Advanced Training in Fire Fighting Model Course 2.03 PDF

Model Course 2.
03
Advanced Training in
Fire Fighting
First published in 1991 by the
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SR
Second edition 2000
Printed in the United Kingdom by CPC The Printers, Portsmouth
2 4 6 8 10 9 7 5 3 1
ISBN 92-801-5087-1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
IMO wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the

Government of India for its valuable
assistance and co-operation in the production of this course.
Copyright © IMO 2001
.
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may, for sales purposes, be produced,
stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise,
without prior permission in writing from the International Maritime Organization.
Contents
Page
Foreword v
Introduction 1
Part A: Course Framework 5

-"
Part B: Course Outline and Timetable 10
Part C: Detailed Teaching Syllabus 15
Competence1: Control fire-fighting operations aboard ship
Competence2: Organizeand train fire parties
Competence3: Inspect and service fire detection and

extinguishing systems and equipment
Competence4: Investigateand compile reports on incidents

involving fire
Part D: Instructor Manual 45

Introduction
Guidance Notes
Appendix 1: Guidanceon CaseStudies and Group Assignments 53
Appendix 2: Materialfor CaseStudies 57
Appendix 3: Plateswhich can be used to make overhead projector 101

transparencies
Appendix 4: Supporting materialfor the instructor 147
Appendix 5: Mock-up model of training facility for advancedfire fighting 199

.
Attachment: Guidanceon the il11plementationof model courses 205
Hi
Foreword
Since its inception the International Maritime Organization has recognized the importance of
human resources to the development of the maritime industry and has given the highest
priority to assisting developing countries in enhancing their maritime training capabilities
through the provision or improvement of maritime training facilities at national and regional
levels. IMO has also responded to the needs of developing countries for postgraduate training
for senior personnel in administration, ports, shipping companies and maritime training
institutes by establishing the World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden, in 1983.
Following the earlier adoption of the International Convention on Standards of Training,

Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers, 1978, a number of IMO Member Governments
had suggested that IMO should develop model training courses to assist m
the implementation
of the Convention and in achieving a more rapid transfer of information and skills regarding
new developments in maritime technology. IMO training advisers and consultants also
subsequently determined from their visits to training establishments in developing countries
that the provision of model courses could help instructors improve the quality of their existing
courses and enhance their effectiveness in meeting the requirements of the Convention and
implementing the associated Conference and IMO Assembly resolutions.
In addition, it was appreciated that a comprehensive set of short model courses in various
fields of maritime training would supplement the instruction provided by maritime academies
and allow administrators and technical specialists already employed in maritime
administrations, ports and shipping companies to improve their knowledge and skills in certain
specialized fields. IMO has therefore developed the current series of model courses in
response to these generally identified needs and with the generous assistance of Norway.
These model courses may be used by any training institution and the Organization is prepared
to assist developing countries in implementing any course when the requisite financing is
available.
W. A. O'NEIL
Secretary-General
v
Introduction
Purpose of the model courses
The purpose of the IMO model courses is to assist maritime training institutes and their
teaching staff in organizing and introducing new training courses, or in enhancing, updating
or supplementing existing training material where the quality and effectiveness of the training
courses may thereby be improved.
It is not the intention of the model course programme to present instructors with a rigid
"teaching package" which they are expected to "follow blindly". Nor is it the intention to
substitute audiovisual or "programmed" material for the instructor's presence. As in all training
endeavours, the knowledge, skills and dedication of the instructor are the key components in
the transfer of knowledge and skills to those being trained through IMO m~gel course material.
Because educational systems and the cultural backgrounds of trainees in maritime subjects
vary considerably from country to country, the model course material has been designed to
identify the basic entry requirements and trainee target group for each course in universally
applicable terms, and the skill necessary to meet the technical intent of IMO conventions and
related recommendations.
Use of the model course
To use the model course the instructor should review the course plan and detailed syllabus,
taking into account the information provided under the entry standards specified in the course
framework. The actual level of knowledge and skills and prior technical education of the
trainees should be kept in mind during this review, and any areas within the detailed syllabus
which may cause difficulties because of differences between the actual trainee entry level and
that assumed by the course designer should be identified. To compensate for such
differences, the instructor is expected to delete from the course, or reduce the emphasis on,
items dealing with knowledge or skills already attained by the trainees. He should also identify
any academic knowledge, skills or technical training which they may not have acquired.
By analyzing the detailed syllabus and the academic knowledge required to allow training in
the technical area to proceed, the instructor can design an appropriate pre-entry course or,
alternatively, insert the elements of academic knowledge required to support the technical
training elements concerned at appropriate points within the technical course.
Adjustment of the course objectives, scope and content may also be necessary if in your
maritime industry the trainees completing the course are to undertake duties which differ from
the course objectives specified in the model course.
Within the course plan the course designers have indicated their assessment of the time which
should be allotted to each learning area. However, it must be appreciated that these
allocations are arbitrary and assume that the trainees have fully met all the entry requirements
of the course. The instructor should therefore review these assessments and may need to
reallocate the time required to achieve each specific learning objective.
1
ADVANCED TRAINING IN FIRE FIGHTING
• Lesson plans
Having adjusted the course content to suit the trainee intake and any revision of the course
objectives, the instructor should draw up lesson plans based on the detailed syllabus. The
detailed syllabus contains specific references to the textbooks or teaching material proposed
to be used in the course. An example of a lesson plan is shown in the instructor manual on
page 53. Where no adjustment has been found necessary in the learning objectives of the
detailed syllabus, the lesson plans may simply consist of the detailed syllabus with keywords
or other reminders added to assist the instructor in making his presentation of the material.
• Presentation
The presentation of concepts and methodologies must be repeated in various ways until the
instructor is satisfied, by testing and evaluating the trainee's performance and achievements,
that the trainee has attained each specific learning objective or training outcome. The syllabus
is laid out in learning objective format and each objective specifies a required performance or,
what the trainee must be able to do as the learning or training outcome. Taken as a whole,
these objectives aim to meet the knowledge, understanding and proficiency specified in the
appropriate tables of the STCW Code.
• Implementation
For the course to run smoothly and to be effective, considerable attention must be paid to the
availability and use of:
• properly qualified instructors

• support staff
• rooms and other spaces
• equipment
• textbooks, technical papers
• other reference material.
Thorough preparation is the key to successful implementation of the course. IMO has
produced "Guidance on the implementation of model courses", which deals with this aspect
in greater detail and is included as an attachment to this course.
• Training and the STCW 1995 Convention
The standards of competence that have to be met by seafarers are defined in Part A of the
STCW Code in the Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers
Convention, as amended in 1995. This IMO model course has been revised and updated to
cover the competences in STCW 1995. It sets out the education and training to achieve those
standards set out in Chapter VI Table A-VI/3.
Part A provides the framework for the course with its aims and objectives and notes on the
suggested teaching facilities and equipment. A list of useful teaching aids, IMO references
and textbooks is also included.
2
INTRODUCTION
Part B provides an outline of lectures, demonstrations and exercises for the course. A
suggested timetable is included but from the teaching and learning point of view, it is more
important that the trainee achieves the minimum standard of competence defined in the STCW
Code than that a strict timetable is followed. Depending on their experience and ability, some
students will naturally take longer to become proficient in some topics than in others. Also
included in this section are guidance notes and additional explanations.
A separate IMO model course addresses Assessment of Competence. This course explains
the use of various methods for demonstrating competence and criteria for evaluating
competence as tabulated in the STCW Code.
Part C gives the Detailed Teaching Syllabus. This is based on the theoretical and practical
knowledge specified in the STCW Code. It is written as a series of learning Objectives, in other
words what the trainee is expected to be able to do as a result of the teaching and training.
Each of the objectives is expanded to define a required performance of knowledge,
understanding and proficiency. IMO references, textbook references and suggested teaching
aids are included to assist the teacher in designing lessons.
The new training requirements for these competences are addressed in the appropriate parts
of the detailed teaching syllabus. These new training requirements include:
- communication and co-ordination during fire fighting

- management and control of injured persons
- procedures for co-ordination with shore-based fire fighters
- contingency plans and strategies and tactics for control
- requirements for statutory and classification surveys.
The Convention defines the minimum standards to be maintained in Part A of the STCW
Code. Mandatory provisions concerning Training and Assessment are given in Section A-1/6
of the STCW Code. These provisions cover: qualification of instructors; supervisors as
assessors; in-service training; assessment of competence; and training and assessment within
an institution. The corresponding Part B of the STCW Code contains non-mandatory guidance
on training and assessment.
As previously mentioned a separate model course addresses Assessment of Competence and

use of the criteria for evaluating competence tabulated in the STCW Code.
Responsibilities of Administrations
Administrations should ensure that training courses delivered by colleges and academies are
such as to ensure officers completing training do meet the standards of competence required
by STCW Regulation VI/3,.
Validation
Th~ information contained in this document has been validated by the Sub-Committee on
Standards of Training and Watchkeeping for use by technical advisors, consultants and
experts for the training and certification of seafarers so that the minimum standards
implemented may be as uniform as possible. Validation in the context ofthis document means
that the Sub-Committee has found no grounds to object to its content. The Sub-Committee
3
has not granted its authority to the documents, as it considers that this work must not be
regarded as an official interpretation of the Convention.
In reaching a decision in this regard, the Sub-Committee was guided by the advice of a
Validation Group comprised of representatives designated by ILO and IMO.
4
PART A: COURSE FRAMEWORK
Part A: Course Framework

Aims
This model course aims to provide the training in advanced fire fighting in accordance with
Section A-VI/3 of the STCW Code. The emphasis of the training is in organization, tactics and
command.
Objective
This syllabus covers the requirements of the 1995 STCW Convention Chapter VI, Section A-
VI/3 and Table A-VI/3. On meeting the minimum standard of competence in advanced fire
fighting, a trainee will be competent to take command, organize and trBin fire parties and
control fire-fighting operations. The seafarer will have acquired a knowledge of fire prevention
and an ability to inspect and service fire detection and extinguishing 'systems and equipment.
He will also be able to investigate and report on incidents involving fire.
Entry standards
The course is open to seafarers who have completed basic training in fire prevention. All
trainees must be certified by a doctor to be in good health.
Course certificate
On successful completion of the course and demonstration of competence, a document may
be issued certifying that the holder has met the standard of competence specified in Table A-
VI/3 of the STCW Code 1995.
Note: If designated to control fire-fighting operations seafarers must have successfully

completed advanced training in techniques for fire fighting with particular emphasis on
organization, tactics and command. This training forms part of the competence required of all
officers.
A certificate may be issued only by centres approved by the Administration.
Course intake limitations

The maximum number of trainees attending each session will depend on the availability of
instructors, equipment and facilities available for conducting the training. Any practical training
should be undertaken in small groups of not more than six trainees per instructor.
Staff requirements
The instructor shall haye appropriate training in instructional techniques and training methods
(STCW Code A-I/6, pa.7). In addition, all training and instruction should be given by qualified
personnel; the senior instructor, having considerable experience in fire safety and fire-fighting
techniques, should have a good kn9wledge of ships, including stability considerations. All
assistant instructors should have praCtical knowledge ottire fighting and should be familiar with
ships. During any practical training one instructor must be in charge of each group. Staff may
be recruited from the local fire brigade.
5
Training facilities and equipment

Ordinary classroom facilities and an overhead projector are sufficient for the theoretical part
of the course. When making use of audiovisual material such as videos or slides, make sure
the appropriate equipment is available. In addition, a demonstration table measuring 3 m x
1 m would be advantageous. Separate rooms, equipped with a table and chairs, will also be
needed to accommodate three or four groups of trainees during case studies and other group
assignments.
For the practical part of the course it would be advantageous if the training facilities of a local
or port fire brigade could be used. Alternatively, the following structure and equipment are
required:
0 Building for smoke and fire drills, or a similar facility (see Figure A on page 7)
0 Facilities for recharging compressed-air bottles, with spare parts for maintenance
0 Room with work bench area for inspection and maintenance of breathing
apparatus
0 2 steel fire trays (approximately 1 m x 1 m x 0.3 m)
0 2 three-sided brick fire trays
0 2 fire hydrants with 2 outlets each, or a similar water supply from open water and
a fire pump
0 A large supply of carbonaceous and hydrocarbon fuels (wood, diesel and

lubricating oils, etc.) for the fire trays
0 6 dummies, for search and rescue procedures
0 6 fire hoses (65 mm diameter)
0 3 fire hoses (38 mm diameter)
0 3 branch pipes
0 6 fire nozzles (2 standard, 2 diffuser and 2 jet spray)
0 2 mechanical foam branches
0 1 generator of high-expansion foam and foam compound
0 2 stand pipes, with keys and bars to operate the hydrant supply
0 6 water extinguishers (9 litre)
0 6 foam extinguishers (9 litre)
0 6 carbon dioxide extinguishers (5 kilogram)
0 10 dry powder extinguishers (10 kilogram)
0 Refills for all types of extinguishers
0 30 sets of pr9tective clothing, overalls, gloves, fire-boots, helmets and rainproof
clothing
0 25 sets of self-contained breathing apparatus, complete with spare cylinders,
spare parts and maintenal)ce tools (including sets for use by instructors only)
0 25 distress signal units (OS Us) for attachment to breathing apparatus sets
0 Smoke generator
0 Smoke helmets with air pump
0 A shower at the site
0 1 stretcher
6
PART A: COU~E FRAMEWORK
o 1 first-aid kit
o 1 resuscitation kit with oxygen/suction unit
o 2 sets of fire-protective clothing

o 2 helmets with visor and neck protection
o 2 fire axes
o 2 safety lines (36 metres long) with snaphooks
o Examples of different types of detectors used on board ships
The building for smoke and fire drills can easily be constructed from two steel containers, one
on top of the other, arranged as shown in Figure A. Each container should measure
approximately 7 m x 3 m x 2 m. The different rooms should be designed as follows:
o A cabin
o A corridor/open room
o An electric switchboard room
o An engine-room with a grating floor
Every room in the building must be readily accessible from the outside as a safety precaution.
In addition, there should be access between rooms (1) and (2) by a manhole, between (2) and
(4) by a manhole and vertical ladder, and between (3) and (4) by a door.
Note: The location of this building and the area for fire-fighting drills should preferably be
adjacent to the lecture room, toilet and shower facilities.
There should be no restrictions concerning smoke emissions in the area.
A more elaborate example of a building for use in fire-fighting exercises is shown in Appendix
5.
7
Teaching aids (A)

A1 Instructor Manual (Part D of the course), with appendices 1,2,3 and 4.
A2 Overhead projector transparencies, as required, from plates in appendices 2, 3 and 4
of A1.
A3 Cross-sections or cross-sectional drawings of different types of fire extinguishers and
nozzles.
A4 International ship-to-shore fire-hose connection.
A5 Demonstration set of self-contained breathing apparatus.
A6 Videos:
V1 Fire Fighting Series Part 3 - Command & Control at the Incident (Code No. 675)
V2 Fire Fighting Series Part 4 - Command & Control by the Master (Code No. 676)
V3 Fire Party Operations (Code No. 509) ..•
:.
V4 Fire Fighting on Container Ships (Code No. 602)

V5 Cargo Fire Fighting on Liquefied Gas Carriers (Code No. 254)
V6 Fire Fighting and Safe Cargo Operations on Car Carriers (Code No. 602)
V7 Machinery Space Fires (Code No. 667 )
Available from: Videotel Marine International Limited

84 Newman Street
London W1 P 3LD, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 7299 1800
Fax: +44 (0)20 7299 1818
e-mail: mail@videotelmail.com
URL: www.videotel.co.uk
IMO references (R)

R1 The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers, 1995 (STCW 1995), 1998 edition (IMO Sales No. 938E)
R2 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (SOLAS
1974) (lMO Sales No. 110E)
R3 IMO/ILO Document for Guidance, 1985 (lMO Sales No. 935E)
R4 Assembly resolution A.602(15) Revised Guidelines for Marine Portable Fire
Extinguishers, Adopted 19 November 1987
R5 Emergency Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous Goods (Supplement to IMDG
Code; IMO Sales No. 210E)
R6 Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMO Sales No. 260E)
R7 Assembly resolution A.415(XI) Improved Fire Safety Standards for Ships
R8 Assembly resolution A.437(XI) Training of Crews in Fire-fighting
R9 Assembly resolution A.519(13) Standards for devices to prevent the passage of flame
into cargo tanks
R10 Assembly resolutiort A.654(16) Graphic symbols for fire control plans
R11 Assembly resolution A.655(16) Use of halons as fire-fighting media on board ships
R12 Assembly resolution A.686(17) Code on alarms and indicators
R13 Assembly resolution A.690(17) Periodical inspections of abandon ship and fire drills on
passenger ships
R14 Assembly resolution A.852(20) Guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of
contingency planning for shipboard emergencies
8
PART B: COURSE OUTLINE
Details of distributors of IMO publications that maintain a permanent stock of all IMO
publications may be found on the IMO website at http://www.imo.org
Textbooks (T)
T1 Olav B0, Basic Safety Course: Fire Safety. (Oslo, Norwegian University Press,
1987)(ISBN 92 8011359 3)
T2 Course Compendium
Bibliography (B)
B1 F. Rushbrook, Rushbrook's Fire Aboard. 3rd ed. (Glasgow, Brown, Son and Ferguson
Ltd, 1998) (ISBN 0 85174 659 4)
B2 G. Victory and I.H. Owen, Marine Engineering Practice, Vol. 1 Part 5: Fire-fighting
Equipment and Its Use in Ships, (London, The Institute of Marine Engineers, 1981)
(ISBN 0 900976 14 4)
B3 Review of Engine Room Fires and Guide to Fire Prevention, NK Tech Bulletin 1994
B4 Sydney-McCrudden, F.D. Fire performance of electric cables. Trans IMarE. Vol 101, pp
211-224
B5 Cooke, P. C. and Stone, D.J. Analogue addressable fire detection systems and marine
applications. Trans IMarE, Vol 103, pp.221-232
B6 Design of Fire-detection and Alarm Systems: Current Trends and State of the Art Trans
IMarE (C), Vol 98, paper C1/4
B7 Problems of Fire Control on Board Ships. Trans IMarE (TM), Vol. 94, 1982 paper 22
B8 Summary of Investigations, MAIB. Http://www.open.gov.uklmaib/maibhome.htm
B9 Safety Digest, MAIB, DETR. Http://www.open.gov.uklmaib/maibhome.htm
Part B: Course Outline and Timetable

Lectures
As far as possible, lectures should be presented within a familiar context and should make use
of practical examples. They should be well illustrated with diagrams, photographs and charts
where appropriate, and be related to matter learned during seagoing time.
An effective manner of presentation is to develop a technique of giving information and then

reinforcing it. For example, first tell the trainees briefly what you are going to present to them;
then cover the topic in detail; and, finally, summarize what you have told them. The use of an
overhead projector and the distribution of copies of the transparencies as trainees' handouts
contribute to the learning process. -~<
Course Outline
The tables that follow list the competencies and areas of knowledge, understanding and
proficiency, together with the estimated total hours required for lectures and practical
exercises. Teaching staff should note that timings are suggestions only and should be
adapted to suit individual groups of trainees depending on their experience, ability, equipment
and staff available for training.
Previous experience from colleges and academies conducting training in fire fighting shows
that as much time as possible should be spent on practical exercises. This fact is also
supported by the feedback from course participants. In planning and scheduling training
teaching staff should devote the maximum time possible to practical training.
10
PART B: COURSEOUTLINE
Course Outline
Competence 1: Control fire-fighting operations aboard ship
Course Outline Approximate time

(hours)
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency Lectures, demonstrations
and practical work
1.1 Introduction, safety and principles 0.5
1.2 Areas of fire hazard 0.75
1.3 Fire precautions 0.75

..
1.4 Dry distillation 0.5
1.5 Chemical reactions 0.5
1.6 Boiler uptake fires and exhaust fires in prime movers and
auxiliary exhausts 0.5
1.7 Fires In water-tube boilers 0.5
1.8 Tactics and procedure of fire control while ship is at sea 0.5
1.9 Tactics and procedure of fire control while ship is in port 0.5
1.10 Tactics and procedure of fire control while ship is carrying

dangerous goods 0.5
1.11 Tactics and procedure of fire control for oil, chemical and gas
tankers 0.5
1.12 Use of water for fire extinguishing, the effect on stability,

precautions and corrective procedures 0.25
1.13 Communication and co-ordination during fire-fighting 0.25

operations
1.14 Ventilation control including smoke extractor 0.25
1.15 Control of fuel and electrical systems 0.25
1.16 Fire precautions and hazards associated with the storage and
handling of materials (paints etc)
1.17 Management and conuol of injured persons 1.5
1.18 Procedures for co-ordination with shore-based fire fighters 0.25

<
Sub-Total 9.0
.
11
Competence 2: Organize and train fire parties

(hours)
and practical work
2.1 Preparation of contingency plans 0.25
2.2 Composition and allocation of personnel to fire parties 0.75
2.3 Training of seafarers in fire-fighting 3.5
2.4 Fire control plans 0.25

".-,
2.5 Organization of fire and abandon ship drills 0.75
2.6 Strategies and tactics for control of fires in various parts of the
ship 0.5
Sub-Total 6.0
Competence 3: Inspect and service fire detection and extinguishing systems and
equipment

(hours)
and practical work
3.1 Fire alarms 0.25
3.2 Fire detection equipment 1.0
3.3 Fixed fire-extinguishing equipment 1.75
3.4 Fire main, hydrants, hoses, nozzles and pumps 1.0
3.5 Portable and mobile fire extinguishing equipment including

appliances 1.0
3.6 Firefighter's outfits and other personal protective equipment 1.5
3.7 Rescue and life support equipment 1.25
3.8 Salvage equipment 0.5

<
3.9 Communication equipment 0.75
3.10 Requirements for statutory and classification surveys 1.0
Sub-Total 10.0
12
PART C: DETAILED TEACHING SYLLABUS
Part C: Detailed Teaching Syllabus

Introduction
The detailed teaching syllabus has been written in learning objective format in which the
objective describes what the trainee must do to demonstrate that knowledge has been
transferred.
All objectives are understood to be prefixed by the words, "The expected learning outcome is
that the trainee ................... "
In order to assist the instructor, references are shown against the learning objectives to
indicate IMO references and publications, textbooks, additional technicat'iTlaterial and teaching
aids, which the instructor may wish to use when preparing course material. The material listed
in the course framework has been used to structure the detailed teaching syllabus; in
particular,
Teaching aids (indicated by A),

IMO references (indicated by R), and
Textbooks (indicated by T)
will provide valuable information to instructors. The abbreviations used are:
App. Appendix
Ch. chapter
pa. paragraph
p., pp. page, pages
PI. plate
pt. part
Reg. regulation
Sect. section
The following are examples of the use of references:
"R3 - Reg. 11-2/2" refers to regulation 2 of chapter 11-2 of the SOLAS Convention.
"T1 - Ch.3" refers to chapter 3 of Basic Safety Course: Fire Safety .
• Note
Throughout the course, safe working practices are to be clearly defined and emphasized with
reference to current international requirements and regulations.
It is expected that the national institution implementing the course will insert references to
national requirements and regulations as necessary.
15
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency IMO Reference Detailed Teaching

Syllabus Reference
Competence 1: Control Fire-fighting Operations R1-

b d Sh" (9 h ) Reg. VI/3
a oar Ip ours Sect. A-VII3
Table A-VII3
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency 1.3,1.8,1.9,1.10
Fire-fighting procedures at sea and in port with particular
emphasis on organization, tactics and command
Use of water for fire-extinguishing, the effect on ship stability, 1.12

precautions and corrective procedures
Communication and co-ordination during fire-fighting ';1.13

operations
Ventilation control, including smoke extractor 1.14
Control of fuel and electrical systems 1.15
Fire-fighting process hazards (dry distillation, chemical 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7
reactions, boiler uptake fires, etc.)
Fire fighting involving dangerous goods 1.10,1.11
Fire precautions and hazards associated with the storage 1.2,1.16

and handling of materials (paints, etc.)
Management and control of injured persons 1.17
Procedures for co-ordination with shore-based fire fighters 1.18
Objectives are:
1 Actions taken to control fires are based on a full and
accurate assessment of the incident, using all available
sources of information
2 The order of priority, timing and sequence of actions
are appropriate to the overall requirements of the
incident and to minimize damage and potential damage
to the ship, injuries to personnel and impairment of the
operational effectiveness of the ship
3 Transmission of information is prompt, accurate,
complete and clear
4 Personal safety durJng fire control activities is
safeguarded at all times
.
16
Proficiency in Advanced Fire Fighting IMO Reference Detailed Teaching

Syllabus Reference
Competence 2: Organize and Train Fire Parties R1-

(6 hours) Reg. VI/3
Sect. A-VI/3
Table A-VI/3
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency
Preparation of contingency plans 2.1
Composition and allocation of personnel to fire parties 2.2,2.3
Strategies and tactics for control of fires in various parts of

the ship 2.4, 2.5, 2.6
...-,
Objectives are:
1 Composition and organization of fire control parties
ensure the prompt and effective implementation of
emergency plans and procedures
Competence 3: Inspect and Service Fire R1-

Detection and Extinguishing Systems and Reg. VI/3
Equipment (9 hours) Sect. A-VI/3
Table A-VI/3
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency
Fire-detection systems 3.1,3.2
Fixed fire-extinguishing systems 3.3
Portable and mobile fire-extinguishing equipment,

including appliances, pumps and rescue, salvage, life-
support, personal protective and communication 3.4-3.9
equipment
Requirements for statutory and classification societies 3.10
Objectives are:
1 Effectiveness of all fire-detection and extinguishing
systems and equipment is maintained at all times in
accordance with performance specifications and
legislative requirements
Competence 4: Investigate and Compile

Reports on Incidents I.nvolving Fire (5 hours)
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency R1-

Assessment of cause of incidents involving fire Reg. VI/3 4.1-4.3
Sect. A-VI/3
Objectives are: Table A-VI/3
1 Causes of fire are identified and the effectiveness of
countermeasures is evaluated
17
PROFICIENCY IN ADVANCED FIRE FIGHTING
Proficiency in advanced fire fighting IMO Reference Textbooks, Teaching

Bibliography Aid
R1 - Reg. VI/3 A 1 - Ch. 1

Competence 1: Control fire-fighting operations Sect. A-VII3 A2-PI.
aboard ship Table A-VI/3 1.101-104
V1, V2
1.1 Introduction, safety and principles (0.5 hour) R7, R15
Required performance:
.1 lists the main aim of the course as:

- to organize and train fire parties
- to inspect and service fire detection and extinguishing
systems and equipment
- to control fire-fighting operations aboard ships
- to investigate and compile reports on incidents involving
fire
..
.2 states the safety rules laid down by the Chief Instructor
which must be adhered to during the course
.3 lists the principles of survival in relation to fire as:

- knowledge of theory of fire precautions
- regular and realistic training and drills
- formulation of contingency plans for fire emergency
- identification of emergency escape
- identification of dangers of smoke and toxic fires
- regular inspection and maintenance of:
• fire-detection equipment
• portable and mobile fire extinguishers
• fixed fire-fighting equipment
• firefighter's outfit
1.2 Areas of fire hazard (0.75 hour)
.1 lists, for fires in the machinery space:
- causes, including: R1 A1 - Ch.3
• combustible liquids leaking through faulty or damaged A2-PI.
connections 2.101
• oil-soaked insulation
• hot surfaces, e.g. exhaust pipes, engine parts
overheating in close proximity to oil lines
• defects in lagging
• hot work, e.g. welding, cutting by oxy-acetylene torch
• autoignition, e.g. oil dripping on hot surface
- methods of containment, including:
• watertight doors
• fire doors
• dampers
• water sprays and screens, and remote control of these
where applicable
- methods of detection, including:
• smoke detectors A2 - PI. 3.1,
• high-temperature probes 3.2
• rate-of-rise of temperature probes 81 - p. 493
• patrols
18
Knowledge, understanding and proficency IMO Textbooks, Teaching

Reference Bibliography Aid
- fire appliances, including:

• fixed systems, e.g. water, foam and carbon dioxide R11
• portable, e.g. water, foam, carbon dioxide and powder
• mobile, e.g. foam, carbon dioxide and powder
.2 lists, for fires in the accommodation:

- causes, including:
• combustible materials
• matches and cigarette smoking, including careless
disposal of burning cigarettes or ash
• textiles adjacent to hot objects such as radiators and
lamps
• defective and overloaded electrical systems
• in a laundry, incorrect installation of a tumble drier or ..
failure to keep it clean
• fire doors and dampers
• sprinkler system A2 - PI. 3.3
• fire-retardant materials in construction
• fire-retardant deck coverings
• fire-retardant furnishings
• smoke detectors
• temperature probes
• sprinkler system
• patrols
• fixed system, e.g. water hydrants and hoses
• portable, e.g. water
.3 lists, for fires in the galley:

• overheating of combustible liquids and fats
• overheating of deep-fat fryers
• hot surfaces
• defective electrical connections
• greasy flues
• fire doors, ventilation and flue dampers 81 - p. 493
• fire blankets
• patrols
• fixed system, e.g. water hydrants and hoses
• portable, e.g. water (not for fat or oil fires), carbon
dioxide and powder
.4 lists, for fires in the radio room or battery room and for
electrical fires:
• overloading and short circuits
• defective insula!ion
• fractured and loose connections
• in battery room, build-up of hydrogen (due to lack of
ventilation) and its ignition, e.g. from smoking
• fire doors .'
• observation
- fire appliances, including portable, e.g. carbon dioxide
and powder
19
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency IMO Textbooks, Teaching

.5 lists, for fires in holds and in containers:

• cargoes liable to self-heating and spontaneous T2 - Paper
combustion (coal, copra), bulk cargoes liable to emit C1/1
flammable gas (coal, direct reduced iron)
• loss of integrity of packages containing explosive,
flammable or reactive substances
• collection of oily materials as a result of insufficient
cleaning and of leakage from tanks
• hatch covers, 'tween-decks and hull structure
• use of dampers
• remote control of extinguishing media
• smoke detectors .••.-.
• temperature probes
• fixed systems, e.g. water spray, high-expansion foam
and carbon dioxide
• portable, e.g. water, foam, powder and carbon dioxide
• mobile, e.g. foam-making equipment
.6 fire precautions and hazards associated with the storage

and handling of materials (parts etc.) lists, for flammable
ship's stores:
- potentially hazardous materials, which include:
• paints and varnishes approved by an Administration
• lubricating oils
• cleaning fluids, paint thinners, paraffin
• fuel for motor lifeboats and emergency engines
• oxygen and acetylene cylinders
- approved storage areas for such materials, e.g.
• paint store
• deck lockers
- prohibited storage area for paints, oils, cleaning fluids,
e.g.
• accommodation
• machinery spaces
- approved methods of handling between shore and ship
in order to avoid:
• spillage
• ignition from any cause
• delay in transporting the materials from shore to
storage
1.3 Fire precautions (0.75 hour) R1 - Annex 2 81 - p.13 A 1 - Ch. 3

A2-PI.
3.102
.1 lists structural fire-protection provisions, including: R2 - Reg. T2 - Paper A2 - PI. 3.4
- division of the ship jnto main vertical zones by thermal 11-2/24 C1/2 -3.9
and structural boundaries
- inert gas protection 01} tankers Reg. 11-2/62 PI.
- lockers for combustible materials 26.2.2.(14) 3.10-3.12
- use of flame-retardant materials 2/44.2.2.(9)
20

- flame screens and other devices for preventing the Reg. 11-2/34
passage of flame
- the use of steel Reg. 11-213
- provisions with respect to the fire main: diameter, Reg. 11-214
pressure
.2 describes fire-fighting equipment and systems for a R11

passenger ship, including:
- distribution and quantity of: R2-
• fire-extinguishing gas, CO2 Reg. 11-215
• hydrants and fire hoses Reg. 11-214
• portable fire extinguishers Reg. 11-216
• sprinklers Reg. 11-2/12
• firefighter's outfits Reg. 11-2/17 ..-.
- arrangements for the supply of power and water, Reg. 11-2/4,
including emergency supplies Reg. 11-2112
- spaces subject to automatic fire detection Reg. 11-2/14
- provision of emergency controls Reg. 11-1/39,
42,43,46,47,
48,49,50,51,
52,53,54
.3 lists operations required, including:

- maintaining cleanliness on board
- ensuring observance of smoking only in approved
spaces
- keeping doors closed
- maintenance of fire appliances, including fire dampers
- observance of approved fire-fighting methods
- observance of regular fire drills and instructions
.4 explains the organization and tasks of fire parties,

including:
- making best use of available personnel: R1
• need to be flexible in choice
• personnel are to be trained to use different equipment
• how to establish who is on board and available
• training in agreed method for establishing which
members of fire parties are in fire zone
- the choosing of assembly points for fire parties:
• difference between assembly point and site of fire
• how an assembly point is indicated
• considerations in choosing suitable assembly points T1 - Ch. 3
• communications between assembly points and bridge
- initial and subsequent actions of fire parties on hearing
alarm:
• considers dangers of entering a space which is on fire
• observes restriction on the use of certain fire-fighting
media
• considers means for resolving conflict between the
need for prompt action and the prevention of wrong
action
.5
.
• has a full knowledge of the muster list
states procedures which must be observed when a ship is R2 - Reg. 111/8,

in a dockyard for repairs, including: 53
- safety procedures for dockyard personnel
- responsibility for fire fighting
- control of testing T2 - Paper
C1/1
21

- oxidizing cargoes, such as some fertilizers, sustaining a

fire even if blanketed in an extinguishing gas
- cargoes spontaneously igniting in air, e.g. phosphorus
when its packaging gets damaged
- self-heating of cargoes such as grain when wet
- production of methane in coal cargoes to dangerous
levels when ventilation is restricted
.5 states that the correct response to fire in dangerous goods

is given in the Emergency Procedures for Ships Carrying
Dangerous Goods
.6 states that the correct response to fire in bulk materials R5

possessing chemical hazards is given in the Emergency
Schedules of the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk ..
Cargoes
.7 with the aid of the General Index of the IMDG Code and the R6
Emergency Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous
Goods, determines the response action for a fire in a given
substance
.8 with the aid of the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk R5
Cargoes, determines the response action for fire in a given
bulk cargo
1.6 Boiler uptake fires and exhaust fires in R6
prime movers and auxiliary exhausts (0.5

hour)
.1 defines boiler uptake fires as those occurring in:
- uptakes, economizers and air heaters for steamships
- exhaust pipes, economizers and waste-heat boilers of
ships propelled by internal-combustion engines
.2 states that the usual cause of such fires is an accumulation R1 A2-PI.

of carbon deposits, with or without oil, which become 8.104
overheated and catch fire
.3 states that the difficulties and hazards of fighting these fires

are:
- inaccessibility of all sections of the uptake in the upper
section of the engine room
- the possibility of explosion if access doors to the
economizer are opened
- the possibility of the economizer tubes reaching a
temperature of 700'C, when the following can take
place:
• the iron in the tubes will burn in steam
• the reaction will be-self-sustaining and will generate
heat
- the products of combustion will be btack oxide of iron
and free hydrogen
- the burning of iron in steam will be independent of a
supply of oxygen
- the hydrogen produced will burn if air is introduced
- explosion
23

.4 states that a procedure for containing and extinguishing the

fire is to:
- shut down the boiler and/or main engine
- spray the external surfaces in the way of the fire with
water to keep the temperature down
- close necessary dampers and boiler change valve to
exclude air from fire
- protect essential electrical and other equipment below
the fire zone against water damage
- continue cooling until it is considered safe to open the
economizer for examination and thorough cleaning on
the fire side
1.7 Fires in water-tube boilers (0.5 hour) ..

:.,
.1 states that iron-in-steam fires can occur in water-tube
boilers due to:
- shortage of water in the boiler causing overheating of the
tubes above the water level and undue delay in shutting
down the boiler
- an uncontrollable soot fire in the furnace after a boiler
has been shut down in a port, coupled with a shortage of
water in the boiler causing overheating of the tubes
above the water level
.2 states that if fire is discovered before the temperature of A1 - Ch. 8

the tube has reached lOO'C, the preferred method of fire A2-PI.
fighting is: 8.105
- to direct through burner aperture, or equivalent, the A2-PI.
maximum amount of water available as solid jets and 8.1-8.3
through feed pumps to the source of the fire, assuming
boiler tubes have fractured or burned
- to keep air casings and uptakes cool by hosing them
with water
- to avoid using fire spray nozzles, foam appliances or
carbon dioxide directly on the fire
.3 states that the fire-fighting procedures in competence 1.6

must be used if the iron-in-steam fire has developed
1.8 Tactics and procedure of fire control while

ship is at sea (0.5 hour)
.1 states that, when the fire alarm is given, the fire procedure
and the emergency stations procedure are put into effect,
for example:
- the crew assembles 'at the designated fire stations as
given on the muster
- the fire parties assembre, on orders from the bridge, and
carry out their tasks aimed at containing the fire
- the ship's course and speed are altered as necessary to
assist in containing the fire
- the pumps are prepared to dispose of extinguishing
water
- for engine-room fires, the ship is stopped
- the master decides the most appropriate method for
fighting the fire and this is implemented by the fire officer
- for engine-room fires, early preparations are made to
launch lifeboats
24

.2 states that the master controls the fire-fighting T1 - Ch. 2 A 1 - Ch. 6

operations from the bridge, as indicated in competence V2
2.1
.3 states that when the fire is extinguished, a fire-watch is R2 - Reg. 81 - pp. A2-PI.
kept, the requirement for emergency stations is III/53 75-103 6.101
cancelled and an investigation into the fire, as indicated
in competence 4.1, is begun

ship is in port (0.5 hour)
Required performance: .:.
.1 states that, when the fire alarm is given, the fire

procedure and the emergency stations procedure are
put into effect, as indicated in competence 1.8 above
.2 procedures for co-ordination with shore-based fire 81 - pp. A2-PI.

fighters states that the following addition procedures 104-131 6.102
must be followed:
- call the port fire brigade
- inform the appropriate authority
- confirm with harbour master that the master of the
ship will remain in overall charge
- confirm with harbour master that the fire brigade will T2 - Paper
take charge of the fire-fighting operations, assisted by C1/9
the crew as required
- confirm with harbour master that he will keep the
master informed of any hazards to the dock
installation and any actions required
- check who is on board
- make preparations for ship to leave port if required,
either by own power or with help of tugs
- evacuate non-essential personnel

ship is carrying dangerous goods (0.5 hour)
.1 states that the stowage plan should be marked to show the
position and class of dangerous goods
.2 states that a fire-fighting plan should be prepared showing

which fire-fighting media and appliances can safely be
used
.3 states that the dangers and the consequent risk to the crew
should be assessed .when the cargo is loaded
and the emergency procedure are put into effect, as
indicated in competence 1.8
.5 states the danger of rushing into action without knowing the

nature of the cargo
25

.6 states that, when the fire has been extinguished, a fire- R9 V4,V6
watch is kept, the requirement for emergency stations is
cancelled and an investigation into the fire, as indicated in
competence 4.1, is begun
1.11 Tactics and procedure of fire control for oil,

chemical and gas tankers (0.5 hour)
and the emergency procedure are put into effect, as
indicated in competence 1.8 -,-.
.2 states that the additional requirements for a tanker include: R2- A2-PI.
- a fixed fire-extinguishing system in the pump room Reg. 11-2/63 6.103 V5
- remotely controlled foam monitors on the deck Reg. 11-2/61 A2 - PI. 6.1
- an inert gas system for the cargo tanks Reg. 11-2/62
- isolation valves fitted in the fire main at the poop front Reg. 11-2/61.9,
and at specified distances forward of the poop front to Reg. 11-2/4.3.6
allow:
• control of the water supply to the foam monitors in the
event of damage to the fire main
• control of the water supply if the emergency fire pump
is in use
- a division into gas-dangerous and gas-free spaces Reg. 11-2/56
- strict segregation between cargo spaces and systems
and machinery/accommodation spaces and systems
.3 states that, when the fire has been extinguished, a fire-

watch is kept, the requirement for emergency stations is
cancelled and an investigation into the fire, as indicated in
competence 4.1, is begun
1.12 Use of water for fire extinguishing, the effect

on stability, precautions and corrective
procedures (0.25 hour)
.1 states that addition of water in large amounts, particularly in
cargo hold, causes stability problem as free surface effect
of water will come into effect thereby reducing the GM of
the ship
.2 states that draining of particular cargo hold which is flooded

to extinguish fire is absolutely important to avoid the free
surface effect of water-
.3 states that addition of water in cargo holds carrying

cargoes such as grain and paper pump is risky as cargo
swells which could cause rupture of shell,·plates and bulk
head plates. Addition of water for fighting fire in such
cases is to be judicially monitored during the entire fire-
fighting operation
26

1.13 Communication and co-ordination during V3
fire-fighting operations (0.25 hour)
.1 states that communication and co-ordination during fire-
fighting operations is two-fold, Le. internal communication
and co-ordination in the ship and external with the
management representatives of owner, classification
society and coastal states for external assistance
.2 states that master is in charge of the entire fire-fighting

operation . .•..,.
.3 states that the internal communication with control station,

site of fire and master shall adhere to the contingency plan
.4 states that walkie-talkie and ship's internal telephone

systems are vital in developing internal communication in
addition to direct communication by messengers
.5 states that external communication links should be

documented in contingency plan, including links to ship
owner, classification society and neighbouring states
1.14 Ventilation control including smoke

extractor (0.25 hour)
.1 states that ventilation system is the weakest spot in zonal
system of passenger and crew accommodation and must
be controlled so that fires do not propagate from one
zone/compartment to the adjacent one through ventilation
ducts
.2 states that the respective ventilator flaps and draught stops

must be closed to avoid spread of fire to adjacent
compartments
.3 states that accommodation A.C. blower suction flaps must

be closed during accommodation fire
.4 states that cargo hold ventilation flaps must be closed in

the hold affected by fire
.5 states that engine room ventilation flaps must be closed in

case of engine room fire
.6 states that smoke extractor and smoke sampling devices

are used for large ro-ro and passenger ships carrying more
than 36 passengers. States further that smoke extractor
systems shall be used only at the discretion of the master
to evacuate passengers and facilitate fire fighting
thereafter. States that the capacity of the smoke extractor
shall be one change of air in 10 minutes
27

1.15 Control of fuel and electrical systems (0.25

hour)
.1 states why shutting off fuel supply from settling tanks is
essential in engine-room fires
.2 states that closing off fuel to main engine and auxiliary

engines is required from outside engine-rooms in case of
major engine-room fire
.3 states that fuel transfer pumps and separators need to be

shut off at the time of a major engine-room fire
.•.. ~
.4 states that electrical systems should be shut off in
accommodation, engine-room, pump-room and cargo
spaces as applicable in case of fire
1.16 Fire precautions and hazards associated

with the storage and handling of materials
(paints etc.) (0.25 hour)
.1 states that a fixed fire-extinguishing system is provided in
paint locker of the ship. The system must be tried during
fire drill so that it is readily available when needed
.2 states that the ships are permitted an accommodation area

up to a maximum space of 0.4 m2 not provided with fixed
installation. Combustible materials should not be stored in
such spaces
.3 states that storage of lubricating oil drums are to be in safer

space, preferably on main deck to facilitate jettison in case
of emergency
.4 states that additional precautionary measures are to be

taken for dangerous cargo stowage as per dangerous
cargo code and its E.M.S .
.5 states that engine-room should be kept clean and oil drums

containing oil should not be stored in engine-room
1.17 Management and control of injured persons A 1 - Ch. 9

(1.5 hours)
Required performance: .
.1 describes the main hazards arising from.~res for the health R1 A2-PI.
of personnel as: 9.101
- asphyxiation
- poisoning
- damaged tissues
- burnt skin
- pain
- secondary shock
28

.2 explains that:
- asphyxiation may be the result of:
• fires causing oxygen shortage
• an extinguishing gas replacing air
- poisoning may be caused by:
• carbon monoxide, which is produced in most fires
• toxic combustion products of fire
- damaged tissue may lead to:
• loss of function of parts of the body
• infection
• mutilation/scarring/disfigurement
- burnt skin may interfere with its breathing function, which
may cause death
- secondary shock is a serious condition, caused by the
collection of body fluids in blisters, and must always be .•..•
suspected except with minor burns
.3 states the importance of first-aid measures being followed

up with medical treatment
.4 describes the first-aid measures in cases of asphyxiation

and poisoning as:
- removal of victim from danger area; thereafter:
• if unconscious, placing victim in the recovery position
• in the absence of breathing, applying artificial
respiration
• in the absence of a pulse, applying cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation
.5 demonstrates:
- putting a person in the correct recovery position
- the application for artificial respiration (mouth to
mouth/nose)
- the application of cardio-pulmonary resuscitation
.6 describes the first-aid treatment for burns as:

- extended flushing with water or submerging the affected
parts in water
- injection of morphine if the victim is in great pain
.7 states that bandaging and treatment for shock are equally

important but should not be done as a first-aid measure
1.18 Procedures for co-ordination with shore-

based fire fighters (0.25 hour)
.1 states that shore fire fighters must be informed in case of
fire in port. Master and ship staff must take immediate
action to control fire as per contingency plan till the shore
fire fighters arrive •
.2 states that it is possible to get expe,rt advice from the

management representatives, owners, classification society
and neighbouring countries in case of fire at sea. The
present day satellite communication system is very prompt
in such emergencies
.3 states that the shore-based help may be available in major

fires by helicopter landing of experts from nearest land
.4 states that stability information and flooding/pumping

sequence can be obtained from classification societies
through their computer software 29

R1 - Reg. VI/3 V1, V3

Competence 2: Organize and train fire parties Sect. A-VI/3
(0.25 hour) Table A-VI/3
2.1 Preparation of contingency plans R14
.1 states that the central control station will be on the bridge
.2 states that the master will be in charge
.3 states that the fire officer/officers will report to the bridge

.•..•
and receive instructions
.4 lists the information which central control station requires,

A2-PI.
including:
4.102
- the time at which the fire alarm was given
- the position and nature of the fire
- confirmation that fire parties are at their assembly points
and that the firefighter's outfits are available
- confirmation that the fire main is pressurized
- report on initial attempts to extinguish fire using portable
extinguishers
- report on effect of fire on services, e.g. lighting
- report on persons present or trapped in compartments or
unaccounted for
.5 lists information which should be available on the bridge,

R2 - Reg. 11-
including:
2/20
- arrangement drawings, in a convenient size, of ship,
engine room and accommodation
- details of accesses and escapes from the different
zones of the ship
- details of fire-extinguishing equipment, both fixed and
portable, for the entire ship, including storage position of
refills
- stability information
- details of survival equipment and where it is stored
- stowage plans
- information on dangerous goods
.6 lists communication co-ordination methods available,

including:
- telephones
- loud hailers
- direct speech, e.g. bridge to machinery control room
- radio telephones, hand-held radios
- messengers
T1 - Ch. 5 A2-PI.
.7 lists methods of dam!:!ge control and containment of fires,
4.104
including:
- bridge-operated closing of watertight doors and release
of fire doors to their snut position
- stopping of ventilation fans and closing of dampers on
funnel and other places
- closing of all windows and portholes in accommodation,
galley and other spaces
- turning ship to give best position relative to wind
direction for fighting the fire
- cooling boundary bulkheads
- using fire blankets as necessary
- maintaining fire watch after fire is extinguished
30

.8 explains how the stability of the ship is monitored and T2 - Paper

controlled, due to use of water for fire extinguishing: C1/10
- calculating the change in GM caused by the weight of
the extinguishing water and as free surface effect
- arranging pumping or draining of fire-fighting water from
affected spaces, including cutting holes in ship's side
- for cargo fires, calculating the effect of having to move
cargo to attack a fire
- assessing the effect of any damage which causes
spaces to be flooded by seawater
- considering possibilities of moving vessel to shallow
water or even allowing it to ground
-,
2.2 Composition and allocation of personnel to
fire parties (0.75 hour)
.1 explains the organization of fire parties, including:
A2-PI.
- how each fire party is identified
4.105
- how each member of a fire party is identified
- what the safeguards are for keeping in contact with each
person and knowing his position
- the duties of each fire party, including:
• the reconnaissance team, equipped with portable fire
extinguishers
• the fire hose team
• the help, search and first-aid team
• the technical team for checking lifts, closing fire
dampers, controlling ventilation fans and fuel shut-off
valves, starting emergency generator and emergency
fire pump and for refilling used extinguishers as
required and preparing for gas flooding
2.3 Training of seafarers in fire fighting (3.5 R8 T1 - Ch. 11 A1-Ch.5

hours) V3
.1 states that, after joining a ship, the crew must be given T2 - Paper A2-PI.
instruction on the emergency procedures in use and trained C1/8 5.101
in the use of its fire appliances and its equipment, paying
particular attention to:
- the location and use of portable fire extinguishers R11 T1 - Ch. 7 A2 - PI. 5.1
containing: to 5.9
• water
• foam
• powder
• carbon dioxide
- the location and use of mobile fire extinguishers A2-PI.
containing: 5.10-5.14
• foam
• powder .
• carbon dioxide
31

- the location and use of fixed fire extinguishing R2 - Reg. 11- T1 - Ch. 9 A2
appliances, e.g. 2/17
• fire hydrants, hoses and nozzles
• water sprinklers
• water sprays
• foam system
• carbon dioxide system
- the location and use of firefighter's outfit and in
particular:
• learning how to don the protective clothing quickly
• knowing where the personal equipment is stowed and
what it comprises
• checking and using the approved breathing apparatus
• checking and using the fireproof lifeline and being
familiar with the signalling codes T1-Ch.10
.2 strategies and tactics for control of fires in various parts of

the ship states that, for crew training, realistic but safe fire
drills should be held in various areas of the ship, including: A2
- general functions, covering:
• starting the emergency generator
• starting the emergency fire and bilge pump
• selecting the appropriate valves for providing water for
fire fighting, flooding holds or pumping out bilges
• identifying the emergency controls and their function T1-Ch.10
- improving personal safety by practice
- moving and finding the way in spaces with restricted
visibility
- moving through small apertures
- finding and removing casualties
- using compressed-air breathing apparatus and the
fireproof lifeline in these conditions
- machinery spaces, assuming mock fires, e.g.
• fire on diesel alternator due to fuel-oil spray from
fractured fuel injection pipe striking hot exhaust pipe
• fire in bilge due to fuel oil being ignited by sparks from
welding work in the vicinity
• fire at top of engine room due to lubricating oil leaking
from a fractured pipe to the turbocharger bearing and
striking the hot surface of turbocharger
• fire adjacent to boiler due to blow-back from furnace
• fire in switchboard caused by loose connection
• fire in the economizer or boiler uptake due to
accumulation of soot
- accommodation spaces, assuming mock fires, e.g,
• fire in a cabin due to bedclothes catching fire from a
fallen cigarette
• fire in crew lounge due to defective electrical
connection
- fire in galley, including:
• fire on top of stove due to spilled cooking fat
• fire in deep-fat fryer
- fire in deck contaioer, e.g.
• fire due to defect in integral refrigeration unit
- fire in cargo spaces, taking into account cargo on board,
e.g.
• in holds, 'tween deck or containers .'
• involving dangerous goods
- ventilation control and smoke extractor
- control of fuel and electrical systems
32

.3 states that the members of fire parties are given training, T1 - Ch. 3 A2
which includes:
- instruction in the duties of each fire party to which a crew
member may be assigned
- instruction in the duties of each member of a fire party
and how these duties are allocated, e.g. by number or
otherwise
- exercises to make each fire party proficient, including
first aid
.4 states that crew members who operate a fire patrol system 81

will be trained to ensure that they are familiar with the
arrangements of the ship as well as the location and
operation of equipment, including:
- manually operated call points R2 - Reg. 11- ..
2/40.1, 40.6
- fixed fire-detection and alarm systems
- telephones
- portable fire extinguishers and their limitations
- hydrants, hoses and nozzles
.5 demonstrates the ability to carry out the exercises listed in

2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4 above
.6 recharges, repairs and maintains portable fire extinguishers
2.4 Fire control plans (0.25 hour) R10
.1 states that the fire control plans must be checked

periodically to ensure they are legible and up-to-date
.2 states that the duplicate set of fire control plans or the R2 - Reg. 11-
booklet containing them, which are for the assistance of 2/20.1,20.2
shoreside fire-fighting personnel, are checked to confirm
that they are in good condition
.3 checks that the guide signs to the duplicate plans are intact A2
and distinct
2.5 Organization of fire and abandon ship drills R13

(0.75 hour)
.1 states that drills shall, as far as practicable, be conducted
as if there were an actual emergency
.2 states that ev~ry crew member shall participate at least one

abandon ship drill and one fire drill every month
.3 fire drills:
.
- states that fire drill should be planned in such a way that
due consideration is given to regular practice in the
various emergencies that may occur depending on the
type of ship and the cargo
- states that while conducting fire drills the following
proc~dures should be followed:
• reporting to stations and preparing for the duties
described in muster list
33

• starting of a fire pump, using at least the two required

jets of water
• operation and use of fire-extinguishing appliances
• checking and using firefighter's outfit and other
personal rescue equipment
• testing of relevant communication equipment
• operation of watertight doors, fire doors, fire dampers
and main inlets and outlets of ventilation systems in the
drill area
• checking the necessary arrangements for abandoning
the ship
.4 states that the equipment used during drills shall

immediately be brought back to its fully operational
condition .,-."
.5 states that any faults and defects discovered during the

drills shall be remedied as soon as possible
.6 abandon ship drills:

- states that while conducting abandon ship drills the
following procedures must be followed:
• abandon ship drill is called by raising particular alarm
followed by announcement on the public address or
other communication systems. All passengers and crew
shall be familiar with this alarm and announcement
• on hearing alarm, crew shall report to stations and
prepare for the duties described in muster list
• passengers and crew are suitably dressed
• lifejackets are correctly donned
• preparation and lowering of at least one lifeboat
• starting and operating the lifeboat engine
• launching method of liferaft is explained
• a mock search and rescue of a crew member trapped
in cabin is carried out
• instruction in the use of radio life-saving appliances
- states that different lifeboats shall be lowered at
successive drills
- states that rescue boat other than lifeboats shall be
launched each month with their assigned crew aboard
and manoeuvred in the water
- states that emergency lighting for mustering and
abandonment is tested at each abandon ship drill
2.6 Strategies and tactics for control of fires in

various parts of the ship (0.5 hour)
.1 states that the fire qan occur in the:
- engine-room
- accommodation
- galley
.
- storerooms
- cargo spaces
34

.2 states contingency plans are required to be drawn for every

type of emergency on board, particularly for fire and
abandon ship:
- demonstrates use of the integrated approach to
contingency planning for shipboard emergencies
- explains how tactics and strategies for control of fires in
engine room, accommodation and cargo spaces differ
- states that tactics and strategies for control of engine
room fires involves management and fire-fighting
techniques of hot oil and exhaust gases
- states that control of accommodation fires may be
achieved by confining the fire within the zones bounded
by A-60 bulkheads and cutting off ventilation
- states that fighting cargo space fires is complex and
involves special training for fighting fires involving bulk,
oil, chemical and gas cargoes as well as dangerous
cargoes
- states that BC Code, SOLAS Chapter 11-2,IBC and IGC
Codes and EMS for Dangerous Cargoes contain
essential data for use in setting strategies
- states that composition and organization of fire control
parties ensure prompt and effective implementation of
emergency plans and procedures

R1 - Reg. VI/3 A 1 - Ch. 7

Competence 3: Inspect and service fire Sect. A-VI/3 A2-PI.
detection and extinguishing systems and Table A-VI/3 7.101,7.102
equipment
3.1 Fire alarms R12
.1 states that for the fire alarms and the actuating switches:
- a plan should be available which shows their positions
- a schedule should be prepared that shows dates when
surveys, inspections, maintenance and testing should ".-,
be carried out
- a record should be kept of defects found and of repairs
carried out
- the manufacturer's instruction manuals should be used
as a basis for the schedule referred to above, which
should include at least:
• inspection for damage or omissions in wiring and R2 - Reg. 11-
equipment 2/20
• cleaning of electrical contacts and switches
• testing of the system and proving that all equipment
operates correctly
3.2 Fire detection equipment

.1 states that a scheme similar to that in 3.1 above should be T1 - Ch. 1
prepared and operated
.2 states that additionally the maintenance schedule should

include:
- testing the correct operation of each head or probe, as
appropriate, for:
• smoke (ion) detectors
• flame detectors (infrared or ultraviolet rays from the
flames)
• heat detectors (thermal contact)
• rate of change of temperature detector
• bursting temperature of sprinkler bulb in a sprinkler
system
- cleaning and checking of contacts and other
components in the control box and ensuring that
connection to the fire alarm system operates correctly
3.3 Fixed fire extinguishing equipment A1-Ch.7

.
.1 states that a scheme similar to that in 3.1 above should be
prepared and operated for each type of fixed fire
extinguishing equipment
.2 states that the maintenance schedule for a sprinkler system

should also include:
- checking that the water level and air pressure in the
pressure vessel are correct and, or not, adjusting as
required
36

- checking that the sprinkler pump starts if pressure is

reduced to the correct level
- checking that all zone and stop valves are workable and
are in the correct position for service
- checking that all sprinkler bulbs are unobstructed
.3 states that the maintenance schedule for a carbon dioxide

system should also include:
- testing the level of liquid gas in the cylinders by: A2 - PI. 7.1
• the isotope method
• the weighing method
- checking that the siren that gives warning that gas is
about to be released operates correctly
- checking that the gas outlets in the spaces protected
are unobstructed ..
.4 states that the maintenance schedule for a fixed pressure
water spraying system should also include:
- checking that the nozzles are unobstructed R2 - Reg. 11-
2/10.7
- checking that the valves operate correctly
.5 states that the maintenance schedule for a foam system

should also include:
- checking (on tankers) that the deck monitors operate R2 - Reg. 11- T1 - Ch. 6
correctly 2/61
- checking that for engine-room applications the foam
outlets and spreaders are clear and that the pipes are
free of corrosion products
3.4 Fire main, hydrants, hoses and nozzles and

pumps
A 1 - Ch. 7
.1 states that a scheme similar to that in 3.1 should be
.2 describes the inspection and maintenance of the fire main

and its associated piping in terms of:
- testing the system for leaks
- inspecting the pipes for corrosion
- keeping hydrants and coupling lugs movable
- attending to leaks
- having alternatives in place when shutting down or
removing a part of the system
- inspecting relief valves
- keeping adequate spares of handwheels, spindles,
gaskets, coupling lugs, washers and valves
.3 describes the in!~pection and maintenance of fire hoses and

nozzles in terms of:
- pressure-testing hoses
- moving spray nozzles through their operating range
- keeping coupling lugs movable
- checking on washers :'
- keeping adequate spares for hoses, coupling lugs,
washers and nozzles
37

.4 describes the measures that have to be taken in icy

conditions to keep the fire main system free of ice as being:
- shut down the pump and close valves as required
- drain all water from pipes
- keep checking that the system remains empty of water
- put up warning notices on the bridge that the fire main
has been drained of water
.5 states that the practice of opening one or more hydrant

valves does not prevent the system from becoming frozen
in certain conditions
Required performance: R4
":,
3.5 Portable and mobile fire extinguishing
equipment including appliances
.2 states that when a portable or mobile fire extinguisher has

been discharged it should be prepared for further use as
follows:
- on an extinguisher with a trigger handle, depress the
handle to ensure that the cylinder is not pressurized
- remove the top cap, including the cartridge, and then:
• clean the cylinder and inspect for any corrosion if the
cylinder is made of steel
• check when the cylinder is due for a pressure test,
T2
which is normally done by the suppliers
• check that the discharge pipe and nozzles are clear
• check the operation of the trigger valve to ensure it is
fluid-tight and operates freely
• check the operation and tightness of other valves (if
fitted)
• reassemble the extinguisher, using the correct media
and cartridge
• after the cap has been fitted, fit the safety pin
- write the date of refilling on a record label on the
cylinder
- replace the extinguisher in its previous position or put it
in store, as required by the chief mate
.3 states that neither a partially discharged extinguisher nor

an empty one should be placed in its previous position
before being refilled
R2 - Reg. T1 - Ch. 9
3.6 Firefighter's outfits and other personal 11-2/17
protective equipment
.2 states that, in addition, the inspection and maintenance

schedule should include checking:
- that all outfits are in their correct stowage positions
- that the personal equipment is undamaged and
complete
- that the battery of the electric safety lamp (hand lantern)
is fully charged
38

- that the breathing apparatus is ready for use

- that the compressed air bottles, including all spares, are
kept fully charged
- that, after any use, the breathing apparatus is
dismantled to ensure that all parts are clean and all
valves are operating correctly
- that the fireproof lifeline is undamaged
3.7 Rescue and life support equipment (1.5

hou rs)
.•.
-~
.1 demonstrates the use of rescue equipment:

- stretcher
- first-aid kit
- self-contained breathing apparatus
- hand operated resuscitators - air and oxygen type
- fully automatic resuscitators
- rescue harness with lifeline and safety hook
- intrinsically safe portable lights
- fire axe
- fire suit
- personal protective gear such as helmet, gloves and
boots
.2 demonstrates and states that during search and rescue of

injured persons, rescue party should carry additional SCBA
and a resuscitator
.3 demonstrates first aid for burns and bleeding to a casualty
.4 demonstrates resuscitation
.5 demonstrates and states that in addition to a line, a guide

line may also be rigged as rescue aid
.6 states that thermal protective aid, life jacket and life buoys
are also used as rescue equipment during abandonment of
the ship
3.8 Salvage equipment (0.5 hour)

.1 states, and demonstrates where necessary, the names and
describes the working principles and operations of following
salvage equipment:
- fire and salvage tugs
- helicopters
- hand flares, parachute rockets, smoke floats, line
throwing applianc;es, MOB marker, EPIRBs, SARTs,
two-way communication
- gas cutting set with oxy-acetylen~ torches
- collision mats
- signalling flags and morse signalling lamps
- rope ladder with boat hook
- rescue boat
- large capacity salvage pumps and ejector pumps fitted
on fire boat and tugs
- oxygen analyser and toxic gas analysers for entry into
enclosed spaces
39

- high-expansion foam system fitted on fire-fighting tugs

- towing gear
3.9 Communication equipment (0.75 hour)

.1 states that communication equipment used for fire fighting
is of two types: internal and external communications
.2 demonstrates internal communications:

- communication by voice, messenger and loud hailer
- two-way communications with radio hand sets
- portable radios including rescue boats and lifeboat radio
equipment .'-.'
- public address systems
- intercoms and fixed telephone systems
.3 explains use of external communication equipment such

as:
- DSC on VHF, MF and HF
- Inmarsat-AI-C
- all other terrestrial and GMDSS systems
3.10 Requirements for statutory and

classification surveys (1 hour)
.1 states that the statutory requirements for fire prevention,
protection, detection and extinction are contained in
Chapter 11/2of SOLAS 74
.2 states that specialized fire-fighting systems, equipment and

procedures while carrying dangerous goods are described
in the emergency procedures of the IMDG Code

procedure for the carriage of fire-prone cargoes in bulk are
described in the BC Code

procedures for the carriage of liquid chemicals in bulk are
described in the IBCIBCH Codes

procedures for the carriage of liquefied gases in bulk are
described in the IGC/GC Code
.6 states that fire protection bulkheads such as A-60, B-30

and C/F class mate'rials, fire proof materials and low flame
.
spread materials are tested as per fire test procedure code
.7 states that administrations are required to follow the

minimum IMO requirements and shall :also make national
rules
.8 states that classification societies' rules are based on IMO

requirements and their own particular requirements
40

.9 states that SOLAS 74 requirements are under constant review

and updating and changes include:
- smoke detection and extraction system for passenger
spaces
- helicopter deck
- fixed installation for paint lockers
- fire-fighting arrangement for ro-ro spaces
- jacketing of fuel injection pipe for main and auxiliary
engines
- definition of control station
- inerting ventilation and gas measurement for double hull
space of oil tankers
- special requirements for ships carrying dangerous
goods, location and separation of spaces
".- .
41

R1-Annex2 A1 - Ch. 10
Competence 4: Investigate and compile reports R1 - Reg. VI/3
on incidents involving fire Sect. A-VI/3
Table A-VI/3
4.1 Fire investigation and reporting (2 hours)

A2-PI.
.1 states that the investigation into the fire should include
10.101
recording the following:
- how the fire was discovered
- the time at which the fire alarm was given
- how the alarm was given .....
- the time at which the master or other officer was
informed
- the position and nature of the fire
- who was first on the scene
- what actions were taken for the initial attempt to
extinguish the fire
- how many firefighter's outfits with compressed air
operated breathing apparatus (CABA) were used
- what appliances were used, both portable and fixed
- what manpower was used
- at what time the fire was extinguished
- the number of casualties, with details of those injured
and the nature of injuries
- what damage was caused, including any to the structure
and fittings of the ship
- an estimate of what proportion of the damage was
caused by the fire extinguishing media, e.g. water or
foam, as compared to that directly caused by the fire
- for how long after the fire was extinguished was a fire
watch maintained
- to what extent the ship or any part of it, e.g. the engine
room, was immobilized because of the fire
- an analysis of the fire, the materials which were burning,
the known or probable source of ignition and the cause
- conclusions on the cause of the fire and
recommendations for avoiding a recurrence
.2 states that the report on the investigation will include these

A2-PI.
details of the fire-fighting procedures:
10.103
- the occurrence and a timetable of the fire
- the actions taken and the time of each action
- the facts concerning the fire, including its site, materials
and ignition
- the fire-extinguishing appliances required for fighting the
fire and the numbers of each type used
- the number of crew and shore firemen (if appropriate)
engaged in fighting the fire
- the number of firefighter's outfits and CABA used
- the damage caused by the fire
- the damage caused by the fire-extinguishing media
- the extent to whicl1 the ship or its services were
immobilized by the fire
.3 states that the report should also contain conclusions from

the facts established, including:
- an analysis and discussion of the facts
- the conclusions reached from this analysis and
discussion
- recommendations on the actions required to avoid a
recurrence
- recommendations, if any, to improve fire prevention and
fire-fighting procedures
42

4.2 Trainee's experience of fires on ships

.1 describes details of fires experienced:
- their causes
- the fire-fighting procedures
- the results
4.3 Documented reports of fires on ships and -,

lessons learned
.1 describes, after being given the particulars of a ship and its
cargo and how a fire was discovered, the initial action
which has to be taken
.2 describes, after being given the results of that action, what

further measures, if any, are required
.3 describes, after being given the particulars of the whole

incident, how his actions compared with those actually
taken on board the ship concerned
Review and assessment A1-Ch.12
43
Part D: Instructor Manual

Introduction
The instructor manual provides guidance on the material that is to be presented during the
course. The course material reflects the requirements for the training of masters, chief
engineers, officers and key personnel with particular emphasis on organization, tactics and
command, as specified in Table A-VI/3 of the STCW Code.
The material is arranged in four competences:
1 Control fire-fighting operations aboard ship .,

2 Organize and train fire parties
3 Inspect and service fire detection and extinguishing systems and equipment
4 Investigate and compile reports on incidents involving fire
Table A-VI/3 ofthe STCW Code (R1) is used as a basic reference throughout the course, and
the consolidated text of the 1974 SOlAS Convention, the 1978 SOlAS Protocol and the 1981,
1983, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1994 and 1996 amendments (R2) referenced where appropriate.
The trainee is expected to have a good knowledge of all the competences of Table A-VI/1-2,
A-VI/3 and of SOlAS, which will be useful as he makes progress in his sea-going career and
has to take examinations which include fire fighting.
The course outline and timetable provide guidance on the allocation of time for the course
material, but the instructor is free to make adjustments as necessary. The detailed teaching
syllabus must be studied carefully and lesson plans or lecture notes compiled where
appropriate. An example of a lesson plan is attached at the end of Part D.
It will be necessary to prepare material for use with overhead projectors or for distribution to
trainees as handouts. Appendix 3 contains examples of plates for such use and Appendix 4
contains supporting material for the use of the instructor when delivering the lectures.
Preparation is essential if the course is to be effective and successful.
Throughout the course it is important to stress that rules and regulations must be strictly
observed and all precautions taken to maximize safety. Where appropriate trainees should be
given advice on the avpidance of accidents.
The detailed teaching syflabus must be studied carefully and lesson plans or lecture notes
compiled where appropriate. An exa,mple of a lesson plan is given on page 53.
Instruction should be made as practical as possible and actual equipment should be used,
where available, to illustrate lessons in the classroom.
Guidance on assessment is given in a separate IMO Model Course 3.12.
44
PART D: INSTRUCTOR MANUAL
Throughout the course it is important to stress that rules and regulations must be strictly
observed and all precautions taken to minimize risk to traines and staff. Where appropriate,
trainees should be given advice on the avoidance of accidents .
• Safety routines
Safety precautions during drills are a major component in the organization of this course.
Course trainees must be protected from danger at all times while the course is in progress.
Instructors and their assistants must supervise strictly and act as safety guards. When
necessary, the staff should wear complete breathing apparatus and carry portable fire
extinguishers so that they can assist trainees when required. Other safety precautions include
an extra fire hose nozzle, a shower near the site, first-aid equipment an~:.an oxygen unit and
resuscitation kit.
45
Guidance notes
Introduction, Safety and Principles

The main aims of Table A-VI/3 of the STCW Code should be explained to the trainees.
Adherence to safety rules and the need for care in all actions must be stressed.
The trainees should be encouraged to learn and to understand the stated principles of survival
in relation to fire. The beginning of the session is also intended as a refresher of their earlier
training.
Competence 1: Control fire-fighting operations aboard ship 9 hours
Areas of Fire Hazard

For Competence 1.2, a knowledge of theory of fire is required. This is not a repetition of the
same material covered in the Fire Prevention and Fire Fighting Course, but a summary of key
points. However, for a complete refresher knowledge and understanding of "Areas of Fire
Hazards" the instructor may also give a brief introduction of theory of fire from the Fire
Prevention and Fire Fighting Course.
The trainees should be encouraged to add to the headings and to provide their own ideas on
containment, detection and appliances required. The course should also help trainees to
develop an "eye" for fire hazards and the right attitude for eliminating any potential sources of
fire. See also 87.
The syllabus identifies different areas, each of which has its own particular risks. Each ofthese
also has its own form of containment and means for combating fires.
Judging by statistics of the incidence of shipboard fires, machinery spaces are probably the
areas of highest risk. This is readily understandable: not only do these spaces constitute a
place to store combustible liquids, but they are also the site of pipelines and other equipment
through which heated oils are pumped under varying degrees of pressure, often in close
proximity to hot surfaces. Oil can collect in bilges and oil leakages can be absorbed by lagging.
80th areas constitute a fire hazard. Oil piping may develop leaks through a fracture, blown-out
gaskets and meters or sight glasses breaking. A constant source of danger is the slowly
developing leak which remains undiscovered or is left unattended too long. Prompt attendance
to such small leaks and scrupulous cleanliness of the engine room go a long way towards the
prevention of fires, see 83.
Fire-extinguishing media for fires in machinery spaces consist of water, powder, foam and gas.
In addition it is necessary that remote controls are provided to stop the main engine, to shut
down ventilation and to operate other emergency stops and dumping valves if the engine room
becomes inaccessible. In order not to render the ship helpless when the fire shuts down
essential services, provisions should be available for the emergency supply of power and
water. Also it should be possible to operate a bilge pump from outside the engine room.
Tackling fires in machinery spaces and pump rooms is addressed in video V7. Though
engine-room fires are rare, their effect can be devasting: prompt and effective action is
essential.
46
Accommodation fires, if treated incorrectly, quickly get out of hand, racing along corridors and
up stair wells, eventually reaching the navigating bridge. A fire originating in the
accommodation area usually starts in a cabin or public room. Regular patrols are necessary
and it is good practice to check public rooms after they have been left for the night. Passenger
ships are protected by sprinkler systems and fire doors. Cargo ships usually have less
protection. Personnel should be warned to leave their cabins at once on hearing the fire alarm
to avoid being trapped when the fire comes along the corridor.
For fires in the accommodation, the fire-fighting medium used is normally water. This can be
applied by hose, sprinkler or extinguishers. Restriction of air movement is extremely important.
Stores such as paints and mineral oils should be kept out of the accommodation and only kept
in paint lockers, lamp rooms etc. provided for that purpose .
-.
.••.
Galley personnel should be made aware of the most common causes of galley fires and the
correct remedial action. Fire patrols should visit the galley after the cessation of work. If a fire
develops which threatens to get out of hand, the usual measures to restrict air flow should be
taken. Electric ranges must be isolated before fire hoses are used in the galley.
Cargo spaces pose problems of a different nature. Many cargoes may contribute to a fire even
if not classed as dangerous. Adequate packaging, good stowage and safe conditions are three
important precautionary factors. Some of these factors cannot always be controlled by the
ship. Cargoes may have absorbed too much moisture, giving rise to self-heating. Other
cargoes may not have been sufficiently weathered, giving rise to the generation of flammable
gas. Containers (V4) may have been wrongly packed, giving rise to dangerous conditions
within the container without the crew being aware of it. The same applies for lorries on ro-ro
ships. A long-standing problem is smoking by stevedores, which is still one of the main causes
of hold fires.
Means to combat hold fires are fire hoses, sprinklers (ro-ro) (V6), smothering gas or inhibiting
gas. Oil tankers are provided with foam monitors. Cargo tanks are protected by inert gas.
Another useful medium to deal with hold fires is high-expansion foam, with which some ships
have been provided.
The instructor must draw attention to the increased risk of fire on a ship which is under repair.
It should always be clearly known and stated who is responsible for fire prevention and fire
fighting - the master of the ship or the manager of the repair firm.
Special care must be taken when the repairs are completed and testing of fire alarms and
other alarms is in progress. If a fire occurs during the testing period, an alarm may be
disregarded and considered as part of the test. Only a strict control of the testing, i.e. no
indiscriminate testing sho.uld be permitted, can prevent confusion over real orfalse test alarms.
If the captain of the ship is tn charge of fire precautions and fire fighting, he must ensure that
the ship-repair workmen are made farn,iliar with the ship's fire alarm system, especially the
signals for evacuating the engine room' and the ship.
Exit paths from the engine room and from some spaces in the ship could be marked by exit
signs and coloured tapes.
47
Dry distillation, chemical reactions, boiler uptake fires and exhaust fires in prime
movers and auxiliary exhausts and fires in water-tube boilers
Dry distillation and uptake fires involving iron in steam fires are treated as special fire hazards
on board the ship.
The term "dry distillation" may be unusual, but it is used in Annex 2 of resolution A.437(XI). Dry
distillation is a combustion process in which a flammable material burns with insufficient
oxygen to achieve complete combustion of the material. It can be a very dangerous stage of
a fire and should be dealt with accordingly, including a warning of the existence of a high
concentration of carbon monoxide.
The main point which must be stressed when dealing with the chemical reactions is that
ordinary fire-fighting media such as water and sand may have an adverse r~action with some
types of chemical fires. The production of toxic gases from some plastics must also be given
prominence.
The "iron in steam" fires are sometimes known as "steel fires" and mostly take place in the
uptake of the ship. The important fact about them is that they should not be fought as normal
fires, since the consequences of so doing may be disastrous. Patience is required with such
fires as, generally, they have to be allowed to burn themselves out; the fire fighters have to
concentrate on preventing any spread of the fire.
If direct fire fighting has to be done, the recommended method is to direct as many jets of
water as practicable at the seat of the fire. Water sprays, foam or smothering methods must
not be used. The hydrogen fire which may burn simultaneously with the iron-in-steam fire
should be controlled but not extinguished until the iron-in-steam fire is out; this is to avoid the
possibility of an explosion.
Management and control of injured persons

It is recommended that this section of the course is carried out under the supervision of a
qualified medical practitioner.
This is not intended as a first-aid course but is instead an instruction in first-aid action to be
taken in case of fire casualties. It must be stressed that further medical treatment will be
necessary. First aid is limited to removing the casualty from danger and taking such action as
may be necessary to save life and to limit pain and tissue damage.
In other words, restore breathing if necessary and deal with the effects of burns. The latter
should be done by flushing burnt areas with water at once. If this cannot be done, immerse the
affected parts in water. Flushing or immersion should be continued for at least 10 minutes to
give time for the cooling process to reach the deeper-lying tissues. There is no need to do this
with particularly cold water. Water at a more comfortable temperature may even be more
beneficial. The essence· is speed of treatment. Any flushing with water is better than no
flushing, so no time should be waste~ on searching for optimal water conditions.
Speed is also of the essence in cases where resuscitation is necessary. Such treatment, if
considered necessary, should commence as soon as the casualty is removed from the area
of danger, or even en route to a safer place.
48
One of the main dangers arising from burns is shock, the more so as it may not become
apparent immediately. Unawareness of this phenomenon may cause the death of a casualty,
and it is best, except in cases of very minor burns, to prepare for the possibility of shock. Since
means for treating severe shock are very limited on board ship, medical advice must be sought
and calling at a nearby port must be considered, for hospitalization of the casualty.
Competence 2: Organize and train fire parties 6 hours
Preparation of contingency plans, composition and allocation of personnel to fire

parties
The main emphasis of this competence is the preparation of an effective contingency plan for
the ship. Based on the contingency plan the composition and allocatiol1.;of personnel to fire
parties must be exhibited in the muster list. It is to be stressed that the organization on a ship
for fire fighting must be complete and that the crew is familiar with it, well trained and prepared
for any emergency. The instructor must also stress the need for flexibility in the arrangements,
particularly in making allowances for crew numbers being fewer than anticipated.
Some exercises should be done on stability conditions during fire fighting if a large quantity of
water is used.
Training of seafarers in fire fighting

The item on fire drills is important. The intention is not to provide realism with a real fire but
rather to simulate the conditions, particularly with the smoke, by using smoke bombs which
produce a smoke which is not harmful to the crew. Smoke can also be created by burning
carbonaceous matter such as dry wood and oil, but this may be toxic. The trainees must get
used to operating in a smoke filled compartment by wearing CABA. Some techniques in
search and rescue are illustrated in V3.
The drills should take into account the possible consequences of a fire which affects another
part of the ship.
For each type of fire a plan should be prepared showing:

- which watertight doors, fire doors or dampers should be shut and which ventilation fans
stopped
- which extinguishers should be used, e.g. portable, hydrant and, if required, the fixed
system
- which crew should be assigned for the different duties
- how the fire should be tackled
- which valves should be closed
- which machinery should be shut down
- which accesses and escapes should be used
- where the nearest firefighter's outfits are stored
- whether the emergency generator and the emergency fire pump should be started
- where checks should be made for accumulation of oil vapour and how it can be dispersed
safely.
Illustrations of tackling fires on specific types of vessels are shown in videos V5 and V6.
49
Trainees should at this stage be taken through practical working team exercises outlined in the
syllabus, such as:
- the use of portable fire extinguishers on different categories of fire
- the use of water to extinguish different categories of fire both outside and in enclosed
spaces
- moving and searching for victims in smoke-filled spaces moving through small apertures
wearing CA8A
- rescuing victims from enclosed spaces
- donning and testing protective gear
- communications between site of fire and control station.
Videos V1, V2 and V3 may be used to show the principles involved.
-'-.
Competence 3: Inspect and service fire detection and extinguishing

systems and equipment 10 hours
The organization developed on board and the training of the crew should come into effect
immediately and ensure that any fire is extinguished without delay. The cases offire at sea and
in port described in reference 81 should be useful for trainees as they provide examples of
how serious fires on ships can be tackled. See also 85 and 86.
The importance of methodical training in the use of fire appliances and equipment and of
exercises in fire fighting should be stressed.
A good training in the inspection and servicing of all of the fire-fighting equipment will enable
the crew to ensure that, when required, the equipment is in good order.
Stress should be laid on the importance of maintaining sufficient refills and spares to enable
proper servicing to take place.
In regard to sprinkler systems, it is good practice after a system has been filled with seawater,
whether by accident or because of a fire, to drain it, flush it out with fresh water and then
recharge it in the normal manner.
Valves used on fire hydrants and for isolation purposes on the fire main are frequently of the
diaphragm type. It is important to stress that these diaphragms are of an approved fire-proof
type and that if a new one has to be fitted, care must be taken to ensure that it is of the same
type.
The section on precautions which have to be taken during icy conditions to prevent freezing
and damage to the fire main and to branches should be explained in some detail, including the
effect of wind speed . •
On ships with sprinkler systems it is often desirable to put a small paper bag over the sprinkler
head, to prevent the bulb freezing and bursting, if the particular head is subject to a cold
draught from an open door to the deck.
50
Competence 4: Investigate and compile reports on incidents involving fire

4 hours
Fire investigation and reporting
There is scope for flexibility in the form of the investigation and the report. It is important,
however, for the instructor to stress the need for keeping facts and opinions separated, as
opinions have a value only when all facts are clearly stated.
Documented reports of fires on ships and lessons learned

The instructor has scope for flexibility in this section as cases experienced by trainees can be
analyzed and the circumstances of the fire given, leaving the trainees to decide how to fight
and extinguish the fire and to write the report. The particulars of the case studies (see
Appendix 2, at the end of Part D) should not all be given beforehand but in parts as the case
develops. <.
Furthermore, in practice it may not always be possible to carry out the demonstrations referred
to in Competence 2 and 3. In this event, the time allocated for the demonstrations could be
used to enable the trainees to carry out group assignments or case studies additional to those
given in Appendix 2. More detailed guidance on group assignments and case studies is given
in Appendix 1.
Review and assessment

The instructor may carry out a continuous assessment during the entire period of the course,
stressing the main safety aspects of each subject area and encouraging discussion where
appropriate. The methods for demonstrating competence and criteria for evaluating
competence are given in Table A-VI/3 of the STCW Code.
51
Appendix 1
Guidance on Case Studies and Group Assignments

(Competence 4.2 and 4.3)
1 Introduction
Case studies are useful for teaching Competence 4. This appendix has been produced to
provide more detailed guidance to the instructors who will be implementing and presenting the
course.
Application of the course material is covered by means of:
- case studies
- small group assignments
- presentation of assignment results
At an early stage in the course, the trainees should be formed into small groups; their size
would be in the range of 5 to 9 people. -,
When forming the groups, an aim should be to achieve a reasonable balance not only in
numbers but also in professional experience, ability and job of the trainees, and allowing for
any special difficulties in communication, such as language.
Prior to commencing the assignment tasks, the trainees should be given only the minimum of
information; for example:
- title of task to be carried out

- particulars of task and time allowed
The instructors may provide further information, but only if asked for by a spokesperson of a
group.
The small groups carry through their assignments, making use of:
- the course syllabus

- the course compendium
- further information provided by instructors.
The planning for these assignments also has to be commenced at an early stage in the
course, so that, when the groups assemble, everything is prepared and ready, such as:
- a separate room with a large table and sufficient chairs for each group
- a supply of paper or overhead transparency film for preparing reports.
2 Case Studies
Case studies are useful in focussing attention on specific important aspects of the course and
in assisting the consolidation of the information which the instructor is transferring to the
trainees. It also helps for trainees to learn from previous mistakes. The material in Appendix
2 is intended to help with this.
Additional reports that may be used for compiling case studies may be found in the summaries
of investigations of merchant vessel and fishing vessel accidents compiled by the UK Marine
Accident Investigation Branch, B8 and B9.
54
APPENDIX 1
3 Small group assignment tasks

This will be used at the end of the presentation of the main part of the course, dealing with
case studies and assignments; the trainees will work in small groups. For this section the
trainees should choose, for each group,
- a group leader or "chairman"

- a secretary
- a spokesperson
The group leader would co-ordinate the work of the group and should preferably be a person
with some experience of fire fighting or the maintenance of fire-fighting equipment.
The secretary should keep notes of discussions etc., and construct a report of the work of the
group.
The spokesperson will present a report on the assignment task to the trainees in joint session.
In carrying through the assignment task, the trainees will make use of the knowledge gained
from the lectures and case studies and will use the syllabus and the compendium as
supporting material.
4 Presentation
The report should be able to be presented in a period of, say, 15 minutes, making use of
overhead transparencies to give the main information in terms of key words and phrases,
which can be amplified as necessary by the spokesman for the group. The trainees should
then be allowed a period of, say, 5 to 10 minutes for any questions or comments on the report.
S Guidance for group assignments

5.1 Selection of subjects
Subjects may be chosen by the instructor from any part of the course but, initially, they should
be confined to those familiar to a majority of the trainees.
The subjects can be conveniently grouped under the following headings:

Structural fire protection
Fire safety measures for tankers
Fire detection and fire alarms
Water fire-extinguishing systems (fixed)
Gas fire-extinguishing systems (fixed)
Foam fire-extinguishing systems (fixed)
Portable fire extinguishers
Fireman's outfit .
Fire-control plans
.
5.2 Method for planning study:'
It is suggested that, when a subject and the type of maintenance it requires have been
chosen, the trainees should study any SaLAS references on it. This will give them a general
idea on the IMO requirements and in some cases enough information to enable them to
pursue the study and write the report. Other references in the course may provide more
55
detailed knowledge of the subject. In practice, an Administration may have its own guidelines
on maintenance, and these should be used if available.
All of this information should assist in the compiling of a checklist for carrying out the
maintenance and another for listing possible faults to look for.
On completion of this part of the study, the form of recording to be made should be
considered.
5.3 Reporting
The report on the maintenance exercise should include the following:
General condition checklist .•.."
1 cleanliness, lighting
2 alterations, movement, repairs
3 state of maintenance
4 marking of items
5 fastening
6 accessibility
7 note of deficiencies
Maintenance checklist
8 items (parts) to be opened up or dismantled for inspection
9 items (parts) requiring measurement
10 items requiring testing
11 items (parts) changed, and reasons for change
12 condition of items
13 ease of handling of items
14 preparation prior to inspection (i.e. cleaning, removal, fitting lifting tackle etc.)
- appropriate checks in accordance with Comptence 3 of the syllabus
56
Appendix 2
Material for Case Studies

CONTENTS
International Chamber of Shipping
Fire Casualty Report Scheme

Page
Report No. 1 Fire in container stowed on deck 59

No.2 Fire in cargo of timber products 61
No.3 Fire in engine room of tanker 63
No.4 Fire in crew accommodation during repairs 64
NO.5 Fire in engineers' store room 65
NO.6 Fire in cargo of jute <. 66
No. 7 Fire in cargo of baled cotton 67
NO.8 Fire in cargo of cotton and in engine room 69
No.9 Fire in engine room 71
No. 10 Fire in accommodation of a passenger ship 73
No. 11 Fire in deck cargo of dangerous goods 75
No. 12 Fire in engine room 77
No. 13 Fire in engineers' store room 80
No. 14 Fire in cargo of dangerous goods 82
No. 15 Fire in crew accommodation 84
No. 16 Fire in cargo of baled cotton 86
No. 17 Fire in cargo of coal 88
No. 18 Fire in cargo of bulk grain 92
No. 19 Fire in engine room of a tanker 94
No. 20 Fire in cargo of steel swart 96
No. 21 Fire in engine room 98
Note: 1.C.S. has given permission for these reports to be incorporated in the Instructor
Manual on condition that:
(i) the texts of the reports are not altered from the original; and
(ii) the reports are provided as case-study material for the use of the instructor
only; they may not be circulated or given as hand-outs for retention by
others.•
Further subjects for case study are:
The burning of iron in steam (Compendium page 71)

Water-tube boiler accidents (Compendium page 75)
58
PART D: INSTRUCTOR MANUAL (APPENDIX 2)
Suggested Circulation; NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Dry Cargo
IN~ERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF SHIPPING

FIRE CASUALTY REPORT SCHEME
REPORT NO.1
1- Situation
A 12000 ton dwt. foreign-going cargo ship built .~n 1966 was
berthed in an Australian port, when an outbreak of fire
occurred in a deck container stowed adjacent to No.2 hatch.
2. Initial Action
At 16.00 hours the fire alarms were sounded by the duty
officer, from a fire point in the poop accommodation, after
observing fire in a container during discharging operations.
On hearing the alarm the crew mustered at their fire
stations.
3. Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
Hoses were already laid out on the fore deck since this is a
routine precaution when dangerous cargoes are loaded or
discharged. Additional hoses were made available and
arrangements made for the maintenance of essential services
and communications.
The affected container contained drums of phosphorus and it
was therefore considered that the use of water in the form
of a jet or spray, from hoses, would be likely to prove
ineffective. However, as the container was in the process
of being unloaded and was already secured in a spreader the
crane driver was instructed to lift the container clear of
the ship and submerge it in the dock. This was done
without incident and the container subsequently landed onto
the quay. However as soon as the water had drained from
the compartment the phosphorus re-ignited. By this time
the fire brigade were in attendance and fought the blaze
with dry powder. The fire was extinguished at 16.45 hours.
4. Damage and Personal Injuries

Damage was limited to the container concerned.
.
No injuries occurred •
5. Cause of Fire
Whilst lifting the container from its locator the forward
right hand corner was not cleared properly. As a result
the container tilted, then swung violently, striking an
obstruction which punctured the container wall and a drum of
phosphorus, the contents of which ignited spontaneously.
59
- 2 -
6. Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal
As it was considered inadvisable to use hoses on this type

of fire, and dry powder was not available in sufficient
quantities, the action of submerging the container in the
dock, away from the vessel, was the correct procedure.
This action resulted in the containment of the fire until
the arrival of the fire service. The crew were also
correct in adopting fire control procedures in the area to
limit the fire spread in case the container crashed to the
deck • ...-.
The crew carried out their duties satisfactorily within the
limited resources available.
7. Remedial Action Taken by Company

The problems of dealing with the multiplicity of hazardous
cargoes in an emergency situation are many and very often a
compromise has to be reached.
In this particular instance, subject to the general
conclusions shown below, no specific action was adopted by
the Company.
8. Conclusions
This occurrence highlights the following .
a) The importance of ready identification of dangerous
goods - by correct marking and labelling on the outside
of the contain~r - in addition to such marking and
labelling on individual receptacles stowed within the
container.
b) If the amount and type of cargo constitutes an unusual
risk, the fire brigade should be alerted before loading
or discharging operations commence.
c) Where practicable, the vessel itself should ~arry

supplementary equipment of a type appropriate to the
cargo(es) being carried •
10th September, 1974.
60
CIRCULATION:
DRY CARGO
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF SHIPPING

REPORT NO.2
.•...
1. Situation
A cargo ship of 26,000 tons dwt. built in 1970 was on passage from Canada's western seaboard to
Europe with a cargo of timber products and a full deck cargo of timber. The vesselhad been on passagefor
24 days when the fire was discovered.
Two days before the discovery hurricane weather conditions had been experienced in which the deck
cargo had shifted. The wind had moderated but fairly heavy sea conditions were prevailing at the time of
discovery.
2. Initial Action
The bridge smoke detection cabinet gave first indications of a fire in No.2 hold. The audible alarm did
not function. At 12.22 hours smoke was observed in the vicinity of No. 2 hatchway.
The Officer of the Watch immediately sounded the fire alarm; engineswere put on "standby" and the
ship's speed reduced.
3. Tactical Fire Fishting Procedures

No.2 hold was sealed and carbon dioxide injected by the ship's fixed installation. Six fire hoses were
used for cooling decks and timber in the vicinity of the hold.
At 14.06 hours the ship resumed full speed.
At 17.03 hours smoke was again seen in the vicinity of No. 2 hatch. More carbon dioxide was
injected. At 19.00 hours No.1 and No.3 holds were examined and found normal.
From then onwards carbon dioxide was injected into No.2 hold at hourly intervals, and decks and
the timber cargo in the vicinity were cooled continously. Examinations of No.1 and No.2 holds were made
at regular intervals.
On the twenty-sixth day of passage when smothering and cooling procedures had been in progress for
44 hours, the vesselaltered course for Falmouth.
The Owners made arrangements with the Falmouth Fire Service for equipment and firemen to be
availablewhen the ship arrived.
Thirteen hours after altering course a small explosion was heard in No.2 hold. Eight hours later the
supply of carbon dioxide ran out.
By this.time the vesselwas within two hours steaming from Falmouth.
Since the discovery of the fue a south-westerly wind between force 5-8 had been experienced.
Two hourf after picking up the Falmouth Pilot and Harbour Master the local fue service boarded
the ship moored in the harbour and commenced arrangements to control the fue.
It was decided to inject high expansion foam into No.2 hold through ventilator trunks at the aft end.
To accomplish this a portable foam generator was shipped and timber shifted to giveaccess. Foam was fed
through a large diameter polyethylene pipe and vents for'd were opened to allow the extinguishing agent
to spr~ad through the hold. The ship's carbon dioxide supply was replenished and a 30 cwt. tank of
carbon dioxide shipped on deck to supplement the fIXedinstallation. Two days after arrival at Falmouth
the vesselsailed for its first scheduled discharge port, Cardiff, with six firemen on board.
61
On the twenty-one hour pUllp from Falmouth to Cardiff smoke and steam were observed. Durinl
this period the levelof hiah expansion foam in the hold was maintained.
At Cardiff the local fireservicerelievedthe firemen on board and stood by whiletimber. destined for the
port. was diacharpd. Further foam was injected into the hold. After removina timber from No.2 hatch It
was found that water had entered the hold causlna carlo to swell. as a result of which the hatch covers had
lifted and become distorted. It was decided not to open up No. 2 hatch as It wal felt that further inare" of
air would increase the fire rlak.
Temporary repairs were carried out and the ve•••l sailed for ItI second Icheduled dllcharp port,
Antwerp. with two firemen on board.
On the fifty-one hour plllap from Cardiff to Antwerp bad Wlather condltlonl prevent.d the
inspection of No.2 hold, but It was then discovered that the hatch COVIrshad IIft.d furth.r due to the
ingress of sea spray swelling the cargo. On entry. the hold was found to be cool althouah tractl of It.am
were being emitted. Hold temperatures were taken throuahout and the hlah .xpanllon foam top~d up U
necessary. The condition of other holds was found to be normal.
On arrival at Antwerp the local fire service attended. It was decided that they nlld not remain on
board but should attend when No.2 hatch covers were removed to dllcharle carao.
When the hatch covers were eventually removed, traces of steam Wire oburved. DurlnJ dllchar•• ,
which took place with little difficulty. the cargo was found to be coollnJ rapidly and no furth.r outbreak of
fire occurred. It was evident that the high expansion foam had penetrated the entire carao.
4. Dlmqe and PenonlilDJuries

There was considerable charring and water damap to cargo in No.2 hold and to the deck carao aboVl
this hold. Structural damap had occurred to hatches. hatch coaminp. deck platina and lUoelated ltiffenlrs
due to the ingress of water sweUinathe Cargo.No personal injuries were lustained.
S. Cause of Fire
The seat of the fire in No. 2 hold was located in sulphite paper rolls. The cause wu not determined.
The sugestiun that steel wrapping bands on the CIJ'Io rubbtna adjacent Iteel Itructure could
pnerate sufficient heat to cause the fire was discounted. as was the sUllestion that breaJeap of a wrappInJ
band caused a spark. There is no evidence that this product ianltes through spontaneous combustion. The
most logical explanation is a carelessly discarded ci&aretteor elglr. Experiments have shown that lulphlte
paper willsmoulder and burn very slowly without generating much smoke or heat If in contact with allahted
ciaarette.
6. T.ctical Fire Filhtina Appraisal

The smothering and cooling procedures used kept the fire under control. Had the vesselbeen further
from a port of refup. with depleted supplies of Cllbon dioxide. the situation would have been far more
serious.
Foam penetration in the hold was probably a major factor in extingWshingthe fire.
7. Remedial Action T.en by Complliy

High expansion foam pnerators have been supplied to vessels as weD as operattna and testing
instructions for smoke detectors. Testing of detectors isnow being regularly carried out.
8. Conclusions
Regular inspection of the hold spaces may weD have detected this fire at an earlier stap. It is
considered that some damap had already occurred to the hatch which allowed the escape of smoke when
the fue was discovered.
.
The use of water in fighting the fue in the hold would have caused swellingof the cargo and may have
caused more structural as weDas cargo dam•••.
November. 1974
62
CIRCULATION:
ALL SHIPS NOT FOR PUBLICATION

REPORT NO. 3
1. Situation
A 167,000 ton dwt. crude oil carrier, built in 1968, was in ballast and at anchor off a Persian Gulf
loading terminal, awaiting a berth, when an outbreak of fire occurred in the engine room following leakage
from the lubricating oil supply to a turbo alternator.
..
:.
2. Initial Action
The bridge was informed of the outbreak by actuation of the General and Engineer's alarms. Bridge
monitors also indicated a fire in the engine room.
Engine room personnel tackled the fire with a 30 gallon portable foam extinguisher and fire hoses
fitted with spray nozzles but their efforts were insufficient to contain the blaze.

At the same time other fire fighting teams were deployed in cooling boundary bulkheads and extin·
guishing secondary fires which had started.
The engine room became untenable after some ten minutes, mainly due to dense smoke. The main
fire was finally contained and extinguished by the engine room water spray system. while the ship's tire
fighting teams progressively dealt with secondary fires.

Electric cables, auxiliary machinery and store rooms sustained fire damage.
While attempting to escape, a member of the engine room staff became isolated. He was later found
unconscious and all efforts to revive him failed. Death was reported as due to suffocation.
5. Cause of Fire
The fire was caused by lubricating oil, under pressure, spraying on to the hot surface of a turbine
casing, during routine servicing of a Duplex f1.Iter.The oil supply should have been depressurised before the
f1.Iter cover was removed.
Failure to stop the turbo alternator and 10 shut off the lubricating oil supply resulted in a local tire
developing into a major incident.

Apart from failing to shut off the lubricating oil supply, which resulted in the fire reaching the
proportions of a major outbreak, the measures taken to fight the fire were correct and effective. As it was.
the oil flow was ultimately reduced when the turbo alternator seized.
Actuation of the engine room water spray system was the most effective measure taken to redu.:e
the fire to containable proportions.
The ship's fire fighting teams dealt with secondary fires in a very competent manner and made a
significant contribution towards bringing the situation under control.
7. Remedia.l Action taken by Company

All ships in the fleet were warned of the hazards associated with incorrect maintenance of lubrkating
.
oil filters. Hot surfaces adjacent to lubricating oil filters were fitted with metal shields .
To avoid future errors a work control system was adopted to ensure that potentially dangerous work
activity was properly pre·planned and controlled.
Thus, hazard potential now receives a proper degree of consideration, resulting in better precautions.
8. Conclusions
This incident illustrates the hazards caused by incorrect maintenance procedures. Moreover, it empha-
sises the paramount importance of cutting the supply of fuel as quickly as possible in the event of an oil
fire in the engine room.
January, 1975
63
CIRCULATION

REPORT NO. 4
1. Situation
A 14000 dwt. tanker built in 1970, was undergoing shell-plating and engine room repairs involving
welding at a repair berth. The ship was partially manned and, with fire-fighting equipment-out of
commission while certain items were undergoing inspection ashore, the repair yard had assumed
responsibility for fire protection on board.
A shore labourer, engaged in laying alleyway flooring in the aft accommodation, observed smoke
coming from a cabin.
2. Initial Action
Finding that there was no fire-fighting equipment at hand, he went on deck and procured a
fire hose, only to find that it was not connected to the shore hydrant.
During the time taken to connect the hose the fire spread from the cabin to the adjacent corridor
and dense smoke made it impossible to enter the area.
3. Tactical Fire-Fighting Procedures

The municipal fire brigade was called in but no further details are available beyond the fact
that water and foam were used.

The entire after part of the ship was damaged. In particular, the accommodation was gutted.
A man working in the engine room perished, although the cause of death is not known.
5. Cause of Fire
As a result of an asbestos fire screen becoming dislodged, cabin furniture and bedding were ignited
by heat from ederior welding work.
6. Tactical Fire-Fighting Appraisal

Nothing can be said about the fire fighting procedures adopted, because of the absence of detailed
information. However, it is probable that if a watchman had been stationed in the accommodation area
and portable extinguishers provided as required by the regulations of the repair yard, the outbreak of fire
might have been contained.
Yard regulations also required the following measures: the siting of extinguishers in the vicinity
of the gangway, and a fire hose-connected to a shore hydrant at all times-on deck.
Non-compliance with these regulations allowed the fire to assume the proportions of a major
outbreak. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that free circulation of air could not be
eliminated as it was not possible to close doors in the area, due to the presence of cables carrying
services for repairs in the engine room.
7. Remedial Action taken by Company

All ships' offu:ers were instructed to make sure, regardless of whoever is responsible for safety
when repair work is being carried out, that fire fighting equipment is available, ready for use, and that
the necessary surveillan~e is carried out, particularly when welding operations are in progress.
,
8. Conclusion
When a vessel is undergoing repair~: the risk of fire is increased. Shipowners and personnel should
satisfy themselves that all the safety precautions are observed especially where the responsibility for ship
safety is shared.
March, 1975.
64
CIRCULATION:

REPORT NO. 5
1. Situation
An 11000 dwt. cargo ship built in 1959, was berthed in an Indian port when fire started in an
engineers' store-room, in which cotton waste had been stowed earlier in the day.
2. Initial Action .•...

At about 1900 hrs. smoke was observed coming from the poop deck ventilator and a check was
made of the store-rooms in. the area. The fire was found to be in the engineers' store on the lower deck
starboard side.

The poop accommodation was cleared of personnel and at 1930 hrs. carbon dioxide was discharged
into the store-room from the ship's fixed installation. At the same time the engine room fire pump was
started and water was used to cool the ship's starboard side, in way of the store-room.
The Port fire brigade was summoned and arrived on the scene at 1940 hrs. to supervise fire flghting.
Between ] 930 and 2230 hrs. 8 cylinders of carbon dioxide (in all about 240 Kgs.) were discharged
into the store-room but the door was not kept properly closed and the gas concentration was too low to
be effective.
Hoses.were used to flood the store-room and the fire was eventually extinguished by 0500 hrs. the
foUowing morning.

No structural damage or injuries to personnel were sustained.
Fire damage was confined to electrical circuits, fittings and stores in the compartment; engine spares
were damaged by water. Flooding also caused drums of paint to float about, spiUing their contents.
5. Cause of Fire
Cotton waste, stowed in the store-room earlier in the day, had been placed in contact with a bare
electric light bulb.
At the time the ship's after electric lighting was turned off so that repairs could be carried out to a
defective flood-light. However, the circuit serving the store-room light had been left with the switch in the
"on" position.
Repairs were completed at 1700 hrs. and the electricity supply restored. Heat from the store-room
light bulb which, of course, lit automatica1Jy, caused the cotton waste to ignite.

The fact that the door to the store-room had not been properly closed and that this door was
repeatedly opened to observe results, reduced the effectiveness of the carbon dioxide. The compartment
had to be flooded to extinguish the fire,causing water damage.
7. Remedial Action Taken by Company

The foUowing instructions were issued by the Company:-
Cotton waste should be stowed in spaces provided for the purpose.
Paint and cotton waste should not be stowed together.
All electric light bulbs should have protective guards in place at all times.
When leaving a.compartment, personnel should ensure that light switches are in the "off' position.
8. Conclusions
The importance of checking that electrical fittings are in good order and that, when not in use,
electric lights are switched off cannot be over-stressed. If proper care had been taken in stowing the cotton
waste, there would have been no fire.
June 1975.
65
aItCULA110N :
DRY CARGO NOT FOR PUBLICATION

REPORT NO. 6
1. Situation
A 13000 dwt. general cargo vessel was discharging a cargo of gunnies, jute, tea and carpeting
materials. By the afternoon of the thirteenth day of discharge, bales of jute stacked four high in the after
part of No. 2 hold, remained to be unloaded. .•.-,
The Port Fire Prevention Officer had just boarded for his daily inspection when the alarm was
raised from No. 2 hold.
2. Initial Action
The Fire Prevention Officer ran to No. 2 where dockers in the lower hold were attempting to
smother a fire in the jute cargo. He took a hose, which was already coupled to the deck main supply as part
of the precautionary measures, and directed it onto the fire. At the same time the hold was evacuated.
3. Tactical Fire FightinJ Procedures

Another hose was already being connected to the ship's main deck supply and this was also
brought to bear on the fire. These two hoses were then manoeuvred into the 'tween deck from where fire-
fighting continued until dense smoke made further efforts impossible in this area. Within sixteen minutes
of the warning being given, the local Fire Brigade had arrived and took charge of operations.
The fire was now located in three areas of the cargo in No. 2 lower hold. The initial two jets of
water were used by the Fire Brigade to attack and contain these fires.
Later, teams with breathing apparatus investigated the extent of the fire and positioned the hoses.
Four jets of water were now used to tackle the fire and cool down oil tanks under the jute. Two medium
expansion foam jets were also used.
After about five hours the hold was smoke free and no fire was visible. A watch was kept overnight
and a medium expansion foam jet was used at times to control intermittent outbreaks. This watch was
maintained while the remaining cargo was discharged from the hold.
4. Damage III!d Personal Injuries

No personal injuries were sustained but a considerable amount of damage was done to the jute
cargo. The hold bulkhead in No. 2 was also slightly buckled.
5. Cause of fire
The cause of the fire was not fully established.
The possibility of sparks from the funnel being responsible was put forward but discounted,
as was an electrical source.
The most probable cause seems to have been the hurried disposal of smoking materials by
dockers when they were informed that the Fire Prevention Officer was approaching the "Smoking
Prohibited" area of No. 2 hold.
6. Tactical Fire Fightin. Appraisal

The promptness in tackling the fire prevented a major incident as the vessel had jute in other
holds and there were large quantities of jute in the sheds on the quay.
7. Remedial Action Taken By Company

Incident reported to all other units of the fleet and the need for constant vigilancereiterated with
especial reference to jute cargo.
8. Conclusions
This incident high!ights the need for:
(II) fire hoses to be coupled and ready for immediate use when handling certain types of
readily combustible cargo - the wisdom of this practice was amply demonstrated in
this case;
(b) a strict control being placed on persoMel in "smoking prohibited" a.reas.
August 1975.
66
CIRCULATION: NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DRY CARGO

REPORT NO. 7
1. Situation
A 15000 dwt. general cargo ship built in 1970 was on passage from South America to Europe
with a cargo including asbestos, coffee and cotton, and a number of containers. The ship had been at sea
for 13 days when a fire was discovered in a forward cargo compartment. During this time the weather had
been fme with moderate winds.
2. Initial Action
At 15.50 hours very slight white smoke was seen issuing from the ventilators at No.2 hatch.
The bridge smoke detecting cabinet was checked and showed similar white smoke. The audible alarm
sounded five minutes later. The ventilator fans were stopped and the fire flaps closed. The Master ordered
"stop engines" and gave instructions for the ventilators to be sealed. Within a few minutes the smoke
became thick but remained white.

At 16.25 all hatches were sealed and the ship resumed its voyage to the first port of discharge.
CO2 was injected into No. 2/3 hold, and Nos. 1 and 4 were inspected; slight smoke was noticed but no
apparent fire. At 20.00 hours, a temperature check was made in No. 2/3 tween-deck and checks were
repeated every hour. By noon the following day the tween-deck temperature had dropped 3°C and, at
that time, the temperature in the lower hold was 9°C below the tween-deck figure. At midnight the tween-
deck temperature had fallen by a further 5 C and the lower hold figure showed a 1°( drop. Smoke
U
emission from the small hatch through which temperatures were recorded had now ceased altogether.
Throughout the passage moderate weather prevailed and the ship arrived at its first discharge
port some forty hours after the lire was discovered. Temperatures on arrival showed a rise of 4°C in the
tween-deck but no change in the lower hold. Discharging of Nos. 1 and 5 holds commenced at 10.00, but
it was deCided nqt to open No. 2/3, and at 15.00 further CO2 was injected. During the following day
tween-deck temperatures were down by between 5°C and 8°C; in the lower hold the drop was not so pro-
nounced, reaching 3°C. At 19.00 further CO2 was injected and the ship sailed that evening for the next
discharge port, having replenished CO2 stocks.
During the twenty hour passage there was no change in the situation. Firemen boarded the ship
on arrival and entered No. 2/3 hold; no signs of smoke or fire were found.
Discharging of Nos. 1 and 5 was resumed at 14.00 but no decision had been taken about opening
No. 2/3. The tween-deck temperature was steady and a further drop of 2° to 4°C was recorded in the
lower hold.
By noon the following day, the tween-deck temperature had risen slightly and smoke was issuing
from the hatch; further CO2 was. injected. The fire-brigade attended at 13.00 and stood by with hoses
while deck car.go on the No. 2/3 hatch covers was discharged and the hatches prepared for opening. The
master had suggested using foam as well as water for fire-fighting but the fire-brigade refused on the grounds
that it was custo~ry to use water on fires in cotton cargoes.
At 16.40 the fire·brigade ordered No.3 hatch to be opened and, after thick smoke had cleared, the
compartment was inspected but there was no evidence of a fire.
No.2 hatch was opened at 17.00. and about ten minutes later flames were seen in baled cotton
in the lower hold port side; the fire brigade applied water using hoses from the main deck, and spent
about forty-five minutes shifting heavy cargo from the aftermost section of the tween-deck hatch covers.
At about 18.00 the fire-brigade estimated it would take twenty minutes to have the fire under control.
67
An hour later, however, it was obvious that the fire was intensifying. The fire-brigade cOJ-,{inucJ
to apply water and the ship's crew cleared and opened up further sections of the tween-dcct: Latch
covers to make the lower hold more accessible for fire fighting.
By this time the ship's side and starboard deck plating had started to buckle, and water w~s lI~ed
for cooling. The fire continued to spread, and at 23.35 the fire-brigade forced air into the holJ to dear
the smoke by means of a compressor, with an air-hose leading into the hold.
At 00.50 the fire-brigade started flooding the hold, and by 03.00 the smoke had lessened and
another tween-deck hatch cover was opened.
The fire was eventually brought under control at about 08.00, although cargo at the top of the
port side was still burning. These uppermost bales were above the water level in the hold duc to the
list which the ship had taken.
Discharging of the cotton started at 11.15, but at noon work switched to coffee in thc..forcjJart
which had started to swell, pushing up sections of the tween-deck hatch cover and the tween-deck itself.

Apart from considerable fire and water damage to cargo, structural damage was caused to the
tween-deck plating and stiffeners, main deck plating, ship's side and the forward bulkhead of No. 2{3
hold. There were no personal injuries.
5. Cause of Fire
Not yet known.

The fire was discovered at an early stage, '.his enabled it to be kept under control with CO2 durin;
the voyage.
It is felt that the tactics employed by the fire-brigade in opening up all of No. 2/3 hold cn~:1~d
greater difficulties than would otherwise have been met in extinguishing the outbreak. The use of fC3Jn,
as suggested by the master, might also have been more effective than water at the early stages, tht;reby
perhaps obviating the need to flood, and minimising cargo and structural damage.
7. Remedial Action Taken by the Company

All necessary and conceivable measures were taken to minimise damage and protect the interests
of the vessel and the other parties involved.
8. Conclusions
This incident appears to confirm the owners' opinion that the fire-brigade lacked experience in
handling shipboard fires; continuous pressure by the ship's command, fully supported by the owners'
agents, had little if any effect in improving the fire fighting tactics used. It also underlines the ease with
which a deep-seated fire in a combustible cargo can spread if air is re-admitted.
January 1976 .
68
CIRCULATION:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ALL SHIPS
INTERNATIONAL CHAM BER OF SHIPPING

REPORT NO. 8
-,
L Situation
An 11,000 dwt cargo liner loaded with general cargo and cotton was enroute to the west coast
of the U.S.A. when fire broke out in No.4 hold. Weather at the time was fme with a force 3 wind.
2. Initial Action
At OL05 hours, smoke was seen coming from ventilators at No.4 hold. The fire alarm was
sounded and ventilation fans to the cargo compartments were stopped. The main engines were
ordered to "stand bY" and the ship was turned off wind.

At OLI4 the engineer on watch reported that the bulkhead between the engine room and
No. 4 cargo hold was extremely hot. Shortly afterwards flames were seen in the after part of the
engine room. The main engines were stopped, the skylight and ventilators were closed and the
engine room was evacuated.
Meanwhile the ship's fire-fighting team led by the Chief Officer had been organised. The
emergency fire pump located in the poop section was brought into operation and an attempt was
made to gain ~ntry into No. 4 hold but this was not possible because of the heat and smoke.
It was decided to tackle both fires with COz. Greater priority was given to the engine room
fire which was threatening the whole of the midships superstructure. Furthermore, it was hoped this
action would enable the main fire pumps to be brought into use to tackle the fire in No.4. Accord-
ingly, fifty cylinders were discharged into the engine room and twenty·four into No.4 hold but
shortly afterwards it was reported that the fire had spread to the store-room above and adjacent
to the engine room.
The officers' and crew's quarters were located on the deck above the store-room and the danger
of fire spreading throughout the accommodation was imminent.
Due to the main fire pumps still being inoperable the only fire-fighting resources available
were the emergency pump and portable extinguishers.
Access to the store-room was through a narrow, smoke-filled passage but two seamen wearing
fire suits and compressed air breathing apparatus succeeded in controlling the fire there, while
others tackled fires which had broken out in the accommodatioft above.
At 02.30 the fire in the engine room appeared to be extinguished and the store-room fire
brought uhder control.
In No. <4 hold however, the temperature was again rising and it was clear that the COz had
only temporarily subdued the fire. It was decided to flood the hold using the emergency pump.
Meanwhile fires continued to ,break out in the store-room and these were tackled with portable
extinguishers.
During the fire-fighting operations, radio contact was established with the ship's agent and with
the authorities at the nearest port. Details of cargo composition, draught, weather conditions and
the fire situation were given and the assistance of a fire-fighting boat was' requested. In addition
lifeboats and rafts were prepared for launching and other precautions taken to abandon the vessel
should this become necessary.
69
At 06.50, a fire-fighting tug arrived and increased the rate of flooding of No.4 hold using
three jets.
A second tug arrived at 12.15. The jets from the first tug were stopped and the ship was
taken in tow; flooding of No.4 continued, using the ship's emergency pump.
At 19.40 the vessel arrived in port and the tugs resumed flooding. A further supply of C02 was
provided and discharged into the hold.
At 08.20 the following day, flooding of No.4 was ceased and at 09.00, crew members were
able to gain entry to the tweendeck. The ship had listed 10° to port and while the port side of the
lower hold was filled with water the starboard side was dry. Hot plating in this area indicated that a
renewed outbreak of fire could be expected. The local fire brigade which had been in attendance
since the ship berthed cut six holes through the plating and further water was applied by o~e of the
tugs.
At 15.00 there were no signs of fire in the hold and at 16.40 the hatchcover was opened.
At 19.20 the auxiliary engines and pumps were started and the water was removed from No.4.
Discharge of damaged cargo began at 19.45.

Considerable structural and cargo damage was sustained but further details were not given.
There were no personal injuries.
5. Cause of Fire
Investigations showed that the fire originated in the middle of the cotton cargo in No.4 lower
hold. The most probable cause was thought to be smoking by dockers during loading. Spontaneous
combustion, put forward as an alternative theory, was considered to be less likely.
6. Tactical Fire-fighting Appraisal

The fire broke out at night while the ship was at sea. After the initial outbreak it spread
quickly to the engine room and midships accommodation. Even after the fire in the engine room
appeared to be extinguished the main fire pumps could not be used because of the concentration
of C02 remaining in the engine room.
The most critical phases of what was a difficult incident to control were successfully tackled
by the ship's personnel who acted with determination and skill.
7. Remedial Action Taken by The Company

The incident was studied by the company's safety committee. All senior deck and engineer
officers undergo compulsory training courses in fire-fighting. The company also operates montWy
safety conferences which officers on shore leave attend. On all ships great attention is given to train-
ing and fire-fighting drills.
8. Conclusions
This incident demonstrates the value of well trained personnel on board and an al:tive company
policy towards education and training in all safety matters.
September 1976
70

ALL SHIPS

REPORT NO. 9
1. Situation
This report concerns an engine room fire on an ore carrier of 18,300 dwt, built in 1960, proceeding
on a short coastwise passage in United Kingdom waters. The main propulsion machinery ·was a five
cylinder turbo-charged unit, which at the time of the incident was operating on diesel fuel.
Before the start of the voyage the fuel valves of numbers 4 and 5 cylinders had been replaced by
overhauled spares. During the passage the Third Engineer was rectifying minor leaks in the fuel lines to
these replacement valves and while attempting to tighten a connection, the stud coupling sheared. Escaping
fuel ignited on contact with the exhaust manifold.
2. Initial Action
The Third Engineer informed the Second Engineer who was at the main engine controls. He then
returned to tackle the fire with a two-gallon foam extinguisher. The Second Engineer sounded the general
alarm and instructed a Junior Engineer to advise the bridge. The main engine was stopped and the fuel
oil booster pump shut down. The Second Engineer then went to the outbreak where the Third Engineer
and Fireman Greaser were attacking the fire with portable foam extinguishers. The fire was getting out of
hand and all three, two Apprentices and the Junior Engineer evacuated the engine room. At this time the
Chief Engineer who had been off-duty arrived and assumed command of the fire-fighting operation.

Meanwhile the Electrician had activated the C02 discharge system alarm but had not operated the
release valves. He was told not to do so by the Chief Engineer so that the situation could be assessed
and a check made that all personnel had evacuated the engine room. The electrical shut down switches
were operated and engine room skylights, vent flaps and funnel dampers closed. Deck personnel were set
to rigging hoses and smoke masks, catering staff and another Junior Engineer collected fire extinguishers
in readiness for use.
The fire appeared to be seated at the exhaust trunking in way of number 5 cylinder. The Chief Engineer
and Store-keeper used foam and soda acid extinguishers but were unable to get close enough because of
thickening fumes and smoke. An attempt to clear the atmosphere by opening the skylight caused a flare
up. All the quick release valve gear were operated except the fuel SUPIDY to the generators which was clear
of the fire.
By this time the fire had begun to subside but flared up as spilt fuel on the cylinder head footplates
dripped on to the exhaust system. The Second Engineer and the Electrician, both wearing smoke helmets
and the Chief Engineer, without a smoke helmet so that he could move more freely to direct operations,
applied water from hoses fitted with spray jets to the exhaust manifold and the adjacent floor plates.
A rescue party stationed outside helped to manoeuvre the hoses. The Chief Engineer was of the opinion
that the situation was coming under control but at the same time a glow was noticed in the area of the
workshop aft and purifier flat at the upper platform level. It was thought that the fire had spread to
these parts where lubricating oil and kerosene tanks were located, and it was decided to close the fuel
supply to the generators, vacate the engine room and discharge C02 into it. This decision had been delayed
for some forty minutes as the ship was in a buoyed channel and hitherto the apparent seat of the fire had
not endangered these tanks.
As soon as the fumes had cleared: the Chief and Second Engineers checked the engine room casing for
hot spots but found none. By 14.00 hrs., thirty minutes after discharging the C02, the Chief Engineer
was convinced that the fire was extinguished but decided to allow further time for the exhaust manifold
to cool down to avoid the possibility of re-ignition when the engine room was opened up for inspection.
At 15.00 hrs. the Chief Engineer entered the engine room wearing a smoke helmet and safety line;
a hose party stood by. The fire was out and unlikely to re-start. Skylights were eased up to ventilate the
space and as soon as power had been restored the engine room forced ventilation fans were started.
71

The main engine turbo-blower was seriously damaged, in particular the circular frame, inner and outer
suction nozzles and the air inlet filter elements.
Exhaust gas by-pass trunking was fitted and after repairs had been made to the fuel piping and the
whole tested, the voyage was resumed on reduced revolutions.
No personal injuries were sustained.
5. Cause of Fire
The fire was caused by ignition of leaking fuel from a sheared fuel pipe coupling.

The prompt actions of the Second Engineer confined the fire so that the only serious damage was
.•..-.
to the turbo-charger .
Allowing for the fact that the ship's position made immediate use of the engine room C02 system
undesirable, the Chief Engineer's control of the situation resulted in speedy resumption of normal
conditions in the engine room.
After operating the C02 system, smoke in the alleyway prevented a check being made that all the
bottles had discharged. It was found afterwards that nine bottles out of the total of sixty had not operated
because their pull-cord was not properly connected to the operating piston.
In addition to the fifty-one bottles of C02 discharged, a total of six two-gallon foam extinguishers
and two two-gallon soda-acid extinguishers were used.

Fire-fighting personnel reported that smoke helmets restricted movement and sets of self-contained
breathing apparatus were subsequently supplied.
A thirty-gallon foam extinguisher located at the forward end of the boiler flat could not be used
due to insufficient length of hose. This was re-sited in a position approved by a surveyor of the national
administration.
8. Conclusions
This incident demonstrates the need to replace compressible olives in couplings whenever fuel valves
are changed - to prevent over-tightening of couplings. Such work should not be undertaken while the
engine is running or still hot.
It was reported that too many personnel were attempting to assist fire-fighting and in so doing
generally hampering operations. Instructions should be given that all personnel, apart from fire-fighting
and back-up teams, should muster at an approved position for ease of counting and to facilitate giving of
assistance where required.
November, 1976 .
72
CIRCULATION:
ALL SIDPS NOT FOR PUBLICATION

REPORT NO. 10
1. Situation
This report concerns a fire in the accommodation space of a passenger ship of 25,000 tons which,
at the time of the 'incident, was in port, berthed alongside.
-,
2. Initial Action
At 2300 an outbreak of fire occurred in a locker in the Smoke Room. Attempts to extinguish it by
means of fire extinguishers were unsuccessful and the general alarm was sounded, the port fire brigade
was summoned and the Port Captain's Office was also informed. The fire spread rapidly from the locker
into the cavity between the Smoke Room ceiling panelling and the steel deck above. Shortly afterwards
the interior of the ship rapidly filled with smoke and instructions were given to evacuate all passengers
ashore. The public address system and the general alarm system could no longer be used because the
wiring of these systems passed through the locker where the fire originated and had been damaged.
Instructions to evacuate were passed orally by members of the crew and the evacuation proceeded in a
very orderly manner, being completed by 23.45.
3. Tactical Fire FightiDgProcedures

At this time four Grinnel sprinkler heads were operating in the Smoke Room, but it soon became
clear, from the rapid increase in deck temperatures of the Sun Deck cabins overhead, that the fire was
above the deckhead panelling in the Smoke Room. As the continued use of sprinklers was having little
effect, and was causing unnecessary flooding, the sprinkler system was shut down. The fire brigade
produced a smoke extracting pump which was partly effective in clearing smoke in the vicinity of the
door into the Smoke Room. With the assistance of breathing apparatus and strong lighting. it was
possible to use hoses on the Smoke Room locker which was still extremely hot.
To check the spread of fire above the deckhead panelling, part of the panelIing was removed and
water was sprayed into the area where the fire was still burning fiercely in the trunkings and ceiling
grounds. This action brought the fire under control and considerably cooled the area. It also further
reduced the concentration of smoke. Further deckhead panels were removed to release trapped heat
and the deckhead plating was cooled with water.
The fire was eventually extinguished at 00.30 the following mornipg.

All electrical cables passing through the locker had been badly charred and, in addition to the side
panelling in the immediate vicinity of the fire, there was extensive damage to the deckhead panelling
over a fairly large area.
The steel deck over the area was buckled and a cabin on this deck had been badly affected. There
was minor fire.and water damage to furniture in the Smoke Room and water damage to some cabins on
the deck below, where water had penetrated by way of the stairways.
No personal injuries were reported.
5. Cause of Fire
The fire appears to' have been caused by the ignition of waste paper in a refuse bag in one of the
Smoke Room lockers. The contents of ashtrays had been emptied into this bag.
73

It is possible that the fire had already spread from the locker into the space over the Smoke Room
deckhead panelling by the time it was detected.
The use of fire extinguishers was not effective but prompt application of water, which had the
added benefit of cooling the deck plating above, prevented stiII greater spread of fire and consequent
damage.
7. Conclusions
Despite the obvious risks of putting the contents of ashtrays into receptacles containing com-
bustible material, reports of many incidents where fire appears to have been caused by smoking show
that human carelessness is all too common.
Although fitted with a sprinkler system, the construction of the deckhead panelling was such that a
fire, which started at a lower level, was able to spread into the space between the panelling and the steel
deckhead and affect a wide area of this space.
February, 1977.
74
CIRCULATION:
DRY CARGO
NOT FOR PUBUCATION

REPORT NO. 11
1. Situation
This report concerns a fire which broke out among dangerous goods stowed on deck on a five
hatch general cargo ship of 15,000 dwt. The ship had loaded at northwest European ports for South
Africa and the Persian Gulf and at the time of the incident was berthed alongside at Kuwait.
'&.-.
2. Initial Action
At 1745, during discharge, a fire occurred on deck at No.5 hatch in a stow of plastics receptacles
of "Butanox" (methyl ethyl ketone peroxide - a dangerous substance classified by IMCO as Class
5.2 - organic peroxides).
The crew went to fire stations and shore fire services were notified. All cargo discharging was
stopped and stevedores sent ashore. The fire was tackled with a 10 lb. dry powder extinguisher and at
first this action appeared to have been effective, but within a few seconds the fire broke out again and
spread rapidly to an adjacent stow of steel drums of Fenitrothion pesticide (Class 6.1 - poisons). Heat
and smoke quickly developed and despite the efforts of two hose parties, the fire spread to cartons of
aerosol cans and butane gas lighter refills (Class 2 - inflammable gas). These began to explode and fly
in all directions, creating additional hazards for the fire fighting parties.

Owing to the very rapid spread and intensity of the fire, it was impossible to close No.5 hatch and
a number of burning aerosol cans fell into the 'tween deck of No.5, setting fire to the cardboard packing
of pallets of plastics granules in the square of the hatch. This fire which soon ignited dunnage and the
main stow of plastics granules in the port wing of the 'tween deck, was tackled with another hose.
Shortly afterwards, at 1800, the port fire service arrived with two appliances and a fire float.
The fire float quickly extinguished the fire on deck, and two hoses from the shore appliances soon
brought the outbreak in the 'tween deck under control.
After the arrival of shore assistance the ship's fire parties concentrated on cooling the ship's
structure. The fire was completely extinguished by 1815.
Adjacent compartments were checked for any damage or spread of fire but none was found. The
water which had been discharged into No.5 'tween deck drained into the bilges and was pumped out.
At 1900, cargo discharge was resumed at Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 hatches. Continuous fire watches were
set during the night and the fire main was kept pressurised. No further outbreaks of fire occurred.

Damage to the ship was confined to electrical wiring, ropes and a gangway net, and the starboard
accommodation ladder.
No personal injuries were reported.
5. Cause of Fire
The cause of the fire was not reported but spontaneous decomposition of methyl ethyl ketone
peroxide cannot be disregarded especially at an ambient temperature to be expected in Kuwait in July.
Possible leakage of the peroxide from a damaged receptacle or through an insecure closure would be
6.
.
likely to increase such a risk .
Tactical Fire Fighting Appraisal

Fires involving, or in the vicinity of, organic peroxides can lead to an explosion and should be
tackled from a distance using water only. In this incident only a moderate quantity of peroxide was
involved (one pallet load of approximately 800 kg.) but the use of a dry powder extinguisher was
ineffective. Considering the nature of the cargo involved and the size and violence of the fire, the action
of the ship's fire fighting hose parties was commendable. Fire service assistance using water was correct
and effective.
75
CRCULATION:
ALL SIUPS NOT FOR PUBLICATION

REPORT NO. 12
1. Situation
This report concerns an engine room fire in a roll-on/roll-off ferry of 1,900 dwt, on a short sea
passage to a United Kingdom port .
-...
2. Initial Action
At 0007 the Third Engineer, on watch in the control room, saw the fire start through the control
room window. He stopped both main engines and informed the Chief Engineer by telephone, but did not
switch off the oil fuel booster pumps or the fuel supply to the main engines. He then attempted to tackle
the fue with a portable dry powder extinguisher but was unable to do so because of smoke.
Heat from the fue activated the automatic fue alarm.
The navigating officer, on hearing the fue alarm, noted that the engine control warning lights showed
the starboard engine to be stopped and the port engine on overload. He put both combinator levers to the
stop position, switched off the mechanical ventilation to the vehicle deck and engine room, and reported
the situation to the Master who arrived in the wheelhouse when the fire alarm sounded. The officer then
went to the scene of the fue, closing the engine room ventilator flaps on the boat deck on his way.

The Chief Engineer, alerted by the fue alarm and the telephone call from the Third Engineer, went to
the engine room which he found full of smoke. He gave instructions for the emergency fire pump and the
emergency generator to be started. Then he and the Bosun, both wearing self-contained breathing apparatus
and the latter a life line, took a hose and entered the engine room to see if the cause and seat of the fue
could be identified, but both were forced to leave because of smoke entering their face masks. The fault
to the masks was remedied and they re-entered the engine room. A bellows type breathing apparatus was
rigged and manned in case the need arose for assistance to be given to the two men. The Chief Engineer
was able to see the fire which was in the vicinity of the turbo blower. Water was directed towards the fue
by a jet nozzle but the hose was not long enough for the seat of the fire to be reached and both men
withdrew.
An additional length of hose was connected and, because of the intense heat in the engine room, the
Chief Engineer asked for a spray nozzle to be fitted in place of the jet nozzle, hoping that by usinl\ the
spray as a curtain, he would be able to get closer to the seat of the fire. This plan could not be put into
effect as all the spray nozzles were stowed in the engine room and could not be reached.
At about 0030 the Chief Engineer and the Bosun re-entered the engine room, and found that the
temperature had dropped significantly and the fue appeared to be burning itself out. Water was escaping
from burst connections in the cooling water system and it was considered that this was helping to reduce
the intensity of the fire. The Chief Engineer therefore decided that he and the Bosun should withdraw again
and let the fue extinguish itself.
The Chief Engineer, and the Second and Third Engineers, made a number of inspections of the engine
room and at 0045 no further flames could be seen. After an inspection of the whole of the machinery
spaces the Master was informed, at 0110, that the fire was extinguished.
In addition to the fue in the engine room itself, the deck plating of the vehicle space above became
very hot and the Chief Officer organised four hoses for cooling purposes. Large amounts of steam were
produced and visibility in the area was bad. When the Chief Engineer reported that the fire was out the
Chief Office~ asked the Master to restart the vehicle deck fans to clear the atmosphere. It did not prove
necessary to move any of the vehicles but a number of tyres were damaged by heat.
At 0405, the port engine', which remained serviceable, was restarted and the vessel completed the
passage on one engine, entering harbour at 0838.

The major part of the damage was to electrical wiring and fittings, all wiring and light fittings above
both main engines requiring renewal. The effects of heat were apparent diagonally across the port engine
and along the starboard engine, the insulation of a large number of power and lighting cables, carried on
77
cable trays below the deckhead being damaged. Damage to the main engines was confmed mainly to
auxiliary fittings, flexible pipe connections and joints. The starboard turbo-blower inlet filter casing had
yartly melted, together with the rotor bearings. The starboard governor with associated starting and control
gear and the oil mist detector required complete overhaul. Fuel rack return springs, and all pipe joints and
flexible connections affected by heat had to be renewed.
Damage to the ship's structure consisted of localised buckling of the deckhead longitudinals above the
after end of the engine room.
There were no injuries to personnel.
5. C:tuse of Fire
When the fire was extinguished and conditions were suitable for a detailed examination to be carried
out it was found that No.8 starboard fuel pump low pressure delivery pipe had fractured. The broken ends
of pipe had sprung out of line, permitting a discharge of fuel oil towards the engine in line with the fuel
pump. Ignition was caused by fuel oil coming into contact with the exhaust system. The cause .()f the
fracture is not known but it was apparent from the misalignment of the sections of fractured pipe that the
pipe had been under tension.

'lhe vessel was fitted with CO2 extinguishing systems both for the engine room and the vehicle deck,
but the Chief Engineer considered that the use of CO2 in the engine room should be avoided if at all
possible. The diesel generator was still running and providing light and power, and the use of CO2 would
have immobilised the generator. There would also be the problem of purging the engine room atmosphere
after the fire was extinguished and of ensuring that it was safe for personnel to man the control room, the
door between the engine room and the control room not being gas-tight. C02 was not used on the car deck
as it was considered that the situation did not justify it.
The efforts of the Chief Engineer and the Bosun, commendable as they were, probably had only
minimal effects on the fire. It was considered that the fire went out through a combination of two factors:
a) Cessation of the supply of fuel oil via the broken pipe due to the stopping on the booster pumps;
and
b) The escape of water from the burnt flexible cooling water pipes. Cooling the vehicle deck above
the fire with hoses may also have been a contributing factor.
All engineer officers were closely questioned about stopping the booster pumps but no one could
recollect having done so either by operating the breaker at the main switchboard or the emergency stop
switch in the engine room entrance. After the fire it was found that the port booster pump, which had been
in operation at the outbreak, could not be restarted due to a loose connection in the starter. This loose
connection may have been the reason for the pump stopping when it did but no explanation could be
found for the failure of the starboard pump-on standby-to cut in on pressure drop. Had the low pressure
fuel supply continued to deliver fuel oil to the seat of the fire, the incident would have been far more
serious.

Investigations into the incident revealed that within a few seconds of the initial outbreak tremendous
heat and large volumes of smoke and fumes were generated. Coupled with loss of engine room lighting,
these conditions made it impossible for staff to remain in the engine room without breathing apparatus or
to approach close enough to the fire to make effective use of portable extinguishers. Smoke and fumes
rapidly spread to the control room which had to be evacuated. In the circumstances the fue had to be
fought with equipment located outside the engine room.
The only fire ·fighting appliances located in the vehicle deck were hoses with fixed nozzles. When
carrying out fire drills, a situation whereby a hose had to be taken into the engine room from outside had
not been envisaged. For this reason the length of hose used at first was insufficient to enable a jet of water
to be directed onto the fire. The hose had to follow a very tortuous path from the car deck down a stairway
to the control room, around the console and down a further stairway to the engine room floor plate;
severe kinking seriously restricted the flow of water.
The Chief Engineer and the Bosun found that their breathing apparatus made it impossible to com-
municate with one another and difficult to remain in contact. The Bosun also found his life line awkward
and at times·it became entangled with the hose.
78
PART D: INSTRUCTOR MANUAL (APPENDIX 2~
The following recommendations were made as a result of the Company's investigations into the
incident:
a) Consideration should be given to fitting all ships of the type in question with a water spray system
in the engine room, operable from outside the machinery space and capable of being selectively
operated in sections.
b) Consideration should be given to fitting all ships of the type in question with a manually operated
drencher system on the vehicle deck.
c) Supplies of portable foam making equipment should be available on vehicle decks of all roll-on/
roll-off vessels.
d) All hoses in the vehicle deck should be fitted with combined jet/spray nozzles.
e) A non-kinking hose fitted with a jet/spray nozzle should be mounted on a reel permanently
connected to the ship's rue main, adjacent to any door between the control room and the machin-
ery space.
f) The door and bulkhead between any machinery space and control room should-be gas-tight.
8. Conclusions
Apart from the remedial measures listed, this casualty emphasises the necessity of carrying out
realistic rue drills-with the source of fire in various locations. Only by so doing can defects in equipment
or procedure be discovered.
July, 1977.
CRCULATlON: NOT FOR PUBUCATION

ALL SHIPS
INTERNA TIO NAL CHAMBER OF SHIPPING

REPORT NO. 13
Situation
1. This incident concerns a fire which broke out in a locker used as an engine store on a general cargo
ship of about 7,500 grt. The ship had loaded at northwest European ports for northern Brazil, and at the
time of the incident was in the Atlantic, about 750 n.rniles from the Brazilian coast. The weather was fair,
with overcast sky and north-easterly wind.
Initial Action
2. At 15.00 the Second Engineer, on duty in the engine room, became aware of smoke:fle made an
immediate search for the cause and discovered a fue in a locker used as an engine store on the port side
(aft) adjacent to the crew accommodation on the main deck. The navigating officer and the Master were
informed immediately. At 15.05 the general alarm was sounded, all ventilation was stopped, the emergency
rue pump was started and full pressure to the fire lines was ordered. The ship was stopped with the port
side to leeward. At 15.10 all doors and other openings, other than essential machinery air intakes, were
closed, and the crew assembled at muster stations on the boat deck. The Master assumed operational
command from the bridge while the second officer was delegated to exercise on-scene command, com-
munication with the bridge being maintained by portable radio.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures
3. After having reported the fire the Second Engineer started to tackle it with a powder extinguisher.
This attempt failed and he was forced by the heat and dense smoke to retreat to the open deck. A fire-
fighting party equipped with compressed air self-contained breathing apparatus and using hoses took over,
while a second team was set up and kept in reserve. The remaining crew installed hoses in front of and
abaft the superstructure and started to cool the decks over the seat of the fire.
By now the fire extended throughout the whole of the accommodation area on the main deck. The
heat in the passageway compelled the fire-fighting parties to retreat but before doing so two toilet basins on
the port side of the main deck were smashed to facilitate drainage of water from the fire-fighting hoses.
As fire-fighting from within the superstructure had become impossible due to the heat and smoke,
running boards were rigged overside at the level of the main deck cabins adjacent to the engine room store,
to allow the fire to be attacked with hoses through the cabin side-scuttles. Three hoses were used, although
the fire-fighting party had difficulty in keeping their position on the running boards because of the amount
of steam and smoke emerging from the cabin side-scuttles.
By 16.00 the rue had reached the poop deck and the crew's mess. The after bulkhead of No.5 cargo
hold had to be cooled to prevent ignition of cargo. By now the ship had developed a list to port of 10° due
to the amount of water used in fighting the fire, despite the fact that all ballast tanks in the double bottom
had been flooded as a precautionary measure. The possibility that the fire would spread to the promenade
deck and boat deck could not be excluded and preparations to abandon ship were made at 17.00. The
lifeboats were cleared for launching and equipped with nautical instruments and sea-dtarts.
Soon afterwards it became necessary to evacuate the bridge. The radio officer, using a length of hose
pipe for a temporary breathing apparatus, managed to make the transmitter operational and to install a
morse key in the windward bridge wing. Distress signals were not transmitted. The CO2 installation was
made ready to flood the engine room as the bulkheads of the engine casing were heating up in the vicinity
of the fire.
The ship's company continued to fight the rue under these difficult conditions, and eventually a
rue-fighting party regained access to the port side accommodation passageway on the main deck_ They were
joined by another team who had managed to enter by way of a cabin side-scuttle, and by 18.30, the
combined efforts of these two groups ha4 extinguished the fire in the engine store locker and accommoda-
tion on the main deck.
Fire-fightina continued on the poop deck, promenade deck and boat deck and at about 23.00 the
fire was brought under control; at 02.00 next morning it was completely extinguished.
With the crew temporarily accommodated in No. 1 upper tween deck, it was possible to resume the
voyage in spite of extensive damage to navigational and control systems. The starboard rudder engine was
restored to operational condition and the ship was steered using a magnetic compass installed in the rudder
engine room. Later a remote control steering apparatus was set up on the bridge. The rudder indicator,
which h,d been rendered inoperative was replaced by a communications link using portable radio sets,
with crew members posted at the bridge and on deck close to the hatch of the rudder engine room. 72
hours after the rue was discovered the vessel was safely at anchor at the roads of Belem in the Amazon
estuary .
80
Damage and Personal Injuries

4. The whole of the accommodation was destroyed and most of the electrical wiring, including power
circuits. In addition to the rudder indicator, the radar, echo-sounder, engine indicator, engine telegraph,
general alarm, navigation lights and other navigational equipment were inoperative. One officer and two
ratings suffered from smoke inhalation but they recovered within a short time. No other personal injuries
were reported.
Cause of Fire
S. The cause of the fire could not be established, but it is assumed that a short circuit in the power
cables leading through the engine store locker might have occurred, possibly due to chafmg of the cables
brought about by vibration.
Tactical Fire Fighting Appnisal
6. Although it was not possible to contain the initial outbreak thereby preventing the fire from spread-
ing throughout the accommodation, the ship's company carried out their duties with efficiency and
courage. The timely preparation of lifeboats, and maintenance of radio communications were both com-
mendable.
Remedial Action taken by the Company
7. The Master stated in his report that two sets of self-contained breathing apparatus were not
adequate for the size of ship. He proposed at least three sets with sufficient spare cylinders to support a
sustained fire-fighting effort. This matter had already been under consideration by the company, and
the experience gained in dealing with the incident was taken into account in re-quipping all ships in the
fleet.
While fire-fighting was in progress, and afterwards when the voyage was resumed, considerable diffi-
culties were met with on-board radio communications due to insufficient power and range of the portable
sets. These have since been replaced by VHF equipment.
Conclusions
8. This incident demonstrates that high standards of discipline, training and personal alertness allow the
best possible use to be made of available skills and equipment, thereby maintaining control of a ship even
under extremely unfavourable conditions. The efficiency and courage of the ship's company in fighting a
major fire at sea without assistance, and in bringing the ship safely to a port of refuge fully justified the
commendations received.
OCTOBER, 1977
81
CIRCULATION:
DRY CARGO
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER Of. SHIPPING

REPORT NO. 14
1. Situation
A 10500 dwt general cargo ship built in 1958 was on passage from Europe to.~e Far East with
a cargo including woodpulp, chemicals, and a number of freight containers on deck. The ship was in
her second loading port, with four gangs working, when a fire broke out in a forward cargo compart-
ment. The weather was fair after earlier rain, with a light to moderate south-westerly wind.
2. IDitiaI Action
At 09.25 an explosion occurred in No. 2 lower 'tween deck followed by a severe fire. The ship's
fire a1arm was sounded, and the police, fire brigade and port authority were notified. Hoses were
coupled up to the fire main to tackle burning cargo on deck at No. 2 hatch. Stevedores went ashore
immediately, and all crew members, other than those assisting with attempts to extinguish the burning
deck cargo, were ordered ashore. However, three seamen engaged in securing cargo were trapped in
No. 2 lower hold.
3. Tadical Ftr.FlgbtiDg Proeedares

The ship's command informed the fire chief about the situation on board. Cargo in the burning
'tween deck included 80 drums of sodium peroxide (IMDG Code Class 5.1 - oxidising agents) with a
total weight of about 16 tons. The drums were stowed one tier high in both wings of No.2 lower
'tween deck, at mid-length. The fore and after ends of the deck were empty, awaiting other cargo.
The drums were stowed on dunnage and covered on all sides, including top and bottom, by
plastics sheets, and were secured on each side by aluminium stanchions attached to the deck, and to the
hatchway at their upper ends.
The incident occurred while pallets of '~Duranite" (a non-dangerous synthetic resin) in paper
bags, were being loaded in No. 2 lower 'tween deck, by means of a forklift truck. While the truck was
being manoeuvred, one wheel - which stood on the plastics sheet protecting the drums of sodium
peroxide - spun rapidly, creating sufficient frictional heat to ignite traces of spilled sodium peroxide.
The plastics sheet material burned fiercely and shortly afterwards the first explosion occurred.
Access to No.2 hatch for fire-fighting was hampered by the presence of freight containers and
other cargo on deck and at adjacent hatches. Attempts to rescue the three men trapped in No.2 lower
hold were unsuccessful.
A fire boat arrived and cooled the ship's side, later assisted by 5 tugs. The fire brigade used
water to extinguish the burning deck cargo, and firemen wearing self-contained breathing apparatus
moved in to tackle the fire in No.2 hold from positions at the weatherdeck hatch coaming. Water was
applied in large quantities but without success; high expansion foam was also tried but convection blew
the foam about to such an extent that an effective blanket could not be applied.
At about 10.25 there were more explosions. Flames shot out to a height of about 40 metres and
crew members and firemen were evacuated. Fire-fighting was resumed after several minutes with the
use of heavy (low expansion) foam. 16 hoses and 2 monitors were in operation ashore. supported by
two monitors from the fire boat and three monitors from the tugs.
The fire hlVinow spread to No. 3 hold; burning cargo in the forward end was extinguished and
discharged by the fire brigade. It was also thought that No. 1 hold was on fire but this could not be
confirmed because of the manner in which smoke was drifting in the area. The presence of inftammllblc
and poisonous cargo in the after end of No. 1 hold gave rise.to particular concern. A chemist in attend-
ance on board confirmed that there was a risk of the drums rupturing and releasing poisonous vapour
over the surrounding port area. Thereafter checks were made on the composition of the smoke and.
as the situation remained unclear, the fire officer in charge of the operation decided to issue a poison
gas warning at about 11.00. Police evacuated areas of the port affected by drifting smoke. (Subsequent
checks by police helicopter established that only small areas in the after end of the hold were on fire).
82
CIRCULATION: NOT FOR PUBUCATION

ALL SHIPS
REPORT NO. 15
1. Situation
A 20,000 dwt tanker was berthed in a north European port, having discharged a full cargo of gas
oil when fue broke out in the crew recreation room, followed about one hour later by an ~losion in the
saloon area one deck above. Extensive fire and smoke damage was caused to the accommodation. Several
crew members were overcome by smoke, two of whom died in their cabins. The incident occurred in mid-
winter with very severe weather, air temperature being in the region of -70C.
2. Initial Action
Cargo was discharged by 23.15 and ballasting had started. At about 00.55 a fire was discovered in
the crew recreation room by an Assistant Steward who called some of the crew before reporting the fue to
the Chief Officer on deck. The fire alarm was rung at 01.04, ballasting stopped, cargo tank openinga were
closed, accommodation fans were switched off and the shore fire brigade called. Thick black smoke in the
accommodation filled the alleyways on the mail) deck and the starboard alleyway on the poop deck. Most
crew members evacuating their cabins had no time to dress properly and were thus ill equipped to fight the
fire in the very low air temperature.
3. Tactical Fire FiahtiDa Procedures

Fire fighting equipment was brought to the poop, and fire fighting parties and rescue operations
were centred there. One party under the Third Officer took responsibility for rescue attempts on the star·
board side of the poop using self-contained breathing apparatus from midships, whilst the Second Officer,
using a smoke helmet, led another party in checking cabins in the port lower crew alleyway.
The Chief Officer and others attempted to operate a fire hose from the poop into the lower port
crew alleyway, but were hindered by the centre aft hydrant on the poop being seized, it not being apprec-
iated that there was a closer hydrant in the crew cross alleyway.
Another party, under the other Second Officer, had a hose rigged on the main deck but could not
get water. After checking the fue main valves it was assumed that a plug of water in the line to the main
deck had frozen. Although there was water in the poop line, no attempt was made by the main deck
party to connect their hose to a hydrant on the poop line, either at the poop front or on the port side of
the poop.
Eventually, despite the thick smoke, the Chief Officer's party managed to connect a hose to the aft
hydrant in the main deck aft cross alleyway (although this hose was never used), and also connected a hose
on the port side of the poop for cooling the poop front deck.
In the engine room, a second fire pump was started and hoses were rigged for cooling the adjacent
crew recreation room bulkhead.
The shore fue brigade arrived and concentrated their efforts on rescue and cooling the front of the
accommodation. However, effective liaison with the ship's personnel was severely hampered by language
difficulties.
At about 01.50 an explosion occurred in the saloon area on the poop deck; engine room and acco-
mmodation doors were blown out and personnel on the poop were injured. Fire fighting from the poop was
no longer possible and the Chief Officer, thinking that the oil tanks in the engine room had ignited, ordered
all personnel to leave, the poop and proceed ashore. The build-up of smoke made the engine room unten-
able, and the Chief Engineer ordered shut down and evacuation of the engine room.
All personnel were off the ship. at 02.00 and a muster was taken; it was then established that two
men were missing.
The fue was eventually extinguished by the fire brigade at about 06.00.
4. Damage and Persoaallnjuries

All accommodation on the boat deck was destroyed, together with most of the accommodation on
the poop deck and the forward part on the main deck. The after accommodation on the main deck was
damaged by foam and smoke.
84
Six crew members were trapped in their cabins by the smoke. Of these, one escaped out of his port
by IPs own efforts, two were rescued via their ports and one eventually made his way from his cabin down
a smoke filled alleyway to the poop from where he was draged unconscious. Unfortunately the other two
crew members were overcome by smoke and died in their cabins.
S. Cause of PiN
The most likely source of ignition was considered to be an unextinguished ciprette end. Although
the recreation room bulkheads were constructed of steel, open doors permitted fire to spread to
adjacent cabins.
Build up of heat on the deck above led to the evolution of flammable gases from flooring material,
bulkheads and furniture in the saloon. This flammable atmosphere subsequently ignited, causing the
explosion.
6. Tactical Fire fiahtina Appraisal

When the fire was first discovered no one attempted to use the 2 gallon foam extinguishers or fue
hoses on each side of the crew recreation room, nor were the two doors to the recreation room shut.
Most crew members evacuating their cabins had no time to dress properly and were thus ill equipped
to f1ght a fire, lacking protection both from the heat and the freezing conditions on deck. Fire fighting was
hindered by thick smoke and the tack of breathing apparatus, the seized hydrant, the partly frozen fire
main, language difficulties with the shore fue brigade and a lack of communication between senior staff on
board. The latter may in part have been due to the fact that two Second Officers had joined the ship only
16 hours earlier and may not have been fully familiar with the ship and location of equipment. Weather
conditions also resulted in the freezing of water and foam from shore fire hoses and monitors on deck,
making footholds precarious.
7. RemecUll Action Taken by the Company

After a thorough investigation, a report was issued which included a recommendation that water
should be kept running through the deck fire lines during freezing conditions. The existing instructions
were that deck lines had to })e drained, the deck fue main isolated, hydrants opened and drain plugs reo
moved. The need for frequent and realistic exercises in fire and boat drill was also re-emphasised.
More alarm switches, self-closing doors and B class (non-combustible) bulkheads were to be fitted
to the veael when repaired.
The self contained breathing apparatus wo~d be relocated and an additional set provided.
To minimise language problems with shore fire brigades, the introduction of a "Fire Wallet" con·
taining a general arrangement plan, a pumping plan, ventilation arrangements, an access plan and data for
trim and stability calculations was being considered.
8. Couc:1usioDS
This incident illustrates the problems of casualty evacuation and fire fighting caused by materials
producing dense smoke and explosive gases in an accommodation fire. It also emphasises the importance
of boundary cooling above as well as on the side boundaries of a fire, the availability of adequate
supplies of water, and of good communications during an emergency situation.
However it is considered that, under difficult circumstances, praiseworthy efforts were made to
rescue personnel and fight the fire. As a result, three trapped crew members were saved. Had the ex-
plosion not occurred, the ship's staff, with the assistance of the fire brigade, might have contained and
extinguished the fire before it had a chance to spread.
December 1978 .
85
CIRCULATION:
DRY CARGO
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

REPORT NO. 16
....
This report, which deals with a tire in a cargo of baled cotton, highlights the difficulties
or controlling such a tire. in particular when it is necessary to gain access to the stow to com-
mence discharge. The effectiveness of High Expansion foam as a fire extinguishing medium is
made clear especially in avoiding the stability problems and structural damage which can be
created by the use of water for extinguishing purposes.
In this context readers may wish to refer again to Report No. 7 in this series. in which
incident the port tire brigade refused to use foam in spite of pressure from the ship's master.
1. Situation
A 7.000 dwt. four hatch general cargo ship was on passage from Colombian and Central
American ports to the United Kingdom. carrying cotton. timber and general cargo. The ship
bunkered at Curacao and tifteen hours after sailing fire was discovered in No.4 hold. The weather
was moderate with a northeasterly wind force 5.
2. Initial Action
First indication of the tire. at 0225 hrs .. was given by the smoke-detecting cabinet on the
bridge. and at the same time smoke was seen issuing from the forward ventilators of No. 4 hold.
The general tire alarm was sounded. speed was reduced, and all ventilation to No. 4 hold was
sealed off.
3. Tactical Fire-fighting Procedures

At 0300 CO. was discharged into No. 4 hold, and at 0330 it was decided to return to
Curacao. Full speed was resumed. The deck plating. ventilator trunks and the crew recreation
room bulkhead adjacent to the hold were becoming hot. During the day further CO. was discharged
into the hold. and hot areas of the deck. hatch coaming and ventilator trunks were cooled with
water. Wooden panelling on bulkheads in the crew accommodation was removed to check for
heating. Gradually the temperature of all heated areas reduced to near normal.
By the time the ship entered Willemstad harbour, Curacao at 2000. the whole of the CO.
supply had been used. and at 2100 bulkheads and ventilator trunks began to heat up again.
Further supplies of CO. were received from ashore and, with frequent applications throughout
the night. the rise in temperature was lessened. indicating that the fire was being kept under control.
Following consultations between the Master. the Harbour Master and Fire Service Officers,
it was decided to discharge the cotton to get to the seat of the fire. This action was delayed
pending availability of a suitable berth, and throughout the next day the fire was contained with
CO •. .
At 1010 the following day, with three fire tenders in attendance, Fire Officers wearing breath-
ing apparatus entered No. 4 hold. They reported no sign of fire in the upper and lower compart-
ments, although the 'tween decks plating was hot. The hatch was again sealed and further CO.
discharged into the hold.
At 1125 a section of hatch covers was removed and stevedores began clearing cotton from
the upper compartment. At 1400 the chemist in attendance to monitor the atmosphere. declared
the concentration of CO. too high for men to work unprotected in the space. The stevedores left
the area and firemen wearing breathing apparatus began removing 'tween decks covers. Heavy
86
smoke emerged from below, accompanied by a rise in temperature. The firemen evacuated the
hold and as the hatch was being closed at 1445 a flash fire enveloped the whole area, necessitating
the use of water which was applied from hoses fitted with spray nozzles.
The hatch was re-sealed, and further CO. discharged into the hold. Two hours later the
temperature of the steel work around the hatchway began to fall, returning to near normal at 2000.
At this stage the need for High Expansion foam became apparent in order to seal the
space from which the 'tween decks hatch covers had been removed and allow more cotton to be
discharged. There was reluctance to use water to fight the fire as the ship's stability, though fully
adequate for seakeeping qualities. would have been threatened by flooding the hold and 'tween-
decks. The only time water was used inside the hold itself was when the flash fire occurred. H.E.
foam equipment was not available in Curacao and arrangements were made to obtain it from the
United States.
The H.E. foam equipment did not arrive until two days later and. thereafter, it was decided
to maintain the concentration of CO. for a further 24 hours before applying the fO~:Q1.
At 0715 the following day firemen wearing breathing apparatus entered the hold and began
laying a blanket of foam. At O~OO firemen started to unload cotton from the upper compartment.
When the hatchway area was cleared the covers were lifted and foam was discharged into the
'tween decks. A number of burnt bales of cotton were now exposed. these were sprayed with
water and landed. Later. access was gained to the lower hold but no sign of fire or fire damage
was apparent.
The use of H.E. foam enabled the seat of the fire to be kept under control while stevedores
discharged the surrounding bales. until all cotton in the affected compartment had been discharged.
and by 1230 next day the Fire Officer was able to declare that all traces of fire on board had
been extinguished.

Some 180 bales of cotton had been badly damaged by fire and extinguishing agents. Apart
from slight buckling of 'tween decks beams and plating there was little structural damage. There
were no injuries to personnel.
S. Cause of Fire
Not established.
6. Tactical Fire-fighting Appraisal

The smoke-detecting apparatus gave prompt indication of fire which was kept under control
with CO. up until the time of cargo discharge. The ship's entire stock of 76 x 45kg. bottles of
CO. was consumed in fifteen hours and, shortly afterwards, there were signs that the fire was
renewing its intensity. Control of the fire was maintained with supplies from ashore thereafter.
In all. approximately 13.000 kg. of CO, was used. The use of RE. foam allowed the hatch
to be opened so that burning bales could be removed from the stow and extinguished with water
as they were discharged.
7. Remedial Action taken by the Company

Two experts experienced in dealing with colton fires were flown to Curacao to assist the,
local fire brigade. This incident high-lights the effectiveness of High Expansion foam, and foam
generating apparatus has been installed on other ships in the Company's fleet to supplement the
statutory fire-fighting equipment.
8. Conclusions
The effectiveness of CO. in this type of situation is limited to maintaining partial control
and is dependent. on an adequate concentration being maintained. It is, therefore, desirable to
make for the nearest port (preferably one where CO. is available) before the ship's supply is
exhausted. Fire Brigades in ports,. which claim any degree of sophistication should have access
to RE. foam equipment.
June. IQ79.
87
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CIRCULATION:
DRY CARGO

REPORT :'110. 17
FOREWORD
This report, which refers to self-heating of coal cargo, differs from previous repW"ls in this
series in that no outbreak of fire occurred. and no fire-fighting action was necessary. It is,
nevertheless. considered to be a report which will be of interest in view of the renewed activity and
probable growth in the coal trade. The report follows the original very closely apart from minor
editorial changes agreed with the owners.
INTRODUCTION
The ship, a motor tramp ship of about 16.500 grt built in 1972, loaded a cargo of "steaming
grade" coal in Maputo for discharge in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. During the passage self-heating of cargo
was experienced. Subsequently the cargo was satisfactorily discharged at Kaohsiung although it was
evident that many pockets of very hot coal existed in all holds, which when discharged gave off heavy
steam vapour.
LOADING
The coal was brought to the jetty by railway wagons which were tipped into a hopper with a
fixed shoot. The fixed shoot necessitated the ship moving along the jetty in order to place each hatch
under the shoot as required.
The loading sequence was as follow5:-
Hatch Total
No.2 hatch approx. 2,500 tons

No.4 hatch approx. 2.700 tons
No.5 hatch approx. :!.lOO tons
No.3 hatch approx. 5,138 5,138
No.1 hatch approx. 2,100
At this time a bulldozer was used in No.3 hatch to level the cargo,
thereafter being placed in
No.2 to level the cargo
Bulldozer now placed in :"/0. 5 hatch
No.4 hatch part loaded, then bulldozed level and loading continued
to approx. 3,100 5,800
No. I hatch approx. 1,100 3.200
Total cargo loaded 23.538
.---
The cargo appeared normal in every respect; ranging from 50mm lumps to duff, the majority
being very small and duff.
THE PASSAGE
The ship sailed from Maputo 1st February.
Following normal custom 'he cargo was surface ventilated by opening the forward and aft
access .:overs to each hold. Temperature readings were taken by lowering a thermometer down the
port and starboard bill,!epipe~ oi ~ach hold.
88
On 2nd February it was observed that No.2 starboard bilge pipe reading was 38.SoC with
other bilge pipe readings ranging down to 30°C; the ambient air temperature was 29°C.
From this date a careful check of bilge pipe temperatures was carried out and it was noted that
a slight rise was occurring daily.
On 8th February the readings were:-
1 2 3 4 S
P&S P&S P&S P&S P&S
No Readings 33 4O.S 33 36 32 34 36 34
In view of these readings it was decided to enter each hatch and insert thermometers in the
cargo to a depth of about 300mm. The following readings were noted:
1 2 3 4 S
33 44 46+ 31 19
These sub-surface temperature readings were taken in various parts of the holds to locate the
hottest areas. The figure for No.3 (46 + ) was due to the maximum reading of the thermometer being
SO°C;at the time the reading was taken the mercury was rising rapidly and the actual temperature
was probably much in excessof that figure.
A thermometer pocket was made up, consisting of a tube about 2m in length and 2Smm bore
with the end blanked and fitted with a point to ease penetration into the cargo. This was inserted in
the hottest area in No.3 hold. The thermometer placed in this pocket showed a rise of 3°C over 24
hours and, in view of this, four other thermometer pockets were prepared and fitted in the other
holds on 10th February.
Experience proved that correct readings were only obtained when the thermometers were left
constantly in position as thermometers moved from site to site gave erratic readings.
Throughout the voyage, after the discovery of the rise in cargo temperature, holds were
thoroughly surface ventilated by raising main hatch covers at regular intervals and leaving access
hatch covers open at all times.
On receipt of advice from the master about the problems being encountered with the cargo,
owners contacted their P & I Club and national administration for guidance. Other national experts
were also contacted. There were two schools of thought as to whether or not the cargo should be
ventilated. The P & I Club consultant recommended full ventilation to prevent a build up of explosive
gas in the cargo holds; other experts advocated closing all hatches to prevent ingress of air to the
heated coal. The national administration further recommended that all electrical installations in the
vicinity of the cargo holds should be isolated to eliminate sources of ignition.
This information was forwarded by radio to the ship with owners' recommendation that full
ventilation should be carried out to prevent risk of explosion; battening down only to take place if the
cargo commenced smoking.
Prior to receipt of this information the master had decided to thoroughly ventilate. He had
plotted his course to Kaohsiung so that he was never far from a port of refuge should the need arise.
On 20th February No.3 hold thermometer read 80°C and stayed at this reading until berthing
on 23rd February. All other cargo temperatures continued to rise by approximately 1°C per day.
The conventional method of recording cargo temperatures by lowering a thermometer down

bilge pipes was also carried out regularly, bilge pipe readings taken on 22nd February were as
follows:-
Air
Temp
24
. 1
P&S
No Readings
2
P&S
29 43.S
3
P&S
28 26.S
4
P&S
27 30
S
P&S
No Readings
Owing to an obstruction in:'No. 2 starboard bilge pipe the thermometer fitted in this pipe was
left permanently in position and with the knowledge that the coal in No. 3 was by far the hottest
cargo it is reasonable to assume that No.2 starboard was the only reliable bilge pipe temperature.
The normal method of recording temperatures by lowering a thermometer down the bilge pipe
for a period of 4-S minutes before withdrawing and reading can be considered unreliable and of little
value.
89
No berths were available when the vessel arrived at Kaohsuing, however under pressure from
owners and at owners' expense the vessel berthed at a buoy berth on 23rd February.
All hatches were opened, and a surface inspection of the coal cargo by two Salvage
Association Surveyors revealed that whereas the surface of the cargo was cool, by digging as little as
300mm a rise of temperature could be noted. Also, in No. 3 hatch steam was evident where a
thermometer pocket had been removed and relocated leaving two holes.
A 4m thermometer pocket was prepared and placed in No. 3 hold and this showed a
temperature of 48°C; a further pocket of about 2.Sm depth was fitted and this also showed a
temperature of 48°C.
On 25th February these two pockets were relocated adjacent to the 2m pocket, and readings
taken were - 2m 80°C, 205m 62°C, 4m 70°C.
In order to establish a pattern of the hot strata, pipes and thermometers were ordered to
permit thermometers to be placed at a forward, midpoint and aft position in No.3 hold at"depths of
1,2,3 and 4m. However, before these thermometer pockets could be prepared the vessel berthed and
this inspection was not carried out.
Having got the ship into port the possible problems associated with discharge were discussed
by the master and the Salvage Association Surveyor.
I) On berthing the maximum temperature noted was 80°C and this appeared stable.
2) No smoke or signs of fire were evident although there were wisps of steam.
3) Cargo could be unloaded into barges but the total barge capacity available was 3,000 tons.
4) It was not known what would happen to the hot coal under the surface when exposed to air
during discharge.
S) There was limited under keel clearance, of about 2 metres at the buoy, although the bed of the
harbour was reported to be mainly free of rocks.
6) Harbour tugs with powerful fire fighting water monitors were readily available.
7) With barge capacity available being only 3.000 tons and cargo apparently stabilising, together
with the uncertainty of what would happen when the hot coal was exposed to air, it was decided
to leave discharge until a quay berth was available.
8) It was felt that, when alongside, the amount of cargo that could be discharged would only be
limited by the ship's discharging gear. If necessary burning coal could be dumped on the jetty
and quenched with water, also if the ship had to be stranded by flooding the holds there was
no disadvantage in being alongside a jetty.
It had been the owners' intention that, had fire developed in the cargo, the ship would put into
Singapore. However, agents at Singapore advised that there were no facilities in the port for the
discharge of hot coal cargo and as it was Chinese New Year very little assistance could be expected
from the pOrt authorities.
The master stated his preference to proceed direct to Kaohsiung. As a precautionary measure
however a supply of C02 bottles was put aboard at Singapore to be used by the ship if necessary. A
total of 19 x 4Skg bottles, together with some high pressure hoses were delivered on board, this being
the total available in Singapore. In the event this gas was not used.
DISCHARGING'
The ship berth,ed alongside on 26th February and commenced discharge into lorries at 1800
hours using ship's cranes and grabs.
Cargo discharge was carried 6ut between the hours of 0800 and 2230 every day from
commencement at 1800 hours 26th February to completion 1700 hours 5th March.
During discharge the ccal was generally hot and steaming. However, this did not prevent the
lorry drivers from climbing on top of the lorries to trim the loads level prior to driving off. It was also
evident as the discharge ,roceeded that no particular pattern existed so far as hot spots were
concerned, as random hot spOts were noted down as far as Im from the tank top.
90
On completion of discharge the cargo holds were inspected but no structural damage was
noted.
CONCLUSIONS
I) Monitoring of coal temperatures must be regularly carried out.
2) Thermometer readings using bilge pipes are unreliable unless:
a) the height of cargo in the vicinity of the bilge pipe is known and the thermometer is situated
about 2m below this position.
b) The thermometer is left permanently in position and removed only for reading.
3) Pipes for use as thermometer pockets of varying lengths should be carried on board and placed
in each hold on completion of loading. The thermometers placed in these pipes -should be left
permanently in situ, except for reading.
4) Bearing in mind that coal overheats in random pockets, spare 2m thermometer pockets and
thermometers should be carried for random test readings in order to locate hot spots.
S) Full ventilation should be maintained.
July /980
91

DRY CARGO

30/32 St. Mary Axe, LONDON EC3A 8ET
REPORT NO. 18
This report deals with a fire which occurred in a cargo of bulk grain, which was being
fumigated whilst the ship was in transit. Although the incident was an unusual occurrence, it high-
lights a potential hazard and emphasises the need for strict observance of recommended procedures
for in-transit fumigation .• :-
Background
1. A 26,000 dwt bulk carrier had loaded in the U.S. Gulf a full cargo of grain for a voyage to
South America. The loading was without incident, and on completion all holds were full except No.4
which was slack. One of the conditions of sale for the cargo was that the buyer required the cargo
to be fumigated while the ship was in transit. A specialist company was engaged by the sellers of the
cargo for this purpose. The fumigant they used was in the form of tablets which were placed on top
of the cargo after loading. Fumigation was effected during the voyage by the decomposition of the
active ingredient in the tablets (aluminium phosphide) releasing phosphine gas into the cargo.
The Incident
2. The first indication of fire was five days after the vessel had sailed, at 0120 hours, when the
second officer on watch smelled smoke. The third officer was summoned to the bridgeand the second
officer proceeded to check around the accommodation and decks. At 0130 hours he confirmed that
the smoke was coming from the forward end of No.4 hatch. The Master, chief officer and engineer
on watch were alerted. The Master rang fire stations and engines were put 'on standby. The Master
and chief officer inspected No.4 hold, and confirmed that there was a fire, although they could not
locate it. To do this the chief officer and second officer entered No. 4 hold wearing breathing
apparatus, but the smoke was too dense and the attempt had to be abandoned. Checks' were also
made in No.4 wingtanks, but no traces of smoke or heat were found.
It was decided to try to extinguish the fire with COz. No.4 hatch was sealed and at 0400 the
COzwasreleased. Because a leak occurred in the COz room it took until 0500 to release 33 cylinders.
Nos. 3 and 5 holds were ventilated to remove the phosphine gas and allow inspection of these holds.
At 0900 a further 10 cylinders of COz were released into No. 4 hold. Throughout the rest of the
morning and early afternoon single cylinders of COz were released into the hold at hourly intervals.
However, the smoke continued to build up and there was no decrease in hold temperature. At 1512,
the Master radioed that he was diverting to Trinidad for assistance and gave his E.T.A. at Port of
Spain as 0600 the following morning. Throughout the night COz was injected into the hold at regular
intervals.
The ship anchored at Port of Spain where firemen and the coastguard boarded the vessel. The
firemen attempted to enter the hold wearing breathing apparatus, but the density of the smoke forced
them back. After consulting the Master it was decided to open up the forward end of NO.4 hatch and
try to extinguish the fire with water spray. Because of the danger from phosphine gas all personnel
involved wore breathing apparatus. The hatch was opened and after the smoke had cleared, an area
of about two square metres in the centre of the hatch was seen to be on fire. This was rapidly
extinguished by water, arid men were sent in to start removing the charred grain. Whilst this was in
progress, the fumigation tablets away from the seat of the fire started to explode and caused several
more flare-ups wh!ch were quickly extinguished with water. Some of the tablets were salvaged from
the hold and sent ashore for examination by a surveyor who was in attendance. The fire was
extinguished by 1400, but it took another four days before all the burnt cargo was removed and the
classification society surveyor was satisfied that the ship was no longer in any danger. The other
holds were inspected but nothing untoward was discovered. However, the ship was delayed for a
further ten days until her COz bottles' could be refilled. Replacement COz bottles had to be air-
freighted to the ship.
Damage
3. About ten tons of grain had been affected by the fire. There was no structural damage or any
injuries to personnel.
92
Cause of Fire
4. The unstable decomposition of the fumigation tablets suggests that their quality was suspect
or that they had been incorrectly applied.
Conclusion
S. The incident confirms that the fire fighting procedures adopted by the Master and crew were
successful in containing the fire until the ship reached port. However, had fire occurred in more than
one hold the result could have been much more serious. It appears that the tablets used in No.4 hold
reacted somewhat differently from the rest. The fact that there was fourteen feet of ullage in No.4
hold compared to very little air space in the remaining holds may have had something to do with this.
In particular, the incident illustrates a potential hazard resulting from in-transit fumigation
and the need to be aware of the possible dangers from fire and/or toxic gases at all times.
Further information can also be found in the IMCO publication "Recommendation on the
Safe Use of Pesticides in Ships" .
MARCH, 1981
..

ALL SHIPS

30/32 St. Mary Axe, London EC3A BET
Casualty Report No. 19
.•.:.
This report describes an outbreak offire in the engine room of a tanker while the vessel was taking
on diesel oil bunkers. Due to the prompt action of the marine engineer superintendent who was on
board at the time, there was no loss of life and a potential serious explosion was averted.
Background
The incident occurred aboard a 95,354 dwt tanker while she was discharging her cargo of light
crude oil ashore at a port in the Hawaiian Archipelago. The vessel was not fitted with inert gas to her
cargo tanks, but was fitted with CO~ smothering to the engine and pump room.
At the time of the incident neither the master nor the chief engineer were on board.
The Incident
The vessel started to take on diesel bunkers to her port and starboard double-bottom tanks at
1700 brs. This operation proceeded without incident until the watch was changed at appro~imately
2000 brs.
At 2024, the port double-bottom tank overflowed. Oil was forced up the sounding pipe and
sprayed over the hot exhaust manifold of the running starboard diesel generator. In coming into contact
with the hot exhaust manifold the oil ignited and a flash fire developed which rapidly gained in intensity
and saturated the engine room spaces.
The general alarm was sounded at 2025 and,thick black smoke was seen coming out from under
the upper engine room door. Upon hearing the general alarm the marine engineer superintendent
(MES) assumed command and:-
(i) Stopped all ventilation blowers;
(ii) Ordered all fuelling operations to be stopped;
(iii) Stopped cargo operations;
(iv) Ordered the forward emergency r1J'epump to be started;
(v) Ordered all officers and crew to leave the vessel and to stand by in the lifeboats.
Having ascertained that all the officers and crew were off the vessel, the MES proceeded to fight
the r1J'e.He first activated the two pilot bottles located in the CO~ room. The vessel was equipped with a
CO~ system of 176 45kg bottles divided into three systems. Two were located in the CO~ room and the
other in the port passageway. Upon activation the two systems in the CO~ room released 132bottles: the
other 44 were activated later from the port passageway control. The systems were designed to direct
60% ofthe CO~ into the engine room and 40% into the pump room. Having released 75% of the COz on
board the vessel, the MES then secured all remote fuel shut-off valves to the main engine, boiler and
ancillary equipment. He then closed all doors, flaps and dampers providing ventilation to the engine
and funnel casings. Finally he released the remaining COz from the port passageway control station.
After about an hour and a half, the MES recalled the 2nd mate on board, and the two men started
to cool down the I\Ot decks and bulkheads using fire hoses.
At 2115 a US Coast Guard helicopter arrived over the vessel and at 2230 a US Coast Guard cutter
arrived to provide assistance.
At 2315 the Honolulu Fire Boat arrived and the vessel was boarded at 2345 by the Fire Chief and a
Coast Guard officer.
The Fire Chief declared the fire out at 2355 but the engine room was left sealed and a watch
maintained until morning.
Damage Sustained
Inspection after the fire revealed extensive damage to the engine room. The vessel was
subsequently towed to Japan where repairs were effected.
94
PART D: INSTRUCTOR MANUAL (APPENDI
COIICIasions
From the evidence presented to the Court of Inquiry convened to investigate the incident, the
following was established:-
(i) No attempt was made to slow down the rate of bunkering as the tanks came up to the
"topping off" point;
(ii) After taking over the watch, the engineer continued bunkering at full rate for about 20
minutes. He concluded that the starboard tank was full, and shut the valves, thereby
producing an immediate doubling of the rate into the port tank, which was also nearly full,
causing it to overflow almost immediately. The tank overflowed through the vent pipe,
spraying oil over the engine and the hot diesel generator manifold exhaust, which acted as
the source of ignition for the rue.
The Court ofInquiry concluded that the cause of the fire was attributable to errors made by the
engineer on watch. The incident illustrates how overfamiliarity or lack of informa!~n can turn a
routine cargo operation into a potential disaster.
It cannot be over-emphasized that where flammable cargoes are handled, precise instructions
should be issued as to the ullages or soundings required. Furthermore, when tanks are near to "topping
ofr' •loading rates should be slowed down so that cargo operations can be stopped almost immediately.
It is also recommended that when bunkering at least two people should be on duty.
SEPl'EMBER 1981
The circulation of these reports depends upon the receipt of suitable information about incidents. The
reports are always presented in an anonymous form, and the draft, where appropriate, is sent for
approval to the company which has provided the information.
PLEASE CONSIDER WHETHER YOU HAVE ANY SUITABLE MATERIAL FOR ANY OF THE
THRE~ SERIES OF REPORTS (FIRE, NAVIGATION, TANKER) AND SEND IT TO THE
ADDRESS AT THE HEAD OF THE REPORT.
95

DRY CARGO

30/32 St. Mary Axe, London EC3A SET
Casualty Report No. 20
-.-,
Situation
This report deals with a fire on board a 6616 grt bulk carrier which was carrying a cargo of steel
swarf and was on passage down the lower St. Lawrence River.
Background
The vessel had proceeded upwards through the St. Lawrence system to unload general cargo from
Europe. On completion of discharge the vessel was scheduled to load 10,000 tonnes of steel swarf at a
US Great Lakes port for Spain. Loading proceeded without incident. However, on completion of
loading, sailing was prohibited as the cargo temperatures were well in excess of the upper limit
permitted by the International ~aritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. The cargo temperature
took six days to drop below the maximum permissible limit of 65°C (149"F). The vessel was then cleared
and proceeded down the St. Lawrence Seaway system without incident.
The Incident
Prior to the morning of the fire the vessel had bunkered at Montreal and was proceeding down river
to the open sea. The fire was first noticed when thick smoke was seen coming out of the vent from No.1
hold. A section of the hatch was opened and the cargo found to be on fire. The hatch was promptly
re-sealed. The Canadian Coast Guard was informed of the fire at 1200hours and the vessel instructed to
proceed to a safe anchorage where an inspection would be carried out. The vessel arrived at the
anchorage at 2200 hours and the inspection was completed later that night. The cargo was not on fire at
this stage, though it was found to be overheating at the forward starboard side of No. 1 hold. Shortly
after the inspectors left, fire again broke out in this area. From experience gained during a similar
incident it was known that the vessel's fire fighting equipment was inadequate to extinguish the fire.
Various options were considered by the owner, and it was eventually agreed to send the vessel up
river to discharge the affected cargo. The hold was completely discharged and all but 400 tonnes were
reloaded into the ship. The ship was then cleared and proceeded without incident to her destination.
Damage
400 tonnes of cargo were damaged. There was no serious damage to the ship and no injuries to the
crew.
Remarks on the Incident
This was the first time the vessel had loaded such a cargo, but the loading was supervised by the
shipper's charterer and documentary evidence shows that all the requirements of the IMDG Code had
been complied with.
Steel swarf is a waste material of machine shop operations, consisting of scrap metal cuttings,
turnings, borings, etc., and is a mixture of many types of carbon steel. Such cargoes may also include
cast iron shavings and the residues from the cooling oil-water mixture used during machining.
Oxidation of the large exposed surface area releases heat which does not usually build up until the cargo
is loaded into the codfmed space of a ship's hold.
Under the IMDG Code steel swarf is considered as Class 4.2 "spontaneously combustible cargo,
having properties of self heat and spotltaneous ignition." Sub-section 3 of the entry notes: "Whilst at
sea any rise in surface temperature of the swarf indicates a self-heating reaction problem. If the
temperature should rise to 80"C, a potential fire situation is developing and the vessel should make for
the nearest suitable port. Water should not be used at sea. Early application of an inert gas to a
smouldering situation may be effective. In port, copious quantities of water may be used but due
consideration should be given to [the ship's] stability."
96
Conclusion
From all available evidence it would appear that all IMDG Code and related US RegulatioQS were
complied with from the time that the cargo was loaded, until the damaged cargo was removed, and on
the subsequent voyage.
Nevertheless, in spite of these precautions, spontaneous fires with this cargo can occur. Ships'
crews should be aware of this fact and note that a careful watch of cargo hold temperatures is necessary.
NOTE: The IMDG Code and Solid Bulk Cargoes Code warn that this type of cargo can cause
dangerous oxygen depletion. Deaths have occurred while monitoring the temperatures ofthe swarf and
great care must be exercised when entering holds.
Prior to entry the hold should be ventilated and the safety of the atmosp,here therein checked.
There should also be a man on standby at the top of the hatch while persons are working in the hold.
If the hold cannot be sufficiently ventilated, self contained breathing apparatus should be used.
<.
DECEMBER 1982
The circulation of these reports depends upon receipt of suitable information about incidents.
The reports are always presented in an anonymous form, and the draft, where appropriate, is
sent for approval to the company which has provided the information.
PLEASE CONSIDER WHETHER YOU HAVE ANY SUITABLE MATERIAL FOR ANY
OF THE THREE SERIES OF REPORTS (FIRE, NA VIGA TION, TANKER) AND SEND
IT TO THE ADDRESS AT THE HEAD OF THE REPORT.
97

ALL SHIPS

30/32 St. Mary Axe, LONDON EC3A 8ET
REPORT NO. 21
Situation
An 87,000 dwt combination carrier, built in 1970, was undergoing repairs at a repair yard.
Some 230 workers from the yard were on board the ship, of whom about 75 were engaged in a variety
of jobs in the engine-room, including hot work with oxyacetylene torches. The portside ladder
leading to the lower platform in the engine-room had been removed to provide access for equipment,
leaving only the starboard ladder in use between the upper and lower platforms. The ship's gener-
ators were not in use and the ship was totally reliant on the repair yard for electrical power and water.
One of the ship's engineers and a petty officer were engaged in removing the general service
pump located on the lower platform of the engine-room, using a cutting torch borrowed from the
repair yard. The task involved the removal of six foundation bolts, but after the fourth nut had been
cut smoke was observed coming up from the bilges in the area of the stool supporting the pump
baseplate.
Initial Action
The ship's engineer and petty officer attempted to tackle the fire with a portable C02 extin-
guisher, but the fire spread rapidly below the engine-room floorplates and a minor explosion
followed. The fire could not be controlled by using the extinguisher, and the two men therefore raised
the alarm by shouting "fire" as they left the engine-room. The engine-room filled with smoke very
rapidly, severely reducing visibility.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures

The engine-room was not sealed on the alarm being raised because some repair yard workers
were still inside. An attempt was made by the ship's crew to enter the engine-room with breathing
apparatus, but this had to be abandoned owing to dense, blinding smoke. Within a short time the
repair yard fire control party and the local fire brigade arrived on the scene. The dense smoke forced
the fire fighting efforts to be conducted from outside the engine-room: shore electric power was
switched off and copious quantities of water were pumped into the engine-room space.
Personal Injuries and Fatalities
The ship's personnel and most of the repair yard workers succeeded in escaping front the
engine-room, but 10 of the repair yard workers failed to escape and were subsequently found dead.
Two of those who escaped were injured. The casualties were due to the fire. •
Extent of Damage
The fire caused serious structural damage on the lowest platform, forward of the main engine.
Floorplates and supporting beams had buckled and sagged on both the starboard and port sides of
the main engine, aft and inboard of the general service pump. In addition, damage by smoke and
water was evident throughout the engine-room. No fire damage was observed in the accommodation
section around the engine-room casing.
Cause of Fire
Though no <;onclusiveevidence was found, the probable cause of the fire was ignition of oil or
oil-soaked rags on the tank top by a hot nut cut from the support stool of the general service pump.
The bilges had been tl1oroughly cleaned prior to the ship's entry to the repair yard, and it was there-
fore thought saJe to carry out hot work. There was no natural light in the bilges and the visual
inspections performed in the vicinity Prior to commencement of hot work would not appear to have
been effective. '
The small fire on the tank top apparently heated, and eventually ignited, oil deposits on the
under-sides of adjacent pipes. The ignition of these oily deposits and attendant flash or rapid spread
of flame may have given the impression of the minor explosion referred to above. At this stage the
fire developed beyond the control of the "first aid" fire fighters.
Once the oil deposits had been ignited, large quantities of thick choking smoke were released
and rapidly filled the engine-room space. Thereafter entry became impossible.
98
Comments on the Incident

As the ship was virtually dependent on the repair yard for providing fire fighting cover, steps
should have been taken to ensure that there was a water supply with adequate pressure at the
hydrants. In addition, sufficient portable extinguishers, hoses and nozzles should have been available
at the work site.
Neither the ship's nor the shore fire watch was in attendance in the area where hot work was in
progress. Fire watchmen of the repair yard were assigned dual duties, with the result that rounds were
not made as frequently as would otherwise have been the case. The same comment applies to the
ship's crew.
Despite the presence of a large number of repair yard workers in the engine-room it appears
that no consideration was given to evacuation arrangements and procedures; notably, there was a
failure to mark clearly the routes to the various exits.
The ship/shore emergency organisation plan, specifying duties and responsibilities of ship and
shore personnel, was inadequate and no combined fire drill was practised at anY time before the
incident took place. <,
Conclusions
This incident illustrates both the greatly enhanced risk of fire when a ship is undergoing repair
in a shipyard and the need for safety precautions and procedures to be strictly adhered to. Such
precautions and procedures include the following:-
I. Before any hot work is permitted, an inspection of the work place and adjacent spaces should
be carried out by a responsible officer to ensure that these areas are free of flammable material and
that any precautions against fire are effective.
2. The attendance of a fire watchman in the vicinity for the duration of the operation should
always be considered.
3. During the operation special care should be taken to prevent oil or oily rags coming into
contact with hot surfaces, fittings or equipment.
4. Where the ship's crew remain on board, they must consider themselves responsible for the
ship's safety even though the repair yard may prescribe its own requirements on safety and fire
control. In such cases, a clear ship/shore emergency plan should be in existence and all personnel
made aware of its provisions. The emergency plan should cover at least means of escape, fire fighting
and raising the alarm; regular fire drills; and the respective duties of ship and shore personnel. A
combined fire drill, including the evacuation of the engine-room in an emergency, should be
practised at the earliest opportunity after the ship's arrival at the yard, and at least at weekly intervals
thereafter.
JANUARY, 1985
Appendix 3
Plates which can be used to make overhead projector transparencies.

CONTENTS
Plates, diagrams etc., for use in producing overhead projector transparencies or as master
copies for producing hand-outs.
The first number of the Plate refers to the section of the Instructor Manual and the second
number gives its position in numerical sequence.
For example, 3.5 means the fifth Plate relating to section 3 of the Instructor Manual.
List of Plates
Plate No. Title Page
2.1 The fire square and the fire triangle 105

3.1 Fire detection and alarm 106
3.2 Fire detectors 107
3.3 A sprinkler system 108
3.4 Vertical and horizontal zones and insulation 109
3.5 Arrangement of 'B' class corridor bulkheads 110
3.6 Methods of erecting 'B' class bulkheads 111
3.7 Methods of attaching 'B' class bulkheads to insulation 112
3.8 Typical metal vapour barriers 113
3.9 Arrangement of stairways 114
3.10 A typical arrangement for an inert-gas system 115
3.11 Inert-gas system - basic layout 116
3.12 Inert-gas system - deck layout 117
5.1 A portable 9 litre water fire extinguisher 118

5.2 A portable 9 litre AFFF [aqueous-film-forming foam] (AB) extinguisher 119
5.3 A portable 2.25 kg ammonium phosphate/ammonium sulphate (ABC)
dry powder fire extinguisher 120
5.4 A portable 6 kg sodium bicarbonate (BC) dry powder fire extinguisher 121
5.5 A portable 6 kg ABC dry powder fire extinguisher 122
5.6 A portable 10 kg ABC dry powder fire extinguisher 123
5.7 A portable 12 kg BC dry powder fire extinguisher 124
5.8 A portable.6 kg BC carbon dioxide fire extinguisher 125
5.9 A portable 7 kg ABC h~lon 1211 fire extinguisher 126
5.10 A wheeled 45 litre AB protein foam fire extinguisher 127
5.11 A wheeled 135 litre AB protein foam fire extinguisher 128
5.12 A wheeled 50 kg BC dry powder fire extinguisher 129
102
List of Plates (contd.)
5.13 A wheeled 9 kg BC carbon dioxidefire extinguisher 130

5.14 A wheeled45 kg BC carbon dioxidefire extinguisher 131
5.15 A fire-main system 132
5.16 Schematicdiagramof a C02 "total flooding" system 133
5.17 A carbon dioxide release locker for a fire-extinguishingsystem
in an engine-room 134
5.18 A halon 1301fire-extinguishingsystem 135
5.19 A decentralizedhalon system '., 136
5.20 A centralizedhalon system 137
5.21 Use of low-expansionfoam 138
5.22 A fireman's outfit 139
6.1 A foam monitor 140
7.1 Checkingthe level of liquid carbon dioxide in cylinders,using an

isotope probe 141
7.2 Guide signs to the locationof fire-controlplans 142
8.1 Resultof an iron-in-steamfire 143

8.2 Insidea furnace looking aft towards burners 144
8.3 Inside a furnace lookingtowards back and water pocket 145
Plate 2. 1
The fire square and the fire triangle
105
Plate 3. 1
Fire detection and alarm
106
Plate 3.2
Fire detectors
107
Plate 3.3
A sprinkler system
108
Three methods of insulating a typical machinery casing,

showing the ribands of insulation at the boundaries and intersections
Two methods of insulating a typical 'A' Class deck,

showing the ribands of insulation at the boundaries and intersections
Plate 3.4
Vertical and horizontal zones and insulation
109
bulkheads are stopped short of the deckhead
Plate 3.5
Arrangement of '8' class corridor bulkheads
110
bulkheads ,are fitted deck to deck, incorporating a curtain plate
Plate 3.6
Methods of erecting 'B' class bulkheads
111
Plate 3.7
Methods of attaching' B' class bulkheads to insulation
112
Plate 3.8
Typical metal vapour barriers
113
114
E
(I)
••
~
en
en
o
C)
I
t
(I)
c
"-
c
- ..
00
·0
(It) ••••
(I) ••
"C
0(1)
i5:E
(I)
C)
c
e••
o
'6
o
"0.
~
«
115
Plate 5. 15
A fire-main system
132
Plate 5. 17
A carbon dioxide release locker for a
fire-extinguishing system in an engine-room
134
Plate 5. 18
A halon 1301 fire-extinguishing system
135
Plate 5.21
Use of low-expansion foam
138
Plate 6. 1
A foam monitor
140
Plate 7.1
Checking the level of liquid carbon dioxide in cylinders
using an isotope probe
141
· Alternative styles of guide signs

The arrows show the direction where the enclosure can be found
Plate 1.2
Guide signs to the location of fire-control plans
142
Plate 8. 1
Result of an iron-in-steam fire
143
Appendix 4
Supporting material for the instructor.

CONTENTS
The first number of the Plate refers to the section of the Instructor Manualand the second
numbergives its position in numericalsequence.To distinguishbetweenthe Plates in
appendices3 and 4, those in appendix 3 are numberedfrom 1 whereas those in appendix
4 are numberedfrom 100 for each section. For exampie, 3.5 is the fifth Plate in appendix3
relatingto section 3 of the Instructor Manual and 3.105 is the fifth Plate in appendix4
relatingto the same section of the Instructor Manual.
List of Plates
1.101 Model course 2.03 - AdvancedTraining in Fire Fighting 151

1.102 Titles of IMO Assembly ResolutionA.437(X1) and its Annexes 152
1. 1 03A Annex 2 of ResolutionA.437(X1) 153
1.1038 Annex 2 of ResolutionA.437(X1) (continued) 154
1.104 Principlesof survival in fire 155
2.101 Conditionsfor fires (1 ) 156

2.102 Conditionsfor fires (2) 157
2.105 Principlesof fire fighting (1 160
2.106 Principlesof fire fighting (2) 161
2.110 Propertiesof flammable materials 165
2.111 Spread of fire - definitions 166
2.112 Fire hazards in the engine-room 167
2.113 Fire hazards in the galley and in accommodation 168
2.114 Fire hazardsfrom cargoes 169
2.115 Fire development 170
2.116 Classificationsof fire 171
2.117 Appropriateextinguishingagents for classes of fires 172
3.101 Areas of fire hazard 173

3.102 Fire precautions 174
4.101 Ship fire-fightingorganization 175

4.102 Informationto the bridge 176
148
List of Plates (contd.)
4.103 Informationon the bridge 177

4.104 Damagecontrol and containmentof fire 178
4.105 Organizationof fire parties 179
5.101 Trainingof seafarersin fire fighting - onboardtraining 180

5.102 Fire drills 181
5.103 Trainingof fire parties 182
6.101 Proceduresfor fire fighting - ship at sea 183

6.102 Additionalproceduresin port 184
6.103 Oil tankers 185
7.101 Inspectionand servicingof fire appliancesand equipment 186

7.102 Fire alarms 187
8.101 Fire-fightingprocesshazards 188

8.102 Dry distillation 189
8.103 Chemicalreactions 190
8.104 Boiler uptakefires 191
8.105 Fires in water-tubeboilers 192
9.101 First aid - main hazards 193
10.1 01A Fire investigation 194

10.101B Fire investigation(continued) 195
10.102 Reporton investigation 196
10.103 Conclusionsof report 197
149
Plate 1.101
151
IMO RESOLUTION A.437{XI)
TRAINING OF CREWS IN FIRE-FIGHTING
Annex 1
BASIC TRAINING OF CREWS IN FIRE-FIGHTING
Annex 2
ADVANCED TRAINING IN FIRE-FIGHTING
Plate 1.102
152
Plate 1.1 03A
153
Plate 1.1038
154
Plate 1.104
155
Plate 2.101
156
Plate 2.102
157
Plate 2.103
158
Plate 2.104
159
Plate 2.105
160
Plate 2.106
161
Plate 2.107
162
Plate 2.108
163
Plate 2.109
164
Plate 2.110
165
SPREAD OF FIRE:
- Conduction
- Radiation
- Heat flow
- Convection currents
Plate 2.111
166
Plate 2.112
167
Plate 2.113
168
Plate 2.115
170
Plate 2.116
Appendix 5
Mock-up model of training facility for advanced fire fighting

APPENDIX 5
APPENDIX 5
203
Attachment
GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

MODEL COURSES
GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MODEL COURSES
Contents
Part 1 Preparation
Part 2 Notes on Teaching Technique
Part 3 Curriculum Development
Annex A 1 Preparation checklist
Annex A2 Example of a Model Course syllabus in a subject area
Annex A3 Example of a lesson plan for annex A2
206
Part 1 - Preparation
1 Introduction
1.1 The success of any enterprise depends heavily on sound and effective preparations.
1.2 Although the IMO model course "package" has been made as comprehensive as possible, it is
nonetheless vital that sufficient time and resources are devoted to preparation. Preparation not only
involves matters concerning administration or organization, but also includes the preparation of any
course notes, drawings, sketches, overhead transparencies, etc., which may be necessary.
2 General considerations
2.1 The course "package" should be studied carefully; in particular, the course syllabus and associated
material must be attentively and thoroughly studied. This is vital if a clear understanding is to be
obtained of what is required, in terms of resources necessary to successfully implement the course.
2.2 A "checklisf', such as that set out in annex A1, should be used throughout all stages of preparation to
ensure that all necessary actions and activities are being carried out in good time and in an effective
manner. The checklist allows the status of the preparation procedures to be monitored, and helps in
identifying the remedial actions necessary to meet deadlines. It will be necessary to hold meetings of
all those concerned in presenting the course from time to time in order to assess the status of the
preparation and "trouble-shoof' any difficulties.
2.3 The course syllabus should be discussed with the teaching staff who are to present the course, and
their views received on the particular parts they are to present. A study of the syllabus will determine
whether the incoming trainees need preparatory work to meet the entry standard. The detailed
teaching syllabus is constructed in "training outcome" format. Each specific outcome states precisely
what the trainee must do to show that the outcome has been achieved. An example of a model course
syllabus is given in annex A2. Part 3 deals with curriculum development and explains how a syllabus
is constructed and used.
2.4 The teaching staff who are to present the course should construct notes or lesson plans to achieve
these outcomes. A sample lesson plan for one of the areas of the sample syllabus is provided in
annex A3.
2.5 It is important that the staff who present the course convey, to the person in charge of the course,
their assessment of the course as it progresses.
3 Specific considerations
3.1 Scope of course
In reviewing the scope of the course, the instructor should determine whether it needs any adjustment
in order to meet additional local or national requirements (see Part 3).
3.2 Course objective

3.2.1 The course .objective, as stated in the course material, should be very carefully considered so
that its meaning is fully understood. Does the course objective require expansion to encompass any
additional task that national or local requirements will impose upon those who successfully complete
the course? Conversely, are there elements included which are not validated by national industry
requirements?
3.2.2 It is important that any subsequent assessment made of the course should include a review of
the course objectives.
207
3.3 Entry standards

3.3.1 If the entry standard will not be met by your intended trainee intake, those entering the course
should first be required to complete an upgrading course to raise them to the stated entry level.
Alternatively, those parts of the course affected could be augmented by inserting course material
which will cover the knowledge required.
3.3.2 If the entry standard will be exceeded by your planned trainee intake, you may wish to
abridge or omit those parts of the course the teaching of which would be unnecessary, or which could
be dealt with as revision.
3.3.3 Study the course material with the above questions in mind and with a view to assessing
whether or not it will be necessary for the trainees to carry out preparatory work prior to joining the
course. Preparatory material for the trainees can range from refresher notes, selected topics from
textbooks and reading of selected technical papers, through to formal courses of instruction. It may be
necessary to use a combination of preparatory work and the model course rt:Iaterial in modified form.
It must be emphasized that where the model course material involves an international requirement,
such as a regulation of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watch keeping (STCW) 1978, as amended, the standard must not be relaxed; in many instances, the
intention of the Convention is to require review, revision or increased depth of knowledge by
candidates undergoing training for higher certificates.
3.4 Course certificate, diploma or document

Where a certificate, diploma or document is to be issued to trainees who successfully complete the
course, ensure that this is available and properly worded and that the industry and all authorities
concerned are fully aware of its purpose and intent.
3.5 Course intake limitations

3.5.1 The course designers have recommended limitations regarding the numbers of trainees who
may participate in the course. As far as possible, these limitations should not be exceeded; otherwise,
the quality of the course will be diluted.
3.5.2 It may be necessary to make arrangements for accommodating the trainees and providing
facilities for food and transportation. These aspects must be considered at an early stage of the
preparations.
3.6 Staff requirements

3.6.1 It is important that an experienced person, preferably someone with experience in course and
curriculum development, is given the responsibility of implementing the course.
3.6.2 Such a person is often termed a "course co-ordinator" or "course director". Other staff, such
as lecturers, instructors, laboratory technicians, workshop instructors, etc., will be needed to
implement the course effectively. Staff involved in presenting the course will need to be properly
briefed about the course work they will be dealing with, and a system must be set up for checking the
material they may be required to prepare. To do this, it will be essential to make a thorough study of
the syllabus and apportion the parts of the course work according to the abilities of the staff called
upon to present the work.
3.6.3 The person responsible for implementing the course should consider monitoring the quality of
teaching in such areas as variety and form of approach, relationship with trainees, and communicative
.
and interactive skills; where necessary, this person should also provide appropriate counselling and
support .
3.7 Teaching facilities and equipment

Rooms and other services
3.7.1 It is important to make reservations as soon as is practicable for the use of lecture rooms,
laboratories, workshops and other spaces.
208
Equipment
3.7.2 Arrangements must be made at an early stage for the use of equipment needed in the spaces
mentioned in 3.7.1 to support and carry through the work of the course. For example:
.1 blackboards and writing materials
.2 apparatus in laboratories for any associated demonstrations and experiments
.3 machinery and related equipment in workshops
.4 equipment and materials in other spaces (e.g. for demonstrating fire fighting, personal
survival, etc.).
3.8 Teaching aids

Any training aids specified as being essential to the course should be constructed, or checked for
availability and working order.
3.9 Audio-visual aids

Audio-visual aids (AVA) may be recommended in order to reinforce the learning process in some
parts of the course. Such recommendations will be identified in Part A of the model course. The
following points should be borne in mind:
.1 Overhead projectors
Check through any illustrations provided in the course for producing overhead projector (OHP)
transparencies, and arrange them in order of presentation. To produce transparencies, a supply of
transparency sheets is required; the illustrations can be transferred to these via photocopying.
Alternatively, transparencies can be produced by writing or drawing on the sheet. Coloured pens are
useful for emphasizing salient points. Ensure that spare projector lamps (bulbs) are available.
.2 Slide projectors
If you order slides indicated in the course framework, check through them and arrange them in order
of presentation. Slides are usually produced from photographic negatives. If further slides are
considered necessary and cannot be produced locally, OHP transparencies should be resorted to.
.3 Cine projector
If films are to be used, check their compatibility with the projector (Le. 16 mm, 35 mm, sound, etc.).
The films must be test-run to ensure there are no breakages.
.4 Video equipment
It is essential to check the type of video tape to be used. The two types commonly used are VHS and
Betamax. Although special machines exist which can play either format, the majority of machines play
only one or the other type. Note that VHS and Betamax are not compatible; the correct machine type
is required to match the tape. Check also that the TV raster format used in the tapes (Le. number of
lines, frames/second, scanning order, etc.) is appropriate to the TV equipment available. (Specialist
advice may have to be sought on this aspect.) All video tapes should be test-run prior to their use on
the course.
.5 Computer equipment
If computer-based aids are used. check their compatibility with the projector and the available
software.
.6 General note
The electricity supply must be checked for voltage and whether it is AC or DC, and every precaution
must be taken to ensure that the equipment operates properly and safely. It is important to use a
proper screen which is correctly positioned; it may be necessary to exclude daylight in some cases. A
check must be made to ensure that appropriate screens or blinds are available. All material to be
presented should be test-run to eliminate any possible troubles, arranged in the correct sequence in
which it is to be shown, and properly identified and cross-referenced in the course timetable and
lesson plans.
209
3.10 IMO references

The content of the course, and therefore its standard, reflects the requirements of all the relevant IMO
international conventions and the provisions of other instruments as indicated in the model course.
The relevant publications can be obtained from the Publication Service of IMO, and should be
available, at least to those involved in presenting the course, if the indicated extracts are not included
in a compendium supplied with the course.
3.11 Textbooks
The detailed syllabus may refer to a particular textbook or textbooks. It is essential that these books
are available to each student taking the course. If supplies of textbooks are limited, a copy should be
loaned to each student, who will return it at the end of the course. Again, some courses are provided
with a compendium which includes all or part of the training material required to support the course.
3.12 Bibliography
Any useful supplementary source material is identified by the course designers and listed in the model
course. This list should be supplied to the participants so that they are aWare where additional
information can be obtained, and at least two copies of each book or publication should be available
for reference in the training institute library.
3.13 Timetable
If a timetable is provided in a model course, it is for guidance only. It may only take one or two
presentations of the course to achieve an optimal timetable. However, even then it must be borne in
mind that any timetable is subject to variation, depending on the general needs of the trainees in any
one class and the availability of instructors and equipment.
210
Part 2 - Notes on Teaching Technique
1 Preparation
1.1 Identify the section of the syllabus which is to be dealt with.
1.2 Read and study thoroughly all the syllabus elements.
1.3 Obtain the necessary textbooks or reference papers which cover the training area to be presented.
1.4 Identify the equipment which will be needed, together with support staff necessary for its operation.
1.5 It is essential to use a "lesson plan", which can provide a simplified format for co-ordinating lecture
notes and supporting activities. The lesson plan breaks the material down into identifiable steps,
making use of brief statements, possibly with keywords added, and indicating suitable allocations of
time for each step. The use of audio-visual material should be indexed at the correct point in the
lecture with an appropriate allowance of time. The audio-visual material should be test-run prior to its
being used in the lecture. An example of a lesson plan is shown in annex A3.
1.6 The syllabus is structured in training outcome format and it is thereby relatively straightforward to
assess each trainee's grasp of the subject matter presented during the lecture. Such assessment may
take the form of further discussion, oral questions, written tests or selection-type tests, such as
multiple-choice questions, based on the objectives used in the syllabus. Selection-type tests and
short-answer tests can provide an objective assessment independent of any bias on the part of the
assessor. For certification purposes, assessors should be appropriately qualified for the particular
type of training or assessment.
REMEMBER - POOR PREPARATION IS A SURE WAY TO LOSE THE INTEREST OF A GROUP
1.7 Check the rooms to be used before the lecture is delivered. Make sure that all the equipment and
apparatus are ready for use and that any support staff are also prepared and ready. In particular,
check that all blackboards are clean and that a supply of writing and cleaning materials is readily
available.
2 Delivery
2.1 Always face the people you are talking to; never talk with your back to the group.
2.2 Talk clearly and sufficiently loudly to reach everyone.
2.3 Maintain eye contact with the whole group as a way of securing their interest and maintaining it (Le.
do not look continuously at one particular person, nor at a point in space).
2.4 People are all different, and they behave and react in different ways. An important function of a
lecturer is to maintain interest and interaction between members of a group.
2.5 Some points or statements are more important than others and should therefore be emphasized. To
ensure that such 'points or statements are remembered, they must be restated a number of times,
.
preferably in different words .
2.6 If a blackboard is to be used, any writing on it must be clear and large enough for everyone to see.
Use colour to emphasize important points, particularly in sketches.
2.7 It is only possible to maintain a high level of interest for a relatively short period of time; therefore,
break the lecture up into different periods of activity to keep interest at its highest level. Speaking,
writing, sketching, use of audio-visual material, questions, and discussions can all be used to
accomplish this. When a group is writing or sketching, walk amongst the group, looking at their work,
and provide comment or advice to individual members of the group when necessary.
211
2.8 When holding a discussion, do not allow individual members of the group to monopolize the activity,
but ensure that all members have a chance to express opinions or ideas.
2.9 If addressing questions to a group, do not ask them collectively; otherwise, the same person may
reply each time. Instead, address the questions to individuals in turn, so that everyone is invited to
participate.
2.10 It is important to be guided by the syllabus content and not to be tempted to introduce material which
may be too advanced, or may contribute little to the course objective. There is often competition
between instructors to achieve a level which is too advanced. Also, instructors often strongly resist
attempts to reduce the level to that required by a syllabus.
2.11 Finally, effective preparation makes a major contribution to the success of a lecture. Things often go
wrong; preparedness and good planning will contribute to putting things right. Poor teaching cannot
be improved by good accommodation or advanced equipment, but good teaching can overcome any
disadvantages that poor accommodation and lack of equipment can present.
212
Part 3 - Curriculum Development
1 Curriculum
The dictionary defines curriculum as a "regular course of study", while syllabus is defined as "a
concise statement of the subjects forming a course of study". Thus, in general terms, a curriculum is
simply a course, while a syllabus can be thought of as a list (traditionally, a "list of things to be
taughf').
2 Course content
The subjects which are needed to form a training course, and the precise skills and depth of
knowledge required in the various subjects, can only be determined through an in-depth assessment
of the job functions which the course participants are to be trained to perform (job analysis). This
analysis determines the training needs, thence the purpose of the course (course objective). After
ascertaining this, it is possible to define the scope of the course.
(NOTE: Determination of whether or not the course objective has been achieved may quite possibly
entail assessment, over a period of time, of the "on-the-job performance" of those completing the
course. However, the detailed learning objectives are quite specific and immediately assessable.)
3 Job analysis
A job analysis can only be properly carried out by a group whose members are representative of the
organizations and bodies involved in the area of work to be covered by the course. The validation of
results, via review with persons currently employed in the job concerned, is essential if undertraining
and overtraining are to be avoided.
4 Course plan
Following definition of the course objective and scope, a course plan or outline can be drawn up. The
potential students for the course (the trainee target group) must then be identified, the entry standard
to the course decided and the prerequisites defined.
5 Syllabus
The final step in the process is the preparation of the detailed syllabus with associated time scales;
the identification of those parts of textbooks and technical papers which cover the training areas to a
sufficient degree to meet, but not exceed, each learning objective; and the drawing up of a
bibliography of additional material for supplementary reading.
6 Syllabus content
The material contained in a syllabus is not static; technology is continuously undergoing change and
there must therefore be a means for reviewing course material in order to eliminate what is redundant
and introduce new'material reflecting current practice. As defined above, a syllabus can be though of
as a list and, traditionally, there have always been an "examination syllabus" and a "teaching
syllabus"; these indicate, respectively, the subject matter contained in an examination paper, and the
subject matter a teacher is to use in preparing lessons or lectures.
7 Training outcomes
7.1 The prime communication difficulty presented by any syllabus is how to convey the "depth" of
knowledge required. A syllabus is usually constructed as a series of "training outcomes" to help
resolve this difficulty.
213
7.2 Thus, curriculum development makes use of training outcomes to ensure that a common minimum
level and breadth of attainment is achieved by all the trainees following the same course, irrespective
of the training institution (Le. teaching/lecturing staff).
7.3 Training outcomes are trainee-oriented, in that they describe an end result which is to be achieved by
the trainee as a result of a learning process.
7.4 In many cases, the learning process is linked to a skill or work activity and, to demonstrate properly
the attainment of the objective, the trainee response may have to be based on practical application or
use, or on work experience.
7.5 The training outcome, although aimed principally at the trainee to ensure achievement of a specific
learning step, also provides a framework for the teacher or lecturer upon which lessons or lectures
can be constructed.
7.6 A training outcome is specific and describes precisely what a trainee must do to demonstrate his
knowledge, understanding or skill as an end product of a learning process.
7.7 The learning process is the "knowledge acquisition" or "skill developmenf' that takes place during a
course. The outcome of the process is an acquired "knowledge", "understanding", "skill"; but these
terms alone are not sufficiently precise for describing a training outcome.
7.8 Verbs, such as "calculates", "defines", "explains", "lists", "solves" and "states", must be used when
constructing a specific training outcome, so as to define precisely what the trainee will be enabled to
do.
7.9 In the IMO model course project, the aim is to provide a series of model courses to assist instructors
in developing countries to enhance or update the maritime training they provide, and to allow a
common minimum standard to be achieved throughout the world. The use of training outcomes is a
tangible way of achieving this desired aim.
7.10 As an example, a syllabus in training-outcome format for the subject of ship construction appears in
annex A2.. This is a standard way of structuring this kind of syllabus. Although, in this case, an
outcome for each area has been identified - and could be used in an assessment procedure - this
stage is often dropped to obtain a more compact syllabus structure.
S Assessment
Training outcomes describe an outcome which is to be achieved by the trainee. Of equal importance
is the fact that such an achievement can be measured OBJECTIVELY through an evaluation which
will not be influenced by the personal opinions and judgements of the examiner. Objective testing or
evaluation provides a sound base on which to make reliable judgements concerning the levels of
understanding and knowledge achieved, thus allowing an effective evaluation to be made of the
progress of trainees in a course.
214
Annex A2 - Example of a Model Course syllabus in a subject area

Subject area: Ship construction
Prerequisite: Have a broad understanding of shipyard practice
General aims: Have knowledge of materials used in shipbuilding, specification of

shipbuilding steel and process of approval
Textbooks: No specific textbook has been used to construct the syllabus, but the
instructor would be assisted in preparation of lecture notes by referring to
suitable books on ship construction, such as Ship Construction by Eyres
(T12) and Merchant Ship Construction by Taylor (T58)
217
Part C3: Detailed Teaching Syllabus

Introduction
The detailed teaching syllabus is presented as a series of learning objectives. The
objective, therefore, describes what the trainee must do to demonstrate that the
specified knowledge or skill has been transferred.
Thus each training outcome is supported by a number of related performance

elements in which the trainee is required to be proficient. The teaching syllabus
shows the Required performance expected of the trainee in the tables that follow.
In order to assist the instructor, references are shown to indicate IMO references
and publications, textbooks and teaching aids that instructors may wish to use in
preparing and presenting their lessons.
The material listed in the course framework has been used to structure the detailed
teaching syllabus; in particular,
Teaching aids (indicated by A)
IMO references (indicated by R) and
Textbooks (indicated by T)
will provide valuable information to instructors.
Explanation of information contained in the syllabus tables

The information on each table is systematically organized in the following way.
The line at the head of the table describes the FUNCTION with which the training is
concerned. A function means a group of tasks, duties and responsibilities as
specified in the STCW Code. It describes related activities which make up a
professional discipline or traditional departmental responsibility on board.
The header of the first column denotes the COMPETENCE concerned. Each
function comprises a number of competences. For example, the Function 3,
Controlling the Operation of the Ship and Care for Persons on board at the
Management Level, comprises a number of COMPETENCES. Each competence is
uniquely and consistently numbered in this model course.
In this function the competence is Control trim, stability and stress. It is

numbered 3.1; that is, the first competence in Function 3. The term "competence"
should be understood as the application of knowledge, understanding, proficiency,
skills, experience for an individual to perform a task, duty or responsibility on board
in a safe, efficient and timely manner.
Shown next is the required TRAINING OUTCOME. The training outcomes are the
areas of knowledge, understanding and proficiency in which the trainee must be
able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding. Each COMPETENCE
comprises a number of training outcomes. For example, the aboye c8mpetence
comprises three training outcomes. The first is concerned with FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF SHIP CONSTRUCTION, TRIM AND STABILITY. Each training
outcome is uniquely and consistently numbered in this model course. That
concerned with fundamental principles of ship construction, trim and stability is
219
uniquely numbered 3 ..1.~ 1. For clarity, tr(iining outcomes are printed in black type on
grey, for example TRAINING OUTCOMI;.
Finally, each training outcome embodies a variable number of Required

performances - as evidence of competence. The instruction, training and learning
should lead to the trainee meeting the specified Required performance. For the
training outcome concerned with fundamental principles of ship construction, trim
and stability there are three areas of performance. These are:
3.1.1.1 Shipbuilding materials
3.1.1.2 Welding
3.1.1.3 Bulkheads
Following each numbered area of Required performance there is a list of activities

that the trainee should complete and which collectively specify the standard of
competence that the trainee must meet. These are for the guidance of teachers
and instructors in designing lessons, lectures, tests and exercises for use in the
teaching process. For example, under the topic 3.1.1.1, to meet the Required
performance, the trainee should be able to:
- state that steels are alloys of iron, with properties dependent upon the
type and amounts of alloying materials used
- state that the specifications of shipbuilding steels are laid down by
classification societies
- state that shipbuilding steel is tested and graded by classification society
surveyors who stamp it with approval marks
and so on.
IMO references (Rx) are listed in the column to the right-hand side. Teaching aids
(Ax), videos (Vx) and textbooks (Tx) relevant to the training outcome and required
performances are placed immediately following the TRAINING QUTc;QME title.
It is not intended that lessons are organized to follow the sequence of Required
performances listed in the Tables. The Syllabus Tables are organized to match with
the competence in the STCW Code Table A-II/2. Lessons and teaching should
follow college practices. It is not necessary, for example, for ship building materials
to be studied before stability. What is necessary is that _allof the material is covered
and that teaching is effective to allow trainees to meet the standard of the Required
performance .
220
FUNCTION 3: CONTROLLING THE OPERATION OF THE SHIP AND CARE FOR

PERSONS ON BOARD AT THE MANAGEMENT LEVEL
COMPETENCE 3.1 Control trim, stability and stress IMO reference
S]1.1FfWNDAMEN'TAl··PRINCIPlESOFfSHIP
IONS"'BPC"'I~N;"'BIMANPS"'ABILIJ'Y
Textbooks:T11, T12, T35, T58, T69
Teaching aids: A1, A4, V5, V6, V7
1.1 Shipbuilding materials (3 hours) R1

- states that steels are alloys of iron, with properties dependent upon
the type and amounts of alloying materials used
- states that the specifications of shipbuilding steels are laid down by

classification societies
- states that shipbuilding steel is tested and graded by classification

society surveyors, who stamp it with approval marks
- explains that mild steel, graded A to E, is used for most parts of the
ship
- states why higher tensile steel may be used in areas of high stress,
such as the sheer strake
- explains that the use of higher tensile steel in place of mild steel
results in a saving of weight for the same strength
- explains what is meant by:

• tensile strength
• ductility
• hardness
• toughness
- defines strain as extension divided by original length
- sketches a stress-strain curve for mild steel
- explains:
• yield point
• ultimate tensile stress
• modulus of elasticity
- explains that toughness is related to the tendency to brittle fracture
- explains that stress fracture may be initiated by a small crack or notch

in a plate
- states that cold conditions increase the chances of brittle fracture
- states why mild steel is unsuitable for the very low temperatures
involved in the containment of liquefied gases
- lists examples where castings or forgings are used in ship
-
.
construction
explains the advantages of the use of aluminium alloys in the

construction of superstructures
- states that aluminium alloys are tested and graded by classification

society surveyors
- explains how strength is preserved in aluminium superstructures in the

event of fire
- describes the special precautions against corrosion that are needed

where aluminium alloy is connected to steelwork
221
Compendium for
Model Course 2.03
Advanced Training
in Fire Fighting
This Compendium has been prepared for use by instructors and trainees during the
presentation of IMO Model Course 2.03, Advanced Training in Fire Fighting, in which specific
references to appropriate sections are made. It has been compiled from a variety of sources
collected together for ease of reference and it supplements the information contained in
publications listed in the course framework.
Caution to Instructors
Before issuing this compendium to trainees, the following pages should be removed
and withheld pending the completion of the group activities
Sections of course Pages to be removed from Related group activity

compendium and withheld
until related group activity is
completed.
8 and 11 71-80 inclusive Case Studies
v
Contents
Page
Foreword ix
Papers from Ship Fires in the 1980s
Paper C1/1 Fires in ships 1974-1984 1

K.S. Harvey
Discussion 9
Paper C1/2 Structural fire protection of cargo ships and guidance

on the requirements of the Merchant Shipping
(Fire Protection) Regulations 1984 13
I.G. Noble
Discussion 20
Paper C1/7 Toxic hazards caused by fires 23

J.M. Murrell
Discussion 30
Paper C1/8 A shipboard emergency response plan 35

G.S. Skipp
Discussion 43
Paper C1/9 A fire brigade's role in fire fighting onboard ships 47

D. Wynne
Discussion 51
Paper C1/10 Ship stability during fire fighting 53

F.G.M. Evans, D.G. Eves and J. Spiers
Discussion 57
Paper C1/12 Fixed fire-protection systems - the regulatory angle 61

T.A. Edw&rds
Discussion 65
vii
The burning of iron in steam 71
A Ministry of Defence Paper
Water tube boiler accidents 75

G. McNee
Operating instructions for Unitor fire extinguishers suitable for:

Class A fires : 9 litre water 83
Class 8 fires : 45 litre foam 84
Class A and B fires : 9 litre AFFF foam 85
: 50 kg dry powder 86
Class Band C and electrical fires : 6 kg BC powder 87
: 12 kg BC powder 88
Class A, Band C and electrical fires : 2.25 kg ABC dry powder 89
: 10 kg ABC powder 90
: 7 kg Halon 1211 91
Operating instructions and service procedures for Unitor fire extinguishers:

Stored-pressure type - 2.25 kg dry powder 95
Gas-cartridge type - 9 litre water and 9 litre foam hand portable 97
- 6 kg, 9 kg, 10 kg and 12 kg dry powder 99
- 135 litre and 45 litre wheeled foam 101
- 50 kg wheeled dry powder 103
Hand portable 6 kg carbon dioxide 105

Wheeled 9 kg and 45 kg carbon dioxide 107
Hand portable 7 kg halon 109
Sectional view of cartridge-operated water and foam extinguisher headcap 112
Sectional view of cartridge-operated powder extinguisher headcap 113
Sectional view of small powder headcap 114
Sectional view of halon extinguisher headcap 115
Data on AFFF foam concentrates 116
Data on ABC powder 117
Data on BC powder 118
viii
Foreword
This compendium has been compiled not only for use as a textbook during the presentation
of the IMO model course on advanced training in fire fighting but also as a valuable source of
reference material for use by trainees as they make progress in their profession. As the risk
of fire is always present on a ship, trainees are advised, in the interests of safety, to keep a
lively interest in reports on fires on ships.
Since the material incorporated in this compendium has not been specially written for the
course, a subject area may be dealt with in more than one part of the compendium.
It is hoped that trainees will add their own annex to the compendium with notes on their own
experiences with fires and other articles on shipboard fires, so that they will be better qualified
to train the personnel on board in fire fighting.
ix
Papers from Ship Fires in the 1980s
(Transactions of the Institute of Marine E'ngineers,

Section C, Volume 98)
Paper C1/1
Fires in Ships 1974-1984

K. S. Harvey CEng, FIMarE, FRINA, MCMS
Salvage Association
SYNOPSIS
The intention of this paper is to bring to the attention of interested parties some details of the fires which
have occurred in ships during the period from 1974 to 1984. During the most recent years of this period
merchant vessel casualties have been sustained in the Middle East, but damage irzconnection with hostile
actions does not form any part of this presentation. Many papers associated with the subject of fires in ships
have, for more than 30 years, been presented to this and other Institutes, mainly during the 1960s, and they
have included a statistical review of all major casualties, including fires and explosions. In order to maintain
some continuity with previous papers, details of the casualties occurring between 1974 and 1984 are
presented in similar tabular form. In a substantial proportion of cases a Surveyor, when investigating fire
damage, finds it very difficult to determine the exact cause of the fire, and quite often it is impossible to
determine because of the destruction of evidence by the fire. Obviously whenever possible an attempt will be
made by responsible and diligent people to limit as far as they can the extent of damage, not least where
safety of life might be involved, but these efforts can also result in the destruction of important evidence
relevant to the investigation of the cause. The losses resulting from some of the fires discussed are mentioned
and some typical case histories are outlined. The paper concludes with some comments regarding the
prevailing trend and future possibilities.
INTRODUCTION
Keith Harvey served an engineering apprenticeship in
The library of The Institute of Marine Engineers as well as N~ Zealan~ and from ~here comme~ced the ~eagoing
other technical libraries have on their shelves an extensive section of his career with Shaw Savill & Albion, sub-
array of literature concerning the subject offire. This literature seque!1tl,,:serving in s~veral o~her UK-based shipo~ning
... organizations. He obtained a First Class Steam Certificate
IIlustrat.es the qUite rema~kable a~ount of t~me, eff?rt. and with Motor Endorsement in Liverpool, and since 1954 has
expendlt~r.e. that has been mc~rred 10 at.temptmg to ellmmate occupied various positions in shipbuilding, shiprepairing,
the possibilIty of fires occurrmg, provide methods of early shipowning and ship management organizations, and was
detection, provide safety equipment to assist in saving life as it Consulting Engineer and Ship Surveyor before joining
well as vessel and cargo, and develop fire-resistant/fire-retar- his present employer in 1973. He is currently Assistant
dant materials. Technical Adviser with The Salvage Association at their
It follows that the basic understanding of the various prob- London Head <>!fice.Prior to that he was.a Senior St?ff
lems associated with this subject has improved and led to ~urve.yorbasedlntheUSAandalsoservedlnthatcapaclty
substantial technical improvements in the design of all ships In their Glasgow Office.
and the materials used in their construction. It is absolutely
certain that when each of the vessels covered by this paper was
accepted from the builders by her owner, the vessel's design, STATISTICS
materials of construction and equipment complied with the
contemporary rules and regulations of the authorities con- It has been found impossible to formulate statistical tables
cerned, including those of the Classification Society involved. which do not combine the two subjects of fire and explosion
Where a vessel is maintained in satisfactory condition in under a single heading. However, using the available records
accordance with these standards, and is provided with a compe- in a similar manner to previous authors does provide continuity
tent, well trained and conscientious crew, the avoidance of for interested readers. I
serious fire-associated damage is much enhanced and even Statistical records of the total losses recorded due to fire and
non-existent in certain fleets. explosion, similar to those shown by Fig. I, are very disconcert-
When a vessel is not maintained and operated in accordance ing in that they verify an apparently inexorable continuation of
with these standards, but nevertheless continues to trade with such occurrences over the many years that such records have
all documentation apparent1y in order, including the condition been kept, in spite of the extensive advances made in ship
known as 'Class Maintained', it is only to be expected that an design, materials, safety equipment and procedures.
outbreak of fire will rapidly escalate and reach serious In 1970 hopeful indications gave rise to the premise that
proportions. previous experiences and extensive research, leading to
Unfortunately fire-associated damage involving ships of all improvements in preventive measures and safety equipment,
types is extremely high. If it is accepted that the rules and would lead to a reduction in the annual cost attributable to fires
regulations presently in use are not in need of immediate and their consequences. Recent research sadly shows that, far
revision then the fault must be found elsewhere. This subject from improving, the situation has deteriorated.
will be returned to in the concluding remarks. Table I shows the comparison quite clearly. Over the 11
Trans IMarE (C). Vol. 98, Pap~r CI / I
1
ADVANCED TRAINING IN FIRE FIGHTING: COMPENDIUM
2
SHIP FIRES IN THE 19808
Table III:Total '- caused by fire and explosion relative to size

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross
Tonnage No. tons No. tons No. tons No. tons No. tons No. tons No. tons No. tons No. tons No. tons No. tons
500-1000 14 10291 8 5868 10 8349 5 3894 14 10046 4 3234 7 5230 8 6290 6 4911 8 6626 11 8556
1001-2000 9 12408 12 17254 9 13787 10 15543 19 25840 13 19364 10 15266 16 25080 11 16872 11 15481 11 14888
2001-4000 13 40814 10 30224 12 35707 15 40557 11 34396 20 57414 12 36877 9 28009 15 46860 9 26506 10 29537
4001~ 4 18697 5 24165 6 28681 8 40339 7 35668 - - 3 14528 5 22814 8 39 493 6 28482 3 14377
6001-7000 2 12657 2 12366 3 18965 3 18881 2 13639 1 6065 4 26661 1 6139 1 6053 3 19658 2 13336
7001-8000 3 22 769 3 22780 2 14693 3 22779 3 22581 5 36833 1 7028 2 15009 4 30229 2 15547 1 7607
8001-10000 1 8886 3 26997 4 33850 5 42460 6 54718 7 61322 4 35212 8 72478 10 89832 12110293 4 35850
10001-15000 5 64 000 4 47021 7 85009 11 128816 2 25 504 3 35275 5 59828 11 136313 9108542 10118231 8 89 479
15001-30000 2 39861 1 15998 2 39978 1 26650 5105 193 5104134 4 78288 4103602 3 59965 - - 4 82 250
30001-50000 - - - - 2 77141 2 80 282 2 71334 2 73 782 1 33 340 3 115468 3 121310 4157694 1 33 555
50001-75000 1 72 294 - - - - - 2121657 - 1 61766 1 50904 2142515 1 59958 - - 1 67420
75001-100000
over 100000
-
-
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- 1 91963
1 153480
1 96 228
3342056
-
-
-
- - -
1 88 285 - - -
1 138822 -
--
Total 54 302677 48 202673 57356160 65541858 71398939 63704632 56 SOl 446 69673717 72 672310 66637340 56 396855
Table IV: Age of total losses posted 8S caused by fire or explosion (500 gross tons and upwards)
1941-1945
and
earlier 1946-1950 1951-1955 1956--1960 1961-1965 1966--1970 1971-1975 1976--1980 1981-1984 Total
1974 7 11 9 13 10 1 3 54
1975 3 5 13 14 5 8 48
1976 6 9 13 15 6 7 1 57
1977 4 6 20 23 9 3 65
1978 7 8 13 14 11 9 8 1 71
1979 2 7 12 20 7 11 3 1 63
1980 1 5 6 14 15 7 6 2 56
1981 1 2 8 23 16 12 6 1 69
1982 4 5 21 20 16 3 3 72
1983 3 1 2 12 25 15 4 4 66
1984 2 1 5 5 20 13 9 1 56
Total 44 62 118 186 149 109 46 13 727
Sinclair2 found when carrying out his research ofthis subject recorded for vessels built between 1956 and 1965. There were
approximately 14 years ago that there were in excess of 400 a very large number of vessels built during this period and
fire-associated occurrences per annum between 1960 and 1970. possibly the material of construction contributed; additionally
At first sight it might be thought that although Table II fires occurred which were not accidental.
indicates a similar number of casualties in 1974, it also indicates Tables V and VI provide further direct comparisons for the
an encouraging reduction down to 260 occurrences over the two periods 1960--1970and 1974-1984 and also record the large
intervening years up to 1984. However, closer inspection increase in the gross tonnage lost during recent years.
reveals that although the total number of incidents dropped to
260 for 1984, the total losses in 1974 amounted to 164538 gross
tons, whereas during the 1980s the equivalent figure has aver- SOME CASE HISTORIES
aged in excess of 600 000 gross tons.
Concurrent with this quite dramatic increase are the substan- A large number of case histories were reviewed during the
tial escalations in the capital cost of vessels, the much higher preparation of this paper and a substantial majority of them
values of cargoes carried, the increased replacement/repair were found to be worthy of inclusion. However, it proved
costs and the serious loss of valuable resources, together with impossible to tabulate the many different aspects in a meaning-
the destructive effects of pollution where this has taken place. ful way and quite impossible to describe them all in sufficient
Inevitably with these higher costs an owner can sustain detail within the confines of this paper. It should also be
serious financial loss when vessels are out of service and not understood that although it is not possible to name the vessels
earning the freight needed for running a viable commercial concerned, an attempt has been made to include interesting
enterprise. and informative examples.
When one looks further into Table II and notes the number
o~ out?reaks of ~re k~own'o be due to weldi~, collision ~nd Tanker fires in general
011 resIdue for the penod from 1974 to 1984, It ISencouragmg
to find that these have reduced compared with those recorded Notable past tanker casualties, particularly those which
for between 1960 and 1970. However, there has been a substan- occurred in the late 1960s, are well known and documented.
tial increase in the number of outbreaks in machinery spaces. The biggest single factor to emerge from that era was the
Turning now to Table III it will be seen that vessels of production and utilization of inert gas systems. There is no
between 4000 and 6000 gross tons and below show the highest doubt that such systems have been very successful in limiting
number of losses: the loss of lives, vessels and cargo, and have therefore been
Table IV indicates that when taking the age of the vessels instrumental in reducing pollution, which would no doubt have
concerned into account the greatest number of losses were been involved in many cases.
Trans IMarE (CJ, Vol. 98, PaperCl/1
3
One wonders, however, if, or when, equipment to produce Tankers at sea

nitrogen will be developed to a stage where it will become
satisfactorily and economically feasible to install it for general In one recent case a loaded tanker of III ()()()dwt caught fire
use on vessels. In the meantime, cases of severe damage after being in collision with another vessel at sea. The distor-
continue to occur on tankers in service due to fire and explosion tion of the tankers hull caused cargo spillage. ignition occurred
and which are thereby actually totally lost, constructively and the vessel became a constructive total loss. The cost of
totally lost or otherwise seriously damaged. necessary repairs was estimated to be well in excess of US$8M.
There are sufficient incidents involving fires and explosions In another incident a 270 ()()()dwt loaded tanker went on fire
in tankers under repair to warrant consideration. Under UK in the region of its loading manifold and a permanent ballast
law The Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Regulations, 1960 tank and later broke in two. The blazing stern section capsized
require that a qualified analyst shall issue a 'Certificate of and sank whilst the forward section, which remained aftoat
Entry' and subsequently a 'Naked Light Certificate'. Often with the bow pointing vertically upwards, was later towed into
fires and explosions take place after the competent analyst has deeper water and sunk by controlled explosion. It was estab-
issued his Certificates and has left the vessel. The analyst is lished that although in 'Class Maintained' condition the vessel
expected to know of the required hot work for the day and of had structural defects in way of the permanent ballast tanks,
dangers associated with such work. Generally however the and that these tanks were being progressively repaired during.
analyst is not a Naval Architect or Marine Engineer and so it is ballast voyages.
suggested that a Ship's Officer and a Repairer's Engineer It was thus concluded that the origin of the fire was
should be a party to the issuing of such Certificates. associated with these defects/repairs and that the total loss was
Table V: World tot.llosses 1500gross tons and upwards)
1959 1960 1961 1962
Nature of casualty No. Gross tons No. Gross tons No. Gross tons No. Gross tons
Weather damage 2 12312 4 30118

Founderings and abandonments 22 32 685 17 30 559 15 27 343 17 38910
Strandings 41 135 008 61 211422 32 182 565 68 280 732
Collisions 15 83019 12 66703 7 15218 14 60 843
Contact damage 5 18698 4 17501 2 1345 4 23559
Fires and explosions 13 65503 8 50192 20 127300 13 60319
Missing 2 1157 3 4670 1 535 2 9657
Damage to machinery, shafts and props 2 2000 2 21115 2 3392
Other casualties 5 3721 1 1056
Totals 100 338070 114 418195 78 355362 124 507 530
World tonnage 121463414 126246158 132143280 136030729
Loss ratio (%) 0.28 0.33 0.27 0.37
1963 1964 1965 1966
Weather damage 1 685 6 23912 8 22 046 14 61207

Founderings and abandonments 18 35732 17 50 499 14 42 557 20 76077
Strandings 71 266 767 47 215302 69 312824 52 281 362
Collisions 21 66 983 18 78958 14 32331 19 102993
Contact damage 8 37 389 5 15176 9 68 767 7 29521
Fires and explosions 23 86202 15 56196 22 144744 38 247147
Missing 4 15113 3 .9201 3 9696
Damage to machinery, shafts and props 1 7607 1 1845 5 21864 1 2959
Other casualties 1 609 5 26119 10 36 889 8 35393
Totals 148 517 087 117 477208 154 691718 159 836659
World tonnage 141744587 148635526 155873 302 166465849

Loss ratio (%) 0.36 0.32 0.44 0.50
1967 1968 1969 1970
Weather damage 8 24470 15 59817 12 98 222 21 138887

Strandings
Collisions
Contact damage
. 64
16
8
341 068
63 997
9465
61
10
5
282305
54271
18065
49
21
3
200 600
124365
13097
45
12
7
195187
39270
14456
Fires and explosions 32 185018 33 152035 33 289069 30 164 538
Missing 6 21522 5 10448 1 10009
Damage to machinery, shafts and props 2 10850 2 4636 2 13423
Other casualties 12 62234 17 54 936 8 17101 10 51 877
Totals 163 746 834 157 675054 147 819740 151 708855
World tonnage 177249686 188730467 205 781 443 221 322771

Loss ratio (%) 0.42 0.36 0.40 0.32
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CI/I
4
SHIP FIRES IN THE 1980s
about USSl5M not taking into account the considerable coastal incident under review occurred, no. 5 port cargo tank carried a
pollution which occurred. parcel of caustic soda solution, which leaked into the void
A very unusual case concerns a loaded products tanker of space, reacted with the galvanized and zinc-rich protective
350Q0 dwt which was seriously damaged by a fire and conse- coating (which had been applied to all internal void space hull
quential explosions. Investigation revealed that a fire had structural surfaces to prevent their corrosion) and produced
occurred in a void space surrounding the insulated free stand- hydrogen.
ing no. 6 centre cargo tank. Further investigation revealed that On the voyage when the incident occurred no. 5 port cargo
a small hole existed in the bulkhead between this void space tank contained an alkane, which provided the initial fuel for
and no. 5 port cargo tank. the fire. The fire in the void space could have started by ignition
This hole was most probably initiated by improper welding of the hydrogen gas which in turn ignited the alkane. Alterna-
or arc cutting during construction of the vessel and eventually tively the fire may have started by direct ignition of the alkane.
penetrated the bulkhead by corrosion over the subsequent 14 The most probable source of ignition was considered to be
years of the vessel's life. The hole was located at a point where static electricity, which could have been generated by one or
it would be extremely difficult to detect it by visual inspection both of the following methods:
from the bottom of the tank or installed walkways. An addi- I. Movement of the alkane, which had leaked from no. 5 tank
tional factor was that the void space had been filled with into the void space surrounding no. 6 tank. against the
nitrogen some two or more years earlier and sealed to prevent insulation of no. 6 tank due to vessel motion ..
entry. 2. The alkane flowing through the bulkhead hole into the void
During the loaded voyage prior to the one on which the space. Spark discharge of the static electricity could have
Table VI:World total 10_ (500 gross tons and upwards)
1913 1974 1975 1976
Weather damage 35 119496 26 123860 31 190193 36 283040

Foundarings and abandonments 15 71761 23 55295 23 55 599 18 35016
Strandings 36 286744 48 279618 53 310009 44 268232
Collisions 20 68 383 19 153637 13 102384 25 73694
Contact damage 5 .23 098 8 48070 3 47258 8 91796
Fires and explosions 50 404 862 54 302 677 48 202673 57 356 160
Missing 3 27 683 4 13223 3 20 729 4 37516
Other casualties 12 72 604 10 17 714 16 82 332 15 59 232
Totals 179 1 078 523 195 1 025492 192 1 039 663 208 1206271
World tonnage 282789 525 303896126 334424470 364066852
Loss ratio (%) 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.33
1977 1978 1979 1980
Weather damage 37 243 184 41 294 275 58 398 425 53 281 963
Strandings 41 188 526 52 372799 50 254090 35 143902
Collisions 18 57 223 28 113763 33 508384 10 39460
Cont8Ct damage 2 9720 8 23990 5 37214 6 25993
Fires and explosions 65 541858 71 398 939 63 704 632 56 801446
Missing 2 26047 2 10401 3 19471 6 168966
Other casualties 11 66172 22 82140 22 192582 22 172564
Totals 203 1200318 260 1379695 278 2258221 228 1783843
World tonnage 385540268 397738061 404312794 410792576

Loss ratio (%) 0.31 0.35 0.56 0.43
1981 1982 1983 1984
Weather damage 50 393 329 40 247180 43 178014 54 256261

Founderings and abandonmenr. 24 92072 22 60761 29 100167 32 104249
Strandings 38 178216 40 177418 34 294253 37 290 273
Collisions 30 144695 20 59374 11 36773 12 61965
Cont8Ct damage • 11 33273
673717
7
72
25033
672310
7
66
29751
637 340
7
56
38214
396855
Fires and explosions 69
Missing 5 10235 1 19505 - - 2 16337
Other casualties 16 48952 26 131492 18 62291 7 11754
Totals 248 1614199 236 1460212 209 1351510 215 1294537
World tonnage 411635184 415336602 413050362 409176177

Loss ratio (%) 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.32
TrIUlSIMarE(C), Vol. 98, PaperCI/l
5
ignited either the hydrogen, which in turn ignited the A total of 11 vessels were berthed at the complex, some of
alkane. or it could have directly ignited the alkane. The which also sustained certain damage. Two of the berths were
latter has been shown to be practical by tests carried out in heavily damaged. Unfortunately lives were lost and personnel
a laboratory with the alkane and insulation material injured. The total (estimated) cost is not presently known.
together at ambient temperature. although the estimated cost of repairs required by the two
After the fire commenced and had been burning for several vessels mentioned above was US$1M and US$2.1M,
minutes. pressure built up in the void space and caused the respectively.
deck plating to bulge sufficiently to rupture the welded connec-
tion between the deck plating and the longitudinal bulkhead of Ca essel disch •
adjacent tanks containing hot polybutene. The polybutene rgo v argmg
vapour exploded and threw personnel off the deck, including A 46 ()()()dwt bulk carrier was lying alongside whilst her
the harbour pilot who was standing on deck preparing to cargo of sulphur was being discharged by shore cranes.
disembark as his boat came towards the vessel. One crew Because of the hazardous nature of this cargo fire hoses had
member was lost while the pilot and several crew members been laid out from ashore and the local Fire Brigade personnel
were injured. were in attendance. At about 1330 hours thick black smoke
Approximately simultaneously with the first explosion the was observed in the Officers' smoke room as well as flames in.
expansion trunk of no. 6 centre tank ruptured. The main area the vicinity of a power radio located on a bookshelf therein.
of the vessel's deck lifted off, cartwheeled and landed upside Attempts by a Deck Officer to extinguish the fire with a
down on the deck of the vessel forward of the area of damage. portable extinguisher proved futile, because of the intense
The contents of the tanks concerned remained on fire for smoke and heat.
several hours in spite of efforts to extinguish the fire. The fire. which spread rapidly, was fought by thc crew and
The vessel subsequently broke in two, the aft part, contain- shore fin: fighlcrs assisted by four fire boats and was extin-
ing machinery. accommodation and the bridge, sinking. Sal- guished by IXI)() hours. However, further use of fire hoses was
vaging of the fore part, bringing it into port where the remain- found to be necessary some time later when flames were noted
ing cargo was salvaged and putting it into drydock for examina- in way of deckhead panelIing. With the exception of the Master
tion cost in the region of US$4M. and Chief Officer, who sustained minor injuries, no loss of life
It was estimated that the cost of building a new aft section or serious injury to personnel occurred. The cost of repairs was
and reinstating the vessel would have cost well in excess of estimated to be about US$2M.
US$50M, the cost of building an entirely new vessel to the The cause ofthis fire was considered to be a fault in the radio
same specification being about US$75M. located in the Officers' smoke room. Quite clearly if it had not
been recognized that the vessel was discharging a hazardous
Tankers discha • cargo and had the suitable precautions not been taken it is ~ost
rgmg probable that the damage would have been much more senous
In many cases serious consequential loss has been avoided in both nature and extent.
by the diligent action of those present. One such case occurred
on. a VLCC. Whilst dis~hargin~ cargo, no. 3 stea~-turbine- Vessels under construction
dnven cargo pump sustained senous damage to turbine, gear-
ing, drive shaft and pump. In consequence damage was caused It might be considered reasonable to expect, because of the
to no. 2 cargo pump turbine, piping in engine and pump rooms time and effort expended by interested parties over the years,
and a fire broke out in the pump room, which was successfully that it would be most unlikely for a major fire to occur on a
extinguished. vessel still under construction, but nearing completion, in a
Investigation revealed that the prime cause ofthe damage to modern efficient shipyard. However such a fire did occur, on a
no. 3 cargo pump set was consistent with an external force nearly completed vessel, and resulted in a repair cost in excess
applied between the turbine and the pump. The investigators ofUS$\.4M.
traced the origin of the damage to the upper universal joint of It was established that this fire was caused by a spark
the vertical drive shaft leading through the engine-room deck emanating from an operation being performed by a welder and
plating. One of the set screws securing one of the upper resulted in considerable damage in the engine room, to electri-
universal joint crosshead bearing caps had fractured across cal installations and to other component parts. The delivery of
under its head and thus initiated the occurrence. This is one the; vessel was delayed by approximately six months and
case where prompt action by those concerned following the doubtless resulted in additional loss to the owners. Such
failure of a component part limited the actual cost of repairs to incidents in shore-based establishments are not confined to
about US$O.5M. shipyards.
Obviously if the fire had not been promptly extinguished this In June 1985 the press reported a fire that had occurred in a
incident could have involved serious loss of life and also new civic office complex in Surrey, England. The building was
become one of the major incidents of the period under review. due to be opened in October 1985 and so construction was well
advanced. The report stated that it was believed that this fire
LNGILPG I was caused by a spark from a welder's torch. The loss was put
vesse s at about £4M.
The incidence of fire damage to this type of vessel is relatively
low. One serious ca~e .occurr~d as a resu~t of a series of ~vents Ships under repair
at a location containing adjacent terminals. At the time a
mooring boat exploded whilst operating within an LPG cloud Fires continue to occur in vessels whilst they are under
emanating from a spillage off one of the berths. Immediately repair. Typical is the case of a small passenger vessel moored
fire spread to other vessels berthed at the complex and to the alongside and undergoing refitting. A fire occurred and
complex itself.' resulted in serious damage to the accommodation and bridge
The fire was brought under control in about one hour, but in areas; consequential damage resulted from the efforts to extin-
the meantime one 25 ()()()dwt tanker adjacent to the spillage guish the fire, particularly in the machinery spaces. Whilst the
and a 17()()()dwt tanker berthed downwind of the fire sustained fire fighting progressed the vessel was towed away from the
extensive damage. Another tanker sheltered by the second of repair berth and beached.
these vessels escaped serious damage by the prompt actions of The vessel was subsequently repaired for a cost in excess of
the crew, who shut all open spaces and started fire-prevention US$1.2M. Investigation revealed that the contractors had
drill. This vessel was moved quickly to a safe anchorage. been welding doubler plates to the deck plating under one of
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CI/I
6
the lifeboats and that the fire had started in the accommodation the mass. Gases and hot air will pass upwards and out of the
below this area. mass and fresh air (oxygen) will be drawn into the mass to
One survey proved to be a most distressing experience. continue the heating process.
Instructions were received to proceed to a certain shipyard One successful method of preventing heating in coal (or
where a vessel was undergoing repair which involved fairly delaying it) is to compact the coal as it is being loaded. and to
extensive internal steelwork. It was reported that an explosion adjust ventilation to prevent the ingress of air into the cargo.
had occurred. On entering the compartment concerned no Many efforts have been made to classify coals in accordance
evidence of fire, explosion or damage could be found, but with their susceptibility to spontaneous heating. Laboratory
tragically nothing remained of the two workmen who had been tests have been devised but th~ results of these tests cannot be
in the tank at the time. used to decide whether a coal will spontaneously heat. It is
Oxy-acetylene hoses still connected to shore manifolds had safer to assume that all coals will self-heat if given the right
been left in the compartment overnight, with open ends where conditions. Thus if coal is to be shipped then it should be
the workmen had disconnected their torch to take it ashore the shipped in accordance with recommended practice.
previous evening in accordance with anti-theft procedures.
From the investigation it was concluded that the oxygen supply C tt
had either been left on overnight or the valves were leaking, 0 on .
and that almost immediately after the two workmen had Cotton, cotton waste and rags are all included in the IMO
entered the compartment to commence work an event occur- Dangerous Goods Code.
red with such terrible consequences, possibly caused by one of Cotton is a fine fibre material attached to the cotton seed.
them attempting to light either a cigarette or their torch'. These fibres develop in a boll attached to the seed and at
maturity burst into a fluffy mass of fibres. The seeds and fibres
are collected and in the process the fibres are removed from the
CARGO FIRES seeds. the seeds to be processed for oil. feedcake etc. and the
fibres to be baled and dispatched for spinning. Shorter fibres
The types of cargo have changed over the last 30 years or so. are removed from the seeds and form the linters used in the
For example, because of the container revolution much less manufacture of cotton wadding.
break bulk cargo is carried nowadays. However, those hazard- Cotton fibre is composed almost entirely of cellulose and in
ous cargoes that continue to be transported in bulk warrant appearance is flat and ribbon like and hollow or cellular inside.
careful attention. It has an ignition temperature of about 250°C, and because of
its structure (long hollow fibres) a large surface area ofthe fibre
C I is exposed and so creates a serious fire problem. Even in tightly
08 . baled conditions the fibre still has its own built-in air supply
Incidents involving coal cargoes still occur, although if coals within the individual fibres.
are carried strictly in accordance with IMO recommendations According to the IMO Dangerous Goods Code all forms of
the risk of spontaneous combustion is substantially reduced. cotton, cotton waste and rags are stated to be liable to ignite
Immediately a coal is mined it is subject to two processes. spontaneously. However. work conducted at the Fire
The first is a chemical process whereby oxygen reacts with the Research Station ofthe Department of Scientific and Industrial
coal substance and the second is a physical process whereby the Research concludes that spontaneous ignition is unlikely to
coal tends to distintegrate into smaller particles. Handling of occur either in dry or wet cotton bales. Wet cotton bales may
the coal causes an increase in the second process as does spontaneously heat by biological activity but this heating does
weathering, eg rain, sun, frost, icing etc. As a result of this not proceed to the ignition of the cotton fibres.
second process more surfaces of the coal are exposed to react However. the research indicates that bales of cotton eon-
with oxygen. taminated with an oxidisable oil could spontaneously heat and
The speed of the oxidation reaction depends upon the type eventually spontaneously ignite. Many vegetable and animal
of coal, the slowest reactions normally occurring in anthracite oils can absorb oxygen from the air to form oxidation products.
coals and increasing through the bituminous and semi-bitumin- This oxidation process produces heat and the resultant increase
ous coals and being most rapid in the lignite coals. in temperature accelerates the oxidation process. Drying oils
Oxidation of the coal generates heat, and if the coal is in a such as linseed. tung. poppy and sunflower oils and semi-drying
mass and depending on the degree of compaction this heat can oils such as soya bean, corn, cotton and castor oils all absorb
build-up within the mass. A mass of coal is a poor conductor of oxygen readily and thus experience a self-heating process.
heat and so the temperature of a mass of coal spontaneously Cotton fibres are readily ignited and if contaminated with an
heating is increased. This increase in temperature causes a oxidisable oil the oil will heat spontaneously. If this heat is not
more rapid oxidation and so the reaction accelerates within the dissipated then the temperature of the cotton fibres in contact
mass until ignition ofthe coal occurs. with the oil will rise to the point of ignition.
The rate of temperature rise usually increases slowly from A frequent cause of fire in cotton is the 'fire-pm:ked' or 'hot'
ambient temperatures up to temperatures of the order of 120 bale. This refers to a bale of cotton which has included in the
of (69°C). Following this the temperature rise increases until bale a small portion of cotton that may have been ignited in
a temperature of about ISOof (S2"C) is reached. This tempera- some manner during the ginning or baling process. Heat
ture will remain constant for a period until all the moisture is created in the process by friction or sparks may ignite a portion
evaporated from the coal, but when this point is reached the of cotton; this can escape detection and the cotton can be
temperature will increase rapidly to the temperature of ignition included in the bale.
ofthe coal [about 750°F (400°C) but dependent upon the type Because of the peculiar nature of the cotton fibre with its
of coal). own 'built-in' air supply. this burning can continue within the
Air is essential for this oxidation process, as without the bale and still remain undetected. The bale is tightly packed and
oxygen present in air the process will cease. Thus if air can be so combustion products cannot escape and be seen. Further-
excluded from a mass of coalthen theoretically the coal will not more, a bale of cotton has excellent insulating properties,
oxidise or heat spontaneously. If a coal mass is loosely piled again because of the fibrous nature of the cotton fibres. Thus a
and coned as in some loading patterns, then air effects on the fire burning inside a bale cannot be detected by touch on the
edges ofthe pile can create airflows through the pile. providing outside of the bale because the outside will still remain cool
the oxygen necessary for self-heating at the face of the coal owing to the insulating properties.
particles. Furthermore, as soon as a mass begins to heat, if in a There are reports of 'fire-packed' bales bursting into name
loosely compaced sfate, chimney effects will be created within several weeks after production. and until they burst into name
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CII I
7
no heat or smoke was detected on the outside of the bale. a hazardous product and if wetted produce large quantities of
Furthermore, at the time flames burst out the whole of the explosive hydrogen gas and generate tremendous heat to the
inside of the bale was consumed by fire. point of auto-ignition, direct reduced iron hot moulded
A carelessly discarded match or cigarette end will readily briquettes are generally considered to be both more stable
ignite cotton fibre. Despite rules and restrictions it is almost and safer.
impossible to stop persons smoking in and around cotton However, the following brief description of a recent casu-
during picking, ginning or transportation. Unused matches alty serves to illustrate the care which is still necessary in
have been detected in seed cotton sent for ginning and it has transporting reduced iron ore.
been considered possible that these matches could be ignited A vessel carrying FIOR briquettes (hot moulded direct
during the ginning process and possibly start a fire within a reduced iron briquettes) struck a lock in the Panama Canal,
packed bale. and as a result fresh water entered no. 1 hold and caused the
Fire-damaged bales are often the cause of further fires in briquettes contained therein to heat and give off hydrogen.
cotton storage and transport. Following fire in a load of cotton The 2500 t of briquettes had been loaded without trimming
bales, which may appear to be undamaged on the outside, and formed a cone 6 m high at its peak.
other than by wetting, a bale may suddenly burst into flames Several hours after water had entered the hold the cargo
days or weeks later. The cause of ignition is not the wetting of was found to be heating up and steam was observed issuing
the bales but because fire has burned into the bales and then from the top of the cone. The hold was flooded with sea
smouldered within the bale. This smouldering may continue water and the cargo submerged. The hatch covers were left
within the bales before eventually breaking out at the surface open to ventilate the hold and dissipate'the large quantity of
again. It has been reported that a fire-damaged bale was hydrogen being generated. The water was seen to be bubbling
immersed in dock water for a period of one month and when it over its entire surface.
was brought to the surface again and dried out it immediately Following advice, the level of the water in no. 1 hold was
burst into flame. reduced to 3 m depth leaving the top of the cone exposed.
The temperature of the exposed wetted cargo slowly
J t . increased and stabilized after about 24 h at 60 ·C. Explosive
u e levels of hydrogen were recorded just below the surface of
Raw jute consists of dried vegetable fibres which are readily the briquettes but some 0.76 m above the surface the levels
ignited. Many instances have been reported of bales of jute were found to be non-explosive.
burning during loading, carriage and discharge. The fibres Less than 36 h after this dewatering heavy muffled thumps
burn readily and are generally extinguished using copious were noted emanating from beneath the cargo surface and a
quantities of water. small hydrogen fire occurred on top of the cargo. This fire
This fire-fighting exercise sometimes creates a further spread rapidly over the surface ofthe exposed cargo and hosing
hazard. When a bale of raw jute is thoroughly wetted it can it with water only increased the hydrogen fire. The hold was
expand to up to one and a half times its original size. This can reflooded to submerge the cargo and a thick layer of foam was
create problems in a ship's hold or in a warehouse. There are sprayed to cover the surface of the water.
records of warehouse walls collapsing because of the expansion Short IXafterwards a series of explosions occurred at water
of jute bales wetted during fire-fighting operations. level in the hold and it became apparent that hydrogen was
A further hazard of jute arises when the fibres are used to being trapped in the foam. When it was dispersed the explo-
manufacture jute sacks. The fine hair-like fibres of jute which sions ceased.
protrude over the surface of the sacks enable flame to spread The cargo was subsequently discharged into the sea using a
rapidly over the outside surface of the sacks leaving no trace of grab rigged on the vessel's crane, this operation being carried
scorching. out while keeping the cargo in the hold submerged. During this
Investigations of fires which suggested spontaneous combus- operation explosive levels of hydrogen were measured in the
tion of materials in the sacks have later proved to be fire effects hold until the cargo had been completely removed.
caused by flash of flames over the sacks. Fire started by a small
ignition source, su~h as a cigarette end, could spread across the Fires in containers
sacks and perhaps mto spaces between the sacks. When frayed
edges of the sacks are encountered the flames could then ignite The present indications are that the incidence of fire originat-
the edges of the sack and possibly burn into the contents, the ing from within containers on board ship or in port terminals is
path of the flame being invisible and the stacks having the apparently non-existent, or of such negligible proportions that
appearance of several seats of fire. Cargo Underwriters have no record of such fires. This is most
surprising considering the total number of container move-
Reduced iron ore (direct reduced iron) men~s taking. place all around the wc;>rl.d.
It IS tempt 109 to conclude that this IS resultant upon lack of
Iron ore is found naturally in several forms, nearly all access to the container contents by personnel other than those
containing oxygen in combination with iron. The presence of loading or unloading the container under carefully supervised
oxygen and other impurities reduces the value of the ore, so it conditions. It is most probably also a function of the types of
follows that enriching the ore to increase its iron content results cargo that may be carried in enclosed. sealed containers.
in a more profitable payload. This is done by a process called The one case history found concerned a 12000 dwt vessel
reduction, ie by removing the oxygen content from the ore. In which was being discharged of cargo and on which an outbreak
a blast furnace coke is used as the reducing agent. In the fines of tire occurred in a container stowed on deck and known to
iron ore reduced (FIOR) process hydrogen is the reducing contain a hazardous cargo. The affected container, loaded
agent and at a high temperature combines with the oxygen in with drums of phosphorus, was being lifted by crane when it
the ore to form water, which is carrjed away as dry steam. caught in a guide, tilted, swung sideways and an adjacent
The ore is treated in the form of 'fines' as this is the best obstruction pierced the container at the same time puncturing
method for quick and thorough reduction. The end product, a drum of phosphorus which ignited spontaneously. The crane
FIOR, is then briquetted to reduce subsequent oxidation and driver was instructed to submerge the container in the dock
to assist handling and transportation. The original ore will away from the vessel.
contain impurities other than oxygen such as compounds of Later, when the container was landed onto the quay and the
phosphorus, sulphur, carbon etc. These compounds will also water had drained from it the phosphorus re-ignited. By this
be reduced and will perh!lPS become reactive with water. time the Fire Brigade was at the scene and extinguished the fire
Whilst it is well known that direct reduced iron pellets are a with dry powder.
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CIII
8
CAUSE OF FIRE However, from the substantial number of reports concern-

ing fire-associated casualties investigated on behalf of Under-
It has always been the case, and is perhaps inevitable, that writers, it is quite obvious that the subject remains a matter for
difficulty is experienced by those attempting to determine the grave concern. There are no encouraging indications to show
exact cause of a fire onboard a ship. The vagaries of human that this situation will not remain. Consequently the present
nature: ar~ such that sometimes, mainly because an attempted indications are that financial loss amounting to many millions
fire raIser ISunsuccessful, even partially unsuccessful, evidence of pounds can be expected to remain a factor within the
of the deliberate starting of a fire can be found. This can shipping industry generally, as well as within its associated
involve several obvious points such as cotton waste remaining interests, notably Underwriters, for the foreseeable futurc.
in an unusual location, severely burnt metal waste-paper There is no single cause for these fire-associated casualties.
baskets, particularly when these are found in the middle of a Human error. negligence. lack of maintenance of the vessel's
cabin or other unusual location, stop valves found open on fuel equipment and failure to follow the rules and regulations of
lines with joints disconnected, direct connections between carefully drawn-up safety procedures are all factors in the
cargo system and engine fuel system pipe lines, and so on. various case histories reviewed. There are cases where evi·
However, in a substantial number of cases either the fire dence was found to show that a fire had been deliberately
itself or the conscientious and reasonable attempts to extin- started. others where due to the circumstances surrounding the
guish a fire can result in the removal of all evidence of the cause case the investigator suspected that a fire had been deliberately
of a fire. The cause then becomes a matter for conjecture and started.
can exercise the time and effort of the many persons who must In any event a drastic revision is required in the recruitment.
then become involved before the financial aspects can be training and supervision of personnel if the lessons of previous
settled. years are not to be wasted and if technical advances which have
been made are to be properly utilized.
GENERAL COMMENTS
It is hoped that the foregoing will be found of interest, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

particularly in the light of the statistics provided and the
knowledge that there is nothing very original about the The author thanks his employers, The Salvage Asssociation.
majority of the cases reviewed when compared with those for access to records and permission to publish this paper. The
described by previous researchers of this subject in previous Liverpool Underwriters' Association for the statistics provided
presentations. and all those others who have given of their time and assistance.
Extensive study has produced a wealth of information avail-
able to those concerned, and regulatory authorities have
defined the various parameters and issued rules and regulations REFERENCES
which are up-dated whenever considered appropriate. Vast
impro~ements have ~een made as .regards ship design, 1. Annual Reports of The LiverpoolUnderwriters' Association.
matenals of constructIon, early warnmg systems and fire- 2, C. A. Sinclair. 'Causes of fires', Paper presented al RINA/lMarE
fighting and safety equipment. Joint Symposium(1972).
Discussion _
F. G. M. EVANS (The College of Maritime Studies, Warsash): The almost zero fire-loss record of some container com-
I am a little worried that the statements in Mr Harvey's paper panies is, I believe, due in part to the very high standards of
concerning the lack of fires in container ships or container construction and fire protection adopted by these companies
storage at terminals may lead to undue complacency. Without and shows that international standards are still very low in this
looking up the records I can think of several incidents involving respect.
containers.
A fairly recent incident involved an Evergreen line ship P. BRENNAN (Ministry of Defence): Tables V and VI of
which had a fire after a collision. The fire involved containers Mr Harvey's paper indicate a large increase from 1973 onwards
packed with matches and shop fireworks and spread to contain- in fires in civilian ships, and Table I of Mr Akhurst's paper
ers holding cotton. There was also a French ship lost which had shows a substantial and sustained increa~e in warshil? fires from
beeswax in containers, an explosion in a containe:r of fertil.izer 1974 onwards. Is th~re any reason for thIs a~parent mcrease or
affected by an external fire in Glasgow, and a fire m a contamer was there a change m the methods of reportmg fires?
terminal in Australia caused by heavy weather damaged con-
tainers having been removed and exposed to sunlight. Dr A. MITCHESON (Dr J. H. Burgoyne and Partners):
However, it may be that many of these incidents do not Mr Harvey has mentioned that there were no apparent trends
appear in underwriters' ",ecords because of the habit of some of in the statistics of fire losse~ ot~er than ~he fact that each. had a
the container consortiums to carry their own insurance. I do human element. As a leadmg mternatlOnal firm of fire mves-
agree though that the number of incidents is small in relation to tigators, my company has noted a number of transient vogues
the quantity of cargo carried. in the casualties we have seen. For example, some years ago we
rrQJISIMarE (CJ, Vol. 98, Paper CJ II
9
had a large number oftanker explosions before the widespread wasted trying to find a jetty operator willing to receive the
adoption of inert gas systems, and currently we have the losses vessel.
arising from hostilities in the Arabian Gulf. In my opinion the question of inshore fire fighting is
I would like to ask Mr Harvey if he has observed any effect sufficiently important to warrant a review of the legal responsi-
of the slump in world shipping in either the number or type of bilities and powers, liaison with LAms, and the desirability of
casualties? Also, is there an age of vessel above which there is a more uniform approach.
a significantly greater risk of fire, or any particular nationality?
Dr R. L. FARQUHAR (Graviner Ltd): From the statistics in
R. J. ARBON (Ministry of Defence): I would like to ask Mr Harvey's paper it is evident that the majority (well over
Mr Harvey if there are any standards laid down for the training 50% ) of fires onboard ships origiQate in the machinery spaces,
of crew members for ships worldwide. In my experience some and this figure has been fairly constant over the last decade.
companies maintain a good standard of training in first aid, fire Halon suppression systems are available and are allowable
fighting and use of fire-fighting equipment, whilst others seem in machinery-space areas. At present, however, the crew have
to pay no attention to training. to abandon the area before the halon can be allowed to ftood
As an operational fire officer I have attended a number of the area. By this time, 5-7 min, the fire has become deep seated
ship fires and I have often been appalled at the complete lack and temperatures generally may be too high and so make halon.
of training of crew members in elementary fire fighting and the ineffective and conventional fire containment and suppression
use of equipment and been amazed at the proliferation of difficult.
fire-fighting equipment and breathing apparatus found The crew of military vehicles are protected by automatic
onboard some ships. In one particular case I found nine sets of halon suppression systems, whereby the halon is ftooded into
breathing apparatus, all from different manufacturers and the area within 20 ms. Halon 1301, which is used in such
consequently with different modes of operation. On question- applications, is non-toxic to the crew in the concentrations
ing the crew I discovered that no one knew how to use them. necessary to extinguish fires. Military authorities seem satisfied
The standard of maintenance of fire-fighting equipment also that Halon 1301 does not endanger the crew.
often leaves much to be desired. One finds extinguishers that Does Mr Harvey not think that use of such automatic
do not work, deck hydrant valves that cannot be opened, and systems would help to reduce significantly the damage done by
breathing apparatus that has no test record or any indication as fire and that the regulatory bodies should be encouraged to
to its serviceability. recommend its use onboard ships?
Is it not time that IMO produced standards to be adhered to
by shipping of all nations? Surely the effort involved in training G. COGGON (Lloyd's Register of Shipping): In his Introduc-
the workforce and maintaining the equipment would be worth- tion on p. I, Mr Harvey appears to question the practice of
while, not only to safeguard the interests of the owners but also allowing ships to continue 'to trade with all documentation
to safeguard the lives ofthc crew. apparently in order, including the condition known as "Class
Mr Harvey also talks about fires on vessels under construc- Maintained"'.
tion or being repaired. This is another area that should be Ships are subject to damage and deterioration, including
addressed more seriously. In the Navy Department we have fractures, between surveys and it is the shipowner's responsi-
rigid working procedures which call for a certificate or permit bility to bring any serious fault to the attention of the respon-
to work whenever hot work is to take place. In the majority of sible society. After survey, the owner may be required to carry
cases we also insist that a trained weldinglbuming sentry is in out either permanent or temporary repairs or repairs may be
attendance, with the necessary first aid and fire-fighting equip- deferred to a later date, probably for a stated period of time,
ment, to check and control the work. This procedure has been depending on the judgement of the Surveyor. For that period
responsible for a dramatic reduction in the number of fires the class would be continued.
caused by such operations. Whilst it is the primary function of Classification Societies to
see that ships are adequately maintained in order to ensure safe
R. CAREY (Humberside Fire Brigade): I should like to point trading .•I f~el that this must ~ done with as little interruption
out that for the period 1974--84 there were, annually, more as possI~le In t~e use of ~he S~lpS ...
high-value losses in port than at sea. I accept the reasons for the The n~ne major ~a~slficatlon S~cletl~s are ~e~bers of the
emphasis on the 'at sea' part of the statistics, since such Intematlo~al ~Iatl~n of ClassIficatIon SOCIetIes(!ACS).
incidents are unique in their challenges, but I wonder if the On~ of theIr alms ISto Improve standa!ds of c~nst~ctlon and
merchant services of the world give sufficient consideration to maintenance and much has been done In that dIrectIon.
availing themselves of the expert services of shore-based fire The term 'Classification Society' covers a large number of
brigades. such organisations (in fa~t there are over 30 ofvariable worth),
The UK fire service has excellent and effective working and consequently would It not seem reasonable to suppose that
protocols and procedures with the Royal Navy. Unfortunately some impro~ement. in the condition of maintenance of ships
the same could not be said for many home-based and most may be achIeved If the employment of one of the more
overseas merchant shipping companies. A major resource ~esponsible Cl~ssification Societies led to a reduction in the
which could have a significant impact on port or inshore fires is Insurance premIums?
not being fully exploited ..
This is particularly apparent in estuarial waters where, J. DENT (Department of Transport): IMO has looked
although technically at sea, there is often a shore-based fire thoroughly into standards of training and watchkeeping and a
brigade capable of providing the services and resources Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping Con-
rapidly. My own brigade is capable of airlifting a helicopter vention is now in force. Certificated offices should have proper
reconnaissance team, backed by a brigade-manned fire tug, to training in fire-fighting procedures and crew should be given
any vessel asking for help in the lJumber Estuary. onboard fire-fighting training.
One difficulty is the apparent lack in many UK estuaries of a However, given the previous standards acceptable to many
body with the power to make effective use of such a service. An owners of ftag of convenience ships, this work has yet to have
example of this is the difficulty experienced by fire brigades in any real effect on such vessels.
getting a vessel alongside when such action is important to
fire-fighting objectives. There appears to be no one with the D. NAYLOR (Goodwin-Hamilton & Adamson Ltd): I very
authority to insist upon a berth being provided. At a serious much appreciate all the hard work that must have been done by
fire in 1982 involving a passenger vessel, more than 60 min of Mr Harvey in gathering his statistics especially as, on a com-
fire time, crucial to the safety of the passengers and crew, was pany basis, I have endeavoured to do the same thing in the past.
TrllllSIMarE (CJ, Vol. 98, Paper ClII
10
However, I would like to ask specifically about one classifi- material there would have been no fire. The main reason for
cation, namely the incident analysis in Table II referring to the fire was that combustible material had been allowed to
domestic stores. The influx of chemicals and solvents for accumulate and had not been properly protected against
machinery and domestic usage has greatly increased in recent sparks, which can come from many sources. Unless combust-
years and I should like to know whether there is any evidence ible material in the wrong place is regarded as a possible cause
to show that such commodities were involved. of fires, we may fail to see the wood for the trees.
The reason for my concern is that although these chemicals
may be covered by the relative Health and Safety Acts, they
may not be stowed properly segregated into the authorized
compartments, but instead left indiscriminately in locations Author's reply _
convenient for daily working practises. This obviously presents
hazards to both the individual and the ship, and is often caused
by a lack of approved stowage spaces, especially on older Mr Evans' comment is correct. The incidents he refers to do
vessels. The greatest danger is incompatible stowage with not appear in the research material which was available to me.
other combustible stores and stowage in high-risk and accom- There is no doubt that fires occur which do not form a claim or
modation areas. part of a claim submitted to Insurers ..
Considering the vast number of containers now in use the
T. J. SANDELL (BD Systems): In view of the evidence that incidents of fire originating in a container are remarkably few,
many fires are caused by human error and on vessels which are especially when compared with die number of ships in service!
not up to Class, should not a body other than the Classification number of ship fires reported. Mr Evans warns against com-
Society, which is employed by the shipowners, be responsible placency as regards containers, a sentiment which I endorse
for inspection? whole-heartedly.
BJ. HANSEN (Det norske Veritas): The last contributor has In reply to Mr Brennan. I have had access to certain of the
suggested that the Classification Societies do not carry out merchant vessel statistics only and as far as I am aware the
their jobs properly. I would like to refute this completely. method of recording fires in 1984 in those statistics was no
Det norske Veritas do not ask the owners for permission to different from the method adopted in previous years.
strike sub-standard ships off the register, and so the suggestion
that the Classification Societies are in the pocket of the owners In reply to Dr Mitcheson. my paper does not consciously
is definitely untrue. Fire prevention, detection and extinction include any item concerning the loss of vessels caused by
have traditionally been the authorities' problems. However, in hostile actions in the Arabian Gulf or elsewhere. The difficulty
the last 10 years the Classification Societies have become facing the fire investigatoristhe large, if not complete, destruc-
involved in this field and their efforts within lACS and IMO tion of material which occurs before he is able to search
will surely be reflected in the statistics in another 10years time. amongst the debris for possible evidence.
Could Mr Harvey please comment further on cargo fires, Each case has to be assessed on its own merits and there are
and especially their prevention? I believe that the avoidance of far too many where the cause is not finally established for the
sources of ignition on cargo decks and surface ventilation of question to be answered.
coal cargoes should be emphasized.
In reply to Mr Arbon, there is no established worldwide
J. K. ROBINSON (Lloyd's Register of Shipping): Since the basic standard for training crews in first aid. fire prevention an d
19605 the application of remote instrumentation and automatic fire fighting. Some crews are highly trained, some receive a
controls, introduced to permit reduced manning levels, has degree of training, others receive no training whatsoever, all
resulted in an enormous increase in the quantity of electrical according to the particular shipowner's motivation.
cable insulating and sheathing materials in merchant vessels. Drawing up a set of procedures is possible, but ensuring that
Whilst the cables themselves are seldom the source of a fire, they are strictly adhered to is not.
in any fire which is not quickly suppressed the resulting fumes
from the burning cables are so voluminous that they hinder Mr Carey is to be congratulated on the training and capa-
both escape and manual fire fighting. In addition, when the bility of his unit. His comments are a valuable contribution to
conflagration is eventually extinguished, the refurbishment of this discussion.
electronic and other equipments remote from the fire area. The problem is not with a British Flag vessel in a port in the
which will be contaminated with a sticky corrosive and conduc- UK but rather rests with the extremely large number of
tive film, can make a significant contribution to salvage costs. permutations of owner, flag, mixed languages and non-
Two modern developments should help to alleviate this standard equipment which exist.
problem:
1. The use of distributed microprocessors interlinked by Dr Farquhar's view of the available statistics appears to be
data hi-ways for instrumentation, communication and quite correct. Given that in spite of all that might be done a fire
control circuits. occurs, it is surely incumbent on all interested parties to make
2. The use of low-fire-hazard (LFH) insulation and sheath- every effort to see that the fire is extinguished at an early stage
ing materials for power- and data-transmission cables. in order to limit the danger to life, vessel, cargo and, if in port,
The reduced shipyard installation costs provide a natural the shore facilities and environment.
incentive for development I, but unfortunately the LFH cables
developed for MOD(P£) for naval vessels, with their minor Mr Coggon comments that ships can sustain damage and
space! weight reduction per unit conductor volume, cost signifi- suffer deterioration, including fractures, between periodical
cantly more than conventiOl1al cable made to IEC Pub. 92-3 or surveys. In general, however, it seems to be accepted that
BS 6883. This means that their adoption in new merchant ships sub-standard ships exist. The defects are not initiated and
would appear to require either an IMO regulation or differen- wholly developed in the interim period between consecutive
tial insurance rates. survey dates specified in the various Classification Society rule
books.
G. VICTORY: On p. 6 Mr Harvey says 'this fire was caused by Inevitably the subject is raised of a possible reduction in
a spark'. However, Ithink we must be clear about what causes insurance premium payable by owners who comply with
fires. certain standards. This subject is outside my field, but the
A fire may be initiated by a spark. but without combustible standard reply is that there is a rate of premium fixed by those
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, PaperCl/I
11
concerned to which increments are added according to the Ifeelthat I went as faras I could go, in the confines ofa single
assessment of the risk. paper, on the subject of cargo fires. A great deal of work has
The problem remains that certain 'Oass Maintained' vessels been done in the past and a large number of requirements, also
have been found in seriously wasted and deteriorated con- guidelines, are available concerning every possible cargo.
dition, quite separately from those on whic.h Oass has been Disseminating this information amongst the people involved
suspended or even withdrawn. and improving its applications will greatly assist in achieving
the results Mr Hansen predicts.
Mr Dent's comments are encouraging and all will join him in
hoping that substantial improvements do occur. Mr Robinson has clearly described and confirms what recent
experience has shown to be one of the most serious aspects in
Unfortunately in the majority of fires the type of evidence the aftermath of a shipboard fire. However, I suspect that the
mentioned by Mr Naylor is destroyed. Stowage of chemicals, use of microprocessors and associated circuiting is not decided
solvents, paints etc. would doubtless be treated with the same on the basis of low overall cost for the initial capital outlay plus
respect as fuel oil and lubricating oil on a well maintained ship. labour and materials for installation, or for their ability to
survive a fire.
In view of the number of bodies already in existence it is Any improvement such as the installation of low-tire-hazard
most unlikely that the one more suggested by Mr Sandell insulation and sheathing materials, which will enhance crew .
would give any greater degree of success in the reduction of safety and the possibility of saving the ~hip and cargo, should
fires in ships. I believe, however, that a substantial reduction be vigorously pursued. If the demand for these materials is
could be achieved if all concerned would comply strictly with high enough it is not impossible that the manufacturers could
the existing rules and regulations and take cognizance of the reduce their costs.
wealth of information available on the subject.
Of course Mr Victory is correct. It is certain that if the spark
As Mr Hansen points out, fire protection, detection and did not exist a fire would not occur. The fire investigator would
extinguishing was at one time dealt with by a governmental surely have to agree that if no spark occurred the combustible
authority such as the old Ministry of Transport in the UK. material would not have caught fire at the specific date, time
However, for rather more than 10 years Classification Societies and place of the occurrence, and therefore it is the cause of the
have become increasingly involved because of their appoint- spark that he will be attempting to establish.
ment by various Governments to act on their behalf. The fact that the vessel had an accumulation of combustible
Sub-standard ships have been mentioned again and again. material in the space concerned may be due to the negligence
Mr Coggon and Mr Hallsen and their colleagues are quite or apathy of the crew, or it may be quite legitimately in the
clearly doing their utmost to improve the situation. location of the outbreak of the fire.
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CUI
12
Paper C1/2
S~ructural Fire Protection of Cargo Ships

and Guidance on the Requirements of the
Merchant Shipping (Fire Protection) .
Regulations 1984
I. G. Noble CEng, FRINA
Department of Transport
SYNOPSIS
The 1981 Amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention introduced major changes in structllral fire
protection on new cargo ships of 500 tons and over. These Amendments formed the ha.\·isof the Merchant
Shipping (Fire Protection) Regulations /984, which came into force on / Septemher /984. New cargo ships
are required to comply with one of three methods of strtlctllral fire protection: Method /C, which requires
all bulkheads, ceilings and linings to be non-combustible; Method UC, which imposes no restriction on the
materials used for bulkheads, ceilings and linings bllt requires a sprinkler system to be prOl'ided; or Method
II/C, which permits combustible bulkheads, ceilings and linings within a network of 'A' and 'R' Class
divisions with the provision of a fire-detection system, All three methods require corridor bulkheads to be
'B' Class divisions, the stairways to be enclosed and accommodation and service spaces and control stations
to be separated from other spaces by 'A' or 'B' Class divisions, Tanker.\·are required to comply with Method
IC with additional requirements.
INTRODUCTION Regulations. respectively. These requirements wnstitute a

major step forward in structural tire protection on cargo ships
On 20 November 1981 the flrst set of Amendments to the oecause for the previous 20 years the Merchant Shipping
1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea Regulations required little more than the corridor oulkheads
(1981 SOLAS Amendments)' were ratified oy the Maritime to oe constructed of 'B' Class panels. The improvements were
Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime long overdue since there is little justification for not providing
Organisation (IMO). These Amendments came into force on I the erew of cargo ships with tire protection similar to that
September 1984. The fire-protection requirements in these provided for crew and passengers on passenger ships.
Amendments were incorporated in the Merchant Shipping The papcr generally projects the policy of the Department
(Fire Protection) Regulations 1984! (Regulations). This is the out contains a few comments which are solely those of the
first occasion that fire protection. detection and extinction for author.
all types of ships have been incoporated in a single Statutory
Instrument. Previously the fire-protection requirements for
passenger and cargo ships were embodied in the Construction STRUCTURAL FIRE-PROTECTION
Regulations for the respective ship types. REQUIREMENTS FOR CARGO SHIPS
This paper is concerned only with the structural firc-protec- AND TANKERS
tion requirements for new cargo ships and tankers of 500 tons
and over. which are dealt with in Parts VII and VIII of the Definitions
The definitions of such phrases as .A' Class divisions.

Ian Noble served an apprenticeship in the drawing office Accommodati~>n spaces etc. may oe found in Regulation 1(2)
at Furness Shipbuilding Co. Ltd, Haverton Hillon the River of thc Regulaltons.
Tees and qualified in Naval Architecture at the Constantine
Technical College, Middlilsbrough. After National Service S tructura I materIa• Is (R egu IatJons
• . 112 d 128
he returned to Furness Shipbuilding Co. Ltd and worked in an )
the Design Office and as al!.assistant manager on ships The hull. superstructure. structural bulkheads. decks and
building and fitting out. In ~961 he joined the Depar:tment deckhouses are required to be constructed of steel or other
of Transport (~part.ment) In Southampton as ~ ship sur- equivalent material except that thc crowns and casings of
veyor. transfernng In 1966 to headquarters In London ..
where he served in the subdivison and crew accommoda- mac~l.nery spaces of Category A. are to be only of stecl.
tion sections, He was appointed Principal Ship Surveyor in Additionally the extenor. boundanes of superstructures and
1976 and is currently employed in the Fire Protection deckhouses of tankers which are Insulated to ANI standard arc
Branch on the approval of fire-resisting materials and to be constructed of steel.
fittings and structural fire-protection arrangements. Any .A' or 'B' Class divisions constructed of aluminium
alloy are to be insulated such that the temperature of the
TransIMar£(C). Vol. 98. Papt!rCI/2
13
structural core docs not rise more than 200 'C above the
ambient temperature at any time during a standard fire test of
60 min duration for' A' Class divisions and 30 min duration for
'8' Class divisions. Aluminium alloy structures supporting the
lifeboat and liferaft stowage, launching and embarkation areas
are to be insulated such that they meet the temperature
limitation for' A' Class divisions.
The use of aluminium alloy in lieu of steel is piohibited by
the cost of fitting the insulation required to comply with the
core-tempcrature limitation.
Method of fire protection (Regulations 113 and 131(1»

One of the following methods of fire protection is required
to be adopted in the accommodation and service spaces of a
cargo ship:
I. Method IC. All internal divisional bulkheads are to be '8'
or 'C' Class divisions without the necessity to fit an auto-
matic sprinkler, fire-protection and fire-alarm system
(sprinkler system) or a fixed fire-detection and fire-alarm
system (detector system).
2. Method lie. A sprinkler system is required to be fitted in all
spaces in which fire may originate with no restriction on the
materials used in the construction of the internal divisional
bulkheads, ie combustible materials such as chipboard may
he used.
3. Method IIIC. A detector system is required to be fitted in all
spaces in which fire may originate with no restriction on the
materials uscd in the construction of the internal divisional
hulk heads except that the area of any accommodation
space or spaces bounded by 'A' and/or '8' Class divisions is
not to exceed 50 m~. Permission may be given for this area
to be exceeded in public spaces.
As far as tankers are concerned there is no alternative but to
use Method Ie.
Irrespective of which method of protection is adopted all
cargo ships and tankers built on or after I September 1985 are
reljuired to he fitted with smoke detectors in corridors and over
stairways within accommodation spaces.
Corridor bulkheads and other '8' Class bulkheads

(Regulations 114 and 131)
In all three methods of fire protection corridor bulkheads
are reljuired to be '8' Class divisions. Every '8' Class bulkhead
is to extend from deck to deck and to the shell or other
houndaries unless continuous '8' Class ceilings and/or linings
arc fitted on both sides of the bulkhead, in which case the
hulkhead may terminate at the continuous ceiling and/or lin-
ing. Figure I illustrates arrangements satisfying these require-
ments.
Fire integrity of bulkheads and decks (Regulations 115

and 132)
Spaces throughout a ship are classified into categories
according to their fire risk. The fire integrity of a bulkhead or
deck separating adjacent spaces on cargo ships or tankers,
respectively, may be obtained by cross-referencing the approp-
riate categories of the spaces in tables 7 and 8 or 9 and 10 in the
Regulations. Where there is doubt as to the classification of a
space it is to be treated as a space,within the category having the
most stringent boundary requirements.
Continuous '8' Class ceilings or linings in association with a
deck or bulkhead, respectively, ma, be accepted as contribut-
ing, wholly or in part, to the required insulation standards of an
,A' Class division.
The insulation standards of 'A' Class divisions are to be
maintained at the intersections and boundaries of such divi-
sions. The importance of this requirement cannot be too highly
emphasized. There is no sense in leaving these intersections
and boundaries unprotected because the ability of a division to
14
withstand fire is only as good as its weakest point. Figure 2

indicates where ribands of insulation are required at the inter-
sections and boundaries of a typical machinery casing. Figure 3
indicates similar precautions to be taken when insulating a
typical' A' Class deck.
Similar precautions must be taken when bulkheads and
decks are insulated with linings and ceilings. respectively.
Protection of stairways and lifts within accommodation

and service spaces (Regulations 116 and 133)
Stairways are required to be constructed of steel except
where the use of equivalent material is approved. Every
stairway and lift is to lie within an enclosurc or trunk con-
structed of' A' Class divisions of AO standard, except that an
isolated stairway serving only two decks need only be encl9sed
at one level by' A' Class divisions of AO standard or 'B' Class
divisions of BO standard. However, where a stairway abuts a
machinery space of Categ()ry A, a ro-TOcargo space nr a cargo
pump room, the fire integrity of the bulkhead separating the
stairway from the machinery, cargo space or pump room shall
be determined by reference to table 7 or 9 in the Regulations as
appropriate. Doors serving stairway enclosures or lift trunks
are to be ofthe same' A' or 'B' Class standard as the bulkheads
in which they are fitted.
Figure 4 shows three methods of enclosing stairways. all of
which have been acceptcd by thc MSC as complying with the
Regulations in the 19K1SOlAS Amendments relating 10 the
enclosing of stairways serving more than two decks.
The Department recently agreed 10 a request made by the
General Council of British Shipping (GCBS) 10 apply no
higher standards on UK registered ships than those imposed by
the International Conventions and interpretations of the Con-
ventions accepted by the MSC. Consequently any of the three
arrangements shown in Fig. 4 is now accepted by the Depart-
ment as complying with the Regulations, even though for the
10years prior to this request the Department had only accepted
the method shown in Fig. 4(a) on tankers in compliance with
the Merchant Shipping Regulations in force during that period.
Although Fig. 4(a) and (b) comply with the strict interpreta-
tion of the 19KI SOlAS Amendments there are doubts about
the arrangement shown in Fig. 4(c) because the stairways in
this arrangement are not enclosed at each level as required by
the Amendments. It is the author's opinion that the arrange-
ments shown in Fig. 4(b) and (c) do not afford the same degree
of protection as that provided by the arrangement shown in approved by the Department. Doors fitted in 'B' Class bul-
Fig. 4(a). which would impose no more restrictions on the kheads forming part of a stairway enclosure are to be self-clos-
accommodation layout than the other arrangements, as can be ing. Hold-back arrangements fitted to these self-closing doors
seen by comparing the plan views in Fig. 5. Moreover. it would are subject to the same conditions as those fitted to 'A' Class
afford a much safer means of escape and access for fire parties doors.
when corridors are filled with smoke and toxic gases. Ventilation openings in 'B' Class bulkheads are to be kept to
a minimum and provided as far as practicable only in the lower
Open'lOgs10
. 'A' CI ass d'"
IVlslons(Regu Ia t'Ions 117 an d 134) part of a door and fitted with a steel grille or under the door,
., .. , ,
except that these opemngs are not permitted In a door In a 8
The effectiveness of' A' Class divisions in resisting fire is not Class bulkhead forming a stairway enclosure. The net area of
to be impaired by penetrations such as pipes, cables, ducting, the opening or openings is not to exceed 0.05 m2• The gap
beams etc. Penetrations are treated as follows, and are also under a door fitted in a stairway enclosure bulkhead is not to
insulated to the same standards as the divisions for a distance exceed 6 mm, and 25 mm in the case of other '8' Class doors.
of 3!!Omm from the plating. The grille is to be capable of being closed manually from each
Steel piping is simply welded to the bulkhead or deck to side of the door. Kick-out panels in '8' Class doors are not
maintain integrity. Plastic piping and metal piping with low. required by the Department.
melting points arc required to pass through 900 mm long close
litting steel sleeves of 3 mm minimu~ thiekne.ss ~e~ded to ~he Ventilation systems (Regulations 119 and 136)
bulkhead or deck. In the case of vertical plastic plpmg passmg, .
through more than one tween deck the piping in alternate Ventilation ducts which pass through 'A' and '8' Class
Iween decks must be of steel. divisions are treated as shown in Table I.
Cables are required to pass through either any proprietary The manual control of any damper in a ventilation duct must
cable gland approved by the Department or 450 mm long steel be directly connected to the spindle of the damper, and
spigots of 3 mm minimum thickness welded to the bulkhead or therefore manual controls operable by push button, linkages
deck. with mineral wool insulation packed tightly in the spigot or wires are not acceptable. There is no absolute guarantee
between and around the cables and scaled at each end with a with remote manual controls of these types that a damper will
flexible sealant. close when the control is activated. In order to satisfy the
Ventilation ducts penetrating' A' Class divisions are treated requirement for manual control on both sides of 'A' Class
as indicated below under 'Ventilation systems'. divisions, a damper is required to be fitted on each side.
Doors litted in 'A' Class divisions are to be of designs However, in certain circumstances dampers need only be
approved by the Department. Doors fitted in 'A' Class bulk- fitted on one side of the division, eg a duct passing through an
heads forming part 01 a stairway enclosure or lift trunk serving. 'A' Class stairway enclosure bulkhead need only have a
accommodation and service spaces and control stations, and damper fitted on the stairway side of the bulkhead. Fusible
every door litted in the boundary bulkheads and casings of a links when fitted must be on the inside of the ducts in order that
machinery space of Cate~ory A, are to be self-closing. Doors they may be -activated by the hot gases passing through the
serving a machinery space of Category A are also to be ducts.
reasonably gastight. Any hpld-back arrangements fitted to Where a ventilation system penetrates decks, dampers are
these self-closing doors arc to have remote releases which will to be fitted in addition to those required to maintain the
automatically close the doors if the control system is disrupted integrity of 'A' Class decks; this is to reduce the passage of
and which will permit them to be closed manually. Watertight smoke and hot gases from one tween deck to another through
doors need not be insulated but this does not include weather- the system. Ducts serving stairway enclosures are to be taken
tight doors as is sometimes assumed. from the fan room independently of other ducts in the system
It is imperative that bulkheads are properly stiffened when and are not to serve any other space.
openings are cut in them for 'A' Class doors and the openings When a control station is situated below deck means must be
properly faired. Doorframes arc not designed to compensate provided to ensure that the space is ventilated and kept free
for the removal of plating and stiffeners. Most problems from smoke in the event of a fire in the ship. Unless the control
associated with lire doors such as distortion of frames and/or station is situated on, or has access to, an open deck, or is
door panels, binding of hinges, inability of latches to engage provided with local closing arrangements equally effective in
the frame properly etc. arc invariably the result of inadequate maintaining ventilation and freedom from smoke, there must
compensatory stiffening in way of the bulkhead openings. be at least two entirely separate means of supplying air to the
space. The air inlets must be situated such that the risk of both
.. ' ' I '" R I f 118 d 135) inlets drawing in smoke simultaneously is eliminated as far as
O pemngs ID B C ass d IVlslons( egu a Ions an is practicable.
The effecliveness of '8' Class divisions in resisting fire is not Ventilation ducts, except those in cargo spaces, are to be
to bc impaired by penetrations such as pipes. cables. ducting. constructed as follows:
beams etc. Steel piping is collared to the bulkhead or ceiling. I. Ducts having sectional areas of 0.075 m2 or more and all
the collar being fitted in two halves and screwed to the division. vertical ducts serving two or more tween decks must be
Plastic piping and metal piping with low melting poinn; are constructed of steel or other equivalent material. .
required to pass through <XX) mm steel sleeves collared to the 2. Subject to the requirements of 3 below, ducts having sec-
division in a similar manner to steel piping. tional areas of less than 0.075 m2, other than vertical ducts,
Cables are to pass through 450 mm long steel conduits, the must be constructed of non-combustible materials, except
conduit being collared to "the division in a similar manner to that the integrity of 'A' and '8' Class divisions must be
steel piping. with the ends of the conduit being sealed with a maintained as indicated below and in Table 1. ,
flexible scalant. When a steeL conduit is unsuitable the cables 3. Ducts having secticmal areas of 0.02 m2 or less and not more
are to pass through a 450 mm long steel spigot, the spigot being than 2 m long need not be constructed of non-combustible
collared to the division in a similar manner to that used for steel material subject to the following: (a) the ducts are con-
piping. with mineral wool insulation packed tightly in the structed of material having regard to the risk of fire, (b) the
spigot between and around the cables and sealed with a ftexible ducts are used only at the terminal ends of the ventilation
sealant. system and (c) the ducts are no closer than 0.6m along their
Ventilation ducts penetrating '8' Class divisions are treated lengths to penetrations of 'A' or '8' Class divisions.
as indicated below under 'Ventilation systems'. Ducts provided for the ventilation of machinery spaces of
Doors fitted in '8' Class divisions are to be of designs Category A, galleys. ro-ro cargo spaces or cargo spaces
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper Cl/2
16
Table I: Treatment of ventilation ducts penatrating 'A' and '8' Cia•• divisions
Division
Area of duct 'A'Class '8' Class
0.02 m' and under Steel ducts other than spiroducts are to be collared and Steel ducts other than spiroducts are to be collared.
welded to division. Collars of steel or 'B' Class material.
Double spiroducts to be collared and welded to division Double spiroducts to be collared to division. Collars of steel
or passed through 900 mm long steel sleeves welded or 'B' Class material.
to division.
Single spiroducts to be passed through 900 mm long Single spiroducts to be passed through 900 mm long steel
steel sleeves welded to division.' sleeves collared to division.'
Over 0.02 m' and not ex- Approved damper units are to be fined consisting of a Steel ducts other than spiroducls are to be collared to
ceeding 0.075 m' 900 mm x 3 mm steel coaming incorporating a division. Collars of steel.
manually operated damper on each side of the division.
Double spiroducts to be collared to division. Collars of
In some instances one damper may be dispensed with.
steel.
Ducts to be anached to ends of coaming.
Single spiroducts to be passed through 900 mm steel
sleeves collared to division ..Collars of steel.
Over 0.075 m' Approved damper units are 10 be fined consisting of a Steel ducts other than spiroducts are to be connected 10
900 mm x 5 mm steel coaming incorporating an auto- 900 mm x 3 mm steel spigols collared to division or
matically/manually operated damper on one side and passed through 900 mm x 3 mm steel sleeves collared
a manually operated damper on the other side. In to division. Collars of steel.
some instances the manually operated damper may
Double and single spiroducts to be passed through
be dispensed with.
900 mm x 900 mm x 3 mm steel sleeves collared 10
division. Collars of steel.
Aluminium alloy ducting to be tr.ated as single spiroducting. Where thickness of spigot is not specified it may be 1 mm or more
·Steel sleeves fined to prevent single spirOductl unwinding in fire.
intended for the carriage of vehicles having fuel in their tanks enclosures serving accommodation and service spaces and
must not pass through accommodation and service spaces and control stations arc required to he non-comhustihlc.
control stations unless the ducts are either:
1. (a) Constructed of steel having a minimum thickness of 3 R t" t" f b fbl t" I (R I r 121 d
mm for duct widths or diameters of 300 mm or less and a I;:) rlc Ion 0 com us lema erla egu a Ions an
minimum thickness of 5 mm for duct widths or diameters of
760 mm or more (the thicknesses of ducts having inter- Exposed surfaces in corridors and stairway enclosures and
mediate widths or diameters are to be determined by surfaces in concealed spaces within accommodation and ser-
interpolation), (b) suitably supported and stiffened, (c) vice spaces and control stations arc to have a Class I surfacc
fitted close to each penetrated boundary with an automatic spread of flame rating when tested to BS 476: Part 7: 1971.
fire damper, which is also capable of being closed manually, Other exposed surfaces in accommodation and service spaces
and (d) insulated to A60 standard from each penetrated and control stations and those in machinery spaces arc to havc
boundary to a point at least 5 metres beyond the fire a Class 1 or 2 rating. This docs not. however. apply to
damper; or furniture, furnishings. machinery and similar items.
2. (a) Constructed of steel as in I(a) and I(b) above and (b) Primary deck coverings in accommodation and service
insulated to A60 standard throughout the accommodation spaces and control stations arc to he of materials which have
and service spaces and control rooms. been tested satisfactorily. inter alia. to an ignitahility standard
Ducts provided for the ventilation of accommodation and specified by the Department.
service spaces and control stations must not pass through Insulating materials (ie for tire. thermal and acoustic pur-
machinery spaces of Category A, galleys, ro-ro cargo spaces or poses) are to be non-combustible when tested to BS 476: Part
cargo spaces intended for the carriage of vehicles having fuel in 4: 1970, except for those used in cargo spaces and refrigeratcd
their tanks unless similar precautions are taken to those compartments and those used to insulate valves in hot and cold
described above. service systems, providing their surfaces have a Class I surface
Exhaust ducts from galley ranges which pass through accom- spread of flame rating. The exposed surfaces of vapour harriers
modation spaces or spaces containing combustibles must be and adhesives used in association with insulating materials arc
constructed of ,A' Class scantlings and must be fitted with (a) a also to have a Class I rating.
grease trap which is readily removable for cleaning, (b) an Non-combustible bulkheads. linings and ceilings in accom-
automatic fire damper located at the lower end of the duct, (c) modation and service spaces may be faced with combustihle
arrangements which are operable within the galley for stopping materials not exceeding 2.0 mm in thickness. except for those
the exhaust fan, and (d) a fixed means of extinguishing a fire in corridors. stairway enclosures and control stations where
within the duct using eitl]er carbon dioxide or a water spray the combustible materials must not exceed 1.5 mm in thick-
system. ness.
Construction of ceilings, Ii~ings etc. (Regulations 120 and Miscellaneous items of fire protection (Regulations 122
137) and 139)
When Method IC is adopted ceilings, linings, draught stops In accommodation and service spaces and control stations
and their supports in accommodation and service spaces and pipes intended to convey oil or other flammable liquids arc to
control stations are to be non-combustible. However. when be of suitable material having regard to the risk of fire, and
Methods IIC and IIIC are adopted only ceilings, linings. overboard scuppers. sanitary discharges or other outlets close
draught stops and their supports in corridors and stairway to or below the waterline arc not to be of heat-sensitive
Trans [MarE (CJ. Vol. 98, Paper ClI2
17
spaces and whose internal boundaries are insulated to A60

standard.
2. Sidescuttles and windows other than wheelhouse windows
must be of a non-opening type. Windows must not be fitted
in the first tier of superstructures or deckhouses on the
upper deck and sidescuttles in this tier are to be fitted
internally with steel deadlights. Sidescuttles and windows
fitted in higher tiers other than the wheelhouse windows are
to have permanently fitted or portable steel shutters.
3. Air inlets and other openings are not permitted.
Additionally the above provisions apply to the exterior side
boundaries of the superstructure and deckhouses enclosing
accommodation and service spaces for a distance of at least 4%
of the length of the ship but neither less than 3 m nor more than
5 m from the boundary facing the cargo area. This requirement
does not apply to the exterior boundaries of the wheelhouse.
Windows and sidescuttles must not be fitted in internal or
external boundary bulkheads and decks of machinery spaces of
Category A and cargo pump rooms, or in skylights to such
spaces, except that windows and sidescuttles may be fitted in a
bulkhead separating a machinery space of Category A and a
control room located within its boundaries. Skylights to
machinery spaces of Category A and cargo pump rooms are to
be capable of being opened and closed from external positions.
MATERIALS AND FITTINGS USED IN THE

CONSTRUCTION OF 'A' AND 'B' CLASS
DIVISIONS
materials as the failure of such materials could give rise to. The Department approves materials and fittings for use in
serious flooding. the construction of' A' and '8' Class divisions on UK registered
Electric heaters arc to be fixed in position and constructed so ships and the approvals are dependent on satisfactory fire tests
as to minimise the risk of fire. Their elements must not be so being carried out on specimen constructions by testing
exposed as to scorch or set on fire clothing, curtains etc. laboratories acceptable to the Department. Drawings showing
Waste-paper baskets are to be of non-combustible materials how materials and fittings are to be used are examined and
and have solid sides and bottoms. modified as necessary and then endorsed with the stamp of the
Where insulations are exposed to oil and oil vapours they are Department. Certificates referring to these drawings and indi-
to be faced with impervious materials. cating the conditions under which the materials or fittings are
Spaces behind ceilings or linings within accommodation and
service spaces and control stations are to be divided by close-
fitting draught stops spaced not more than 14 m apart and
closed at each deck.
Special arrangements in machinery spaces (Regulations

124 and 141)
The number of openings to machinery spaces is to be the
minimum compatible with the proper working of the ship. Any
machinery space of Category A which is accessible from an
adjacent shaft tunnel is. in addition to any watertight door, to
be provided with a lightweight steel fire-screen door located on
the shaft-tunnel side of the bulkhead and capable of being
operated from each side.
Additional requirements for tankers (Regulations 129)

The exterior boundaries of superstructures and deckhouses
enclosing accommodation and service spaces, control stations
and cargo control stations, and any overhanging deck which
supports such spaces, are to be insulated to A60 standard for
the portions facing the cargo area and on their sides for a
distance of 3 m from the boundary facing the cargo area.
However, the insulation need n~t be fitted to the boundaries
and overhanging decks of the wheelhouse and the external
boundary of any space permitted to have a door fitted in this
boundary, as indicated below.
The following conditions apply to the exterior boundary
facing the cargo area of superstructures and deck houses enclos-
ing accommodation and service spaces:
1. Doors must not b~ fitted except for those serving spaces
which do not have access to accommodation and service
18
to be used are issued to the manufacturers, who are required to

inform their customers of these conditions.
,A' Class insulations

.The types of insulation used for' A' Class bulkheads are
mineral wool, sprayed and panel. Mineral-wool insulations,
which for the purpose of this paper include ceramic·fibre
insulations, are secured to the bulkhead by means of welded
steel pins of 3 mm diameter spaeed about 350 mm apart, wire
netting and spring steel washers. Mild steel washers are unsuit-
able because they do not grip the pins. There are minor
variations to this arrangement; eg instead of fitting spring steel
washers the pins are bent over at right angles to hold the wire
netting in plaee. The pins must not be bent in One direction
only because the wire netting may slip from under them.
The density of mineral-wool insulations must be within
± 10% of the nominal density stated by the manufacturer.
which may be easily checked by weighing the slabs. For A60
standard, mineral-wool insulations are required to bc fitted
over the bulkhead plating in two layers of equal thickness. or
as near equal thickness as possible. with the butts and seams in
the two layers staggered.
When metal vapour barriers are used they must not be fitted
directly over the insulation because in a fire the metal will
expand and buckle between the pins and cut into the insulation.
thereby reducing its effectiveness. There should be at least a
20 mm air gap between the insulation and the metal vapour
barrier. Figure 6 shows two methods of fixing these barriers.
Sprayed insulation approved by the Department consist of
either a cement/mineral-fibre base or a cement/vermiculite
base mixed with water. Steel split pins are welded to the
structure to form a key for the insulation. Half the thickness of
insulation is then applied and the split pins bent over. Spraying
is continued until the approved thickness has been applied.
The insulation is applied by operators trained by the manufac-
turers. Some manufacturers use loosely fitted wire netting SMOKE AND TOXICITY
pinned to the structure instead of the split pins.
Panel insulations may be of the homogeneous-board type or Little has bccn done at IMO about smokc and toxic gases
the steel-sheet-faced mineral-wool type and are usually free even though thcsc arc thc principal causcs of falalities in fires.
standing, ie fitted independentlyofthe bulkhead. Panels which The main reason why little has been done .isthat the problem is
are insufficiently robust to be free standing in service are bolted complex and virtually insoluble. The situation hilSbeen partly
to the bulkheads. In order to stop these panels from becoming alleviated by the use of flame-retardant male rials to enclose
damaged as the bulkheads distort during a fire, the bolts arc organic foams used in furniture.
fitted with nylon nuts which melt and allow the panels to It has been suggested that a positive air pressure should be
become free standing as the bulkheads bow away from them. maintained in corridors and stairway enclosures by supply fans
Panel insulations are required to be fitted deck to deck and independent of the ships' n()rmal ventilation systems in order
must be erected as shown on the approved drawings. ie at the to prevent the ingress of smoke and toxic gases. This appears
correct distance from the bulkhead and using the correct to be a very good idea and worthy of investigation.
jointing profiles.
'A' Class decks may be insulated on the underside by using
mineral-wool or sprayed insulation in a similar manner to CONCLUSIONS
bulkheads, by ceilings constructed of homogeneous panels or
insulated steel panels, or by overdeck insulations incorporated Unfortunately the improvements in structurill tire protection
in deck coverings. No internal bulkhead or lining other than a on cargo ships discussed in this pilper arc unlikely to be
steel bulkhead must penetrate the ceiling or deck covering. reflected in casualty records for some time hecause ships huilt
prior to I September 19H4 and those of less than 500 tons built
after that date are not covered by the Regulations. Investiga-
'B' Class bulkheads and ceilings tion is needed into the protection of crew and passengers from
'B' Class bulkheads fitted deck to deck or from deck to smoke and toxic gases. and if means could be found to reduce
continuous 'B' Class ceiljng are to be erected as shown in the amounts of these products in tires. the reduction in casual-
Fig. 7. The gap above the top edge of the bulkheads allows ties could he quite dramalic.
them to move independently of the structure during a fire and
also protects them from datnage from vibrations or other
movement of the structure. REFERENCES
Although the Regulations require 'B' Class bulkheads to be 1. Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life
fitted from deek to deck or from deck to a continuous ceiling at Sea 1974 (adopted hy the Maritime Safety Committee on 211
they must not penetrate' A' Class overdeck insulations. They November 19KI). Published hy the International Maritime Organi-
must also be attached to the non-eombustible part of the deck sation (l9K2).
covering, and any combustible material laid over 'A' Class 2. The Merchant Shipping (Fire Protection) Regulations 19K4.Statu-
overdeck insulations must not be laid under the 'B' Class tory Instrument 19K4No. 12IH.Puhlished hy lIer Majesty's Station-
division (see Fig. 8). ery Office (l9K4).
Trans IMarE tC), Vol. 98, Paper CI/2
19
Discussion
Dr A. MITCHESON (DrJ. H. Burgoyne and Partners): When tural fire protection, fire detection and fire extinguishing. So
considering structural fire protection, it must be recalled that what do we have to cover these vital elements of fire safety?
the standard tests are necessarily contrived and artificial, and Unless we can get a reasonable balance between these equally
so the test data must be applied with great caution outside the important elements of safety then a fire will find the weakest
limits of the test conditions. link and all efforts to control it could fail.
In particular, it should be remembered that many compo- Method IC requires no detection (except in corridors and
nents used on ships are load-bearing structures, and as they stairways) and no fixed extinguishing system in accommo-
suffer a reduction in strength with increasing temperature they dation, whilst Method IIIC has no requirements whatever for
could possibly collapse with attendant loss of compartmen- structural protection or an extinguishing system in cabin
tation within the time pertaining to the Class. For example, a spaces. To say that this is in any way 'similar to that provided
temperature rise of 200 'C above ambient in some aluminium on passenger ships' is very wide of the mark.
alloys would cause a four-fold reduction in proof stress. Strangely enough the only system which gives a reasonable
level of fire extinguishing capability, Method IIC, in which an'
G. COGGON (Lloyd's Register of Shipping): In view of the effective system (or presumably an equivalent fixed fire extin-
ferocity of fires involving organic foam materials and the large guishing system) is required, is not permitted in tankers.
volumes of toxic smoke produced thereby, does Mr Noble Surely tankers at least deserve to have a well balanced combi-
consider it time to restrict the use of such materials in furniture nation of structural protection, detection and extinguishing
in accommodation spaces onboard ships? arrangements. Who has not seen horrific pictures of bridge
Referring to the section of his paper on the protection of fronts collapsing under terrific external heat (eg the MV
stairways and lifts in accommodation spaces (p. 15), I find it Betelgeuse), proving that even though bridge fronts are sup-
surprising and disappointing that the 1981 SOLAS Amend- posed to be A60, all port glasses were melted out, showing that
ments and hence the UK Rules now permit the configurations the accommodation block is far from the 'citadel' which it is
shown in Fig. 4 (b) and (c). This is a retrograde step and would intended to be.
require escaping personnel to leave the stair enclosure at each Surely we do not still think that to tackle a fire with a two
level of accommodation and possibly be confronted by fire or gallon extinguisher, and if that does not work to evacuate the
smoke. space whilst properly equipped fire parties are assembled
Could Mr Noble state whether the UK has any plans for (which at night could take 15 min or more), is really giving the
reopening this subject at IMO with a view to retrieving the crew the protection they deserve. I know that in these days it is
previous requirement for a continuous fire shelter from the very difficult to get agreement for safety improvements at IMO
lowest level of accommodation up to the embarkation deck or but it should be possible to get a more effective mix of
to an open deck, as is now required for passenger ships? protection, detection and extinction than this.
In 1966 Admiral Shepherd and the US delegation came to
J. K. ROBINSON (Lloyd's Register of Shipping): I should like IMCO and pointed out that if you build a non-combustible ship
to ask Mr Noble why, if 450 mm long steel spigots are satisfac- then there is no need for a sprinkler system. It was only by
tory for cable penetrations of 'A' Class divisions, 450 mm strong battling that UK delegates were able to keep the
spigots are still necessary for 'B' Class divisions (p. 16). sprinklered alternative as part of the new 'Part H', which is
In addition, does Mr Noble not consider that IMO should incorporated in the 1974 SOLAS Convention, even though it
specify limits as to the quantities and types of combustible seemed that it was unlikely to be fitted because of cost and
materials permitted within the various fire sub-division areas, American opposition to this alternative for any cruise ship
along similar lines to the MOD(PE) design requirements? operating out of US ports.
We did think that the fire damage to a number of so-called
J. C. WRIGHT (Ewbank Preece): I should like to ask non-combustible ships would ensure that after a reasonable
Mr Noble if the temperature against time curve presently used lapse of time the sense of requiring both the US standards of
when testing fire partitions adequately represents the perfor- passive protection and a fixed fire-detection system in accom-
mance of the materials used in modern ships. modation in passenger ships would prevail and we should see
Surely a more uniform standard of protection would be this implemented at IMO. Then, in time, we might see some-
obtained if a hydrocarbon-type temperature against time curve thing 'similar' on cargo ships.
were to be used for testing partitions in sections of the ship I wonder whether Mr Noble could assure us that this is still
where flammable and combustible liquids are stored or used. the aim and intention ofthe Directorate and the UK represen-
tatives at IMO and that pressure will be maintained at IMO to
G. VICTORY: In his paper Mr Noble says 'there is little proceed towards this goal.
justification for not providing the crew of cargo ships with fire
protection similar to that provided for crew and passengers on F. G. M. EVANS (The College of Maritime Studies, Warsash):
passenger ships'. On the face of it a very laudable aim and, I understand the necessity for international harmony in legis-
having regard to the number of destructive fires on ships lation, and the great improvement in minimum standards that
outlined in Mr Harvey's paper, not before time, if only it were the new fire protection rules represent. However, I wonder if
true. Mr Noble would care to make a comment on legislation that
Looking at the alternative~ we see that Method IC, the only allows a ship to be built without a fire detection or sprinkler
one allowed for tankers, requires that internal bulkheads are system, or alternatively allows the use of unrestricted materials
to be of 'B' or 'C' Class divisions. Unfortunately these divisions such as chipboard ..
are not effectively non-combustible as the standard fire test for The proliferation of fires causing the total burn-out of
'B' Class divisions stops at 843'C and fires can reach tempera- accommodation began with the introduction of cabin insu-
tures well in excess of this, and 'C' Class .divisions are not lation and air conditioning. Since then any improvements have
required to have any integrity against smoke and flame. So been along the lines of more insulation. Has any thought been
much for 'non-combustible' construction, and I wonder who is given to providing more protected ventilation so that selected
going to oversee the very complex fittings which Mr Noble areas may be vented to remove smoke, heat and humidity
shows in his paper. during fire fighting, as is done in some commercial premises
Fire safety has three elements of equal importance: struc- ashore?
Trans lMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper Cl/2
20
matter. Man-made materials generally generate higher tem-

Author's reply peratures over shorter periods of time than natural materials.
Consequently I think that the existing temperature against
time curve will be replaced in the not too distant future by a
I agree with Dr Mitcheson that materials and fittings may not curve which will be closer to the present hydrocarbon-type
perform in actual pre situations as they do when subjected to temperature against time curve, and it may be that this curve
recognised fire tests because the heat source, availability of will be accepted for all fire resistance tests.
oxygen etc. are unlikely to be the same. However, I think that
when fire tests are devised every endeavour is made to relate In response to Mr Victory's comments I have not claimed in
them to actual fire conditions as far as possible, bearing in mind my paper that the standards of fire protection for cargo ships
that the tests have to be cheap, reasonably simple, repeatable are similar to those for passenger ships. However, they are a
and reproduceable. great improvement on the standards of fire protection for
Regarding Dr Mitcheson's comments on the collapse of cargo ships which were required by the Regulations existing
load-bearing structures, this is unlikely to occur unless a fire is prior to 1 September 1984. They compare closely with the
completely out of control. From the investigation of fire three methods of structural fire protection which were required
casualties, the steel structure generally remains intact even for passenger ships up until 1980. The three methods are
where the accommodation has been completely gutted. considered to have equal standing and each method has its
Aluminium alloy structures are, of course, much more vulner- good and bad points. I do not think anyone would deny that the
able and would certainly collapse if a fire did get out of control, best protection would be that provided by the combination of
but the insulation required to limit the core temperature rise to Method lC and a sprinkler system.
200 °C would increase the time before collapse occurred. It However,asMrVictorywellknows,itisdifficulttogetIMO
should be borne in mind that aluminium alloy is used only to a to accept major changes in Regulations and generally several
limited extent in the construction of cargo ships because it has stages have to be introduced before a hoped for change has
little or no economic advantage over steel when the cost of been adopted. I think that the present structural fire protection
fitting the insulation and its weight are taken into account. for cargo ships is at such an intermediate stage and that
ultimately the same standards for fire protection which are
I share Mr Coggon's concern over the use of organic foams currently applied to passenger ships will apply to cargo ships,
in furniture but I do not think it is possible to restrict their use and it is hoped that this will occur in the foreseeable future.
because there are few if any suitable non-hazardous alterna- The temperature at which the non-combustibility of ma-
tives. Unfortunately IMO have not yet produced any tests for terials is assessed is 750°C but this does not mean that the
assessing the emission of smoke and toxic gases from materials materials are unable to withstand temperatures in excess of
or set any acceptable concentration limits. As an interim this. For example, panel materials used in the construction of
measure the Department of Transport has informed the 'B' Class divisions are also used as the insulating media for 'A'
Chamber of Shipping that the upholstered parts of furniture in Class divisions in the form of linings and ceilings. They are also
spaces containing furniture and furnishings of restricted fire used as the insulating media for 'H' Class divisions in the
risk on passenger ships are required to satisfy the cigarette and offshore industry. The methods of constructing 'A' and 'B'
butane flame tests referred to in BS 5852: Part 1 and have Class divisions on UK registered ships which are shown on the
recommended that this standard should be applied to drawings approved by the Department of Transport are sur-
upholstered furniture on all types of ships. veyed by the marine surveyors of the Department.
With regard to the protection of stairways, I agree The bridge front of a tanker is not intended to withstand the
wholeheartedly with Mr Coggon's comments. In my opinion intense heat which was obviously experienced on the MV
two of the IMO interpretations do not provide adequate Betelgeuse and I would suggest that the fire in that case
protection. As far as I am aware it is not the intention ofthe UK probably burned for several hours if not days. A60 standard
to raise this issue again at IMO. only implies protection for one hour, provided that the actual
fire conditions are similar to those in the standard fire test. The
With respect to Mr Robinson's query regarding the reason bridge front is not required to be an A60 division because it is
for identical treatment of cables passing through 'A' and 'B' pierced by windows and sidescuttles which are only provided
Class divisions, it is that the 450 mm long steel spigot is with steel shutters. The insulation and shutters are only
accepted by the Department of Transport for both types of intended to provide protection to the accommodation whilst
division without test and irrespective of either the number of the crew is fighting a fire in the cargo area. If the fire gets out of
cables involved or the type of approved insulation which is control then the prudent thing to do, in my opinion, would be
used to pack the spigot. If any manufacturer were prepared to to abandon the ship as quickly as possible.
fire test a shorter length of spigot for an 'A' or 'B' Class division The term 'citadel' implies that the crew would 'sit-out' a fire
and the test was successful then the Department of Transport in the cargo area and as far as I am aware this was never the
would accept the construction. However, it should be noted intention. I think the citadel concept on tankers should not be
that it would only be accepted for the division in which it was fostered because it may give crew members a totally false
tested, and the maximum and minimum sizes of the shorter impression of their safety. The citadel concept was introduced
length of spigot which would be accepted in practice would be on gas carriers so that the crew could remain in the accom-
the sizes which were fire tested, and the approval would only modation whilst gas leaking from a damaged tank dispersed
relate to that manufacturer's product. naturally. As in the case of tankers it was never the intention to
I think it would be advantageous for IMO to consider the use the accommodation on gas carriers as a citadel to sit-out a
limitation of quantities and types of combustible materials but fire involving the cargo.
not necessarily to the same extent as the MOD(PE) because Most, if not all, of the fire casualties which have occurred
IMO is only concerned with the safety of life at sea and the since 1 September 1984 have been in ships which were built
MOD is concerned primaril~ with maintaining a warship as a prior to that date and it is considered that criticism of the
fighting unit for as long as possible. The two aims may not Regulations is unjustified when there is little or no evidence to
necessarily require the same action. support such criticism. IMO is constantly examining existing
Regulations to see if they can be improved but any modifi-
In answer to Mr Wright's questions it is now generally cations must be justified by evidence obtained from casualty
accepted in the field of fire protection thatthe standard temper- records. Where such evidence exists then the Department of
ature against time curve does not reflect the fire performances Transport would be amongst the first to press for change, as it
of materials used' in modern ships, or in buildings for that has done in the past.
Trans [MarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper Cl/2
21
I hope that Mr Evans will accept as a reply to his first dation spaces in order to provide safe escape routes for crew
question what I have said in response to some of Mr Victory's and passengers and to provide safe access for fire-fighting
comments. parties.
In reply to Mr Evans' second question, some discussion has However, it may be some time before any measures are
taken place at IMO regarding the removal of smoke, toxic adopted to deal with this problem, which is a pity because it is
gases etc. from passageways and stairways within accommo- a subject which merits urgent consideration.
Trans IMarE (CJ, Vol. 98, Paper Cl/2
22
Paper C1/7
Toxic Hazards Caused by Fires

J. M. Murrell BSe, MPhil, MRSC, CChem
Fire Research Station, Building Research Establishment
SYNOPSIS
An outline is given of the hazards which can arise in fires, particularly those related to smoke and toxic·
gases. The work of the Fire Research Station in identifying decomposition products and fire gases from. the
burning of polymeric materials is discussed and it is shown how this information can be relevant to the
environments of ships and submarines. It is also demonstrated that a reduction. in the ignitability and rate of
fire growth can help to reduce the overall hazard in fires.
INTRODUCTION
Janet Murrell graduated from London University in 1978
There are many factors contributing to the overall hazard of rece.ivin,!a BSc in Chemistry. She !oi.n~d th.e Fire Resea~ch
fire once ignition has taken place: the rate of fi g owth a d Stat.lon In the same. year, specla!I~lng In ~ombustl~n
.. re r.. n Toxicology and studYing for a MPhilin analytical chemls-
the release of heat, smok~ and tOXICgases .and the clrcul.allo.n try, utilising mass spectrometry and gas chromatography.
of the fire gases are all Important. A ship or submarmc IS which she received in 1985. Mrs Murrell is currently a
essentially an isolated or enclosed environment and has special Higher Scientific Officer in the Materials and Composites
problems; any fire, therefore, can give rise to a major hazard. Section, where her work involves studying the behaviour
The growth of the synthetic plastics industry over the past of building materials and structures in fires. She also
few decades has provided many new products for use in represents FRS on numerous BSIcommittees.
furnishings and construction. The polymeric materials on
which these plastics are based can incorporatc a rangc of
chemical elements, in addition to the normal carbon/hydrogen
structure, and may give rise to effects not always cxperienced An accidcntal firc invariahly has the potential for putting life
with traditional materials. in jeopardy and rcpresents onc of thc major hazards to which a
Great concern has centred on the nature and effects of thc ship may hc cxposcd. Fire-protection measures. hoth struc-
combustion products of polymeric materials in virtually all tural and activc, pcrmit most shipboard fire~ to he controlled
building and transport applications. Whilst carbon monoxidc quickly with minimal propcrty loss and little threat to life and
is usually the major toxic product arising from the burning of safcty.
organic materials, the presence of other chemical spccies can Howcvcr, the increascd usc of organic polymeric materials
contribute to the toxicity or irritancy of the fire atmospheres. in the construction and furnishing of ships can incrcase the risk
When it is recognized that the thermal decomposition of a of firc and thus thc production of smoke and toxic gases.
single polymer can produce in excess of one hundred different Recently, both engine-room and accommodation fires have
chemical species, the magnitude of the problem begins to incrcascd significantly; during 19X2 and 19X3, 40% of serious
become apparent. For example hydrogen cyanide, organic fires, producing dangcrous quantitics of smoke and toxic gases,
nitriles, benzene and toluene can be generated from poly- occurrcd in shiphoard accommodation, especially at night.'
urethanes and hydrogen chloride can be released from The smoke gcncratcd during thc early stages of a firc can
poly(vinyl chloride). somctimes assist in the detection, thus increasing thc possihility
A consideration of the physiological effects of fire gases and of effective control and allowing the fire to he extinguishcd. As
smoke is, of course, of great importance but extremely com- the firc grows, ho~cver, thc ohscuration of escapc routcs and
plex and little understood. Approaches over recent years have the incapacitating effects of fire gases contrihute to loss of life.
led to studies, with many countries taking part, involving Such effects also seriously hindcr firc-fighting opcrations, as
small-scale decompositions, large-scale fires, biological studies demonstrated in recent fires on thc Scandinavian Sun at
and pathplogical investigations. Miami~ on 21 August 19X4, and on the Scandinavian Sea at
The Fire Research Station (FRS) has made significant con- Port Canavaral on 9 March 19X4; 1 ohscuration, hy thc largc
tributions to these studies, both directly and by way of contract quantities of smoke evolved, caused the firc hrigadcs scrious
work. An important aspect has been identification of the difficulties in locating the scat of the firc.
nature of the decompositiQn products and fire gases using a The possible problems of fires in naval ships wcrc graphically
specialized analysis system (gas chromotograph-mass spectro- illustrated during the Falklands campaign hy the fires on HMS
meter), which is discussed in detail later. This is important not Sheffield and HMS Coventry. In particular, the events on HMS
only with 'pedigree' polyme~ but also those incorporating Sheffield showed the speed at which firc, smoke and toxic gases
fire-retardant additives. Such treatment can involve the whole can spread throughout a ship. Attempts to minimize this
component, for example cable insulation, or be part of a spread have been reported4 and new designs now incorporate
composite assembly. Many benefits arise from the use of these smoke 'compartmentation'.
flame-retardant additives but they increase the toxicity or In submarines the problems presented by the smoke and
irritancy of the fire atmosphere once the polymer has been toxic gases produced in fires are exacerbated and can present a
ignited (albeit with difficulty). Thus in attempting to prevent serious hazard.
ignition, other factors which contribute to the overall hazard Much progress is being made in understanding the fire
can be adversely affected. behaviour of materials and composites used in buildings.
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CI/7
23
especially with regard to minimizing the hazards of smoke and volatile species. This can take place at temperatures up to and
toxic gases. An important part ofthis paper is intended to bring above 1000 ·C in an oxidative environment (thermal oxidative
these approaches to the attention of those involved with the decomposition) or in an inert atmosphere (pyrolysis), depend-
marine environment. The challenges from fire are great, and ing upon the availability of oxygen near the surface of the
all relevant information and expertise need to be brought polymer, to produ~e products I and II, respectively.
together if the problems of fires are to be mitigated. These products (I and II) are released into the relatively
mobile atmosphere of the fire and may escape without furthcr
change. However, the products may pass through a hot gaseous
POLYMERS AND THEIR DECOMPOSITION 'zone where further decomposition takes place. This gaseous
environment may be either oxidative or pyrolytic in nature to
Every year there are over a quarter of a million fires in the produce products III and IV, respectively.
UK resulting in about 1000 deaths and over 8000 non-fatal The main complexity of the products in fires is shown for
casualties. However, whereas the number of fires and casual- different temperature regimes in Fig. 2. At relatively low
ties have remained fairly constant, the proportion of injuries temperatures (below 400 ·C) polymeric materials decompose
caused by smoke and toxic gases, both fatal and non-fatal, has to give a simple range of complex chemical products. At
increased four fold over the last three decades. The nature of medium temperatures (4<X}-'700·C) the greatest variety anq
the decomposition products is now recognized as a factor of often the greatest quantities of products are formed. It is in this
major importance in fires. temperature band that polymers, which are sensitive to oxy-
Since the actual number of fires has not increased, it must be gen, may form oxygenated species by the incorporation of
assumed that the nature of the items involved during the early atmospheric oxygen. I"
(and important) stages of a fire has changed either to produce
more smoke and toxic gases or to generate them at a greater
rate. It is also generally believed that the increase in smoke and
gas intoxication in fires reflects, to some extent, the rise in the
use of synthetic polymers, for example in soft furnishings. S.h In
1950 per capita consumption of plastics was only 2.5 kg/yr
whereas by 1979 this had risen to 41 kg/yr. A similar rise in the
use of synthetic polymers has occurred in ships.
The complexity of chemical species found in fire atmos-
pheres is largely due to the thermal decomposition of poly-
mers. Details of the general types of products formed from
some common polymeric materials under pyrolysis or thermal
oxidative conditions are given in Table I. For comparison,
complete combustion (flaming) tends to destroy the complex
products with the formation of a small range of simple combus-
tion species. For example, a polymer containing carbon,
hydrogen and oxygen will yield carbon monoxide, carbon
dioxide and water by flaming or combustion; if nitrogen is also
present then molecular nitrogen and oxides of nitrogen 7 may
also be formed. In fires, however, flaming combustion is rarely
complete and mixed decomposition and combustion (flame)
products are released.
Laboratory studies on commonly used synthetic polymers
have shown that large quantities of smoke and decomposition
products are formed durinl the thermal degradation and com-
bustion of these materials. III Low-density cellular polymers in
particular are often easily ignited and exhibit a high rate of
burning, with the conse~uent rapid emission of decomposition
products. Fire brigades I have commented that 'fires involving
synthetic materials are relatively intense, usually of short
duration and accompanied by the formation of copious
amounts of smoke and toxic gases' which are 'irritant to the
eyes and respiratory system'.
DECOMPOSITION AND COMBUSTION OF

POLYMERIC MATERIALS
A basic understanding of the processes involved in the

combustion of polymeric materials is essential if the wider
aspects of combustion toxicology are to be appreciated. A
simplistic approach to these. product-formation routes is pre-
sented in Fig. 1.
Under the action of heat, polymeric materials are raised to
elevated temperatures; this causes cleavage of chemical bonds
and the subsequent release of volatile fragments. If a sufficient
concentration of these products is attained and ignited, then
the flame will feed back to the polymer to continue the process.
Under certain circumstances smouldering (non-flaming) com-
bustion may be established.
The primary step in product formation therefore involves
the thermal degradatIon of the polymer and the formation of
24
At high temperatures (over 700 0c) complex organic species important in defining a fire atmosphere from a toxicological
are unstable. The main products are polycyclic hydrocarbons 13 point of view. These include:
arising from ring cyclisates, other stable products of low 1. Theyieldsofoxidesofcarbon(inciudingtheC02/COratio)
molecular weight, eg hydrogen cyanide, III and certain organic and reduction in oxygen as a measure of the basic combus-
nitriles. Inorganic products such as hydrogen chloride9 from tion conditions.
PVC will also be stable. 2. The concentration of specific toxic gases which may be
important for the specific polymers (eg hydrogen cyanide).
3. The types and concentrations of 'un burnt' organic products
APPROACHES IN DEFINING FIRE (chemical fingerprints) including: (a) total concentrations
ATMOSPHERES relative to carbon monoxide and (b) percentage distribution
of important groups, eg aromatic and aliphatic hydrocar-
Fires which place life at risk may vary widely and include bons, oxygenated species, nitriles, halides etc.
non-~aming (smouldering) and flaming. For each combustion 4. The rate of production and total quantities of the major
mode, the general nature of the atmosphere must be charac- products of toxicological significance.
terized for toxicological guidance and also to provide detailed The above features are aimed at toxicological considerations.
analysis for comparing the decomposition and combustion Other important aspects of the fire atmosphere affecting life
products in large fires (both real and experimental) with safety include: .
laboratory-generated atmospheres (ie furnace decomposition • Smoke density (obscuration), rate of production and total
and toxicity test models). amount produced;
FRS experience indicates that a number of factors are • Temperatures of the fire gases and their radiative heat flux.
Smoke is important because not only does it reduce visibility
but also may absorb irritant and toxic species thus adding to the
effects of combustion gases in causing intense irritation to the
mucous membrane ofthe respiratory tract and in particular the
eyes.14 It has also been shown that smoke contributes signifi-
cantly to panic. IS Thus, smoke can hinder or even prevent
escape and cause substantial difficulties to fire fighters.
The effect of temperatures is important since high tempera-
tures also inhibit fire fighting and the escape of occupants.
Burns, heat stroke, dehydration, oedema and damage to the
respiratory tract lining can be caused by direct contact with or
radiation from flames. 16 Irreversible bodily injury is produced
after 12 min ifthe skin is exposed to temperatures of 100 °C and
after only 30 s at 180 0c.17 Air temperatures of 100 °C can only
be tolerated for a few minutes and incapacitation can occur at
temperatures as low as 70°C. IH
CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF FIRE ATMOSPHERES
A novel method of sampling, storage and analysis by gas

chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) of fire gases
has been developed at FRS [Fig. 3(a) ) and can analyse chemical
species with molecular weights from 16 to 250.
Sampling
The sampling vessel [Fig. 3(b)] is made from borosilicate
glass with a nominal volume of 250 ml. Silicone rubber tubing
and a clip are used to seal the vessel, which before use is
flame-cleane<;l and evacuated to a vacuum of 10-2 Torr. For
one fire experiment up to 40 vessels may be prepared. Samples
are drawn in under vacuum suction by opening the clip, and the
bottles are then resealed and stored in solid carbon dioxide at
-80°C.
Long-term storage is achieved by transferring the contents
of the sampling vessels into stainless-steel liquid-nitrogen traps
(-196°C). Transfer is achieved by passing nitrogen into the
vessel via a catheter tube, which 'flushes' the contents from the
vessel into the trap. The vessel is fitted with a heating jacket to
ensure purging of condensed vapours.
Analysis
A gas chromatograph fitted with an outlet splitter to a flame
ionisation detector and a mass spectrometer is used. Two
columns are employed, depending on the molecular weight
range to be studied, ie Porapak Q for molecular weights from
16 to 140 and OVlOl for molecular weights from 70 to 300. The
carrier gas is helium (30 ml/min) and the column temperature
is programmed from 30 to 250 °Clmin.
Samples are introduced onto the column by connecting the
stainless-steel trap into the carrier-gas stream. The liquid
25
nitrogen is removed and an electrical connection is made to the the floor and seating, a severe fire had developed, spreading
trap supplying a current of 45 A, which raises the temperature beneath the roof and involving the timbers. The intense down-
from -130 to +21O°C within 12 s, effectively flash vapourising ward radiation of heat from the burning volatiles below the
the trapped products and sweeping them on to the column. roof accelerated the spread of the fire in the stand and caused
Quantitative data are obtained using an electronic integrator severe burn injuries (both directly and by the ignition of
with calibration by external standards and published response clothing) to persons escaping from the stand and their rescuers.
factors.IY Quantitative data from the mass spectrometer is Within some 7 min the whole stand was alight. However, while
obtained by reference to the Aldermaston 8 Peak Index.2C1 the effects of the flames and heat were apparent from the
television coverage of this fire, many of the deaths were
Analysis of acid gases attributed to inhalation of smoke and toxic gas and occurred in
a rear walkway of the stand.
A high-pressure ion chromatograph (HPIC) is used to
analyse the hydrogen halides and hydrogen cyanide found in Full-scale experimental fires
fire atmospheres. To extract these gases from the sample
vessels 20 ml of water is injected, the vessel is shaken and the The FRS has conducted many experimental fires using
liquid is then removed. Aliquots are then injected directly into pedigree polymers in a 24 m~ room communicating with a long
the HPIC for analysis. corridor (12 m) via a variable-width opening (Fig. 5). Using
this facility the fuel type and burning rate can be carefully
controlled. These fires provide information about the typical
FIRE STUDIES USING POLYMERIC MATERIALS quantities of products encountered during large-scale fires thus
{n recent years, FRS has used these analytical techniques to

study the atmospheres created in many different experiments
ranging from small-scale toxicity test methods to full-scale
reconstructions of fires of national interest.
Large fires
Woo/worth \ store, Manchester (1979)
This fire occurred in May 1979 and has been well
documented and reported. 21Ten deaths resulted from the fire,
which developed in a stack of fwrniture situated on the second
floor of the building. The stack contained soft furnishings
(upholstered chairs and settees, mattresses) and panel furni-
ture. The fire was characterised by the rapid release of smoke
and toxic gases. A simulation, with a small fraction of the
overall fire load, showed a sharp increase in the release of
smoke and toxic gases after about I min, with a rate of release
sufficient to have made escape from the floor uncertain after a
further 2 min.
·Stardust'di.\·co, Dublin (l98/)

This fire occurred on 14 February 1981 and resulted in 48
deaths and injury to over 2(X) persons.22 A reconstruction
illustrated the enormous complexity of this particular fire, with
un interactive mechunism between the burning of seating
(PVC over polyurethane foam) and adjacent polyester wall
linings giving rise to a very rapidly growing fire with the release
of fatui concentrations of smoke und toxic gases.
May.~fie/d Leisure Celllre, Be/fast (1984)

This fire occurred on 14January 1984and 6 persons, includ-
ing 2 young children, lost their lives. The fire was characterised
by the production of copious amounts of smoke and toxic gases
and involved the burning of a variety of gymnastic materials
and equipment. A part plan of the ground floor of the Leisure
Centre is given in Fig. 4 and shows the large distances which
toxic gases can travel to endanger life. Foams were implicated
as being an important constituent of the gymnastic mats
involved but in a simulation experiment2~ the dense smoke
developed only after the fire had involved substantial quan-
tities of PVC in the judo mats. Note that polyurethane foam
did burn during the early stages of the simulation with little
smoke being produced .
.
Valley Parade Ground, Bradford (1985)
This fire occurred in the main stand at Bradford City's
foothall ground on II May 1985 and resulted in over 50 deaths
and injury to several hundred people. The fire started in the
wooden benches at one end of the covered stand following the
ignition of rubbish that had accumulated over a number of
years. Within 2 min from the first appearance of flames above
26
T.bIe II: YIelds (In ppm) of fingerprint compounds 8t three sQg_ of fire (low ventll8tlon)
Wood Polypropylene
Steady srNdy
Chemical interpretation Growth state Decay Compound Growth state Decay
Methane
Acetylene
11.9 95.9 7.9 Methane 0.2 · .
0.8 35.8 5.7 Acetylene 2.8 0.6 1.2
Ethylene 1.9 22.2 9.0 Ethylene 2.4 2020.9 899.4
Ethane 0.2 0.3 - Ethane 5.1 977.5' 349.4
Allene - - - Propene
.
3.3 -31.2 3.7
Propene 5.7 103.9 10.0 Propyne 25.7 6.2
Cyclopropane 0.1 - - Methanol 0.5 6.2 12.7
Propyne 0.6 22.3 1.1 Acetaldehyde 2.7 3.9 2.5
Methanol 3.7 329.3 34.1 Butene }
0.5 18.3 3.1
Acetaldehyde 7.2 65.4 1.6 Butadiene
Butene
Butadiene
}
1.3 90.7 1.0
Cyclobutane
Butane
- ·
0.7 . '0.1
Ethanol
Acrolein
-
2.7
0.2
3.7
·· Ethanol
Acrolein
-. -
·
1.7
7.0
Acetone 2.7 269.1 52.1 Acetone 899.2 . 216.2 32.5
Cyclopentadiene
Crotonaldehyde
2.5
-
248.3
6.3
48.1
·
Cyclopentadiene
Pentadiene
899.2 23.9
.1.1
Hexene/Cyclohexane 2.4 6.0 Crotonaldehyde 17.2 5.4 7.3

Benzene
Cyclohexadiene .
1.8 603.3
··
152.9
-
Hexene
Benzene
0.3
72.1
0.4
809.9
0.1
575.1
Heptene 0.1 - Cyclohexadiene 0.5 0.1
Heptyne 0.1 - Heptene 1.2 -
Heptadiene
Toluene
0.2
0.5
·
182.0
-
20.4
Toluene
Octene
54.5
1.6
56.5
0.4
31.6
0.6
Octene 0.5 3.6 2.3 Octadiene 0.2 0.1
Xylene 0.8 28.6 5.1 Xylene 43.0 26.5 15.1
Styrene 0.5 72.1 3.0 Styrene - 32.2 5.6
Nonene 0.3 - - Nonene 3.1 - -
Benzaldehyde 3.0 94.9 60.4 Benzaldehyde }
12.5 10.7 12.3
Methylstyrene 0.3 23.4 Methylstyrene
Decene 0.3 - - Indene 0.4 26.4 2.8
Indene 0.7 85.1 8.2 Ethylstyrene 7.1 1.9
Ethylstyrene
Methylindene .
1.6 12.2
19.6 -
Decene
Methylindene 19.6 2.7
Naphthalene 2.2 164.0 - Napthalene 6.0 204.8 103.0
Methylnaphthalene - -
• Present but concentration too low to measure.
forming the basis for the chemical classification used to

examine the scope of small-scale toxicity test protocols. The
atmospheres created are monitored continuously for changing
carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (C02) and oxygen
(02) concentrations. In addition, grab samples are taken for
subsequent analysis by GC-MS and HPIC. The chemical
fingerprints obtained yield information on the types and quan-
tities of compounds present during different stages of the fire
(ie growth, fully developed and decay). Temperatures and
smoke density are also continuously monitored.
Table II shows a typical chemical fingerprint from two fires
(wood and polypropylene) with restricted ventilation over the
growth, fully developed or steady state and decay stages of the
fire. The fingerprint compounds can be classified into various
chemical groups and Table III shows a breakdown of the
fingerprint products given in Table II.
The oxygenated organic species, particularly unsaturated
aldehydes such as acrolein, require special attention because
of both their toxicity and their irritancy. Aromatic hydro-
carbons are also important because of their involvement in particularly to the irritancy of the atmosphere. In all fires,
ring-cyclisation reactions leading to smoke production. the major toxic risk appeared to be due to carbon
Two important conclusions have been drawn from the study monoxide.
of the various fire atmosphc!res analysed at FRS:
I. The fingerprints show a similarity in terms of chemicals Toxicity test protocols
present (not yields) for most polymeric fuels, which may be
related to the severity of the fire. Because of limitations in the effective extrapolation of the
2. The total yields of fingerprint components are generally less chemical analysis of fire atmospheres to toxicological signifi-
than the concentration of carbon monoxide at the same cance, some countries are moving towards standard test
point in the fire. The role of the many additional chemical methods for the assessment of the toxicity of combustion
species therefore appears to be of a contributory nature, products using biological procedures.
Trans IMarE (CJ, Vol. 98, Paper CII7
27
Test methods of this kind are being

viewed with reservation in the UK par-
ticularly because:
1. The products generated by the
specified combustion regimes have
not been shown to have any meaning-
ful relationship to those encountered
in fires.
2. The procedures use live animals and
are therefore very expensive and
highly emotive (even if permitted in
the UK within the Cruelty to Animals
Act). Testing is limited to
laboratories holding both licences
and the necessary expertise.
3. There is no simple method of using
results from toxicity tests, within the
framework of an assessment of over-
all hazard, to ensure lives are saved
and injury from fires reduced.
The use of these test methods is under
review within the International Organi-
sation for Standardisation (ISO) and the
British Standards Institute (BSI). Within
the UK no national decision has been
made to adopt toxicity tests, but a Naval
Engineering Standard, NES 713, is in
use.
Proposed ISO toxicity protocols The irritants, mainly oxidative compounds, eg acrolein,
Within ISO two test methods have been carefully consi- affecttheeyes, nose and lungs causing impairment of breathing
dered, the DIN 5343624and Pott's Pot.2SThe DIN method is a and general vision, thus preventing escape. Several hours or
dynamic system in which small samples of material are heated even days after a victim has been removed from the fire
at different temperatures in a stream of air by a tube furnace atmosphere a fatal acute inflammatory lung reaction27 some-
moving in a direction counter-current to the air flow. Thus the times occurs.
sample is decomposed or burnt and the products carried by the The major difference between the two types of products is
air flow to an animal exposure system. The Pott's Pot is a static that irritants can have a lasting effect, but if a victim who has
method, developed essentially as a screen for highly toxic been incapacitated by intoxicants is taken away from the fire,
products, in which a small sample of material is placed in a total recovery is swift. 27
heated pot under non-flaming and flaming conditions such that From Table III it can be seen that compounds identified in
the products collect in a large chamber for animal exposures. fire atmospheres can be grouped into five classes. Each class of
FRS has studied both methods of test, using chemical compound has a different effect on a human being, within the
analysis only, to monitor oxides of carbon, oxygen loss and the two broad groupings outlined above.
general fingerprint pattern of products. By using these (i) Oxides of carbon are produced in large quantities from all
techniques it has been possible to compare atmospheres from fires involving organic materials. Carbon dioxide is toxic only
these toxicity tests with large-scale fires. Figure 6 shows the at high concentrations where oxygen is depleted. However,
chemical fingerprints observed from the DIN 53436, the Pott's CO2 does cause hyperventilation, eg a concentration of 3%
Pot and full-scale fires involving polypropylene homopolymer increases the respiratory rate,28 which results in a high intake
as the test material. As can be seen, the atmospheres produced of other chemicals, including carbon monoxide, which is
by each test method differ markedly. accepted as the major toxic gas in fires. 14.29Carbon monoxide
binds to haemoglobin over 200 times faster than oxygen and
Naval Engineering Standard N ES 713 therefore inhibits the oxygen-carrying capacity of blood.
The NES 713 (Determination of the Toxicity Index of the (ii) Hydrogen cyanide and nitriles can cause dizziness and
Products of Combustion from Small Specimens of Materials) is nausea and are toxic in that the cyanide inhibits cellular
a simple method designed to enable a choice, based on toxic- respiration a. high' concentrations. At low concentrations
gas release during combustion, to be made between materials hydrogen cyanide stimulates respiration, which causes the fire
to be used in ships and submarines. The test method utilises a atmosphere to be inhaled at a faster rate.J()
premixed bunsen-burner flame to initiate and maintain flaming (iii) Many of the oxygenated compounds, ie the carbonyls
combustion in a 1 m3 chamber. and especially the unsaturated aldehydes, are strong irritants. 31
Acrolein is the most toxic with a threshold limit value of only
0.1 ppm for an 8 h exposure.32.33
EFFECTS OF FIRE ATMOSPHERES (iv) Of the hydrocarbons, the alkanes and alkenes are
relatively non-toxic but may have some anaesthetic qualities,
Inhalation toxicologists, in st14diesassessing the toxicity of whereas simple aromatics, eg styrene and xylene, are irritants
materials by means of biological procedures,26 have shown that to the eyes and respiratory system.32.33Other aromatics, eg
the products of fires fall into two simple categories: 'the intoxi- benzene and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, are implicated
cants and the irritants. in carcinogenicity.
The intoxicants are narcotic and incapacitate the victim by
the effects upon the nervous and cardiovascular systems, eg
HCN and CO. They cause convulsions and severe cerebral HAZARDS PRESENTED BY FIRES
disturbances which ca~ incapacitate the victim and thus pre-
vent escape. So far only the toxic hazard has been referred to in this
Trans IMarE (CJ. Vol. 98. Pap~r CI/7
28
paper, but the hazards offered by fire are composed of many reaction often involves the evolution of large quantities of
other parameters in addition to toxicity. Fire processes involve gaseous compounds, some of which can be irritant, toxic or
ignition, growth, developed burning, the release of smoke, corrosive.
toxic gases and heat and oxygen vitiation. These parameters, Therefore, when considering the use of fire retardants, the
in a defined environment, constitute the overall hazard. The advantages of a reduced probability of ignition and a slower
environment is important and includes location, ease of fire growth rate must be weighed against the disadvantages of
escape, mobility of occupants and the provision of fire-protec- the increased irritancy, toxicity and corrosivity of the atmos-
tion measures. These parameters are interactive; for example, phere.
the rate of release of heat, smoke and toxic gases is strongly
dependent on the rate of burning and this in turn is influenced
by the fire's location and the available ventilation. All these CONCLUSIONS
factors must be considered when assessing overall hazard.
Essentially, the major difference between the hazards pre- In the majority of fires, carbon monoxide is the most impor-
sented by different natural and synthetic materials arises tant toxicological factor in fire deaths, but with some contri~
because of differences in the rates at which these materials bution from other features, in particular from irritancy.
burn. In the short term, hazards can be mitigated by reducing Differences in the toxicity of combustion products from
the igmtability and slowing the rate of burning of materials synthetic and traditional materials are not great, but it IS the
rather than reducing their toxicity. rate of production of toxic products, or the rate of burning,
which produces the major difference in the hazards presented
by traditional mate~ials and synthetic polymers.
REDUCING IGNITION AND THE RATE Improvement ofthe ignition and rate of burning of materials
OF FIRE GROWTH could be more effective than any improvement in toxicity, as
toxicity forms only a small part of the overall hazard presented
The probability of ignition of a material can be reduced by: by fire and other factors must be considered when making an
\. Introducing additive or reactive fire retardants to the assessment of likely hazard.
polymer (reactive flame retardants are incorporated into A more detailed understanding of the meaning of toxicity
the polymer structure whereas additive retardants are intro- tests is needed, together with an identification of the type of
duced into the polymer 'mix'). fire being modelled, before these tests can be used with
2. Using flame-retardant barriers in furnishings, particularly confidence to assess the possible toxicity of materials.
for contract use, eg interliners and barrier foams.
3. Using non-flammable protective surface coatings, ie either
intumescent or non-intumescent coatings.
4. Using polymers which because of their mechanism of ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
decomposition yield products which inhibit flame reaction,
eg PTFE, and/or form chars, eg PVc. This paper forms part of the work of the Fire Research
Flame retardants act by preventing the thermal decompo- Station, Building Research Establishment, Department of the
sition of a material, inhibiting the flame reaction or interfering Environment and is Crown Copyright. It is contributed by
with the heat transfer back to the polymer. Inhibiting the flame permission ofthe Director, Building Research E,stablishment.
REFERENCES
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1983). of combustion toxicology of fires'. Fire Mater., Vol. 3, No.2,
2. Lloyd's Weekly Casualty Reports for August 21-23 (1984). pp. 110--120(1979).
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pp. 3~38, 41 and 42 (1984). Med. Sci. Law, Vol. 17, No.2, pp. 83-90 (1977).
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(1985). 16. H. H. Stone, D. W. Rheme andJ. D. Corbitt, 'Respiratory burns:
5. C. F. Cullis and M. M. Hirschler, The Combustion of Organic a correlation of clinical and laboratory results'. Ann. Surg.,
Polymers. Clarendon Press, London (1981). No. 165, pp. 157-168 (1967).
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Division, Current Paper CP 91n4. Fire Research Station, II, the relative importance of time and surface temperatures in the
Borehamwood (1974). causation of cutaneous burns'. Am. J. Path., Vol. 23, pp. 695-720
7. W. D. Woolley, P. J. Fardell. A. P. Atkinson and A. P. Verall, (1947).
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122-131 (1978). Davies and F. H. Tyrer. E. andS. Livingstone, Edinburgh (1967).
8. P. J. Fardell, J. M. Murrell and J. V. Murrell, 'Chemical finger- 19. W. Dietz, 'Response factors for gas chromatography detectors'. J.
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Conference, GuildforQ (1982). 20. Eight Peak Index of Mass Spectra, 2nd edn. Mass Spectrometry
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fires'. Hr. Polym. J., Vol. 3, No.4, pp. 186-193 (1971). 21. W. D. Woolley, S. A. Ames and P. G. Smith, 'The Manchester
10. W. D. Woolley, 'Nitrogefl-containing products from the thermal Woolworth's store fire, May 1979;characteristics ofthe furniture'.
decomposition of flexible polyurethane foams'. Hr. Polym. J., J. Fire Safety, Vol. 3, pp. 55-65. (1980/81).
Vol. 4, No. I, pp. 27-43 (1972). 22. W. D. Woolley et aI., 'The Stardust disco fire, Dublin 1981;
I'. Central Fire Brigades Advisory Councils for England and Wales studies of combustion products during simulation experiments'. J.
and for Scotland, Joint Fire Prevention Committee. Report ofthe Fire Safety, Vol. 7, pp. 267-283 (1984).
Technical Sub-committee on the Fire Risks of New Materials. 23. W. D. Woolley et al., 'Fire in the Maysfield Leisure Centre,
Home Office, Fire Department (1978). Belfast, January 1984; studies of the burning characteristics of
12. J. Mitera et aI., 'Analysis of thermo-oxidation products of poly- gymnastic materials'. To be published.
propylene and polyethylene by gas chromatography/mass spec- 24. DIN 53436, 'Erzeugung Thermischer Zersetzungsprodukte von
trometry'. Z. Arch. Chern., Vol. 281, pp. 23-27 (1976). Kunstoffen unter Luftzufuhr und ihre Toxikoligische Priifung.
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29
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Discussion
P. BRENN~N (Ministry of Defence): I should like to ask Mrs 'Once started the fire had far more wood to feed on
Mur~ll ~hlch ~f the compounds listed in her paper cause than was gener~lly known. Apart from floors, chairs
fatahtles m fires m, for example, domestic accommodation. tables, and the like, there was wood in the walls and
, roof which had not been replaced by steel, and such
~!. J. 0 NEILL (Du Pont de.Nemours): Mrs Murrell's work wooden beams as existed being old were ideal tinder for
mdlcate~ that the com.plexity ~s well as the composition of sparks ... ' ' ,
combustion product mixtures (m terms of the chemical com-
pounds present) are more dependent on the conditions of And as a ~n~lcomme~t o~ the question of the role of
combustion than on the origin of the burning materials, be they halogen-contamm~ m~tenals ~n fire~, I would like to put
natural or synthetic. Would Mrs Murrell agree that the major forward the followmg mformatlon which has been collated by
fire h~zar~ posed by commonly used natural or synthetic Dr David Purser o~ Huntingd?n Research Centre for use by
matenals hes most of all in their ease of ignition and flame the ISO subcommittee workmg on the problem of toxic
spread? hazards in fire.
For exampl~, if we compare horsehair with polyurethane The data given .here on t~e ~arcotic and irri~ant effects of
(both contammg carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen in common c01!'bustlon gases mdlcate that acrolem (present in
their chemical structure), would Mrs Murrell agree that the the combustion products from non-halogenated materials such
toxic hazard of the combustion products of these materials is as woo~ and polypro~ylene as Mrs Murrell's paper shows) is
lik~ly' to be similar, provided that the combustibility charac- many' times more tOXICth~n carbon monoxide or hydrogen
tens tiCS of the materials are similar? Would Mrs Murrell chlon~e: Moreover, acrolem can be seen to be about 100 times
further agree that the major fire hazard of combustible foams more Irntant than hydrogen chloride which, according to these
(be they natural or synthetic in origin) is found in their physical collected data, aI?pears to be of about the same toxic potency
nature (high specific surface and low as carbon monoxide.
thermal inertia) rather than in their
chemical make-up?
As a comment rather than a question,
I would like to draw attention to an old
newspaper report recently republished
in The Times (2 December 1985),
describing the fire at the Crystal Palace
which caused massive destruction on the
night of 30 November 1936.
The following excerpt from the article
highlights the fact that the problem of
the rapid spread of fire is not due to the
widespread use of materials which are
synthetic but rather to the widespread
use of materials which are highly com-
bustible. A move away from today's
combustibles back to yester$y's com-
bustibles is unlikely to solve the fire
problem:
'The two features of the fire which
chiefly mystified the public have
been its origin and the speed with
which the flames tore through the
building ....
30
This information (presented here with the permission of Dr after the discovery of the fire, I know which product causes the
Purser) should help us to get a better perspective on the real fireman most concern.
risk that halogenated materials are likely to represent. The
~enerally superior resistance of ~logenated mat~rials to igni- G. C. SWEET (Du Pont (UK) Ltd): Toxicit tests are carried
hon and ft~me spread are addItional elements m favour of out on samples which are burned to decom~sition and Naval
. these matenals. E' . •. '
Concentrations of narcotics at who h ther Id b d ngmeenng Stan d ar d 713 I~ a typlca 1example .of such a test; .
. .. . IC e wou e anger In real fires some matenals burn more easIly than others
of mc~paCltatlon (loss o~ consclous~ess) and death aft~r and some may not even become involved in a fire if th~
~P P~:ttelY 5 ~nd 30. m+n~t~ure m a person engaged m temperature does not reach their ignition point. I should like to
Igh ... y ar~ sown m a ~ ..... ask Mrs Murrell if there is scope for relating the toxic and
~e Imtlal pamful effects of Irrlta~tS (sensory IrritatIon) are combustibility properties of materials to give a more practical
mamly upo~ the eyes and upper respiratory tract. These do not 'total fire hazard' appraisal.
get worse wIth prolonged exposure and may even lessen. The
toxic effects on the lungs increase with prolonged exposure, ....
are often most serious some hours after exposure and may M. J. OMAN (Fire ServIce College): WIth the advent of
cause death. modern materials, smoke production has increased dramatic-
Table DH shows the data. For sensory irritation, a means ally. Smoke during a fire in ~ dwe~lin~, for instanc~, ,,:ill com.e
unpleasant and quite severely disturbing eye and upper down t~ ftoor level. ~n a sh~p, wIth mherent venttlatlon, thIs
respiratory tract irritation, while b means severe eye and upper productIon of smo~e.ls very Important.
respiratory tract irritation with severe pain, blepharospasm, For t~e fire servIce, the proble\YIs as~ia.ted with a ship fire
copious lacrymation and mucus secretion accompanied by are mamfold but per~aps the most senous ISthe extent of the
chest pain. For deaths the figures represent concentrations at smoke boundary whl~h conceals the fire, makes rescue of
which there is a danger of death occurring during or trappe~ per~o~s very d~fficult and delays the application of any
immediately after exposure. fire-extmgUlshmg medIa.
In general, smokes are irritant when they contain oxidized Wh~t the fire service would like to see is compartmentation
organic products, and the most irritant of these substances or zomng (as adopted by the Royal Navy) with an autonomous
known to occur commonly in smokes from a number of ventilati?n system. In addition, a crash-stop facility which
different materials is acrolein. Another well known irritant is automatIcally closes dampers and isolates compartments
the acid gas hydrogen chloride, which is evolved during the would be .extre~ely effective in limiting the spread of smoke
thermal decomposition of poly( vinyl chloride) (PVC). Data on and allowmg easIer evacuation.
these two products are presented as examples of irritant
effects. Dr R. E. MANNING (Building Services Research and Informa-
tion Association): I should like to ask Mrs Murrell if there is a
1. G. Kimmerle, 'Aspects and methodology for the evaluation of time lag between the production oftoxic gases and the produc-
toxi~ological parameters during the fire exposure'. Combustion tion of smoke. I am thinking especially of the small amount of
Toxicology, Vol. 1, pp. 4-50 (1.97~) .. smoke initially produced in the burning of polyethylene.
2. D. A..purs;erand K. R: Bernl~, Effects of carbon mon~xlde on Mrs Murrell has mentioned a figure of 0.1 ppm for an 8 h
behaviour In monkeys In relation to human fire hazard. Arch. exposure to acrolein In most shl'p fir the sh'p b k
Environ. Hlth., Vol. 38, pp. 308-315(1983)..... eS.1 can e smo e
3. D. A. Purser, P. Grimshawand K. R. Berrill, 'The role of hydrogen logg~d wlthm a few ~mutes, ~nd. I should like to ask about
cyanide in the acute toxicity of the pyrolysis products of poly- survIvable concentrations on this timescale.
acrylonitrile'. Arch. Environ. Hlth., Vol. 39,294-400 (1984).
4. D. A. Purser, 'A bioassay mod~l for testing the incapacitat!ng G. MCALLAN(YARDLtd): The subject of fire toxicity seems
effects of exposure ~o co~bus!'on product atmospheres uSing to attract a lot of diverse comment and it is quite right to
cynomolgus'!I0nkeys . J. Fire SCI., ~ol: 2, pp. 20-36 (1984).. emphasize the fact that the rate of burning of materials is more
5. Documentation of the threshold I1mltvalues for substances In important than the toxicity Of the comb t'on pr d t I d d
workroom air. AGIGH L98O. us I 0 UCs. n ~e
6. D. A. Purser and W. D. Woolley,'Biologicalstudies of combustion recent papers have shown that the range of standard-burmng
atmospheres'. J. Fire. Sci., Vol. I, pp. 118-144(1983). or heat-~elease !ates for different material~ is at I~s.t an order
7. H. L. Kaplan, A. F. Grand, W. R. Rogers, W. G. Switzerand G. ofmagmtude.wlder t~a.n.the range ofrelatlve toxIcIties.
C. Hartzell, 'A research study of the assessmentof escape impair- The matenals exhIbIting the fastest rate of burning are of
ment by irritant combustiongasesinposlcrashaircraft fires'. Report course ftammable fluids such as oils. Moderate rates of burning
No. D~T~AAlcr-~/16 (1984)... are seen in woods and high-char plastics, and other materials
8. Y. Alane, In.Proceedrngso[t?e InhalatIon Toxlcologyan~ Technol- such as PTFE do not burn in the normal sense. Moreover, it is
ogy SymposIum. Ed. by Basil K. Leong, Ann Arbor SCience,The a fallacy that all 'plastics' either burn vigorously or else produce
Butterworth
. '£
Group
. (1980).'£
'L • · · If'
arge quan Itles 0f tOXICsmo . k e,.. for example, aromatic
9 . R egIStry oJ 1iOXICEffieclS OJCnemlca IS U bstances, NatlonaII nstItute · ..
for Occupational Safety and Health (1982Edn). ~Iyaml d e fabncs ~ave been s~<?wn to be supenor to alterna-
tives such as woolm both toxIcIty and response-to-fire tests.
Lt Cdr J, BINNS (Ministry of Defence): I should like to ask These materials are currently being adopted by fire brigades
Mrs Murrell whether, in her opinion, the use of CO, CO2 and throughout the country .....
nitrous Draeger tubes and the measurement of the smoke ft Many .o.ther polyme~ do not dIsplay ~he fatlmgs of hIgh
density in an enclosed atmosphere (eg a submarine) are satis- ammabtllty and excessIve smoke.productlon of the older a~d
factory indications of the general toxicity of the; atmosphere cheaper p~ymers. As the productIon .costs fall for the.supenor
and hence the need to wear breathing equipment. polymers .e can look forwar~ to a tll1~e when the mghtmare
polymers dIsappear from use Just as bnck and stone replaced
T. M. BONTOFf (Humberside Fire Brigade): After discussing wood after the Great Fire of London.
the problems of the decomposition of horsehair or
polyurethane we may accept that the products of the combus- ~. A: J. ~ILL (Roy~l Navy): I should like to ask Mrs Murrell
tion of each are basically the same. However, from a fireman's If activation of a spnnkler has any effect on the toxic products
point of view the rate of burning is the crucial factor. produced by a fire.
When confronted with a fire in a household of three persons
where the only fuel is a settee made of polyurethane, and one K. S. HARVEY (Salvage Association): Ideally smoke should
person is dead o.n the arrival of the fire brigade three minutes be removed from a fire zone. I should like to ask Mrs Murrell
31
if putting in large fans to do this aggravates or escalates the fire seem to be plausible in that much carbon monoxide is produced
in any way. by a secondary chemical reaction in hot smoke between carbon
dioxide and carbon. The toxicity ofthose gases soluble in water
J. K. ROBINSON (Lloyd's Register of Shipping): Electrical would also be reduced.
cables in merchant ships are generally manufactured to meet
IEC Pub. 92 'Electrical Installations in Ships' (or an equivalent
National Standard), which in turn requires that individual ,
cable samples pass a flame retardance test to IEC Pub. 332 Author s reply _
Part 1.
Cables for naval vessels, however, in addition to a flamma-
bility test, have to pass the following fire performance tests on In rePly to Mr Brennan, carbon monoxide is generally
their sheathing materials: Critical Oxygen Index (BS 2782 accepted to be the most important toxic product in domestic
Part I), Temperature Index (NES 715), Toxicity Index (NES fires. The majority of deaths caused by smoke and toxic gas
713), Halogen Content (Lassaigne Test), and Smoke Index inhalation are attributed to this product. However, as
(NES 711). explained in my paper, the other chemical species present can
It is my opinion that the specification of commercial cables significantly effect the time taken to escape because of
for ships is being distorted by the linking together of SOLAS physiological effects.
1981 Amendment Chapter II-I Reg. 45.5.2, which states 'All
electric cables and wiring external to equipment shall be at Dr O'Neill in' his commentary asks three questions. In
least of a flame retardant type and shall be so installed as not to answer to the first, I agree that if ignition can be prevented then
impair their original flame-retarding properties', and IEC Pub. there will be no fire hazard and therefore no toxic hazard. It
332 Part 3 tests on bunched electric wires or cables under fire follows that if the rate at which a material burns can be
conditions. reduced, the time available for escape, should a fire develop,
These Part 3 tests were brought into being as a result of will be increased.
serious fires in long cable runs in power station ducts, a Secondly, when comparing horsehair and polyurethane
situation which does not occur in ships because of the numer- foam, the range of compounds which each material produces
ous fire and watertight sub-divisions. Furthermore, this stan- in a fire situation tend to be very similar, although the quan-
dard has been found wanting in that the cable installation tities of each compound may differ.
geometry, which 'has been shown to have adramaticinfluence' Finally, in answer to the third question, I agree that the
is not specified and many typical cable runs in ships fall outside physical nature of materials contributes significantly to the fire
the range of volumetric cate&ories specified. I bebaviour of those materials but the chemical nature also plays
In my experience the mostserious impairment of cable flame an essential role. The 'physics' determines the rate at which
retardance in ships is the notorious, but common, shipyard polymeric materials are heated but the 'chemistry' determines
practice of paint spraying (minimum three coats) everything the chemical composition and flammability of the products (ie
that doesn't move! Also the IEC Pub. 332 Part 3 test is not cellular materials).
comparable with a scaled-up 'original' Part 1 test, eg compare
the length of the testtime. In response to Lt Cdr Binns, gas detector tubes are very
Would Mrs Murrell agree, in the light of her concluding simple to operate and give a direct indication ofthe concentra-
remark re a balance between 'the advantages of a reduced tion of specific gases present in a fire atmosphere. However, it
probability of ignition and a slower fire growth rate must be must be stressed that this method provides only a semi-quan-
weighed against the disadvantages of the increased irritancy, titative indication of the presence of specific species and that is
toxicity and corrosivity', that the IEC working parties at subject to interference from other species and the temperature
present drafting cable test requirements for merchant ships of the gas being sampled.
should switch their attention from yet further examination of
bunched cable flame retardance to other aspects of fire perfor- The rate of burning is a crucial factor in fire behaviour and
mance, in particular toxicity and smoke. As explained in her the illustration given by Mr Bontoft, which states that
paper, there are difficulties in specifying toxicity, but an agreed polyurethane foam causes most concern because of its rapid
standard for smoke performance ShOdld be more readily rate of burning and thus the rapid rate at which the toxic gases
achievable, possibly along the lines of the LTE 3 m3 test. produced reach lethal concentrations, is a good example of the
problems of materials of low density, low thermal conductivity
.. and high flammability.
1. G. C. Stevens and J. A. M. Gibbons, 'Assessmg smoke and gas
emissionhazards from burning electric cables'. Institution of Elec- " .
trical Engineers Conference Publication 239 (Sept. 1984). In reply to Mr Sweet, scope for relatmg the flammablltty and
, combustion toxicity properties of materials certainly exists,
and indeed within the British Standards Institution work is
F.G. M. EVANS (The College of Maritime Studies, Warsash): being carried out to draft a Code of Practice on Combustion
I should like to congratulate Mrs Murrell on her paper and
should just like clarification on some points raised during
discussion.
As I understand it, it is smoke that kills most people in fires
in that it disorientates them, causes panic, prevents escape and
makes people remain long enough in a fire zone to be overcome
by the toxicological effects. Is it true that the main difference
in the behaviour of modern materials in a fire is the increase in
the rate of smoke production over that for traditional
materials, and that this is the problem to be addressed, along
with design for smoke removal or exclusion from escape
routes?
I have heard that in America there is an interest in sprinklers
as a form of life protection. Does Mrs Murrell know of any
research into the claim that sprinklers can reduce the amount
of carbon monoxide present in combustion products? It would
32
Toxicology. This puts the toxic hazard presented by a fire into growth and extinguish the fire. In doing so, they also serve to
perspective by providing a stepwise approach for assessing reduce the rate at which toxic gases and smoke are produced.
hazard from a given fire scenario. The steps include a consider- In addition to this, the concentration of gases which are water
ation of ignition flammability and 'scenario' features as well as soluble, eg the hydrogen halides, may be reduced.
toxicity aspects. ,
In reply to Mr Harvey, when a fire is sufficiently confined,
In response to Mr Oman, the adoption of similar procedures ideally if the room can be sealed, the fire will burn itself out.
to the compartmentation or zoning principles used by the However, if air is allowed to enter, ~uch that there is no
Royal Navy in all shipping would help the fire service in restriction on ventilation, the fire will develop at the fastest
fighting ship fires. Recent fires have highlighted the problems rate possible, this being governed by the physical and chemical
of identifying the seat of the fire in a smoke-filled compart- properties ofthe material burning. Small drafts and air currents
ment. However, design could present difficulties and the tend to influence the burning behaviour of materials, generally
economics of the system would have to be seriously considered. adversely, by increasing the rate of burning, this increase being
, a function of the increased amount of available oxygen at the
In reply to Dr Manning, if smoke is defined as a suspension surface of the ignited material.
of carbonaceous particles in a fine effluent, then there can However, it is often true to say that any size of compartl,11ent
indeed be a time lag between ignition or thermal decomposi- will fill with smoke long before the concentration of oxygen
tion of certain materials and smoke being produced. limits fire growth. ,Therefore, in the earlier stages of a fire, fans
Generation of gases (including possibly toxic or irritant and ventilators can be of value in maintaining a level of
components) is possible before smoke is seen when materials visibility which will improve the means of escape and enable
are subjected to an external heat flux, eg wood will release the seat of the fire to be identified more easily and thus aid fire
acrolein into the atomsphere if heated to above 400 °C. In fighting.
general, polymers have to undergo flaming combustion to
release carbonaceous smoke; below ignition temperatures or In response to Mr Robinson, whilst it is not my place to
heat fluxes aerosol particles and the typical products of incom- advise upon the work programme of IEC cable testing commit-
plete combustion can be produced, eg oxygenated organic tees, I do feel that the IEC should consider all aspects of fire
species. Carbonaceous smoke is generally not produced from performance, including smoke production, when testing cable
the smouldering process, when fumes including aerosols, runs.
hydrocarbons, oxygenated species and other such compounds
tend to be formed. In answer to Mr Evans' first question, since the rate of
In answer to the second query, Table DIll sets out the production ofsmoke, together with other fire products, ie heat
estimated short-term (10 min) lethal concentrations (ppm) for and toxic gases, is inherently linked with the rate of burning, it
some of the more toxic or irritant fire gases. It must be stressed is the factor which should be studie~ together with mitigating
that these values represent 'tenability limits' of concentrations actions in the event of fire, such as smoke removal and
likely to prove lethal if inhaled for the duration of exposure exclusion from escape routes.
stated. Much lower concentrations can still seriously impede Sprinklers are used to control fire spread and rate of burning
the ability of a person to escape from a fire due to irritancy and and should ultimately extinguish fires. The rate of production
incapacitation. of carbon monoxide, which is linked to rate of burning, is
therefore likely to be decreased. Work is being carried out in
I agree with the comments made by Mr McAllan, in that rate Japan to study the reduction in concentration of HCI brought
of burning or rate of heat release is important and that the about by the use of sprinklers and other work has shown that
range exhibited by different materials is considerable. It is also concentrations of other water-soluble gases are also decreased.
true to say that some modern 'plastics' have been formulated These include, to a small extent, carbon monoxide. However,
with improved rates of burning and smoke-production charac- I am unaware of any work being carried out on the reduction of
teristics. carbon monoxide by lowering the temperature of the gas
plume and thus reducing or preventing the reaction between
In reply to Mr Hill, sprinklers are employed to control fire carbon dioxide and carbon to produce carbon monoxide.
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CII7
33
Paper C1/8
A Shipboard Emergency Response Plan

G. S. Skipp, Master Mariner
Texaco Marine Services Inc.
SYNOPSIS
In January 1983 Texaco Overseas Tankship (TOT) Ltd introduced a radical emergency response package
to its fleet of oceangoing oil tankers. This 'Emergency Response Plan' (ERP) was formulated after
consultation with the Devonshire and Hampshire Fire Brigades, and parallels procedures used in their
command fire-fighting training courses for senior sea staff. Thus, the ERP was a logical development
toward practical implementation of principles previously only used within a training environment.
BACKGROUND
Oaiy.Sldppserved at sea is ••declcappl'8f1ctlceand deck
In April 1981 TOT Ltd suffered the tragic loss of three 'offar,v.qth TOT Ltd (formerly GaltexTracfing and Trans-
valuable members of its seagoing staff whilst they fought a fire port ltdl from 1959 untiJ he was promoted Master in 1973.
in the machinery space of a VLCC. The resultant inquirytte.~.~ Int!?the company's fleet headqua~ers in
identified, amongst other things, the need for a better and 19~<4,~,an ~nt ~rine 5uJ*i~end!'~t ~n~ t~en
more structured way of responding to shipboard emergencies. ,,~'~'a yarietYof poSltiO~S ~Iminat,"g with promot'~n
It was decided to rethink completely the philosophy for a ito Man.r of Fleet Operat'OI'I~ In ,1981. Currently, he IS
.. employed as a Fleet Manager WithTexaco Marine ServlCN
re~ponse to any shIpboard emergency. After careful conslder- !,IIe.based In Port Arthur, Texas.
atlon five basIc parameters that the 'Emergency Response .
Plan' (ERP) must satisfy were identified:
1. The preservation of human life, ie ships and equipment can watch keepers were not excluded. ERP manuals were placed:
be replaced, but people are irreplaceable .• In every cabin.
2. The appropriate conditioned initial responses to an • On the bridge.
emergency by individuals must be encouraged .• In the radio room.
3. The ERP should be flexible and suitable for use in any • In engine and cargo control rooms.
shipboard emergency situation .• In all office spaces.
4. The ERP must have at its core the ability to facilitate • In all public rooms.
efficient communications, thus enabling tight controls to be • In the vessel's technical library .
maintained during an emergency .• At all the muster stations.
5. The ERP must be able to demonstrate that to achieve its In other words, everypubliclocation in each ship contained the
prime objective, the preservation of human life, the preven- ERP manual. Cabin cards, placed in each cabin, indicated the
tion of any emergency must be the best policy. occupants' emergency muster and lifeboat muster stations. All
The ERP was published and despatched to each vessel in the existing station bills and cabin cards were destroyed.
TOT Ltd fleet with instructions for its implementation in four Phase 4 was the carrying out of the first emergency response
phases. drill, which was followed by a lifeboat station drill to ensure
Phase 1 was the distribution of the ERP manuals to all that each person knew his stations and duties. Thereafter,
members of each ship's complement so they could study the frequent realistic emergenCies would be simulated to improve
contents. the command and control operations and to improve the
Phase 2 was the convening by each ship's management team effectiveness of the teams. It was suggested that an excellent
of meetings to review all aspects of the ERP and stimulate method of getting the enthusiasm and commitment of the
questions and criticism. Each management team had to formu- ship's staff was to allow safety subcommittees to plan and
late and agree upon a course of action based on the following decide the nature of the simulated emergencies and report to
suggestions: senior management on board, ie the Master, with their ideas
• Select the primary and secondary muster stations as outlined and suggestions for improvement.
by the ERP.
• Identify the muster stations with large painted signs.
• Fabricate emergency control equipment storage lockers at INTRODUCTION TO THE ERP
the muster stations.
• Commence team selection and determine the onboard train- In any emergency situation onboard a vessel, a prompt,
ing requirements. organized and well rehearsed response must go into immediate
• Issue standing orders with respect to the actions of watch- action in order to minimize the effect of that emergency. This
keeping personnel at the start of an emergency. response must be standard for all vessels in a fleet. In time, on
Phase 3 was the completion of team selection and of all joining a ship, the crew member will already know what the
station bills and cabin cards, followed by the thorough indoctri- basic organisation will be, and will only have to determine in
nation of everyone with the ERP. It was recommended that the what capacity he fits into the emergency organisation.
indoctrination be 'done formally and in two sessions so that The response outlined parallels the procedures used by the
Trans IMar E (C). Vol. 98. Paper CII8
35
Devon Fire Brigade in their Command Fire-fighting Course. It missing, thirdly that the available manpower is standing by
is recommended that a fteet's senior officers complete this ready for immediate deployment, and fourthly that the
training, and therefore the introduction of the plan into a fteet equipment and/or machinery the team is responsible for has
will be a logical follow up to the course. This paper is not a been checked and is in good order.
guide to practical fire fighting but an outline of well tried
organisational and administrative procedures. Role of team I d
The basis of the ERP is that small and well trained teams ea ers
would tackle any emergency that may arise. Examples of some All team leaders must be capable of carrying out any task
emergencies that may occur are fire, explosion, enclosed space that would be assigned to members of their team. The team
rescue, grounding, collision, pollution etc. leader must never become so involved in actual operation that
It is acknowledged that no single emergency incident is control is lost of his team's actions so that they jeopardise their
standard and that each situation must be properly evaluated lives.
before taking remedial action. After initial assessment of an To be able to achieve this a leader must ensure that his team
incident it is the Master's or Officer in Command's duty to is efficiently trained and thatthey have confidence in the leader
direct the teams. The safety of personnel must be a prime and in each other's abilities.
consideration and unnecessary risks must not be taken.
Advan~ages of the team concept are that small teams .are Team formation
more eastly accounted for and managed, and can be rapidly
deployed, with equipment, from a muster station. For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that the
ship's complement is divided into five teams working on a basic
minimum number of 26 people. The formation of the teams is
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS shown in Table I. Unassigned personnel muster with the
support team and supernumeraries muster on the bridge.
Emergency alarms and musters Bridge team
Irrespective of whether the vessel is at sea, at anchor or in The bridge team is responsible for command and control of
port, on hearing an emergency alarm teams must muster at the situation, and for ensuring that an efficient muster of
their designated stations. Great emphasis must be placed on personnel is carried out. If required, the bridge team will
this initial muster of personnel at their stations. This ensures institute a controlled search for any person not accounted for.
that the available manpower resources are known and missing The bridge team must also establish immediate external
persons identified. A maximum state of readiness is promptly communications, establish internal communications between
established and a standardized response to emergency situ- the bridge, engine room, emergency and support teams, main-
ations can be achieved, allowing remedial actions to be more tain the safe navigation of the vessel and keep a detailed timed
easily coordinated and controlled. record and log of events.
An individual's initial response to an emergency should
therefore be as follows: Engine room team
1. On discovering an emergency, raise the alarm. The engine room team must advise the bridge of the state of
2. Provide the control centre with as much information as is readiness of the engine room. This advice must indicate the
possible. status of plant and emergency systems, which must be placed in
3. Attempt to control the emergency by whatever means are a state of maximum readiness.
available until relived by an emergency team. Should the The team must also establish whether the emergency has
situation become hazardous to the individual he must had any adverse effect on the operation of the plant, and then
retreat immediately to the primary emergency team muster determine what actions, if any, need to be taken to remedy any
station and report arrival there to the control centre. deficiencies to the plant and emergency systems. The team
4. On hearing the alarm, all personnel must proceed should be able to maintain essential emergency services.
immediately to their designated muster station and perform
the initial allotted tasks. Emergency teams 1and 2
5. Emergency team leaders or their deputies to muster and The emergency teams first muster and report to the Bridge.
report readiness to the bridge. It should be noted that the They then make ready equipment and report their readiness to
term 'readiness' in this context must indicate first the team's the Bridge, ready to take action as directed by the Master or
identity, secondly the names of any person or persons Officer in command.
Support team EMERGENCY ORGANISATION RELATIONSHIPS

The support team advises its readiness to the bridge and .
provides support to the emergency teams as and when Ala
instructed by the Master or Officer in Command, for example: no response
.• Hospital and first aid. The initial conditioned responSe required from all personnel
• Prepare lifeboats and liferafts. on hearing the emergency alarm must be: .
• Prepare to provide breathing-apparatus support to • Collect life jacket.
emergency teams • Dress in long-sleeved boiler suit, safety slroes and hard hat.
• Provide logistical support to emergency teams, such as • Proceed immediately to designated muster station.
recharging self-contained breathing-apparatus cylinders .• Remain on watch until relieved by emergency team mem-
• Provide additional fire-fighting equipment. bers.
• Maintain security patrols. Exceptions to the foregoing will be:
• Provide boundary cooling .. 1. Chief Engineer Officer, who will ensure that the emergency
The success of this team is measured by the effective support fire pump is started, ventilation stopped and watertight
it can provide the emergency teams. To provide this service, doors, if any, closed before proceeding to muster station.
individual team members will need similar skills and attributes 2. First Navigating Officer, who will secure the cargo system
as for an emerg!:ncy team. before proceeding to muster station.
3. Chief Cook, who wjl\ secure the galley before proceeding to
Reserve teams muster station.
In cases where a vessel's complement exceeds 26 people, 4. Bridge Messenger, who will distribute portable radios to all
additional suitable personnel may be designated to each team team leaders.
as deemed prudent, however it is strongly recommended that
no team ever exceeds eight people. E·mergency m th e engme
.
room
Team efl'ecti eness In such an emergency, when access to the machinery space is
v denied, the Chief Engineer Officer must conduct the muster of
The success of each team is dependent upon the varying his team at the secondary emergency control location , establish
skills and attributes of individual team members as well as communications with the bridge, and direct the team to shut
upon the degree of effectiveness in harnessing such skills down the plant as necessary by operating fuel oil trips and
through realistic simulation of all forms of emergency. remote shut-offs.
In selecting the members of an emergency team the follow- He must also initiate efforts to establish emergency services,
ing skills and attributes should be sought: report progress to Bridge, and become the on-scene com-
• Fire fighting (all members). mander for dealing with this particular. emergency, using the
• Enclosed-space entry (all members using SCBA) emergency teams as he deems necessary after receiving direc-
• Search and rescue techniques. tion from the Master and keeping him advised of progress
• Observant and able to communicate. throughout.
• Electrical skill.
• Mechanic~1 ski~1. All other emergencies
• SeamanshIp sktll.
• First aid skill. The First Navigating Officer will direct emergency team I
• Survival skill. actions after receiving direction from the Master and keeping
• Knowledge of the ship and its equipment. him fully advised of the progress of the operations as they
• Damage control. develop. Should emergency team 2 be brought into action that
• Physical fitness (age may be a consideration). team leader will receive instructions direct from the Master.
• Self-discipline/respect for authority.
• Team spirit. Muster stations
• The muster stations for the various teams will, of course,
In port/shipyard or lay-up depend on the particular layout of each vessel. However,
The organization outlined above is intended primarily for careful consideration must be given by each ship's management
when a vessel is at sea, but it must be appreciated that team to ascertain the most suitable location, bearing in mind
individual team strengths may be reduced when in port. There- the following criteria.
fore, after the initial muster, the various teams' compositions
may require modification. It should be stressed in any Bridge team station
emergency response plan that the initial conditioned response This is normally the navigating bridge, but should it be
in por:!must be to notify the shore fire and emergency services unavailable because it is the site of the actual emergency, an
immediately so that additional expert assistance becomes alternative location must be designated as a precaution. As
available promptly. communications and control are the primary consideration for
Special circumstances will apply when a vessel is in a ship- the bridge team, telephone, radio and visual contact is of major
yard or laid-up as the availability of a ship's complement will be importance when selecting an alternative location.
minimal. The initial conditioned response must thus be:
1. To activate the emerg~ncy alarm and inform the Officer in Emergency teams stations
Command. These positions should be located where there is direct
2. To call up and request help from the shore emergency communication available with the bridge. One should be
services .• situated on the starboard side of the vessel and the other on the
3. To deal with the emergency so far as is safe, reasonable and pOrt side. Both stations will have similar equipment stored
practicable .. there. Should one ~ cut off in a.n emergency, the other will
4. To ascertain promptly what services are avatlable onboard become th~ .alternatlve muster pomt. .
in such a situation. The posItIons should be equally accessIble from an entrance
5. To be ready to guide the shore emergency service personnel from an open deck and the aft part of the vessel. Designated
to the scene of the emergency and provide them with as walk-in lockers containing the emergency equipment must be
much information as is possible. protected from the elements and sited in the least likely space
Trans IMar E (C), Vol. 98, Paper CIIB
37
to be cut off by fire, smoke or toxic fumes. Each location must carried out on the equipment. This ensures that everything is
be prominently identified by notices or signs. maintained in readiness for immediate use.
Each team must be encouraged to be responsible for the
Engine room team stations maintenance and appearance of the equipment in their locker,
This muster position will normally be the engine control which must only be used for the storage of emergency equip-
room or control platform. An alternative site must be selected ment.
if the designated muster position is inaccessible. Should this be
the case, communication with the bridge is an essential priority
for the alternative site, as is close proximity to an engine room COMMUNICATION PLAN
entrance where access and egress can be easily controlled.
Both p.rimary ~nd alternative stations must be clearly identified Internal communications
by notices or signs.
The success of any emergency response depends on the
Support team station quality of communications between the team leaders and the
This muster position will normally be in an open space on the command centre . .Principal communication will be by voice
poop deck or in close proximity to the hospital, with communi- and by radio handsets, which must be maintained in constant
cation to the bridge. An alternative site will be designated as readiness in a fully charged state, together with fully charged
appropriate to any particular vessel. These stations must also spare batteries. The use of portable radios provides team
be clearly identified by notices or signs. leaders with the added advantage that they are party to the
whole scenario.
Checklists for team members at muster stations The use of public addre~s, intercoms and. ~xed telephone
systems must also be considered when devlsmg emergency
Checklists must be established at each station indicating the communications procedures, although it should be stressed
name and rating of each person assigned to the team and who that portable radio communication is the most efficient
is required to muster at the station. If any member has a method. Correct and controlled radio procedures must be
designated preliminary action prior to the muster, this must devised and rehearsed.
also be noted on the checklist.
External communications at sea
Emergency equipment checklists ..
The Master, on recelVmg reports from team leaders, must
An equipment check-off list must also be posted in assess the gravity of the situation and communicate via the
emergency control lockers. An assignment bill detailing assign- Radio Officer accordingly. The options that the Master has at
ments of individuals comprising the team for each category of his disposal are:
emergency must also be posted (see Table II) .• An alert message to all ships and shore base stations (as
Each Locker must contain the following items: appropriate) in the vicinity advising that an emergency
• Four self-contained breathing-apparatus sets complete with exists onboard the ship and to stand by for further infor-
harnesses, tags, personal guide ropes and distress signal mation. The text of this message must include the vessel's
units. name, its position, the nature of the emergency plus the
• One trolley breathing-apparatus set complete with spare course and speed if applicable.
bottles .• An advice message transmitted when all the facts are known
• One rescue oxygen resuscitator. in order to update the alert message.
• Four lifelines (hemp-covered wire) .• A distress message sent if outside assistance is required,
• One breathing-apparatus control board. indicating the type of help that is required.
• Two fire brigade style guide ropes with containers .• A cancellation message transmitted when the emergency is
• Four spare SCBA air cylinders with covers. over and no further assistance is required.
• Four large rechargeable safety lamps. As soon as is practical, a telephone call and a confirming
• Two approved fire-fighting approach suits (including gloves, telex or cable to Fleet Headquarters could be of assistance,
boots and helmets). especially when the services of salvage/fire-fighting tugs are
• Two hand axes. volunteered.
• Four spare hoses with couplings.
• One spare fog nozzle (with spanners ifrequired). Ext aI . ti • rt I
• Two Acme Thunderer whistles. ern commuDIca ons ID po or ay-up
• One explosimeter. Immediate contact must be made with port authorities (or
• One oxygen analyser. shipyard fire brigade if the vessel is in shipyard). As a routine,
• One emergency document pouch containing booklet of every Master and Radio Officer must be fully cognizant with
general plans including general arrangements, fire and emergency shore contact procedures whenever the vessel
safety control plans, muster and check-off lists. arrives in port.
• One team station bill listing specific duties for fire, collision
and closed-space search and rescue. Individuals' initial response to any emergency
• One spare rescue safety harness.
• One station tool kit for helicopter operations. M t
• One large axe, one crowbar and one pair of wire cutters. US er
• One coil of 1 in diameter ro ... Th e team Iea d er or d ep.uty must co~ d uct a muster at t h e
• 0 ne s h arp k nhe .•
'& pe station and report to the bndge when this has been done.
• One international shore-hydrant connection.
• Six boiler suits. Unauthorized action
• Six safety helmets complete with chin straps. The team leader must ensure that individual team members
do not act independently in tackling an emergency but ensure
• that the team keeps together and follows instructions.
E mergencyequlpmen t Ioc k er recor d book
A record book must be established for each locker indicating Dress
when routine inspections and tests are to be and have been Emergency teams will find boiler suits and safety helmets at
Trans [Mar E (C). Vol. 98, Paper ClI8
38
reblell: Emergency control locker station bill, teem I
Designatedduties (example)
Name Rank Premuster task Fire Enclosed space rescue Collision Grounding
Chief Officer Secure cargo system Team leader, Team leader, gas Cargo control room Cargo control room
emergency monitoring BAcontrol
pouch BA control -
Fourth Engineer As per standing orders Deputy team leader, Deputy team leader, Damage contrail Salvage pumpteam
trolley set trolley set BAteam
Petty Officer - BA set rescue BA set rescue Cargo control and! Checktankand
resuscitator resuscitator and orpumproom compartment
harness soundings
Rating - BA set, main guidelines BA set, mainguidelines Damage controll Salvage pump team
BAteam
Rati.ng BAset, two lifelines BA set, two lifelines Damage contrail Salvage pump team
BA team
Rating - BA,set, two spare BA set, two spare Damage controll Salvage pump team
cylinders cylinders BAteam
their muster stations and should be wearing safety shoes and own conduct in dealing with the emergency will reflect the
carrying their life jackets when reporting for muster. All other overall discipline of his team. Discipline and well reasoned
personnel must arrive at their muster stations wearing suitable decisions make for good teamwork.
clothes, safety helmets, safety shoes and carrying their life
jackets.
MAINTENANCE OF RESOURCES
Direct response to an emergency
Human resources
Assessment of the emergency .
The Master will assess the ravit of the situation from the The most Important consideratIOn ISthe preserv~tlon of hfe.
rt . df th t g I
repo s receive rom e earn ea ers.
I Each emergency team leader must carefully mom tor the well
being of his team members during an incident and ensure that
Provision of information they are r~sted and relieved if they show signs of fatigue or
Th e M aster WI·11d·Irect an emergency team to provi·d e m.or-
.• over-exertion.
Ad t tt b t b tT d t t
mation relatin to the emergency. equ.a e suppor ea.m mem e~s mus e u IIZ~ o. rans-
g port eqUipment, replemsh breathmg-apparatus air cyhnders
R d · d I tt' and provide refreshments and relief in good time.
ecor mgan po mg
The information received from the emergency teams and the
direct~ons given by the Master must be timed and recorded by Equipment resources
the bodge team recorder.
Everybody onboard must be made fully aware of what
External Communications equipment is available, where it is stowed, what it can be used
The Radio Officer, as directed by the Master, will ensure for and how to use it. An emergency document pouch must be
external communication is established in accordance with the available at every muster station and should contai'n:
communication plan .• A general arrangement plan for the ship .
• A general fire and safety plan for the ship.
PI n f action for bridge team • An ~nlarged .scale dr~wing. of each d~ck or flat showin~ the
a 0 precise location and Identity of equipment, plant, fittmgs,
When the Master has received sufficient information about doorways, openings, stairwells, control boxes, fire-fighting
the emergency he must formulate a plan of action and deploy and safety equipment.
his resources to best effect. In the event that the emergency is • A schematic diagram of the pumping arrangements.
a fire, the Master, through his emergency teams, must: • A diagram of the fixed fire-fighting systems for the vessel
1. Determine the initial boundaries. with detailed information on the exact areas and items of
2. Determine the secondary boundaries and perimeter cooling plant equipment protected.
requirements .• Clear instructions of how the emergency fire and power
3. Determine a plan of action. installations can be activated and brought into service.
4. Mount the attack. • An updated crew list and stations bill.
5. Make continued assessment of progress. • A list of storage spaces where sensitive materials are stored.
6. Exchange information with his team leaders thus allowing eg oxygen, acetylene, paints, solvents, chemicals and other
any improvement or deterforation of the situation to be possibly toxic substances.
identified.
7. Update outside agencies on developments and progress. Self-contained breathing apparatus
This equipment must be reserved for use solely for drills and
••• training, the rescue of personnel, the fighting of fires and other
DIscipline and conduct emergencies where there is a danger to life or the possible loss
Each team leader must maintain discipline throughout all of the vessel. On no account should SCBA equipment be used
phases of the emergency. The team leader must realize that his for routine work,
Trans IMar E (C), Vol. 98, Paper ClIS
39
Trolley sets Safety procedures for breathing-apparatus wearers

Each SCBA should have an air line attachment which will ... , ..
permit the use of a trolley set when any entry is likely to be Heat and humIdIty can cause senous physlologl~1 effec~s. m
.... the human body. To keep the body temperature m eqUllIb-
prolo~ged ..A trolley set can suppl~ aIr VIaa budt-m filter from rium excess heat generated in the body must be dissipated.
the ship's air supply from spare cylInders fitted to the trolley.
. " Th ree' ways a bod y Ioses h ea t are:
All ships should be provIded wIth two trolley sets to enable a 1 Co t' (' rfl d th b d t f 250/. f
two-man breathing-apparatus team concept to be maintained .. h ~ec )on al owaroun e 0 y accoun s or 00
All air lines should be of sufficient length to reach remote

areas, ie cargo tank bottoms .. 2 Rea d°' t~ . ( · t· th b d
a la Ion ra d la Ion from e 0 y accoun s or t f 50 °'
10 0
f
Distress signal units (DS U)

Each SCBA should be fitted with a DSU which the wearer
activates should he get into difficulty and require assistance. A
DSU emits a high-intensity sound signal that can only be
stopped by the use of a special key. This key must always be left
with the breathing-apparatus control officer.
Guideropes
The use of guideropes is mandatory (see Fig. I). Special
guideropes should be supplied which must be used to indicate
the ~oute taken by a SCBA team from the entrance to a space
indicating the direction to exit. Guideropes are stowed within
the small shoulder container and are about 60 m in length and
have a diameter of (r8 mm.
A series of two markers are secured to the guide rope at
intervals of 21 m throughout its length. One marker has two
knots in it and the other has none. The knotted marker is
always located on the 'way out' side of the un knotted marker.
The looped inboard end of the guiderope is secured to a
hook inside the container. A sliphook is attached to the
outboard end of the guiderope. This hook is made fast at the
entrance to a space prior to entry of a SCBA team and will pay
out automatically as guiderope wearers enter the space.
The first SCBA member to enter the affected space carries
the guiderope container on his shoulder. As the guiderope
pays out the second SCBA member ties it off at a convenient
height from the deck. Tie-off points need not be close together,
but must be at sufficient intervals to keep the guiderope off the
deck. When a change of direction is necessary to avoid an
obstacle, open hatchway or space, it is essential that the
guiderope is tied off to mark the safe passage.
During this entry, the two SCBA team members should stay
in physical contact with each other.
Personal guideropes
Personal guideropes are carried by each SCBA wearer in a
pouch fitted to their waist belt (see Fig. 2). The line is 4 mm in
diameter and is 6 m long.
On the outboard end there is a large snaphook which can be
attached to either the main guiderope, which the snaphook
then slides along as the breathing-apparatus wearer proceeds
into the space, or the other SCBA team member so that they
do not become separated (see Fig. 3)
Lifelines
The use of lifelines under every condition of SCBA-assisted
entry is a matter of judgement and practicality. In situations
where there is a vertical straight descent or an area free of
obstacles, the lifeline can be paid out and may be used for basic
signalling.
In cases where several changes of direction are necessary at
different levels, the lifeline 'will quickly become fouled and
retard the progress of the SCBA wearer. Additionally, it will
no longer be capable for use in signalling.
In the past the lifeline has always been secured to a SCBA
harness between the shoulder blades. Thus it was very difficult
for the SCBA wearer to release it should the line become
entangled. It is now recommended that whenever lifelines are
used they are secured to the SCBA wearer's safety belt at the
waits. Lifelines must always be available at the breathing-
apparatus control site. in the event that they are needed for
hoisting casualties.
40
hel,itloss, but the body can absorb heat if the temperature of Working within safe time limits
the environment is higher than body temperature). All the above factors cause the body's heat-regulation sys-
3. Evaporation (perspiration reduces body heat by evapor- tem to break down and can produce the following symptoms,
ation). which must be brought to the attention of all team members:
_ Blood flow is increased to the blood vessels in the skin,
. Entering an enclosed space or approaching afire especially if the ambient temperature is greater than the
In situations where a SCBA wearer enters an enclosed space body temperature.
or approaches a fire, it must be appreciated that when wearing - The pulse rate increases with a corresponding rise in breath-
protective clothing air circulation will be minimal. The protec- ing rate and the blood pressure drops, causing the blood
tive clothing also prevents radiation heat loss which may result supply to the brain to reduce leading to failure of the senses
in the body absorbing heat rather than losing it. and unconsciousness.
As a hot and humid atmosphere prevents perspiration, there - Heat stroke occurs, perspiration ceases and the individual
will probably be no body-cooling effect from this process. It becomes increasingly irritable and complains of headache
should also be borne in mind that hard physical work will also and a burning sensation ofthe skin.
generate body heat, and so any person working in an enclosed - Unconsciousness soon follows and the person may theh pass
space or approaching a fire must be made fully aware of the into a coma and die.
very real dangers of heat stroke. It can be appreciated from the above that it is obvious that
the individuals must not be allowed to work in a hot and humid
atmosphere for longer than is absolutely necessary, nor must
they make successive entries into an enclosed space without
suitable recovery periods.
Any team member who is suffering or appears to suffer from
dizziness, nausea or abdominal pain must be relieved and
escorted to fresh air. Dry clothes and cold drinks must be
available (see Table III).
Smoke inhalation
Smoke inhalation must be avoided or reduced to the abso-
lute minimum. SCBA teams must don their equipment in fresh
air.
The effects of smoke inhalation are cumulative and are not
overcome by moving an affected person to fresh air, although
their condition can be eased by this changed location. Soot
particles from the smoke-filled environment will have passed
into the person's lungs.
Under no circumstances must any person who has been
affected by smoke be allowed to make further breathing
apparatus entries into any enclosed space. It should be noted
that recovery from excessive exposure to smoke takes some
considerable time.
Evacuation signals
Whenever a SCBA team is inside a space and the team
leader requires the team to evacuate, a whistle can be used if
other communication methods have failed. A continuous
series of whistle blasts means evacuate the space immediately.
Entry control
The most important aspect of SCBA use is the control of the
people wearing and using the equipment. Whenever a decision
to use SCBA is taken, a responsible person must be appointed
as SCBA entry controller.
The nominated SCBA entry controller will equip himself
with the SCBA control board (see Table IV) and position
himself in fresh air as close as possible to the entry point. The
responsibilities of a SCBA entry controller are:
1. To check that the team has donned breathing-apparatus
sets correctly, that they have all the necessary equipment,
and that the face seal check is done.
2. To enter the names of the individuals on the board using the
breathing-apparatus tag and the time of entry. Air-cylinder
pressures should be noted.
3. To use the air-cylinder work duration table provided (see
Table V) to calculate the estimated whistle time.
4. To initiating emergency action if members of the team fail
to report at the expected time (note that ideally the team
should be exiting prior to whistle time).
5. To ensure that any rescue team carries oxygen resuscitation
equipment and that the SCBA team checks are done as well.
6. To record the time of exit of every individual.
41
7. To make any entries deemed necessary in the 'remarks'

column ofthe BA control board.
8. To be able to request auxiliary equipment support as and
when required.
9. To ensure that an adequate supply of full SCBA air
cylinders are always readily available, and suspend breath-
ing-apparatus operations if the supply becomes depleted.
10. To ensure that empty air cylinders are clearly marked
'empty' and sent for recharging or stowage away from the
location of the emergency, so as to prevent empty cylinders
being confused with full cylinders.
11. To prevent unauthorized entry to the enclosed space.
12. To ensure that the team leader is kept fully aware of the
status so that the bridge team is aware of the situation.
Control procedures for SCBA wearers

Wearers of breathing apparatus must strictly adhere to the
following rules:
• At the beginning of operations a SCBA set must not be used
·if a cylinder has less than 20 min worth of air in it.
• All SCBA must be donned in fresh air.
• The team must not enter any space without having provided
the information required by the SCBA entry controller, ie
their name, pressure gauge reading and whether the face
seal test has been carried out. On exiting the space they must
again report to the SCBA entry controller so that the time of
exit is recorded.
• The SCBA team should work as a single unit and work
together at all times.
• Whenever a wearer is seen to be in distress, rescue of that
individual is the first priority.
• During any SCBA entry into an enclosed space, a rescue
team must be on standby alert ready to enter if required.
• SCBA wearers must comply with all the instructions given
to them with regard to disposal and recharging of empty
cylinders.
Selection of appropriate fire-fighting systems Know the ship

The decision to use the fixed system must only be made by On joining any vessel, all personnel must know their lifeboat
the Master after consultation with the Chief Engineer. When station and determine their role in the ERP. They should also
making the decision tQ use a fixed fire-fighting system it should familiarize themselves with the general layout of the ship, for
be remembered that, in the case of gas and foam systems, once example:
the bulk charge has been used there will be no alternatives to • Accommodation.
fight a large fire which is not accessible to fire hoses .• Machinery spaces, including main and auxiliary pumprooms.
With water-spray fixed systems, although the supply of basic • All storerooms, paying special attention to those
materials is endless (ie the sea), due regard must be made as to storerooms where paint and other combustible materials
the likely extent of water damage to other machinery and plant are stored.
that could have an adverse effect on controlling the emergency • Position of all fire alarms.
and saving lives .• Positions of muster stations and emergency equipment
It is imperative that all persons onboard a ship know how to lockers.
operate the fixed fire-fighting systems and that clear and • Locations of fire hoses, fire hydrants and portable fire-
concise instructions are available at the control site of the fighting equipment ..
system .• The operation and location of all emergency fire pumps.
The coverage of each system and its subsystem must be • The position and operation of fixed fire-fighting systems.
clearly marked on an easy to read diagram which illustrates the Most importantly, they must be totally familiar with the
equipment and plant protected by the system. emergency signals and the expected initial responses to those
Operating instructions for fixed fire-fighting systems must signals.
also be made easy to follow by clear mimic diagrams, flow •.••
arrows and colour codings of valves and pipelines for prompt Anticipate SituatiOns
identification. When planning drills, potential emergendes (such as fire,
grounding, collision, man overboard, spillage, large oil pol-
lution, loss of steering and rescue from enclosed spaces) that
• might occur should be anticipated.
PLANNING DRILLS
· · '" . Mental rehearsal of actions
In or d er to ac h leve an e ffi clent ERP It IS Imperative t h at
regular practices are carried out. These practices must be It should be noted that in addition to formal practical drills,
realistic if they are to be effective. Therefore, some of the opportunities should exist and must be taken for individuals to
following points are considered essential for an ERP to be imagine or anticipate emergencies that could occur and then
effective and they should be borne in mind when planning define alternative actions that could be taken in each of these
drills. circumstances.
Trans IMar E (C). Vol. 98, Paper ClIS
42
Thus drills need not only be limited to practical drills but also all emergency equipment is tested in simulated emergency
could be a classroom brain-storming session, leading to sugges- conditions at frequent intervals.
tions to be put into operation at some future drill. Onboard training and safety matters must be made the
responsibility of a safety subco!fimittee. A degree of training of
Identification of probable areas/types of fire safety subcommitte~ members may first have to be instituted
by the Master and hIs management team to ensure all subcom-
When planning drills, thought should be given to the proba- mittee members know their ship and the equipment on it.
ble areas and types of fire that could occur, both at sea and in
port. The Master, through the vessel's management team, V ' ' f I d fi
should create a safety subcommittee. en t Il a t Ion 0 enc ose -space res
This safety subcommittee would report directly to the Mas- It must be stressed that the correct conditioned response to
ter and have the responsibility of reporting the efficiency of a fire emergency is the closing down of ventilation to the space
drills and making recommendations for improvements in the that is affected. The next step is to ascertain informatioQ from
ERP.Itshouldalsobeencouragedtoplanandauditeverydrill. the emergency teams and assess the situation. A command
decision is then required as to whether to restart ventilation,
Awareness of alternative escape routes recognizing that it is a principle of fire-fighting to contai~ fire
and smoke.
When tackling an emergency or evacuating a space, es- It should also be recognized that fire fighters can be assisted
pecially machinery and accommodation spaces, all personnel in reducing heat levels and increasing visual awareness through
must 'know their ship' and be aware of all alternative routes. the use of controlled ventilation. Emergency rescue of casual-
Drills should be arranged so as to cover alternative routes. ties may be enhanced by exercising appropriate ventilation ·of
Outside formal drills, emergency team leaders should con- the affected space.
vene their teams occasionally, especially when new members Such decisions can only be made with a full appreciation of
join the team, to conduct 'know your ship' sessions. the risks involved if the fire were to spread, and so contingency
plans must be made in order to combat such circumstances, the
'' ' attitude to adopt being not if but when.
A wareness 0fth e capa b Il tI Y 0f equlpmen t
It is essential that all personnel understand and are aware of
the capabilities and limitations of their safety equipment. It is
vital that emergency teams are fully conversant with their CONCLUSIONS
equipment. Equipment in emergency control lockers must be
looked after by the emergency response teams. The 'Emergency Response Plan' o~tlined in this paper has
Outside formal drills, emergency team leaders must convene yet to be used in earnest to cope with a large-scale emergency.
their teams regularly in order to conduct 'know your equip- Thus it seems to have achieved one of its primary objectives,
men!' and equipment check sessions. Key support team mem- namely enhancing the awareness of all onboard of the hazards
bers must also be trained by emergency team leaders so that and difficulties involved in rescue and of the positive advan-
they can substitute for emergency team members. tages of prevention.
A survey was recently conducted amongst the seagoing staff
, , , . of TOT Ltd to determine what major changes need to be made
Frequency, attitudes, testmg and trammg to the ERP. The result was that no changes were required after
Emergency drills must be conducted weekly. The objective some 30 months of use. It should be noted that the enthusiasm
of these drills is to stimulate and encourage an initial con- for the plan was not so strong in the beginning, and it was
ditioned response when activating the emergency alarm sig- regarded as just another one of those things from the office.
nals. However, it has been proven that with persistence and belief in
Onboard training must encourage the attitude that drills are the plan, plus ensuring that all the training programmes incor-
not just a regulatory requirement but a rehearsal of actions porated the basic policies of the plan, a high degree of commit-
taken for specific emergencies. Drills must be devised so that ment to the plan has been achieved.
Discussion
F, G. M, EVANS (The COllege of Maritime Studies, Warsash): been a feature of past case histories where engineers have been
I have been involved in the implementation of Texaco's plan by involved fighting 'their fire' without involving the deck depart-
way of in-company enclosed-space and rescue courses at the ment or vice versa. An engineer is second in command, to the
College of Maritime Studies, and I should like to make some Chief Officer, of No. 1 party, and the Second Mate is second in
comments. command, to the third engineer, of No. 2 party.
The first is that the scheme was greeted with complete Lessons learned from exercises include the fact that as a
enthusiasm by ships' crews. (Texaco were also innovative in general principle there must be an on-scene commander (Chief
sending representative whole crews for training together.) Officer on deck, Chief Engineer in the engine room) and other
Secondly, there is a feature in the design to get over the party leaders work to him rather than taking independent
elemehts of inter-departmental non-cooperation which have action or acting on direct orders from the Master.
Trans [Mar E (C), Vol. 98. Paper ClIS
43
W. WRIGHT (University of Wales Institute of Science and ship so long as it is tenable, but in port it is sometimes forgotten
Technology): Texaco are to be congratulated in the way they that early evacuation is often a wise move, as with only one
have tackled the problem of effective ship fire fighting in that possible escape route, and that on only one side of the ship,
they have consulted local fire authorities, who have a great deal lives are sometimes lost by delaying evacuation.
of practical experience in fire-fighting efficiency. They then Additionally, as there are as many different approaches and
agreed upon a general guideline for mustering of crews and the decisions as there are Masters and the wrong decisions can
duties of fire parties on hearing alarms etc. endanger a whole crew, I wonder if any 'Guidelines to Masters'
Although this arrangement may be modified during the fire, have been formulated?
it provides each crew member with muster stations and duties
so that in the vital first few minutes each man knows exactly
what he has to do.
The alternative to the 'fleet' guideline is the shipboard safety
committee where the Master and Officers decide their own Author's reply
strategy. This, however, has the disadvantages of arguments
being won by seniority and powers of persuasion and not
fire-fighting experience, and also a plan changing many times In response to Mr Evans, feedback from ships' officers has.
with changes of personnel, leaving the long-serving crew totally indicated that during practice drills an on-scene commander
confused. has proved to be essential. With the teams communicating
through him to the Master, lines of communications are more
Capt. R. D. M. LENTHALL (OIL Ltd): A new procedure is clearly defined resulting in less radio congestion and confusion.
nOFffiallyintroduced by a statement that it is now company The Bridge Team are also able to monitor the situation, which
policy and has to be adhered to. However, generally it is better is verified at regular intervals by situation reports from the
to sell the idea or concept to the ship's staff involved, and lon-scene commander.
should like to ask Mr Skipp how he went about selling the new
procedures to his staff. Repyling to Mr Wright, onboard training is conducted in
such a manner that each team member upon mustering and
Bj. HANSEN (Det norske Veritas): As long as we have com- being checked off undertakes certain specific duties so that the
bustible materials and ignition sources onboard ships then fires entire team arrives at the scene of the emergency with all their
will occur. equipment and ready to tackle the emergency. I don't believe
There are lots of rules and regulations laid down by gov- that there is a practical alternative to this plan given the
ern mental bodies and Classification Societies. They can cer- turnover in staff caused by a vessel's relieving programme.
tainly be improved upon and, I am sure, will be. However, I
feel that systematic training of officers and crew is needed in In reply to Capt. Lenthall, as with introducing any change,
order to make everybody conversant with the fire-protection the way to have people support the change is to involve them
and fire-fighting facilities onboard the ship. in it. Whilst the ERP became company policy and therefore
Such systematic training has been in force in Norway for had to be followed, and with good reason, senior officers who
several years and most Norwegian seafarers have undergone had attended the Command and Control Course with Devon
this training at the Norwegian Naval base outside Bergen or in Fire Brigade could easily see the sound sense and practicality
Stavanger. This training has the positive byproduct of making of it.
everybody concerned safety conscious and hopefully will lead Onboard the ships the involvement of the safety subteam in
to the complete cessation of fires at sea. planning and organizing the drills highlighted the positive
structure of the plan to junior officers and ratings. Positive
N. C. F. BARBER (Qcean Transport and Trading pic): Mr feedback, encouragement and constructive comments from
Skipp has described the Texaco ERP in some detail but I the office relating to reports of drills held onboard vessels
should like him to comment on the relationship with shore- helped to reinforce acceptance of the ERP.
based fire brigades when in port.
In response to Mr Hansen, the primary objective of the ERP
G. VICTORY: Mr Skipp's paper shows the vital necessity of is the preservation of human life, and so the prevention of any
proper planning and proper organization of the actions to be emergency is stressed throughout any vessel safety pro-
taken when fire occurs if lives are not to be lost unnecessarily gramme.
by ill equipped persons endeavouring to 'have a go' them- Formal training in fire fighting is a requirement for British
selves. seafarers and must be undertaken at specified time intervals.
However, it is evident that proper preparation to enter a As a company, Texaco has also ensured that their fleet person-
space, with the necessary taking of equipment from a store, nel have undertaken training in. enclosed-spaces rescue and
checking that it is all there and that each member of the party breathing-apparatus maintenance courses. Whilst I would
is properly equipped, takes time, and in all fires time is of the agree that formal training in these areas increases personnel
essence. awareness of the catastrophic effects of shipboard fires, there
I would like to ask Mr Skipp whether he has checked the is still no substitute for an active and well structured safety and
time from sounding an alarm at night, when most of the crew loss-prevention campaign on board each vessel.
are asleep, to a properly equipped fire party actually entering The recent introduction of official safety officers together
a particular space. If not, could he give an estimate of what the with safety representatives elected from both officers and crew
time might be. It seems we are between the devil and the deep plus the formation of an Executive Health and Safety Commit-
blue sea: rush the job and lives might be lost, do it properly tee and a Health and Safety Subteam ensures that the vessel's
(and I fully agree that nothing less will do) and the fire might loss-prevention programme is well structured and actively
get out of hand.· supported by all the personnel.
Although it is inferred, I would like to have seen special
reference to the need to protect lines of retreat, both in In reply to Mr Barber, in port or shipyard, where t/te ship's
ensuring that the fire party can return safely to an open deck if staff levels may be depleted for any reason, the initial con-
their task proves too dangerous (the 'flash-over' fire is a great ditioned response must be to notify the shore fire and
hazard in this respect) and in the ability to evacuate the ship if emergency services so that additional expert assistance is
this is the only way to survive. At sea one should not leave a available as soon as possible.
Trans [MarE (C). Vol. 98. Paper CI/8
44
The relationship with a shore fire brigade when they arrive and fire-detection systems are so sensitive that occasionally
should be one of giving them as much support, guidance and false alarms are triggered by, for example, a small gas leak
local knowledge as possible to help them tackle the emergency from the uptakes. Response to these alarms at night is reported
in the most effective way. The Master's decision-making in this as being about 2 min to a full muster. I would estimate that a
instance must also be heavily inftuenced by what he learns by further 3 min would elapse before the first team was ready to
conferring with the Officer in Charge of the shore-based tackle the emergency, espeCially if breathing apparatus -is
emergency services. involved and the correct donning procedures are essential.
Port regulations may also dictate that in a major emergency The points regarding protecting lines of.retreat and evacua-
onboard a vessel in the port, the shore-based Officer in Charge tion of the vessel are noted.
of emergency services actually takes full control of the opera- I agree that the decisions taken during any emergeny will
tions to bring the emergency under control. Until expert vary depending upon who is controlling the response. The
assistance arrives, however, the ship's staff must deal with the quality of any decision also relates directly to the facts on which
emergency within the limits of the manpower available at the the decision is based. The ERP is designed to put into effect a
time. conditioned response to an emergency situation or to manage
the emergency effectively. Apart from the Operating 'Policy
In response to Mr Victory, three of our vessels have the Manual, which is onboard each vessel, I am not sure that
facility to operate with unmanned engine rooms. The smoke- further 'Guidelines to Masters' would be necessary.
Trans [MarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper ClI8
45
Paper C1/9
A Fire Brigade's Role in Fire Fighting

Onboard Ships
D. Wynne GradlFireE
Hampshire Fire Brigade
SYNOPSIS
The legal requirements and responsibilities of Local Authority Fire Brigades in the United Kingdom are
summarized, and the number of fires, their size, extinguishing methods and casualties during the 1980s are
examined. The need to be aware of different types and states of ships and the approach to fires onboard
ships is discussed, and the necessity for specialized training and pre-planning is highlighted. Fire Brigade
operational procedures, strategy, tactics and methods of control are outlined.
INTRODUCTION In Scotland there is no equivalent general statutory provi-

sion, and again the boundary may be subject to locallegisla-
From time to time there is an article in one of the trade or tion.
safety magazines stating that 'fire is still the number one enemy Ships in port tied up alongside are within the geographical
of the mariner'. Fire when out of control is indeed totally area of responsibility of the LAFB.
destructive. This paper seeks to present, drawing on 28 years From the above it will be noted that an LAFB has no legal
experience in a Local Authority Fire Brigade (LAFB), the way responsibility to respond to a vessel on fire at sea. However,
in which LAFBs are involved in fighting ships' fires. there are several LAFBs whose area~ of responsibility include
coastline and whose members have volunteered to go to sea to
LIT fight fires, Hampshire Fire Brigade being one of them.
ega posllon In 1970 there was a severe fire onboard the Pacific Glory, a
In the UK there are 63 LAFBs. Each authority is auton- 42 ()()()ton oil tanker, when she was in the Solent off the coast
omous in its own right, but must comply to nationally agreed of Hampshire. There were thirteen fatalities, but without the
and monitored standards. The Fire Services Act of1947 clearly lessons learnt from a similar incident in 1967 involving the
makes specific requirements of all Local Authorities, which 61 ()()()ton Torrey Canyon off the coast of Cornwall, the final
include: result could have been much worse.
1. The provision of the necessary services for the area covered Where an LAFB attends a fire at sea it does so in the exercise
and the personnel and equipment to meet efficiently all of its power under Section 3(I)(d) of the Fire Services Act
normal requirements. 1947, which enables the authority to employ the fire brigade
2. The provision of efficient training for the personnel. maintained by them, or use any equipment so maintained,
3. The provision of the necessary communications to receive outside their area. However, it must be emphasized that this
calls for assistance and to summon the personnel in cases of service is not volunteered by all LAFBs.
emergency.
4. !he p~ovision of e~ficient ~rrange~ents to. obtain, by Figures and statistics
inspectIOn or otherwise, the information required for fire
fighting in the area covered. The Department of Transport show in their latest casualties
5. The provision of adequate supplies of water and access to to vessels of over 100 gross registered tons that in 1980, of the
them. 2771 vessels registered, there were 38 incidents of fire and
Section 72 of the Local Government Act of 1972 for England explosion. In 1983 there were 2361 vessels registered and 23
and Wales defines the limit of responsibility of a Local Author- incidents of fire and explosion ..
ity as the low-water mark at ordinary tides. There are vari- Every emergency incident attended by an LAFB in the UK
ations to this rule where the boundary of a borough which is subject to a report. These details are collated and published
abuts on the sea or river has been extended by local act or annually. Table I shows incidents for all classes of ships and
provisional order. To determine the seaward boundary of such boats for the first four years of this decade. The figures for 1974
an authority it is necessary to refer to the extension map are also shown for comparison. The size of the fire can be
attached to the act or order before deciding how far land judged by the number of water jets used by the LAFB to
covered by water is included in the authority's area. extinguish it .
• From 1980 to 1983 the total number of incidents attended by
LAFBs was constant with little variation in the methods used
to extinguish the fires. There is an indication that there were
Divisional Officer Derek Wynne has been actively fewer large fires, ie those which required three or more jets and
involved in ship fire fighting since 1957. He is n?w the involved ships rather than boats. A similar pattern to that
Divisional Training Officer for South E~ Hamp~hlre and shown by the Department of Transport's figures is indicated.
lectures regularly at the College of Marltlm~ StudIes, W~r- Casualties to persons involved in fires onboard ships and
sas h~ Ph 08O .iNBCD
X School, HMS Phoenix and The FIre boats attended by LAFBs are shown in Table II. Non-fatal
rvlce
Se C0 ege. II ·
casua Ities . t h e elg
In . h·ties h ave Increased
. compared with 1974,
Trans IMarE (C). Vol. 98. Paper CI/9
47
and 1982 and 1983 show some decrease in the number of fatal priorities. The fire brigade is there to save life first and extin-
casualties. However. it appears from the figures that there will guish fires as a secondary consideration.
not be a drastic change in the number of incidents overthe next Experience. custom. practice and local knowledge make a
five years. good background for an efficient and determined attack to
A fire at sea, in accordance with LIoyd's casualty returns. is extinguish a fire. The approach is first to find the fire. which is
more than twice as likely to lead to the total loss of a ship than not always an easy task in unfamiliar and smoke-laden passage-
the next highest single cause. namely 'weather'. Lives will ways. compartments. spaces and holds. The knowledge and
continue to be lost and fires will continue to occur onboard guidance of the master and crew is needed. If required. and if
ships. There is no doubt that. for the rest of this decade and the manpower permits. there should be a combined fire brigade
beyond. the mariner. when his ship is tied up in port. or when and ship's crew team of four men, equipped with breathing
able to reach land, will continue to call on the expertise of fire apparatus. who will enter and find the fire. The thermal
brigades when there is fire onboard his vessel. imaging camera. which detects variations of temperature, is
now part of the standard equipment, as it is also of the RN. It
is a welcome and useful tool of the 19805. Indeed at fires which
Types and states of vessels are deep seated and more difficult to find. it should prove to be
Each LAFB will be aware of the types of ships that will both revolutionary and indispensable.
frequent its ports: whether dry cargo, gas carrier or cruise Once the fire is found then it can be determined exactly what
liner, the risk must be known and understood and emergency is burning. and a decision as to what action ought to be taken
plans must be made. can be made, and a plan of campaign laid out.
Hampshire Fire Brigade expects to be called to fires oboard Consider first ships tied up alongside. With current preventa-
all classes of surface vessels and submarines of the Royal Navy tive measures any fire should be discovered in its early stages
(RN) in Portsmouth Naval Base, and also the visiting ships by the ship's crew, by automatic fire-detection systems. by
from NATO and other countries. posted safety sentries or by watch keepers. The LAFB must be
The ships involved may be of conventional propulsion or called immediately and will respond quickly. The method is to
nuclear powered, and they may be fuelled, armed and fully fight the fire hard and fast. and extinguish it whilst it is small.
manned with a disciplined and capable crew. On the other keeping the task relatively easy. If this cannot be done. for
hand they may be undergoing a refit with aver'! rc:duced crew. whatever reason. such as the size and strength of fire. its
perhaps only watchkeepers at night. Under these cir- locat,ion. access or stability. then the fire must be contained.
cumstances Hampshire Fire Brigade is aware that the vessel is isolated, controlled and then extingushed.
more vulnerable to a serious fire. Usually there are more
combustible materials onboard than a fire-prevention officer T "ni
would be happy with, and during the day there is the extra risk . ral ng
of workers carrying out their specific tasks. Even with the best In order that the British Fire Service has a uniform general
roll-board system, the accountability ofthe personnel onboard approach, courses on ship and port fires are regularly held at
the ship is sometimes not as quick and effective as would be the Fire Service College at Moreton-in-Marsh, Gloucester-
wished for in an emergency. shire. Here senior officers who have a shipping risk on their
Hampshire Fire Brigade recognises that the RN has a prior- ground obtain a thorough understanding of prevention, pre-
ity to maintain a floating and moveable fighting platform for planning, liaison. stability. strategy, tactics and command for
the defence of the nation. To do so, their ships are constructed fires onboard ships. There is even a concrete ship in its own
and protected accordingly. They are also fitted with automatic dock for realistic exercises.
fire-detection systems. and automatic and manual fire-extin- The .mariner can expect the same service from all LAFBs
guishing installations; these include fire mains water spray, throughout the UK. although each one will be planned specifi-
sprinklers, foam and Halon systems. along with numerous cally to the locally available resources and need. To ensure
portable extinguishers. All of these precautions are familiar to efficiency in all aspects of its work. each brigade is visited
the well trained crew, who have the additional protection of annually by one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Fire Brigades.
Fearnaught fire clothing and compressed-air breathing
apparatus. Pre-planning
At the adjacent Portsmouth Continental Ferry Port, which
is busy and growing, a different risk is expected from the It is essential to have a workable, and preferably proven,
passenger/cargo re-ro ferries. Mixed and unknown cargoes plan for all the different emergencies to which an LAFB may
present problems in an emergency. At a serious fire on a car be called, and fire-fighting on board ships is no exception. The
deck on a re-ro, which was initially contained by the crew and Appendix shows the introduction to the Hampshire Fire
subsequently extinguished by Hampshire Fire Brigade, it was Brigade order detailing the operational instructions for proce-
realized, after the smoke had cleared, that a large and full dures to be adopted by personnel when attending the various
liquefied petroleum gas container had been in the fire. listed shipping incidents they may be called to. This is an 'In
In the large commercial port of Southampton there are House' discipline. A major portion of the time of the brigade is
extensive containerization facilities, re-ro and general cargo devoted to training, which is considered to be an important
traffic. factor in fighting fires.
Pre-planning must include good liaison between senior fire
brigade officers (from the Chief Fire Officer to the Officer in
APPROACH OF THE FIRE BRIGADE TO FIRES Chargeofthe dock's fire station) and the Local Port Authority,
ONBOARD SHIPS the Admiral ofthe Port, the Port Captain, the Port Manager,
shipping company managers or representatives, and,
I 'fal I' whenever possible, masters and senior crew members.
DI I ac Ion. Regular joint meetings should be held between the various
Many senior fire brigade officers who now have a command levels of responsibility, and problems should be identified and
role at fires onboard ships learnt their trade as a fireman, plans made. This will include the provision of private water
wearing a breathing-apparatus set with a water spray jet or a supplies and communications, access for vehicles and an accep-
foam branch in their hands, fire fighting in smoke and intense tance of each others' roles and responsibilities.
heat. This is where the fight is won or lost by the fireman doing Arrangements should be made for regular familiarization
the right thing, at the right time, and safely. The lives of the visits by firemen from the local station to the port and ships.
mariners, members of the public and firemen are the first Many potentially disastrous incidents have been controlled
Trans [MarE (C). Vol. 98. Paper Cl/9
48
before the brigade arrives. Small fires are comparatively easy

and quick to extinguish. Large fires are not so easy and are very
. expensive.
If the LAFB arrives and is informed that the fire has been
extinghished by the ship's company, the officers do not object,
and there is no charge! In fact this is the case in the majority of
fires attended by Hampshire Fire Brigade in Portsmouth Naval
Base.
Operational procedure
because of local knowledge and the ability to apply the correct The strength of the LAFB is in their short response time.
extinguishing agent both efficiently and effectively. Hampshire Fire Brigade expects to arrive at the dock area of
At a serious fire it is so helpful to meet familiar port and Portsmouth or Southampton within five minutes of receiving a
company personnel: no time is wasted and fighting the fire call, with three pumping appliances and an emergency tender.
becomes a joint venture. Two senior officers wi\l also be present. Each self-contained
pumping appliance has at least four men and three compressed-
Responsibilities air breathing-apparatus (CA~) sets witb spare cylinde~.
The emergency tender has addItIonal CABA sets, spare cyhn-
In 1976, following a serious fire onboard HMS Fife, a County ders and walkie-talkie radio sets, and.is used as a dockside
class destroyer undergoing a major refit in Portsmouth Dock- communications centre in direct radio contact with both the
yard, the responsibilities of the RN and senior fire brigade officer in charge of the incident onboard the ship and Brigade
officers at a fire were clearly defined. The RN officers main- Headquarter's Control. All communications pass through this
tained overall command of the ship, but after briefing, control point.
provided that there is sufficient manpower and equipment, Breathing-apparatus wearers on the first two appliances don
responsibility for all saving of life, extinguishing of the fire and their sets whilst travelling to the fire. Upon arrival at the
control of all breathing-apparatus wearers (both fire brigade correct gangway the officer in charge boards the vesseltogether
and RN) is handed over to the senior fire brigade officer in with two BA men and the BA entry-control officer, who
attendance. records all details of all BA men working in the fire to ensure
The RN must supply all information and resources, both their safety. Two 25 m lengths of hose of 45 mm diameter and
manpower and equipment. that wi\l be reasonably requested a hand-controlled branch are taken onboard. The second crew
to deal successfully with the emergency. This has always been then follow with two more BA men and hose. Water from the
the situation and has never led to any problems, but a written ships mains, if available, is used for the initial attack. Regard-
instruction leaves an inexperienced person with no doubt. less of this the third appliance obtains water from the nearest
Onboard a merchant ship the master maintains the responsi- dockside hydrant and takes onboard an independent supply
bility for his vessel: the LAFB attends at his request and, as the along with hose that wi\l terminate at a controlled dividing
experts, accept responsibility for saving lives and extinguishing breaching on the weather deck at the nearest point of entry to
fires. Good liaison, understanding and cooperation is essential the fire. This can supply two good spray jets and is quickly
at a large fire. available for use if required.
Ifa situation exists which is beyond control, the Port Captain The officer in·charge of the third appliance remains ashore
may need to exercise his responsibility and order the offending and becomes the dockside officer, responsible for cQntrol of
vessel to be removed, in order to protect the docks, surround- vehicle movement, access and water supplies. Two members
ing areas, buildings etc. of his crew don BA and report to the officer in charge of the fire
for deployment.
Once the resources for an immediate attack have been
Types or fires assembled, the basic strategy must be considered. The choices
The LAFBs have a saying that all fires are different and each are attack and extinguish, initial containment, prevent
must be dealt with on its own priorities, but fires onboard ships immediate local spread or investigate further spread of fire.
are similar in that they can be compared to a fire in a sealed tin The choice must be right for the prevailing circumstances. As
box containing an abundance of fuel, oxygen and heat. This much information as possihle is needed from the master or
produces large quantities of smoke, and large quantities of senior officer in charge at the scene of the fire. Some of the
steam when water is applied. Qmditions of high temperature questions that are asked are:
and humidity make fire fighting difficult, dangerous and • Is anyone missing or injured, and if so where are they?
arduous. • Where is the fire?
Statistics show that fire is most likely to break out in machin- • What is burning?
ery spaces, followed by cargo and accommodat~on spac~s. • ~ave electrical supplies to the ship or fire zone been
When ships are tied up alongside and a fire occurs, mespectlve Isolated?
of where or when or the size of it, the LAFB should be called • How long has the fire been burning?
straight away at the time of discovery, rather than later when • How did the fire start?
the crew have lost control and a serious fire has developed • What action has been taken by the ship's staff?
49
• What is the state of the ship's salt-water services? 3. Foam Officer: Responsible for ensuring adequate supplies
• Are there any dangerous compartments adjacentto the fire? of foam compound or concentrate and availability and
• What is the state of the ship's fire and emergency party? efficient operation of foam-producing equipment.
• How critical is the ship's stability? 4. Water Officer: Responsible for adequate water supplies
• How much water has been pumped in? and dockside officer.
• Are timber docking shores affected (in dry dock only)? 5. Stability Officer: Responsible for gathering information
• Has a smoke boundary been set up, and is so where is it? and, in liaison with the ship's officers, giving advance
• What fixed fire-fighting installations are available? warning of stability problems and determining corrective
• Have any fixed fire-fighting installations already been action.
operated? 6. Liaison Officer: Responsible for informing master, or in the
With this information the best course of action can be case of RN officer in charge at ship's HO, of fire brigade
determined. If the fi.re is in an obvious location it may be activity and advising fire brigade senior officer at the scene
possible to make a direct attack. But if it is not it may be of the fire of any relevant information obtained.
necessary for the BA men to lay a ship's guideline from the 7. Salvage Officer: Responsible for effective salvage opera-
weather deck to the fire. They are then guided to the fire by tions in order to minimize the effects of water used in
ship's personnel in BA who are familiar with that part of the fire-fighting operations.
vessel. Once the guideline is in position hoses can be laid and
fire fighters can quickly and safely find their way through thick .
smoke to and from the fire. CONCLUSIONS
. Experience has shown that it is folly to give BA men detailed
instructions on a complicated route through smoke to the seat Ship fire fighting in the 19805 will surely be dominated by the
ofthe fire. The going is painfully slow for safety reasons, and it severe fires that occurred during the Falklands campaign.
is also extremely easy to become totally disorientated. Lessons learnt relating to breathing apparatus, clothing, com-
Where deep penetration through smoke is necessary, it is of munications and the need for effective training were of great
the utmost importance that the first BA team is of two fire interest, but were no great surprise.
brigade men and two men from the ship's company. If avail- It has always been recognized by LAFBs that their efficiency
able, a thermal imaging camera should be used. Once the fire in extinguishing fires below deck is directly attributed to their
is located the first hurdle is over, and the correct extinguishing ability to muster sufficient well trained and motivated BA men
media can be selected and the attack begun. anI! attack the fire hard.
If this is not possible then the fire must be contained until
additional resources are available, or with the compartment
closed down the fixed fire-fighting installations (if provided) APPENDIX
can be used. These systems should be used early to control the
fire, r~ther than after the fire has grown too big to be controlled Introduction to Hampshire Fire Brigade operational
effectIVely... , . instructions
The correct extmgulshmg media must always be used, and
occasionally water is very wrong. However, whether ex- This is a composite Order, together with Appendices, setting
tinguishing or controlling a fire below decks, to 'cool it', using out instructions, guidance and procedures to be adopted when
the minimum amount of water, is usually the correct action to fighting fires onboard ships in or moored alongside docks,
take. ships away from shore and small vessels in inland waterways. It
also gives details of the Solfire Emergency Plan.
S "ft d f For reference purposes the order is divided as follows:
peel c u les Part I General instructions for ship fire fighting in
Once a fire and the fighting of that fire are under way, and as dock.
make-up appliances and officers arrive, it is vital that adequate Appendix A Port fire liaison officer.
logistic support is present and that there is full control of Appendix B Special procedures, HM ships.
specific operations. For this purpose consideration must be Appendix C Ship fires and stability procedures.
given to nominating officers for specific duties. These may Appendix D Fires in ships, Southampton Water (non-Solfire
include; incidents).
1. Officer in Charge of Control Unit: Responsible for effective Appendix E Fires afloat, Portsmouth Harbour and Eastern
operation of the control unit and control of reinforcing Solent (non-Solfire incidents).
appliances and personnel. Appendix F Fires afloat, rivers and marinas.
2. Breathing-apparatus Main Control Officer: Responsible Appendix G Visits of nuclear·ships.
for the provision of BA wearers and equipment, and servic- Appendix H The Solent and Southampton Water Marine
ing needs to meet all BA requirements. Emergency Plan.
Trans IMar£ (C), Vol. 98, PaperCl/9
50
Discussion
Dr A. MITCHESON (Dr J. H. Burgoyne and Partners): I Vancouver, British Columbia, it is our cust011!to present the
would like to echo Mr Wynne's plea for closer cooperation ship's master with a pamphlet entitled 'N,9tices to Ship Mas-
between fleet owners and fire brigades. ters', this being taken aboard by the pilot when he joins the
Before the Summit Tunnel fire of December 1984, LAFBs vessel.
received little cooperation from British Rail in planning their In the event of a fire onboard a vessel when at the Port, the
emergency procedures in the event of a fire within a tunnel. responding Municipal Fire Department Chief would deploy
Needless to say, LAFBs were very concerned about the poten- his manpower and equipment in cooperation with and under
tial for catastrophe. The Summit Tunnel incident brought that the advice of the ship's master for ship safety, and the Harbour
potential to the attention of British Rail who now, I under- Master or his designate for the general well being and safety of
stand, offer whatever assistance they can to LAFBs. Close the Port facility.
cooperation with the relevant fire brigades is essential to We have for the past 20 years operated without any serious
mitigate loss,. and it should not take a disaster in which lives fire incident but feel quite confident that fire control. and
may be lost to forge these links. extinction could be- achieved with our present local agree-
ments.
Capt. R. D. M. LENTHALL (OIL Ltd): I should like to ask Mr
Wynne about his and LAFBs' responsibilities and authority in
the event of land-based fires in say hotels, large office blocks or
high-rise flats.
Indeed, does Mr Wynne believe that such authority that he Author's reply
and the LAFBs do have should be extended to cover ships
tied-up alongside in ports? I also wonder why such authority is
not extended to vessels in ports. In reply to Dr Mitcheson, it is a pity, but nevertheless true,
that it often takes a major incident, usually where life is lost, to
Capt. K. A. HAUGEN (Norwegian Caribbean Lines): As a bring about a measure of required awareness of a potential
Captain on cruise ships operating out of Miami, Florida, I am danger, which had previously been treated with a 'blind eye'.
concerned about the fact that the Port of Miami has decided We consider pre-planning essential and are pleased to give
that Miami Fire Department shall be in charge of fighting fires advice. Prevention is preferable to loss of life, investment and
on ships docked in Miami, over-ruling the Captain's authority. employment.
I agreed to have extensive training with the fire department
but I think it is wrong to tamper with the Captain's responsibil- In reply to Capt. Lenthall, the Fire Services Act of 1947
ity. I dread the possible consequences if less developed coun- authorises LAFBs to enter buildings in order to extinguish
tries follow Miami's example. fires. This of course includes office blocks and high-rise flats.
As for authority to board a ship which is on fire when it is tied
J. DENT (Department of Transport): Does Mr Wynne, as a up alongside or indeed in port, providi.ng it is in our geographi-
fire brigade officer in charge of fire brigade parties attending cal area of responsibility we would board with the intention of
ship fires, have any comments to make on the following: fire fighting. Other than a superficial fire, it is extremely
1. The equipment statutorily provided on merchant ships unlikely that our action would be effective without the full
for fire-fighting purposes. cooperation and support of the Captain and crew. In this
2. The minimum type and a number of crew he would hope unlikely event the vessel, unlike the hotel, can be moved.
to find on board. There are exceptions, but I have only once been refused
3. The facilities available to ships to call a fire brigade. permission to board. The vessel in question was a visiting
4. The arrangements that should be made for command warship, and the pre-determined arrangement required them
responsibility when a fire brigade is called to a ship where to inform the LAFB in the event of fire. We assembled our
the ship's staff are also involved. resources on the dockside whilst the crew extinguished their
small fire. If they had not been successful, only then would we
N. C. F. BARBER (Ocean Transport and Trading pic): Mr have boarded. Failure, caused by time delay and fire spread,
Wynne has referred to the need for good liaison and coopera- would have resulted in removal and subsequent destruction.
tion between the ship and the fire brigade.
Could he please comment on how effective liaison with In response to Capt. Haugen, there is an unquestionable
merchant ships is in practice and would he please suggest ways necessity for all participants at a fire to know their responsibil-
in which merchant ships could organize themselves better in ity and have the authority to discharge it.
relation to shore-based fire brigades. It would be improper for me to make comments on proce-
dures appropriate to Miami.
M. S. SANDELL (B. D. Systems): Up to now ways of control- Unless fire is controlled, it will consume and destroy. Cer-
ling fires, the problems caused by fires, how to prevent fires tainly a Fire Officer is, by virtue of his knowledge and experi-
spreading and how to put out fires have been discussed, but the ence, best suited to command operations to save life and
problem of how fires on ships are started has n?t been addr~s- extinguish fires. There should be no joint responsibility in this
sed. I should therefore like to ask Mr Wynne If he could give respect. Where there is a competent fire brigade to assist I
some indication of the most relevant causes of fire and reasons would think a ship's master would be pleased to receive this
for the outbreak of fire onboard ships. type of assistance.
I appreciate that smoking in certain areas is now prohibi~ed, Generally, the Captain should maintain responsibility for
and that measures have been taken to prevent fires occurnng, his vessel at all times. However, I hope he would not expect to
but one of the most relevant courses of action could be to be given the authority to direct the actions of LAFB personnel.
isolate the major danger areas and discover the main causes of
fires starting. I shall reply to Mr Dent's comments in the order he has made
them:
W. E. HOOPER (Vancouver Port Corporation): At the port of 1. The fire-fighting equipment provided onboard ships is of

course for use by Ships' crews and not designed or benefits of all participants involved in a ship fire of knowing
supplied with a fire brigade in mind. I am in favour of their responsibilities and procedures cannot be overstressed.
sufficient self-contained breathing-apparatus sets, pro- The only way for effective liaison is interaction with your
tective clothing and fire-fighting equipment to enable the local fire brigade. If all companies introduced a requirement
crew to have an opportunity to extinguish the fire success- that all their ships had an annual exercise with their LAFB
fully. More breathing apparatus sets need to be supplied. when in port, this would be a start. In many instances this may
Fixed fire-detection and extinguishing systems are also be difficult to achieve, but it should be possible to make one
most welcome, person at the shipping office the 'Fire Brigade Liaison Officer',
2. We are aware of automation onboard ships and a reduc- give him the task of introducing a practical programme for his
tion of crew. Number of crew and size of vessel are area of responsibility, and have a company system of checking
directly related. If the crew are few in number then the area effectiveness.
ship's safety design, fire-detection and automatic/manual
fire-extinguishing systems should be to a high standard. In reply to Mr Sandell, the Department of Transport show in
3. The need is for us to be called quickly. A fixed facility to their 'Casualties to Vessels Registered in the United Kingdom'
all ships is desirable. This should be received by the return for 1983, which is their latest issue, the following causes
LAFB via the '999' telephone system or via a fixed of fires and explosions on ships of 100 gross tons or more:
'emergency ~nly' direct line from ~ const~ntly manned Mechanical breakdown or failure 1
dockyard sWitchboard, Language difficulties could be a Electricsparkin 3
problem, but pre-planned arrangements can overcome
' H 0t wor kg 3
this. , , Spillage ofliquids 4
4, The Captam of the vessel should retam overall command
'd 'b'l' & h' ' ' Oth er k nowncauses 9
an responsl I ny lor IS vesse I at a II times. Th e Semor T t I 20
Fire Brigade Officer present should be responsible for 0 a
the command and control for the saving of life and the
' , ' ' ' e In r spon se to M r H ooper, t 0 ma k e a poSI·t'Ive wn'tt en
extmctl<;>n.~ f fire on b oar d sh IpS: Th ISwou,Id mc Iu d e t h e communication to all masters of vessels enterin rt must be
responsibilIty for any crew usmg breathmg apparatus od . g po .
during the incident, The Captain and crew should be a go plan. ~t IS.ofcour:se necessary tQ en~u~e that th~ CaptalO
, ' reads the notice 10 detall and passes on this mformatlon to the
require d t 0 respon d favoura b ly t 0 any reques t s pu t to ' ' ...
them by the LAFB for information equipment or man- crew. To sign that he has rec~lve~ th~ notice ISnot sufficient.
th t' bl t d ' No doubt a verbal commumcation IS also made to ensure
power a ISreasona y reques e . mutual understanding.
Good command at an incident requires thorough informa-
In reply to Mr Barber, with exceptions, liaiso~ between ship tion about the ship and cargo, and cooperation with the ship's
and fire brigades in this financially orientated world leaves ,master is essential. However, at a fire in the UK, command and
much to be desired, We understand your pressures in the short control ofthe fire fighters would always remain with the Senior
periods your vessels are tied-up alongside. However, the Fire Officer present.
Trans [MarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper C1I9
52
Paper C1/10
Ship Stability during Fire Fighting

F. G. M. Evans BA, FNI, GradlFireE, D. G. Eves Extra Master, MNI and J. Spiers BSc, CEng,
FRINA
College of Maritime Studies, Warsash
SYNOPSIS
Although stability theory has not changed, the present generation of seafarers tend to rely mor~ on
stability indicators or computers to solve problems. However, during an emergency, experience and a sound
understanding of concepts may in some cases be more valuable than predictions gained from instruments.
Various aspects of stability assessement during fire fighting are discussed and the need for preplanning and
consideration of the problems likely to be encountered is emphasized.
INTRODUCTION
The authors are lecturers at The College of Maritime
Over the past decade an average of about 60 ships a year Studies, Warsash, within The Southampton Institute of
have been lost as a result of fire on board. While the great H.igher Education. Mr F. G. M. Evans i. in charg~ of the
majority of the loss are directly attributable to the fire itself, Flre-~g~tlng School and conducts regular routine and
some have occurred through insufficient stability and capsize .• peelahst couflles for students from h~me a~d abroad. Mr
.. ' D. G. EV811 i. Deputy Head of the Nautical Science Depart-
m some mstances ... after the fire has been brought under control. m em an d Mr.J Spt'efll Is IIUbI'ect leade r for Sh'Ip St a b'I'ty
II
In other ~ases, as Illustrated recently on MV Scandinavian Sea, and Construction. Both Mr EVeIIand Mr Spiers lecture to
fire fightmg had to be suspended for several hours because the students preparing for Class 1 and 2 Department of Trans-
stability was considered to be insufficient. port examination •.
Traditionally, monitoring of stability has been the province
of the deck department but with the advent of smaller crews
and a team management approach to ship operation, roles are
changing. Engineer officers are also trained in ship stability can then be directed to fire fighting alone. Should the fire
and may be called upon to assess stability during normal or escalate into a major operation, time will be available {or
emergency situations. stability assessment and corrective action can be taken before
The 1968 Load-line Rules specify a minimum standard of a critical situation develops ..
stability for a vessel in any sea-going condition. The majority However, it appears that with increased container and deck
of vessels operate with an adequate reserve above this cargo traffic some vessels, in particular smaller ones, operate
minimum so that if a fire-fighting emergency occurs there with a stability standard not far in excess of the required
should be no immediate stablity problems and the major effort minimum. In such cases stability considerations may well run
concurrent with the emergency since the minimum standard
required by the Regulations gives little lattitude for any further
deterioration.
MEASURES OF STABILITY
Most ships' officers and probably most fire brigade officers
are given instruction in ship stability and are aware of the
metacentric height (GM) and curve of statical stability (GZ
curve) as measures of stability (see Fig. 1).
Metacentric height
For the practical mariner this is probably the most con-
venient measure of stability as KG is relatively easy to calculate
and KM is pre-computed against draught for the upright
condition. Providing the GM is moderately large, the move-
ment of M for small angles of heel is insignificant.
What is not always fully appreciated is what will happen if G
is raised above M or how to assess the likely equilibrium
position, if any. The vessel will be unable to remain upright and
the equilibrium angle or loll, which may be to either side, will
gradually increase as GM becomes more negative. Under
these circumstances the movement of M must be acknow-
ledged in order to appreciate how the equilibrium position and
subsequent positive stability is attained. The onset of a nega-
tive GM caused by adding top weight when fire fighting will be
53
righting levers, ie assuming the upright FSM remains constant

at all angles, is probably justified if for no other reason than it
is difficult to allow for pocketing by any simple approach. If
.pocketing does occur the heeling moment of the liquid will be
reduced and so any error in assessment is on the safe side.
When fire fighting small quantities of water may be put into
a space of large breadth and to ignore pocketing in such
circumstances can be very misleading. Many vessels have large
spaces high in the ship, eg public rooms in passenger vessels or
car decks in ferries. The free-surface moments of such spaces
can be very large and if assumed to come into effect as soon as
water is added the resulting assessed stability could cause
alarm. It is presumably such assumptions that have led to
articles appearing in the national press with such headlines as
'The ships that sink with one inch of water'. A simple example
may clarify the point.
Consider a vessel of 20000 t displacement with GM = 0.5 m
and 8M = 5.0 m. As a result of fire 5 t of fresh water is added
to an empty rectangular deck 25 m long x 20 m wide, sym-
metrical about the centre line and at the same height as the
ship's centre of gravity. The 5 t will have a negligible effect on
KG,K80rKM.
The values of GM and 8M in the loll formula must both be
corrected for the free-surface effect.
GM fluid would be assessed as 0.5 - [(25 x 20J)/(]2 x
20(05)], ie -0.33 m, and 8M would be assessed as 5.0 - 0.83, ballast double-bottom tanks or other low spaces this should be
ie 4.]7 m. This would suggest an angle of loll of 22°. However, carried out at an early stage. Unnecessary free surface should
5 t of fresh water in this space would only cover the deck to a be eliminated where possible. If there are slack fuel tanks
depth of 1cm, and as soon as the vessel moved from the upright adjacent to the fire and the ullage space is considered danger-
the water would run to the low corner. ous, filling the tank rather than simply inciting will displace
In practice it is virtually impossible to keep the ship precisely both the vapour and the free surface.
upright and particularly so as GM decreases. The water there- Many spaces in a ship are not designed to cope with drainage,
fore would have built up from the low corner and the above other than minor spillage, and scupper facilities will be limited.
assumed FSM would never have arisen. This can be compared Fire fighters should be reminded that continuing to cool a
with the whole 5 t being added at the ship's side 10 m off the boundary that is already wet achieves little other than possibly
centreline, when the transverse shift of G would be (5 x overloading the scuppers. It follows that in general any
10)120005 = 0.0025 m and tan 8 would be about 0.0025/0.5, unnecessary excess of water should be avoided and if halons or
which is negligible. foam can be used in place of water such problems will not arise.
On the assumption that the ship was initially upright the It is essential to ensure that all scuppers and drainage
actual and apparent GZs would be as shown in Fig. 4. facilities are kept clear. In passenger and accommodation
spaces scuppers are limited and stairways are normally sited
near the centre line. There is a tendency therefore for water to
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF STABILITY DURING accumulate on one side. It may be possible to supplement
FIRE FIGHTING drainage by smashing WC pans and waste pipes at deck level.
Rolled up carpets may be used to direct or restrain flood water.
Ships' officers are unlikely to be able to devote time to the It is on record that siphoning using cut rigid hoses has been
finer points mentioned above during a real emergency. A effective in removing water.
prime concern then will simply be to maintain adequate posi- Drastic measures to remove water such as cutting holes in
tive initial stability. Emergencies rarely occur at a convenient the side shell, particularly near the water line, are open to
time and it is doubtful if a stability asessement later than debate. If water could be transferrred a significant distance
departure from the previous port would be available and so downwards the stability is likely to be improved more than by
most decisions and assessments are likely to be made on the discharging it from a small distance above the vessel's centre of
basis of experience, knowledge and the 'feel' of the situation. gravity, even though an additional free-surface effect may be
In a major incident continuing for several hours a quantita- created.
tive assessment will be useful even though accuracy may be Few ships carry portable equipment for removing water. (In
limited by the information available and any approximations one recent incident such equipment was not readily available
or assumptions made. These are likely to be many and may in the port area.) Such equipment would include ejectors
include estimes of: based on the venturi principle (Fig. 6) or portable pumps which
• Weight of water added (by ship, from ashore, from fire need to be fitted with hard suction hose and a strainer. A
boats etc., see Fig. 5); portable pump can be used to remove loose water which is
• Weight of water removed (drainage overside, pumped out); subsequently recycled for fire fighting.
• Weight of water draining from one compartmentto another; Distinguishing between loll and list is important if corrective
• Weight of water turned to steam; action is contemplated as incorrect procedure on a lolled vessel
• Weight of material, cargo etc;. totally burnt and effectively can cause a worse situation to develop. Faced with a ship
discharged; heeled to some angle it is most difficult to decide, without
• KG of added water if there is already material such as cargo rolling the vessel, whether it is lolled because of instability or
in the space' listed because of unsymmetrical loading. It is suggested that
• Free-surfa~ effects. when fire fighting in calm conditions in port it might be difficult
However a best estimate of the situation will be better than to decide whether an inclination was a loll or list unless one
no assesse~ent. Even an approximate GZ curve and a pre- knew the GM or was fairly certain where the water was being
dicted curve for one or two hours later could prove valuable. added. At sea the motion of the vessel would no doubt indicate
If stability looks like becoming marginal and it is possible to a very tender condition.
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CI/IO
55
STABILITY INDICATORS
Marine students have traditionally held an unwavering faith

in the 'the gospel according to the text book', even though it
may on one page state that 'the metacentre is a fjxed point for
angles of heel up to 15°', and then a few pages later attempt to
explain an angle ofloll. In recent years this blind faith has been
superceded by 'the gospel according to the computer' .
Many ships now have computer programmes for routine
stability and stress problems, some not being so convenient for
non-routine use. Constant reliance on the computer dulls one's
memory of theory and fairly rapidly reduces one's ability to
solve problems which the computer has not been programmed
to handle.
The stability officer would be well advised to investigate any
limitations of his computer or indicator, and he may find that
the instrument he would want to rely upon in an emergency can
only accept weights in preprogrammed spaces, which may not
include the space where the fire occurs. It mayor may not give
him a OZ curve and if it does it may not be able to cope with an
angle of loll. If it can handle free-surface effects for dry cargo
spaces it may indicate a misleading curve, as in Fig. 4. Even an
efficient ship's programme may have limitations with which the
ship's officers should become familiar. Additionally it should
be borne in mind that reliability of output depends on the
accuracy of the input (garbage in = garbage out).
Not many ships can boast of the luxury of a computer or a
stability officer. The Department of Transport have recom-
mended that deadweight moment, maximum KG or minimum
OM tables or curves, originally developed for small vessels, be
supplied to all ships for assessing whether stability complies
with the minimum requirements of the load-li\le regulations.
A deadweight moment curve seems to be the most popular
presentation. This is a graph showing the maximum moment
about the keel of deadweight items' plotted against displace-
ment and/or draught. It is a simple matter to calculate the
deadweight moment and plot at the appropriate displacement
to check if the stability is acceptable.
Such a curve indicates how the stability compares with the
required minimum rather than giving actual stability. Where a
vessel just satisfies the minimum criteria, the addition of water
and the free-surface effect may change the condition to unac-
ceptable, although possibly still stable. The addition of a
limiting line for zero OM to the graph will enable the rate at
which stability is being eroded to be assessed. The required
maximum deadweight moment to give zero OM is obtained by
subtracting the light ship moment from the product of displace-
ment and associated KM. Repeating this for several displace-
ments enables a curve to be drawn (see Fig. 7).
At the start of an emergency the displacement and dead-
weight moment can be plotted and this point updated to show
the effects of free surface and added weight. Similarly the
maximum weight to add to produce zero OM can be readily
obtained.
For example, with reference to Fig. 7 and assuming an initial
condition of displacement 2200 t and deadweight moment 5500
t m (point A), let 200 t of salt water be added at KO 6 m into a
rectangular space 8 m long x 8 m wide. A full FSM of (8 x 8 x
1.025)/12 x 350 t m is assumed and the additional deadweight
moment is 1200 t m. From point A layoff the FSM to point 8
and then plot (point C) the final displacement of 2400 t and
deadweight moment of7050 t m. Provided that point Cremains
to the left-hand side of the limiting line the vessel has a positive
OM.
The maximum weight to loadoat a given KO to cause zero
OM can be easily found. Consider an initial position point D,
ie displacement 2600 t and deadweight moment 8000 t m. To
find the maximum weight to load at KO 8 m to cause zero OM,
load (say) 300 t to give a displaCement of 2900 t and a
deadweight moment of 10400 t m and plot at point E. Joining
points D and E will indicate that the maximum weight to load
is 150 t. At sea it would not be prudent to reach this limit, and
56
naturally if means are available for improving the stability to to be made would no doubt indicate the limited data that are
avoid such a critical situation, they should be taken. immediately availa!>le and so indicate the kind of information
Such a diagram is probably most useful for small vessels but that could be prepared. A more complete fire wallet may detail
on larger ships several graphs covering different ranges of essential action to be taken and provide a guidance on the
displacement could be drawn at a convenient scale. Care must following:
obviously be exercised where lines cross at a shallow angle .• KG and dimensions of spaces;
• Drainage arrangements and final collec.tion spaces;
• Identification of watertight and non-watertight boundaries
EMERG ENCY DATA AND DRILLS (the latter would permit the spread of free surface);
• Some of the expediencies highlighted in this paper.
The fire-protection regulations require duplicate sets of
plans to be provided outside the deck house for the use of fire
personnel along with instructions for the maintenance and
operation of equipment. Although the rules do not require CONCLUSIONS
duplicate stability data, their availability for transfer ashore
would seem prudent. One suspects that should a major fire Few people would relish the thought of being responsible for
originate from an electrical fault in the stability indicator no the stability of a tender ship during a major fire. Information
assessment of stability would be possible as all the data books on which to base and check decisions mayor may not be
are frequently stowed nearby! available and the success of any such operation could well
Imaginative fire-fighting drills are often held at sea but depend on the preparation and thought that has been given to
rarely, it would seem. are the wider issues such as stability the possibility ofsuch an event occurring. To ensure competent
assessment considered. An exercise assuming a fire in the monitoring of stability during an emergency a team should be
accommodation spaces and requiring a stability investigation identified and then given regular and realistic training.
Discussion
R. A. STEVENSON (East Sussex Fire Brigade): I should like system extinguishes a fire very quickly, and with follow-up and
to ask Messrs Spiers, Evans and Eves for how long, in the event closure of the sector valve can result in a much smaller weight
of a fire on the car deck involving a large commercial vehicle, of water being released than would be the case if a fire party
the drenching system could be operated before the stability of approach with hoses after the fire had been allowed to get a
the ship became a problem. In making the calculation, what good hold. One company, reporting on the effectiveness of
percentage of the car deck scuppers would be deemed to be sprinklers, said that after an alarm the crew would shut the
unusable because of the debris from the fire? sector valve and go to see where the fire had been.
In the examples (not given in the paper) it was stated that the
C. M. J. GUINAN (Lancashire Fire Brigade): Fires at sea wedge of water does notreach the centre line ofthe ship, or if
require a greater degree of control experience than those in it fills part of whole volume atthe deeper part ofthe wedge then
docks or harbours, and I wonder if it would be reasonable to the loss of GM can be less than a simple calculation would
consider the provision of a specialist (fire) officer on larger suggest. However, the calculations are based on statical stab-
shipping of high value. iIity and ignore the dynamic effect of the wedge of water
The primary function of this officer would be the training of sloshing up against the side of the tank or ship.
personnel, testing and maintenance of equipment, testing of It has often been suggested that the Gaul could not have
detection equipment and fixed installations, and a high degree capsized from the effect of water on deck only, but I have yet
of stability expertise. He would assume command of fire- to see any calculations based on the dynamic effect of a wall of
fighting operations in emergencies and be responsible directly water coming from the stern and building up in the deep wells
to the Master. between the bridge and the high ship side at the forward end of
the after deck. This provided protection to the crew and posed
G. VICTORY: Messrs Spiers, Evans and Eves rightly say that no danger to static water as the sides fell away to normal
losses have occurred through insufficient stability after a fire, bulkheads further aft, but what would happen if a wave sloshed
presumably because of water used in fire fighting accumulating up into the dead-end? Perhaps it would be wise to look at the
in 'top-side' spaces. Tliey quote the case of the MV Scandi- worst case and ignore possibilities which might give a more
navian Sea where fire fighting had to be suspended for several favourable result.
hours because stability w/I5IConsideredto be insufficient. It is agreed that the safest way to improve stability is to press
I would like to ask them whether this water was from manual up any slack tanks in the lower part of the ship and drain any
fire fighting with hoses or whether it resulted from the oper- water from higher spaces to lower spaces or discharge it'
ation ofa sprinkler system. I would imagine the former, for few overboard. However, such action may be dangerous, for if
of the modem cruise ships are fitted with sprinklers now that it sounding pipes, bilge pipes or other connections are broken, or
is not an IMO requirement. scuppers blocked, then holds or tween deck spaces can be
If the former, it would give the lie to the ill used argument partially flooded, resulting in even greater loss of stability. Of
that'operation of a sprinkler system could rC?sultin dan~erous course, one should minimize the quantity of water used in any
loss of stability. In fact the prompt operation of a spnnkler fire.
Trans IMarE (C). Vol. 98, Paper CillO
57
I was on a ship which set off two magnetic mines in Tobruk available in the near future. Computers are, however, seen as
harbour in twelve hours, one whilst entering and the other having enormous potential as teaching aids and could give
whilst moving across the harbour to a 'safer' anchorage. Practi- students a greater feel for the principles of stability.
cally all the bilge pipes and sounding pipes were broken at or
just above the tank top, as was realized after attempts at
pressing up the DBs failed to improve the situation. We tried
to maintain a 10" list to starboard but during the night the ship
flopped over to port to about 45°, and I managed to walk down
the ship's side to take a blank flange off the oil overboard
discharge, allowing oil to be discharged to bring her up to a Authors' reply
manageable angle.
The fact that the tanker Adinda hit a mine, caught fire,
ploughed six feet into our boat deck and holed us under water In reply to Mr Stevenson, the ability of a vessel to withstand
as we rolled on impact, then lay alongside and set us on fire did the addition of Water would depend upon its condition of
nothing to improve the situation. The ship had numerous loading. The capacity and location of deck scuppers is such that
passenger rooms and was very tender but we had to enter the no accumulation of water should occur, and this is normally
after tween deck accommodation with hoses looking for fires in tested by the approving authority. Normal good housekeeping'
these rooms. should ensure that the decks are kept clear of debris which may
In order to reduce the quantity of water used we had to say impede the effectiveness of the scuppers. During a fire it would
'count up to 30, then turn on the water for a minute, then turn be prudent to direct effort to keeping the scuppers clear.
it off. This was the signal for the two people on the hoses to get The function and philosophy of a drencher system is to make
out, for we had no masks or breathing apparatus. Perhaps we up for the lack of fire-breaks in the through decks of Ro-Ro
were lucky but we got away with it. I passed out on reaching the vessels. The asbestos curtains originally fitted were superseded
open air after the last fire, in smouldering lifejackets, had been by water walls. It was, however, difficult to persuade people
extinguished. not to park across the yellow lines bounding the zones. The
I am also surprised that high-expansion foam, a very useful drencher systems now fitted are still zoned. The drencher is
extinguishing media if large quantities of water are to be intended to stop the spread of fire between vehicles but would
avoided, has not been mentioned. not extinguish the fire inside a vehicle and is not like other fixed
Roll-on-roll-off ships were also mentioned, drawing atten- systems where fire fighters wait outside the space for the fire to
tion to the grave danger with these ships of water accumulating be extinguished. Fire fighters may enter with fog applicators or
on a car deck, particularly those high above the main deck. It appropriate extinguishing medium to finish off the fire.
is not often realised that the only drainage allowed in such
spaces is through scuppers draining directly overboard. These In reply to Mr Guinan, some flag Administrations do insist
are fitted with 'clack' non-return valves to prevent water that one ofthe Officers is a designated Fire Officer. France, for
flowing back into the ship but all too often these become instance, requires that one of the Officers should have done
choked, perhaps because the 'clack' valves are apt to stick three months' specialist training. This system has had its
between test periods or because all the rubbish accumulating administrative problems, as you can imagine.·
on the deck is swept or washed into the scuppers. The idea has merit, but as you say it is only a larger
Since the only effective fire extinguishing arrangement in commercial enterprise such as a cruise liner which could
these 'through' car spaces is to use a water-drenching system support such a person if this were his only duty. The next
over a number of sections, a large water outflow may have to question is who would this person be, a fireman with specialist
be disposed of if the free-water effect is to be avoided. When training or a seafarer with specialist training?
looking at the consequences of fitting water-drenching systems It would be impossible for this man to take 'command' of the
I suggested that the scuppers should go directly to a large tank ship's crew in an emergency if he was not normally in a position
with suctions to one or more large pumps. 'Clack valves' would of command on board. The best he could do is to advise the
then not be needed and loss of GM would be avoided. How- Master.
ever, I was told that this would be contrary to the 'load line A suggestion discussed for many years is a go-anywhere
rules', which were laid down for the old open tween deck team of fire fighters. Such a team is at present growing out of
spaces. Apart from the position on the ship there seems little necessity in the Gulf area. Another alternative may be 'special-
similarity between 'through' car spaces and the old tween deck ist advice' available by radio communications. This, plus con-
with its bulkheads and closing appliances. tinued training of the seafarer so that he can act on this advice,
So here we have another case of antiquated rules resulting in is probably the right road to take. Hopefully there are not too
a reduction of safety. I would have thought that this was many people about with a great degree of experience in
sufficient justification for a change in the rules. Perhaps Messrs fighting fires at sea!
Spiers, Evans and Eves could comment on this seeming incon-
stistency. In reply to Mr Victory, the problem in the Scandinavian Sea
arose from the liberal use of water added from hoses. We
J. DENT (Department of Transport): For car deck scupper would agree with your observation that small quantities of
systems, the test performed on trials is to operate two (of say water applied by sprinkler can, in many cases, be much more
seven) sections of drencher at one time together with two fire effective than hose application.
hoses until all combinations of pairs of sections have been Since the conference we have received a document from-the
tried. During this period there must be no build up of water on US Coastguard making recommendations as a result of their
the car deck. Once builders' rubbish has been cleared from all investigations ofthe fire on the Scandinavian Sea. This suggests
scuppers the systems I have seen worked effectively. that the fire would have been quickly controlled if a sprinkler
had been fitted and recommends the fitting of sprinklers even
Cdr J. BOLGER (Ministry of Defence): Since Operation though it is not a legislative requirement.
CORPORATE the Navy has examined thoroughly the Our slide illustrations were concerned with static ca1cu-
requirement, identified in the South Atlantic, for an aide to lations and were intended to illustrate a situation in which a fire
help ship's officers with the stability problem. fighter might be reluctant to add more water because the
So far we have had little success and apart from some consequences of doing so could easily be over estimated. If the
continuing work by Souihampton University on a GM meter, ship were rolling, the water surface would incline beyond the
the RN sees very little prospect of such an instrument being static angle creating an increased heeling moment.
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper ClIIO
58
The addition of storm water, as in the case of the Gaul, 2. Once the fire has been covered, it cannot be seen and it is
provides additional complications involving unknown quan- dangerous, though possible, for men to enter the foam.
tities of water. In the situation you describe we agree that the a
3. The foam cannot exist against dry surface. If the surface
addition of storm water on deck could be considerably higher is hot the bubbles will cOIitinue to burst until the surface
than assumed under a purely static calculation. has been cooled enough to be wetted. Because of the low
We thank Mr Victory for his reminder that, subsequent to water content (1: 1(00) a lot of foam wiD be destroyed
damage, piping may be ruptured. It is good seamanship to before it stabilizes.
check damage after collision, explosion etc. and to check by We agree with the suggestion regarding the drainage of
sounding, if it is not possible visually, that water is going where vehicle decks into a sump tank and it would appear that a
it was intended. number of ships have this facility. This conforms with Lloyd's·
It would be useful if Mr Victory's experiences could be Rules and does not appear to conflict with the load line Rides.
grafted on the shoulders of men being trained today. Howev.er, However the 1984 Cargo Ship Construction Regulations state
it has to be remembered that fighting such a fire without that 'drainage shall be by suitable number and size scuppers
breathing apparatus would be hazardous today as nowadays discharging directly overboard' in certain cases.
even lifejackets are manufactured from man-made materials.
Perhaps greater emphasis should be placed on the advan-
tages in terms of stability of using foam or halons. There are, In reply to Cdr Bo.lger, in the past we have been approached
however, some problems with high-expansion foam which by junior officers who have complained that after their skipper
need to be appreciated: came to Warsash on an advanced fire-fighting course they had
1. If foam is being produced at 8000 m3/min then it will be spent three months doing stability calculations. We endeavQur
necessary to ventilate at the same rate. The exhausted to give our students a better appreciation of the likely
gases may be superheated and cooling sprays should be behaviour of their vessels after damage or emergency action
used. Any back pressure may prevent the foam from and for this purpose computer programmes are a very useful
filling the space leaving isolated pockets of fire. aid.
Trans IMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper ClI 10
59
Paper C1/12
Fixed Fire-protection Systems-

The Regulatory Angle
T. A. Edwards PhD, CEng, FIMarE, FRSA, MINucEng
Marine Directorate. Department of Transport
SYNOPSIS
Fixed fire-protection systems designed for use on ships must be considered with the various National and
International Regulations in mind. Examples are given of difficulties encountered in the interpretation of
these Regulations, and the Directorate's stance and the reason for it are discussed. The Directorate's view of
innovative methods of fire protection and of methods which, for good reason, do not comply with the
Regulations is then presented. The Directorate is shown to have a human face in dealing with these problems
in a flexible and constructive way while maintaining that overall safety must be paramount.
INTRODUCTION
Dr T. A. Edwards is a Principal Surveyor within the
It is traditional to start papers on fire-protection systems Marine Directorate of the Department of Transport (UK,>.
with the well known fire triangle of fuel/oxygen/heat. How- where he .has. ~n !'mployed. for the last '.8 years; he IS
.•. , .. now working In Its Fire Protection Branch. HIs background
ever, since fixed fire-prot~ctJon system~ as .understood !n th!s is in marine engineering: he sailed as an Engineer Officer
context actua.lly m~ans fi~ed fire-ext~nctlon system~. thIs in the Merchant Navy and is the holder of an Extra First
paper starts wIth a shghtly dIfferent versIon of the fire tnangle, Class Certificate of Competency. He also holds post-
the fire-extinction diagram (Fig. 1). Methods of extinguishing graduate Qualifications in computing. nuclear physics and
fires. ie remove fuel/smother/cool, will be examined. systems engineering.
It is possible to extinguish fires using anyone of these
methods or any combination of them, so Fig. 1 is a Venn
diagram showing overlapping regions and can have the various fourth area, reduce reaction energy, has been included.
methods of extinction placed on it as shown. It is in fact difficult Halogenated hydrocarbons and dry powder have been placed
to place all extinguishing methods on such a diagram and so a in this area.
Some people may disagree with this diagram for various
reasons, but it is far from complete as there is an even more
important requirement for fire-protection systems which is
often forgotten or ignored in early design stages but which if
not considered can mean that the system will never extinguish
a fire. This essential ingredient is compliance with Statutory
Requirements. A system which does not comply with these
requirements is not even allowed to function. This paper looks
at the various Statutory Requirements.
BACKGROUND
The relevant Authority of each Flag State has its own set of
regulations codified into its own particular legal system. Each
of these may differ slightly from the others but all stem from
the same International Convention, namely The Ineroational
Convention forthe Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 1974).1
This Convention has been amended twice and for the purposes
of this paper Chapter 11-2 as amended by the 1981 or 1st
Amendments [IMO Resolution IMO-MSCl(XLV)] is the
basic document.2 In the UK this Chapter is implemented by
The Merchant Shipping (Fire Protection) Regulations 1984
(Statutory Instrument 1984 No. 1218).3
All National Requirements based on SOLAS should be
generally the same as Authorities may not subtract from these
requirements (although they may add extra ones). In the UK
the Statutory Requirements are almost identical to those of
SOLAS 1974 as amended (they are identical word for word in
many areas) and very little has been added. The same can be
said of most nations and consequently there should be little
61
difference in the requirements promulgated by different Aag

States.
In practice, however. this is not the case because of differ-
ences in interpretation. This paper will look at the interpreta-
tion applied by the Marine Directorate of the Department of
Transport, the UK's Statutory Authority. Nevertheless before
doing this the reasons for Statutory Regulations will be
examined in order to obtain an overall view.
Regulations have two main purposes. The first is simply to
ensure safety by seeing that the systems are fitted and that they
actually work. Largely this is done by precedent. The Regulat-
ory Authorities observe systems that have stood the test of
time and legislate to ensure that historically effective systems
are used on new ships. Equally, when existing systems prove
ineffective or deficient in practice, legislati9n is produced to
improve or outlaw them. Some believe that this historic per-
spective stands to maintain the status quo and stifle advances
towards new systems, but it is hoped that this is not the case.
Indeed specific steps have been taken at IMO to prevent this
occurring; this point will be returned to later.
The second purpose of regulations is an attempt to ensure
equal treatment and equal safety for all. This is true of both
National and International Regulations, but is only achieved if
the Regulations are applied and interpreted evenly. It is true
that internationally some problems in this area cause
inequalities but these are not the focus of this paper, which is
rather to explain the way in which the Department of Transport
interprets some of its National Regulations and the reason for
these interpretations.
INTERPRETATIONS OF REGULA TIPNS
Below are a selection of examples, drawn from the various should the test fail on a nearly completed vessel the owners and
fixed fire-protection systems in general use, showing the manufacturers would be left in an impossible position.
interpretation of the Regulations by the Directorate. which In this case the problem was solved when the Directorate
may not agree with interpretations by others. It is hoped that produced its own computer program, in 1975, which could be
by explaining the thinking behind the Directorate's stance its used to cross-check designs produced by other computers.
position will come to be understood. There is still room for dispute when the Directorate's computer
disagrees with the manufacturer's computer. but in the small
Fixed CO2 gas extinguishing systems number of cases ~hen this occurs it is up ~o the ma~ufactur~r
[Ref.: Schedule 10(1) and (2) of S11984 No. 1218] to P rove to the Directorate that the two mmute requirement IS
me.t
Carbon dioxide flooding is a well known and long standing Often very small differences in interpretation cause major
method of extinguishing fires and has been successfully used at difficulties when vessels are to be built to conform with the
sea for many years. This long usage has served to iron out most requirements of two National Authorities. A case in point is
of the difficulties in design, but a few conflicts remain with the alarm required for CO2 smothering systems. The US Coast
respect to interpretation. One of these concerns pipe line Guard insist that such alarms are powered by the pressurised
sizing in machinery spaces. The Regulations are silent on this gas on release, while the Directorate insists on the alarm
matter. but they do require that 85% of the necessary gas is sounding before the gas is released from the bottles.
discharged within the first two minutes, which places an in- As this is an international difference in interpretations we
direct constraint on pipe size. must look to the international Rules for guidance. Paragraph
Many years ago the Directorate published a list of minimum 1.6 of Regulation 5 of Chapter 2 SOLAS 1974 (as amended)
pipe diameters for various discharge rates. These were requires that 'The alarm shall operate for a suitable period
intended to refer to the main discharge line rather than branch before the medium is released'. It is from such loose drafting
lines but piping systems designed to these dimensions have that problems of interpretation grow. The immediate ques- .
always been accepted by the Directorate. However, in recent tions are 'what is a suitable period?' and 'released from or to
years computerised design of pipe distribution systems has led where?' The UK legislation does not clarify the matter but
to a reduction in designed pipe diameters, which has on simply repeats the same wording [Schedule 10(1)(f)] and con-
occasion led to conflict between the Directorate and manufac- sequently it is left to the Marine Directorate to interpret. It has
turers. been decided that 'released' means 'released from the bottles'
This is a classic case where the Directorate's interpretation and that 'a suitable period' is one sufficient for personnel
of the requirements to ensure a two minute discharge was inadvertently left in the space to escape before the CO2 is
based on an historic judgement.of what would certainly be discharged. This period can be quite long on a vessel with a
adequate. There was no suggestion on behalf of the Directo- large machinery space and virtually prevents the use of a
rate that computer-designed pipe work was inadequate. The gas-pressure-operated alarm, which leads to the interpretation
problem was simply that it knew that pipes designed to the that the alarm must be independently powered and must
published figures were adequate but had no direct knowledge operate before the gas leaves the bottles.
of the adequacy of the smaller diameter systems (nor of the The Directorate feels that this is a fair stance assuming that
accuracy of the computer programs used to design them). The the alarm is intended to alert personnel inadvertently still in
oDvious solution of practical tests was not viable due tQ the the protected space and, that.being so. it is reasonable to give
excessive dangers and costs of full-scale tests and the fact that them sufficient time to escape before release.
Trans IMarE (C). Vol. 98, Paper Cl1l2
62
by owners in good faith in an attempt to increase safety. The tation were presented with which not all would agree. In cases
Directorate will, for its part, normally accept equipment not where the problem is interpretation only and does not affect
mentioned in the regulations or not up to the full statutory the wording of the regulations the remedy is simple. The
requirements when fitted in excess of that required when it is officers of the Directorate are always open to suggestion, will
satisfied that overall safety is not reduced. Extra equipment listen to arguments and willingly reconsider their interpreta-
can reduce safety as ships' crews cannot be expected to know tions, changing them without formality if they consider it
(or care) which equipment is approved and which is not in the desirable. The basis of the Directorates stance will always be
heat of an emergency situation. The distinction being made is overall safety, but.arguments regarding the original intent of
that approved equipment can be expected to work while the regulation and the necessity of a particular interpretation
non-approved equipment remains an unknown quantity. will always be considered.
Decisions regarding the acceptance of this extra equipment If a particular innovation suggests a protection system which
are usually made by the Directorate's Surveyors on the spot, contravenes the actual intent or words of the regulation the
who would discuss the consequences of the additions, in the situation is more difficult, but the mechanism for overcoming
light of overall safety, with the owners and manufacturers. A this type of problem does exist. In the case of international
national mechanism does exist for the early assessment of this requirements the power lies in Regulation 5(a) of Chapter I of
extra equipment as the Directorate will assess any pieces of SOLAS 1974, which is worth quoting in'full:
equipment not required by the Regulations giving it a seal of 'Where the present Regulations require that a particular
approval in the form of a Certificate certifying that 'The fitting material appliance or apparatus, or type thereof,
Secretary of State has no objection to the carriage of (items) on shall be fitted or carried in a ship, or that any particular
British ships in addition to any appliances required by (Statut- provision shall be made, the Administration may allow
ory Regulations)'. This certificate is known as the 'Blue' or 'No any other fitting material appliance or apparatus, or type
Objection' Certificate and is issued simply to facilitate the thereof, to refitted or carried, or any other provision to be
acceptance of this type of equipment on UK ships. made in that ship, if it is satisfied by that trial thereof or
otherwise that such· fitting material appliance or
apparatus, or type thereof, or provision, is at least as
INNOVATIONS effective as that required by the present Regulations'.
This rather wordy legalistic statement gives very wide powers
It is not the Marine Directorate's function to produce or seek indeed.
innovation in the sphere of. fire prQtection or any other area Effectively, anything can be replaced by anything but the
(although innovation is encouraged through research grants). overriding requirement is that the replacing item or provision
However, neither is it its function to stand in the way of be 'at least as effective'. This International Regulation is
progress, and it is hoped that it does not do so. The Directorate carried into UK domestic legislation (as far as fire protection is
would like to think that it is always open to suggestions for concerned) by Regulation 144of the Merchant Shipping (Fire
improvement and not hidebound in any of its decisions. Any Protection) Regulations 1984.This has very similar wording to
decision can, and will, be changed if it can be shown that there the International Regulation but it goes further as it includes
is a better way (or even a cheaper way) with equivalent safety. methods of construction in the list which can be substituted.
Earlier a number of examples of the Department's interpre- In UK national legislation the authority is vested in the
TrQIISIMarE (C). Vol. 98. Paper CI/12
64
Secretary of State, and the next Regulation, No. 145, gives These 'alternative' and 'exemption' regulations are as
even wider powers. It reads: important a part .of the fire-protection Regulations as those
'The Secretary of State may grant exemptions from all or requiring the carriage of extinguishing equipment and are
any of the provisions of these Regulations (as may be there to be used to ensure an overaIl high standard of safety
specified in the exemption) for classes of cases or and to give the flexibility necessary to aIlow change.
individual cases on such terms (if any) as he may so
specify ... .'
These even wider powers effectively allow the Secretary of CONCLUSIONS
State to exempt anything from anything, but of course in so
exempting the Secretary of State takes due ace.ount of the This paper was not intended to provide instruction regarding
overall effect on safety. In the case of both equIvalents and the Regulations, nor is it meant to explain the Directorate's
exemptions t~e local Administration re~rts.the circ';1mstances interpretation of them, f~r that would be too vast a subject.
to IMO, whIch has the effect of allowmg mternatlOnal con- However, it is hoped that by explaining the background to
sideration of new ideas. some specific examples it will be realized that the Directorate
The process necessary :or the international acceptance of has a human face. The aim. in fact the very function. of the
innovative equipment is shown in Fig. 3. It will be seen that the Directorate is to maintain and improve safety at sea, and it
initial action rests with the local Administration and that once hopes to do this il) a fair and constructive way. The examples
an innovation is aceepted locally it can move on to be accepted show that the Directorate is not hidebound behind entrenched
internationally as an 'equivalent' with the minimum of for- positions based on the strict word of the regulations but tries to
malities. be flexible and has the will and the means to accept innovation
An innovation which is not equivalentto any existing system, and change. if that would lead to greater safety or the more
but which constitutes a new concept, can also become part of efficient use of resources.
the Convention by the longer route through Sub-committees
and the Marine Safety Committee. This route provides an
opportunity for Administrations. owners and manufacturers REFERENCES
to comment upon a new concept.
Thus there is no reason for the historical basis of regulations I. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
to hold back progress and innovation, for the mechanisms to (SOLAS) 1974.Publishedby Intergovernmental Marine Consulta-
aIlow change do exist. However, are these mechanisms ever tive Organisation (1974)....
used? There are, in fact, many cases where alternatives are 2. Amendmentstot~elnternattonaICon.venuonf~r.theSafety~f~lfe
used. Examples can be quoted across the whole spectru.m of (:~:;) 1974.Publishedby the InternatIonal MaritIme Orgamsatlon
fire protection. Fro~ minor poi~ts (eg where small machmery 3. The Merchant Shipping (Fire Pratection) Regulations 1984,
spaces are not requIred to contam hydrants as caIled for by the Statutory Instrument 1984No. 1218.Published by Her Majesty's
regulations) to major changes such as the modified fire-protec- Stationery Office(1984).
tion systems allowed in dynamicaIly supported craft where an 4. Interim Recommendations and Interpretations of Chapter 11-2of
insistence on Convention requirements would make the craft the 1981/83SOLAS Amendments. Published by the International
so heavy that it could not 'fly'. Maritime Organisation (1985). Ref. SLS. 17/Circ.3.
Discussion
R. A. STEVENSON (East Sussex Fire Brigade): Severalofthe J. K. ROBINSON (Lloyd's Register of Shipping): It would
large cross-Channel ferries have extremely limited open deck appear that whilst the SOLAS Amendments recognized that
space. In the event of a passenger accommodation fire produc- unattended machinery spaces required a fixed fire-detection
ing a large amount of smoke, I should like to ask Dr Edwards system, at the time they were framed the extent to which the
what arrangements are there to ensure the safety of up to 1400 number of crew members available to fight fires would be
people in what are almost totally enclosed vessels. reduced was not appreciated. Hence additional fixed extin-
As a general rule all the fire-fighting equipment for the car guishing systems were not made a requirement.
deck area is located in smaIl amounts at each fire hydrant With 40% of serious fires producing dangerous quantities of
around the deck area. In the event of a fire on the car deck most smoke occurring in accommodation and often at night; and
of this equipment would be unusable due to: the extensive use of ventilation re-circulating systems, surely it
1. The hazards to crew entering the area to retrieve this is time forthe automatic shutdown ofaceommodation fans and
equipment .• the closure of fire zone ventilation flaps to be made an IMO
2. The fact, in most cases, that it is severely obstructed by requirement for accommodation areas.
the vehicle cargo. With manning levels in large merchant vessels in the (near)
I should also like to ask Dr Edwards if any consideration has future projected to be reduced to 12, I should like to ask
been given to providing these vessels with a fire station at either Dr Edwards if he envisages any extension and automation of
end of the ship where, in a safe area (say the stairway en- the fixed fire-extinguishing systems on such vessels.
closure), quantities of fire.-fighting equipment could .be 1. D. A. Smith, 'Suppressionofsmoke and toxicgasesfrom polymers
loca~ed. These small fire stattons would also be the reportmg in shipboard fires'. Marine Engineers Review (June 1985).
point for the ship's working parties.
Trans lMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CI/12
65
G. VICTORY: For Dr Edwards to say that his paper is on fire after a good pre-bum time. In fact the foam eventually came
'protection' systems is surely wrong, and might appear to out at the top of the funnel although injected at a low level. I
endorse the opinion some people, and some Administrations, submit that this was an effective test. All that was needed at
seem to have, ie if you provide the passive 'fire protection' that time was an amendment to SOLAS to allow the project to
required by IMO you don't need an active 'fire-extinguishing' take off.
system. What has happened? SOLAS has been amended to permit
Until the time Admiral Shepherd led the US Delegation to the use of this very valuable tool and the UK 'has no equivalent
IMCO (as it was then) every British foreign-going passenger regulation'. Dr Edwards says that it is not the Directorate's
ship was fitted with the 'sprinkler' system ..Admiral Shepherd function to produce or seek innovation in the sphere of fire
pointed out that if you build a non-combustible ship you won't protection or any other area. I would suggest that they should
have a fire and therefore you don't need a fixed fire-extinguish- be working with Industry in the development of new equip-
ing facility. I believe that the fallacy of this argument has now ments, new applications of old equipment and the effective use
been made apparent by the destructive fires on a number of of all types of extinguishing agents.
cruise ships built to the US standard, ie without sprinklers. The All extinguishing agents have their particular applications so
UK had great difficulty in maintaining the 'sprinklered alterna- I would ask Dr Edwards why high-expansion foam and
tive' approach in 'Part H' and subsequently in the 1974 SOLAS medium-expansion foam have been left out of his paper. Why
Convention, against opposition from the USA in particular. restrict the IIse of halons to bromotrifturomethane (BIM or
One reason why we wanted to keep this option in SOLAS Halon 1301) and ban bromochlorodifturomethane (BCF or
was that once out it would be much more difficult to get back in Halon 1202). It was envisaged that this would provide a useful
and we hoped that, in time (and I don't mean 20 years), it might and cheaper alternative and be acceptable at IMO.
have been found possible to amend the 'Part H' rules and get It is accepted that BCF has a slightly higher hazard rating
agreement to require the US standard of structural fire protec- when pyrolized, but the rules limit the quantity which can be
tion, an effective detection system and a fixed fire-extinguish- released in any space to about 7%, and as this has to all be
ing system in accommodation spaces on all Class I Passenger released in under 10 s the possibility of pyrolization is very low.
Ships. After all, the Department of Transport have always accepted
Mrs Murrell has shown us how quickly a fire in furnishing can CO2 systems which fill the space to 35% concentration with a
make evacuation a necessity, even at a Fire Research Station, gas which is quickly fatal at about 10%, so why ban BCF when,
and Mr Skipp has outlined the procedures ",:hich are required compared .with CO2, it is comparatively harmless at a low
to ensure that members of a fire party are properly equipped, concentration?
that all necessary equipment is brought to the assembly point, When in difficulty Dr Edwards appears to 'pass the buck' to
checked as to its effectiveness and donned by the fire party, all those who drafted the IMO rules. He quotes Paragraph 1.6 of
of whom must be accounted for if the operation is not to be Regulation 5 of Chapter 2 SOLAS 1974 as amended 'The
hazarded. alarm shall operate for a suitable period before the medium is
An amendment to SOLAS to require better security in this released' and goes on to say 'It is from such loose drafting that
respect for passenger vessels is, I believe, overdue. Even if it problems of interpretation grow'.
were altered now it would take many years before it became 'What is a suitable period?' and 'released from or to where?'
effective on ships, and many years more before it worked its he asks. I can assure him that SOLAS means exactly what it
way down to cargo ships. I suggest that the present standards says:. 'the. alarm shall operate for ~ suitable period before the
will not be acceptable in thc 199Os, and certainly not in the medIUm IS released'. As SOLAS IS presently worded the US
twenty-first century. Coast Guard are in non-compliance if they insist that 'alarms
Would Dr Edwards agree that 'fire safety' embodies passive are powered by the pressuri~ed gas on release'. An alar~
structural 'fire protection', effective 'fire detection' and a fixed opc;rated by the gas cannot give an alarm 'before the gas IS
'fire-extinguishing system' appropriate to the space and the fire released', and anyone caught below without warning would be
hazards connected to it. Can he assure us that it is still the killed.
Department of Transport's intention to get a truly balanced The question 'what is a suitable period' obviously depends
requirement to ensure that the best 'fire safety' arrangements on the space concerned. I would have thought that anyone who
are assured for passengers and crew? did not wish to misinterpret this phrase would realize that
Incidentally, Dr Edwards, like other contributors, seems to enough time to evacuate the space would be 'suitable'. Accept-
assume that the 1974 SOLAS requirements were written and ing that w.hils~ a p!e-release alarm is a sine qua n~)O, it might be
introduced at the 1974 Convention. This is not the case. Most a good thmg If this were backed up by a..pressunzed gas alarm
of the technical sections were developed at various times to indicate that gas was actually entering the space. I would
between 1966 and 1973. The 1974 SOLAS Convention was have thought that amendment to SOLAS requiring both to be
mainly a consolidating document for all these. pro~ded would be ~th possible and desirable ..
I wonder why Dr Edwards has not included in his paper fixed . Fmally, I would h~ to thank Dr Edward.s for a very mterest-
fire-extinguishing systems, water sprinkler or halon, for 109 paper, and for gJvI~g me the opportumty of gettmg on my
accommodation spares. Surely these come within the ambit of 'hobby horse' once agam!
his paper. Is it that he has been 'persuaded' to accept the US
philosophy that a pound spent on passive protection is better Bj. HANSEN (Det norske Veritas): I agree with Mr Victory
than a pound spent on effective fire extinguishing? Or would thatthe interpretation of SOLAS (1981 Amendments) must be
he, like me, prefer to see 50 p spent on each? He says the that the alarm should be allowed to sound for a longer period
Directorate 'is not hidebound behind entrenched positions of time than the time it takes for CO2 to flow from the bottles
based on the strict word of the regulations' but has he proved to the protected space.
his case? The use of halon in spaces other than those allowed by
For example, Dr Edwards says that the UK has no equival- SOLAS is now being discussed in an IMO working party, and
ent regulation to SOLAS 1974 in {espect of high-expansion there seems to be agreement among the members to extend the
foam systems because the Administration has yet to be con- use of halon.
vinced of their effectiveness. To be convinced, the department There is reference to the use of automatic releasable extin-
would have to be satisfied that it was 'testable and effective'. guishing systems, which are allowed by SOLAS, to a greater
Such a system was in fact tested in the boiler room of a large extent. DnV requires-these systems for high-risk areas. Full-
passenger ship which was due for breaking up about ten years scale trials have been held in new buildings and they have
ago and was very successful in extinguishing a very large fire managed to extinguish the fire very quickly.
Trans lMarE (C), Vol. 98, Paper CIIll
66
S. E. JACOBSEN (Det norske Veritas): Referring back to ability) would on balance produce a greater danger to life than
Mr Noble's paper, it is stated on page 17 that 'exhaust ducts could be outweighed by the perhaps faster response (If an
from galley ranges ... must be fitted with ... a fixed means of automatic system. In the foreseeable future we eXpeet the
extinguishing a fire within the duct using either CO2 or a water decision to use the fixed extinguishing system to be a command
spray system.' I should like to ask Dr Edwards why dry powder decision made after weighing all the variables. Small automatic
and halon are not acceptable for this situation. extinguishers are allowed to protect specific high risk areas and
these are likely to remain.
G. COGGON (Lloyd's Register of Shipping): Bearing in mind The Directorate, together with other Administrations, is
the variable fire-extinguishing capabilities of foam concen- aware of the dangers caused by smoke in fire situations. A
trates which are currently available, I should like Dr Edwards considerable amount of investigation is being undertaken into
to state on what basis such materials are approved for use with both passive and active smoke control and this new knowledge
deck foam systems in oil tankers. will be used in designing new vessels. Automatic shut down of
ventilation and automatic closing of fire doors initiated by
M. J. CLEMENTS (John Kerr and Co. Ltd): I sympathize with fire-detection systems is allowed by IMO regulations but statu-
the problems identified by Mr Coggon. of ensuring product tory insistence upon it in all cases is not envisaged.
quality. Companies such as mine manufacture to recognized Discussions on smoke control are presently taking place at
national standards, such as the UK Defence Specifications. IMO and the handling of the ventilating equipment to prevent
The user should specify such standards as a minimum to ensure the spread of and to help remove smoke is amongst the areas
product quality. being discussed.
At an international level work is continuing on an ISO
standard which would provide good guidance as to a minimum It is with some humility that I answer Mr Victory. Some 20
performance standard. The user should be particularly careful years ago I joined what was then the Marine Safety Division of
to specify whether 3%,5% or 6% foam liquid is required for the Board of Trade as a temporary engineer and ship surveyor.
their system, and if necessary insist on a Society Inspection MrVictorywasthentheDivision'sleadingvoiceonfire-protec-
Certificate. The use of 6% foam liquid in a system designed for tion matters and he was soon to become Engineer Surveyor in
a 3% foam liquid would lead to inadequate system perfor- Chief. In short I was brought up on the 'Gospel according to
mance. Gordon Victory' when it came to fire-protection matters. My
first reaction is simply to say 'Yes Sir!' and move on, but I
imagine he expects more than that.
Mr Victory need not worry about the use of the term 'Fire
Protection' as it simply reflects the name of the Directorate
Author's reply Branch which now deals with both fire extinguishing and
structural fire protection. We still control fires by containment
and extinction, but not necessarily in that order as extinction is
It is usual for large passenger vessels, such as those sometimes the most efficient means of containment. The effi-
Mr Stevenson refers to, to be divided into a number of fire ciency of sprinkler systems in fighting fires is well appreciated
zones, each smoke tight and separated from each other by by the Directorate, and I can assure Mr Victory that we still see
fireproof A60 bulkheads, as described by my colleague, fire safety as a combined application of passive and active
Mr Noble, in paper Cll2. In the event of a fire passengers methods.
would be mustered in enclosed spaces remote from the zone There is no deep significance in the selection of examples in
affected by the fire. Should it become necessary to abandon the my paper. The main thrust of it was intended to show the
vessel, passengers would be conducted to boat and raft stations Directorate's latest approach to Regulations and their
in small groups by crew members trained for the task. As each interpretation. I simply selected examples which well illus-
group cleared the vessel further groups would be moved to the trated my case.
embarkation stations. With regard to high-expansion foam systems the Directorate
The philosophy used to control a major fire on a car deck is has no regulation covering them because there is no call for
to use the considerable power of the fixed fire-fighting system one. Certainly we do not forbid them. The existence of a
to extinguish the fire. Then residual fires would be extinguished regulation would hinder the production of such systems as it
by hand extinguishers and hoses gathered from other parts of would be based on uninformed ideas about what was required
the vessel. In many cases extinguishers are stowed adjacent to and would act to stifle development. It is not in the Direc-
entrances for this reason. Fire-extinguishing equipment torate's remit to work with Industry in the development of new
stowed on the car deck is intended for quick application against equipments (we do not have the finance or manpower to do
small fires and in the event of a major outbreak it would be so), but we would certainly give whole-hearted support to
abandoned. The amount of equipment elsewhere on the vessel attempts to produce better or more efficient systems. Discus-
allows for ttiis. sion, however, sometimes leads to research which the Direc-
On some vessels extra equipment is stowed in fire stations, torate helps to fund.
but in general the crew are trained to attack fires with equip- The Directorate would accept an high-expansion foam sys-
ment to hand whilst back up parties are engaged in collecting tem provided that arrangements for distribution ensured that
more equipment from unaffected parts of the vessel. all parts of the protected space were filled with foam. Manufac-
turers and designers appear to find difficulty in meeting this
In reply to Mr Robinson, the fixed fire-extinguishing systems requirement fully because of the complex ducting system
fitted in machinerY spaces before the advent of UMS operation which it involves, and there is no present demand for high-
have proved adequate in the past so when ships began operat- expansion foam systems for UK ships. The fact that foam
ing in the UMS mode it was flOt considered necessary to issues from the funnel does not ensure that all parts of the
require additional fire-extinguishing systems. Rather we machinery space are filled with foam.
required fire-detection systems to ensure that any outbreak of
fire is reported automatically in the absence of personnelin the In reply to Mr Hansen, I too am in agreement with Mr
machinery space. Victory in the interpretation of what is meant by 'suitable
We have considered the pros and cons of automatic fixed period', but he was my teacher!
fire-detection systems but are of the opinion that accidental or With regard to the use of halon, I feel that although it has
premature operation 'Of such systems (which would involve been in use for some time now we are still in a learning stage
danger to personnel and loss of ship's power and manoeuvre- and research still continues. It is certainly an effective extin-
67
guishant if used early, but has deficiencies when used on easily controlled with either drypowder or halon. Unfortu-
deep-seated smouldering fires, or on fires involving copious nately the ability of these two extinguishers to maintain the
amounts of fuel in contact with hot surfaces. I think it is duct in a safe condition is in doubt, and once the extinguishing
destined to become a valuable part of any fire-protection system has been discharged it is not available to control further
scheme, but will take its place as one of the team with other outbreaks. Carbon dioxide effectively inerts the trunk for an
methods. extended period and copious amounts of water are usually
available for cooling and hence these methods are preferred in
My reply to Mr Jacobsen on the reason$ for our dislike ofthe these circumstances.
use of drypowder and halon in fighting fires in exhaust ducts
from galley ranges follows on from my previous answer. An Mr Clements has answered Mr Coggon's question for me.
exhaust duct is usually coated with fatty deposits which have We would require foams to be produced to recognized national
condensed out of the galley atmosphere as it is drawn through standards and to be known to be compatible with the cargo
the duct. Any internal fire is likely to be very hot, but would be carried.
Trans [MarE (C). Vol. 98. Paper CU12
68
The Burning of Iron in Steam
A Ministry of Defence Paper
and
Water Tube Boiler Accidents

By G. McNee
Note to Instructors - These papers should be removed from the compendium and
the pages withheld from trainees until they have completed the appropriate case
studies for sections 8 and 11 of the course.
THE BURNING OF IRON IN STEAM
Cases have occurred at sea of an unusual type of fire, following the loss of
water in a boiler. The most recent incident of this nature occurred in a destroyer
and the result is shown in the accompanying illustrations (see above). At the
enquiry which followed, the Engineer Officer of the ship said that, when he went
down to the boiler room, there was no fire in the furnace but the upper rows of
tubes were incandescent, and molten metal was dropping down through the
tube nest into the furnace. There was fire in the uptakes, and the actual metal of
the tubes was burning.
It is well known to chemists that iron is liable to burn in steam, with the
production of free hydrogen. Ignition takes place at about 700 degrees C and the
reaction will cease if the substances involved are cooled below this temperature,
which is a low red heat. While the burning of iron in steam can continue
entirely independently of any supply of oxygen from the air, the hydrogen
produced by the reaction will burn on coming in contact with air if the tempera-
ture is high enough to cause ignition. This means that there are likely to be two
types of fire burning simultaneously, the one in steam and the other in air. Any
smothering attempt would probably result in extinguishing the hydrogen-in-air
fire while the other continued burning: a hydrogen concentration would build
up and an explosion might result.
Amplifying his evidence, the Engineer Officer of the vessel in question stated
that, when he went down below, he saw this intense fire in the upper parts of the
boiler, but the lower tubes were still in place. It was impossible at this time to
assess exactly what damage had occurred, but it was obvious that the upper
casings in the boiler room were red hot. After checking that all the oil fuel
valves were shut off, the Engineer Officer isolated the oil fuel suction lines and
then closed down the boiler room entirely to eliminate air. He had hoped this
would extinguish the fire, but as a matter of fact it grew worse. At this point, the
First Lieutenant emptied the porn-porn magazine when he found one or two
casings becoming hot. Water sprays were directed through the doors at the
bottom of the funnel and actually down the outer casing as well as down the
inside of the funnel. The Engineer Officer visited the boiler room at regular
intervals to make sure that there were no fires starting outside the casing.
At this stage, the S.E.O. (0) came on board and remarked that it was
inadvisable to put water down the funnel. Foam was introduced through the
funnel door, but the fire increased in intensity. An adaptor was then made from
an old boiler tube with a bent end, the water was directed on to the fire through
the door in the funnel casing. Between 0700 and 1230, when the fire was
extinguished, there was not at any time a fire in the furnace; it was among the
tubes. In addition to the incandescent tubes a flickering flame was also noted;
this must have been due to the liberated hydrogen.
The oxidation of iron in steam with the liberation of hydrogen occurs every
time a boiler or a single tube gets overheated and not only if the sprayers are
kept on. Indeed, loss of vacuum due to the release of hydrogen passing over to
the engines is often the first indication of shortage of water in a boiler. The
reaction starts at the bore of the tube before the burst occurs. The subsequent
71
outrush of water cools the overheated tube below the ignition temperature and
washes away the scale in the vicinity of the burst, but black oxide is always
present in the bore a short distance away on either side of the burst. If the
source of heat is not removed and the supply of feed water is not maintained,
the reaction will start up again.
The possibility -of setting up this reaction in other circumstances must not
be overlooked. particularly when the necessity arises for blowing out a boiler
while steam remains. preparatory to opening for cleaning. Under these con-
ditions a boiler is likely to be foul externally and there is a possibility of an
accumulation of smouldering soot in the tube nests. So long as water remains
in the boiler at or near workin!! level such an accumulation of soot does not
constitute a danger. If. however. the contents of the boiler are blown out and
the air flaps are opened with the object of hastening the cooling of the boiler
72
BURNING OF IRON IN STEAM
73
A similar incident occurred in the German cruiser Prinz Eugen. Following a

shortage of water, fire occurred in the boiler room. It involved the tubes and
spilled oil was ignited. The ship was fitted with a fixed installation for the
introduction of an inert gas, known as Ardexin. The compartment was closed
down and the fire extinguishing gas was introduced. At the end of one hour the
oil fire was extinguished, but when personnel entered the compartment again,
the boiler tubes were still burning, and continued to burn for four hours. It was
believed the fire finally burned itself out when the supply of steam was exhausted.
74
WATER TUBE BOILER ACCIDENTS*
There were unpleasant experiences of severe fire damage to water tube boilers on two
vessels. In each case the boiler was totally wrecked.
The first fire occurred in vessel 1 when the port boiler was being lit up preparatory to'
engine trials. The boilers in this vessel were of the controlled superheat type consisting of
an upper steam drum connected by inclined tubes at approximately 450 to two water
drums. The furnace between these two banks of tubes was completely divided into two
sections by a water wall of studded tubes covered with chrome ore.
The boiler was flashed up at about 2 a.m. and steam was raised, everything being
apparently normal until about 6 a.m. when overheating of the casings in way of the air
preheater was observed, which suggested a fire in the heater. The Fire Brigade was
called immediately and although they arrived promptly, by this time the uptake casings
between boiler and air heater were glowing red.
Six brigade appliances brought eight hoses into action cooling down the casings and this
continued until approximately noon, when the fire could be said to be finally extinguished.
The damage sustained by the boiler was enormous. The complete bank of generating
tubes consisting of about 1400 tubes was completely burnt out, together with the bank of
economiser tubes which lie immediately above and also to one side of the air pre heater.
The furnace division tubes were severely buckled. The boiler casings from lower drum
level to air preheater were severely buckled and split. Fortunately the steam and water
drums were undamaged. There was severe water damage to electrical equipment. The
photographs give some indication of the damage.
The cause of this accident was traced to the faulty assembly of the inboard gauge glass.
This gauge glass had been overhauled by a ship's engineer officer and fitted abroad on
the previous voyage. Luckily, the boiler had not been steamed until the light up referred to
above otherwise the fire might have occurred at sea with disastrous results .
•• This is an edited version of a paper by G. McNee; all technical details are as in the original
paper.
75
WATER TUBE BOILER ACCIDENTS
The gauge glass was of a design having a non-return ball in the bottom fitting. The object
of this ball was to prevent the outflow of scalding water if a glass should break. Due to
carelessness, or ignorance, the centre piece of the gauge glass was fitted upside down
which brought the ball to the top.
The effect of this was the same as a choked top gauge cock, and this should have been
observed by the engineer officers on watch. A contributory error was that the gauge glass
was not blown through after the boiler had commenced to steam. By doing so the fault
would have been found immediately. Additionally the water level in the faulty glass should
have been observed to be behaving oddly, in that, at whatever level it was at, the level
was exactly steady without the usual slight up and down movement associated with a
normal glass. Comparison with the other gauge glass on the boiler would have also
shown up the fault.
The second fire occurred in a two drum design of boiler. In this boiler the steam and
water drums lay in a vertical line and the configuration of tubes was bank of generating
tubes, superheater, further bank of generating tubes. The furnace was formed by water
wall tubes from the other side of the steam and water drums.
The boiler had been flashed up and steam raised to float the safety valves. The valves
were floated about 3 p.m. and on completion the boiler was shut down, about 3.30 p.m.
It had been arranged that the induced draft fan would be balanced when the boiler had
cooled off and this was arranged for 9.15 p.m. that night. When the casing door was
removed for access, fumes were reported in the uptake and further examination
discovered a fire in the boiler. This was promptly diagnosed as an iron in steam fire.
It is interesting to observe that the boiler had been shut down for about six hours before
the fire was discovered.
On this occasion in addition to cooling down the boiler casings, water was also pumped
into the boiler by means of the electro feeder from the main feed tank which was kept filled
•
by four hoses.
78
WATER TUBE BOILER ACCIDENTS
The damage to the boiler consisted of complete destruction of generating tubes and
superheater tubes, but the casing damage was not so severe. Ironically, although the fire
fighting method was superior from the view point of ships safety it did result in
metallurgical damage to the steam drum which had to be renewed.
The cause was entirely different in this case. The engineer officer who shut the boiler
down had only shut the rail valve to each of the two burners which had been in use and
had not shut down the valve at each of the burners. Each valve had been leaking and
during the whole of the period of shut down oil had been spraying into the furnace. The
consequent poor combustion with insufficient air had produced large quantities of soot.
This soot with particles of unburnt oil had settled on the tubes and in due course had
caught alight.
As the boiler had been shut down the fact that the water level had fallen below the bottom
of the gauge glass had not caused concern to other watchkeepers. In addition as the air
registers were shut the slow combustion taking place in the furnace could not be seen.
The type of fire experienced in both vessels is also worthy of comment as it is not
common.
If the conditions are right, iron will bum in steam and the resulting reaction is the
production of black oxide of iron and free hydrogen. Ignition takes place at 700°C, and
above that temperature the reaction is self sustaining and generates heat in the same
manner as an ordinary fire.
The burning of iron in steam is entirely independent of a supply of oxygen from the air, but
the hydrogen produced will bum when it comes in contact with air. Alternatively, an
explosive mixture of hydrogen in air could be formed which, if the conditions are right,
could result in a violent explosion.
In both cases referred to earlier the conditions were correct for this reaction. The boiler
water levels were low iind the tubes above the water level were heated to the required
temperature by the burner in vessel 1 and the oil and soot fire in the second case.
79
With this type of fire the only way to put it out is to get the maximum flow of water to the
seat of the fire in order that the iron will be cooled below 700°C as soon as possible. Fine
spray nozzles, foam appliances or CO smothering must not be used.
2
Reference is made earlier to the additional damage done in the second fire due to
pumping water into the steam drum. It should be kept in mind that the first essential with
any fire is to get the fire out at the earliest possible time. The question of damage, or
additional damage which may possibly be caused by a different method of fire fighting,
must take second place to the safety of the ship.
It is hoped that by drawing your attention to these two serious incidents it will emphasize
the necessity for care in all engineering work, or watchkeeping duties.
80
Operating Instructions for Unitor
Portable Fire Extinguishers suitable for
Various Classes of Fires
These instructions are affixed to the extinguishers

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR UNITOR EXTINGUISHERS
unITOR.
DRY POWDER FIRE EXTINGUISHER
50 Kg FOR CLASS A & B FIRES
TO OPERATE
1. USE UPRIGHT.
2. UNCOIL HOSE.
3. OPEN GAS BOTTLE VALVE SLOWLY (ANTI-CLOCKWISE).
4. AIM DISCHARGE NOZZLE AT BASE OF FIRE HOLD FIRMLY
SQUEEZE NOZZLE LEVER AND USE SWEEPING ACTION
TO EXTINGUISH FIRE.
RELEASE LEVER TO CONTROL DISCHARGE.
RECHARGING AND MAINTENANCE.

1. RECHARGE AFTER PART OR TOTAL USE BY A COMPETENT
PERSON USING MATERIALS SPECIFIED BY THE MANUFACTURER.
2. REMOVE HEAD CAP ENSURING ALL PRESSURE IS RELEASED
BEFORE-HAND.
3. IF DISCHARGED OR POWDER IS OF POOR QUALITY REMOVE
POWDER. ENSURE DISCHARGE SYPHON TUBE, HOSE & NOZZLE
ARE FREE FROM BLOCKAGE. REFILL WITH THE CORRECT
QUANTITY OF RECOMMENDED POWDER. REPLACE HEAD CAP FIRMLY.
4. REMOVE GAS CYLINDER AND CHECK, WEIGH CONTENTS IF MORE THAN
10% UNDER WEIGHT REPLACE WITH NEW GAS CYLINDER.
TESTED TO 500 LBS. POWDER AS SPECIFIED. GAS CYLINDER
(CARBON DIOXIDE) WITH 2.0Kg CAPACITY AND SCREW TYPE VALVE.
MODEL NO: US50 FI67
86
Operating Instructions and Service Procedures
for Unitor Fire Extinguishers
OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS AND SERVICE PROCEDURES FOR UNITOR EXTINGUISHERS
OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
AND
SERVICE PROCEDURES
FOR
UNITOR STORED PRESSURE TYPE
2.25KG A.B.C. DRY POWDER FIRE EXTINGUISHER
TO OPERATE
1- REMOVE SAFETY PIN.
2. DIRECT NOZZLE AT BASE OF FIRE.
3. SQUEEZE HANDLES TO COMMENCE DISCHARGE
RELEASE TO INTERRUPT •
.
B.~I:tA.RGLA_F_TE_R_C_0_MPL,._E_TJ;_o.f.l.2.8B"tl8_L
_U$J;~
95
S_E[WI_C_I_N_G_~_'~.O_C_EJlVR.~
2.25KG ABC DRY POWDER FIRE EXTINGUISHER
1. Visually check the exterior of extinguisher, pay part iculat'

attention to checking for:
a) Any signs of damage or corrosion of the extinguisher.
b) Any dama~e or wear which may affect legibility of

1a be l.
c) Check that pressure gauge is readil"lg 12 bar il"l

gt'eel'"area.
d) Check that gauge is opet'at iOl"lalby usil"lggauge

test kit.
Make customer aware of any defects that cal"'l",ot

be rectified duriYlg set'vice.
2. If extinguisher has been used or discharge test completed.
a) Ey,sut'e gas pressure is released by invert iI"lg

extinguisher and holding with nozzle pointing away
from face squeeze handles together gent ly.
b) Reme.ve valve.
c) Empty powdet' into clean container, check weigh

powder, if of poor quality discard. If extinguisher
has been used empty residue' and discard.
3. a) IYlspect the interior of the body, remove from service

if al"'ysigl"lof cc.t't'OS
ie.1"1
is visible.
b) Fill with new extinguishant as specified by

Mar'lt
fact ut'et'.
4. a) Wipe valve clean, t'emove safety pil"larid discard

sea 1 iYlg cap. Check operation of headcap, check
d ipt ube, and nozzle to make sure of no blockages by
blowi Ylg through nozzle with handles squeezed together,
check valve pressure relief grooves ensuring they are
not ble.cked, check valve thoroughly for damage, if
damaged, t'eplace. Refit safety pin and new sealing
cap.
5. a) Clean neckring of bod y, also valve o-ring sea 1, refit

valve to extinguisher body and tighten.
b) Pressurize extinguisher through nozzle making sure that

Nitrog~n or Dry Air Regulator is set to 12 bar.
c) Check that pressure gauge is readiYlg 12 bar il"lgreen

at'ea.
d) Chec;::kfOt' 1eakages.
e) F,it service 1abe I, arid record detai Is so that they are
legible.
96
AND
SERVICE PROCEDURES
FOR
UNITOR GAS CARTRIDGE TYPE
9LTR WATER, 9LTR FOAM
HAND PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
TO OPERATE
1. REMOVE SAFETY PIN AND UNCLIP HOSE
2. DIRECT HOSE NOZZLE AT BASE OF FIRE
3. SQUEEZE HANDLE TO COMMENCE DISCHARGE,
.
RELEASE TO INTERRUPT
RECHARGE AFTER COMPLETE OR PARTIAL USE.
97
SERVICING PROCEDURE
1. Yisully chick till exterior of extinguisher,

ply pll'ticullr IUentic. to dllclcing for:
I) Anysi gill of IlMlge or COI'TOIiOft

of the
extinguisher.
bl Anyc:r'lCkingof o-clips or _r of 110M.
el AnyIlMlge of ~ lIhich MY Iffect legi-

bility of 1•• 1.
dl DIeck that prnnre gauge is l"HIIing 12 bar

ill grwn Ii'u.
.1 Dwck that gaugt is optI"ItiDIIII by using gluge

test kit.
!lib CUlt~ ••• rt of Illy defects that elllftOt

be rectified during lII"YiCl.
2. If millguishllr his bien used or dischargt tnt

cmpleted
II Ensure gas pl"ftlUre is relNlld by illVll"tillg

ntinguisher and holdillg IIOIewith IIOzzl.
poilltillg ••• y froe flee Iqllttze handles
totethllr gelltly.
bl ~ IlUtrillg. If IlUtring is too tight to

I'ImYI by hand, use IlUtringlplNlll".
el &lpty liquid illto I eltlll c:oIItliMl", and

ri ••• extillguishtr out thoroughly and
diKanI the rillliJl!llo
J. I) IIIIpKt the interior of the body, chlckillg

carefull y for i1I'J evideIICIof rustillg, !WOW
(roe urvice if Illy sigll of COI'I'OIiOft is
visible.
b) IIItUl"llorigillil or II1IIliquid to millguilher

body 15 speci fied by MnuflCturtr. Top up
with fresh Wlter to c:orrect level 15 lpICified
011back libel. IIIkillg IllOlllllCl for Illy
additives. III tnpll"lturn of Ins thin 0 degrws
C millguishllrs should have I I~ided lIIti-
freeze 1IIded.
4. II lIipe hNdcap elNll, ...i.ov. IIfety pill and

diKanI lllling cap. Dwck optI"ltiOftof 1IHIIcap,
c:hIc:Itdipt., strlillll" andllOzzll to !like sure
of 110bl~ by blowillgthrough IIOZzllwith
handles squeezed totethllr. Dwck IlUtrillg prnsure
relief holes ensurillg they IN not blocked, chick
M_I heldeap thoroughly for dluge, if dMIgId,
repllct ••• fit IIfety pill and •••• lllling cap,
11so fit l\1li pressure tilt stuct. IIwII prnsure
test his bien carried out 15 pi!' colour c:ode.
98
AND
SERVICE PROCEDURES
FOR
UNITOR DRY POWDER GAS CARTRIDGE TYPE
SIZES 6KG, 9KG, 10KG & 12KG
TO OPERATE
2. DIRECT'HOSE NOZZLE AT BASE OF FIRE
3. SQUEEZE A
~ NDLE TO COMMENCE DISCHARGE,
99
AND
SERVICE PROCEDURES
FOR
UNITOR 135LTR & 45LTR
WHEELED FOAM FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
TO OPERATE
1- USE UPRIGHT.
2. UNCOIL HOSE.
3. OPERATE GAS CYLINDER VALVE SLOWLY

(ANTI-CLOCKWISE).
4. AIM DISCHARGE NOZZLE AT BASE OF FIRE, HOLD

FIRMLY, SQUEEZE NOZZLE LEVER TO EXTINGUISH FIRE.
S. RELEASE LEVER TO CONTROL DISCHARGE.
101
102
AND
SERVItE PROCEDURES
FOR
UNITOR 50KG
DRY POWDER FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
TO OPERATE
1. USE UPRIGHT.
2. UNCOIL HOSE.
3. OPERATE GAS CYLINDER VALVE SLOWLY

(ANTI-CLOCKWISE).
II. AIM DISCHARGE NOZZLE AT BASE OF FIRE, HOLD

FIRMLY, SQUEEZE NOZZLE LEVER TO EXTINGUISH FIRE.
5. RELEASE LEVER TO CONTROL DISCHARGE.
103
AND
SERVICE PROCEDURES
FOR
UNITOR 9KG & 45KG
WHEELED C02 FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
TO OPERATE
1. UNCOIL HOSE.
2. DIRECT NOZZLE AT BASE OF FIRE
3. OPEN C02 CYLINDER VALVE FULLY (ANTI-CLOCKWISE)
4. ATTACK FIRE QUICKLY WITH FANNING ACTION TO COVER

WHOLE FIRE AREA.
107
108
AND
SERVICE PROCEDURES
FOR
UNITOR 7KG HALON 1211
HAND PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
TO OPERATE
2. DIRECT HOSE NOZZLE AT BASE OF FIRE
3. SQUE~ZE HANDLE TO COMMENCE DISCHARGE,

109
5. II IIRovt extinguisher m:. sclles IIId IhIkt to

Ibsorb nitrogen, dlec:k pl"ft5UI'tI••• i5 in
grownsection rHding 9 bAr.
bl IIIIIovebind fiUtd to hlndl.., I'tIpllCl uftty

pin, vent of pl"ft5U1'1m:. dildlirgl how IIId
~ nozzle •• ptor.
ci 0IIc:k for lliUge.
dl Fit •••• uftty pin IHling clp 1110 •••• pl"lUUl'l

test stud IS pi\" colour code IIhtn pl"ft5UI'tItest
his bttn clrritd out.
111
SECTIONAL VIE\-I OF SMALL POWDER HEAOCAP 19-3-87

DATA ON AFFF FOAM CONCENTRATE-MANUFACTURER 3M

It has been used Igainstfuel
spill fires, runningfueltspill Typical Fire Test Data:
situations, storage tank fires, tUl'1
fires on water. ai~raftcrashf\re$ 'Light Water' AFFF.
Ind major chemica' and solvent
flamlNbl. Fv.Slae Application IO'IIt Control 100'1'0htlnction
tires.
UQuid (m') "-te ('pmlrn2) Time (a_ ) (_s.)
'n one real-fife situation, 'l.;gl1t
Wlter' AFFF was used on a marine JP5 2300 2,0 30 t54
oU tankerwhiclt had blazed for Pelrol&
three days in spite of all efforts to Fuel Oil 8500 2.7 95% conlrol in
extinguish Iheblaze.llpuuhe fire 50:50 4 minutes
outin approximately one hour, Avgls 980 3.8 27 56
eVe'n thO'.Jgh much of the blaze was
below deck and could 1'01 be
reached directly
Matched Fires for Comparison
Fuel: 18.000 I.TRS AVTUR
Fire size: 276 m2
APplications for Applicalion rale: 2.9Itr/minul./m'
'Light Water" AFFF (per IMCO resolution no. A271 (Vlit)
Concentrate IIO'Vo control time 100% extinction
Industrial (MCI.) (•• ca.)
Warehousing PrOlein Nocontrol or extinction
Vehicle assembly Fluoroprotein 24' 325
Paint & Coatrng Mfg 'LightWater' AFFF 29 11&
RubberCompoundll1Q
Solvent recovery
Fuel slorage
Aircraft Hangers Typical Properties:
'Light Water' AFFF Concentrates
Chemical
Solve/1t exlraction
6'10 3'1\0 Freez. 3".•
Process areas Protected
Drum stora~e SpecifiC Gravity@2S·C 1.012 1.055 1.035
Tanker loadong Vi.cosity, Centistoke.
Effluent pi1S .2~ 2.4 7.5 3.7
Dfa1nage channels Minimum use temperature 1.~ -11fc 1.~
Freeze paint -~t -26"t: -4"(:
Petroleum ~025-c e 8 8
Pump stations
RefTnery processing
Loading raQlS
Marketing lerlllin,ls
Marine jetties
Tan •. storage
OffShore platforms
DATA ON PROTEIN FOAM CONCENTRATE TYPE "PROFOAM 806" ..MANUFACTURER KERR.
PROFOAM nPICAL REQUIRE-

PROPERTY 806 PROrDAM 806 RESUl1' UEHT
Recommended Induction Foam expansion
irate % 5-8 (at 4% concentration) 7.5:1 7.0:1
SpecifiC gravity at 2O"C 1.13 25% toam drainage mins 7.5 6.5
pH at 2O"C 6.9 -Fire control time sees 70 140
Viscosity at 2O"C centistrokes 5 Fire extinction time sees 110 180
Viscosity at O"C centistrokes 12 Burn-back time mins 17 I 10
Total solids % 32
Undissolved solids as
· received % maximum 0.25
FOAM PROPERTIES
Undissolved solids after
, ageing % maximum 1 With most oommercially available foam-making
· Pour point DC -8 equipment PROFOAM 806 concentration will give a
Freezing point OC -8 foam expansion in the range 8 to 10depending on the
exact design of apparatus. The drainage time, in addi-
---.
: Maximum continuous storage
i temperature DC 40 tion to equipment design,depends upon the method
· Recommended Premix
10
of measurement: 25%drainage times in the range 3 to
concentration %
10 minutes are typical.
116
DATA ON ABC POWDER

DATA ON BC POWDER
Manufacturer John Kerr. Co. (M/C) Limited
Product Centrtmax BC30S
Basic Ingredients Sodium Bicarbonate
Physical Propertfes
Boiling Point Not Applicable
Flath Point Not Applicable
Solubility in water In80luble
Fire HazaJ'd Nil
Health Ha,ards
Toxicity Non To~c
Effects of over exposure Non Hazardous - ·Temporary Discomfort
Spin or Leak Procedures
Steps to be taken 11'material sptued Sweep up or use vacuum cleaner
Waste disposal method Routine waste disposal for dry

material
,!peclal Protection
. Dust mask recommended
Respiratory Protection
VentitaUon Local ventilation helpful but not

essenttal
Protective Clothes Ideally keep powder off body
118

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Model Course 2.

Second edition 2000

Printed in the United Kingdom by CPC The Printers, Portsmouth

IMO wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the

Copyright © IMO 2001

Part A: Course Framework 5

Part C: Detailed Teaching Syllabus 15

Competence1: Control fire-fighting operations aboard ship

Competence2: Organizeand train fire parties

Competence3: Inspect and service fire detection and

Competence4: Investigateand compile reports on incidents

Part D: Instructor Manual 45

Appendix 1: Guidanceon CaseStudies and Group Assignments 53

Appendix 2: Materialfor CaseStudies 57

Appendix 3: Plateswhich can be used to make overhead projector 101

Appendix 4: Supporting materialfor the instructor 147

Appendix 5: Mock-up model of training facility for advancedfire fighting 199

Following the earlier adoption of the International Convention on Standards of Training,

Use of the model course

• properly qualified instructors

• Training and the STCW 1995 Convention

- communication and co-ordination during fire fighting

As previously mentioned a separate model course addresses Assessment of Competence and

Part A: Course Framework

Note: If designated to control fire-fighting operations seafarers must have successfully

A certificate may be issued only by centres approved by the Administration.

Course intake limitations

Training facilities and equipment

0 A large supply of carbonaceous and hydrocarbon fuels (wood, diesel and

o 2 sets of fire-protective clothing

There should be no restrictions concerning smoke emissions in the area.

Teaching aids (A)

V4 Fire Fighting on Container Ships (Code No. 602)

Available from: Videotel Marine International Limited

IMO references (R)

Part B: Course Outline and Timetable

An effective manner of presentation is to develop a technique of giving information and then

Competence 1: Control fire-fighting operations aboard ship

Course Outline Approximate time

1.1 Introduction, safety and principles 0.5

1.2 Areas of fire hazard 0.75

1.3 Fire precautions 0.75

1.5 Chemical reactions 0.5

1.7 Fires In water-tube boilers 0.5

1.10 Tactics and procedure of fire control while ship is carrying

1.12 Use of water for fire extinguishing, the effect on stability,

1.13 Communication and co-ordination during fire-fighting 0.25

1.14 Ventilation control including smoke extractor 0.25

1.15 Control of fuel and electrical systems 0.25

1.17 Management and conuol of injured persons 1.5

1.18 Procedures for co-ordination with shore-based fire fighters 0.25

Competence 2: Organize and train fire parties

Course Outline Approximate time

2.1 Preparation of contingency plans 0.25

2.2 Composition and allocation of personnel to fire parties 0.75

2.3 Training of seafarers in fire-fighting 3.5

2.4 Fire control plans 0.25

2.5 Organization of fire and abandon ship drills 0.75

Course Outline Approximate time

3.1 Fire alarms 0.25

3.2 Fire detection equipment 1.0

3.3 Fixed fire-extinguishing equipment 1.75

3.4 Fire main, hydrants, hoses, nozzles and pumps 1.0