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Nicole Tota

Russian, East European, and Eurasian Politics

Professor Markowitz

12 December, 2018

The Self-Determination Lie

In late February and early March of 2014, following Euromaidan and the Ukrainian Civil

War, Russian forces annexed Crimea and on March 16th, a referendum was held, allowing

Crimeans to vote on whether they would like Crimea to become a part of Russia or to remain in

Ukraine. The results of the referendum maintained that a crushing 93 percent of voters were in

favor of the annexation; two days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill that

absorbed the territory into the Russian Federation (“Ukraine Crisis”). The annexation and

subsequent referendum were condemned as illegal by the West, yet Crimea has still not been

returned to Ukraine. In an age in which territorial expansion has more or less declined, due to the

Territorial Integrity Norm, this poses the question of how Russia was able to annex Crimea so

quickly. The Territorial Integrity Norm maintains that any alteration of state boundaries, whether

violent or nonviolent, will be met with resistance and sanctions in the international community.

However, the hold of the Territorial Integrity Norm and similar norms upon states and state

actors is tenuous and circumstantial; by reframing the narrative of the Crimea, Putin

circumvented the Territorial Integrity Norm.

The prevailing narrative that Putin put forth to justify the annexation is that of national

self-determination: though a majority of Crimeans, both ethnic Russian and Crimean Tatar, had

largely ceased claims for separatism by 2014, Russia maintains that these claims were still
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prevalent. Another reason that Putin maintains is that the annexation was intended to protect

ethnic Russians living in Crimea from hostile Ukrainian forces during the civil war. However,

despite these claims, there is no evidence that proves that ethnic Russians in Crimea were in any

particular duress. These arguments explain why, although the annexation was condemned on a

global scale, no measures have been taken to return Crimea to Ukraine, but they fail to explain

how, in a matter of days, the region shifted from Ukrainian control to Russian. Several

arguments have been put forth. The geopolitical and historical claims Russia had upon the

region, which was once an autonomous republic within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist

Republic, then an ​oblast​, and finally “gifted” to Ukraine in 1954, have credence. However, these

arguments fail to consider that if Russia had faced a powerful minority, both the annexation and

subsequent referendum could not have occurred.

Due to a Soviet legacy of both repressive and assimilative nationality policies, the

Crimean Tatars became a consolidated minority with a powerful shared history of deportation

and genocide under Stalin. In theory, these are the ingredients for a powerful nationalist

movement, but the history of repression continues in Ukraine to produce a highly consolidated

and political, yet powerless at the national level, minority. The legacy of Soviet nationality

policy upon the Crimean Tatars, combined with the use of the self-determination narrative,

allowed Russia to both annex Crimea rapidly and justify territorial expansion in an age where it

seldom occurs.

The Territorial Integrity Norm, Self-Determination, and the Crimean Tatars

On the whole, territorial conquest has been declining since the Territorial Integrity Norm

became a dominant force in international policy. The Territorial Integrity Norm, as defined by
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historian M. W. Zacher, is “the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate

boundaries” (Zacher qtd. in Hensel et al. 3). This norm has developed since 1919, with the

passage of the League of Nations Covenant, but did not exist in its present form until 1964 and

the passage of the OAU Charter; in its present form, the Territorial Integrity Norm extends to a

general alteration of interstate boundaries, rather than simply a violent alteration of boundaries

(Hensel et al. 4). Alongside emphasizing the cost of annexation, the Norm indicates the threat of

international sanctions to any state that attempts to alter its boundaries. However, such norms are

tenuous at best: the main force behind a particular state’s adherence to an international norm is

conformity and a desire to be viewed as legitimate and appropriate by the international

community (Finnemore 903). Thus, the Territorial Integrity Norm remained in place as long as it

did both because of the fear of sanctions and the larger fear of being labeled a “rogue state,”

which “entails loss of reputation, trust, and credibility” that would be detrimental to a state’s

international and domestic relations.

In certain cases, “​the international community has shown that it will intervene to reverse

and refuse to recognize armed conquest, which might have discouraged states from pursuing

territorial conflicts against other states” (Watts et al. 75). For example, in the case of the

Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s, the United States refused to recognize any Serbian claims to land

beyond the state’s boundaries (Zacher 228). However, there is a strong prevailing norm that

contrasts the Territorial Integrity Norm: in the West, there existed a non-intervention norm,

which was only broken due to the flagrant disregard to “territorial integrity, violability of

frontiers, human rights, and democracy” that occurred during the breakup of Yugoslavia (Flynn

et al. 525). Additionally, after Yugoslavia, the international community decided upon the norm
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that secessionist self-determination will always be subordinate to territorial integrity, intending to

prevent further regional instability (Flynn et al. 527). But, arguably, the case of Crimea differs

from Yugoslavia in that Russia wielded the self-determination narrative to justify the annexation,

rather than there existing a legitimate internal pressure for succession.

Before Russia’s invasion of Crimea, one of the only contemporary territorial conquests

that had succeeded was Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus, which a decade later resulted in an

independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Though the international community

continues its refusal to acknowledge the new secessionist state, as it constituted a violent change

in state boundaries, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus still exists (Zacher 228). There

exists the possibility that “the eventual outcome of the international opposition to the creation of

the secessionist state could be a reunification of the Turkish and Greek parts of the island and

hence a nullification of a coercive territorial change,” but such an outcome appears unlikely to

happen soon (Zacher 229). This appears to be​ the pattern that Crimea will follow: the sanctions

placed upon Russia in 2014 are still in place, yet “it is generally accepted that a return of Crimea

to Ukraine is impossible for the foreseeable future, at least not until the political dynamics have

changed inside Russia” (Sasse para. 2). Furthermore, Crimea has become an unmentionable topic

in Western policy circles, because the narrative of self-determination and historical claims to the

land has taken hold (Sasse para. 2). However, there is little credence to the self-determination

narrative. A May 2013 survey conducted by Gallup reveals that “53% of Crimeans were satisfied

with the status of the peninsula within Ukraine, and only 23% were interested in Crimea

becoming part of Russia” (Beissinger 483). There is also little evidence to suggest that Crimeans

were under duress due to Euromaidan, and calls for separatism were almost nonexistent, save for
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the Russian nationalists that were dispatched to the area to stoke separatism and nationalism

(Bessinger 484).

This misuse of self-determination to justify territorial conquest arises from a Soviet

legacy. In 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which incorporated the Baltic States, Western

Ukraine, and Moldova into the Soviet Union, was similarly framed as an act of

self-determination (Beissinger 481). This Soviet legacy continues, with the expansion of Russian

control in Transcaucasia, Transnistria, Eastern Ukraine, and, most notably, Crimea (Beissinger

480). The 2008 invasion of Georgia was framed as self-determination as well. These territorial

conquests are in actuality an extension of imperialism, which is not dormant in Russia and has

only increased after Russia’s invasion of Crimea: “according to the Pew surveys, in fall 1992,

shortly after the Soviet collapse, only 36% of Russians agreed with the statement ‘There are parts

of neighbouring countries that really belong to us.’ By 2009, that proportion stood at 58%, and

by spring 2014 (after the Crimean invasion)—at 61%.” Nearly half of all Russians surveyed also

agreed with the statement that it is “natural for Russia to have an empire” (Beissinger 483).

Therefore, it becomes readily apparent that the self-determination narrative is a thinly-veiled

cover for imperialism, especially considering that the annexation of Crimea occurred shortly

after it appeared Ukraine would be leaving Russia’s economic sphere of influence to ally with

the West. The use of the self-determination narrative in this way is not uncommon either, as

“self-determination creates incentives for states engaging in acts of imperialism to frame them as

acts of self-determination and provides a script for the powerful concerning how to minimize

opposition when dominating others” (Beissinger 480).

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However, the self-determination narrative used to justify the invasion of Crimea could

never have succeeded, or succeeded so quickly, if not for the absence of a strong minority: the

Crimean Tatars, because of the legacy of Soviet nationality policy and deportation, were

disadvantaged in terms of how successfully they could resist the annexation. A legacy of

violence at the hands of the Soviet Union increased fears amongst the Crimean Tatars that

similar repressive measures would be undertaken against them during the annexation. This

shared history of mistreatment at the hands of the Soviet Union led to the Crimean Tatars

developing a strong sense of identity and a desire to be a political presence in Ukraine.

Additionally, though the Crimean Tatars are historically a politically active group, with a unified

presence, they are not well-integrated into the Ukrainian government or society. Their council,

the Mejlis, is given limited political power; their media is underdeveloped and poorly

represented; their people are not economically integrated into Ukrainian society, as

“three-quarters of the Crimean Tatar population is still rural” (Wilson 430). The leader of the

Crimean Tatar movement, ​Mustafa Dzhemilev, known in the West as “the voice that carries most

authority in challenging the referendum under which the people of Crimea are said to have voted

overwhelmingly to join Russia,” has been banned from entering Russia (and the Crimea) for five

years (Williams 158). Therefore, as long as the structures remained in place to keep the Crimean

Tatars from having political influence, ​the annexation and subsequent referendum over the

annexation were able to happen.

The Legacy of Nationality Policy On Crimean Tatars

Historically, the Soviet Union pursued a mixed and often contradictory nationality policy

in regards to the Crimean Tatars. From 1921 to 1945, an assimilative nationality policy was
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pursued, which consolidated Tatar identity and strengthened their claims to the land; the Soviet

Union created the Crimean ASSR, known as “​one of the most unusual territorial constructs to

come out of the Soviets’ vast policy of republic construction,” as either an ethno-national

autonomous unit or a multi-national territorial autonomy (Williams 58). As the Crimean ASSR’s

status was left up to interpretation, Crimean Tatar nationalists chose to view the territory as an

ethno-national autonomous unit, recognizing that the Soviet Union considered the Tatars the

ethnicity with the most legitimate claim to the land. In the end, however, the exact status of the

Crimean ASSR was more or less invalid in terms of the Soviet Union’s promotion of Crimean

Tatar national identity. The Crimean Tatars became the unofficial state-sponsored nationality and

were subject to the same ​korenizatsiia,​ or “rooting,”​ ​policies as the other state-sponsored

nationalities. The aim of all of these policies was to promote a multi-ethnic Soviet Union:

Crimean Tatars were granted universal education, promotion and creation of their ethnic history,

and the development of anthropological museums. Underlying this new national history was an

emphasis on the bond between the land and its people, which Historian Brian Glyn writes, “had

the effect of territorializing Crimean Tatar communal identity, and administratively and

psychologically ‘rooting’ this people in their state-sponsored territory” (Williams 85). This

emphasis consolidated national identity where there previously was none, however the

subsequent repressive nationality policy pursued by Stalin had a greater effect upon the Crimean

Tatars.

On May 11, 1944, the Soviet Union targeted the Crimean Tatars as one of seven

nationalities to be deported; the Tatars were accused of colluding with the Germans during

World War II, removed from their previously established homeland in the Crimean ASSR, and
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forcibly resettled in Uzbekistan (Pohl 47). In addition, the Crimean ASSR was downgraded to an

oblast,​ which Crimean nationalists interpreted as a sign that the Crimean ASSR had specifically

been designed to be a Tatar homeland; with the Tatars deported, the Crimean ASSR lost its claim

to autonomous status (Williams 59). This deportation has been instrumental in shaping the

Crimean Tatars’ political future in Ukraine and Crimea. The political, cultural, and economic

rights that the Tatars lost during the deportation still have not been fully reinstated, yet the

memory of their deportation forms the backbone of present-day Crimean Tatar nationalist

identity. Although the Crimean Tatars were effectively banned from returning to their homeland

until the 1980s, thus making them a minority in a previous majority territory, “this memory

constituted an important role in the mobilization of Crimean Tatar political activism aimed first

at returning to Crimea and later struggling for the full restoration of their rights as the indigenous

people of the territory” (Pohl 50).​ A

​ survey conducted directly after the illegal referendum shows

that this legacy carries onward: Crimean Tatars who lost more family members in the deportation

were more politically active as a whole. In addition, as each voter’s family legacy of

victimization increased, the chances that the person would vote against the annexation and

against Russia increased (Lupu et al. para. 13). In this way, the historical legacy of deportation

has directly influenced political activism, but that Crimean Tatars cannot constitute a powerful

minority because this same legacy limits their ability to effectively participate in Ukraine’s

political system.

Since the deportation, the Crimean Tatars have become a minority in their former

homeland: in 2012, a census reveals that Crimean Tatars make up a mere 13.6 percent of the

population in Crimea (Wilson 419). Compared to Ukrainian minority at 24 percent and the
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Russian majority at 58 percent, both demographics that are staunch supporters of Russia, the

Crimean Tatars appear to be one of the only pro-Ukraine forces in the Crimea. However, in

previous referendums, the Crimean Tatars have been instrumental in influencing the vote. In the

1991 referendum after the collapse of the Soviet Union, “​it was only thanks to Crimean Tatar

votes that a slim majority in Crimea, just 54%, voted to back Ukrainian independence” (Wilson

421). In the 2004 Orange Revolution, Crimean Tatars also supported the coup of the pro-Russian

government. However, the power of the Crimean Tatars to enact such change is diminishing due

to actions by the Ukrainian government. The two dominant Tatar political organizations in

Ukraine, the Mejlis and the Kurultai, had previously been politically active and able to enact

change--in the Orange Revolution, opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko won 15 percent of

the votes in Crimea, 12 percent of which Mejlis leaders claim was due to their influence (Wilson

421). However, the Mejlis and Kurultai are not true political entities in and of themselves: the

Kurultai serves as the highest authority in the Crimean Tatar nation, and it selects a council of 33

members for the Mejlis. The Mejlis, meanwhile, serves as the representative of the Crimean

Tatars to the governments of Crimea and Ukraine (Coalson para. 5). However, that political

authority is slowly being removed, as “in 2012-13 leading supporters of the Qurultay were

removed from key positions in the Crimean Assembly and Cabinet of Ministers.” Additionally,

Crimean Tatars “have no voice in the Crimean government despite the fact that they make up

between 10 and 11 percent of the autonomous republic’s population” (Williams 156). To a group

that is already underrepresented, with only 10 percent of local council seats and 5 percent of

administration positions held by Crimean Tatars, the removal struck a decisive blow and
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hindered any political authority the Tatars could have had to vote against the annexation (Wilson

425).

During the annexation itself, when pro-Russian gunmen seized buildings in the Crimean

capital, Simferopol, on February 27-28th, there were protests and clashes, but afterwards the

Crimean Tatars became resigned to the annexation. Historically, Tatar movements for

independence have been peaceful and the Tatar leaders’ response to the referendum does not

deviate from this norm. Due to the legacy of Soviet repression, Crimean Tatars were hesitant to

speak out against the Russian government, as many saw parallels between this annexation and

the deportation seventy years earlier; the presence of 6,000 troops in Crimea awakened fears that

long-simmering ethnic tensions might erupt and that the Russian majority would move against

the Crimean Tatars (Williams 128). One Crimean Tatar phrased it thusly, “​We want to live in

peace. But Russian troops have entered our territory—Ukrainian territory—and armed men are

walking around. It scares us—not just me, but all of us.” Rather than voice their concerns and

protest, as the Crimean Tatars had traditionally done, they settled into an uneasy existence under

Russian occupation. A Crimean Tatar, photographer, and fixer for foreign news crews, Emine

Ziyatdinova, recalls how the annexation caused her grandmother, an outspoken woman, to hide

her political opinions because it brought back memories of when Soviet police arrested her father

in 1937 and she never heard from him again. Ziyatdinova notes that this tension is prevalent: 

“Even at home, people would move to the kitchen if they were to discuss current events. If they

did not agree with the party line, they kept it to themselves” (Gonzalez para. 9). Since the

Crimean Tatars, as a whole, kept their fears about the annexation quiet, this allowed Russia to

pursue the self-determination narrative.

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Consequently, Crimean Tatars refused to take an active role in the referendum. As the

referendum was held at gunpoint, notably falsified, and a violation of international sanctions,

there is little evidence to suggest a large Crimean Tatar voting presence would have swung the

vote in favor of Crimea remaining in Ukraine, but it would have increased visibility for their

cause. ​According to official results, 82 percent of the Crimean population participated in the

referendum, with 95 percent voting in favor of Russia; a report from the ​President of Russia’s

Council on Civil Society and Human Rights that was posted on a major Ukrainian news site, and

subsequently taken down, states that the voter turnout was in actuality 30 percent of the Crimean

population (Beissinger 483). According to the President of Russia’s Council on Civil Society and

Human Rights report, only half of the voters approved the annexation, a vast discrepancy

between the 95 percent that official results claim. As for the Crimean Tatars, less than 1 percent

voted in the referendum and “t​he Crimean Tatar leaders did not recognize the new Crimean

leadership, boycotted the referendum, and did not recognize the subsequent Russian annexation

of Crimea” (Shevel para. 4). Putin appeared to recognize that, even if the Tatars had limited

political rights, the actions of the Mejlis leaders could draw attention to the plight of the Tatars

on a more global scale or the historically peaceful Tatars could become armed insurgents. Before

the referendum, Putin spoke with Tatar leader​ M

​ ustafa Dzhemilev and “reportedly promised ‘to

do everything’ to protect Crimean Tatars from any possible aggression”(Shevel para. 3). Indeed,

that promise has been partially followed through: four days after the referendum, the Ukrainian

Parliament officially granted the Crimean Tatars status as an indigenous people, with a right to

self-determination within Ukraine (Shevel para. 8). However, these conciliatory measures are

just that: conciliatory. As long as Russia’s narrative of self-determination, separatism, and

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protecting the interests of the Russian majority prevails, the Crimean Tatars will continue to be a

unified, politically active minority with little political power.

Conclusion

In an age where territorial conquest is declining, the use of the self-determination

narrative by Russia to justify the annexation of the Crimea is troubling and the absence of a

strong minority allowed the annexation to both occur quickly and be relatively uncontested on a

global scale. Aside from Western sanctions on Russia, which still remain in place, and a refusal

to acknowledge the annexation as legitimate, it appears as though the Crimea will remain in

Russia’s possession until Russian policies change. The Territorial Integrity Norm, the force

which prevented many territorial conquests, both violent and non-violent, from occurring in the

present day, has little sway when countries are able to disguise imperialist actions as

self-determination and protection of citizens, as Russia did during the annexation. In actuality,

separatist claims in Crimea had largely gone dormant by 2014 and there is no evidence that

Russians in Crimea were under any sort of threat.

While self-determination proved to be the dominant narrative, this narrative could never

have occurred if not for the lack of powerful internal opposition from the largest minority group

in Crimea, the Crimean Tatars. Due to a Soviet legacy of repression and deportation, Crimean

Tatars were reluctant to speak out against the annexation, refused to vote in the referendum, and

have been given little power in the Ukrainian government, despite concessions that allow them to

be named Indigenous Peoples. On paper, the Crimean Tatars now have more rights, but, much

like Crimea, any political future is contingent upon the Russian government’s policies. In this

way, the Territorial Integrity Norm has failed to protect those it was put in place to protect. In a
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broader context, on an international level the self-determination narrative needs to be examined

closely: it is more imperialist than it seems.

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