ADJUDICATORY POWERS

1. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA

Facts: The petitioner challenge the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration POEA on
the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an
overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 of the POEA, which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers.
The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by
the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor
of the complainant.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine
Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers.

Issue: As regard adjudicatory powers, was due process violated?

Held: No. Petitioner’s argument that it has been denied due process because the same POEA that issued
Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative
law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-
judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second
enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue
adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and
Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram
Regulatory Board and Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so
on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted
as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the
cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations
are observed.

Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of
the private respondent (Saco’s widowed wife), in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and
the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
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2. SMART AND PILTEL VS NTC; GLOBE AND ISLACOM VS CA G.R. NO. 151908, 152063 AUGUST 12, 2003

FACTS:

Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission
issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. In October 6, 2006, NTC issued another memo this time addressing all
cellular mobile telephone service operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate
the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. Petitioners ISLACOM, PILTEL filed against NTC an action
for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC
Memorandum of October 6, 2006 alleging that NTC NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade
and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law;
that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly
prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they
prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. NTC filed a motion to dismiss, which
was denied; and a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. However, when they filed for a
motion for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, it was granted. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUES: 1. WON the NTC and not the regular courts have jurisdiction over this case?

2. WON it was necessary to exhaust administrative remedies in this case?

HELD:

1 and 2. NO! Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new
and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with,
the standards prescribed by law. Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of
an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. In questioning the validity
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS
or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when
the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes,
the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by
the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the
proceeding before the court. However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a
rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution
is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. In the case at bar,
the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October
6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified
in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of
the said issuances. In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred that the Circular
contravened Civil Code provisions on sales and violated the constitutional prohibition against the
deprivation of property without due process of law. These are within the competence of the trial judge.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly
technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity
with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards and this is
judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our population and expertise in
fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.
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3. MUNICIPALITY OF LEMERY VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF BATANGAS

No. 36201, October 29, 1931

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari on the action of the Provincial Board of Batangas through
Board Resolution no. 289 disapproving Municipality of Lemery’s Council Resolutio No. 18 s. 1931. The said
council resolution pertains to the abolition of the office of the court porter and due to economic and
budgetary reason, to allocate a single janitor; thus, consolidating its function as porter, janitor and
messenger of the Office of the Justice of Peace, Office of the Municipal President and the Office of the
Municipal Secretary.

The Council forwarded the Resolution 18 to the Provincial Board for concurrence and apporval, but the
said resolution was disapproved through Board Resolution 289 directing the Municipal Council to
reinstate a dedicated janitor to the office of the justice of peace and to provided the necessary funding
for the post. The Council, due to economic reasons, appealed to the Board by a petition to reconsider
Resolution 18. However, this appeal was denied and the Council was instructed to set aside Resolution 18
and provide the necessary funding or else face administrative sanctions.

For fear to be subjected to an administrative sanction, the Council instituted a petition for certiorari
questioning the decision of the Provincial Board to be in excess of their authority and the praying that a
injuction be issued to prevent the implementation of Board Resolution 289 and to declare the Board Reso
null and void. The Council contends that the Provincial Board abrograted upon itself the power to judge
on the Council’s action to legislate and allocate limited resources. The Board on the other hand contends
that in the exercise of its supervisory function, it can strike actions of the Municipal Council and it such
manner it is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, inasmuch as the petition does not allege that the Board
acted in the exercise of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial functions.

1st ISSUE: Whether or not the Board exercised judicial or quasi-judicial function.

RULING: The Board exercised QUASI-JUDICIAL function in reviewing Council Resolution No. 18 s.
1931. The power execised by the Provincial Board in approving or disapproving a muncipal resolution or
ordinance is in the nature of a Quasi-Judicial function. In disapproving resolution No. 18, series of 1931,
of the municipal council of Lemery, which consolidated the position of janitor for the office of the
municipal president, of the municipal secretary, and of the justice of the peace court, this action being
within the legislative powers of said municipal council, the provincial board of Batangas exceeded its
quasijudicial powers.

"The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial
functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of
legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial
functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter
in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially."
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" The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or
order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the
council or president making the same" (Administrative Code, sec. 2233). Absolutely no other ground is
recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of any
municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or
order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the
scope of the legal powers conferred by law.' "

In vesting provincial boards with power to annul resolutions, and ordinances, passed by municipal councils
in excess of their powers, the law granted such provincial boards quasi-judicial powers, for the
determination of whether an act is legal or no, is an essentially judicial function.

2nd ISSUE: Whether or not the Board has exceeded its jurisdiction in dispproving Council Resolution
no. 18.

RULING: YES. The said board in disapproving resolution No. 18, series of 1931, of the municipal
council of Lemery, relies not upon the basis that the municipal council acted in excess of its legislative
powers. It follows that the municipal council of Lemery acted within its legislative powers and duties in
consolidating the positions of janitor for the office of the municipal president, of municipal secretary, and
of justice of the peace. And the provincial board of Batangas, respondent herein, exceeded its quasi-
judicial powers in disapproving resolution No. 18, series of 1931, of said municipal council of Lemery.

The Court ruled: (1) That the power exercised by the provincial board in approving or disapproving a
municipal resolution or ordinance is in the nature of a quasi-judicial function; (2) that in disapproving
resolution No. 18, series of 1931, of the municipal council of Lemery, which consolidated the position of
janitor for the office of the municipal president, of the municipal secretary, and of the justice of the peace
court, this action being within the legislative powers of said municipal council, the provincial board of
Batangas exceeded its quasi-judicial powers; and (3) that there is no plain, speedy and adequate
administrative remedy, for the Administrative Code does not permit of an appeal from the decisions of
the Chief of the Executive Bureau to the Secretary of the Interior.
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS
4. CSC VS. DACOYCOY 366 PHIL 86

Facts: Pedro O Dacoycoy (a Vocational School Administrator of a public school) was charged with habitual
drunkenness, misconduct, and nepotism. He was charged of nepotism on two counts as a result of the
appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their
assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator,
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. The Recommendation was made by Mr. Daclag, who was under the
supervision of Respondent Dacoycoy.

CSC found him guilty of nepotism and dismissed him. CA reversed as he did not appoint his 2 sons to the
positions under him. CSC appealed to the SC. SC reversed, ruling that he was guilty of nepotism and that
CSC has the standing to bring the present appeal from the adverse decision of the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the CSC is the property party to appeal the suit?
Ruling: YES, SC said that CSC was the proper party to appeal the suit because it was impleaded in the case
and that the exoneration of Dcoycoy by the CA seriously prejudiced the civil service system. In this case,
the SC expressly abandoned the prior rulings that an “aggrieved party” refers only to government
employees adversely affected by the decision. In other words, the SC overruled prior decisions holding
that the Civil Service Law “does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees
from administrative charges”
Issue: Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism?
Ruling: YES. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor
of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing
authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office; and d) person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee.

To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree f consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Undoubtedly, Respondent can be held responsible for the appointment of his 2 sons. Mr. Daclag was a
subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator, He authorized Mr.
Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then
Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent’s two sons and placed them under his
immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school.
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS

5. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB) VS RICARDO V.GARCIA

Facts:

Ricardo Garcia a check processor and cash representative at PNB, was charged by latter with Gross
Neglect of Duty in connection with the funds it had lost and PNB-Administrative Adjudication Office
rendered its decision approved by PNB Executive Vice President found respondent guilty with a penalty
of Forced Resignation with Benefits without prejudiced to his monetary liability arising from the case.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied aggrieved by the decision he appealed to public
respondent (Civil Service Commission). Meanwhile, Pursuant to EO No. 80 PNB was privatized.

Subsequently, public respondent issued a resolution granting private respondent's appeal after
finding that the evidence on record failed to establish neglect of duty on the part of private respondent
which exonerated him of the charges, charged against him. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence appealed in CA and ruled that a decision exonerating a respondent in an administrative
case is final and unappealable citing Citing Mendez v. Civil Service Commission (old doctrine), the CA
construed the phrase "party adversely affected" in the above-quoted provision to refer solely to the public
officer or employee who was administratively disciplined. Hence, an appeal may be availed of only in a
case where the respondent is found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner can appeal the decision made by the Civil Service Commission.

Held:

Yes.

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but a mere statutory privilege that
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.

Neither can the old doctrine barring appeal be justified by the provision limiting the jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission. According to that provision, the CSC was limited to the review of decisions
involving: (1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days’
salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or dismissal from office.

There is nothing in the law that bars an appeal of a decision exonerating a government official or
an employee from an administrative charge. If a statute is clear, plain and free form ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Indeed, the campaign against
corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance in government will be undermined if the government or the
private offended party is prevented from appealing erroneous administrative decisions. After all,
administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are final and
unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy.
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS

Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to
prevent appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and
pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.

Citing Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, the CA construed the phrase "party adversely affected"
in the above-quoted provision to refer solely to the public officer or employee who was administratively
disciplined. Hence, an appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty.
However, this interpretation has been overturned in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy. Speaking
through Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, the Court said that “we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office x x x.

6. MATHAY VS CA

FACTS:

Mayor Simon appointed respondents to positions in Civil Service Unit (CSU) of the LocGov of QC. The
CSUs were created pursuant to PD No. 51, which was signed in 1972.In 1990, Sec of Justice rendered an
Opinion, stating that PD No. 51 was never published in OG, thus is never in force and effect.

CSC issued Memo Circ No. 30, directing all civil service offices to recall and revoke all appointments
made pursuant to PD No. 51. The appointments of the respondents were revoked. QC City Ordinance No.
NC-140 (1990) was enacted, which established the Dept of Public Order and Safety. The law provides that
present personnel of CSU are absorbed into the DPOS. However, the positions in the DPOS were not filled
due to lack of funds. Mayor Simon then offered the respondents private appointments. This was
subsequently renewed, until they were no longer renewed by Mayor Mathay in 1992.

The respondents filed this case.

ISSUE: W/N CSC had the authority to direct Mayor Mathay to reinstate the respondents.

Ruling: NO. CSC is without authority!

Law applicable is old Loc Gov (BP 337). Section 3 of QC Ordinance is invalid for being inconsistent with
BP 337. Ordinance provided for absorption of PERSONNEL, not POSITIONS. Thus, the city council or
sanggunian, in effect, dictated who shall occupy the new positions. BP 337 mandates that the power to
appoint rests with the local chief executive. The power of sanggu is limited to creating, consolidating and
reorganizing city officers and positions.
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS
Also, CSC’s power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It cannot direct that an
appointment of an individual be made. Even assuming that the Ordinance is valid, the absorption
contemplated is not possible since CSU never legally came into existence, thus respondents never held
permanent positions. The seniority rights and permanent status did not arise since they have no valid
appointment.

It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue
of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. Since PD 51 creating the CSU never became
law, it could not be a source of rights. Neither, it could impose duties. It could not afford any protection.
It did not create an office. It is as inoperative as though it was never passed. IN Debulgado v. CSC we
held that “a void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of the
appointment@

7. NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD NAB OF NAPOLCOM VS. P/INSP. JOHN A. MAMAUAG

Gaspar & Pacay (both minors & mild retardates) left the residence of Judge Angeles. Agnes Lucero (Lucero)
found Gaspar and Pacay wandering around the vicinity of the Philippine Rabbit bus terminal in Cubao.
Gaspar and Pacay narrated to Lucero stories of maltreatment and non-payment of salary by Judge
Angeles.
The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases. One was a criminal case
for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 against Judge Angeles. Another was an administrative
complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by Judge Angeles against Ganias, Mamauag, Almario, Cario, Felipe
and Garcia. Judge Angeles later impleaded Billedo as additional respondent.
PNP Chief Sarmiento ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Headquarters finds: Respondent[s] P/CINSP. ROBERTO GANIAS, SPO1 Jaime Billedo, and
SPO1 Roberto Cario guilty of Serious Neglect of Duty and orders their dismissal from the police service;
P/INSP JOHN MAMAUAG and SPO2 Eugene Almario guilty of Less Serious Neglect of Duty and orders that
both of them be suspended from the police service for Ninety (90) days with forfeiture of pay; and SPO4
Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe exonerated of the charge for insufficiency of evidence.

Judge Angeles filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the private complainant in an administrative case has the legal personality to move for
reconsideration, or appeal an adverse decision of the disciplining authority.

RULING: NO.

Section 45 of RA 6975 (AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE) provides that a
disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory. Under Section 45,
a disciplinary action is appealable only if it involves either a demotion or dismissal from the service. If the
disciplinary action is less than a demotion or dismissal from the service, the disciplinary action shall be
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS
final and executory as Section 45 of RA 6975 expressly mandates. Thus, a decision imposing suspension
on a PNP member is not subject to appeal to a higher authority.
Administrative disciplinary action connotes administrative penalty.[ If the decision exonerates the
respondents or otherwise dismisses the charges against the respondents, there is no disciplinary action
since no penalty is imposed. The provision that a penalty less than demotion or dismissal from service is
final and executory does not apply to dismissal of charges or exoneration because they are not disciplinary
actions.
A private complainant like Judge Angeles is not one of either party who can appeal under Sections
43 and 45 of RA 6975. The private complainant is a mere witness of the government which is the real party
in interest. In short, private complainant Judge Angeles is not a party under Sections 43 and 45 who can
appeal the decision of the disciplining authority.
Thus, Judge Angeles has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against Mamauag,
et al. by the CPDC District Director in the Resolution of 10 April 1995. The motion for re-investigation filed
by Judge Angeles with the PNP Chief is in substance an appeal from the decision of the CPDC District
Director. The PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain Judge Angeles appeal in the guise of a motion for
re-investigation. Since the PNP Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by the PNP Chief pursuant to
the appeal is void. Thus, the Decision of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against
Mamauag, et al. stands and is now final and executory.

8. HEIRS OF JUGALBOT VS CA

On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to Nicolas Jugalbot based on the latter’s
claim that he was the tenant of Lot 2180-C of the subject property of the case at bar. The subject property
was registered in the name of Virginia A. Roa under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11543, the
same being issued on April 1, 1970 in the name of "Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa." The property
was originally registered in the name of Marcelino Cabili from whom Virginia A. Roa purchased the same
sometime in 1966.

Nicolas Jugalbot alleged that he was a tenant of the property continuously since the 1950s. On a
Certification dated January 8, 1988 and issued by Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the subject
property was declared to be tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn.
Later, Emancipation Patent was registered with the Register of Deeds and Nicolas Jugalbot was issued TCT
No. E-103.

The heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents, filed before the DARAB Provincial Office of
Misamis Oriental a Complaint for Cancellation of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages.

Issue: W/N DAR has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling: No.

The jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: (a) adjudication of all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure
related problems; and (c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial and other non-agricultural uses.
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS
To recapitulate, petitioners are not de jure tenants of Virginia A. Roa; hence, the DARAB has no jurisdiction
over this case. The DARAB not only committed a serious error in judgment, which the Court of Appeals
properly corrected, but the former likewise committed a palpable error in jurisdiction which is contrary
to law and jurisprudence. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court decision and likewise
hold that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that
the subject matter of the present action is residential, and not agricultural, land, and that all the essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship were sorely lacking in the case at bar.

Reasons why petitioners are not de jure tenants

the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process.
there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas Jugalbot or the petitioners
personally cultivated the property under question or that there was sharing of harvests, except for their
self-serving statements.
the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.
it is readily apparent in this case that the property under dispute is residential property and not
agricultural property.

9. HEIRS OF JULIAN DELA CRUZ VS. HEIRS OF ALBERT CRUZ

FACTS: September 1960, the Republic of the Philippines sold Lot No. 778 to Julian dela Cruz by virtue of
an Agreement to Sell. The DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in his favor as the qualified
allocatee of the landholding.

He cultivated the property and made payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years. He
died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela Cruz and their 10 children, including Mario
and Maximino dela Cruz.

Leonora dela Cruz executed a private document in May 1980 in which she declared that, with the consent
of her children, she had sold the land in favor of Alberto Cruz, who henceforth had the right to possess
and cultivate the property, and the obligation to continue the payment of the amortizations due over the
land under the terms of the Agreement to Sell. Mario dela Cruz conformed to the deed.

Alberto took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of 10 years without any protest
from Leonora and her children. He then filed an application to purchase the property with the DAR.

Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order approving the recommendation of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO). He directed the cancellation of Julian’s CLT and declared that
whatever rights Julian had over the landholding and payments made in favor of the government under
the Agreement to Sell were forfeited.
Maximino, one of the surviving children of Julian, discovered that the landholding had already been
registered in the name of Alberto Cruz. He then filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the following: the order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and
TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 issued in favor of Alberto Cruz.
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS
The petitioners declared, inter alia, that they were the surviving heirs of Julian dela Cruz; they had no
knowledge of the sale by Leonora and Mario of their right as beneficiaries of the property; not being
privies to the said sale, they were not bound by the private deed executed by Leonora; and such sale, as
well as the issuance of the CLOA and the title over the property in favor of Alberto, was null and void.

After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition. It declared that the petitioners were the rightful
allocatees of the property, and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA No. 51750 and TCT No. CLOA -0-3035
and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered to vacate the property. Alberto
appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DAR ADJUDICATION BOARD HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE

RULING: NONE. This Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1)
that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4)
that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

The petitioners themselves categorically admitted in their pleadings that there was no landlord-tenancy
relationship between them and Alberto over the landholding. Nor did they have any tenurial, leasehold,
or agrarian relations whatsoever when petitioners Leonora and her son Mario executed the deed of sale
in May 1980 in favor of Alberto, nor when the petitioners filed their petition with the DARAB. The sole
tenant-beneficiary over the landholding was Julian dela Cruz. There is no showing that before the
execution of the deed of transfer/sale, Alberto was a tenant or farmer, or that he was landless.

The Court agrees with the petitioner’s contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases,
they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been
issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs
by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to
parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the
DARAB.
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10. ANG TIBAY VS. CIR

Facts: Petitioner temporarily layed off some members of the National Labor Union due to shortage of
leather soles, which is now charged with unfair labor practice for such shortage is unsupported and there
was undue discrimination on Ang Tibay’s part as all of those layed off were the NLU’s members, whilst
members of the National Workers Brotherhood were not treated the same way. The Court of Industrial
Relation decided the case in favor of Ang Tibay. Due to new records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers' Brotherhood Union of Ang
Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of
which are illegal, a new trial is being prayed for in this court.

Issue: Whether or not the motion for new trial be granted.

Held: Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the
law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organof the Government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic.

In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation
and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is
a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. CIR is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." However, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrativecharacter. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:

The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof.

Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.

The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.

The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the dicision, the records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by
NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time
of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits
are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered.
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS
11. LRTA V AURORA SALVAÑA GR NO. 192074 JUNE 10, 2014

Facts: Atty. Aurora Salvaña is the OIC of the LRTA (Light Rail Transit Authority) Administrative
Department, until her designation was revoked by the order of the LRTA Administrator, Melquiades
Robles. Aurora questioned this revocation with the Office of the President. Meanwhile, she applied for
sick leave of absence, which she supported with a medical certificate purportedly issued by Dr. Grace
Marie Blanco of the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).

LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco also denied
having seen or treated Salvaña on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her medical certificate. Aurora
explained to the Fact-finding committee that because she refused to sign a resolution favouring a
particular bidder, the Administrator decided to revoke her designation. The Committee was not satisfied
with the explanation and found her guilty of all the charges against her and imposed [on] her the penalty
of dismissal from . . . service with all the accessory penalties." The LRTA Board of Directors approved the
findings of the Committee.

The Civil Service Commission found that Salvaña was guilty only of simple dishonesty. She was
meted a penalty of suspension for three months. LRTA’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Court of Appeals affirmed the Civil Service Commission’s finding that Salvaña was only guilty of
simple dishonesty. The appellate court also ruled that Administrator Robles had no standing to file a
motion for reconsideration before the Civil Service Commission because that right only belonged to
respondent in an administrative case.

Issue: Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator, has the standing to appeal the
decision

Ruling: Yes. Presidential Decree No. 807 provides that Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the
party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. The Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, or the URACCS, on September 27, 1999, defined “party
adversely affected,” in this wise: the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been
rendered.

For some time, government parties were barred from appealing exonerations of civil servants
they had previously sanctioned. It was not until the promulgation by this court of Civil Service Commission
v. Dacoycoy, where the Court expressly abandoned and overruled extant jurisprudence that "the phrase
‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action. It ruled that the CSC may also be an
adversely affected party. The situation where the CSC’s participation is beneficial and indispensable often
involves complaints for administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being notoriously undesirable,
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, where the complainant is more often
acting merely as a witness for the government which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of
this nature, a ruling of the Court of Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is understandably
adverse to the government, and the CSC as representative of the government may appeal the decision to
this Court to protect the integrity of the civil service system.
 ADJUDICATORY POWERS
The right to appeal by government parties was not limited to the Civil Service Commission. In
Pastor v. City of Pasig, this court ruled that the City of Pasig had standing to appeal the decision of the
Civil Service Commission reinstating a city employee to her former position, despite the city government
having reassigned her to another unit. In Geronga v. Varela, this court ruled that the Mayor of Cadiz City
had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of a decision by the Civil Service Commission exonerating
a city employee on the ground that "as the appointing and disciplining authority, he is a real party in
interest." In Department of Education v. Cuanan, this court ruled that the Department of Education
"qualified as a party adversely affected by the judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of
exoneration in an administrative case."

There are, however, cases, which sought to qualify this right to appeal. The government party
appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an
anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of
being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent.

The LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service Commission of its decision.
The employer has the right "to select honest and trustworthy employees." When the government office
disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its discretion. This
discretion is inherent in the constitutional principle that "public officers and employees must, at all times,
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."

During the pendency of this decision, or on November 18, 2011, the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service or RACCS was promulgated. The Civil Service Commission
modified the definition of a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. –….k. PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the respondent
against whom a decision in an administrative case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an
appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original decision.

Procedural laws have retroactive application.