10. Republic of the Philippines current passing through said lines pose danger to life and limbs.
current passing through said lines pose danger to life and limbs. Additionally, respondent-Spouses
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175176 October 17, 2008
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN and SPS. JULITO QUIMCO and GLORIA CAPIN, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to review, reverse, and set aside the Decision1 dated 21 April 2006 and
Resolution2 dated 27 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73656. In its assailed
Decision, the appellate court affirmed the Resolution3 dated 16 April 2001, as modified by the
Order4 dated 24 August 2001, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 7 th Judicial Region, Branch 25, Danao
City, in Civil Case No. DNA-547, awarding in favor of herein respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and
spouses Julito Quimco and Gloria Capin (Spouses Quimco) damages, in the total amount ₱1,434,207.67
(at the rate of ₱448.33 per square meter), for the 3,199-square-meter portion of their lots taken by herein
petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The present controversy arose from the following facts:
Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation duly organized under Philippine laws and
vested with the power of eminent domain by its Charter under Republic Act No. 6395,5 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 938.6 Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project
(Interconnection Project), petitioner expropriated several parcels of land in the Municipality of Carmen
and City of Danao in the Province of Cebu, which will be traversed and affected by its transmission
towers and lines.
Among the lots affected by the petitioner’s Interconnection Project were those owned by the respondents
located in Dawis Sur, Carmen, Cebu. Respondent Santa Loro Vda. De Capin’s lot has an area of 16,193
square meters, covered by Tax Declaration No. 15-22196 (1994);7 while respondent-Spouses Quimco’s
lot has an area of 3,298 square meters, covered by Tax Declaration No. 31376 (1996).8 To be able to enter
the said properties, petitioner obtained from each of the respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and
Spouses Quimco a "Permission to Enter for Construction of Transmission Line Project," dated 14 June
19949 and 11 December 1996,10 respectively. The permits were signed by the respondents upon
representation by the petitioner that it would pay them just compensation for the intrusion into their
properties.
Thereafter, petitioner began to construct on respondents’ properties its power lines and transmission
towers, which were completed in 1996. Petitioner’s Interconnection Project affected portions of
respondents’ properties, with a combined area of 3,199 square meters. Upon its completion of the
construction of the power lines and transmission towers, petitioner imposed several restrictions upon the
respondents on the use of their lands, which included the prohibition against planting or building anything
higher than three meters below the area traversed by its transmission lines as the high tension electric
Quimco, holder of a Small Scale Quarry Permit, Series of 1995, were also prohibited from continuing
their quarry business near petitioner’s transmission towers because of the great possibility that the quarry
might weaken the foundation of the transmission towers. In other words, respondents lost substantial
amount of income due to the restriction imposed on their properties by the petitioner.
Petitioner then paid respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and Spouses Quimco the amounts of
₱8,015.9011 and ₱5,350.49,12 respectively, for the portions of their lots affected by the Interconnection
Project. Only later did respondents discover that in comparison to the measly sums they were paid by
petitioner, the other landowners within their area who resisted the expropriation of their properties in
court or who entered into compromise agreements with the petitioner were paid by petitioner the amount
of ₱448.30 to ₱450.00 per square meter as just compensation for the portions of their properties similarly
affected by the petitioner’s Interconnection Project.
Accordingly, respondents filed a Complaint13 for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession of
Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs, against the
petitioner before the RTC, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. DNA-547.
Petitioner, in its Answer, countered that respondents’ claim for compensation for the full value of their
properties traversed by its transmission lines was repugnant to Section 3-A14 of its Charter, according to
which, petitioner is obligated only to pay the easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the
land as just compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvements.
During the Pre-trial Conference, the parties conceded that there was no dispute as to the material fact that
petitioner had taken portions of respondents’ lots, with a combined area of 3,199 square meters, for use in
its Interconnection Project. They also agreed that the only issue for resolution by the RTC was the
determination of the amount of just compensation due the respondents for the portions of their land taken
by the petitioner. Thus, respondents assented that they would file a Motion for Summary Judgment.
On 4 September 2000, the RTC issued an Order15 giving the respondents 30 days within which to file
their Motion for Summary Judgment. The petitioner was also given 20 days from receipt of a copy of
respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment to interpose or file its Opposition thereto.
In compliance with the 4 September 2000 Order of the RTC, respondents filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment, with several documentary evidence and affidavits of witnesses attached, on 10 October 2000.
In an Order16 dated 17 November 2000, the RTC gave petitioner a 15-day period from receipt of the said
Order to file its Opposition to or Comment on respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
On 21 December 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment on Motion for
Summary Judgment. It averred that (1) it was not inclined to oppose respondents’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, except that the area of 3,199 square meters of respondents’ lots alleged to have been traversed
by petitioner’s transmission lines was still being verified as to its correctness by its Right of Way
Officers; and (2) upon confirmation that the area was correct, it would join respondents’ Motion for
Summary Judgment.17 In an Order18 dated 29 December 2000, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion and
gave it an extension of 15 days within which to file its Comment to respondents’ Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Despite the extension given the petitioner, it still failed to file its Comment. Hence, in an Order 19 dated 23
February 2001, the RTC deemed respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment submitted for resolution.
On 16 April 2001, the RTC rendered a Resolution in favor of the respondents, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [herein
respondents], ordering the [herein petitioner] to pay damages in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED
FORTY EIGHT & 33/100 PESOS (₱448.33) PER SQUARE METER or the total amount of ONE
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR AND TWO HUNDRED SEVEN & 67/100 PESOS
(₱1,434,207.67) for the 3,199 square meters of [respondents’] lots taken by the [petitioner], with interest
thereon at the rate of 14% per annum computed since 1996 when the [petitioner] took said portions from
the [respondents].20
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the aforesaid Resolution of the RTC be set
aside and the amount of just compensation be reduced to ₱25.00 per square meter. Petitioner also filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration seeking the reduction of the interest rate imposed by the RTC
from 14% per annum to 6% per annum.
Acting on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, the
RTC issued an Order21 dated 24 August 2001, affirming its Resolution dated 16 April 2001, with the
modification that the imposable rate of interest was reduced to 6% per annum from the filing of the
complaint, and 12% per annum from the time the judgment has become final and executory until fully
satisfied. According to the dispositive portion of the RTC Order:
WHEREFORE, the resolution of this Court dated [16 April 2001] is hereby affirmed with modification
that the imposable rate of interest of the monetary judgment in favor of [respondents] should be 6% per
annum from the filing of the complaint and 12% per annum from the time the judgment has become final
and executory until fully satisfied, using the amount adjudged as the actual base for the computation. 22
Still refusing to accept the judgment of the RTC, petitioner appealed the 16 April 2001 Resolution and 24
August 2001 Order of the said trial court to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 73656.
On 21 April 2006, the appellate court rendered a Decision affirming the Resolution dated 16 April 2001,
as modified by the Order dated 24 August 2001, both by the RTC.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court’s Decision, but it was denied by the same
court in a Resolution dated 27 October 2006.
Hence, petitioner filed the present Petition before this Court, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the propriety of
the trial court’s resort to summary judgment in determining the amount of just compensation for
the properties of respondents affected by petitioner’s transmission line project.
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the finding of the
trial court that the total area of respondents’ lands affected by petitioner’s transmission line project
is 3,199 square meters.
III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that the decision in
Civil Case No. DNA-379 provides sufficient basis for fixing the fair market value of the affected
properties of respondents at ₱448.33 per square meter.
IV. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not ruling that under
petitioner’s Charter, R.A. No. 6395, as amended, respondents are only entitled to simple easement
fees.23
Petitioner argues that although the Complaint filed by the respondents before the RTC was one for
rescission of agreement and/or damages, it was subsequently transformed into one for "reversed eminent
domain"24 where the determination of the amount of just compensation was the issue. In fact,
respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment focused only on the payment of just compensation.
Resultantly, the RTC erred in resolving the respondents’ Complaint on the basis of the provisions of the
Rules of Court on Summary Judgment. The rules on summary judgment apply only to ordinary taking of
properties. Instead of granting respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the RTC should have
appointed commissioners who would ascertain the amount of just compensation for the subject properties,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.25 Thus, the determination of just
compensation by the RTC based only on the pleadings submitted, was palpably void.
The Resolution dated 16 April 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No. DNA-547, fixing the fair market value
for the portions of respondents’ lots affected by the Interconnection Project at ₱448.33 per square meter,
is based on the Decision dated 25 May 1998 also of the RTC in Civil Case No. DNA-379;26 which,
petitioner contends, is based on another Decision dated 5 May 1998 of the same RTC in Civil Case No.
DNA-373.27 In its 5 May 1998 Decision in Civil Case No. DNA-373, the RTC considered the opinion
values of the Committee on Appraisal in determining the fair market value of the properties involved
therein. The said Decision, however, did not contain a description of the properties involved therein and
their land classification at the time of the filing of the complaint and/or their taking. Therefore, the
Decision dated 25 May 1998 in Civil Case No. DNA-379 did not provide sufficient basis for pegging the
fair market value of respondents’ properties at ₱448.33 per square meter in Civil Case No. DNA-547.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC did not discuss in its Resolution dated 16 April 2001 its factual and
legal bases for fixing the amount of damages payable to respondents. Respondents likewise failed to
demonstrate that their properties, at the time of their taking, were of the same classification as the
properties belonging to other landowners which were similarly traversed by petitioner’s Interconnection
Project and for which petitioner paid more. Finally, petitioner insists that it only acquired an easement of
right of way on respondents’ properties for the construction of its transmission lines. The respondents still
retained ownership of their properties despite the imposition of an easement of right of way thereon.
Consequently, petitioner is liable only to pay respondents an easement fee, not exceeding 10% of the fair
market value of the portions of their properties actually affected by the petitioner’s Interconnection
Project, in accordance with Section 3-A(b) of petitioner’s Charter, as amended.
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial. Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment may still ensue as a
matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine. The
presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety
of summary judgment.28
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the
time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or
admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Under the afore-quoted procedural rules, for a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish
two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of
damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended
thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the
opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment. 29
A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed,
then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The
party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any
genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and
may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded
by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of
trial.30
In this case, during the Pre-trial Conference, petitioner already admitted that it had taken portions of
respondents’ lands for the construction of its power lines and transmission towers pursuant to its
Interconnection Project. However, the parties could not agree on the amount of just compensation or
damages that petitioner should pay respondents for the lands taken. Respondents insist that they be paid
the full market value of the portions of their lots taken by the petitioner, while petitioner believed that it
was only bound to pay respondents easement fees, which was equivalent to 10% of the market value of
the respondents’ lots as indicated in their tax declarations, pursuant to Section 3-A of petitioner’s Charter.
Evidently, based on the foregoing, what remained for the determination of the RTC was the proper
amount of damages due the respondents for the portions of their lots taken by the petitioner.
Accordingly, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment before the RTC, where they specifically
alleged that:
"4. Portions of the above-described parcels of land with a total area of 3,199 square meters were
affected by the aforesaid [petitioner’s] 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project and were taken
by [petitioner] in 1996, is shown by a Sketch Plan hereto attached as Annex C which is also made an
integral part of this motion."31 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner, in turn, filed its Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment, which was granted by the
RTC. In its Motion, petitioner stated that it was not inclined to oppose respondents’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, except that its officers were still verifying whether the area of respondents’ lots traversed by
petitioner’s transmission lines was indeed 3,199 square meters; and the moment the area is confirmed to
be correct, petitioner will join respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment. However, despite the ample
opportunities given to petitioner by the RTC, it never filed any Opposition to or Comment on
respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment. It did not submit to the RTC the results of its supposed
verification of the area of respondents’ lots actually traversed by its transmission lines. Petitioner only
raised the issue on the area actually taken after the RTC had rendered summary judgment directing
petitioner to pay damages for the 3,199 square meters it took from respondents.
As correctly and clearly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals in its appealed Decision:
[Petitioner] did not present the alleged communication of its Project Manager or the sketch plans for the
RTC’s perusal despite the extension of time given by the court a quo. In view thereof, it is quite clear that
the [petitioner] was given sufficient time to verify the area affected by [petitioner’s] tower and
transmission lines and to inform the court of the result thereof. Furthermore, the sketch plans 32 were not
even signed by the geodetic engineer who supposedly conducted the survey and its preparation which
makes these documents of doubtful credibility. As such without any comment filed by the [petitioner] and
without any evidence to the contrary, the court a quo correctly relied on the evidence submitted by the
[respondents]. x x x. The [petitioner] cannot now raise any issue as to any material fact in the case at
bar when through its own fault and inaction, it chose to remain silent when the motion for
summary judgment was filed with the RTC. Such an actuation speaks of a dilatory tactic on the part of
the [petitioner] in the payment of the just compensation due the [respondents]. 33 (Emphasis supplied.)
In light of the foregoing, the issue on the area of respondents’ lots actually affected by petitioner’s
Interconnection Project was not timely or validly raised as an issue before the RTC. Except for the
amount of damages to which the respondents were entitled to as a matter of law, there was no other
genuine issue as to any material fact involved in Civil Case No. DNA-547. Hence, the RTC was justified
in resorting to summary judgment.
Equally futile is petitioner’s insistence that respondents’ Complaint is actually for "reversed eminent
domain," which requires the appointment of commissioners for the determination of just compensation, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, rather than the promulgation of a
summary judgment.
It should be emphasized that the present case stemmed from a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement,
Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and
Other Reliefs filed by the respondents against the petitioner. It was an ordinary civil action for the
rescission of respondents’ agreement with petitioner, as well as recovery of the possession of the lots
taken, for failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to pay just compensation for the respondents’
properties. Payment of just compensation or damages was an alternative remedy, akin to specific
performance by the petitioner of its obligation under its agreement with respondents, which would
prevent the rescission of the agreements altogether and the return of the possession of the properties to
respondents. The parties, at the Pre-Trial Conference, implicitly agreed to pursue the remedy for payment
of damages rather than rescission of the agreement. Clearly, the proceedings before the RTC were not for
expropriation, but were for damages, to which Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court is
irrelevant.
Reference may be made to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals.34 In the said case, after
therein petitioner NAPOCOR withdrew its second Petition for Expropriation, what was left for the trial
court’s determination was the counterclaim of therein private respondent Antonino Pobre, contained in
his Motion to Dismiss, for damages. The Court ruled therein:
"In this case, NPC appropriated [private respondent’s] Property without resort to expropriation
proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC
institute expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the
second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just
compensation and damages that NPC had to pay [private respondent].
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for
expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no
longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable." (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner herein cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of procedural laws when it has so arbitrarily
violated respondents’ right to just compensation for their properties taken for public use.
Petitioner assured respondents that it will pay them just compensation for the portions of their lots needed
for the Interconnection Project, on the basis of which respondents agreed in good faith to allow petitioner
to already enter their properties and build thereon. Yet, instead of paying respondents just compensation
for the portions of their lots taken, they were paid negligible amounts as easements fees.
More lopsided is the fact that the other landowners within their area who resisted the taking of their
properties were paid by petitioner way more than respondents who voluntarily dealt with petitioner.
Petitioner had to bring some of the resisting landowners to court in expropriation proceedings where
petitioner willingly paid just compensation for the said landowners’ properties, as determined by a panel
of commissioners. Petitioner entered into compromise agreements with the other resisting landowners in
which it likewise paid just compensation for the latter’s properties. There is no rhyme or reason why
respondents were the only ones paid with easement fees, which were of much lesser values.
The Decision dated 25 May 1998 of the RTC in Civil Case No. DNA-37935 provides sufficient basis for
the same RTC in Civil Case No. DNA-547 to award just compensation to respondents, equivalent to the
fair market value of their affected properties at a rate of P448.33 per square meter.
In its 25 May 1998 Decision in Civil Case No. DNA-379, the RTC therein ordered the petitioner to pay
just compensation in the amount of ₱448.33 per square meter for the lot owned by the heirs of Tomas
Gingco, which was similarly traversed by petitioner’s transmission lines. Said Decision became final and
executory on 3 December 1998.36 Although it is a Decision in another case, the RTC in Civil Case No.
DNA-547 can take cognizance thereof when respondents presented the same for its consideration.
The lot of the heirs of Tomas Gingco and those of the herein respondents are all located within the same
area in Dawis Sur, Carmen, Cebu and, are in fact, separated only by a lot owned jointly by Epifanio,
Edilberto and Josefa, all surnamed Loro. The lots owned by the respondents are even more
advantageously situated than the lot owned by the heirs of Tomas Gingco since respondents’ properties
are traversed by a barangay road and near the quarry areas of Llyons Richfield Industrial Corporation.
The lots of the heirs of Tomas Gingco and of the respondents were all affected by the Interconnection
Project and were taken by the petitioner at about the same time. The lots of respondents were effectively
taken in June 1996, while the lot of the heirs of Tomas Gingco was acquired only a month later, in July
1996. Since the personalities and properties in both Civil Case No. DNA-379 and Civil Case No. DNA-
547 were essentially in similar situations, then the just compensation awarded for the property in the
former case was a logical and reasonable basis for fixing or determining the just compensation due in the
latter.
Furthermore, petitioner attached to their Motion for Summary Judgment several pieces of document in
support of their allegations therein, and they furnished petitioner copies of the same. The petitioner was
given ample time to study, challenge, and controvert respondents’ evidences, yet it failed to do so. The
RTC only rightfully proceeded, based on its evaluation of the evidence on record, to render a Decision
awarding to the respondents just compensation or damages for the taking of their lots, equivalent to the
fair market value thereof at the rate of ₱448.33 per square meter.
Finally, petitioner cannot insist that it only acquired an easement of right of way on the properties of the
respondents and that it was liable to pay respondents only an easement fee not exceeding 10% of the fair
market value of the portions of their property actually affected by the Interconnection Project, pursuant to
Section 3-A(b) of its Charter.
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the
land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation." 37
After petitioner’s transmission lines were fully constructed on portions of respondents’ lots, petitioner
imposed restrictions thereon such as the prohibition against planting or building anything higher than
three meters below the area traversed by said lines. In addition, respondent-Spouses Quimco, holders of a
Small Scale Quarry Permit, Series of 1995,38 were also prohibited from continuing their quarry business
near petitioner’s transmission towers because of the great possibility that it could weaken the foundation
thereof. Hence, the respondent-spouses Quimco suffered substantial loss of income. It is clear then that
petitioner’s acquisition of an easement of right of way on the lands of the respondents amounted to an
expropriation of the portions of the latter’s properties and perpetually deprived the respondents of their
proprietary rights thereon and for which they are entitled to a reasonable and just compensation. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to
intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. 39
As the Court thoroughly explained in National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez,40 viz:
The trial court’s observation shared by the appellate court show that "x x x While it is true that plaintiff
[is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said
transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-
tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused
beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to
defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their
property."
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of
the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-
way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned
for public use (See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs.
Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597, 1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT,
thus held that:
"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way."
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines,
the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use.41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Having established that petitioner’s acquisition of right-of-way easement over the portions of
respondents’ lots was definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain, petitioner then is liable to
pay respondents just compensation and not merely an easement fee. The Court quotes with affirmation
the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this matter:

The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay
only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having
legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To
uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as
useless the protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no
private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation.

Moreover, the valuation of a property in the tax declaration cannot be an absolute substitute to just
compensation. Stated differently, the market value stated in the tax declaration of the condemned property
is no longer conclusive.42 It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that
the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. It is also repulsive to the basic concepts of justice
and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the
judgment of a court which is promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the
property, after evidence, arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judicially evaluated. 43 10% of the
market value of the expropriated property cannot in any way be considered as the fair and full equivalent
to the loss sustained by the owner of the property, such would be 90% less than what is due him. Thus,
we are of the conclusion that Section 3A of [petitioner’s] Charter cannot prevail over the mandate of our
Constitution on the payment of just compensation. The court a quo did not commit an error when it held
that the [petitioner’s] charter encroached on the function of the court in determining just compensation. 44

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73656, dated 21 April 2006 and 27 October 2006,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
 11.a Anunciacion Vda. De Quana v. Republic of the Philippines, February 9, 2011
G.R. No. 168770
At the center of these two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the issue of the right of
the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City to repurchase or
secure reconveyance of their respective properties.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168770, petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano,
Mario Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez (the Ouanos) seek to nullify the
Decision[1] dated September 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027, affirming
the Order dated December 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 in Cebu City, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20743, a suit to compel the Republic of the Philippines and/or the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey to the Ouanos a parcel of land.
The second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168812, has the MCIAA seeking principally to
annul and set aside the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] dated January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005,
respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 64356, sustaining the RTC, Branch 13 in Cebu City in its
Decision of October 7, 1988 in Civil Case No. CEB-18370.
Per its October 19, 2005 Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
Except for the names of the parties and the specific lot designation involved, the relevant
factual antecedents which gave rise to these consolidated petitions are, for the most part, as set forth in the
Courts Decision[4] of October 15, 2003, as reiterated in a Resolution[5] dated August 9, 2005, in G.R. No.
156273 entitledHeirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority (Heirs of Moreno), and in other earlier related cases.[6]
In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor agency, pursued a program to
expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with
the owners of the properties situated around the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747,
761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim, the
government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their respective
lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes
or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and
executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the
aforementioned lots, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below market,
forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as
successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746,
747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947, among others, docketed as Civil Case No. R-
1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al.
On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment for
the Republic, disposing, in part, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the expropriation of Lots Nos. 75, 76, 76, 89, 90, 91, 92, 105, 106, 107,
108, 104, 921-A, 88, 93, 913-B, 72, 77, 916, 777-A, 918, 919, 920, 764-A, 988, 744-
A, 745-A, 746, 747, 762-A, 763-A, 951, 942, 720-A, x x x and 947, included in the
Lahug Airport, Cebu City, justified in and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent
domain.
xxxx
3. After the payment of the foregoing financial obligation to the landowners,
directing the latter to deliver to the plaintiff the corresponding Transfer Certificates
of Title to their respective lots; and upon the presentation of the said titles to the
Register of Deeds, ordering the latter to cancel the same and to issue, in lieu thereof,
new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the plaintiff.[7]
In view of the adverted buy-back assurance made by the government, the owners of the lots no
longer appealed the decision of the trial court.[8] Following the finality of the judgment of condemnation,
certificates of title for the covered parcels of land were issued in the name of the Republic which,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958,[9] were subsequently transferred to MCIAA.
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA, Lahug Airport completely
ceased operations, Mactan Airport having opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial
flights. On the ground, the expropriated lots were never utilized for the purpose they were taken as no
expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development prompted the former lot owners to
formally demand from the government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right to repurchase.
The demands went unheeded. Civil suits followed.
G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition)
On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who
originally owned six [6] of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven others, successors-
in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of the condemned lots (collectively, the
Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a complaint for reconveyance of real properties and
damages against MCIAA. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-18370, was eventually raffled
to Branch 13 of the court.
On September 29, 1997, one Albert Chiongbian (Chiongbian), alleging to be the owner of Lot
Nos. 761-A and 762-A but which the Inocians were now claiming, moved and was later allowed to
intervene.
During the pre-trial, MCIAA admitted the following facts:
1. That the properties, which are the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, are also the
properties involved in Civil Case R-1881;
2. That the purpose of the expropriation was for the expansion of the old Lahug Airport; that
the Lahug Airport was not expanded;
3. That the old Lahug Airport was closed sometime in June 1992;
4. That the price paid to the lot owners in the expropriation case is found in the decision of the
court; and
5. That some properties were reconveyed by the MCIAA because the previous owners were
able to secure express waivers or riders wherein the government agreed to return the properties should the
expansion of the Lahug Airport not materialize.
During trial, the Inocians adduced evidence which included the testimony of Ricardo Inocian
(Inocian) and Asterio Uy (Uy). Uy, an employee of the CAA, testified that he was a member of the team
which negotiated for the acquisition of certain lots in Lahug for the proposed expansion of
the Lahug Airport. He recalled that he acted as the interpreter/spokesman of the team since he could
speak the Cebuano dialect. He stated that the other members of the team of negotiators were Atty. Pedro
Ocampo, Atty. Lansang, and Atty. Saligumba. He recounted that, in the course of the negotiation, their
team assured the landowners that their landholdings would be reconveyed to them in the event
the Lahug Airport would be abandoned or if its operation were transferred to the MactanAirport. Some
landowners opted to sell, while others were of a different bent owing to the inadequacy of the offered
price.
Inocian testified that he and his mother, Isabel Lambaga, attended a meeting called by the NAC
team of negotiators sometime in 1947 or 1949 where he and the other landowners were given the
assurance that they could repurchase their lands at the same price in the event the Lahug Airport ceases to
operate. He further testified that they rejected the NACs offer. However, he said that they no longer
appealed the decree of expropriation due to the repurchase assurance adverted to.
 The MCIAA presented Michael Bacarizas (Bacarizas), who started working for MCIAA as
legal assistant in 1996. He testified that, in the course of doing research work on the lots subject of Civil
Case No. CEB-18370, he discovered that the same lots were covered by the decision in Civil Case No. R-
1881. He also found out that the said decision did not expressly contain any condition on the matter of
repurchase.
Ruling of the RTC
On October 7, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
directing defendant Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to
reconvey (free from liens and encumbrances) to plaintiffs Ricardo Inocian, Olimpia
E. Esteves, Emilia E. Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana and Raul Inocian Lots No. 744-
A, 745-A, 746, 762-A, 747, 761-A and to plaintiffs Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M.
Suico, Doris S. dela Cruz, James M. Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn S. Lawsin,
Rex M. Suico and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez Lots No. 942 and 947, after plaintiffs
shall have paid MCIAA the sums indicated in the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881.
Defendant MCIAA is likewise directed to pay the aforementioned plaintiffs the sum
or P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses.
Albert Chiongbians intervention should be, as it is hereby DENIED for
utter lack of factual basis.
With costs against defendant MCIAA.[10]
Therefrom, MCIAA went to the CA on appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64356.
Ruling of the CA
On January 14, 2005, the CA rendered judgment for the Inocians, declaring them entitled to the
reconveyance of the questioned lots as the successors-in-interest of the late Isabel Limbaga and Santiago
Suico, as the case may be, who were the former registered owners of the said lots. The decretal portion of
the CAs Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFFIRMING the decision
rendered by the court a quo on October 7, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-18370.
SO ORDERED.
The CA, citing and reproducing excerpts from Heirs of Moreno,[11] virtually held that the decision in Civil
Case No. R-1881 was conditional, stating that the expropriation of [plaintiff-appellees] lots for the
proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport was ordered by the CFI of Cebu under the impression that
Lahug Airport would continue in operation.[12] The condition, as may be deduced from the CFIs decision,
was that should MCIAA, or its precursor agency, discontinue altogether with the operation of Lahug
Airport, then the owners of the lots expropriated may, if so minded, demand of MCIAA to make good its
verbal assurance to allow the repurchase of the properties. To the CA, this assurance, a demandable
agreement of repurchase by itself, has been adequately established.
On September 21, 2005, the MCIAA filed with Us a petition for review of the CAs Decision, docketed as
G.R. No. 168812.
G.R. No. 168770 (Ouano Petition)
Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers
entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The
Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but
the MCIAA ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos instituted a complaint before the Cebu
City RTC against the Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
20743.
Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos no longer have enforceable
rights whatsoever over the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 not having
found any reversionary condition.
Ruling of the RTC
By a Decision dated November 28, 2000, the RTC, Branch 57 in Cebu City ruled in favor of
the Ouanos, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano
Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez and against the Republic of the Philippines and
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to restore to plaintiffs, the
possession and ownership of their land, Lot No. 763-A upon payment of the
expropriation price to defendants; and
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the Certificate of Title
from defendant Republic of the Philippines on Lot 763-A, canceling TCT No. 52004
in the name of defendant Republic of the Philippines and to issue a new title on the
same lot in the names of Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia
Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez.
No pronouncement as to costs.[13]
Acting on the motion of the Republic and MCIAA for reconsideration, however, the RTC, Branch 57
in Cebu City, presided this time by Judge Enriqueta L. Belarmino, issued, on December 9, 2002, an
Order[14] that reversed its earlier decision of November 28, 2000 and dismissed the Ouanos complaint.
Ruling of the CA
In time, the Ouanos interposed an appeal to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78027. Eventually, the
appellate court rendered a Decision[15] dated September 3, 2004, denying the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated December 9, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Civil Case No.
CEB-20743, is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Explaining its case disposition, the CA stated that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 did not state any
condition that Lot No. 763-A of the Ouanosand all covered lots for that matterwould be returned to them
or that they could repurchase the same property if it were to be used for purposes other than for
the LahugAirport. The appellate court also went on to declare the inapplicability of the Courts
pronouncement in MCIAA v. Court of Appeals, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, Melba Limbago, et al.,[16] to
support the Ouanos cause, since the affected landowners in that case, unlike the Ouanos, parted with their
property not through expropriation but via a sale and purchase transaction.
The Ouanos filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs Decision, but was denied per the
CAs May 26, 2005 Resolution.[17] Hence, they filed this petition in G.R. No. 168770.
The Issues
G.R. No. 168812
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
l. THE ASSAILED ISSUANCES ILLEGALLY STRIPPED THE
REPUBLIC OF ITS ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL TITLE TO THE
SUBJECT EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES.
ll. THE IMPUNGED DISPOSITIONS INVALIDLY OVERTURNED
THIS HONORABLE COURTS FINAL RULINGS IN FERY V. MUNICIPALITY
OF CABANATUAN, MCIAA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND REYES V. NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY.
lll. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THIS
HONORABLE COURTS RULING IN MORENO, ALBEIT IT HAS NOT YET
ATTAINED FINALITY.[18]
G.R. No. 168770
Questions of law presented in this Petition
Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the petitioners proving the promises,
assurances and representations by the airport officials and lawyers are inadmissbale
under the Statute of Frauds.
Whether or not under the ruling of this Honorable Court in the heirs of Moreno
Case, and pursuant to the principles enunciated therein, petitioners herein are
entitiled to recover their litigated property.
Reasons for Allowances of this Petition
Respondents did not object during trial to the admissibility of petitioners testimonial
evidence under the Statute of Frauds and have thus waived such objection and are
now barred from raising the same. In any event, the Statute of Frauds is not
applicable herein. Consequently, petitioners evidence is admissible and should be
duly given weight and credence, as initially held by the trial court in its original
Decision.[19]
While their respective actions against MCIAA below ended differently, the Ouanos and the Inocians
proffered arguments presented before this Court run along parallel lines, both asserting entitlement to
recover the litigated property on the strength of the Courts ruling in Heirs of Moreno. MCIAA has,
however, formulated in its Consolidated Memorandum the key interrelated issues in these consolidated
cases, as follows:
I
WHETHER ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE FOR WHICH THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE EXPROPRIATED ENTITLES PETITIONERS
OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. TO REACQUIRE
THEM.
II
WHETHER PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN,
ET AL. ARE ENTITLED TO RECONVEYANCE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES SIMPLY ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED VERBAL PROMISE
OR ASSURANCE OF SOME NAC OFFICIALS THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES WILL BE RETUNRED IF THE AIRPORT PROJECT WOULD BE
ABANDONED.
The Courts Ruling
The Republic and MCIAAs petition in G.R. No. 168812 is bereft of merit, while the Ouano
petition in G.R. No. 168770 is meritorious.
At the outset, three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized:
First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the
final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the
government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport.
Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in
fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development as a commercial complex. [20]
Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of
negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their
respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes.[21] No less than Asterio Uy, the
Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, one of the members of the CAA Mactan Legal Team, which interceded
for the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug Airports expansion, affirmed that persistent assurances were
given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as the Lahug Airport is abandoned or transferred to
Mactan, the lot owners would be able to reacquire their properties. [22] In Civil Case No. CEB-20743,
Exhibit G, the transcript of the deposition[23] of Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the assurance made
had been formally offered in evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of
the RTC Cebu City. In Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence,
and later the CA, recognized the reversionary rights of the suing former lot owners or their successors in
interest[24] and resolved the case accordingly. In point with respect to the representation and promise of
the government to return the lots taken should the planned airport expansion do not materialize is what
the Court said in Heirs of Moreno, thus:
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin
with there exists an undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of
respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of the properties covered by
the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their properties at
the termination of the airports venue. Some acted on this assurance and sold their
properties; other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain
to take its course until finally coming to terms with respondents predecessors that
 they would not appeal nor block further judgment of condemnation if the right of
repurchase was extended to them. A handful failed to prove that they acted on such
assurance when they parted with ownership of their land.[25] (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)
For perspective, Heirs of Morenolater followed by MCIAA v. Tudtud (Tudtud)[26] and the
consolidated cases at baris cast under the same factual setting and centered on the expropriation of
privately-owned lots for the public purpose of expanding the Lahug Airport and the alleged promise of
reconveyance given by the negotiating NAC officials to the private lot owners. All the lots being claimed
by the former owners or successors-in-interest of the former owners in the Heirs of Moreno, Tudtud, and
the present cases were similarly adjudged condemned in favor of the Republic in Civil Case No. R-
1881. All the claimants sought was or is to have the condemned lots reconveyed to them upon the
payment of the condemnation price since the public purpose of the expropriation was never met. Indeed,
the expropriated lots were never used and were, in fact, abandoned by the expropriating government
agencies.
In all then, the issues and supporting arguments presented by both sets of petitioners in these
consolidated cases have already previously been passed upon, discussed at length, and practically
peremptorily resolved in Heirs of Moreno and the November 2008 Tudtud ruling. The Ouanos, as
petitioners in G.R. No. 168770, and the Inocians, as respondents in G.R. No. 168812, are similarly
situated as the heirs of Moreno in Heirs of Moreno and Benjamin Tudtud in Tudtud. Be that as it may,
there is no reason why the ratio decidendi in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud should not be made to apply to
petitioners Ouanos and respondents Inocians such that they shall be entitled to recover their or their
predecessors respective properties under the same manner and arrangement as the heirs of Moreno and
Tudtud. Stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are
established).[27]
Just like in Tudtud and earlier in Heirs of Moreno, MCIAA would foist the theory that the
judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 was without qualification and was unconditional. It
would, in fact, draw attention to the fallo of the expropriation courts decision to
prove that there is nothing in the decision indicating that the government gave
assurance or undertook to reconvey the covered lots in case the Lahug airport
expansion project is aborted. Elaborating on this angle, MCIAA argues that the
claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged verbal assurance of
the NAC negotiating team that they can reacquire their landholdings is barred by
the Statute of Frauds.[28]
Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a
contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same or some note of
the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged. Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of
the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents.
MCIAAs invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute applies
only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially consummated contracts.[29] Carbonnel v.
Poncio, et al., quoting Chief Justice Moran, explains the rationale behind this rule, thusly:
x x x The reason is simple. In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud
because unless they may be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention
of the contracting parties. The statute has been precisely been enacted to prevent
fraud. x x x However, if a contract has been totally or partially performed, the
exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would enable
the defendant to keep the benefits already derived by him from the transaction in
litigation, and at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities
assumed or contracted by him thereby.[30] (Emphasis in the original.)
Analyzing the situation of the cases at bar, there can be no serious objection to the proposition
that the agreement package between the government and the private lot owners was already partially
performed by the government through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of the Lahug airport.
The parties, however, failed to accomplish the more important condition in the CFI decision
decreeing the expropriation of the lots litigated upon: the expansion of the LahugAirport. The projectthe
public purpose behind the forced property takingwas, in fact, never pursued and, as a consequence, the
lots expropriated were abandoned.Be that as it may, the two groups of landowners can, in an action to
compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to allow repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove
the transaction.
At any rate, the objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds
may be waived if not timely raised. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not, as the
Ouanos and the Inocians posit, object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its commitment to
allow the former landowners to repurchase their respective properties upon the occurrence of certain
events.
In a bid to deny the lot owners the right to repurchase, MCIAA, citing cases,[31] points to the
dispositive part of the decision in Civil Case R-1881 which, as couched, granted the Republic absolute
title to the parcels of land declared expropriated. The MCIAA is correct about the unconditional tone of
the dispositive portion of the decision, but that actuality would not carry the day for the agency.
Addressing the matter of the otherwise absolute tenor of the CFIs disposition in Civil Case No. R-1881,
the Court, in Heirs of Moreno, after taking stock of the ensuing portion of the body of the CFIs decision,
said:
As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be
doubted. Although Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not take away the
actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic
of both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and Visayas and pass
thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to
show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether
the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other
departments of the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot
substitute its judgments for those of the said departments or agencies. In the absence
of such showing, the court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to
be in operation.[32] (Emphasis supplied.)
We went on to state as follows:
While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the
presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the
survival of the Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but
instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that Lahug
Airport will continue to be in operation. Verily, these meaningful statements in the
body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would
remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer in
operation. This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport
ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any
airport expansion project, the rights vis--vis the expropriated lots x x x as between
the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and
(b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should
merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the
premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the
findings as contained in the body thereof.[33]

Not to be overlooked of course is what the Court said in its Resolution disposing of MCIAAs
motion to reconsider the original ruling in Heirs of Moreno.In that resolution, We stated that the fallo of
the decision in Civil Case R-1881 should be viewed and understood in connection with the entire text,
which contemplated a return of the property taken if the airport expansion project were abandoned. For
ease of reference, following is what the Court wrote:
Moreover, we do not subscribe to the [MCIAAs] contention that since the
possibility of the Lahug Airports closure was actually considered by the trial court, a
stipulation on reversion or repurchase was so material that it should not have been
discounted by the court a quo in its decision in Civil Case No. R-1881, if, in fact,
there was one. We find it proper to cite, once more, this Courts ruling that
the fallo of the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 must be read in reference to the
other portions of the decision in which it forms a part. A reading of the Courts
judgment must not be confined to the dispositive portion alone; rather it should be
meaningfully construed in unanimity with the ratio decidendi thereof to grasp the
true intent and meaning of a decision.[34]
The Court has, to be sure, taken stock of Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[35] a case MCIAA cites at
every possible turn, where the Court made these observations:
If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the
condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to
its former owner, then of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned, the
former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. x x x If, upon the contrary,
however the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of
course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator x x x and in that
case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings x x x.
Fery notwithstanding, MCIAA cannot really rightfully say that it has absolute title to the lots
decreed expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. The correct lesson of Fery is captured by what the Court
said in that case, thus: the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be
allowed by the character of its title over the properties. In light of our disposition in Heirs of
Moreno and Tudtud, the statement immediately adverted to means that in the event the particular public
use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or
repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly
deducible from the condemnation judgment. But as has been determined below, the decision in Civil
Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or
repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project. To borrow from our underlying decision
in Heirs of Moreno, [n]o doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could
readily be justified as the manifest legal effect of consequence of the trial courts underlying presumption
that Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and
the airport discontinued its activities.[36]
Providing added support to the Ouanos and the Inocians right to repurchase is what in Heirs of
Moreno was referred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of
the Civil Code,[37] the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment.[38] In the case at bench, the
Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself
to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can
be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, they would be
denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when
the expropriation was authorized. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust
until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated
by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer
of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand Constructive trusts are fictions of
equity that courts use as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of the legal title, MCIAA in
this case, may not, in good conscience, retain the beneficial interest. We add, however, as in Heirs of
Moreno, that the party seeking the aid of equitythe landowners in this instance, in establishing the
trustmust himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just and reasonable.
The Court, in the recent MCIAA v. Lozada, Sr., revisited and abandoned the Fery ruling that the former
owner is not entitled to reversion of the property even if the public purpose were not pursued and
were abandoned, thus:
On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit our ruling in Fery, which
involved an expropriation suit commenced upon parcels of land to be used as a site
for a public market. Instead of putting up a public market,
respondent Cabanatuan constructed residential houses for lease on the area.
Claiming that the municipality lost its right to the property taken since it did not
pursue its public purpose, petitioner Juan Fery, the former owner of the lots
expropriated, sought to recover his properties. However, as he had admitted that, in
1915, respondent Cabanatuan acquired a fee simple title to the lands in question,
judgment was rendered in favor of the municipality, following American
jurisprudence, particularly City of Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore & M.S. RY.
Co., McConihay v. Theodore Wright, and Reichling v. Covington Lumber Co., all
uniformly holding that the transfer to a third party of the expropriated real property,
which necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for
which the property was taken, is not a ground for the recovery of the same by its
previous owner, the title of the expropriating agency being one of fee simple.
Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held
constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements:
(1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to
the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions
that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the
expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated
in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another
petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator
to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire
the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it
would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will
be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of
law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness,
and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of
private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent
domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the
specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose
or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then
the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject
to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the
 exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the
required factual justification.[39](Emphasis supplied.)
Clinging to Fery, specifically the fee simple concept underpinning it, is no longer compelling,
considering the ensuing inequity such application entails. Too, the Court resolved Fery not under the
cover of any of the Philippine Constitutions, each decreeing that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. The twin elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by
themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of
fee simple title. The fee does not vest until payment of just compensation. [40]
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a
chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner
is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be
strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public
purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from
the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include
any use that is of usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the
public].[41] If the genuine public necessitythe very reason or condition as it wereallowing, at the first
instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for
the governments retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the
government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates
from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the
state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who
will use it predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is offensive to our laws. [42]
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition
for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves
the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government
cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor
the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play,
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted
ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. We suggested as much
in Heirs of Moreno and in Tudtud and more recently in Lozada, Sr. Expropriated lands should be
differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an
unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and
the other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is
really no occasion to apply the fee simple concept if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private
land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose.
As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of
the just compensation received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter pill to
swallow for the owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield ownership to the
government which reneges on its assurance that the private property shall be for a public purpose may be
too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to
benefit another with influence and power in the political process, including development firms. The
mischief thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery. Even as the Court
deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is poised to
sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added
dimension to abandon Fery.
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of
the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also
dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this
case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance obligation. [43] They must likewise
pay MCIAA the necessary expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their respective lots and the
monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as private owners,
were benefited thereby.
In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever
income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the Ouanos and
Inocians need not require the accounting of interests earned by the amounts they received as just
compensation.[44]
Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that [i]f the thing is improved by its nature,
or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x, the Ouanos and Inocians
do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance
process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time.
Finally, We delete the award of PhP 50,000 and PhP 10,000, as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses, respectively, made in favor of the Inocians by the Cebu City RTC in its judgment in Civil Case
No. CEB-18370, as later affirmed by the CA. As a matter of sound policy, no premium should be set on
the right to litigate where there is no doubt about the bona fides of the exercise of such right,[45] as here,
albeit the decision of MCIAA to resist the former landowners claim eventually turned out to be untenable.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 168770 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated
September 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority is ordered to reconvey subject Lot No. 763-A to petitioners Anunciacion
vda. de Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz, and Cielo Ouano Martinez. The Register of Deeds
of Cebu City is ordered to effect the necessary cancellation of title and transfer it in the name of the
petitioners within fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment.
The petition of the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority in G.R. No.
168812 is DENIED, and the CAs Decision and Resolution dated January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 64356 are AFFIRMED, except insofar as they awarded attorneys fees
and litigation expenses that are hereby DELETED. Accordingly, Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority is ordered to reconvey to respondents Ricardo L. Inocian, Olympia E. Esteves, Emilia E.
Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana, and Raul L. Inocian the litigated Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 762-A, 747,
and 761-A; and to respondents Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M. Suico, Dolores S. dela Cruz, James M.
Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn S. Lawsin, Rex M. Suico, and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez the litigated Lot
Nos. 942 and 947. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to effect the necessary cancellation of
title and transfer it in the name of respondents within a period of fifteen (15) days from finality of
judgment.
The foregoing dispositions are subject to QUALIFICATIONS, to apply to these consolidated
petitions, when appropriate, as follows:
(1) Petitioners Ouano, et al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L Inocian, et al. in G.R. No.
168812 are ordered to return to the MCIAA the just compensation they or their predecessors-in-interest
received for the expropriation of their respective lots as stated in Civil Case No. R-1881, within a period
of sixty (60) days from finality of judgment;
(2) The MCIAA shall be entitled to RETAIN whatever fruits and income it may have obtained from the
subject expropriated lots without any obligation to refund the same to the lot owners; and
(3) Petitioners Ouano, et al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L. Inocian, et al. in G.R. No.
168812 shall RETAIN whatever interests the amounts they received as just compensation may have
earned in the meantime without any obligation to refund the same to MCIAA.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARY KRISTIN JOY C. DEVERA
JD-1
POLICE POWER
White Light Corporation vs. Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
G.R. No. 122846, Jan 20, 2009
FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, city Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance. This ordinance known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests
as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC granted the motion to intervene and
also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings.
The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from
enforcing the Ordinance and alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On
February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from
the enforcement of the Ordinance. A month later, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing
that the Ordinance is constitutional. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring
the Ordinance null and void.
The City filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the
Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality
of the Ordinance.
Petitioner file a motion for review with the Supreme Court assailed that the Ordinance is
an invalid exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance Law pass by City Mayor Lim is a valid exercise of police
power.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the petition is granter. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and reinstated the RTC decision claiming the City Ordinance law is unconstitutional.
The Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels,
and inns, among other establishment. The continuing progression of the human story has seen not
only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as
the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free
societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but
from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and
protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to
uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of
consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to
uphold the law. The tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the
government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to
promote morality.
POLICE POWER
MMDA vs. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising
G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009
FACTS:
In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail
Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957, under which MRTC
undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon
the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government.
The BLT agreement stipulated, among others, that MRTC could build and develop
commercial premises in the MRT3 structures, or obtain advertising income therefrom.
In 1998, respondent Trackworks entered into a contract for advertising services with
MRTC. Trackworks installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertizing media in the
different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards,
signages and other advertizing media pursuant to MMDA Regulation, whereby MMDA prohibited
the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in
any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks
refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar
forms of advertisement.
On March 1, 2002, Trackworks filed against MMDA in RTC in Pasig City an injunction
suit with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
On March 6, 2002, the RTC issued a TRO, enjoining MMDA from dismantling or
destroying Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertizing media and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction for the same purpose.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration to challenge the RTC’s issuances, MMDA
brought a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, but the CA denied the
petition and affirmed the RTC. The CA ultimately denied MMDA’s motion for reconsideration
through its resolution issued.
MMDA appealed to Supreme Court, which denied MMDA’s petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MMDA regulation prohibiting any kinds of billboard, signs and the likes,
is unlawful lawful practice of police power.
RULING:
The Court denies the petition. The Court clarify that the real nature of MMDA is:
xxx The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It
is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself.
Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages
and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property
pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to
which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to
Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not
specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the
center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included
MRT3 in its prohibition.
POLICE POWER
ACEBEDO Optical vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists,
respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit subject to the following conditions:
1. Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial
store;
2. Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients,
because these are functions of optical clinics;
3. Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first
been made by an independent optometrist (not its employee) or independent optical clinic.
Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and
similar eyeglasses;
4. Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and
similar glasses and frames;
5. Acebedo is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent
optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI),
Iligan Chapter, through its Acting President, complaint against the petitioner before the Office of
the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit
and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit.
The City Mayor designated City Legal Officer to conduct an investigation on the matter
and finds that herein petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its business permit and
recommending the disqualification of petitioner from operating its business. The report further
advised that no new permit shall be granted to petitioner for the year 1989 and should only be given
time to wind up its affairs.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
restraining order/preliminary injunction against the respondents before the RTC. Petitioner alleged
that (1) it was denied due process because it was not given an opportunity to present its evidence
during the investigation conducted by the City Legal Officer; (2) it was denied equal protection of
the laws as the limitations imposed on its business permit were not imposed on similar businesses in
Iligan City; (3) the City Mayor had no authority to impose the special conditions on its business
permit; and (4) the City Legal Officer had no authority to conduct the investigation as the matter
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of
Optometry.
On May 30, 1990, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued.
On October 3, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the questioned Order of Dismissal, branding the same
as tainted with grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner files motion for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special condition in the business permit issued to the petitioner by the
City Mayor has a basis to impose against the petitioner.
RULING:
The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the City
Major is ordered to reissue petitioner’s business permit in accordance with law and with this
disposition.
The Court held that the power of the City Mayor to grant or issue licenses or business
permits must always be exercised in accordance with law with utmost observance of the rights of all
concerned to due process and equal protection to all.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Association of Small Landlords vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989
FACTS:
The following are consolidated cases:
1. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657.
Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants.
Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The
petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s power.
2. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental
against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian
Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
3. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer.
4. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares.
ISSUE:
Whether the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were constitutional.
HELD:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power
and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was
authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid
exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes
necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.
What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer-beneficiary.
 The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in
Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Philippine Press Institution, Inc. vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-119694, May 22, 1995
FACTS:
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers,
filed by Philippine Press Institute Inc for the court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of
Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data
to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions
of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press
and of expression.
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of
respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the
publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any
criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the
Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in
connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of
such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the
"Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the
questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same
would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General
also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of
print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution no. 2772 issued by COMELEC is valid.
RULING:
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its
22March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print
space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside
and nullified. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in
part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated
22March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is
hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs
EMINENT DOMAIN
ForForm Development Corporation vs. PNR
G.R. No. 124795, December 10, 2008
FACTS:
The San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation of
railroad facilities and appurtenances to serve the squatters’ resettlement areas. The properties of
Forform were traversed as right of way and the PNR occupied the Forform properties without
previous condemnation proceedings and payment of just compensation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Forform can recover possession of its property because PNR fails to file
any expropriation case and just compensation.
2. Whether leasing out of option of the property to third person is beyond the scope of
public use.
RULING:
1. No. The owner of the land, who stands by, without objection, and sees as public
railroad constructed over it, cannot, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been
thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the
railroad company.
In such a case, there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.
2. No. The public use requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
At present, it may ne amiss to state that whatever id beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfy the requirement of public use. Term “public use” has now been held to be
synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” public welfare,” and “public convenience.”
Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses Cancio
G.R. No. 170147, January 30, 2009
FACTS:
On January 15, 1979, President Marcus issued Proc. No. 18115 which reserved certain
parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of the petitioner (EZPA) for the
establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels covered by the
proclamation, including that of respondents lot which respondents rejected.
Petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property. It sought a
writ of possession for the property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount
with LBP in accordance with A.O. No. 507. Respondents, however, filed a motion to require
petitioner to comply with RA 8974 specifically Sec. 4, thereof, which requires that, upon the filing
of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the
property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purpose of the
issuance of a writ of possession.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the writ
of possession.
RULING:
RA 8974 governs this case, not A.O. No. 50 as petitioner insists. RA 8974 applies to
instances when the national government expropriates property for national government project.
Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost 1 year after the
law approved on November 7, 2000. Thus there is no doubt about its applicability to this case.
It is only after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that just
compensation will be determined. In establishing the amount of just compensation, the parties may
present evidence relative to the property’s fair market value, as provided under Section 5 of RA
8974.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio vs. Jovito M. Luis
G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009
FACTS:
Respondents are owner of a parcel of land taken by the City of Pasig in 1980 which was
used as a municipal road. The Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing
payments for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee assessed the value of the land
only at P150.00 per meter. Respondents requested the appraisal Committee to consider P2,000.00
per square meter as the value of their land which was rejected.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damage before the RTC praying
that the property be returned to them with payment of reasonable rental for 16 years of use at
P500.00 per meter with legal interest from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or if
said property can no longer be returned, that petitioners pay just compensation of P7,930,000.00
and rental for 16 years of use at P500.00 per meter, both with legal interest from the date of filing of
the complaint until full payment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents’ claim for just compensation has already prescribed.
RULING:
Petitioners must be disabused of their belief that respondents’ action for recovery of their
property, which had been taken for public use, or to claim just compensation therefore is already
barred by prescription. Government agencies should not exercise the power of eminent domain with
wanton disregard for property rights as Sec. 9, Art. III of the Constitution provides that “private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
Recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be allowed on the
ground of estoppels and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public utility
the obligation to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case of expropriation will
not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is
the right of compensation.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Republic vs. Heirs of Saturnino Borbon
G. R. No. 165364, January 15, 2015
FACTS:
NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to
construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the
property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas
City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them
before entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they
tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for
the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly
diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.
During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable
agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose
because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’
property; that because the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to
exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-
bound to return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the
expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed
pending appeal.
RULING:
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is
proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or
discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.” However, the concept has
expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. “Public use” has
now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” and “public
convenience.”
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained
throughout the proceedings for expropriation.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the
property to the respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them because
their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the
property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of
their property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession by
paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a
result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the
fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines.
Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during
the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the
effect of converting the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The court of origin shall treat the case as if
originally filed as an action for damages.

DUE PROCESS
Efren T. Uy vs. Judge Alan L. Flores
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332, June 24, 2014
FACTS:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Lilian Hefti reassigned Mustapha Gandarosa from
Cagayan de Oro City to Quezon City. Gandarosa, not amiable to the reassignment, filed a Rule 65
petition with prayer for a TRO before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, under Judge Flores. The
judge granted Ganadarosa’s request.
According to the Administrative Code of 1987 in Book V, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Section
26(3), an employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service
Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Flores commit gross ignorance of the law by taking jurisdiction of
the case.
RULING:
Yes. When a law rule is basic, judges should simply apply the law. Anything less is
considered gross ignorance of the law. In this case, the law was clear that Gandarosa should have
filed the case with the Civil Service Commission, not the Regional Trial Court.
DUE PROCESS
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
G.R. No. L-139465, January 18, 2000
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC. The DOJ received a request
from the DFA for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the US. The Grand Jury
Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting document for said extradition were
attached along with the request.
The DOJ, through a designed panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be request and for
him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following
grounds:
 He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that
point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law have been complied with by the Requesting Government.
Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents id not a preliminary investigation like in criminal
cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights to the accused in criminal prosecution
inapplicable.
 The US requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the
documents.
 The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that
every treaty in the force is binding upon the parties.
 Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice, RTC presiding judge
favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the request papers, as well
as conducting further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the proceedings constitute a breach of legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-
US Extradition.
RULING:
Bo. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligation to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
DUE PROCESS
Government of the USA vs. Hon. Guillermo Purganan
G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002
FACTS:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application
for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his
provisional liberty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
RULING:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction.”
The constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Sec. 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not
at issue.
DUE PROCESS
PGBI vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through
its resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8)
of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which
provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any
of the following grounds:
x x x x(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate
in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the
misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner
elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it
became the law in question.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
2. Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
RULINGS:
1. No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear
and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA
7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot
stand.
2. No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for it
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of COMELEC resolution. The
essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. It is obvious that under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.
DUE PROCESS
SUYAN VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 189644 July 2, 2014
FACTS:
Suyan was charged with violation of Sec. 16, Article III of the RA No. 6425. He pleaded
guilty to the charge. The Trial Court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six years of prision
correccional. He filed his application for probation on the same day. RTC issued a Probation Order
covering a period of six years.
While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate occasions, both for violation of
Sec. 16 of RA 6425. Two separate information were filed against him. Because of this, the Chief of
the Parole and Probation Office recommended the revocation of his probation, citing recidivism.
The RTC ordered the revocation of Suyan’s probation and directed him to serve his
sentence. Suyan then interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. He argued that he was not
accorded due process. Finding merit in his petition, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the
RTC for further proceedings. Thus, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.
The Parole and Probation Office filed a Violation Report where it stated that probationer
Suyan showed negative attitude towards rehabilitation and instead continued with his illegal drug
activities despite counseling and warning from the office. The prosecution likewise file its Formal
Offer of Evidence where it attached a certification from another court that Suyan has already served
his sentence on the other drug charges against him Suyan file his Comment but did not dispute the
certification. RDT issued the order revoking the probation. Suyan appealed with the CA but was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probation was validly revoked.
RULING:
Yes, the probation of Suyan was validly revoked.
Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation. His commission of another offense is a direct
violation of the condition in his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in Probation
Law. Probation law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the probation
order ineffective.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Landbank of the Philippines vs Raymunda Martinez
G.R. No. 169008, July 31, 2008
FACTS:
The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the purpose of CARP,
of which the LBP offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the amount was just
and confiscatory, Martinez rejected it. Thus, PARAD conducted a summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of the just compensation.
PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures and factors used by LBP in its
computation, so they rendered an amount of P12,179,492.50 as just compensation.
LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB on the just
compensation has become final after the lapse of 15 days. Martinez opposed the motion. Later on,
LBP instituted a petition for certiorari against PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its
discretion when it issued the order for the 12m just compensation despite the pending petition in the
RTC. CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping dismissed the petition, Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department
RULING:
The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari could not be filed
without the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) entering its appearance as the
principal legal counsel of the bank or without the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal
Department’s filing of the petition. The Court also found petitioner to have forum-shopped when it
moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment via
certiorari under Rule 65. Most importantly, the Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the
issuance of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision on land
valuation. The said adjudicator’s decision attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated
in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
Rules of Procedure.
On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates
its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains
finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing
of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the
SAC within the said period. Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that the PARAD’s
decision had already attained finality because of LBP’s failure to file the petition for the fixing of
just compensation within the 15-day period.
National Power Corporation vs. Santa Loro
G.R. No. 175176, October 7, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation duly organized under
Philippine laws and vested with the power of eminent domain by. Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-
Cebu Interconnection Project (Interconnection Project), petitioner expropriated several parcels of
land in the Municipality of Carmen and City of Danao in the Province of Cebu, which will be
traversed and affected by its transmission towers and lines.
Among the lots affected by the petitioner’s Interconnection Project were those owned by
the respondents located in Dawis Sur, Carmen, Cebu. Respondents Santa Loro and Spouses
Quimco’s lots. To be able to enter the said properties, petitioner obtained from each of the
respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and Spouses Quimco a "Permission to Enter for
Construction of Transmission Line Project," dated 14 June 1994 and 11 December
1996, respectively. The permits were signed by the respondents upon representation by the
petitioner that it would pay them just compensation for the intrusion into their properties.
Petitioner then paid respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and Spouses Quimco the
amounts of ₱8,015.90 and ₱5,350.49, respectively, for the portions of their lots affected by the
Interconnection Project. Only later did respondents discover that in comparison to the measly sums
they were paid by petitioner, the other landowners within their area who resisted the expropriation
of their properties in court or who entered into compromise agreements with the petitioner were
paid by petitioner the amount of ₱448.30 to ₱450.00 per square meter as just compensation for the
portions of their properties similarly affected by the petitioner’s Interconnection Project.
Accordingly, respondents filed a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of
Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and Other
Reliefs, against the petitioner before the RTC.
RTC rendered decision in favor of the respondent. Petitioner file a Motion of
Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals praying that the decision of the RTC be set aside and the
amount for just compensation be reduced to Php25.00 per sq. meter. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision with modification regarding the interest rate in favor of the respondent.
Petitioner refuse to accept the said decision then file a motion for review to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of CA committed error in affirming the RTC decision with
regards to the just compensation of the respondent.
RULING:
The Court denied the petition. The decision of CA was affirmed. The valuation of a
property in the tax declaration cannot be an absolute substitute to just compensation. Stated
differently, the market value stated in the tax declaration of the condemned property is no longer
conclusive. It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. It is also repulsive to the basic concepts of justice
and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over
the judgment of a court which is promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed
the property, after evidence, arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judicially evaluated. The court a
quo did not commit an error when it held that the petitioner’s charter encroached on the function of
the court in determining just compensation.