequent acts (2nd case). Reason for it not being double jeopardy? If in case
paramour uses defense of not knowing that woman is married, paramour can’t say
the same for subsequent cases/charges.
Gandionco v. Penaranda
- Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein
petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage
as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against
her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of
support pendent elite to be provided by Froilen for her and their child which was
approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend
the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the
support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is
inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to
legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or
acquittal of the criminal case.
- WON a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution
of the criminal case for concubinage.
- YES.
- Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil
action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of,
or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil
action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both
the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such
civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications
from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding
or conviction is necessary.
- Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an
action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case,
the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous,
he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz
- Plaintiff Estrella Dela Cruz alleged that her husband, defendant Severino Dela
Cruz, had abandoned her and was mismanaging their conjugal properties
- She prayed for support and separation of property
- Plaintiff alleged her husband stopped residing in the conjugal dwelling and that
he kept a mistress on whom their assets were being used on
- She also alleged that defendant abused his administration of their conjugal
properties by not discussing business activities with her
- Defendant denied all charges but admitted her lived separately on a temporary
basis a year before plaintiff filed action
- Defendant said he made short visits to their children and regularly gave monthly
financial support; wife even had enough money to play mahjong
- Defendant also says he could not have mismanaged the conjugal properties as
their value increased to over a million pesos
- Defendant denied having a mistress
W/N separation of defendant from plaintiff constitutes abandonment in law that
would justify separation of conjugal assets - NO
W/N defendant’s failure/refusal to inform plaintiff of their business’s affairs is abuse
of his powers of administration that would warrant separation of matrimonial assets
- NO
R:
- Plaintiff did not sufficiently prove her allegations
- Allegations did not constitute abuse of power of administration as “abuse
connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership”
- To entitle the plaintiff to the remedies she seeks under Art 178 of the Civil Code
“the abandonment must not long be physical estrangement but also amount to
financial and moral desertion”
- And that to constitute abandonment there “must be absolute cessation of marital
relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation”
- Court said that continuing support of the husband contradicted allegations that he
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intended not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties
- Court held there was only physical separation and husband still managed
properties well
MAAM’S COMMENTS
>Even if Court says they don’t condone husband’s acts, why werent the grounds
enough? (he didnt live with them, only short visits, didnt speak to his wife)
>Deprives other wives in the same situation of legal grounds for separation
>Odd since the separation of bed and board in legal sep is already what is
happening
Lapuz v. Eufemio
FACTS: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and
canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife
continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her.
They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She
prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others,
would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy
on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded
and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could
be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence,
petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on
June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year
period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen
abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abates the action and will it also apply if the action involved property
rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come
into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights
in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree
can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there
could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be
resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by
the heirs of the appellant.
B. DEFENSES
FC, Art. 56
Willan v Willan
F: The husband alleges that throughout his marriage to his wife, she frequently
and persistently assaulted him, verbally abused him, and demanded sexual
intercourse when he did not wish to have it. She would pull his hair, shake his
head violently, and would also pester him far into the night to have sex, so that
eventually he was compelled to comply. The night before the husband left for the
last time, an act of sexual intercourse took place between the parties. His petition
for the dissolution of his marriage was denied on the ground that he condoned his
wife’s acts by still engaging in sex with her.
I: W/N the husband condoned the cruelty of his wife, and thus barred him from
filing for the dissolution of his marriage. YES
H: The case of a husband having intercourse with the wife, with full knowledge of
the matrimonial offense, is conclusive evidence of condonation by the husband of
the wife. It is condonation because it is the best possible way of showing that the
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wife has been reinstated as a wife. Furthermore, the Court held that he was free to
submit to or refrain from having sex with her.
Ocampo v Floreciano
Facts:
● 1938 - Ocampo and Serafina married
● 1951 - wife committed adultery with Jose
● 1951 - husband sent wife to manila to study beauty culture, where she
stayed for a year
● 1952 - wife left the husband and lived separately
● 1955 - wife committed adultery with Nelson; husband expressed his wish
to file a petition for legal separation, wife agreed as long as she will not be
criminally charged
● 1955 - two weeks after, ocampo filed for legal separation
● ca held that prescription period is over
Issues/Held:
1. W/N there is condonation NO
2. W/N there is collusion NO
Held:
1. DOCTRINE: Failure of the husband to search for his wife after she left their
conjugal home is not tantamount to condonation.
● he has no duty to search for his wife because it was her who left the house
● she is the one who has the duty to return or at least inform the husband of
her whereabouts
● therefore, NO CONDONATION
2. DOCTRINE: What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly
on defendant’s confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any
defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment,
purposely to prevent it
● even if the wife confessed that she “liked also” to be legally separated from
her husband, the husband presented other evidences to support the
allegation of adultery
● therefore, NO COLLUSION
WHEREFORE, petition for legal separation is GRANTED
Bugayong v. Ginez
- In 1949, Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy,
married Leonila Ginez while on furlough leave.
- After their wedding, they lived with Bugayong’s sisters in Asingan,
Pangasinan, but before he returned to the US they had an agreement that Ginez
would stay with his sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila.
- After some time, Ginez left her sisters-in-law and informed Bugayong
through writing hima letter than she would reside with her mother in Asingan, but
later moved to Dagupan to study.
- In July 1951, Bugayong received letters from Valeriana Polangco and from
anonymous writers that his wife allegedly committed acts of infidelity. He was also
informed by his wife through a letter that an “Eliong” kissed her.
- In October 1951, he consulted the navy legal department about the propriety
of a legal separation between him and his wife on the ground of infidelity.
- In August 1952, he went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife.
They stayed in his cousin’s house for two nights and one day and lived as husband
and wife.
- Bugayong tried to verify the alleged infidelity of his wife but instead of
answering him, she just packed and left the house, which he took as confirmation.
- After this, he exerted efforts to look for her but failed to find her.
- Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan but it was dismissed.
Issue: W/N the petitioner and the defendant can be legally separated despite the
petitioner showing condonation after acquiring knowledge of the defendant’s
alleged infidelity
Held: NO.
- There was no sufficient evidence that the defendant committed adultery,
however, it is not a question at issue. What needs to be considered is the
petitioner’s line of conduct under the assumption that he believed that his wife
committed adultery.
- Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for
legal separation.
- The conduct that the petitioner showed under the belief that his wife was
adulterous deprives him of any action for legal separation against his wife because
his conduct comes within the restriction of Art. 100 of the Civil Code, which was in
effect at the time the case was filed.
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Art. 100, NCC: The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the
parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
- According to American jurisprudence, single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties is sufficient to constitute condonation, and when
they live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation.
Matubis v Praxedes
F: Socorro Matubis (P) and Zoilo Praxedes (D) were married in January 1943.
They failed to agree on how they should live as husband and wife. On May 30,
1944, they agreed to live separately from each other. In 1948, they entered in an
agreement which stated that they relinquish their right over each other as husband
and wife. That they are free to get any mate and live with said mate and
neither of them can file an action for a crime or suit. That the wife is no longer
entitled for support by the husband or any benefit he may receive nor the husband
is entitled to anything from the wife. that neither of them can claim anything from
the other from the time they verbally separated (1944).
In 1955, Praxedes began cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth to a
child.
Matubis filed for legal separation with the CFI alleging abandonment and
concubinage in 1956.
I:WON the period for filing a suit for legal separation has passed? – YES.
WON the plaintiff consented to the concubinage? – YES
R: By the plaintiff’s own admission she discovered the cause for the suit
(concubinage) in January 1955. She instituted the complaint on April 24, 1956.
Through writing of their agreement in 1948 (that both of them is free to get any
mate and live with them), the condonation and consent to the concubinage had
been expressly stated.
People v Sensano and Ramos
- ISSUE: WON there was connivance on the part of the husband regarding his
B.3. CONNIVANCE
● Consent is unilateral act of ONE spouse for the commission of a marital
offense by the other.
● Connivance is bilateral.
○ It’s a “willingness to secretly allow or to be involved in wrongdoing”
○ Inferred that the spouse desires for the other spouse to commit the
offense
○ “hinahayaan mong gawin niya yung masamang action”
Sargent v Sargent
FACTS:
Husband suspects the wife to be committing adultery with their driver, Charles
Simmons. To support his allegations, he hired several detectives and enjoined his
servants to keep a close eye on the actions of his wife. They staged a raid to catch
the wife red handed of the crime alleged of her and testified against her.
Wife and Simmons denied allegations. Arguments against testimonies:
● White woman would not have sex with negro
● If devices were placed, conversations would have been heard and not just
mumblings
● No sex because was sick in bed due to gonorrhea and rheumatism from
October of 1918, to her surgery in Sept. 1919
Details of TESTIMONIES IN CASE MA’AM ASKS (there are 7 testimonies, check
case for more details):
Ida Lewis
● Negress employed at the house and was fired for stealing some trunks
● Mrs. Sargent said that whites and blacks can intermarry if they loved each
other, showed a photograph of a man not her husband saying that he was
her lover
● Saw Simmons in multiple occasions be in the same room as Mrs. Sargent
dressed only in her underwear, corsets, shoes, and stockings
Charlotte Lunford
● Worked at the house, was not liked by Mrs. Sargent. Did not like Simmons
couple because she was tasked to wait on the couple
● Drank wine and whisky with Simmons and Mrs. Sargent in the latter’s
bedroom.
● Was told by the Mrs that Simmons was nice and handsome. Called
Simmons Sweetheart and Dearie
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Persons and Family Relations
wife’s actions? (Art. 56, par. 3)
HELD: YES. Petitioner’s conduct may not have indicated that he wanted his wife to
commit adultery, HOWEVER, his conduct did not indicate that he did not want her
to. Petitioner was made aware of the rumors FOR 2 MONTHS regarding his
wife’s actions with Simmons. He should have discharged Simmons, but
instead kept Simmons employed as his chauffeur, giving him the opportunity
to be with Mrs. Sargent. Petitioner was also often absent for business, leaving his
wife without protection, even AFTER receiving additional reports from his spies
and servants regarding the actions of his wife. It is to be inferred from his conduct
that he did desire his wife to commit the offense in his absence, and that helping
as he did to afford the opportunity which brought about the desired result, he was
consenting thereto.
*What could have Mr. Sargent done to prevent occurrence of connivance?
He could have just fired Simmons or brought his wife with him on his
business trips.
Llave v Republic
- Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Mamintal Tamano married Estrellita
twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato
City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamano’s civil indicated that he was divorced.
- On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in
behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that
this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
- (1) WON the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous.
- RULING: YES. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
- The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated
in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the
Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394 (For a period of twenty years from the date of the
approval of this Act, divorce among Moslems residing in non-Christian
provinces shall be recognized and be governed by Moslem customs and
practices) which was not availed of during its effectivity.
- As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda
has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified
Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly,
Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites.”
- Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this
law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed
certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
- WON the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment (judgment rendered
w/o waiting for the SC’s final resolution on the certiorari petition; Estrellita has
not yet filed her answer and hence denied due process, and the public
prosecutor did not conduct investigation to establish whether or not there was
collusion).
- RULING: NO. Estrellita’s refusal to answer eventually led to the loss of her
right to answer, and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari
questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts
does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the
RTC of Quezon City. Also, it can never be argued that she was deprived of
her right to due process. She was never declared in default, and she
actively participated in the trial to defend her interest. Lastly, Estrellita’s
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. The Court is
convinced that the non-intervention of the prosecuting attorney to assure
lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity
of the proceedings in the trial court.
-
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Brown v Yambao
- July 14, 1955, William Brown filed a suit to obtain legal separation from his wife
who engaged in adulterous relations with Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby
girl
- He learned of his wife’s conduct in 1945, after he was released from his
internment by the Japanese invaders from 1942-45
- After such knowledge, spouses lived separately and executed a document
liquidating their conjugal partnership
- Court declared the wife in default for failure to answer in due time
- Asst. Fiscal Hose cross-examined Brown at trial and elicited that fact that, after
his liberation, he cohabited with another women and had children with her
- Court denied legal sep on grounds that, 1. while wife’s adultery was well-
established, Brown had incurred similar misconduct which barred his right
of action
2. there had been consent and connivance
3. Brown’s action prescribed
- Brown argues that Fiscal acted as counsel to his defaulting wife by cross-
examining him; and that the Fiscal is limited to finding out w/n there was collusion
W/N Court erred in dismissing suit on these grounds - NO
Court defined collusion as the act of married persons in procuring a divorce
by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a
matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend
divorce proceedings
- Court held that the Fiscal was within his duties to bring to light any circumstances
that could give rise to the inference of collusion such as Brown’s cohabitation with
another woman
“evidence of such misconduct and the failure of the wife to set it up as defense
were proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered circumstantial
evidence of collusion”
- it was also true that his suit had already presrcribed as it had been 10 years since
he learned of his wife’s adultery
- 2 well established statutory grounds for denying remedy:
Commission of similar offense
Prescription of action
Art 102, CC
file for leg sep w/in 1 year from time plaintiff became cognizant of cause and w/in 5
years of cause occurring
- True that wife didn’t interpose prescription as defense but courts can take
cognizance of it anyway because of state interest in preserving marriage
Contreras v Macaraig
Contreras vs Macaraig (1970)
Ponente: Dizon
Ma’am’s book: “One recurring issue that the Court had to resolve was how to
determine that knowledge of the marital offense had already been acquired by the
petitioner. “
Case summary:
Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila which dismissed her complaint upon the ground that the
same was filed more than a year from and after the date on which she had
become cognizant of the cause for legal separation. Court ruled that the action to
file for legal separation has not prescribed based on the petitioner having become
cognizant of the infidelity of her husband only in the early part of December 1963
when the husband informed her that he could no longer leave his mistress and
refused to return to his legitimate family.
Facts:
- Petitioner (P) and Defendant (D) were married on March 16, 1952; out of
which 3 children were born.
- Before the election of 1961, D was employed as a manager of the
printing establishment (MICO Offset) owned by P’s father. That he met Lily
Ann Alcala (the mistress).
- He began to be away from home often and to come home very late. He
would not be home for month on end.
- In September 1962 P’s driver told her that D was living in Singalong with
Lily Ann.
- In April 1963, there were rumors that D was seen with a woman on the
family way on Dasmariñas street, but she failed again to either bring up the
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matter of his infidelity.
- When D returned to the conjugal home, P would refrain from asking him
if the rumors were true for fear that he would be driven away.
- P later learned that Lily Ann gave birth to a baby (bc sabi ni Agus one
can give birth to an idea).
- D came home one day with a baby in his arms. (Child’s parents were
proven by a baptismal certificate)
- P entreated her father to talk and convince D to come back home. Father
said he couldn’t do anything.
- In November 1963, P requested the cooperation of D’s older sister to
arrange a meeting with Lily Ann.
- In the said meeting, Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as
she does not want to be accused criminally (kahit na criminally liable naman
na siya. That criminal. Jkjk). However, Lily Ann said that it was D who didn’t
want to break up.
- In the early part of December 1963, P and her children met up with D
and pleaded with him to give up Lily Ann and to come back to the conjugal
home and that she was willing to forgive him. D refused to return to his
legitimate family.
- On Dec. 14, 1963, P filed a petition for legal separation.
- RTC dismissed the petition on grounds that under Art. 102 of the CC,
action for legal separation has prescribed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code
should be counted from Sept 1962 (first heard of the sexual infidelity) or Dec 1963
(when she talked to husband and he refused to come back home).
Ruling:
“We are persuaded that in the eyes of the law, the only time the appellant really
became cognizant of the infidelity of the husband was in the early part of the
December 1963 when her husband informed her that he could no longer leave his
mistress and refused to return to his legitimate family. Thus it was only then that
she was ‘under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal
separation, and…that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have
commenced.”
Somosa-Ramos v Vamenta Jr.
F: Petitioner Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation from her husband,
Clemente Ramos, on the ground of concubinage and an attempt by him against
her life. She also prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return
to her of what she claimed to be her exclusive property. Clemente opposed the
petition for the writ based on Art. 103 of the Civil Code: “An action for legal
separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition.” Respondent Judge Vamenta Jr. sided with Clemente,
suspending the hearing of the petition for injunction.
I: W/N Art. 103 CC precludes the court from acting on a motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction. NO
H: The Court recognizes the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert
itself. Article 104 CC also expressly states that:
“After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to
live separately from each other and manage their respective property.
The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but
if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said
property... “
This is a recognition that the question of management of their respective property
need not be left unresolved even during the six-month period. Rank injustice may
occur if the Court lets the six-month period pass without rendering judgment in
terms of the spouses’ property.
D.
E. Effects of Filing of Petition
De la Vina v Villareal
Facts:
● Diego and Narcisa are married with nine children
● wife alleged that her husband was committing adultery with a certain Ana
Calog whom he brought into their home as concubine
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Persons and Family Relations
● husband then ejected the wife from their conjugal abode in Negros
Oriental, which forced the wife to live in her habitual residence in Iloilo
● wife prayed for divorce, partition of property, alimony pendente lite, and
writ of preliminary injunction to prevent Diego who was trying to alienate or
encumber their conjugal property
● husband demurred that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since the wife’s
domicile should be the same as his (Negros Oriental)
Issues:
1. W/N a married woman may ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from
that of her husband during the existence of her marriage
2. W/N a wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining
and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal
property during the pendency of the action
Held:
1. DOCTRINE: A married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate
from that of her husband, where the husband has given cause for divorce or
consent.
● husband unlawfully ejects her from conjugal home to freely indulge his
illicit relations with another woman
2. DOCTRINE: In an action for divorce, a wife can seek an injunction to curtail the
husband’s power of administration over the conjugal property to protect her
interest.
● wife was not asserting her right to administer property, but right to share in
CPG
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
- In 1976, the private respondent, Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed a complaint against
the petitioner, Manuel Reyes for legal separation on the ground that he attempted
to kill her.
- She asked for support pendente lite for her and her children, which the
petitioner opposed on the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her
physician.
- The respondent Judge issued an order granting Celia’s prayer for pendente
lite in the amount of P5,000 per month.
- Manuel filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not
entitled to support and that even if she was, the amount as excessive. The
respondent Judge reduced it to P4,000 per month.
- Manuel filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals asking that the
order granting his wife’s prayer for pendente lite be annulled on the ground that the
respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion and that the amount was
excessive. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that Manuel has not presented
a clear case of grave abuse of discretion and that he appears to be financially
capable to support his wife and children.
Issue: W/N the private respondent is entitled to receive support pendente lite from
her husband
Held: YES
- Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support, however, adultery
must be established. Mere allegation will not bar the wife to receive support
pendente lite. The petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove the allegation
that his wife committed adultery.
- Private respondent was asking support to be taken from their conjugal
property, which was managed by the petitioner, and not from his personal funds. It
is therefore doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite.
- In addition to this, in fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of
P4,000, the respondent Judge did not act capriciously and whimsically. When she
originally fixed the monthly support of P5,000, she considered the conjugal
properties that were in the possession of the petitioner who is also the president,
manager, and treasurer of their corporation namely: 2.) Standard Mineral Products,
2.) Development and Technology Consultants, Inc., and 3.) The Contra-Pop
Marine Philippines, Inc. Also, the Judge considered that she needs P5,000 a
month for her support in accordance with their station in life.
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- Amount was reduced to P4,000 inasmuch as the children are in his custody NO
and are being supported by him. RATIONALE
· The issues involved in the case relate to the same marital relationship between
- The private respondent submitted documents showing that the corporations the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately,
controlled by the petitioner entered multi-million contracts. dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and
custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.
- The amount of P4,000 a month for support pendente lite is not excessive. · They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and
become
final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation.
Effects of Decree ·As they are mere incidents of legal separation, they may not be subject to multiple
appeals.
Banez v Banez According to Archbishop v CA:
FACTS the rationale behind the multiple appeals is to enable the rest of the case to
· The RTC granted a legal separation decree between Aida and Gabriel Bañez on proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issues is resolved by the court
the and held final This can’t be applied because splitting the appeals in this case
ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity. would only be a violative rule of multiple appeals.
· The effects of this decree include:
o Dissolution of conjugal property relations E.2 Support and Custody
o Division of net conjugal assets ● LegSep provides for the custody and support of legit children
● Can illegit children be supported in case of forfeiture? No. because unfair
o Forfeiture of Gabriel’s ½ share in the net conjugal assets in favour of the
to legit family
common children ● FC, Art. 213: parent chosen by court shall exercise parental authority over
o Payment of P100,000 to the petitioner’s counsel taken from her own share in the children
net assets ○ Choice will depend on age of child
o Surrender by Gabriel of the use and possession of his house and his car to Aida ■ < 7 y.o. will go to mother unless compelling reasons not to
and their common children. ■ 7 and over can choose unless choice is unfit
Matute v Macadaeg
· Aida filed a motion for execution of the decision pending an appeal (i.e., before it
Armando successfully filed a petition for legal separation against his wife Rosario
becomes final and executory) which the RTC granted partially in relation to the based on her acts of adultery with her brother-in-law, Armando’s brother. Petition
surrender of the house and the car. was granted w/ custody of 4 children aged 4, 8, 10, and 12 to the father. Father left
· Gabriel appealed to the CA which, in turn, set aside the RTC’s decision. them in sister’s care in Davao and then went to US; Rosario lived with the
· Aida filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it. children.Rosario asked permission to bring them to Manila for her father’s funeral.
ISSUES/HELD Armando granted, on condition that they’d be back in 2 weeks. Rosario did not
· WON the various effects of a legal separation decree were subject to multiple return them but instead filed for civil case for custody grant, because:
(1) she is legit mother & children want to stay with her
appeals.
(2) 3 children are over 10 and choice should be taken into consideration
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(3) act of infidelity does not have moral depravity and already thing of the
past.
(4) Father is living with another woman, though married, it was after securing
a divorce in the US which makes him guilty of bigamy.
HELD: Since custody was originally Armando’s, Rosario only obtained permission
from him. She needs to file a modification of order of custody to determine if
custody should be given to her. UNLIKELY because Rosario had no livelihood or
own house, by her own accord depended on charity of brothers for support. Court:
no grave abuse of discretion given that “poverty among other causes, rendered
petitioner unfit to take charge of her children.”
RECONCILIATION
Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing
to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the
court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to
the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take
measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the
proper registries of properties.

HOW DONE: The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any
creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate
Art. 65 properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a)
If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath
duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal
separation.

EFFECTS:
Art. 66
The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following
consequences:

(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at
whatever stage; and

(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of
property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall
subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil
registries. (108a)
Art. 67
The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding
DE FACTO SEPARATION
Art. 100 FC. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the
regime of absolute community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
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Persons and Family Relations
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present
shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to
administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the
regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property
of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to
administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and
are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.
Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned
the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the
consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing
facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction,
and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why
the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly
executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court.
Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse,
whose consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse
to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in
said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of
the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse
concerned.
Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall
be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence
or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the
court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their
testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Arroyo v. Vazquez de Arroyo (1921):
- Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazques de Arroyo were married in 1910 and ever
since, they had few short intervals of separation. They have lived together as
husband and wife until 1920, when Dolores went away from their common home
with the intention of separating from her husband.
- After efforts had been made by Mariano w/o avail to induce Dolores to resume
their marital relations, an action was initiated by Mariano to compel Dolores to
return.
- Dolores answered, admitting that she had left their conjugal home, due to her
husband’s cruel treatment. She prays for affirmative relief which consists of a
decree of separation, liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.
- CFI: Husband’s ill-treatment justified wife’s abandonment.
- Appeal.
- The tales of the cruelty on the part of the husband towards his wife, which are
the basis of the cross-action, are in this court’s opinion no more than highly
colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed
themselves from time to time to become involved, and would have little
significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife.
- ISSUE: WON Dolores can be compelled to return to their conjugal dwelling
(If no, is she entitled to support)
- RULING: NO.
- It is not w/in the province of the court to compel one of the spouses to cohabit w/,
and render conjugal rights to the other. Mariano is not entitled to the
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital
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Persons and Family Relations
domicile. But he is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
absented herself w/o sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Also,
since she left without just cause, she is not entitled to support.
- The interests of the parties as well as the society at large require that the courts
should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife, for this step involves recognition of the de facto
separation of the spouses. From here follows that provisions should not be
made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife UNLESS it appears that the
continued cohabitation of that pair has become impossible and separation
necessary from the fault of the husband. In this case, it does not appear.
- Of course, where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. The court distinguished between
maintaining an action for restitution of property rights in contrast to compelling
the restitution of purely personal rights of consortium, which was not enforceable
by an order of contempt.
Lacson v. San Jose (1968)
- Alfonso Lacson (petitioner) and Carmen San-Jose Lacson (respondent) were
married in 1953 and have four children.
- On Jan 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and began residing in
Manila.
- She filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
(JDRC) for custody of all her children (who at this time were all under 10 yrs old)
as well as support for them and herself.
- Before the case could be resolved, the spouses with their attorneys reached an
amicable settlement regarding custody of the kids, support and separation of
property.
- They filed a joint petition in the CFI of Negros Occidental for the judicial approval
of the settlement.
- Settlement provided that, among others:
Petitioners have mutually agreed upon dissolution of the CPR subject to
judicial approval. The terms being:
separation of property(they acquired no property of consequence together)
power of administration of their separate estates
The custody of the 2 younger children goes to Carmen and the 2 older
children goes to Alfonso
Alfonso shall pay monthly support
Reciprocal rights of visitation
That, for that year, all four children be given to Carmen for the summer.
And that the 2 older children be sent back to Alfonso after.
- CFI found the joint petition “conformable to law” and rendered judgment
approving and incorporating their compromise agreement in toto
- The 4 children were subsequently delivered to Carmen, after which she filed a
motion for immediate custody of all her minor children.
- She questioned the validity of her agreement with Alfonso respecting custody of
the children, averring that the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
immediate execution of the compromise agreement.
- CA declared null and void compromise judgment where it relates to custody over
the 2 older children
- Alfonso then appealed this decision
W/N the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI on the
agreement are conformable to law
YES but not in relation to custody
- Court held that the compromise agreement and the CFI’s judgment are valid w/
respect to property separation and dissolution of CPR.
- Judicial sanction was secured allowing separation of property and dissolution as
the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years, “the propriety of
severing their financial and proprietary interests in manifest.”
- Besides decreeing on their property, the Court cannot compel the spouses to live
together as in Arroyo v Vasquez de Arroyo
- By approving the separation of property, the Court still holds that they do not
“thereby accord recognition nor legalize the de facto separation”
- As for kids custody, Court says lower courts erred in allowing the separation of
the children from their mother which is against the tender years presumption.
Remanded to CFI of Negros Occidental
Estrada v. Escritor (2006)
Issue: W/N Escritor can be held to be administratively liable on grounds of her
immoral conjugation. NO
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Persons and Family Relations
- In a sworn letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, petitioner Alejandro
Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor,
court interpreter, in the RTC of Las Piñas, for living with a man not her
husband and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement.
- Defendant was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral
conduct” in violation of the Revised Administrative Code.
- The Civil Service Commission (CSC) defined “disgraceful and immoral
conduct” as “an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and
decorum abhorred and condemned by the society” and “conduct which is
willful, flagrant, ro shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinions of the good and respectable members of the community”
- Defendant asserted that as members of the Jehovah’s witnesses, their
alleged immoral conjugation is in confomity with their religious beliefs and
has the approval of their congregation.
- In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which allows members of the sect
who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital unions.
- Said Declaration makes the resulting union moral and binding within the
congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is
allowed.
- Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute
the said Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the
congregation.
- As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their
respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated before
declarations are executed.
- Once all legal impediments are lifted, the validity of the declarations
ceases, and the couple should legalize their union.
- Congregation: Escritor was widowed, but Quilapio still did not have the
capacity to remarry; hence, there was nothing immoral about their
declarations remain valid, they both remain in good standing.
- SolGen argued that marriage and the family are crucial to the stability of
the nation; hence, Declaraton of PF should not be recognized or given
effect: “it is utterly destructive of the avowed institution of marriage and the
family for it reduces to a mockery these legally exalted and socially
significant instititutions which in their purity demand respect and dignity.
- The Court, while emphasizing the content of the SG’s arguments, stated:
“Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made
out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to
religious freedom (aka my religion doesnt seem to think my arrangement
with the guy is immoral, so it musnt be lol)
- Court recognized the validity of the standards and measures taken by JW
elders in giving the DPF.
- Th Dec doesnt provide a blanket authority to cohabit without marriage
given that once the legal impediment is lifted.
Instant Administrative Complaint is dismissed.
Banaag v. Espeleta (2011)
- A letter complaint was filed by Evelina Banaag before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) charging Olivia Espeleta with gross immorality and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for engaging in an illicit and
immoral relationship with her husband, Avelino Banaag.
- Evelina learned about the affair when her husband withdrew Php 180,000
that was supposed to be given to her sick brother in law. When Evelina asked the
brother in law’s wife, she found out that only Php 80,000 was given. She was then
told that her husband had a mistress working at the City Hall.
- Evelina confronted her husband who admitted to it. She also found out that
he was using their conjugal funds to deposit substantial amounts to Olivia’s
accounts for 3 years. Banaag has in her possession deposit slips amounting to
Php 1.4M which she attached to her letter-complaint.
- The OCA directed respondent to comment within 10 days, buut she failed
to comply. Multiples directions to her were given but these were all unserved since
she was not at her given address. It was soon found that Olivia filed for resignation
and informed the presiding judge that she had gone to the US.
I: WON Respondent Olivia is guilty of immoral conduct. YES
R:
- The Court finds respondent guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct
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Persons and Family Relations
under Sec. 46(b)(5), Ch. 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987.
- Definition of “Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct”: act which violates the
basic norm of decency, morality, and decorum abhorred and condemned by
the society.
- Another Definition: Conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions of the good and
respectable members of the community.
- Respondent’s act of having an illicit relation with a married man counts as
being disgraceful and immoral, which is classified as a grave offense punishable
with suspension from the service for 6 months and 1 day to 1 year for the first
offense, and dismissal for the second.
- Respondent was given the chance to be heard and refute the charges.
However, she did not file any thing. She hastily resigned right after receiving the
1st Indorsement requiring her to answer the letter-complaint. Her perfectly-timed
departure to the US is clearly a way to avoid accountability. These are strongly
indicative of guilt.
- In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. The
deposit slips indicating how amounts were transferred to respondent’s account
prove the allegation that she had been receiving these from the complainant’s
husband.
- Respondent is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. She is to pay a
fine of Php 50,000.
Santos Sr. v. CA (1995)
Facts:
● Leouel and Julia are married with one son
● the son was placed under custody of Julia’s parents ever since; they paid
for all the hospital bills and support as Leouel can’t afford to do so
● Julia left to be a nurse in the US, called husband after 7 months, promised
to return after expiration of contract, but never did
● Leouel looked for her, to no avail
● Grandparents claimed that Julia sent monthly financial support for the son
● Leouel allegedly abducted their son when he visited the grandparents’
house
● Grandparents filed for petition of custody, citing that:
○ they are well-off, so they can provide material advantages, while
Leouel had not given any support
○ Leouel is a military personnel, so he may be prevented from
attending to his son at times
● court granted grandparents’ petition, Leouel appealed
Issue: Whether or not the custody belongs to the father - YES
Held:
●DOCTRINE: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may
not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.
● DOCTRINE: It is only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or
unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority.
○ no proof that father is in no position to provide support
○ his inability to provide cannot be construed as abandonment, as
present action is to rectify his past misdeeds
○ his being a soldier as a compelling reason deprives soldiers
merely because of the consequences of their duties
○ the fact that he kidnapped his son does not render him unfit
THEREFORE, petition for custody is GRANTED, custody belongs to the FATHER
Sy v. CA (2007)
- In 1994, respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petiton of habeas corpus
against petitioner Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial Court of Manila; she
prayed that the writ be issued to order the petitioner to produce their minor
children Vanessa and Jeremiah, 6 and 4 years old respectively, and for the
custody to be given to her as their mother.
- Petitioner contended that the custody should be awarded to him instead for the
following reasons: 1.) the respondent abandoned their family in 1992, 2.) she
is mentally unstable, 3.) she cannot provide proper care to the children.
- The RTC caused the issuance of the writ and they awarded the custody to the
respondent. It further ordered the petitioner to pay monthly support of P50,000
to the respondent and his children.
- Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC erred in
awarding the sole custody of their children to the respondent and in ordering
him to give monthly support of P50,000.
- CA found no merit in the appeal as they found that respondent was driven
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Persons and Family Relations
away by the petitioner’s family because of religious differences, her stay in
Taiwan not being abandonment. Also, the respondent’s act of praying outdoors
when raining is not a sign of mental instability but an expression of one’s faith.
The appellate court was satisfied with the respondent’s proof of financial
stability.
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in awarding the custody of the minor children to
the respondent
Held: NO.
- Court: “When the husband and wife are living separately and apart
from each other, without decree of the court, the court shall award the
care, custody, and control of each child as will be for his best interest,
permitting the child to choose which parent he prefers to live with if he is
over seven (7) years of age unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take
charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness
or poverty.”
- Section 213 of the Family Code states that in the case of separation of
parents, parental authority shall be given to the parent designated by the court.
But no child under seven years old shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reason to order otherwise.
- The foremost consideration for the custody of children is the “physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parent.”
- However, the law favors the mother if she is fit to take care of the children.
This is because “the love, solicitude, and devotion of a mother cannot be
replaced by another and are worth more to a child of tender years than
all things combined.”
- The Civil Code Commission also explained this saying, “the general rule is
recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her.” Likewise, this preference is reiterated in
Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
- The petitioner’s contention that the respondent is unfit was not substantiated.
Perez v. CA (1996)
F: Ray Perez, a doctor, and Nerissa Perez, a registered nurse, were married in
Cebu in 1986. Nerissa gave birth to Ray Perez II (Jr.) in 1992 in New York. Ray
took care of her while she was pregnant but they returned to Cebu in 1993.
However, Nerissa went back to the U.S. as she alleged that they came home for a
5-week vacation. Ray stayed behind to take care of his mother but promised to
follower her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside
permanently in the Philippines but when Nerissa came back to New York, she
changed her mind and continued working there. When she came back for her
son’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms and that they had
frequent quarrels. She also did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on
her husband’s income and she did not want to leave her son but Ray kept her
away from their son. On July 1993, she filed a petition for habeas corpus asking
respondent Ray Perez to surrender the custody of their son to her. The court
issued an Order awarding custody of Ray II to her. Upon appeal by Ray to the CA,
the CA reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody to Ray. Nerissa filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied and so she filed a petition for review.
I: WON Nerissa should be given custody of their only child Ray II Perez - Yes
R: Under art. 213 of the Family code “In case of separation...No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise”. It was also stated that since the code does not qualify
the word “separation” to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples who
are separated in fact such as Nerissa and Ray, are covered within its terms.
The use of the word “shall” also connotes as mandatory character of the law. In
compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents. There was no sufficient reason why the
custody should not be given to the mother, provided that the child was only
3 years old by then.
Salientes v. Abanilla (2006)
Petitioner Marie Antonette Salientes and respondent Loran Abanilla are the
parents of minor Lorenzo Abanilla. They lived with herein petitioners Orlando and
Rosario. Due to conflicts with the in-laws, respondent wanted to transfer to their
own house but Marie refused. He then left the Saliente’s house alone and was
prevented from seeing his son from then on. Respondent then filed a petition for
Habeas Corpus and Custody before the RTC. On Jan. 23, 2003, the trial court
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Persons and Family Relations
directed the Salientes to produce and bring before the Court the body of Lorenzo
and to show cause why the child should not be discharged from restraint. This was
affirmed by the CA and it dismissed the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
I: WON the CA erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial
court’s order directing Marie Antonette Saliente and her parents to bring to the
Court the body of minor Lorenzo and to show cause why the said child should not
be discharged from restraint. NO
R:
- The assailed order of the RTC did not grant custody of the minor to
any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in
court and to explain why they are restraining his liberty in seeing his father.
- Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from someone entitled to it. Art. 211 states that the father and the
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority.
- Even if the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to
be decided by the court. In its absence, both parents are entitled to the custody
of their child. The remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
- Sec. 9 of AM 03-04-04-SC (Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to the Custody of Minors) requires the petitioners to
present the minor before the court.
- Art. 213 can be raised in an argument concerning custody but it is not a
basis for preventing the father to see his child.
- Trial court did not err. CA properly dismissed. Affirmed.
Effects on Property Relations
Art 100 and 127
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present
shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to
administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
Liability of Properties for Support
● everything indispensable to sustenance, dwelling, clothing, transport and
med expenses in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
● CC: Husband has sole duty to provide for the family
● FC: Joint responsibility to provide for the family
Dadivas v. Villanueva (1929)
IMPORTANT BECAUSE: Determined extent of the Court’s power to punish a
spouse for leaving conjugal dwelling
1905: Petitioner-Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva and Respondent-Rafael Villanueva
married and had 3 children
1927: Aurelia filed for separate maintenance from Rafael due to his infidelity and
cruelty. She also asked for custody of 3 kids + allowance for lawyer’s fees
● 10 years prior to the institution of the case, Rafael was guilty of repeated
acts of infidelity with four different women. Even after the institution of the
case it was shown that he has had an illicit relation with another woman.
Court mentioned that it seems that Rafael is an incurable offender against
sanctity of marriage because of his infidelity.
- There was no sufficient evidence to establish the cruelty of the husband but there
were sufficient evidence to establish the infidelity of the husband.
ISSUE: WON the wife is entitled to separate support from her husband.
HELD: YES
-In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate
maintenance from the husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a
concubine into the home. Perverse and illicit
relations with women outside the conjugal home are sufficient grounds.
Garcia v. Santiago (1928)
1910 Cipriana Garcia ♥ Isabelo Santiago married
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Persons and Family Relations
1925 Cipriana was compelled to leave conjugal dwelling:
1. continued family dissensions
2. Alejo, Isabelo’s son by his first wife seduced Prisca Aurelio, Cipriana’s daughter
by her first husband. Prisca gave birth to a child. Isabelo, instead of requiring his
son to marry Prisca, refused to interfere and he seemed to tolerate their illicit
relationship.
3. Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to foster
latter’s whims and caprices and thus, damaging and prejudicing Cipriana’s rights.
Some of these properties include lands acquired during their marriage with money
belonging to the conjugal partnership. Land annually produces 4,500 cavanes of
palay at P4.00/cavan.
- Other allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the Court:
1. Their separation is necessary to avoid personal violence. She could not live in
the conjugal dwelling due to the illicit relationship of Alejo and Prisca tolerated by
Isabelo.
2. She is entitled to P500 pendente lite monthly pension from conjugal partnership.
However, Isabelo refused to provide for her support despite
her demands.
3. She should be in-charge of the administration of the property of their conjugal
partnership because Isabelo is unfit to do so. He exhibits immoral conduct and
acts by publicly maintaining an illicit relationship with Geronima Yap.
- Isabelo answered with a general denial.
- CFI dismissed
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON their separation is justified - YES. They were having a stormy life prior to
the separation due to the frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to leave the house
and threatened to treat her badly if she returned. Prisca’s situation is embarrassing
for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused Prisca’s pregnancy. Compelling
them to cohabit could lead to further
quarrels.
2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal - NO. Failed to prove
that property was community property. Documentary evidences even show that it
was acquired by him before their marriage.
3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500 monthly maintenance = NO. That’s too much.
P50 is enough.
Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng (1958)
- Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married in Zamboanga City in May of
1951. After their marriage, the couple established their residence with the
husband’s parents in Manila. In Oct of the same year, the couple visited Pilar’s
parents in Zamboanga City at the husband’s initiative. It seemed that the
husband was prevailed upon by Pilar’s parents to return to Manila, and allow
Pilar to stay with them awhile w/ the understanding that she would follow him
later, which apparently, she failed to do.
- On Sept 30, 1953, Pilar filed w/ the CFI Zamboanga a complaint for support
against her husband, alleging that they had been estranged and living
separately since Oct 1952, by reason of incessant marital quarrels brought
about by incompatibility of temperament, by defendant’s inability to provide
for themselves a home separate from the latter’s parents, and that she
was staying w/ her parents in Zamboanga City, w/o employment nor property
of her own.
- The husband prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. He argued that their
married life in Manila was harmonious. Through insidious machinations, Pilar’s
parents caused her to be alienated from him resulting in her refusal to return to
Manila. Also, when he returned to Zamboanga to fetch her, through force and
intimidation she was prevented by her parents from going w/ him. Pilar’s
parents exerted undue pressure and influence upon her to file the complaint.
- Ching Chung Beng also argued that he was not evading his obligation to her,
he preferred to fulfill said duty by receiving and maintaining PIlar in Manila.
Moreover, as a husband, he had the right to fix their family residence and he
would even establish a conjugal dwelling in Manila separate from his parents if
that was the plaintiff’s desire.
- Trial court: Pilar granted w/ monthly allowance after finding that her
refusal to return to Manila was because she wanted to live separately
from her husband’s parents after some in-law troubles. Ching Chung
Beng appealed.
- ISSUE: WON Pilar is entitled to receive support from her husband where
she refused to live w/ him on account of some misunderstandings she
had w/ the husband’s immediate?
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- RULING: NO.
- - SC: Pilar, 19 y/o, found herself involved in some sort of domestic
controversy w/ her husband’s immediate relatives in the opposite camp, which
made her feel that living with them would be unbearable. When she visited her
parents, she recounted her plight to them and as the usual reaction of parents
in matters of this nature; they picked up and championed the cause of their
daughter, which resulted in the estrangement of the young couple.
- The husband insists that Art 299 CC provides that he has the option to fulfill
his duty, either by paying an allowance fixed by court or by receiving and
maintain the person entitled to support in his house, and that he elects to
perform his obligation by the second means, which on the other hand cannot
be availed if there is moral or legal impediment. The husband acknowledged
his obligation to support her, even to the extent of expressing his willingness to
abide by her wish to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents.
- The court does not think that misunderstanding with in-laws can be
considered moral or legal obstacle, it is not seen by the law as a just
cause to leave the conjugal home.
- Also, there is no law compelling the wife to live w/ her husband, even if there is
no legal justification of having a separate residence. YET there is still no
plausible reason why she should be allowed any support, since the
husband chose to avail the second alternative granted him Art 299 and
there being no legal/moral hindrance to the exercise of the 2nd
alternative as elected by him.
- Decision appealed from is modified, giving Ching Chung Beng the option
of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from his parents’
home. Should Pilar refuse to abide, the husband shall be relieved from
the obligation of giving any support to his wife.
Del Rosario v. Del Rosario (1949)
Plaintiff Genoveva del Rosario, a widow with 2 kids and defendant Teoderico
del Rosario, a mechanic, widower with a son got married. They lived together
in the house of defendant's mother. Because of petty quarrels, plaintiff left the
conjugal home in 1942.
I: WON plaintiff is justified in leaving and is entitled to support.
R: Yes. As the marriage vow does not include making sacrifices for the in-
laws, there is legal justification for wife’s refusal to live with husband, taking
into account the “traditional hatred between wife and her mother-in-law”. It is
true that wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish
the
residence (Art 58, CC), but this right does not include compelling wife to live
with mother-in-law, if they cannot get along together. Alimony will be set
according to husband’s ability to pay.
Partosa-Jo v. CA (1992)
- Prima Partosa (petitioner) is the legal wife of Jose Jo aka Ho Hang (respondent),
they have one child together
- Jose admits to having cohabited with three other women and having gathered 15
children
- Prima filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property, in
addition to an earlier action for support; the two cases were consolidated and tried
jointly
- The trial court awarded support but the dispositive portion was silent on the
matter of the judicial separation of property.
- Jo appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling for support but dismissed the
judicial separation of conjugal property for lack of cause of action and that
separation by agreement was not covered by Art 178 CC
- Both parties’ motions for reconsideration were denied
W/N CA erred in holding that the judicial separation of conjugal property was
not allowed under Art 175, 178 and 191 CC
YES
W/N CA erred in holding that no such separation was decreed by dispositive
portion of trial court’s decision
YES
- Court held that dispositive portion was incomplete but the court may clarify
ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of a decision
by an amendment even after judgment has become final
- CA should have made modification instead of dismissing the case, CA chose
form over substance
- Agreement cited by CA was misunderstood by them; Spouses did not agree to
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separate permanently
- Agreement involved Prima staying with her parents during early pregnancy and
he would visit and send support
- Even if they did, arrangement would have ended in 1942 when she returned to
conjugal home and he rejected her
- Petitioner cited Art 178(3) of CC which has been superseded by
Art 128 of FC
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his
or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to
marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period
to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed
to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
- In denying Prima admission to their conjugal home, Jo demonstrated that he had
no intention of resuming conjugal relationship
- Prima may also invoke the 2nd ground, failure to comply with obligations to the
family in light of his rejection of her and womanizing
- Also falls under Art 135 (6) of FC which provides that separation in fact for at
least 1 year and reconciliation being highly improbable shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property
-Petition GRANTED AND MODIFIED
Conjugal property of the spouses is ordered divided between them
ABSOLUTE DIVORCE
A. Brief History
● Siete Paredes (a.k.a. Libro de las Leyes)
○ governed rights pertaining to marriage
○ provided for relative divorce or legal sep. if one spouse
wanted to enter a religious order OR was adulterous OR a
heretic
● 1917: Act 2710 (Divorce Law)
○ Absolute Divorce if wife was criminally convicted of
adultery or concubinage for husband
● Japanese Occupation: EO 121
○ 11 grounds for divorce (similar grounds w/ leg sep.)
● Liberation of PH: Douglas MacArthur proclaimed all laws not
passed by PH Commonwealth as null and void = Act No 2710
became prevailing law again. Divorce was contemplated during
drafting of CC but never passed into law.
● Holy See in Vatican and PH are ONLY two countries who don’t
grant divorce
● Law recognizes divorce: ONLY TWO SITUATIONS
○ 1988: Family Code recognizes divorce secured abroad by
foreigner from his/her filipino spouse
○ Code of Muslim Personal Laws recognizes divorce for
Muslims
HB 6027: An Act Providing for Grounds on the Dissolution of Marriage (2017)
● Objectives: (1) ease legal process of terminating marriage [annulment
takes a long time and is expensive] (2) provide opportunity for peaceful
co-existence between former spouses
● For the court to grant dissolution of marriage:
Grounds:
○ irreconcilable differences
○ severe/chronic unhappiness
*causing irreparable breakdown of marriage
AND Joint Plan for Parenthood over common children
○ support, parental authority, custody and living arrangements of
common children
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HB 2380: An Act Introducing Divorce in the Philippines (2016) legal marriage board home or refuses to live
Introduced by Gabriela Women’s Party therein, without just
● Objective: seeks to introduce divorce as another remedy for irreparable cause
marriages
○ Greatly emphasized oppression women faces in marriage marriage vows are marital ties are not Spouse above loses right
(VAW, Social and Trad Expectations of wives vs. Husbands permanently severed dissolved to support
etc.)
○ Divorce is a rights-based option based on the recognition that Former spouses have no relieves duty of spouses Prop regime shall not be
the right to enter into a marriage contract has the corresponding rights/obligations to each to live together affected
spousal right to end such contract when marriage has become other
irreparable
● 5 GROUNDS (all leading to irreparability of marriage) Court May order spouse Transactions that require
○ separated de facto for at least 5 years and reconciliation is who cause sep. to consent of other spouse,
highly improbable provide support for judicial authorization
○ legally separated for at least 2 years and reconciliation is highly innocent spouse and shall be obtained
improbable common children
○ when any grounds for legal sep. has led to irreparable
breakdown of marriage b. Divorce Distinguished from Annulment and Nullity of
○ one or both are psych incap Marriage
○ irreconcilable differences leading to irreparability of marriage
● Like for LegSep there will be Defenses against Divorce
○ Consent and Condonation SHOULD NOT be considered
defenses because of societal pressures (many women are econ Divorce Void Marriage (Nullity) Voidable Marriages
dependent on men etc.) (Annulment)
○ Defense: Collusion
● NO PRESCRIPTION FOR EITHER DIVORCE OR LEGSEP Grounds arose ONLY Grounds arose already in Grounds arose already in
DURING married life existence during existence during
marriage ceremony marriage ceremony
B. Absolute Divorce Distinguished From Other Remedies
a. Divorce Distinguished from Legal Separation and Separation Art. 36 is NOT divorce Considered valid until
de facto PH Style. Line: even if annulled ; Can be ratified
such incapacity becomes
manifest only after
Divorce Legal Sep Sep de Facto solemnization
MISCONCEPTION
judicial termination of separation of bed and Spouse leaves conjugal ONLY.
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C. Foreign Divorce
a. Foreign Divorce Obtained by a Filipino Citizen
Art. 15 NCC. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
Art. 26 FC. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35
(1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order
227)
b. Divorce between Two Filipino Citizens
Tenchavez v. Escano (1966)
Foreign Divorce bet. 2 Filipino citizens is not valid
F: Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano, both Filipinos, were married secretly in
1948. However, only months after, they became estranged, because there was a
letter received by Vicenta’s father claiming that Pastor had amorous relations with
another woman. In 1950 Escano left for the United States without informing
Tenchavez, where she filed for divorce on the ground of mental cruelty—such was
granted and declared final and absolute. She also contracted a subsequent
marriage in the US. Meanwhile, Tenchavez filed for legal separation, citing the
divorce that his wife obtained abroad, and also charged Escano’s parents with
alienating her affections for him, asking for damages. The trial court did not decree
a legal separation but freed Tenchavez from supporting Escano, and permitted the
Escano parents their counterclaims against Tenchavez. Hence, Tenchavez’s
appeal.
I: W/N the divorce obtained by Escano is valid and binding upon courts of
the Philippines. NO
W/N Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation. YES
H: The Court ruled:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a
person other than the lawful husband entitles the latter to a decree of legal
separation;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one
consort entitles the other to recover damages; and
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one
consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their
part.
The Court rejected the foreign divorce decree, because under Art. 15 CC, laws
relating to family rights and duties, status, condition, or legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the PH. Although courts abroad may grant a divorce
decree, it will not be recognized in the PH given that the latter does not have a
divorce law and does not grant any Filipino the capacity to obtain divorce.
c. Foreign Divorce between a Filipino and an Alien
i. Marriage Between a Filipino and an Alien
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (1985)
Dissolution of Marriage by Foreign Divorce Decree should bind not only
alien but Filipino spouse as well.
F: Van Dorn, Filipina, and Upton, American, were married in Hongkong in 1972,
but were divorced in the US in 1982. Van Dorn has remarried in the US. In 1983,
Upton filed a suit against Van Dorn stating that her business in Manila is conjugal
property and asked that she be ordered to render an accounting of that business
and he be declared to have the right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss, claiming that Upton is barred by the previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings because he already acknowledged therein that they had no
community property. Court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
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property involved is located in the PH so that the divorce decree has no bearing in
this case.
I: W/N the foreign divorce decree is valid and binding in the PH jurisdiction, and
thus on both parties and their alleged conjugal property
H: Yes. Art. 15 is only for PH nationals (no divorce)
The decree is binding on respondent and he cannot sue petitioner since he is
estopped by his own representation before the US courts from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. The Court also held that to consider Van Dorn
as still married to the respondent is unjust, and that she should not be
discriminated against in her own country if justice is to be achieved.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somerra (1989)
Facts:
● 1979 - Imelda (Filipino) and Erich (German) were married in Germany,
lived in the PH with one child
● 1983 - erich filed for divorce in Germany on ground of failure of marriage
● Imelda filed for legal separation in Manila
● 1986 - divorce decree promulgated, custody to Imelda
● five months after, erich filed for adultery against Imelda citing:
○ her affair with a certain William (1982) and jesus (1983)
Issue: W/N he has standing to file a suit for adultery - NO
Provisions: Art. 26 FC, Art. 344 RPC
RPC, Art. 44 par. 1 The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
Held:
1. DOCTRINE: Legal effects of a valid divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines.
2. DOCTRINE: In prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.
● divorce is binding, therefore he has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case as offended spouse
● divorce decree was released prior to his filing of suit for adultery
WHEREFORE, petition of husband for adultery is DISMISSED
ii. Marriage Between Filipinos with One Subsequently Changing
Citizenship
Quita v. CA (1998)
F:
- Petitioner Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, got married in the
Philippines in May 1941. They had no children
- Their relationship soured. She sued Arturo for divorce. In the proceedings
she submitted a private writing dated July 1950 regarding their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. In 1954,
- Fe obtained a final judgment of divorce in USA 3 weeks after the decree,
she married for the 2nd time, but that was also divorced. Still in the US, she
married for the third time.
- On April 16, 1972, Arturo died without a will
- Respondent Blandina Dandan claimed to be the surviving spouse of
Arturo. She was with her children with Arturo. They presented certified photocopy
of the final judgment of divorce b/w Fe and Arturo
- Respondent and children failed to appear on scheduled TC hearing. TC
required the submission of the records of the birth of the children w/in 10 days from
receipt of notice; after w/c, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration
of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period
lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
- TC decided: invoked Tenchavez v. Escano, which held that “a foreign
divorce b/w Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the Civil
Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,” and disregarded
the divorce b/w Fe and Arturo saying that Arturo’s marriage with Fe subsisted until
Arturo’s death in 1972. On MR, Dandan allowed to present record of births; thus all
children, except for one illegitimate child, were declared legal heirs.
- Dandan not declared an heir. Her marriage w/ Arturo was void since it was
celebrated in 1947, while Arturo had a subsisting marriage with Fe.
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- CA reversed TC and said TC violated the Rules of Court for deciding the
case without hearing on intestate proceedings
- Petitioner argued Arturo, a Filipino, still legally married to her despite her
remarriage in the US
- Respondent questioned Fe’s right to inherit considering she secured a
divorce in the US and remarried twice after
- Respondent presented transcript of hearing for the reconstitution of the
original of a certain transfer certificate title and the issuance of new owner’s
duplicate copy of that title before another trial court
- When asked, Fe said she was indeed a US citizen since 1954, same year
she obtained decree of divorce
I: WoN it is necessary to establish the citizenship of Quita to determine if she has
right to inherit from her late first husband as the surviving legal wife - YES
R:
- The Court should have solved citizenship issue by looking into
documentary and testimonial evidence
- Once proved that she’s no longer Filipino, Von Dorn will apply and Fe
could lose right to inherit
from Arturo.
- SC affirmed CA remand of the case to TC for further proceedings to
determine right of Fe to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse
Ma’am Beth’s Book
Though intended to liberalize the law on recognition of foreign divorce, the
requirements under article 26 of the FC are stricter than those under article 15 of
the CC. Under art.26, the divorce must have been obtained by the alien spouse
and such decree must allow the alien to remarry for the Filipino to have capacity to
remarry. Art 15 of the CC on the other hand, does not qualify the citizenship of the
contracting parties at the time of the marriage nor does it require that the petitioner
be the foreigner. All that art 15 applies is the nationality principle which can be
read to refer to the nationality of the parties at the time of divorce. In Rep v
Obrecido, the court affirmed that “the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry. By employing art 15 of the CC, the court could have arrived at
this same conclusion without straining the application of art 26 beyond its outer
limits
Republic v. Obrecido (2005)
Par 2 of Art. 26 should be interpreted to allow Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship and remarries, also
to remarry.
- In 1981, Cipriano Obrecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter.
- In 1986, Lady Myros went to the United States together with their son,
Kristoffer.
- A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife has been naturalized as
an American Citizen.
- Sometime in 2000, he learned from his son that Lady Myros obtained a
divorce decree and married Innocent Stanley. Lady Myros, Innocent Stanley,
and their child now live in one residence in California.
- Cipriano filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code.
- No opposition was filed. The court granted the petition.
- The Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but was denied.
- OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is not applicable to the case at
bar because it only applies to a marriage between a Filipino citizen and an
alien.
- Respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized wife obtained a divorce decree that
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capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated to remarry.
Issue: W/N the respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code
Held:
- Art. 26 of the Family Code was amended by EO 227, adding a second
paragraph stating that when a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is valid and a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, then the Filipino spouse shall also have the
capacity to marry under Philippine law.
- However, it seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the marriage,
one spouse is Filipino and the other one is an alien, and not to cases wherein
both were Filipino citizens and one was naturalized as a citizen of another
country.
- In the Report of the Public Hearings on the Family Code, the CBCP registered
objections to the aforementioned paragraph of Art. 26. They said that the rule
“discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad; these spouses who are divorced will not be able to remarry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.”
- In Quita v. CA, the Court hinted that by obiter dictum, a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can
thus remarry.
- The Court held that Paragraph 2 of Art. 26 should include cases involving
parties who at the time of the celebration of marriage were Filipino citizens but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce. The Filipino should be allowed to remarry.
- Art. 26 has two elements: 1.) valid marriage between a Filipino and a
foreigner, 2.) valid divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. The reckoning
point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of celebration of
marriage, but at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse.
- These elements are present in the case at bar. The theory of OSG that the
proper remedy is either annulment or legal separation cannot be sustained.
- However, records are bereft of competent evidence. Respondent must prove
his allegation that his wife is naturalized as American citizen. Before a foreign
divorce decree is recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must be
able to prove it to be a fact. Respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his wife to remarry. Petition granted.
Llorente v. CA (2000)
● Lorenzo Llorente was a member of the US Navy.
● On Feb. 22, 1937, he married petitioner Paula Llorente.
● Lorenzo left for the US before the outbreak of WW2. He acquired US
citizenship from New York on Nov. 30, 1943.
● After the PH was liberated in 1945, he was permitted to visit his wife. He
discovered that she was pregnant and was having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino.
● Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce in California. This became
final on Dec. 4, 1952. He then returned to the PH.
● On Jan. 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in Manila. They lived together for
25 years and had 3 children.
● Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament, bequeathing all his property
to Alicia and their 3 children.
● He died on June 11, 1985
● Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in
her favor, claiming that she was his surviving spouse, that various property
were acquired during their marriage, and that Lorenzo disposed all of it in
favor of Alicia.
● The RTC ruled that the divorce decree is void and that Paula is the
primary compulsory heir.
● Alicia’s motion was also denied and the CA affirmed the RTC.
I: WON the divorce decree is valid. YES
R:
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- The fact that Lorenzo became an American long before and at the
time of his divorce from Paula, marriage to Alicia, execution of his will, and
death is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Necessarily, issues
arising from these are governed by foreign law.
- In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., owing to the nationality principle in Art.
15, only PH nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce.
Court also ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, as long as they
are valid according to their national law.
- In Quita v. CA, it was held that once proven that respondent was
no longer Filipino when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn
would become applicable and petitioner can lose her right to inherit from
him.
- We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo from Paula was
valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
- As to the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will and
the parties’ successional rights, the Court REMANDS the case to the court
of origin to allow proof of foreign law.
Garcia v. Recio (2001)
Proving Foreign Divorce as a matter of FACT. Divorce Decree and National Law of Alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. The case involves a
naturalized Australian citizen’s legal capacity to remarry at the time of his marriage to his
Filipino wife.
Facts:
1987: Respondent-Rederick Recio (Filipino) ♥ Editha Samson (Australian) in Malabon, Rizal
1989: Recio and Samson Divorced; decree by Australian courts
1992: Recio became an Australian citizen
1994: Respondent-Recio ♥ Petitioner-Grace Garcia in Cabanatuan City
1995 - 1996: Respondent and Petitioner started living separately (in Australia) and their
conjugal assets were divided according to Australian law
1998: Petitioner-Garcia filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy; Reason: She only knew of Respondent-Recio’s previous marriage to Samson 3
years into their marriage. Respondent-Recio ALSO filed for a declaration of nullity, which
was granted by AUSTRALIAN Family courts.
RTC: dissolved marriage, NOT DUE TO ANY GROUNDS (respondent’s lack of legal
capacity), but on foreign divorce decree. Petioner petitions for the review of this decision.
Issue:
(1) WON the Divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven - NO
(2) WON the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner
- NO
Held:
(1) There is no PH Law on divorce hence PH Courts can’t grant it. Before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized in PH, it must be PROVEN AS A FACT.
Presentation of divorce decree is not enough. To prove as a fact the divorce
decree itself must be presented + foreign laws allowing absolute divorce
(2) There are different kinds of divorce. Although respondent showed a divorce
decree, it did not specify whether or not it is of an absolute divorce (terminates
marriage completely) or a limited divorce (suspends marriage and leaves the bond
in full force) + even if absolute marriage, foreign statues may still limit a person
from remarrying.
(a) The Australian Divorce decree presented says:
“A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless other party has died) commits the offense of bigamy) -
SHOWS THAT DIVORCE OBTAINED MAY BE LIMITED. NO
EVIDENCE TO SHOW LEGAL CAPACITY TO REMARRY.
RULE: RTC erred in dissolving marriage based only on Australian Divorce Decree because
it did not show legal capacity on respondent’s part. HOWEVER, Court can’t grant
petitioner’s prayer to declare marriage null and void because although no evidence to show
legal capacity, there is also no evidence showing legal incapacity on the part of the
petitioner.
CASE IS REMANDED TO LOWER COURT TO RECEIVE MORE EVIDENCE.
Notes from Book/DOCTRINE:
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A person who wishes to rely on a foreign divorce decree must first, PRESENT THE
DIVORCE DECREE before it is given presumptive evidentiary value; and second, PROVE
THAT THE DIVORCE IS OF A TYPE THAT LEGALLY DISSOLVED THE MARRIAGE
AND CAPACITATED HIM TO MARRY.
● Stems from the principle that laws have legal effects only within their territory -
proof of foreign judgement and its authenticity must be made.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010)
- Petitoner Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization in 2000. In 2005, he married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work, he left for Canada soon after their wedding.
- In 2005, he returned to PH to surprise his wife, but was shocked to discover that his
wife was having an affair w/ another man. Hurt and disappointed, he went back to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce, and was then granted to him.
- 2 yrs after, he found another Filipina to love, and desiring to marry her, he went to
Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official
of NSO informed him that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists in PH law. TO BE
ENFORCEABLE, THE FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE MUST FIRST BE JUDICIALLY
RECOGNIZED BY A COMPETENT PH COURT.
- Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition however it was denied by
RTC. RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that Art 26 FC intended only for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. An alien spouse
cannot claim a right under this provision.
- From RTC’s ruling, Gerbert filed the present petition.
- ISSUE: WON Art 26 FC par 2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
- RULING: NO.
- The alien spouse can claim no right under Art 26 par 2 as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
- However, this does not prevent the alien spouse from instituting action w/ respect to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree in this jurisdiction as a foreign judgment. The
foreign divorce decree is a presumptive evidence of a right that clothes Gerbert
w/ legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction.
- The practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, in this
case of a foreign divorce decree, is grounded not only on the principle of comity but
also for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.
- The foreign judgment’s authenticity must be proven as facts under or rules on evidence,
together w/ the alien’s applicable national law, to show effect of the judgment on the
alien himself.
- In accordance w/ PH law, a foreign judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
- In Gerbert’s case, the record showed that he attached to the petition a copy of the
divorce decree proving its authenticity. However, he failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. The Court, despite its earlier discussion that the law
recognizing foreign divorce decree is for the benefit only of Filipinos, allowed the case
to be remanded, to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent w/ the
Canadian divorce law. Accdg to the Court, this is the more appropriate course of action
esp. since it will serve the interest of Gerbert’s former wife who has agreed to the filing
of the petition.
- Petition granted, RTC decision reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings.
Fujiki v. Marinay (2013)
FACTS
- Petitioner Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay in the
PH in 2004. His parents did not approve of the marriage so he was never able to
bring Marinay to Japan where he resides. They eventually lost touch with each
other.
- In 2008, Marinay married Maekara,, another Japanese national, in Quezon City
without dissolving her first marriage. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan where he
allegedly abused her. Marinay left Maekara and contacted Fujiki.
- Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and reestablished their relationship.
- In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgement from a family court in Japan
that declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.
- In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC praying that they recognize the judgment
of the Japanese family court, that the Marinay-Maekara marriage be declared void
ab initio under Arts. 35(4) and 41 of the FC of the PH and for the RTC to direct the
Civil Registrar to annotate the Jap Court judgment on the marriage certificate
between Marinay and Maekara.
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-RTC dismissed the petition and cited the provisions from the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) based on improper venue and the lack of personality of Fujiki to
file the petition, saying that solely the husband or wife can file.
- Fujiki appealed.
ISSUES:
1 W/N Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages is applicable (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) - NO
2 W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy - YES
3 W/N the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court - YES
RATIO:
1 - Court held that petitioner need only prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
either through an official publication or a certification or copy attested by the officer
who has custody of the judgment. To hold that the (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) applies
to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment will defeat the purpose of allowing
the recognition in the first place as the PH court will have to litigate the case anew.
- PH courts can only recognize foreign judgments as a fact according to rules of
evidence. Foreign judgment need only be admitted and proven.
- Japanese Family Court judgment is also in accordance with PH public policy as
bigamous marriage are also declared void from the beginning (Art 35(4) FC).
2 - The requirement that the petition for declaration of nullity be filed solely by the
husband or wife refers to the husband or wife of the subsisting marriage since “the
parties in a bigamous marriage are neither husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has
personality to file a petition for declaration of void marriage.”
- Also, bigamy is a public crime. If anyone can file a criminal action, there is more
reason to confer personality to sue to the spouse of a subsisting marriage.
3 - In the recognition of foreign judgments, PH courts cannot substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They can only decide
whether to extend the effect of foreign judgment to the Filipino party under
the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Art 15 of the CC.
- The validity of the marriage can be questioned only in a direct proceeding and not
in a Rule 108 proceeding. Questioning the validity of the marriage does not apply
in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment of annulment where one of the parties is an alien.
Petition GRANTED; RTC ordered to REINSTATE petition for further proceedings
in accordance with this Decision
Maam’s comment (p.271)
“...our laws should give legal effect to a divorce decree obtained abroad,
regardless of whether it was the alien or Filipino spouse who filed the petition, for
as long as their marital domicile was in that foreign State.”
Medina v. Koike (2016)
F:
- Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and
respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were
married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. They had two
children.
- On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan,
filed for and were divorced on even same date as appearing in the Divorce
Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register
of Michiyuki Koike.
- Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate
of Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen
filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code before the RTC.
- At the hearing, with no one appearing to oppose, Doreen presented
several foreign documents, [Just take note of the documents.] namely,
“Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce”and “Family
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Register of Michiyuki Koike” both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City
and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for
Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document
entitled “Divorce Certificate” issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of
Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign
Affairs, as well as a Certification issued by the City Civil Registry Office in
Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in
the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and
their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled
“The Civil Code of Japan 2000”and “The Civil Code of Japan 2009”were
likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan’s law on divorce.
- RTC denied Doreen’s petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of
foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance
with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.
- RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were
successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she
nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband,
particularly the existence of the law on divorce.
- RTC observed that the “The Civil Code of Japan 2000” and “The Civil
Code of Japan 2009,” presented were not duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the
said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the
applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial
relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified
expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working
knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations
and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned
treatises pursuant to Section 46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented
and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and law.
I: W/N the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce. NO
R:
- the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
- The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws.
- “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. (The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose
or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.)
- Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
- our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
- Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter
are essentially factual that calls for a reevaluation of the evidence
presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is
obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition
for review.
Case referred to CA to determine and prove the divorce decree and the laws on
divorce of Japan .
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d. Foreign Divorce Between Aliens
D. Muslim Divorces
Yasin v. Shari’a District Court (2016)
F: Hatima C. Yasin was formerly married to Hadji Yasin in accordance with Muslim
rites. In 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce again in accordance with
Islamic Law, after which Hatima’s former husband married another woman. Given
the situation, Hatima filed a petition to resume the use of her maiden name, but the
Shari’a District Court denied it, saying that the petition is one for a change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Under it, she supposedly does not have
compelling reason to have her name changed. Petitioner claims that it is merely a
petition to resume the use of her maiden name after her divorce and does not fall
under Rule 103 ROC.
I: W/N a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for
change of name
H: No.
The true and real name of a person is that give to him and entered in the civil
register, and petitioner’s registered name is Hatima Centi y Saul. She does not
seek to change her registered name but wants to resume the use of her maiden
name. Under the Civil Code, use of the husband’s surname during the marriage
(Art. 370 CC), after annulment (Art. 371 CC), and after the death of the husband
(Art. 373 CC) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation
(Art. 372 CC). The word ‘may’ is used, indicating the permissiveness of the
provision. Thus, a woman need not seek judicial authority to use her husband’s
name because the law grants her such right. Similarly, when the marriage is
terminated, she need not seek judicial confirmation to revert to her maiden name
because the use of her husband’s surname was optional in the first place. The
petition is an unnecessary proceeding, yet the Court granted it for expediency and
authorized her to resume her maiden name and surname.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND
WIFE
RA 10354 RH LAW
Sec. 2
Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,
the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
Pursuant to the declaration of State policies under Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, it is the duty of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution and equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
women especially mothers in particular and of the people in general and instill health
consciousness among them. The family is the natural and fundamental unit of society.
The State shall likewise protect and advance the right of families in particular and the
people in general to a balanced and healthful environment in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature. The State also recognizes and guarantees the promotion and equal
protection of the welfare and rights of children, the youth, and the unborn.
Moreover, the State recognizes and guarantees the promotion of gender equality, gender
equity, women empowerment and dignity as a health and human rights concern and as a
social responsibility. The advancement and protection of women’s human rights shall be
central to the efforts of the State to address reproductive health care.
The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall
defend:
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(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(b) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;
(c) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(d) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs
The State likewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods,
devices, supplies which do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and relevant information and
education thereon according to the priority needs of women, children and other
underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access to those identified through the National
Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) and other government
measures of identifying marginalization, who shall be voluntary beneficiaries of
reproductive health care, services and supplies for free.
The State shall eradicate discriminatory practices, laws and policies that infringe on a
person’s exercise of reproductive health rights.
The State shall also promote openness to life; Provided, That parents bring forth to the
world only those children whom they can raise in a truly humane way.
Sec. 3
Guiding Principles for Implementation. – This Act declares the following as guiding
principles:
(a) The right to make free and informed decisions, which is central to the exercise of any
right, shall not be subjected to any form of coercion and must be fully guaranteed by the
State, like the right itself;
(b) Respect for protection and fulfillment of reproductive health and rights which seek to
promote the rights and welfare of every person particularly couples, adult individuals,
women and adolescents;
(c) Since human resource is among the principal assets of the country, effective and
quality reproductive health care services must be given primacy to ensure maternal and
child health, the health of the unborn, safe delivery and birth of healthy children, and
sound replacement rate, in line with the State’s duty to promote the right to health,
responsible parenthood, social justice and full human development;
(d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, affordable, non-
abortifacient, effective and quality reproductive health care services and supplies is
essential in the promotion of people’s right to health, especially those of women, the poor,
and the marginalized, and shall be incorporated as a component of basic health care;
(e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all
methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have
been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and
approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR
and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State
shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning,
especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their
religious convictions;
(f) The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the
number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of
women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with
existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions: Provided, That no one shall be
deprived, for economic reasons, of the rights to have children; (2) achieve equitable
allocation and utilization of resources; (3) ensure effective partnership among national
government, local government units (LGUs) and the private sector in the design,
implementation, coordination, integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered
programs to enhance the quality of life and environmental protection; (4) conduct studies
to analyze demographic trends including demographic dividends from sound population
policies towards sustainable human development in keeping with the principles of gender
equality, protection of mothers and children, born and unborn and the promotion and
protection of women’s reproductive rights and health; and (5) conduct scientific studies to
determine the safety and efficacy of alternative medicines and methods for reproductive
health care development;
(g) The provision of reproductive health care, information and supplies giving priority to
poor beneficiaries as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
identifying marginalization must be the primary responsibility of the national government
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Persons and Family Relations
consistent with its obligation to respect, protect and promote the right to health and the
right to life;
(h) The State shall respect individuals’ preferences and choice of family planning
methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking
into consideration the State’s obligations under various human rights instruments;
(i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), women’s and people’s
organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and
communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the
poor, and the marginalized;
(j) While this Act recognizes that abortion is illegal and punishable by law, the government
shall ensure that all women needing care for post-abortive complications and all other
complications arising from pregnancy, labor and delivery and related issues shall be
treated and counseled in a humane, nonjudgmental and compassionate manner in
accordance with law and medical ethics;
(k) Each family shall have the right to determine its ideal family size: Provided, however,
That the State shall equip each parent with the necessary information on all aspects of
family life, including reproductive health and responsible parenthood, in order to make
that determination;
(l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and the mitigation, promotion
and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health;
(m) Gender equality and women empowerment are central elements of reproductive
health and population and development;
(n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the entire population, especially
the poor, and allocations thereof must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the life
of the unborn is protected;
(o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the harmonization and
integration of policies, plans, programs and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life of
the people, more particularly the poor, the needy and the marginalized; and
(p) That a comprehensive reproductive health program addresses the needs of people
throughout their life cycle.
Sec. 4
Definition of Terms. – For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
(g) Gender equality refers to the principle of equality between women and men and equal
rights to enjoy conditions in realizing their full human potentials to contribute to, and
benefit from, the results of development, with the State recognizing that all human beings
are free and equal in dignity and rights. It entails equality in opportunities, in the allocation
of resources or benefits, or in access to services in furtherance of the rights to health and
sustainable human development among others, without discrimination.
(h) Gender equity refers to the policies, instruments, programs and actions that address
the disadvantaged position of women in society by providing preferential treatment and
affirmative action. It entails fairness and justice in the distribution of benefits and
responsibilities between women and men, and often requires women-specific projects
and programs to end existing inequalities. This concept recognizes that while
reproductive health involves women and men, it is more critical for women’s health.
(i) Male responsibility refers to the involvement, commitment, accountability and
responsibility of males in all areas of sexual health and reproductive health, as well as the
care of reproductive health concerns specific to men.
(p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the
reproductive system and to its functions and processes. This implies that people are able
to have a responsible, safe, consensual and satisfying sex life, that they have the
capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often to do so. This
further implies that women and men attain equal relationships in matters related to sexual
relations and reproduction.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities,
services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing
reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which
is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health
care include the following:
(1) Family planning information and services which shall include as a first priority making
women of reproductive age fully aware of their respective cycles to make them aware of
when fertilization is highly probable, as well as highly improbable;
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Persons and Family Relations
(2) Maternal, infant and child health and nutrition, including breastfeeding;
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
(4) Adolescent and youth reproductive health guidance and counseling;
(5) Prevention, treatment and management of reproductive tract infections (RTIs), HIV
and AIDS and other sexually transmittable infections (STIs);
(6) Elimination of violence against women and children and other forms of sexual and
gender-based violence;
(7) Education and counseling on sexuality and reproductive health;
(8) Treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers and other gynecological conditions
and disorders;
(9) Male responsibility and involvement and men’s reproductive health;
(10) Prevention, treatment and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction;
(11) Reproductive health education for the adolescents; and
(12) Mental health aspect of reproductive health care.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide
freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of
their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the
highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That
reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
(v) Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the
needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility
between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and
timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns
consistent with their religious convictions.
Sec. 7
Access to Family Planning. – All accredited public health facilities shall provide a full
range of modern family planning methods, which shall also include medical consultations,
supplies and necessary and reasonable procedures for poor and marginalized couples
having infertility issues who desire to have children: Provided, That family planning
services shall likewise be extended by private health facilities to paying patients with the
option to grant free care and services to indigents, except in the case of non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group, but they have
the option to provide such full range of modern family planning methods: Provided,
further, That these hospitals shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and
services to another health facility which is conveniently accessible: Provided, finally, That
the person is not in an emergency condition or serious case as defined in Republic Act
No. 8344.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether
natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when
the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Sec. 8
Maternal Death Review and Fetal and Infant Death Review. – All LGUs, national and
local government hospitals, and other public health units shall conduct an annual
Maternal Death Review and Fetal and Infant Death Review in accordance with the
guidelines set by the DOH. Such review should result in an evidence-based programming
and budgeting process that would contribute to the development of more responsive
reproductive health services to promote women’s health and safe motherhood.
A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and respect, Mutual Help and Support
RPC, Art. 247
Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. - Any legally married
person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter,
or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
(note: banishment or restraining order)
FC, Art. 68
The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
LAW 100
Persons and Family Relations
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
FC, Art. 69
The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(110a)
FC, Art. 70
The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such
support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in
the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of
insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from
the separate properties.
NCC, Art. 344
The adopter may donate property, by an act inter vivos or by will, to the adopted person,
who shall acquire ownership thereof. (n)
(Anti-Rape Law)
RA 8353, Sec. 2
Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a
Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known
as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the
same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
"Chapter Three
"Rape
"Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
"b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
"c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
"d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
"Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall become reclusion perpetua to death.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death.
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
"2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law
enforcement or penal institution;
"3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity;
"4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is
personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of
the crime;
"5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
"6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
(HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible
disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;
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"7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-
military units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or
penal institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the
commission of the crime;
"8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation or disability;
"9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime; and
"10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision
mayor.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua.
"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten
aggravating/ qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.
"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided,
That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage
is void ab initio.
"Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the
act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so
situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as
evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A."
(Anti-VAWC Act of 2004)
RA 9262, Sec 2:
Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women
and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the
need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against
women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention
on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the
Philippines is a party.
Sec 3:
Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he
has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is
not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a
sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together
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in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force,
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental
or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to
witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child
resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological
and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse.
(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and
without lawful justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child
under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing
basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship.
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the
bearing of a common child.
(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or
voluntary organization accredited by the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other
suitable place the resident of which is willing temporarily to receive the victim.
(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable
of taking care of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act,
it includes the biological children of the victim and other children under her care.
Sec 4: Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and
safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
Sec 5: Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with
the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to
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her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business
or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the
conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling
her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual
activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or
through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,
that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets
of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.
Sec 6: Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section
5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated
parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code.
If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised
Penal Code; those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison
mayor; those constituting less serious physical injuries shall be punished by prision
correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto
mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower
than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding
paragraph but shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the
presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty
prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less
than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred
thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or
psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.
Sec8 : Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in
Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a
protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm,
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minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and
ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. The provisions of the
protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders
that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary
protection order (TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that
may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or
through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent
must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement
agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from
the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or
household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the
residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the
petitioner and any designated family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential
personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement
officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the
petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential
personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal
belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to
legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an
appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly
by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the
woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the
woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his
employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly
weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by
the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to
use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order
the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to
investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not
limited to, property damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and
provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member,
provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such
relief.
Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a
decree of legal separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a
petitioner from applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO.
Sec 21: Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a violation of a BPO issued
under this Act must be filed directly with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court,
or municipal circuit trial court that has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued
the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days
without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for
any of the acts committed.
A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court.
During trial and upon judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order
as it deems necessary without need of an application.
Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute
contempt of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to
any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts
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committed.
Sec 26: Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim- survivors who are found by
the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and
civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered
woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted
by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
Sec 28: Custody of children. – The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the
custody and support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old older but
with mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to
support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from
having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the
perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from Battered woman syndrome.
Sec 35: Rights of Victims. – In addition to their rights under existing laws, victims of
violence against women and their children shall have the following rights:
(a) to be treated with respect and dignity;
(b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any
public legal assistance office;
(c) To be entitled to support services form the DSWD and LGUs'
(d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family
Code; and
(e) To be informed of their rights and the services available to them including their right to
apply for a protection order.
Magna Carta of Women
RA 9710, Sec 19
Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations. -
The State shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women
in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall ensure:
(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or common law relationships
referred to under the Family Code without prejudice to personal or religious beliefs;
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their
free and full consent. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect;
(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to
the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights;
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law spouses including the right
to choose freely a profession and an occupation;
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses in respect of the ownership,
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property;
(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled or not, and inheritance,
whether formal or customary; and
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their nationality.
The State shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of
nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of
the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. Various
statutes of other countries concerning dual citizenship that may be enjoyed equally by
women and men shall likewise be considered.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do not discriminate
against women.
FC, Art 68 CC, Art. 111
The husband and wife are obliged to live The husband is responsible for the support
together, observe mutual love, respect and of the wife and the rest of the family. These
fidelity, and render mutual help and expenses shall be met first from the
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from previous marriages

support. conjugal property, then from the husband's
● The husband’s son, Alejo and the wife’s daughter, Prisca bore a child
capital, and lastly from the wife's
FC, Art 70 paraphernal property. In case there is a ● The spouses fought often, causing the wife to leave conjugal home. She
The spouses are jointly responsible for the separation of property, by stipulation in the cited the following reasons:
support of the family. The expenses for marriage settlements, the husband and ○ husband refuses to interfere and seems to tolerate the illicit
such support and other conjugal wife shall contribute proportionately to the relation of his son and his wife’s daughter, not requiring his son to
obligations shall be paid from the family expenses. (n) marry the other
community property and, in the absence ○ husband transfers conjugal property to his son at the latter’s whim,
thereof, from the income or fruits of their to the detriment of the wife, as some of these properties include
separate properties. In case of insufficiency lands acquired during their marriage with money belonging to the
or absence of said income or fruits, such
conjugal partnership
obligations shall be satisfied from the
separate properties. ● husband threatened violence if she returns
● husband publicly maintained illicit relations with a certain Geronima
FC, Art. 199 ● wife filed petition for support
Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein provided: Issues/Held:
(1) The spouse; 1. W/N separation is justified - YES
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree; a. DOCTRINE: Considerations of morality are referred to in
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and granting separate support for spouses who leave the
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a) conjugal dwelling.
■ continued cohabitation implies the parent’s approval of the
FC, Art 200
When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the
immoral conduct
same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. 2. W/N she is entitled to support - YES
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only a. DOCTRINE: Where the husband has ordered the wife to leave the
one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from conjugal home with threats of violence if she should return, she
the other obligors the share due from them. cannot be compelled to cohabit with her husband, and is entitled
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same to support.
person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all
claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the
concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in Goitia v. Campos Rueda (1916)
which case the child shall be preferred. (295a)
- Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were married in 1915. They lived
together for about a month.
Garcia v. Santiago
- Eloisa returned to her parents’ home.
Facts:
● Cipriana and Isabelo are married. They both have children they brought - She filed a complaint against her husband for support outside their conjugal
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home.
- She alleged that one month after their marriage, Jose demanded her to
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals and that she spurned
the obscene demands of her husband.
- Jose had been making the same demands, and because Eloisa would
always refuse, Jose maltreated her by word and deed and inflicted injuries
upon her lips, face, and different parts of the body.
- Because of this, she was obliged to leave their conjugal home. Eloisa went
back to her parents’ home.
- The lower court sustained the defendant’s demurrer on the ground that the
petitioner did not state a cause of action. The court held that the defendant
cannot be compelled to give support to his wife except by maintaining her in
his house, unless there is a judicial decree granting her divorce or separation
from the defendant.
Issue: W/N the plaintiff, who left because of the bad conduct of the defendant
towards her, is entitled to receive support from the defendant outside their conjugal
domicile
Held: YES
- Marriage is regulated and controlled by the State upon principles of public
policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties.
- When the object of the marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties, relief in some way should be possible.
- Law provides that husband and wife must live together ( Art. 44 and Art. 48
of the Law of Civil Marriage) and to support each other reciprocally (Art.
143). Support can either be by paying a fixed pension or by maintaining in
the house of the person obliged to give support (Art. 149). It is also in the
law that the failure of the wife to live with her husband is not of the instances
when the obligation to give support shall cease (Art. 152).
- Mere act of marriage creates the obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife.
- A judgement for separate maintenance is not payable either as damages or
penalty, but it is a call to perform marital duty to give support. This is done
with a view to preserve public peace and the “purity of the wife” when the
husband makes so base demands and assaults his wife.
- The separation resulting from a decree of separate support does not breach
the public policy of inviolability of marriage, instead, it is a stronger policy,
being a means to preserve public peace and morals. It does not impair the
marriage contract. Decision reversed.
Warren v State (1985)
FACTS:
● The appellant Daniel Warren, was indicted for rape and aggravated
sodomy of his wife when they were living together as husband and wife.
● The appellant filed a pretrial general demurrer and motion to dismiss the
indictment but the motion was denied. He then sought and was issued a
certificate of immediate review and filed an application for an interlocutory
appeal which was granted by the court.
● He asserts that within the rape statute, there is an implicit marital exclusion
that makes it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife
ISSUE: WON there is a marital exemption to rape that makes it legally impossible
for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife - NO
HELD:
● There are different theories for the basis of marital exemption from rape.
The first comes from Lord Hale’s contractual theory
- “but a husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her
husband which she cannot retreat.
- Basis of of Lord Hale’s theory possibly stems from English Law
wherein the perpetrator could avoid rape charges by marrying the
victim.
● 2nd Theory: A wife was regarded as property during Medieval Times.
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Rape was considered as a man making use of his own property.
● 3rd Theory: Unity of Marriage Theory: the very being or legal existence of
a woman was suspended during marriage or at least was incorporated and
consolidated into that of her husband. As one legal being, a husband could
not be convicted of raping himself
● HOWEVER, there have been dramatic changes in women’s rights and the
status of women and marriage. State Constitution provides that “no person
shall be deprived of life liberty or property except by due process” and that
the “protection to person and property is the paramount duty of
government and shall be impartial and complete and no person shall be
denied equal protection of the law. These guarantees are not reduced in
marriage
● The implied consent theory to spousal rape is without logical reasoning
and conflicts with our constitutional and statutory laws and our regard for
all citizens of this state.
● There has never been an expressly stated marital exemption included
in the Georgia rape statute. A reading of the statute indicates that there is
no marital exclusion. “A person commits the offense of rape when he has
carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.
● In regard to sodomy, appellant contends that there is also an implicit
marital exclusion within the aggravated sodomy statute. Sodomy was
originally defined as “the carnal knowledge and connection against the
order of nature by man with man or in the same unnatural manner with
woman.
● One accused of somody could not defend by alleging consent. An
allegation of consent would only show the other party’s guilt.
● There can be no common law marital exemption under the aggravated
sodomy statute based on “implied consent” when the statute was enacted
in 1968 and where there was no implied consent or marital exemption for
sodomy based on consent under the original sodomy statute.
● Book: When a woman says I do, does she give up her right to say I won't?
● This question does not pose the real question, because *and aggravated
sodomy are not sexual acts of an ardent husband performed upon an
initially apathetic wife, they are acts of violence that are accompanied
with physical and mental abuse and often leave the victim with physical
and psychological damage that is almost always long lasting
● When a woman says "I do" in Georgia does she give up her right to State
protection from the violent acts of rape and aggravated sodomy performed
by her husband. The answer is no
People v Jumawan (2014)
● On Feb. 19, 1999, KKK executed a complaint-affidavit alleging that her
husband raped her and that on Dec. 12, 1998, he boxed her shoulder for
refusing to have sex with him.
● Criminal charges on grave threats, less serious physical injuries, and rape
were filed against Jumawan on the recommendation of the City Prosecutor
of CDO. Jumawan was arrested and pleaded not guilty.
● KKK’s case was anchored on the testimonies of her daughters MMM and
OOO who were present on 2 separate occasions of the alleged rape:
1. They were woken up by KKK’s crying and shouting while
Jumawan forced himself into her.
2. They saw their mother crouched on the bed crying with her
torn underwear. They helped shield her from their father and
took care of her in their room.
● Jumawan denied raping his wife and contends that she filed the charges
as a form of revenge because he took over the management of their
business.
● RTC gave more weight to the testimonies of the daughters as it is not
natural in our culture for daughters to speak against their own father for a
crime such as rape if it were not truly committed.
● CA affirmed the RTC. They rejected the husband’s contention that he has
the right to have sex with his wife and that there must be convincing
physical evidence of the alleged force and intimidation. CA explained that
physical showing of injuries is not required in rape. What is necessary is
that the victim was forced to have sex.
I: WON defendant is guilty of marital rape. YES
R:
● Court outlines the history of rape and marriage; that women were seen as
chattel/property and that they lose their identity upon marriage and
becomes one with the husband who has control of her.
● Court also cited Matthew Hale’s marital exemption rule in the 17th Century
on the irrevocable implied consent theory wherein the husband cannot be
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guilty of rape on his wife since she has given herself to her husband which
she cannot retract.
● The marital exemption rule was abandoned in the US case People v.
Liberta in 1983 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital
and non-marital rape. It held the Hale’s implied consent to an act that is
violent and causes severe physical and psychological harm is irrational
and absurd. Marriage license should not be a license for a husband to
rape his wife.
● This is the first case of marital rape in the PH. PH joined in on the
ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW). In compliance,
1. PH enshrined the value and recognition of equality and the
role of women in nation building in the 1987 Constitution (Art
II. Sec. 11, 14)
2. RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law) was enacted. Art. 266-C’s
second paragraph recognizes the reality of marital rape and
criminalizes its perpetration. It penalizes crime of rape without
regard to the rapist’s legal relation with his victim.
3. This is further affirmed by RA 9262 (VAWC Act) that
regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence
committed by a man against his wife.
● A husband who has sex with his wife is not merely using property, he is
fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal
to that he accords himself.
● The FC obligates spouses to love one another but it sanctions sex as an
expression of love that is mutual and not unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
● Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his wife’s refusal to have sex
can seek have the wife declared psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an
essential marital obligation.
● To treat marital rape differently infringes on the equal protection clause.
● Human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, sexual and
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.
● The failure to immediately report to the authorities is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
People v Liberta (1984) highly recommend reading, maraming magandang
sinabi yung court
The case involves a man accused of rape and aggravated sodomy against his
wife, questioning the unconstitutionality of the rape statutes in an effort to absolve
him of his crime
F
● Mario Liberta and Denise Liberta were married in 1978 and have a son
together
● Mario beat Denise. in 1980, she was granted a temporary order of
protection from Mario which required him move out of their conjugal home,
and to stay away from Denise. Mario however could still visit their son
once every weekend.
● One weekend, mario didn’t show up for his weekly visit. Instead on
Tuesday, he calls Denise to to ask if he could visit the house on that day.
Denise refuses. Denise, with their son, agreed to be picked up by Mario
and brought back to the motel he was staying in on the condition that
Mario’s friend would be there as well.
● At the motel however, the friend left. As soon as he did, Mario “attacked
Denise, threatened to kill her, and forced her to perform fellatio on him and
to engage in sexual intercourse with him” all while their son was in the
room, with Mario even telling Denise “to tell their son to watch what he was
doing to her.”
● The next day, she made a felony complaint against Mario
● Sec. 130.35 (re: rape) of the Penal Law and Section 130.50 (re: sodomy)
of the Penal Law provide a marital exemption, wherein, husbands are
exempt from these crimes if they rape or sodomize their wife.
● This should’ve exempted Mario from his actions, HOWEVER, at the time
of the attack, a temporary order of protection was in effect, which required
Mario and Denise to live apart. Since they were living apart, they could be
deemed as “not married” for the purposes of the statutes.
I WON marital rape is a crime? - FUCK YES.
WON marital exemption from rape is unconstitutional - YES
R: Conviction against Mario is affirmed.
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Mario argued for the ff:
1. Temp. Order of Protection didn’t make them NOT married therefore his
case still falls under the statutes’ marital exemptions
Court: Legislation expanded meaning of “not married” to include those
who are living apart due to a court order, which is what happened to them.
2. Assuming the TOP does give him unmarried male status, still can’t try him
because both statutes are unconstitutional by violating equal protection
clause in that
a. THEY BURDEN SOME (unmarried males) BUT NOT ALL MALES
(married) - unconsti
Court: There is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital
rape and non marital rape. Marital Exemption for rape in New York
statute is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
b. Burdens ONLY MEN and not women - unconsti
Court: The fact that the act of a female forcibly raping a male may
be difficult or rare occurrence does not mean that the gender
exemption satisfies the constitutional test. (fit vs gov’t interest)
GENDER NEUTRAL WOULD BE BETTER.
OTHER IMPORTANT NOTES BY COURT:
● Marital privacy (like in Griswold) can’t be used to defend marital exemption
to rape because no rational relation between allowing a husband to
forcibly rape his wife and protecting marital privacy and encouraging
reconciliation
● Clearly it is the violent act of rape and not the subsequent attempt of the
wife to seek protect which “disrupts” a marriage
● FROM BOOK: If the marriage has already reached the point where
intercourse is accomplished by violent assault, it is doubtful that there is
anything left to reconcile
Thurman v City of Torrington (1984)
- Summary: Between early Oct 1982 to June 1983, the plaintiff Tracey Thurman,
living in the City of Torrington, and others on her behalf, notified the defendant Ciy
through the defendant police officers of the City of the repeated threats upon her
and the life of her child (plaintiff Charles J. Thurman Jr.), made by her estranged
husband, Charles Thurman. Over the course of 8 months, attempts to file
complaints by Tracey against Charles in response to his death threats and
maiming were ignored and rejected by the defendant police officers. The plaintiffs
brought this action alleging that their constitutional rights to equal protection of
laws were violated by the nonperformance/malperformace of official duties by the
defendant police officers.
- In Oct 1982, Charles attacked Tracey at the home of Jude Bentley and Richard
St Hilaire in the City of Torrington. Mr. Bentley and Mr. St. Hilaire made a formal
complaint of the attack to one of the defendant police officers and requested efforts
to keep Charles off their property.
- In Nov 1982, Charles went back to the said residence and used physical force,
taking Charles Jr. with him. Tracey and Mr. St. Hilaire went to the Torrington police
headquarters to make a complaint. The defendant police officers refused to accept
the complaint, and even refused to accept the complaint from Mr. St. Hilaire even
as to trespassing.
- In the same month, Charles screamed threats at Tracey while Tracey was
sitting inside her car. One of the defendant police officers stood on the street,
witnessing the scene, until Charles broke the windshield of Tracey’s car, and he
was then arrested after that. He was then convicted of breach of peace and
received a suspended sentence of 6 months in jail and a 2-yr conditional
discharge, during which he was ordered to stay completely away from Tracey and
the Bentley-St. Hialire residence and to commit no further crimes.
- During the period of conditional discharge, Tracey called the police department
several times complaining that Charles was violating the terms of the discharge.
The police refused to do anything about Tracey’s complaints. At one point, Charles
threatened to kill Tracey. At that time, Tracey attempted to get Charles arrested for
violating his conditional discharge. The police department refused to help Tracey.
Officers repeatedly asked her to return to the police station at a later date. Tracey
pursued her attempts to get Charles arrested, but to no avail.
- Charles appeared at the residence where Tracey was staying. Tracey,
remaining indoors, called the police department and asked that Charles be
arrested for violation of the conditional discharge. After about 15 minutes, Tracey
went outside to persuade him not to take her or hurt Charles, Jr. Soon thereafter,
Charles began to stab Tracey in the chest, neck, and throat. Approximately 25
minutes after Tracey’s call, a single police officer arrived at the scene. When the
officer arrived, Charles dropped the knife, and in the officer’s presence, kicked
Tracey in the head and ran into the house. Charles returned from the house
holding Charles, Jr., and dropped the child on his wounded mother. Charles then
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kicked Tracey in the head a second time. Soon thereafter, three more police
officers arrived at the scene, but continued to let Charles wander about the crowd
and to continue to threaten Tracey. Finally, when Charles approached Tracey
again (this time, she was lying on a stretcher) Charles was arrested and taken into
custody.
- It is alleged that at all times mentioned, except for approx. 2 weeks following his
sentence in Nov 1982, Charles resided in Torrington and worked there as a
counterman and short order cook at a diner. There he served many members of
the Torrington Police Dept including some of the defendant police officers. In the
course of his employment, Charles boasted to the defendant police officers that he
intended to get his wife and that he intended to kill her.
- The defendant City brought a motion to dismiss the case. They allege that the
plaintiffs failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right, and that the equal
protection clause does not guarantee equal application of social services. They
argue that police protection was fully provided to persons abused by someone with
whom the victim had no domestic relationship, but the police consistently afforded
lesser protection when the victim was a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse
or boyfriend or when a child was abused the a father or stepfather.
ISSUE: WON the conduct of the Torrington Police Dept deprives Tracey of
her right to equal protection.
RULING: YES. The Court held that police action is subject to the equal protection
clause, whether in the form of commission of violative acts or omission to perform
required acts pursuant to police officers’ duty to protect. A law enforcement officer
can be liable when his inaction/action fails to perform a statutorily imposed duty to
enforce the laws equally and fairly, and thereby denies equal protection.
- If the City wishes to discriminate against women who are victims of domestic
violence, it must articulate important govt interest for doing so. And here, it has
failed to put forward any justification.
- English common law during the 18th century recognized the right of husbands to
physically discipline their wives. However, today, any notion of a husband’s
prerogative to physically discipline his wife is an increasingly outdated
misconception. A man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman
merely because he is her husband.
- A man is not allowed to physically abuse/engender a woman merely because he
is her husband. Moreover, a police officer may not knowingly refrain from
interference in such violence, and may not automatically decline to make an arrest
simply because the assaulter and his victim are marred to each other. In addition,
any notion that the defendant police officers’ practice can be justified as a means
of promoting domestic harmony by refraining from interference in marital disputes,
has no place in the case.
- The motion to dismiss by the defendant city was dismissed and Tracey was
awarded $2.3million.
Garcia v. Drilon and Jaype-Garcia (2013)
- Private respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed for herself and on behalf of her
minor children a petition before the Bacolod City RTC for the issuance of
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) under RA9262 against her husband and herein
petitioner, Jesus C. Garcia.
- This petition was prompted by her husband’s history of controlling and jealous
behavior as well as his infidelity and violence towards her and their children. He
has boasted about his sexual relations to the household help. Their fights often led
to physical violence which he would also turn towards their eldest child.
- Jesus’s behavior even drove Rosalie to attempt suicide by cutting her wrist at
home. She was found by her young son. Jesus fled the house and did not take her
to the hospital.
- Jesus told her he was leaving her for good after she informed the boss of
Jesus’s mistress that she was going to file charges against her. (Mistress worked
at the bank; godmother of one their sons)
- Rosalie is determined to separate from Jesus but is afraid he will take her
children and deprive her of financial support. Jesus previously warned her that if
she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.
- Jesus controls all the family businesses.
- RTC issued the TPO, finding reasonable ground that they were in imminent
danger of violence. The TPO ordered, among other things:
>remove himself and all his belongings from the conjugal home, assisted
by police officers
>to stay away from her and her children, mother and staff (1000m)
>not to harass aforementioned people directly or indirectly
>to pay full financial support
- Jesus did not desist and even attempted to kidnap his son
- RTC continued issuing TPOs every time they expired which was every 30 days
- Petitioner did not submit required comment to renewal of TPO arguing it would
be “an exercise in futility”
- During the pendency of Rosalie’s case, Jesus filed a petitioner before the CA for
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prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO.
He challenged:
the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the due process
and the equal protection clauses.
the validity of the modified TPO as a “product of an invalid law”
I:
W/N RA 9262 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause
and therefore unconstitutional - NO
R:
- Delving into the deliberations of RA 9262, the Court held that the intent in
excluding men from the protection afforded by RA 9262 was in light of the inherent
and historical inequalities between the genders in society. Statistics also clearly
point to the prevalence of violence against women and children (“usual” and “most
likely” victims) and that this was a special law to address the need for their
protection.
- There are, of course, cases of domestic violence against men but it is relatively
few and these incidents do not render RA 9262 invalid as the classification used is
valid.
- They also held that the equal protection clause requires “that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.”
- Held also that valid classification is allowed for as long as it is reasonable,
meaning that “classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class.” And that every classification by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.
Ma’am quoted from the case in her book:
“The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias
and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice MacIntyre succinctly states, the
accommodation of differences...is the essence of true equality.”
Go-Tan v Tan (2008
Pertinent Provisions:
Sec.5(h)(5), RA 9262 (Anti-VAWC Act of 2004) - SECTION 5. Acts of Violence
Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262: ‘‘[v]iolence against women and their children’’ as “any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in
or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”
“SEC. 47. Suppletory Application.—For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.”
Article 10 of the RPC :
“ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. —Offenses which
are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary.”
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Facts:
· Petitioner Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married on
April 18, 1999, from which two children were born.
· Petitioner filed on Jan. 12, 2005 a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Protective Order against Steven and her parents-in-law (Perfecto
and Juanita Tan), herein defendants, on grounds that they are causing verbal,
psychological, and economic abuse in violation of RA 9262.
· Respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since
Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related
to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship
· RTC ruled in favor of the defendants
· RTC denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
· Hence, this petition
Issue:
· W/N Respondents may be included in the petition for the issuance of a
protective order in accordance with RA 9262. – YES
Held:
· While the said Sec 3 provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or
dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle
of conspiracy under the RPC
· (Ito hahanapin ni Ma’am kasi ito nasa libro niya) “once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals. “
· Notwithstanding the above quoted provision, Sec. 5 of RA 9262 expressly
recognizes the acts of violence against women and their children may be
committed by an offender through another.
· More so, Sec. 8 (Protection Orders) provides that POs may be issued to
prohibit acts of violence done directly by the spouse or indirectly through other
persons.
Fallo:
· The Court decided that the PO can be issued against the husband and his
parents who caused verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in
violation of RA 9262.
Pelayo v Lauron (1909)
Facts:
- Arturo Pelayo, physician, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and
Juana Abella
o Pelayo alleged that the couple called him to render medical assistance to
their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth
o He performed a surgery necessary for the childbirth
o Defendants refused to pay him for his services
o Petitioner prays that they pay the costs
- Defendants answered:
o Their daughter-in-law died as a consequence of the childbirth, and
o Her stay at the couple’s house was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances
o Defendants pray that they be absolved of the complaint
Issue: W/N the in-laws were obliged to pay the medical bill
Held: No.
- The husband is obliged to pay the costs.
LAW 100
Persons and Family Relations

- The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the mutual ● Private agreement between persons married or about to be married which
obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support (Art. 142, 143 attempts to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract as
CC). defined by the law is contrary to public policy and unenforceable.
- This obligation has legal force between the contracting parties—in this ○ a provision releasing the husband from his duty to support his wife
case, the spouses. in a contract makes the same void
- The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested
his assistance does not preclude the husband from his obligation B. Management and Household
- The defendants only acted in view of the imminent danger their daughter-
in-law was under. Besides, within the meaning of the law, in-laws are strangers
with respect to the obligation to provide support. FC, Art 71 CC, Art. 115
- Thus, plaintiff must direct his action against the deceased’s husband. The management of the household The wife manages the affairs of the
shall be the right and the duty of both household. She may purchase things
spouses. The expenses for such necessary for the support of the family,
management shall be paid in and the conjugal partnership shall be
Graham v Graham (1940) accordance with the provisions of bound thereby. She may borrow
Article 70 money for this purpose, if the husband
Facts: fails to deliver the proper sum. The
● Sydney and Margrethe are married purchase of jewelry and precious
● They made a contract stipulating that the wife will pay the husband 300 objects is voidable, unless the
USD monthly transaction has been expressly or
● They divorced tacitly approved by the husband, or
● Husband files an action against his former wife to recover the amount unless the price paid is from her
stipulated in their contract, claiming that: paraphernal property.
○ he agreed to the contract because his wife asked him to quit his
job, so that he can accompany her to his travels, in exchange of C. Exercise of Profession
her monthly payment
● Wife denies entering such agreement, claiming that:
○ his abandonment of work and continued reliance upon her for FC, Art 73 NCC, Art. 117
support was always distasteful to her
Either spouse may exercise any The wife may exercise any profession
Issue: W/N contract is valid - NO legitimate profession, occupation, or occupation or engage in business.
business or activity without the consent However, the husband may object,
Held: of the other. The latter may object only provided:
● Marriage is not merely a private contract between the parties, but creates on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
a status in which the state is vitally interested and under which certain In case of disagreement, the court (1) His income is sufficient for the
rights and duties incident to the relationship come into being, irrespective shall decide whether or not: family, according to its social standing,
of the wishes of the parties. (1) The objection is proper; and and
LAW 100
Persons and Family Relations

(2) Benefit has occurred to the family (2) His opposition is founded on ● obtain loans, insurance contracts, passports w/o need for consent of
prior to the objection or thereafter. If serious and valid grounds. husband,
the benefit accrued prior to the Equality in Membership of Clubs - socio, civic clubs
objection, the resulting obligation shall In case of disagreement on this
be enforced against the separate question, the parents and
Admission to Military Schools. — women shall be accorded equal opportunities
property of the spouse who has not grandparents as well as the family
obtained consent. council, if any, shall be consulted. If no for appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in all
The foregoing provisions shall not agreement is still arrived at, the court military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police
prejudice the rights of creditors who will decide whatever may be proper
acted in good faith. and in the best interest of the family.
Sec. 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. — Married persons who
RA 7192 (Women in Development and Nation-Building Act) devote full time to managing the household and family affairs shall, upon the
Responsible Agency is NEDA working spouse's consent, be entitled to voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan —
Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at Gobyerno), Government Service Insurance System
Objective: State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS) coverage to the extent of one-half (1/2)
men. (nation-building) of the salary and compensation of the working spouse. The contributions due
thereon shall be deducted from the salary of the working spouse.
(1) A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received
from foreign governments and multilateral agencies and organizations shall be
The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules and regulations
set aside and utilized by the agencies concerned to support programs and
necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this section
activities for women;

(2) All government departments shall ensure that women benefit equally and
participate directly in the development programs and projects of said
department, specifically those funded under official foreign development
assistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the
development process; and
(3) All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all
their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures to remove gender bias
therein.
Equality in Capacity to Act: Married men = Married Women = Unmarried women
Magna Carta of Women
RA 9710
Sec 12
Equal Treatment Before the Law. - The State shall take steps to review and, when
necessary, amend and/or repeal existing laws that are discriminatory to women within
three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act.
Sec 13
Equal Access and Elimination of Discrimination in Education, Scholarships, and
Training. - (a) The State shall ensure that gender stereotypes and images in educational
materials and curricula are adequately and appropriately revised. Gender-sensitive
LAW 100
Persons and Family Relations
language shall be used at all times. Capacity-building on gender and development
(GAD), peace and human rights, education for teachers, and all those involved in the
education sector shall be pursued toward this end. Partnerships between and among
players of the education sector, including the private sector, churches, and faith groups
shall be encouraged.
Sec 14
Women in Sports. - The State shall develop, establish, and strengthen programs for the
participation of women and girl-children in competitive and noncompetitive sports as a
means to achieve excellence, promote physical and social well-being, eliminate gender-
role stereotyping, and provide equal access to the full benefits of development for all
persons regardless of sex, gender identity, and other similar factors.
For this purpose, all sports-related organizations shall create guidelines that will establish
and integrate affirmative action as a strategy and gender equality as a framework in
planning and implementing their policies, budgets, programs, and activities relating to the
participation of women and girls in sports.
The State will also provide material and nonmaterial incentives to local government units,
media organizations, and the private sector for promoting, training, and preparing women
and girls for participation in competitive and noncompetitive sports, especially in local and
international events, including, but not limited to, the Palarong Pambansa, Southeast
Asian Games, Asian Games, and the Olympics.
No sports event or tournament will offer or award a different sports prize, with respect to
its amount or value, to women and men winners in the same sports category: Provided,
That the said tournament, contest, race, match, event, or game is open to both sexes:
Provided, further, That the sports event or tournament is divided into male or female
divisions.
The State shall also ensure the safety and well-being of all women and girls participating
in sports, especially, but not limited to, trainees, reserve members, members, coaches,
and mentors of national sports teams, whether in studying, training, or performance
phases, by providing them comprehensive health and medical insurance coverage, as
well as integrated medical, nutritional, and healthcare services.
Schools, colleges, universities, or any other learning institution shall take into account its
total women student population in granting athletic scholarship. There shall be a pro rata
representation of women in the athletic scholarship program based on the percentage of
women in the whole student population.
Sec 15
Women in the Military. - The State shall pursue appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination of women in the military, police, and other similar services, including
revising or abolishing policies and practices that restrict women from availing of both
combat and noncombat training that are open to men, or from taking on functions other
than administrative tasks, such as engaging in combat, security-related, or field
operations. Women in the military shall be accorded the same promotional privileges and
opportunities as men, including pay increases, additional remunerations and benefits,
and awards based on their competency and quality of performance. Towards this end,
the State shall ensure that the personal dignity of women shall always be respected.
Women in the military, police, and other similar services shall be provided with the same
right to employment as men on equal conditions. Equally, they shall be accorded the
same capacity as men to act in and enter into contracts, including marriage.
Further, women in the military, police; and other similar services shall be entitled to leave
benefits such as maternity leave, as provided for by existing laws.
Sec 16
Nondiscriminatory and Nonderogatory Portrayal of Women in Media and Film. - The
State shall formulate policies and programs for the advancement of women in
collaboration with government and nongovernment media-related organizations. It shall
likewise endeavor to raise the consciousness of the general public in recognizing the
dignity of women and the role and contribution of women in the family; community, and
the society through the strategic use of mass media.
For this purpose, the State shall ensure allocation of space; airtime, and resources,
strengthen programming, production, and image-making that appropriately present
women's needs, issues, and concerns in all forms of media, communication, information
dissemination, and advertising.
The State, in cooperation with all schools of journalism, information, and communication,
as well as the national media federations and associations, shall require all media
organizations and corporations to integrate into their human resource development
components regular training on gender equality and gender-based discrimination, create
and use gender equality guidelines in all aspects of management, training, production,
information, dissemination, communication, and programming; and convene a gender
equality committee that will promote gender mainstreaming as a framework and
affirmative action as a strategy, and monitor and evaluate the implementation of gender
LAW 100
Persons and Family Relations
equality guidelines.
Sec 22
Right to Decent Work. - The State shall progressively realize and ensure decent work
standards for women that involve the creation of jobs of acceptable quality in conditions
of freedom, equity, security, and human dignity.
(a) Decent work involves opportunities for work that are productive and fairly
remunerative as family living wage, security in the workplace, and social protection for
families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for
people to express their concerns organize, participate in the decisions that affect their
lives, and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.
(b) The State shall further ensure:
(1) Support services and gears to protect them from occupational and health hazards
taking into account women's maternal functions;
(2) Support services that will enable women to balance their family obligations and work
responsibilities including, but not limited to, the establishment of day care centers and
breast-feeding stations at the workplace, and providing maternity leave pursuant to the
Labor Code and other pertinent laws;
(3) Membership in unions regardless of status of employment and place of employment;
and
(4) Respect for the observance of indigenous peoples' cultural practices even in the
workplace.
(c) In recognition of the temporary nature of overseas work, the State shall exert all efforts
to address the causes of out-migration by developing local employment and other
economic opportunities for women and by introducing measures to curb violence and
forced and involuntary displacement of local women. The State shall ensure the
protection and promotion of the rights and welfare of migrant women regardless of their
work status, and protect them against discrimination in wages, conditions of work, and
employment opportunities in host countries.
Sec 23
Right to Livelihood, Credit, Capital, and Technology. - The State shall ensure that
women are provided with the following:
(a) Equal access to formal sources of credit and capital;
(b) Equal share to the produce of farms and aquatic resources; and
(c) Employment opportunities for returning women migrant workers taking into account
their skills and qualifications. Corollarily, the State shall also promote skills and
entrepreneurship development of returning women migrant workers.
Sec 24
Right to Education and Training. - The State shall ensure the following:
(a) Women migrant workers have the opportunity to undergo skills training, if they so
desire, before taking on a foreign job, and possible retraining upon return to the country:
(b) Gender-sensitive training and seminars; and
(c) Equal opportunities in scholarships based on merit and fitness, especially to those
interested in research and development aimed towards women-friendly farm technology.
Bradwell v Illinois (1940)
Facts:
· Mrs. Myra Bradwell of the State of Illinois applied to the judges of the
Supreme Court of Illinois for a license to practice law. Her petition included
the usual certificate from an inferior court of her good character, and that on
due examination she had been found to possess the requisite qualifications.
Pending this application, she also filed an affidavit to the effect:
"that she was born in the State of Vermont; that she was (had been) a citizen of
that state; that she is now a citizen of the United States, and has been for many
years past a resident of the City of Chicago, in the State of Illinois."
With the affidavit, she also filed a paper asserting that, under the foregoing
facts, she was entitled to the license prayed for by virtue of the second section
of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States, and of the
fourteenth article of amendment of that instrument.
· SC of Illinois: By the common law, which is the basis of the laws of Illinois,
only men were admitted to the bar, and the legislature had not made any
change in this respect, but had simply provided that:
(1) No person should be admitted to practice as attorney or counselor without
having previously obtained a license for that purpose from two justices of the
Supreme Court, and that
(2) No person should receive a license without first obtaining a certificate from
the court of some county of his good moral character.
In other respects, it was left to the discretion of the court to establish the rules
by which admission to the profession should be determined.
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· Limitations by the court:
(1) It should establish such terms of admission as would promote the
proper administration of justice, and
(2) It should not admit any persons, or class of persons, not intended by
the legislature to be admitted, even though not expressly excluded by
statute.
In view of this latter limitation, the court felt compelled to deny the application of
females to be admitted as members of the bar. Being contrary to the rules of
the common law and the usages of Westminster Hall from time immemorial, it
could not be supposed that the legislature had intended to adopt any different
rule.
Issue: Do the laws of Illinois regarding admission to the bar abridge any of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States?
Held:
No. They do not.
Ratio:
Bradwell’s contention:
Fourteenth Amendment: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.
Therefore, the statute law of Illinois, or the common law prevailing in that state, can
no longer be set up as a barrier against the right of females to pursue any lawful
employment for a livelihood (the practice of law included) because it assumes that
it is one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens to engage in any
and every profession, occupation, or employment in civil life.
[She asserts that while she remained in Vermont, that circumstance made her a
citizen of that state. But she states, at the same time, that she is a citizen of the
United States, and that she is now, and has been for many years past, a resident
of Chicago, in the State of Illinois.]
US Supreme Court:
Yes, there are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States
the states must not abridge but the right to admission to practice in the courts of a
state is NOT one of them. This right in no sense depends on citizenship of the
United States. The protection designed by that clause has no application to a
citizen of the state whose laws are complained of. If the plaintiff was a citizen of
the State of Illinois, that provision of the Constitution gave her no protection
against its courts or its legislation.
The right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts
of a state is one of those powers which are not transferred for its protection to the
federal government, and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by
citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license.
(By Ms. Compuesto)
D. Use of Surname
NCC, Art. 370
A married woman may use:
1. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
2. Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
3. Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife,
such as "Mrs."
NCC, Art. 373
A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with article 370.
NCC, Art. 377
Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages
and other relief.
NCC, Art. 378
The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of
action to the latter.
Silverio v Republic supra
Dunn v. Palermo (1975)
- Rose Palermo, a lawyer in Nashville married Denty Cheatham in 1973.
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- She continued using her maiden name professionally, socially, and for other
purposes.
- Tennessee has a state-wide compulsory Registration Law.
- After Rose’s marriage, she went to the Registrar to change her address
form, listing her name as Palermo. However, she was advised that she was
required to register under the surname of her husband, or have her name
purged from the registration records, under the statute Sec. 2-206 TCA.
- Sec. 2-206 TCA states that the registration of a person shall be purged 90
days after he changes his name by marriage or otherwise.
- Upon Rose’s refusal to change her name, her name was purged from the
registration list.
Issue: W/N it is mandatory that a married woman assume the name of her
husband
Held: NO
- Tennessee has no statutory enactment providing that a woman automatically
assumes her husband’s name upon marriage.
- Sec. 2-206 alone does not mandate a change of name by marriage, instead, it
merely recognizes the prevalence of the custom under which a woman adopts
the surname of her husband.
- The Court cited English and American cases emphasizing that a woman
adopting the name of her husband upon marriage is a custom, and a person
can use any name as long as such change is not intended for fraudulent
purposes.
- In addition to this, permitting a married woman to retain her own name would
eliminate substantial administrative problems related to a change of name.
- The Court held that a woman, upon marriage, has a freedom of choice with
regards to her name; she may choose to retain her own surname or use the
surname of her husband.
- The Court also held that the appellee’s legal name is Rosary T. Palermo.
Tolentino v CA (1988)
FACTS:
● Petitioner Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo
Tolentino
● Respondent Consuelo David was married to Arturo but due to abandoning
Arturo for 3 years, they were divorced.
● After the divorce, Arturo married Pilar Adornable who died soon after the
marriage.
● Arturo then married Constancia Tolentino
● Consuelo, continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up
to the time of the filing of the complaint
● Arturo, as third party defendant, admitted that the use of the surname by
Consuelo was with his and his’s family’s consent.
● Petitioner Constancia now is filing a complaint against Consuelo for using
the surname Tolentino.
ISSUES:
● WON the petitioner's cause of action has already prescribed - YES
● WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using
the surname of her former husband from who she was divorced - NO
HELD:
● Petitioner insists that the use of surname Tolentino by David is a
continuing actionable wrong and that every use of it is a new crime. The
use of a surname by a divorced woman for a purpose not criminal in
nature is not a crime.
● The CA is of teh opinion that the period of prescription should be 4 years
since it appears to be an action based on quasi-delict. The action has long
prescribed whether the cause accrued on April 1945, when the petitioner
and Arturo married or on August 1950 when the Civil Code took effect or in
1951 when she came to know of that fact that David was still using the
surname Tolentino. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which
determines the starting point for the computation of the period of
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prescription.
● Petitioner should have brought the action immediately after she gained
knowledge of the use of the surname Tolentino by the respondent David.
The action was brought only in November 1971 (20 years).
● NO merit in petitioner's claim that to sustain the respondent’s stand
contradict Art. 370 and 371. Art 371 speaks of annulment while the case
here refers to absolute divorce and so is not applicable.
● Sen.Tolentino comments on Art 370 which states that “the wife cannot
claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname”; She cannot be
prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain other s from using it
● Respondent has established that to grant the injunction would be an act of
serious dislocation to her. SHe has given proof that she entered into
contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other
legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner has failed to show
that she would suffer any legal injury
● There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in this case.
Usurpation of name implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the
name, it consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the
owner and uspurer.
● Elements of Usurpation
- THere is an actual use of another’s name by the defendant
- the use is unauthorized
- the use of another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person
● None of these elements exist and neither is the claim that the respondent
impersonated her. It is of public knowledge that Constancia Tolentino is
the legal wife of Arturo Tolentino.
● Consuelo David never represented herself as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino but
simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino; she has legitimate children who
have every right to use the surname Tolentino. She could not possibly be
compelled to use the name Mrs. David, different from the surname of her
children. The records do not show that she has legally married.
Yasin v Shari’a District Court supra
Remo v Secretary of Foreign Affairs (2010)
● Petitioner Maria Remo is a married Filipino who sought to renew her
passport. In her old passport, her surname is Rallonza. In her application
with the DFA in Chicago, she requested to revert to her maiden name and
surname.
● DFA denied the request. They stated that the use of maiden name is
allowed only if the married name has not been used in a previous
application. It can only be changed in cases of annulment, divorce, and
death of the husband.
● Case was appealed to the Office of the President and was denied, saying
that the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) offers no leeway for the
interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration
of nullity may a married woman revert to her maiden name. CA also
denied the petition, finding no conflict between Art. 370 and RA 8239.
I: WON petitioner who originally used her husband’s surname in her passport can
revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport despite the subsistence of
her marriage. NO
R:
● Court agrees with petitioner that the word “may” in Art. 370 indicates that
the use of the husband’s surname is permissive rather than obligatory as
held in Yasin v. Shari’a District Court. She is therefore allowed to use her
maiden name upon marriage.
● However, unlike Yasin involving a Muslim divorce, her marriage is still
subsisting.
● OSG argues that Sec. 5 of RA 8239 limits the instances when a married
woman may be allowed to revert to her maiden name in the passport:
1. Death of husband
2. Divorce decree
3. Annulment or nullity of marriage
● The conflict between art. 370 and RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA
8239 does not prohibit the use of a woman’s maiden name in the passport.
Even if these were in conflict, the special law governing passport issuance
must prevail over general law (civil code).
● If the court were to allow this, nothing prevents her in the future to revert to
the use of her husband’s surname. This unjustified change in one’s name
and identity in a passport which is considered superior to all other official
documents cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, confusion and
inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.
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● The acquisition of a PH passport is a privilege. It is the property of the PH
government. Holder is merely a possessor.
E. Property Relations
FC
Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in
the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom. (118)
On Community Property
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements,
the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at
the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a)
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and
the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by
the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry
shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of
such property. (201a)
Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. (160)
Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of
the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make
moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of
family rejoicing or family distress. (n)
On Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife
place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their
efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided
equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements.
(142a)
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with
property belonging to only one of the spouses; and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
(148a)
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (160a)
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the
consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the
other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity
or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (174a)
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Carlos v. Abelardo (2002)
F:
- Spouses Manuel Abelardo and Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo were sued
by the latter’s father, Honorio Carlos, for a sum of money and damages
- 1989 Honorio alleged that he issued a check for US $25,000 for the
spouses to purchase their conjugal home in Paranaque
- In 1994 Honorio made a formal demand for the money, after the spouses
failed to pay him back
- By this time however, the spouses had already been separated for a year
so they filed separate answers
● Maria Theresa Carlos - Abelardo admitted to securing a loan
together w/ her husband from the petitioner but said that the loan
was payable on a staggered basis. No need for immediate
payment
● Manuel Abelardo admitted to receiving the US $25,000 not as a
loan but as his income for the work he did in father-in-law’s
construction company (H.L. Carlos Construction)
○ Used 10 checks amounting to P3,000,000 allegedly from
Honorio to prove that if it were a loan and he had a debt,
then Honorio could’ve just reduced the amount from
P3,000,000
○ Not believable because he is neither a stockholder nor an
employee so why would he have a salary
○ Not believable because checks were not issued by
company but from personal account of Honorio
○ Being compensated does not extinguish his obligation to
pay loan
I: WON the spouses are both liable for the payment of the loan? - YES
R:
- Art. 121 of FC:
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) xxx
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses, or by one of them with
the consent of the other
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities,
the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties
- Spouses never denied that the sum was used to purchase a house and lot and
they never denied that they used this house and lot as their conjugal home, which
obviously was for the benefit of the family.
- Since wife admitted to the loan, wife binds conjugal partnership since proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family THEREFORE defendant-husband and
wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan
*Respondents also had to pay for moral damages because Manuel Abelardo
threatened Honorio as evidenced by 2 separate testimonies
FROM BOOK:
Spouses are solidarily liable (From Art. 1207 CC - a liability shared by two or more
debtors to two or more creditors and that given any one creditor the right to
demand or each one of the debtors bound to render entire compliance with
obligation) for expenses of the family.
Selanova v. Mendoza (1975)
FACTS:
- Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross
ignorance of the law for having prepared and ratified a document dated November 21,
1972, extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his
wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would
withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the
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other and that they waived their "right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of
infidelity" either one would commit against the other.
- Judge Mendoza in his comment on the charge purposed to convey the impression that
he was aware of the invalidity of the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it and
assured the spouses that they would ask the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
(where they were residing) to approve the agreement. That pretension is disbelieved
by the Judicial Consultant.
- Respondent Judge alleged that he relied on the provision that "the husband and the
wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code).
- In that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the
spouses by allocating to the husband a thirteen-hectare riceland and to the wife the
residential house and lot. The last paragraph of the instrument, which licensed either
spouse to commit any act of infidelity, was in effect a ratification of their personal
separation. The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the following
provisions of the Civil Code:
ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and
wife;
ISSUE: WON the agreement separating the conjugal property and the spouses is
void.
RULING: YES. The Judge Mendoza overlooks the unmistakable ruling of this Court in the
Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson case that judicial sanction for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage should be "secured beforehand." Also, it
must be underscored that the extra-judicial dissolution w/o judicial approval is void.
- The case was not referred to a Judge of the Court of First Instance for investigation
because actually no factual issues necessitate a hearing and presentation of evidence.
Judge Mendoza already admitted that he was responsible for the execution of the
questioned document.
- Judge Mendoza retired on February 27, 1975 when he reached the age of seventy. In
his letter of April 8, 1975 he asked for a compassionate view of his case considering his
forty-three years' service in the government (he started his public career in 1932 as a
policeman and became a justice of the peace in 1954). He also cited the financial
predicament of his big family occasioned by the delay in the payment of his retirement
and terminal leave pay.
- Taking into account that circumstance and his apparent good faith and honest desire to
terminate the marital conflict between the complainant and his wife, we are of the
opinion that a drastic penalty should not be imposed on him. But he deserves a severe
censure for his mistake in preparing and notarizing the aforementioned immoral and
illegal agreement. Such severe reprimand should not be an obstacle to his enjoyment
of retirement privileges, assuming that there are no causes for depriving him of such
benefits.
- WHEREFORE, the respondent is severely censured.
F. Sales and Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between
the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage. (133a)
Arriola v. Arriola (2008)
FACTS:
- Petitioner Anthony Arriola and respondent John Arriola were sons of
decedent Fidel Arriola. The former with his first wife Victoria Calabia, and the
latter with his second wife named Vilma.
- On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering the partition of
the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John
Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares
of one-third (1/3) each; the decision became final on March 15, 2004
- The parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land,
respondent sought its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it
- The public auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset
when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house standing on the
subject land
- Respondent filed with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for
Contempt of Court, praying that petitioners be declared in contempt
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Persons and Family Relations
- The RTC denied the motion
- The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or
improvement erected on the property should not be included in the auction sale
- A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision clearly shows that nothing
was mentioned about the house existing on the land subject matter of the case.
- Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in its adjudication
of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to allege the same
- Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari where he sought to have
the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be allowed to proceed with the
auction of the subject land including the subject house.
- In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari
- Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject house is exempted from partition by public
auction - YES
HELD:
Article 159, FC. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
- The RTC excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged its
existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof as
the deceased owned the subject land, he also owned the subject house which is a
mere accessory to the land.
- Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in co-
ownership by his heirs the CA concludes that any decision in the action for
partition of said estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject
house; and further pointed out that petitioners themselves implicitly recognized the
inclusion of the subject house in the partition of the subject land
- It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in
the complaint for partition. Such omission notwithstanding, the subject house is
deemed part of the judgment of partition for two compelling reasons
- First, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed
part of the subject land. The Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA
- Second, there is no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the
deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein,
any one of whom, under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand
the partition of the subject house
- The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the
physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing restrictions on its
partition:
- The heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from
the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for
a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein (10 year period
in case: 2003-2013)
- The heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the
court finds compelling reasons therefor.
- No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found
any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home.
From the Book:
During marriage, the husband and wife may constitute jointly their family home. It
is the dwelling house where they and their family reside and the land on
which it is situated. It is deemed constituted as a family home form the time it is
occupied as a family residence and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale,
or attachment. It can be sold, alienated, donated, or encumbered, only with the
written consent of the owner, his or her spouse and majority of the beneficiaries of
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legal age. The family home endures despite the death of one or both of the
spouses and continues for 10 years or even longer for as long as there is a
beneficiary who is still a minor, such as descendant, brother, or sister whether
legitimate or illegitimate.
G. Duties Toward Their children
RA 10354 RH Law
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall
be defined as follows:
Xxx
(v) Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to
the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared
responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life
aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
Republic v. Toledano (1994)
F:
- Petition for review on certiorari - “In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor
named Solomon Joseph Alcala” It raises a pure question of law.
- Spouses Alvin A Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse filed a petition seeking to adopt
Evelyn’s 12 year old younger brother, Solomon Alcala
- The spouses were married in 1981. Alvin is a natural born citizen of the USA and
Evelyn, a Filipino, is a naturalized citizen of the USA as of 1988.
- They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Solomon.
- He has been under the care of the spouses in 1981 to 1984, and then from 1989
until time of petition. Both Solomon and Nery, his mother (also Evelyn’s mother)
gave their consent to the adoption as Nery is unable to support and educate him.
- Social worker favorably recommended the granting of petition.
- RTC granted the petition for adoption.
- OSG contends that the Spouses Clouse are not qualified to adopt under PH
Law.
W/N aliens Alvin and Evelyn Clouse have the right to adopt Solomon under
PH Law
H: NO
- Arts. 184 and 185 of the Family Code categorically disqualifies the spouses.
Art 184, FC The following persons may not adopt:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or
her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law.
- As an alien, Alvin is not qualified to adopt. Evelyn falls under the exception (a) but
the couple still does not qualify to adopt because of Art 185 which states that:
Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
- Joint adoption is mandatory. As such, Alvin’s disqualification means the couple
cannot qualify.
- “As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is
but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.”
Johnston v. Republic (1963)
“Surname of adopted child to follow that of adopter.”
Facts:
· On June 24, 1960, petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a
petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion
Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old, then under the custody of the Hospicio
de San Jose, an orphanage situated in the city of Manila. The petition shows
that petitioner-appellant is 48 years old, married to Raymond Arthur Johnston;
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that the couple are childless.
· The petitioner-appellant filed a motion on October 24, 1960, praying that
the surname given to the minor be “Valdes Johnston”, instead of “Valdes” only,
but this motion was denied by the lower court in its order of October 31, 1960.
Hence, this appeal.
· Petitioner-appellant argues that since she is now using the surname of her
husband by virtue of Article 370, par. 1 of the new Civil Code, and because
that is the surname (Valdes Johnston) she used in filing the petition in the
present case, under which she testified at the time of the trial, and under which
she is now known to all her relatives, friends and acquaintances, she had to be
known by her maiden surname, and the lower court should have decreed that
the minor whom she adopted should be allowed to bear the surname she is
now using.
· She also argues that the use of the surname “Valdes” by the adopted
child, as prescribed by the lower court, will create the impression that she is
the illegitimate child of petitioner- appellant begotten before her marriage, a
situation which is humiliating to both adopter and adopted.
Issue:
· WON the RTC is correct in ordering the use of VALDES for the adopted.
YES
Doctrine/Ruling:
· Lower Court was correct in authorizing or prescribing the use of Valdes as
the surname of the adopted child.
· The Solicitor General in reply argues that while it is true that a married
woman is permitted to add to her surname her husband’s surname, the fact
remains that appellant’s surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married
woman has a surname of her own to which may be added her husband’s
surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname
Valdes Johnston, much confusion would result because the public would be
misled into believing that she was adopted by appellant’s husband also, which
is not true in this case.
· The provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the
adopted minor to the use of the adopter’s surname, refers to the adopter’s own
surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage.
· She made the adoption singly without the concurrence of her
husband, and not as a married woman, her name as adopter was her
maiden name.
· The adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter
and the adopted, and the consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes’
husband, to the adoption by her individually, did not have the effect of
making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of
Johnston’s own surname.
· To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the
adopter, would mislead the public into believing that he had also been
adopted by the husband, which is not the case.
· And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband’s
consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually
joined in the adoption.
H. Other Rights and Duties
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF
UNMARRIED COHABITANTS
A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and respect, Mutual Help and Support
B. Exercise of Profession
RA 9262 VAWC Act
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the
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dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
C. Use of Surname
Silva v. Peralta (1960)
FACTS:
- In 1944, Esther Peralta (respondent) met Saturnino Silva, an American
citizen and officer of the United States Army
- Despite being married to an Australian citizen, Saturnino proposed a
marriage to Esther, making her believe that he was single
- Their marriage was allegedly solemnized by Father Cote, but no
documents of marriage were prepared nor executed
- In 1945, Silva sustained serious wounds and was transferred to the US
for treatment
- He divorced his Australian wife in the States, and thereafter married
Elenita Silva
- When Saturnino went back to the PH, Esther demanded support for their
child
- Action was filed against Esther by Elenita, seeking to enjoin her from using
the surname Silva
ISSUE: W/N Esther should be enjoined from representing herself to be the
wife of Saturnino
HELD: Yes.
- The fact that there were no marriage documents executed of any kind
prior to, during or after the marriage, and the vigorous denial of the
marriage by Saturnino, the Court concluded that no marriage had ever
taken place
- Thus, it is not proper for Esther to continue representing herself as the
wife of Saturnino
- As to plaintiff Elenita Silva’s claim for moral damages, the Court held that
she is not entitled to such given that Esther had acted in good faith, Silva
having introduced her to other persons as Mrs. Silva, and sent her letters
thus addressed
- Instead, it is Peralta who must be indemnified since she suffered loss of
employment due to the litigation
- Damages must be exclusively shouldered by Saturnino Silva (he being
the one who misled Peralta into invalidly marrying him)
D. Property Relations
FC
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
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cohabitation. (144a)

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph
of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith. (144a)

Valdes v. RTC (1996)

E. Sales and Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa

F. Custody and Support of Children

RELIEF FROM COURTS