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Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia
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TESTI E DOCUMENTI
The short text edited below is the eighth of Richard Lavenham's logical
tracts to appear recently in print 1. Lavenham, a late fourteenth century writer 2,
is on the whole a rather derivative writer. His Trac tatus de eventu futurorum 3,
for instance, is a short but clear account of Ockham's view on future contin-
gents 4. Again, his Insolubilia 5 is an exposition of Albert of Saxony's position
on the Liar and related paradoxes6.
In some respects, Lavenham's lack of originality is a virtue. His Obliga-
tioneSy for instance, edited below, is based in a loose way on Roger Swyneshed's
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" OBLIGATIONES " 225
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226 RICHARD LAVENHAM
25 Swyneshed, ibid., holds that in a depositio both the depositum and its con-
tradictory opposite are obligātā.
26 scilicet/ tibi MV. (The reading in MV is probably preferable).
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"OBLIGATIONES" 227
(5) Secunda regula est haec: Nulla piopositio necessaria vel impossi-
bilis est ponibilis vel deponibilis sed solum propositio contingens est po-
nibilis vel35 deponibilis36. Et propositio contingens est37 illa propositio
quae potest (V 22 va) esse vera vel38 falsa sua significatione primaria re-
manente. Unde si ponatur quod homo sit 39 asinus vel deponatur ista * Deus
est 9 , negatur talis casus quia propositio necessaria et 40 propositio 41 impos-
sibilis non sunt ponibiles nec deponibiles.
(6) Tertia regula: Omne positum et admissum quando non est per-
27 ex/ est M.
28 Om. esse MV.
* Add. tibi V.
30 praecise significet/ significet praecise MV.
31 Om. quod M.
32 Add. tibi V.
33 praecise significet/ significet praecise MV.
34 See Swyneshed, pars. 9 & 11. In par. 11 Swyneshed says that «obligatio est
totum aggregatum ex signis obligationis et obligāto », but does not treat the three
species separately as Lavenham does here.
35 vel/ et M.
36 See Swyneshed, pars. 18-20. In par. 18 Swyneshed remarks that « omnis pro-
positio ad quam extra tempus obligationis propter mutationem ex parte rei est va-
rianda responsio est ponenda vel deponenda », and in par. 19 he observes that these
are exactly the contingent propositions. In par. 19 he says that « nulla propositio ad
quam extra tempus obligationis propter mutationem factam ex parte rei non est va-
rianda responsio est ponenda vel deponenda », and in par. 20 these propositions are
identified as exactly the necessary and impossible propositions.
37 propositio ... est/ est propositio contingens MV.
38 vel/ et etiam MV.
39 sit/ est M.
40 et/ vel M.
41 Interi, propositio L.
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228 RICHARD LA VENHAM
50 sequitur/ se V.
51 Om. Pono V.
52 sit obligatio / obligatio sit M. Add. tibi facta MV.
53 est positio/ positio est M.
54 Om. positio M.
55 et ... aliqua/ aut V .
56 See Swyneshed, par. 64.
57 obligātā/ obligātām V.
s« Add. et MV.
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"OBLIGATIONES" 229
59 ex/ est M.
60 Om. est M.
61 See Swyneshed, pars. 67-68.
62 proponatur/ ponatur V.
63 proponatur/ ponatur V.
64 Add. est V.
65 See Swynesheďs suppositions 10-12, pars. 23 & 29-30. There Swyneshed says
that impertinent propositions known to be true are to be conceded, and those known
to be false are to be denied, while those which are doubtful are to be doubted. This
seems to be the import of Lavenham's rule too, despite the carelessness of his
wording. 1 - 1
66 nec ... consequen
par. 8: « Propositio
est concedenda nec
pars. 34-3 5, 67-68,
67 proponatur/ po
68 Add. est MV.
69 Om. et M.
70 Om. Propositio M.
71 See Swyneshed, par. 7 : « Propositio pertinens est propositio non obligātā quae,
qualitercumque significet, propter obligátům est concedenda vel neganda ». Cf. the
comment above, n. 66.
72 est haec/ haec est V.
73 concessionem/ conclusionem M.
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230 RICHARD LA VENHAM
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"OBLIGATIONES" 231
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232 RICHARD LAVENHAM
125 Note that, whereas 4 Tu respondes ad istam affirmative ' does not follow from
the obligátům , as argued in par. 15, ' Non respondes ad istam negative ' does. For
if you respond affirmatively to every proposition proposed to you, then if this propo-
sition is proposed to you, you respond to it affirmatively, and not negatively. And
if it is not proposed to you, you do not respond to it at all, and so a fortiori not
negatively. In either case, then it follows that you do not respond to it negatively.
126 Add. est o M.
127 Om. et ... obligāto L.
™ Add. tota V.
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" OBLIGATIONES " 233
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234 RICHARD LA VENHAM
142 Om. et M.
143 Om. concedendum M.
i" Om. in L.
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" OBLIGATIONES " 235
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236 RICHARD LAVENHAM
(27) Pro isto194 dico admitiendo casum et negando 195 quod homo
est a , quia ista propositio foret neganda extra tempus obligationis et non
propter impositionem propositionis ad significandum est responsio 196 ad
illam varianda. Et concedo quod ista est falsa. ( V 24 ra) Et quando sic
Sed/ Et V.
īsi Add. quod MV.
182 Interi, vera M.
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' ' OBLIGATIONES " 237
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238 RICHARD LA VENHAM
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"OBLIGATIONES" 239
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240 RICHARD LAVENHAM
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" OBLIGATIONES " 241
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