RULE 72

Lim v. CA
323 SCRA 102 (2002)

Rufina Lim is the surviving spouse of Pastor Lim whose estate is the subject of probate
proceedings. The private respondents are corporations which own real properties. When
Pastor Lim died, Rufina filed for the administration of the estate. The properties which were
owned by the corporations were included in the inventory of the estate. They filed for the
exclusion of the properties from said estate and the cancellation of the annotation of lis
pendens in the TCTs of said properties.

The RTC granted the motions. However, Rufina filed an amended petition which averred
that such corporations were owned by Pastor Lim, that such were dummies of Pastor Lim,
that those listed as incorporators are there only for the purpose of registration with the
SEC, and that the real properties, although registered in the name of the corporations, were
actually acquired by Pastor Lim during his marriage with Rufina. The RTC acting on such
motion set aside its order and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate the lis pendens.
The respondent filed for certiorari with the CA which granted its prayer.

Rufina Lim disputes such decision and urges that not only are the properties of the
corporations part of the estate but also the corporations themselves. She cites that Pastor
Lim during his lifetime organized and wholly owned the 5 corporations.

May a corporation in its universality be the proper subject of and be included in the
inventory of the estate of a deceased person?

The real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Lim are in the
possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which
under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders and in
the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand. A corporation by
legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by
law with a character alien to the persons comprising it. But “when the fiction is urged as a
means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or
generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and
isolates the corporation from will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an
aggregation of individuals.”
The test in determining the applicability of piercing the veil of corporation fiction is as
follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control but complete domination
not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction
attacked so that the corporate entity as of this transaction had at the time no separate
mind, will or existence of its own. 2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal
duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiff’s legal right. 3) The control
and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury. The absence of these elements
prevent the piercing. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence that would justify such piercing.
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by a corporation of all or nearly all of the capital
stock is not sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate
personalities.

Limjoco v. The Estate of Pedro Fragante

80 Phil 776 (1948)

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission
issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing
said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims
that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

May the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality?

Yes. Under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical
person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should be
noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved
the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent
of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged
and decreed”.

Vda. De Manalo vs. CA

349 SCRA 135

Troadio Manalo died intestate survivied by his wife Pilar S. Manalo and his eleven (11)
children who are all of legal age. Respondents (eight of the surviving children) filed a
petition with the RTC of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of Troadio. Pilar, the
widow, along with 3 of the children, filed their opposition to the petition arguing that the
petition should be dismissed due to non-compliance with condition precedent provided for
in Article 222 of the Civil Code. The RTC of Manila admitted the opposition only for the
purpose of considering its merits. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with the CA. CA dismissed the petition as well as the MR. Hence, this petition for review.

(1) Did the CA err in upholding the questioned order of the RTC?
(2) Should the condition precedent as provided for in Art 222 be complied with?

(1) No. It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the petition shall be
controlling. The petition filed by respondents contains sufficient jurisdictional facts
required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. The petition should be
allowed.
(2) No. The argument is misplaced. Art 222 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It
must be emphasized that the oppositors are not being sued for any cause of action as in fact
no defendant was impleaded therein.

Angela Rodriguez vs. Hon. Juan De Borja

GR No. L-21993 June 21, 1996

Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb. 12, 1963 in the City of Manila. On March 4, 1963,
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported will of Fr. Rodriguez. Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez filed for petition of
leave of court to examine the will but withdrew the same before the court could act on the
petition. They then filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for settlement of the intestate
estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging among others that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of
Paranaque, Rizal and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be
appointed as Special Administrator. Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a
petition for the probate of the will delivered by them. The Rodriguez claim that since the
intestate proceeding in the CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00am on March 12,1963 while the
petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Bulacan at 11:00am on the same date, the latter
court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing Section 1 Rule 73
which provides that: “xxx The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.”

Was the CFI of Rizal vested with jurisdiction?

No. The jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan became vested upon delivery of the will of the late
Fr. Rodriguez on March 4, 1963 even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because the will being deposited to the court could, motu proprio, take steps to fix the time
and place for proving the will and issue corresponding notices conformably to what is
prescribed by Sec. 3 Rule 76.

Natcher vs. CA
366 SCRA 385 (2001)

TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and his Six children.1âwphi1.nêt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said they executed and forged an "Agreement of

Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided
among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano
then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land,
leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT
No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into
two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered
under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was
registered under TCT No. 107443.

Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his second wife Patricia as a result of
which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died
leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 55, the six children alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through
the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by
making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987 6 in favor herein
petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no.
186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in
said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been
impaired.

RTC declared the 1) sale null and void, 2) the deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a
valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code
and 3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
compulsory heir of the deceased

CA reversed RTC stating “Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as
advance inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of
(the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding
instituted for that purpose.”

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to
advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

No. CA ruling affirmed

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the
real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question

Under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, was not properly constituted as a
probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

Agapay vs. Palang

276 SCRA 340 (1997)

Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on July 16, 1949. A
few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left for work in Hawaii. Miguel and
Carlina’s only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. During his visit in 1964 to
the Philippines, he stayed with his brother in Zambales. The trial court found that as early
as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in
1972, Miguel refused to stay with Carlina but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old Miguel contracted with second marriage with 19 yr
old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in Binalonan,
Pangasinan was also purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee. On October 1975, Miguel and
Cornelia Palang executed a deed of donation as a form of compromise agreement. The
parties agreed to donate their conjugal property to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were
convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later, Miguel died.

On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia filed an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of the Riceland and house and lot both located at Binalonan,
Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda Agapay. The
RTC dismissed the case and ruled in favour of Agapay. On appeal, the respondent court
reversed the trial court’s decision and declared Carlina and Herminia Palang the owners of
the properties in question.
Whether or not the court erred in not declaring Kristopher Palang as Miguel’s illegitimate
son and thus entitled to inherit Miguel’s estate?

No. The issue is resolved in the respondent court’s pronouncement regarding Kristopher’s
heirship and filiation “inasmuch as question as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof
of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and
claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for that purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action
xxx.”

Pascual vs. CA
300 SCRA 214 (1998)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Don Andres Pascual died intestate and was survived by his wife Adela, and several siblings,
half-siblings and their respective children, one of which is the petitioner, Olivia Pascual who
is an illegitimate daughter of one of the decedent’s brothers.

Adela filed with the CFI a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her
husband, and hired one Atty. Santos, herein private respondent, as counsel, for a fee
equivalent to 15% of the gross estate of the deceased.

In a compromise agreement with the other heirs, Adela was awarded ¾ of the estate of his
husband while the rest go to the other heirs. Upon her death, she left a will naming
petitioner as sole universal heir.

The probate court rejected the claim of the petitioner to Adela’s estate, being illegitimate
children of the brother of the decedent.

The court redistributed the property and awarded the private respondent’s attorney’s fees
to the objection of petitioner who claimed that the award for attorney’s fees was void from
the beginning because it was made after the trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the
attorney’s client by reason of her death.

Did the trial court have jurisdiction to make the questioned award of attorney’s fees?

The basic flaw in petitioner’s argument is the misapplication of the rules on the extinction
of a civil action in special proceedings. The death of Donñ a Adela did not ipso facto
extinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or require him to refile his claim with
the court hearing the settlement of her testate estate. Had he filed the claim against Donñ a
Adela personally, the rule would have applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don
Andres.

The rule does not have the effect of divesting the intestate court of jurisdiction. Its
jurisdiction subsists because the proper party in this case is the estate of Don Andres,
which is distinct and separate from that of Donñ a Adela who merely served as the former’s
administratrix. Donñ a Adela was merely a representative party, and the claim was an item of
the administrative expense of Don Andres’ estate. It is well-settled that a monetary claim
against the person administering an estate, in relation to his or her acts of administration,
in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court where a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate is pending.

Petition denied.

Nazareno vs. CA
343 SCRA 637

On 15 March 1985 Natividad Nazareno filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
Damages against spouses Romeo and Eliza Nazareno. Natividad avers in her complaint that
she is the sole and absolute owner of a parcel of land located in Naic, Cavite, covered by TCT
No. 51798. In April 1981 Natividad's brother, Romeo, and his wife Eliza convinced
Natividad to lend them TCT No. 51798 to be used as collateral to a loan the proceeds of
which would be used in the completion of the construction of the Naic Cinema on the
subject property. Natividad agreed on the condition that title to her property would be
returned within one year from the completion of the construction of the cinema.
Accordingly, Natividad executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses Romeo and
Eliza over the lot. The sale was simulated because Natividad did not receive any
consideration therefor.

The cinema was completed but despite several demands by Natividad, the spouses refused
to return Nativiidad’s title to the property, and had it transferred in their name.

Spouses Romeo and Eliza alleged that the property is their inheritance and originally
formed part of the estate of their late father Maximo Nazareno, Jr. The deed of sale was only
resorted to for the purpose of distribution which was entrusted to Natividad.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Romeo. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision and rule in favor of Natividad.

On November 1996 Natividad filed a Manifestation and Motion with the Regional Trial
Court of Naic praying for the issuance of a writ of execution as well as a writ of possession.
Romeo and Eliza filed an Opposition contending that Natividad’s complaint never prayed
that she be placed in possession of Naic Cinema. Neither did the Court of Appeals order that
petitioner be placed in possession of the property.

On 21 February 1997 the trial court granted the writ of execution but denied the issuance
of a writ of possession as it was not included in the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals stated that Execution not in harmony with the judgment has no validity. It
must conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of
the decision, as the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution.

Should the writ of possession be granted?

No. Petition denied. Petitioner cannot validly claim possession over the Naic Cinema since
in her complaint and subsequent pleadings, she has admitted not being the owner thereof.
On the contrary, she claims that the Naic Cinema belongs to the estate of her father. On the
other hand, respondent spouses have asserted dominion over the Naic Cinema. Plainly,
petitioner cannot wrest possession of the moviehouse from respondent spouses through a
mere writ of possession as she herself even disclaims being the owner thereof. Ownership
over the Naic Cinema must be threshed out in a proper proceeding. A mere prayer for the
issuance of a writ of possession will not suffice.
 RULE 73

Heirs of Sps. Sandejas vs. Lina

GR No. 141634, February 5, 2001
351 SCRA 541

On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that
letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife,
REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17, 1955. The lower court granted the petition
and issued the letters of administration. On April 19, 1983, a motion to intervene and
petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7,
1982, He and Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs,
administrators, and assigns, to sell in their entirety several parcels of land which formed
part of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas. Among the terms and conditions in their
agreement, was the disclosure that the parcels of land were subject of settlement
proceedings and that he has already filed a motion with the Court seeking authority to sell
the lands but was delayed due to the burning of the records of the case which records are
presently under reconstitution and that the parties shall have at least ninety (90) days from
receipt of the Order authorizing Sandejas, in his capacity as administrator, to sell all the
parcels of land, within which to execute the deed of absolute sale covering all above parcels
of land. In 1985, the counsel for Elidorio Sandejas informed the court of the latter’s death.
Subsequently, Lina filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for letters of administration and
consolidation of the cases. The cases were consolidated and thereafter, Lina filed a Motion
for his appointment as a new administrator of the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas,
which was granted by the court. The heirs of the Spouses Sandejas filed a motion for
reconsideration and the appointment of Sixto Sandejas as another administrator of the
intestate estate of his mother Remdios Sandejas. Lina did not object subject to the condition
that Sixto also be appointed as administrator for the estate of his father Elidorio Sandejas.
The court granted the motion. On November 29, 1993, Lina filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to
approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro Sandejas,
Sr.; (b) to compel the heirs of the Spouses Sandejas thru their administrator, to execute a
deed of absolute sale in his favor. The court granted Lina’s motion for approval. On appeal,
the CA overturned the RTC’s ruling and held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr.
and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that
the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas
until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court.

Can the trial court acting as a probate court approve the sale and compel the
petitioners to execute [a] deed of conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P.
Sandejas Sr.?

Yes. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 &
86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the
appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized
powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the
estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner,
so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the
heirs and the beneficiaries. In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle
the decedent's obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the
jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on
whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty --
will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

Barretto Realty Dev. Inc. vs. CA

GR No. L-62431, August 3, 1984

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Drepin were initiated shortly after his
death on July 29, 1972 with the filing of a petition for probate of his holographic will on
August 23, 1972.
Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin will, on August 23, 1972, 9 offers
had been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM Management
Phils., dated August 15, 1978, through its President Honor P. Moslares. Basis for Moslares'
letter proposal is a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent in his favor on
October 9, 1970. It appears that on said date, the deceased sold 80.3980 hectares of land
absolutely and perpetually to Honor P. Moslares for the sum of P2,600,000.00 with a
downpayment of P300,000.00. To secure the payment of the remaining P2,300,000.00, the
latter mortgaged the land to the former. The parties further agreed not to register the sale
yet until P1,300,000.00 shall have been paid to Drepin and P1,000.000.00 paid to Drepin's
creditors.
Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings No. 7257, 7261 and 7269 herein
respondent Moslares, on August 15, 1978, informed the Judicial Administrator Atty. Tomas
Trinidad that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the Special
Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with
mortgage in accordance with the terms of his written proposal. The probate court, on
August 17, 1978 issued an order approving respondent Moslares' proposal and authorizing
administrator Trinidad to enter into the appropriate agreement. This was reiterated by the
court in its order dated January 9, 1979, with the condition that GM Management Phils. had
only up to February 28, 1979 to comply with its letter-offer dated August 15, 1978 and
"failure on their part to comply with the same within the period specified, the contract with
the decedent shall be deemed resolved and ineffective." Counsel for heir claimant Cornelia
Tejano was Revise given up to said date to make and submit a more beneficial offer. Neither
GM Management nor counsel for Tejano was able to perform as required.
Several exchanges between Moslares and the administrator of the Estate was made in order
to accommodate extension of payment for the said parcel of land.
The probate court finding the Motion of the Administrator well-taken and in the best
interests of the Estate, the administrator is authorized to enter into agreement with any
other interested parties on a first paid first served basis without prejudice to G.M.
Management Philippines to continue with its offer and make good the same in as an
ordinary buyer on the same first paid first served basis. Respondent Moslares filed a
motion for reconsideration. the probate court issued an order denying respondent
Moslares' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. And on October 10, 1980
administrator Trinidad executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc.
transferring the titles to the properties in question in the name of the latter. The same was
duly registered. On October 20, 1980, the probate court approved the report of
administrator Trinidad dated October 16, 1980, with xerox copies of the Deed of Sale in
favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. of the estate of Nicolai Drepin pursuant to respondent
court's order authorizing the sale, and of the approved Deed of Undertaking with the
vendee.

Respondent filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig,
Metro Manila to determine title and ownership over the Drepin lands.

On June 23, 1981, a petition for certiorari was filed by respondent Moslares before the
Court of Appeals which issued a temporary restraining order. Judgment was rendered by
respondent court in favor of respondent Moslares, the dispositive portion of which has
been quoted.
Barretto filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on November 12, 1982.
Hence, this petition.

Does the probate court have the power to rule on the said sale of parcel of land?
Yes. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of the
latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate (Rule 89, Revised Rules of Court).
Thus, respondent bound himself under an agreement with the court separate and distinct
from that which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such contract, the court merely
seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which had ceased to be a working
proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the probate court. Though of limited
and special jurisdiction, it cannot be denied, however, that when the law confers
jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise
such jurisdicton to make it effective (Zuniga v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 740).
We cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin estate will never be settled
and liquidated because even if Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price of the Drepin
lands, still the probate court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective buyers. Under
the theory of respondent, it is insisted that the probate court has no authority to cancel his
unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding the fact that he failed miserably to comply with the
terms of his own offer to buy. It is to be remembered that Moslares had already been
granted undue leniency by the probate court to meet his obligations to pay. But, the saga of
Moslares' bouncing checks remains.It is also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's
contract of sale with decedent that had been invalidated but rather the administrator's
authority to sell to respondent. Although the court recognized the Deed of Sale with
Mortgage, still the same was not being enforced as such but was used only as basis for the
terms and conditions of respondent's agreement with the court. To enforce the same is
truly beyond the scope of the probate court's jurisdiction. The court's actions constitute a
refusal to pass upon the validity of the contract to sell.
Further, the probate court has ample discretion in determining whether conditions of a
particular sale would be beneficial to the estate and this is generally respected by the
appellate courts.
 RULE 74

Ilustre vs. Alaras

34 Phil 211

Plaintiff alleges, and the fact is not denied, that he was appointed as administrator of the
estate of the deceased Francisco Calzado. The record fails to show when he was appointed.
Nearly six years after the death of Calzado, Ilustre, as administrator, commenced the
present action to recover the property of the deceased. Defendant Alaras Frondosa
demurred, alleging that the plaintiff was not the proper party to bring the action and the
facts alleged were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. During the trial, Alaras
Frondosa showed by oral and documentary proof that he was in possession of the land in
question; that he had purchased the same from some of the nephews and heirs of the
deceased Francisco Calzado; that he had purchased the interest of all the heirs except
perhaps three. However, there was no proof adduced during the trial to show that any of
the heirs of the deceased were minors or that there were any debts existing against the said
estate.

Can Ilustre recover the subject property?

No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of
a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded
immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of
debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said
property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that
privilege. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion
for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among
the heirs. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the
appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the
present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation,
they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.

Tomias vs. Tomias

GR No. L-3004, May 30, 1951

REYES, J.:

Eustaquio Tomias died intestate in 1920, and was succeeded in the possession and
enjoyment thereof by his 7 children. Two of these, however later died, Leon in 1931 and
Josefa in 1944. It is claimed that Josefa was survived by a daughter named Filomena Tomias.
Leon, who had married twice, was survived by 4 children — Conrado Magdalena, Dolores,
and Anicetas — the first two, by the first marriage, and the other two by the second
marriage. It is claimed, however, that Leon also has a natural son named Filemon Tomias.

Leon’s children Conrado and Magdalena, in conjunction with their cousin Filomena filed a
complaint their aunts Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Enrica, and Agustina, alleging that their
deceased grandfather Eustaquio was the absolute owner of the 15 parcels of land in
Occidental Negros and that the defendants had been refusing to divide it among the heirs
and to give plaintiffs their share of the products. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for partition
and accounting. For refusing to join as plaintiffs, Dolores and Anicetas (the two other
legitimate children of Leon) were included as defendants. Court rendered its decision,
declaring plaintiffs and defendants owners in common of the 15 parcels of land.

Some 5 months thereafter the defendants, together with Filemon, an alleged natural son of
Leon, sought to annul it on the ground (1) that the court did not have jurisdiction over the
case because some of the parcels of land partitioned among the heirs did not belong to the
deceased Eustaquio Tomias but to other persons not made parties to the suit, and (2) that
not all of the heirs were represented in the suit because Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural
child of Leon Tomias, had not been made a party therein.

May the judgment in the partition case be voided?

No. The judgment in the partition case may not be voided on the mere allegation that some
of the parcels of land partitioned were the property of persons not made parties to the suit
when none of those persons has come to the court to protest. There is no showing that
Toribia Tomias has been prejudiced by the adjudication of one-seventh of the inheritance to
Enrica Tomias, the court having found that Toribia and Enrica are one and the same person.
There is no claim that Toribia is entitled to more. Lastly, the claim of Filemon Tomias for a
share in the inheritance as an alleged natural son of Leon Tomias does not call for the
annulment of the decision in the partition case. That claim should be asserted in separate
action against the four legitimate children of Leon Tomias to whom the latter's share in the
inheritance was adjudicated in the partition.

Dolores vda. de Gil vs. Agustin Cancio

14 SCRA 797

Carlos Gil, Sr. died intestate, institution his widow Isabel as his exclusive heir subject to the
condition that should the latter die, the estate, if any, would be inherited by Carlos Jr., Carlos
Sr.’s adopted son.

During the Japanese occupation, the widow Isabel and adopted son Jr. secured a loan from
Agustin Cancio and in payment thereof, they agreed to transfer Carlos Sr.’s Guagua
properties. When Carlos Jr. died, Isabela as administratix prayed for an order to transfer the
Guagua properties to Cancio or his heirs. The motion was approved by Judge San Jose on
condition that the original of the deed of transfer be submitted to the court for approval.

Isabela died before being able to execute the deed of transfer and such was executed by
Dolores, the widow of Carlos Jr., in her capacity as co-administratix and vendor. Dolores was
thereafter directed by the probate court to pay the estate and inheritance taxes due on the
properties before approval of the transfer.

When Cancio reiterated the petition and requested for the approval of the deed, Dolores
filed a strong opposition on the ground that Isabela and Jr.’s loan and agreement to sell was
without authority of the court.

Can an heir sell the rights to his property under administration?

Yes. It should be noted that when Isabel contracted the loan, she was already the
administratix duly appointed and the exclusive heir to the properties in question. It should
also be borne in mind that under the provision of Art. 1430 of the Civil Code, the widow and
children of the deceased are entitled to certain allowances for their support out of the
estate pending its litigation. It is probably for this reason that Isabel and Jr. borrowed
money from Cancio. An heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have
in the property under administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the
probate court.

Hernandez vs. Andal

78 Phil 196

The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and
Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They
acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land of which he died seized
and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.

On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel to Zacarias
Andal in consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the combined shares of the
intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been
made (among the five brother and sisters.

After the sale, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. Andal refused to
part with the land because the plaintiff could not raise enough money to cover for the value
of the property plus expenses incurred by Andal amounting to P 970. Thereafter, plaintiff
found out that the land was repurchased by the intervenors from Andal which plaintiff
claims to be a fictitious sale.
On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention was filed. The
intervenors alleged that there had been a partition among them and their brother and
sisters "with the share of each delineated and marked, and after partition and delineation
everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his portion in the
partition."

Plaintiff is claiming that there was no valid partition as there was no document evidencing
the same. She further argued through her counsel that "under the Rules of Court agreement
affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed by the
person against whom the proof is offered." Upon this objection, the court ruled that under
Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of
the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to decide the case it
had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties.

Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land by
Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad faith.

Was there a valid partition?

Yes. Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required
public instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of
its effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting
this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties dependent on the
execution of a public instrument and its registration.

The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice,
and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as in this case,
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further
proceeding and a new decision not incompatible with this decision, with costs of this
appeal against the appellee.

Marquez vs. CA
300 SCRA 653

During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve
children. Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land described in TCT No.
47572, wherein they constructed their conjugal home.

In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr.
executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication” vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property
described in TCT No. 47572. Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No.
33350 was issued in his name on June 16, 1982.
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Jr. executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” covering the land described in TCT No. 33350 as well as the house constructed
thereon to three of his children, namely: petitioner Rafael Jr., Alfredo and Belen, both
private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein. As a
result of the donation, TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 46461 was issued in
private respondents name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land. However,
when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572 they immediately
demanded that since they are also the children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to
their respective share over the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute
proved unavailing since private respondents ignored petitioners’ demands.
In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a
complaint on May 31, 1991 for “Reconveyance and Partition with Damages” before the trial
court alleging that both the “Affidavit of Adjudication” and “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos”
were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their
father in making him execute the said documents.
In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner’s action was already barred by
the statute of limitations, since the same should have been filed within four years from the
date of discovery of the alleged fraud.

Has the action for reconveyance prescribed?

Held: No. The facts of the case is an example of a constructive trust. Rafael Marquez, Sr.,
having misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when
in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title
under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established. In this regard, it is
settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribed
in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. For the purpose of this
case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued which was
on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31,
1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred
the action.
Godoy vs. Orellano
42 SCRA 347

In consideration of the amount of P1,000 received by the appellant, Felisa Panñ gilinan, a
document was executed by her giving the appellee, Eusebio A. Godoy, an option to buy a
dredge for the sum of P10,000. The said dredge is the common property of the vendor and
of the brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo, and Paz, all surnamed Orellano. The
condition was that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge within twenty days and
that said option was granted in accordance with the power of attorney executed by her co-
owners who reserved the right to ratify whatever sale might be made, or option granted by
Panñ gilinan, their attorney-in-fact. The latter's co-owners did not ratify the option contract.
Before the expiration of twenty days, the Godoy was ready to make complete payment of
the price, but the appellant failed to deliver the dredge. Godoy then brought suit in the
Court of First Instance against Feliza Panñ gilinan, Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano, Demetrio
Orellano, Guillermo Orellano, and Alfredo Orellano, praying the enforcement of the sale plus
damages or to return to him the sum of P1,000 should the carrying out of the sale become
impossible.

The defendants on the other hand argued that the dredge in question was the property of
the intestate estate of Julio Orellano pending in the CFI of Manila. They further alleged that
Godoy was aware of the fact that the said dredge is under judicial control and could not be
disposed of without judicial authority, which as of the time the case was filed had yet to
authorize the sale mentioned in the complaint filed.

The judge a quo rendered judgment, ordering the defendants to pay Eusebio A. Godoy the
sum of P2,000 with legal interest thereon from February 13, 1919, and the cost and
dismissing the complaint as against the defendants Guillermo Orellano and Alfredo
Orellano. Hence, this appeal.

Can the sale be enforced?

No. A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate court, under a will
devising property to them in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise than
by a direction to pay the debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to the purchaser. A
sale by an administrator of the personal property of the estate, without the authority of an
order of court, or of a will, or under an order of court which is void for want of jurisdiction,
does not confer on the purchaser a title which is available against a succeeding
administrator.

Verona Pada-Kilario vs. CA

GR No. 134329, January 19, 2000
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina
and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land denominated as
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters

During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission
from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When
Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children.
Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since
1960.

The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this
purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered in
the Office of the Registrar of Deeds.

At the execution of the extra-judicial partition:

1) Ananias was himself present

2) Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue.

3) Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria;

4) Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and

5) Higina was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in
this case.

It was to both Ananias and Marciano that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the
said partition.

Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property who
sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot
No. 5881.

Maria Pada sold the co-ownership right of her father Marciano to Silverio.

Thereafter, Silverio demanded that Verona Pada-Kilario vacate the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area.

Silverio filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for
ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses.

The heirs of Amador Pada,,executed a Deed of Donation 9 transferring to petitioner Verona

Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.

Verona Pada-Kilario filed their Answer averring

 1) that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to
them by the heirs of Amador Pada.
2) They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada
executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was
executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children
who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated
only through a private document that was never registered in the office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses.
Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment of reversal.

Is the extra-judicial partition valid?

There is no merit to the instant petition.

We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made
in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires
partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid.

The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a
public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors
to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing
or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited
property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the
heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts
which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of
real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for
convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the
acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally
deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of
property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and
effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership
rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively.

Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the
heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying
the subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the
liberality and tolerance of the Pada family.

Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance
of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time.

Pedagrosa vs CA
GR No. 118680, March 5, 2001
353 SCRA 620

August 1, 1946, CFI granted the petition of spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de
Rodriguez to adopt Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa.

On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal
proportion the estate of Miguel.

On November 21, 1972, private respondents JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all
surnamed RODRIGUEZ filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of
Ozamiz City..

On March 11, 1983, while said case was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an
extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel
and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.

Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes
were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some
parcels to third persons.

Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the
properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto
were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.

Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed
on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the
allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and
the defendants, but the same failed."7

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
Has the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition" already prescribed? Is the said deed valid?

Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period:

(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and in addition

(2) when the provisions of Section 119 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that
all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians.20

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently
then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.

The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De
Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of

fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery
is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively.21

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three
years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983,
was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not
yet prescribed.

Under Section 1 of Rule 74, without the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule
contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement
and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in
the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when
publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs.
Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not
binding on her.

The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial
partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition
executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the
same, is fraudulent and vicious. 23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her
adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral
relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003
of the Civil Code.24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not
aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of
adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria
Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The
complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the
decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from
inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With
this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in
bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.

In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:

This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has
been deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as
heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or
summary settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same
Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right will have
prescribed.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which
was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of
the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under
the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and
did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that
their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its
execution in 1941.

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria
Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only
represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased
Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares.
Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.

Bonaga vs. Soler

2 SCRA 755

Following the death of the spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac in 1935 and 1940,
respectively, intestate proceedings for the settlement of their estate were commenced in the
CFI of Camarines Sur with Juan Garza as administrator of the estate. Upon application, Juan
Garza was authorized by the probate court to sell certain parcels of land pertaining to the
estate in favor of appellee Roberto Soler. The heirs of the deceased wife, Maria Isaac then
sold all their shares and interests over certain parcels of land in favor of appellee Soler.
Sometime during the war, the records of were destroyed. Upon reconstitution of these
records, and in an instant action, Bonaga in his capacity as administrator, sought to annul
the sales on the ground that said transactions were fraudulent and made without notice to
the heirs of Alejandro Ros and prayed for reconveyance of the lands sold, since they were
fraudulently registered under Act 496 in the name of Roberto Soler.

The court ordered the dismissal of the action, sustaining the contention that as
administrator of the estate succeeding Juan Garza, plaintiff was estopped to file an action to
annul the sales, and, moreover, that the action had prescribed. Hence, this appeal.

Was the plaintiff estopped and has the action prescribed?

No. The rule is that a decedent's representative is not estopped to question the validity of
his own void deed purporting to convey land and if this be true of the administrator as to
his own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not be estopped to question the acts of his
predecessor are not conformable to law.

The claim of prescription is also untenable. Actions to declare the inexistence of contracts
do not prescribe (Art. 1410, N.C.C.), a principle applied even before the effectivity of the
new Civil Code. The sale on October 14, 1944 by the heirs of Maria Isaac of whatever
interests or participation they might have in the four parcels of land covered by the deed
may be valid, yet it could not have effected an immediate absolute transfer of title to
appellee Soler over any part of the parcels of land themselves, much less over their entirety.
Necessarily, the sale was subject to the result of the administration proceedings, a
contingency upon which the deed of sale itself expressly founded the transaction. By its
terms, not only was the existence of possible heirs of Alejandro Ros recognized, but it also
provided for the contingency that said heirs could yet be declared or adjudicated in the
administration proceedings as the sole owners of the four parcels being sold.

The subsequent registration of those lands covered by the sale of October 14, 1944 and that
of August 30, 1944, allegedly in the exclusive name of appellee Roberto Soler, gave rise to an
action for reconveyance based on trust. Assuming that this case is one of constructive trust,
and under the theory that actions to recover property held in constructive trust would
prescribe, there is here no showing as to when the alleged fraud was discovered (Article
1391, N.C.C.). Hence, it cannot be said that prescription has tolled the action.

De Borja vs. De Borja

GR No. L-28040, GR No. L-28568, GR No. L-292611, August 18, 1972

Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a
petition for the probate of her will with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The
will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and
administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When
Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of
his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a
second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed
special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in
said proceeding.The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana
Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; In order to put an
end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,
by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose
de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he
heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de Borja. On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement
of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and again, on 8 August 1966, to
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in
both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija
court declared it void and unenforceable. Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal
Court's order of approval, while Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval by the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The validity of the compromise was attacked by
Ongsingco, among others, on the ground that the heirs cannot enter into such kind of
agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja. In assailing the approval of
the CFI of Rizal, OngSingco avers that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory
and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the
decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by
appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly
conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement
between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal representatives..."
The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still
pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued,
bar the validity of the agreement. Upon the other hand, Jose de Borja stresses that at the
time it was entered into, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original
Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not.

Was the Compromise Agreement a valid extrajudicial settlement of the estate of

Francisco Borja?

Yes. The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is
apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and
Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of
P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco — shall be considered as full — complete payment
— settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as
the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by
the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis
Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. This provision
evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at
bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was
merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no
stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.

Lee vs RTC
Gr. No. 146006, February 23, 2004

Dr. Juvencio P. Ortanñ ez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company,
Inc. and owned 90% of the subscribed capital stock. On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortanñ ez died. He
left behind a wife, 3 legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortanñ ez) and five
illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortanñ ez-
Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortanñ ez). On
September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortanñ ez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortanñ ez.
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortanñ ez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the
petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent motion, prayed that the intestate
court appoint a special administrator. On March 10, 1982, the Court appointed Rafael and
Jose Ortanñ ez joint special administrators of their father’s estate. As ordered by the intestate
court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortanñ ez submitted an inventory of the estate
of their father. On two different occasions the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortanñ ez, claiming
that she owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share and her son Jose
Ortanez, claiming he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his
inheritance share in the estate in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in
favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its
president, petitioner Jose C. Lee. They both failed to repurchase the shares of stock within
the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its
name. It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate
proceedings), Juliana Ortanñ ez and her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose
Ortanñ ez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortanñ ez, partitioning the among
themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold. On July 12, 1995,
private respondents Enderes et al. filed a motion for appointment of special administrator
of Philinterlife shares of stock which was opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortanñ ez.
The intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed
private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the
memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to
declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate.
Thereafter, Jose Ortanñ ez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of
the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortanñ ez-Enderes as special
administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer
any shares of stock for her to administer. The court denied said motion and subsequently
issued an order annulling the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On appeal,
The appellate court denied his petition, however, ruling that there was no legal justification
whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose Ortanñ ez, his brother Rafael
Ortanñ ez and mother Juliana Ortanñ ez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of
Dr. Ortanñ ez, without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that
there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the
sale made by Jose Ortanñ ez and his mother Juliana Ortanñ ez to FLAG of the shares of stock
they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was
void.

Is the memorandum of agreement between Juliana Ortanez and her sons valid?

No. What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without
securing court approval have appropriated as their own personal property the properties
of the Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. It is
clear that Juliana Ortanñ ez, and her three sons, invalidly entered into a memorandum of
agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their
knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final
settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate
properties by Juliana Ortanñ ez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortanñ ez) was
invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without
court approval, was likewise void. . It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the
validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano,
we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without
the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
Guevara vs. Guevara
74 Phil 749

CONCEPCION, J.
On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara, executed a will, distributing assorted movables
and a residential lot among his children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara, and his stepchildren.
To his second wife Augustia Posadas, the testator bequeathed, in addition to various
movables, a portion of 25 hectares to be taken out of a 259 odd hectare parcel, plus another
five (5) hectares in settlement of her widow’s usufruct. The balance of the 259 odd hectares
he distributed as follows:
100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testator’s lifetime and for payment of
his debts and family expenses;
108.0854 hectares to his legitimate son Ernesto Guevara, including therein 43.2342
hectares by way of mejora;
21.6171 hectares to ‘mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guevara.’

Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without bond.

On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara,
conveying to the latter the southern half of the 259-hectare lot heretofore mentioned, and
expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of the northern half.
Prior to this sale, on November 1, 1932, Victorino and his son Ernesto had jointly applied
for registration of the big parcel, but in view of the sale from the former to the latter, the
decree was issued in the name of Ernesto Guevara exclusively and for the whole tract, a
certificate of title (No. 51691 of Pangasinan) being issued in his sole name on October 12,
1933.
Fifteen days previously, i.e., on September 27, 1933, Victorino Guevara died, but his will was
not filed for probate. About four years later, Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognized
natural child of the deceased Victorino, and on the assumption that he had died intestate,
brought suit against Ernesto Guevara to recover 423,492 square meters of the tract covered
by certificate of title No. 51691 as the portion that should correspond to her (Rosario) by
way of legitime.
On appeal, decision was made in favor of Rosario but the Supreme Court modified the
judgement and also ordered the production of the will.
Claiming to act pursuant to the foregoing decision, Rosario Guevara commenced on October
5, 1945, special proceedings No. 2646 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the
probate of the will of Victorino Guevara.
On January 31, 1946, Ernesto Guevara, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds that (a) the petition itself alleged that the will was revoked; (b) that
‘whatever right to probate the parties may have has already prescribed’; and (c) that the
purpose of the probate was solely to have Petitioner Rosario declared an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased.
On Appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the order of dismissal. Hence this Petition

Is the petition for probate of the will of Victorino L. Guevara barred by the statute of
limitations, considering that the testator died on September 27, 1933, and that the
petition for probate of said will was filed twelve (12) years later, or, to be exact, on
October 5, 1945?

Supreme Court held that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent
left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition
of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate
in accordance with the will.
Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts
and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must
first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the
will.
It is true, as ruled by the trial court, that the rights of parties ‘should not be left hanging in
uncertainty for periods of time far in excess of the maximum period of ten years allowed by
law’; but the obvious remedy is for the other interested persons to petition for the
production of the will and for its probate, or to inflict upon the guilty party the penalties
prescribed by Rule 76 or declare the unworthiness of the heir under the Civil Code for
concealing or suppressing the testament; but not to dismiss the petition for probate,
however belatedly submitted, and thereby refuse sanction to testamentary dispositions
executed with all the formalities prescribed by law, incidentally prejudicing also those
testamentary heirs who do not happen to be successors ab intestato. That in this particular
case the appealed rule may not work injustice would not excuse its adoption as a general
norm applicable to all cases.
“It is true, as ruled by the trial court, that the rights of parties ‘should not be left hanging in
uncertainty for periods of time far in excess of the maximum period of ten years allowed by
law’; but the obvious remedy is for the other interested persons to petition for the
production of the will and for its probate, or to inflict upon the guilty party the penalties
prescribed by Rule 76 or declare the unworthiness of the heir under the Civil Code for
concealing or suppressing the testament; but not to dismiss the petition for probate,
however belatedly submitted, and thereby refuse sanction to testamentary dispositions
executed with all the formalities prescribed by law, incidentally prejudicing also those
testamentary heirs who do not happen to be successors ab intestato. That in this particular
case the appealed rule may not work injustice would not excuse its adoption as a general
norm applicable to all cases.
Adopting the Supreme Court of New York decision, it was further held that “the Statute of
Limitations upon which the court below has relied, sections 38 to 50 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, Act 190, undertakes to fix limits for the filing of ‘civil actions’, but none for
‘special proceedings’ of which probate is admittedly one. The distinction is not purely
verbal, but based on differences that make the limitation to ‘actions’ inapplicable to ‘special
proceedings’.”

Estate of Olave vs. Reyes

123 SCRA 767
RELOVA, J.
The petition alleged that the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee simple of a
parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-27; herein private respondent
SAMCO, as plaintiff, filed Civil Case No. 4623 with the respondent Court of First Instance of
Davao against respondents, Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their
capacities as co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of
an alleged indebtedness of P19,952.11 and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02; that the then
Court of First Instance of Manila, issued an order directing the administrators to secure the
probate court's approval before entering into any transaction involving the 17 titles of the
estate, of which the property described in OCT No. 0-27 is one of them; that the parties
(plaintiff and defendants) in Civil Case No. 4623 of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
submitted to the respondent court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the
estate covered by OCT No. 0-27 was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim;
that the said Amicable Settlement signed by the herein respondents was not submitted to
and approved by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, in Sp. Proc. No.
25876, nor notice thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings;
that respondent court, despite the opposition of the other parties who sought to intervene
in Civil Case No. 4623 and despite the utter lack of approval of the probate court in Manila,
approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a court
decision which, in effect, ceded the property covered by OCT No. 0-27 with an assessed
value of P31,700.00 to SAMCO in payment of its claim for only P19,952.11; and, that if the
said Order of respondent dated November 10, 1967 is not set aside, the same will operate
as a judgment that "conveys illegally and unfairly, the property of petitioner-estate without
the requisite approval of the probate court of Manila, which has the sole jurisdiction to
convey this property in custodia legis of the estate.
Made to answer, herein respondent SAMCO and respondent judge, among others, contend
that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court, "the same having
been entered into in another independent action and in another court of co-equal rank.
Article 2032 of the Civil Code applies only to extrajudicial compromise entered into by the
administrators of the estate. In the alternative, lack of approval of the probate court of the
Amicable Settlement does not render it null and void, but at most voidable, which must be
the subject matter of a direct proceeding in the proper Court of First Instance."

Does the amicable settlement involved in the Civil Case need approval of the Probate
Court?
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; ..." The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract
may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Sp. Proc. No. 25876) for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amadeo Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed,
otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).
The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court
is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be
able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise
the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and
timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due
course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is
burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or
priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased.

McMicking vs. Magtibay

96 Phil 211

In 1902 one Margarita Jose, died and one Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator
with the will annexed of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, and Mariano Ocampo Lao
Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his sureties. After the execution of this bond said Palanca,
as such administrator, took possession of all the property of the said Margarita Jose. In
1904, Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of Manila. CFI made an order directing
the Palanca to furnish a bond to take the place of the undertaking upon which said Mariano
Ocampo and Dy Cuyao. The bond thus required was duly filed and the new sureties thereon
being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca. In the same year
Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Mariano
Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator.
Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of
the property of the deceased, together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a
part of this report and inventory said administrator filed an instrument signed by all of the
persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partition of the
estate among themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the
payment of all obligations against the estate. The CFI, upon the request of the administrator
and of all parties interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, entered an order in
said agreement. Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving the same,
Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, delivered to the devisees and legatees of Mariano
Ocampo, all of the property of said decedent pursuant to the terms of said agreement of
partition, leaving in the hands of the administrator no property or thing of value
whatsoever belonging to the said estate. From that time forward said administrator has not
had in his possession or control any of the assets of the said estate and has not had any
participation in the management thereof. At the time the agreement for participation was
made and signed and at the time of the distribution of the property of the estate pursuant
thereto, no committee had been appointed to hear claims against the estate of the said
Mariano Ocampo, and no notice had been published to creditors of the said deceased to
present their claims against the said estate in the manner prescribed by law. In 1908,
Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate of said Margarita Jose and
Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead. Palanca refused to render an account of the
property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose. Instead of so doing, he retained
possession of said propertyand funds, absconded with the same, and never returned to the
Philippine Islands. In 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the
court for the appointment of commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the
purpose of hearing claims against the estate. The commission having been appointed and
qualified, a claim was presented to it by the plaintiff based upon the defalcation of said
Engracio Palanca, as administrator, which claim was allowed by said commission and
later approved by the court, which directed that the said claim be paid by Doroteo Velasco,
if he had sufficient funds to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be due by
the commission has been paid to the representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose. In
1905, Pio de la Barretto died and letters of administration were issued to Benito Sy
Conbieng. In 1909, upon the application of McMicking, a committee was appointed by CFI
Manila to appraise the estate of the said Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to
hear claims presented against his estate. The claim so presented against the estate of Pio de
la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the committee thereof. Upon these facts
the court having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits,
without costs. Hence this appeal.

Can there be administration of estate after the consummation of partition and

division?

The Supreme Court ruled that after the partition and division provided for in sections 596
and 597 have been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had
unless there occur the following requisites: 1. There must have been discovered a claim
against the estate "within two years after such settlement and distribution of estate."2. The
creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the appointment of
an administrator. In the case at bar:
1. No debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the
partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions
before it was even discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the
estate to his own use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the
alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed; and

2. No creditor made his application. The necessary conclusion is that the appointment of
commissioners to hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court and
was without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force or effect. It gave no
right against the estate and none against the so-called administrator. This section creates a
statute of limitations which deprives all debts which are not discovered within the
prescribed time of the power of requiring an administration of the estate.

The partition proceedings are proceedings out of court. Consequently there is

no prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of
commissioners, the publication of notice to creditors, and all the other proceedings
necessary in cases of administration in court are not required in partition out of court

It was not the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void of no effect simply
because not all of the debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non
payment cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partition
directly by asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to
the right of partition, such partition cannot legally and validly take place while a debt is
outstanding. The mere fact, therefore, that a creditor was not paid before the partition took
place furnishes no ground for a revocation of the partition. It simply provides a fact which
he may urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequent
administration of so much of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.

Vda. De LOPEZ v. LOPEZ

GR .No. L-23915. 28 September 1970

Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased husband
filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her
legitimate children with the deceased.

In an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and
declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen
days thereafter, or on April 16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, 1
represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding,
together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of, the deceased
Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that
their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them.

The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding
had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of
the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper
remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual distributes.
The Court finds that the said petition to reopen is not in order. In view thereof, the said
petition to reopen is hereby denied for lack of merit.The movants asked for reconsideration,
which was denied, and thereupon appealed directly to this Court.

Is the motion to reopen the estate proceeding proper? Was the motion filed too late?

Of vital importance is the fact that appellants' motion to reopen, as well as the petition
attached thereto, is based on their claim that they are illegitimate children of the deceased.
On the face of such claim they are legal heirs of the deceased and hence entitled to share in
his estate. Having been omitted in the partition presented by the judicial administratrix —
and approved by the Court, they were not bound thereby.

A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties
thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest
which the petitioner had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a
conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others
more than his own of such definitive character to stop all means of redress for a co-heir
who has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive
period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real property of
the deceased may be situated.

The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding
closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from
judgments or orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions
become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this case
appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of
closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on time.

Manotok Realty Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. L-35367 April 9, 1987
On November 21, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a probate court in
the special proceedings of the testate estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, authorized
Vicente Legarda, as special co-administrator, to sell the Legarda Tambunting Subdivision.

On December 10, 1952, Legarda as co-administrator allegedly sold Lot 6, Block 4 situated at
Tondo, Manila to Lucero. The sale was on an installment basis and Lucero paid an initial
amount of P200.00 by virtue of which a receipt was issued by Legarda. Lucero took
possession of the lot.

In 1953, Lucero leased the lot to six persons, one is herein private respondent. Respondent
constructed a house on Lot III, Block 2, and paid P15.00 as monthly rentals.

On July 31, 1956, the probate court issued another order authorizing the Philippine Trust
Company as administrator, to sell the subdivision.

The lessees of Lucero, including the private respondent, defaulted in their payment of
rentals. Ejectment cases were filed however, a compromise agreement was concluded. The
tenants continued to pay monthly rentals to Lucero.

Lucero waited the sending by Legarda of the formal contract but as none came, he could not
make further payments. He went to PTC to show receipts of payment.
The petitioner was subsequently awarded the sale of the entire subdivision. Notices were
published in the newspapers addressed to the occupants to vacate the premises. Petitioner
filed the complaint below for ejectment against the private respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the petitioner to be the owner and entitled to
the possession of the land.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the sale made by
Legarda to Lucero was valid because the former acted within his authority as special co-
administrator and that there was no need for the approval of the probate court of such sale.
It also ruled that there was a consummated sale between Legarda and Lucero because they
had agreed on the subject matter and the purchase price and that the latter paid part of the
purchase price while the former delivered the land.
The petitioner contends the appellate court committed an error of law.

Did the court err when: a) it upheld the validity of the contract of sale between
Legarda and Lucero; and b) it ruled that the approval of the probate court was not
necessary for the validity of the said sale?

The alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero should have been embodied in a public
instrument in accordance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code and should have been duly
registered with the Register of Deeds to make it binding against third persons. The
authority given by the probate court to Legarda specifically required the execution of
necessary documents.
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property
belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the
approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate
court. An administrator under the circumstances of this case cannot enjoy blanket
authority to dispose of real estate as he pleases, especially where he ignores specific
directives to execute proper documents and get court approval for the sale's validity.
Petition granted.
 RULE 75

Nuguid v. Nuguid, et. al.

L-56340, June 24, 1983

Rosario Nuguid died single, without descendants. Surviving her were her legitimate parents
Felix & Paz, and 6 siblings: Remedios, Alfredo, Frederico, Conrado, Lourdes & Alberto.
Remedios filed in the CFI a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years before
her death. Remedios prayed that the will be admitted probate & that the letters of
administration be issued to her. Felix & Paz filed their opposition on the ground that they
were illegally preterited by the institution of Remedios as universal heir, & thus the
institution is void. The CFI held that the will is a complete nullity & will create intestacy of
the estate of Rosario.

May the intrinsic validity of the will be resolved before it has been probated?

Yes. The general rule is that, for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to
an examination of, and resolution on, the EXTRINSIC validity of the will. The due execution
thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted
upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on
the intrinsic validity of the provisions. However, a peculiar situation is here thrust upon us.
The arties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate.
For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, if the case
were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. And in the event of
probate, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: WASTE OF TIME, EFFORT,
EXPENSE, plus added anxiety. These are the PRACTICAL CONSDIERATIONS that induce us
to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of
the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

On the other hand, the heirs were preterited. The will here does not explicitly disinherit the
testatrix’s parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather
than be labelled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one w/c the said forced heirs suffer
from preterition. Such preterition results in TOTALLY ABROGATING the will.

Bernabe v. Vergara
73 Phil 676
Victoriano Zafra was survived by three children: Benito Apolonia and Dominga, all
surnamed Zafra. Benito and Apolonia died, the first leaving a daughter named Irinea, and
the second, three children named Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara, the plaintiffs. The
defendants were the plaintiffs’ aunt Dominga Zafra and the persons to whom she had sold
her share in the common property; namely, Martinez and the Landichos. Dominga Zafra, in
her answer, pleaded a counterclaim, alleging that she had paid certain debts contracted by
Apolonia the deceased mother of plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. These debts
constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by the deceased. The trial court
awarded one-third of the common property to the three children and, at the same time,
ordered them to pay the debts of their deceased mother, Apolonia in the amount of P350.

Did the trial court have jurisdiction to render judgment for the sum of money?

Yes. The court has jurisdiction not only because there was a counterclaim wherein the
amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but because the proceeding was in the
nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance wherein debts left by the deceased
ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties, as was the case.

Furthermore, the question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind
of question that confers jurisdiction upon this Court. The jurisdiction involved is not one
over the subject matter but at most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. It is
not a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but jurisdiction over the issue.

Reyes vs. CA
281 SCRA 277

Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament bequeathing some of his properties to
his wife Asuncion R. Reyes. The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato
Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad
Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default
or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. Upon the death of the testator, respondent filed a
petition for probate of the will before the RTC of Mambajao, Camiguin. Thereafter, some
recognized natural children of the testator filed an opposition alleging among others that
the testator was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he
claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle
who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus Asuncion can not be a
compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.
The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the
witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes, and, therefore declaring invalid the
testamentary dispositions in favor of Asuncion Reyes. Julio Vivares filed an appeal before
the Court of Appeals with the allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent
evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of
her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision admitting
the will for probate but declared the testamentary dispositions in favor of Asuncion Reyes
valid.

Does the probate court have jurisdiction to rule on the intrinsic validity of the will?

No. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its
due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the
testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will’s provisions. The intrinsic validity is not
considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been
proved and allowed.

Castro et al. vs. Martinez Gallegos et al.

10 Phil 306

Marcelina Cuico y Rodis was the owner of a house built of wood and nipa on Calle Cadiz,
City of Cebu. On the 17th of October, 1896, before a notary and the proper number of
witnesses she executed a nuncupative will under which she died and wherein she disposed
of the aforementioned and of some furniture and credits of small importance. By one of its
clauses she bequeathed 10 pesos to each one of her nephews, the children of her brother
Valentin, named Godofredo, Mateo, Quitin, Romana, Salud, and Constancia, all of the
surname of Cuico y Rodis.

On the other hand, Antonio Martinez Gallegos and Evaristo Rodis, under the will, were
appointed executors, and in compliance with clause 4 of the same they sold the house and
ground for the price of 500 pesos to Pedro Ferragut and after a series of sale, the property
is finally sold to Ramon Velez y Santos for the price of 2,500 pesos.

Thereafter, Mateo, Quintin, and Constancia, and another of the name of Ignacio, together
with Teopista Castro challenged the will and thereafter the sale. They allege the mental
incapacity of the testator during the execution of the will. They asked that judgment be
entered in their favor declaring them to be the owners of the property as they are the
intestate heirs of Marcelina Cuico y Rodis .
Is the will valid?

Yes. As the will in question was executed in 1896 under the laws then in force, the
provisions of a law now in force but which did not exist cannot be invoked. It is a legal
doctrine established in several decisions of the supreme court of justice of Spain, that "wills
executed with the formalities of law are presumed valid." It is also a legal doctrine
established among others that "the normal condition of the faculties of the testator is
presumed under the law." And finally it is a legal doctrine, mentioned among other
decisions in that of the 13th of February, 1889, "that is not proper to declare the nullity of a
will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the testator when the notary who authorizes
the instrument certifies that according to his judgment the testator, at the time of executing
the will, was of sound mind." Consequently, neither directly nor indirectly, could the nullity
of the will of Marcelina Cuico y Rodis have been declared either as a fact or as a conclusion
of law.

In the event that the will in question was really null, the proper thing to do would be open
the intestate succession of Marcelina Cuico by means of the procedure established by law;
in which action the declaration of heirs of Marcelina Cuico could be obtained with the right
to demand the nullity of the acts or contracts by virtue of which the property of the
intestate estate has been transferred to third persons.

Maninang vs. CA
114 SCRA 478 (1982)

On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age
81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

xxx xxx xxx

It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City,
Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shall be inherited upon
my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived
continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her
husband Pamping have been kind to me. ... I have found peace and happiness
with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and
especially now when I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and
niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear. I
know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not consider
Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.

xxx xxx xxx

On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the
decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304,
hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).

On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to
be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the
Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the
Intestate Case" for brevity).

On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before
Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge.

Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that
the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was
preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.

On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case.

On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit and in the
same Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased
Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while oppositor
Soledad Maninang is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been
shown to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust. "

Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals

alleging that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of
the Testate Case (September 8, 1980) and denial of reconsideration (December 19, 1980).

On April 28, 1981, respondent Court denied certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order
of dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore,
appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of.

Is the dismissal of the testate proceeding is proper?

No, case is remanded to the lower court.

We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the
Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.

The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will
is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.

Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic
validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical
considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the
controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted
aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case
before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution
on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.

Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it
completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that
calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent
had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance.
Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts as its effects are also different.

By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue
has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court
that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion,
however, that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.

Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding that
respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case,
certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction
may be corrected by Certiorari. 13 And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal,
we harken to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be
entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.

Mang-Oy vs. CA
GR No. L-27421, September 12, 1986

On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and testament"
wherein he appointed his son BANDO TUMPAO to carry out or fulfill his testament and shall
have the power to see and dispose his estate, that Bando shall not change what he has
stated in the will. The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named
therein who at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them.
In implementation of this document, they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an
agreement confirming the contents and execution of the will. On November 4, 1960, the
respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided the property of Old
Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other persons
mentioned in the above-quoted documents. By virtue of this partition, Old Man Tumpao's
title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of the three respondents. It is this
title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for reconveyance. They
had been sustained by the trial court, which, however, was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the "will" executed by Old
Man Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated.

Is the will of Old Man Tumpao and the extrajudicial settlement valid?

No. The will, not having been probated as required by law, was inoperative as such. The
settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of
Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or
allowed in court. However, the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of
the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the said document was executed by
Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows: Art. 1056. If the testator should
make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand
in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA

GR. No. 118671 January 29, 1996

Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline,
all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal
and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. When Hilario died, the
cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents
in accordance with the decedent’s will. Four years after his death, private respondent Maria
Pilar Ruiz Montes filed a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for
the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz and in 1993, Testate Estate of Hilario
Ruiz as executor, filed an “Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds.” Respondent Montes
opposed the motion and concurrently filed a “Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs”
and Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will.” Montes prayed for the
release of the said rent payments to granddaughters Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator’s properties, specifically the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the
holographic will.

The probate court ordered the release of funds to the decedent’s three granddaughters and
further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to
the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond.

In 1993, the court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only “such amount as
may be necessary to cover the espenses of administration and allowanceas for support” of
the testator’s three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in
the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent
Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors.

May the probate court (1) grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the
support of the testator’s grandchildren, (2) order the release of the titles to certain
heirs; and (3) grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the
will?

(1) No. It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be
limited to the “minor or incapacitated” children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator’s death,
provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased’s legitimate
spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled
to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the
right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority. However, the law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does
not extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.

(2) Yes. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can
only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance
to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only
if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon
the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is
made to meet those obligations.

(3) No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the
real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration.”

Fernandez vs. Dimagiba

GR No. L-23938, October 12, 1967

Respondent Ismaela Dimagiba, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the
probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22,
1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The
petition was set for hearing, and in due time, petitioners,all claiming to be heirs intestate of
the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. The Court of First Instance, found that
the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of
estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is
opportunely presented." Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration,
and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and
resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in
estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise
the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."

The Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of
submitting an inventory of the estate, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether
the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of
the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930
testament, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of
the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of
the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate Court held that the decree, admitting the will to probate, had become final for
lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of
implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no
legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had
been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance. Hence, this appeal.

Has the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate become final
for lack of appeal? Has the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling
the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants likewise become final?

As to the first issue, no. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles
all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing
of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so
recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that
"any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . .
where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of
the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the
testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is
denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and
hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the
oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of
the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or
devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can preclude
probate of the revoked testament.

As to the second issue, the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public
policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are
entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition
within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the
same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule
75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of
estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable
or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.

In Re: Kaw Singco

74 Phil 239

The question involved in G.R. No. 43444, Sy Oa, administratrix-appellee, vs. Co Ho,
oppositor-appellant, not being one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but rather of
venue which in turn hinges on a question of fact, i.e., whether the deceased, at the time of
his death, was residing in Camarines Sur on in the City of Manila, pursuant to the ruling laid
down in Reyes vs. Diaz G.R. No. 48754, November 26, 1941, and Bernabe vs. Vergara, G.R.
No. 48652, September 16, 1942, this case is hereby certified to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.

Is jurisdiction the same with venue in the probate of a will?

The court held that they are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate
cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter. But the court declined to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to a Court of
First Instance of a province whether the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however,
including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily
filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in
this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of the residence of the
deceased in the province. The court further sate that if they will consider such question of
residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the
effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents
which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be
commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. Furthermore,
section 600 of Act. No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled
in the province whether he had last resided could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is
contained in law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said
time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject-matter is another.
The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the
Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of
jurisdiction of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province
where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue." (Rule 75,
section 1.) Wherefore, Motion for reconsideration is denied.

Pastor Jr vs. CA
GR No. L-56340, June 24, 1983

Pastor Sr a spanish subject died survived by his wife, two legitimate children Pastor Jr and
Sofia, and an illegitimate child Quemada., Quemada filed a petition for the probate and
allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor, Sr. The Probate Court, upon motion of
Quemada and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire
estate of Pastor, Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. On
December 7, 1970, Quemada as special administrator, instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his
wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the
properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and
his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own
rights, and not by inheritance. On February 2, 1971, Pastor, Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their
opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing Quemada as special
administrator. For two years after remand of the case to the Probate Court, Quemada filed
pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties
subject of said legacy. Pastor, Jr. and Sofia opposed these pleadings on the ground of
pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance.
All pleadings remained unacted upon by the Probate Court.

On March 5, 1980, the Pobate Court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for
March 25, 1980, but upon objection of Pastor, Jr. and Sofia on the e ground of pendency of
the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the Probate Court
required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how much inheritance
Quemada was entitled to receive under the wig. Pursuant thereto, Pastor Jr. and Sofia
submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10, which in effect showed that
determination of how much Quemada should receive was still premature. Quemada
submitted his Position paper dated April 20, 1980. Atlas upon order of the Court, submitted
a sworn statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr.
died) to February 1980. On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being
litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the Probate Court issued the
now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of
the royalties payable by Atlas and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not
inofficious. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on
the ground that the Probate Court gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the
question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of Quemada’s legacy after
prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

Did the court in its Probate Order resolved the issues of ownership and the intrinsic
validity of the will?

No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to
the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule
75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory
of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.

Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific

properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it
confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and
propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the
holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly
authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that
the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit
for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case
274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers
only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of some
properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate administration, but not
so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a property for testate but not for
intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the
implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect
must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the
petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly
implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact
not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing Quemada
to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will,
"considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a
resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will. "

That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in
the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very
subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu.

Reyes vs. Diaz

G.R. No. L-48754. 26 November 1941

The case involves an election protest and questions the jurisdiction of the lower court.
Herein protestant-appellant Emilio Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy but its due filing is
being questioned. The authority of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the ballots
adjudicated to the protestant, which have not been challenged by Apolonio Diaz, is also
questioned.

What is the jurisdiction of the trial court?

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.

In the instant, case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described. Both
parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of candidacy is proven, the
trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question
between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either
case. The real question between them is one of fact - whether or not the protestant's
certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact is proved can the
question of jurisdiction be determined.

Neither is the second question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions
above quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised in the
pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. In order that a court may validly
try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some
instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue, meaning
thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in
the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over
the subject-matter the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings.
Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by
consent either express or implied of the parties. Although an issue is not duly pleaded it
may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This
cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction
over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons
of the parties. At any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a
question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is
without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court.

Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that the

institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may examine all the
ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and which
are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question as to their illegality.
 RULE 76

Fernandez v. Tantoco
49 Phil 380

Basilia Tantoco executed an instrument purporting to be her will, she being at the time a
patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital in the City of Manila. Her death occurred a few days
after the will executed, and application for probate was made by father Vicente Fernandez,
parish priest of Malolos. Opposition to probate was made by three brothers and a nephew
of the deceased. At the time set for the submission of proof with respect to the execution of
the will, the proponent introduced the three attesting witnesses to the instrument, namely,
Vicente Platon, Fidel Macapugay, and Placido Suarez, as well as Aurea Gaspar, sister-in-law
of the deceased who had been in attendance upon her at the hospital. The instrument
shows every external requisite of proper execution, but the trial judge refused to allow it to
be probated, for the reason that the three attesting witnesses are not in harmony upon the
point whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the time and place when
the testatrix and the witnesses affixed their signatures to the document.

For many years Vicente Platon, an attorney of Malolos, has from to time done legal services
for the testatrix; and about the year 1910 he wrote a will for her containing the same
substantial disposition with respect to the property above-mentioned as is found in the
contested instrument. When her final illness came upon her, testatrix expressed a desire to
make some further changes in her will, and Sr. Platon therefore redrafted the entire
document and carried it to the hospital for execution .

Should the will be admitted to probate despite the inconsistent testimonies of the
witnesses?

Yes. In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a
competent attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper
execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person
casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that
should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney, being
conversant with the requisites of the proper execution of the instrument, is more likely to
become fixed on details; and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents
in his memory.

In case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally bound to introduce
all of the subscribing witnesses, if available. With respect to the will now in question a
prima facie case for the establishment of the document was made out when it appeared
that the instrument itself was properly drawn and attested and that all of the signatures
thereto are authentic. These facts raise a presumption of regularity; and upon those facts
alone the will should, be admitted to probate in the absence of proof showing that some
fatal irregularity occurred. And such irregularity must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence before probate can be denied.

Acain vs. IAC

L-72706, October 27, 1987
155 SCRA 100

On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed for a petition for the probate of the will
of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was
written in Bisaya with a translation in English submi'tted by petitioner without objection
raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of
debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the
testament.

On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided that all properties may be
given to Segundo Acain and in case the latter predeceased the testator, such properties shall
be given to the heirs of Segundo Acain. Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it
is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner
in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

After such denial respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for the denial of
motion to dismiss. Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the
trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

Is the authority of the probate courts limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated and can it pass upon the intrinsic validity
thereof before it is admitted to probate?

Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent
Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of
the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will. In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to
dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held
that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On
appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical
considerations. The Court said:

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And
for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again
before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After
all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the
surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the
proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in
connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.

In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition
deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate
of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon
even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the
issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals,supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).

For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his
brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that
one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility.
It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court
could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of
the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved.

Codoy vs. Calugay

August 12, 1999

Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Senñ o Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition for probate of the holographic will of the
deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. In the petition, respondents claimed that the
deceased Matilde Senñ o Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she
executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress
employed in the person of the testator, and the will was written voluntarily. On June 28,
1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for
probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible.
This gives an impression that a “third hand” of an interested party other than the “true
hand” of Matilde Senñ o Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. Petitioners argued
that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every disposition is out
of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the
dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly
done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery. Respondents
presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence.

Is it mandatory to present 3 witnesses as required by law to prove the hand writing

of the testator?

Yes. In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil
Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of
a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the
signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator. We are convinced, based on the
language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word “shall” in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion
and that the presumption is that the word “shall,” when used in a statute is mandatory. In
the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that “the object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact
that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will.” However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as
the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires
three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

De Aranz vs. Galing

L-77047, May 28, 1988
161 SCRA 628

PADILLA, J.:

On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late
Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein
petitioners as legatees and devisees.

On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing on 5
May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. On
the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing was then reset to 12 May 1986.
On the same day, private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo
Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand. During the proceedings,
private respondent was appointed executor. On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices
were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that
they be given a period of 10 days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the
will. On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent
and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which
was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision dismissing the petition. Hence, the instant petition.

Is personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees a

jurisdictional requirement in the probate of the will?

YES. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or
personally. — The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and
place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines
at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage
thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of
residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to
the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person
 named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known.
Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the
allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence
be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and
devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the wig itself
indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. But despite
such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to
petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by
mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

Sumilang vs. Ramagosa

G.R. No. L-23135, December 26, 1967

On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed with the CFI of Quezon a petition for the probate of
a document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on
December 1, 1959.

The petition for probate was opposed by appellants alleging that it was made under duress
and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. also claimed
that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased and
prayed only for the disallowance of the will.

Oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that
“the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of
the decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication of law six
years before his death.” Oppositors also stated that before the testator’s death the parcels of
land are no longer under his name and that he sold the parcels of land to petitioner
Sumilang and to his brother Mario.

Petitioner contends that oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are bereft of
personality to oppose the probate of the last will and testament of the testators; and that
oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of the estate of the aforesaid
testator and no existing valid right whatsoever.
Do the oppositors have a legal standing in the case or an interest in the probate of the
will?

No. The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited
to the extrinsic validity thereof. The alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the
petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is
another. The court finds that they have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree
as provided by law and therefore and are totally strangers to the deceased whose will is
under probate. They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate
which must be protected.

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party has
been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor.

The courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings
of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation
thereto.