BARITUA and JB Lines, Inc. vs MERCADER G.R.

• RTC No. 136048

ruled in favor of Rs; CA affirmed except as for lost earnings (no
January 23, 2001 ruling on BOP)
Panganiban., J
Bill of Particulars
SUMMARY: Petitioner’s Argument:
R filed a case against P. P filed Mtd and/or Bill of Particulars. However, P had already filed an P requested
• Answer beforefor BOP due to the alleged incomplete plea of Rs:
it requested for the BOP. SC ruled that Ps cannot now request for BOP because they filed 11 days pastP12,000.00
o the -- representing the death compensation;
o
deadline set by the Court. Also, the filed a motion for BOP after they have filed the Answer, therefore, they An amount to be proven in court, representing actual
cannot now do so. damages;
o P1,660,000.00 or more as may be proven during the trial, by
DOCTRINE: way of loss of earnings;
Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides: o An amount to be proven in court as and by way of funeral
expenses;
Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -- Before responding to a pleading, a party may move foroa more An amount to be proven during the trial, representing moral
definite statement or for a bill of particulars … damages;
o An amount to be determined by this Honorable Court,
representing exemplary damages;
NATURE: Petition for review under Rule 45 o An amount equivalent to 25% of whatever amount the
plaintiffs would be able to collect from the defendant but in
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: no case less than P50,000.00 plus an additional amount of
Br. 21 of RTC Northern Samar ruled in favor of Respondents and ordered the P1,000.00 per hearing as and by way of Attorneys fees;
Petitioners to pay. This was modified by CA as to the loss of earnings but
affirmed on all other aspects. ISSUE(S):
W/N court acquired jurisdiction despite non-payment of docket fees - YES
FACTS: W/N CA GAD when it allowed to pass sub silencio the RTC’s failure to rule of
• R filed a complaint originally against P-Baritua for the death of her P’s bill of particulars - NO
husband, Dominador Mercader, who was a passenger in said bus.
• P filed MtD and/or Bill of Particulars (BOP) because (1) R failed to HELD:
implead Baritua as an indispensable party and (2) Cause of action is Re: Jurisdiction
against a wrong and non-existent party. The Manchester ruling, which became final in 1987, has no retroactive
• As a result of this, R filed an amended complaint which alleged: application and cannot be invoked in the subject Complaint filed in 1984. The
o That Dominador is engaged in the buying and selling of goods Court explicitly declared in that case:
which he buys in Manila and sells in Northern Samar
o That he boarded said bus in its Manila station but was not able To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers
to reach his destination because the bus fell into a river, which and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
caused his death prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
• P denied specifically the allegations and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
o R has not shown the passenger freight-ticket Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted
o P has no Manila station, it only has a Pasay station nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. (But this does
o That Ps had no knowledge that the bridge that the bus will not apply)
traverse was in such dilapidated condition that it will collapse;
such was caused by the negligence of the local officials. Re: Bill of Particulars

Page 1 of 8
P’s counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a motion for a bill of
particulars. The RTC gave him ten days from March 12, 1985 within which to
do so. He, however, filed the aforesaid motion only on April 2, 1985 or eleven
days past the deadline set by the trial court. Moreover, such motion was
already moot and academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already
filed their answer and several other pleadings to the amended Complaint.
Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -- Before responding to a pleading, a
party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars …
OSCAR REYES v. RTC OF MAKATI GR No. 165744
August 11, 2008 Brion, J.
Digest by: Fernandez
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Bill of Particulars (Rule 12)
SUMMARY: Zenith and Rodrigo filed a derivative suit against Oscar, alleging
that the latter fraudulently appropriated for himself their mother’s shareholdings
in the corporation. Oscar filed a motion to declare the complaint as a
harassment suit since it partakes of the nature of a petition for settlement of the
estate of Anastacia. RTC denied, but sustained that only the action for
accounting of corporate assets and funds will be entertained. Oscar filed a Rule
65 before the CA, which affirmed the RTC. SC granted his petition holding that
the complaint failed to aver with particularity the facts allegedly constituting
fraud, and that such defect cannot be cured by a bill of particulars, being one
of the prohibited pleadings in an intracorporate dispute.
DOCTRINE: In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent
acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured
by a bill of particulars; but it is different in intra-corporate controversies since
under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, a bill of
particulars is a prohibited pleading.

PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the decision
of the CA which affirmed the order of the RTC which denied the motion to
declare complaint as nuisance or harassment complaint filed by petitioner.

FACTS:
Spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes, together with 2 of their 4 children, Oscar
and Rodrigo, owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Co., which was
established by their family. When Pedro died, his estate was judicially
partitioned among his heirs. As for Anastacia, however, no such settlement of
her estate appeared to have been made. As of 1990, Anastacia owned 136,598
shares, Oscar owned 8,715,637 shares, and Rodrigo owned 4,250 shares in
Zenith.

In 2000, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a derivative suit with the SEC against Oscar
to obtain an accounting of the corporate assets which were in the control and
custody of Oscar, the President; and to determine the shares of stock of the
deceased Pedro and Anastacia, which were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated by Oscar for himself.

Page 2 of 8
Oscar denied that he illegally obtained the shares of Anastacia, asserting that
he bought said shares with his own funds from the unissued stocks of Zenith,
that the suit has not complied with the requirements of a derivative suit, and
that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the complaint since it pertains to the
settlement of the estate of Anastacia.
The records of the case were then transferred to RTC Makati Br. 142, pursuant
to RA 8799 which transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC
over intracorporate disputes over to the RTC designated as a special
commercial court.
Oscar then filed a motion to declare the complaint as Nuisance or Harassment
Suit since it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of the estate
of Anastacia. RTC denied, but sustained that only the action for the accounting
of corporate assets and funds will be entertained.
Oscar filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
praying that the RTC be prohibited from continuing with the proceedings. CA
affirmed the RTC. MR denied.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT(S): RTC acting as a special commercial court has
no jurisdiction over the complaint since it is in the nature of a petition for
settlement of estate.
ISSUE(S): —
WoN charges of fraud were properly supported by the required factual
allegations – N
WoN the defect can be cured by a bill of particulars - N
HELD:
FRAUDULENT DEVICES AND SCHEMES
The allegations set forth in Rodrigo’s complaint principally invoke Sec. 5 (a)
and (b) as basis for the exercise of the RTC’s special court jurisdiction.
The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise and direct statement
of the plaintiff’s CoA and must specify the relief sought. Sec. 5, Rule 8 states
that all averments of fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. This
rule finds specific application to Sec. 5(a) of PD 902-A, which speaks of
corporate devices or schemes that amount to fraud or misrepresentation
detrimental to the public and/or to the stockholders.
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation and
threats are largely conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of the
Page 3 of 8
facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state a cause of
action. The late Justice Feria declared that fraud and mistake are required to be
averred with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to controvert
the particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake.
Tested against these standards, the Court found that the charges of fraud against
Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual allegations. The
allegations were mere conclusions of law, not statements of ultimate facts: how
and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as “illegal
and fraudulent” were not explained nor elaborated on.
To fall within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction, there must be
sufficient nexus showing that the corporation’s nature, structure or powers
were used to facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme. Contrary to this
concept, the complaint presented a reverse situation. No corporate power or
office was alleged to have facilitated the transfer of the shares; rather, Oscar, as
an individual and without reference to his corporate personality, was alleged to
have transferred the shares of Anastacia to his name, allowing him to become
the majority and controlling stockholder of Zenith, and eventually, the
corporation’s President.
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not
constitute a ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill of
particulars; but it is different in intra-corporate controversies since under the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, a bill of
particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint
to show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the
complainant wishes to invoke the court’s special commercial jurisdiction.
The Court noted that Rodrigo had twice been given the opportunity to study
the propriety of amending or withdrawing the complaint but he consistently
refused. Since the court is limited to the review of the allegations of the
complaint in resolving issues of jurisdiction, the court cannot affirm the RTC’s
assumption of jurisdiction since the complaint failed to specifically allege the
corporate fraud that will call for the exercise of its special commercial
jurisdiction.
INTRACORPORATE CONTROVERSY
To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, two
elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the
nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.
The Court found that, in so far as the subject shares of stock are concerned (i.e.
Anastacia’s shares), Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of Zenith.
While the children acquired a legal title to the estate of Anastacia upon her
death, and are deemed co-owners thereof, such status as co-owners does not
immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the corporation.
Unless and until the transfer is registered in the books of the corporation, such
transferee-heir cannot be considered a stockholder entitled to recognition as
such both by the corporation and by third parties. Consequently, no
intracorporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring the case
within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction.
As regards the nature of the case, the Court concluded that, more than anything
else, the complaint is about the protection and enforcement of successional
rights. The Court noted that the complaint contained no sufficient allegation
that justified the need for an accounting other than to determine the extent of
Anastacia’s shareholdings for purposes of distribution. Rodrigo, in filing the
complaint, is enforcing his rights as a co-heir and not as a stockholder of
Zenith. What Rodrigo clearly aims to accomplish is the distribution of
Anastacia’s shareholdings without prior settlement of her estate – an objective
that cannot be done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court,
has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased.
Such matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court.
DERIVATIVE SUIT
The allegations of the present complaint do not amount to a derivative suit.
First, Rodrigo is not a shareholder with respect to the shareholdings originally
belonging to Anastacia. Second, he failed to exhaust his remedies within the
corporation. Lastly, no injury was done to the corporation due to Oscar’s acts.
If he indeed illegally or fraudulently transferred Anastacia’s shares in his own
name, the damage is not to the corporation but to his co-heirs.
In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC sitting as
special commercial court has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigo’s complaint since
what is involved is the determination and distribution of successional rights to
the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigo’s proper remedy, under the
circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the
dismissal of his present complaint.
Page 4 of 8
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GR No. 148154
SANDIGANBAYAN and FERDINAND
MARCOS JR.
Dec. 17 2007 Quisumbing, J.
Digest By: Lee
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Bill of Particulars
SUMMARY:
On 1987, the PCGG filed a Complaint against the Marcoses and Ramon Cruz
for ill-gotten wealth and prayed for its reconveyance and for damages. This
complaint was later expanded on 1988. The Marcoses were served with
summonses in Hawaii, but they failed to respond; thus, they were declared in
default. On 1995, Mrs. Marcos filed her Answer. On 1999, respondent as
executor of the estate of former Pres. Marcos, filed a Motion for Leave to File
Responsive Pleading. This was opposed by PCGG, but was granted by the anti-
graft court. However, after 3 Motions for Extension, instead of filing an Answer,
the respondent filed for a Motion for Bill of Particulars.
DOCTRINE:
The grant of a motion to file a responsive pleading and a Bill of Particulars has
the effect of lifting the default order.
Default orders are frowned upon, and the SC has been advising the lower
courts to be liberal in setting aside default orders to give both parties every
chance to present their case fairly without resort to technicality. As understood
under Sec. 1 of Rule 12, a Motion for a Bill of Particulars must be filed within
the reglementary period for the filing of a responsive pleading to the pleading
sought to be clarified.
FACTS:
Jul. 21, 1987: The PCGG, through the OSG, filed before the anti-graft court, a
Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, and damages alleging
that former Pres. Marcos, former first lady Imelda Marcos, and Cruz (alleged
business crony of the Marcoses) stole public assets and invested them in
different institutions.
Sept. 18, 1987: Cruz filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and for a Bill of
Particulars.
Apr. 18, 1988: The anti-graft court ordered alias summonses be served on the
Marcoses in Hawaii, admitted the PCGG’s Expanded Complaint.
Jul. 28, 1988: The anti-graft court denied Cruz’s Omnibus Motion, stating that
the expanded complaint sufficiently states causes of action and that matters
alleged are specific enough to allow Cruz to prepare a responsive pleading.
Sept. 15, 1988: Cruz filed his Answer ad Cautelam.
Nov. 10, 1988: Alias summonses were served on the Marcoses in Hawaii.
Apr. 6, 1989: Marcoses failed to file an Answer and were declared in default
Sept. 29, 1989: Former Pres. Marcos died, and was substituted by Mrs. Marcos
and their three children upon motion of PCGG.
Jul. 13, 1992: Motion to Set Aside Order of Default filed by Mrs. Marcos –
granted.
Sept. 6, 1995: Mrs. Marcos filed her Answer
Jan. 11, 1999: Pre-trial briefs filed by Cruz, PCGG, and Mrs. Marcos.
Mar. 16, 1999: Respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File Responsive
Pleading. PCGG opposed on the ground that there is no Motion to Set Aside
Default Order.
May 28, 1999: Court granted respondent’s Motion
Jul. 16, 1999: After 3 Motions for Extension, the respondent filed a Motion for
Bill of Particulars. PCGG opposed arguing that the requested particulars were
evidentiary matters; and that the motion was dilatory. (Note that the Complaint
was filed way back in 1988 – now Marcos is asking for a BOP.) Respondent’s
Motion was allowed.
Petitioner filed an MR, but it was denied. Petitioner thus filed a special civil
action for certiorari before the SC.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT(S):
Since the default order against former Pres. Marcos has not been lifted by any
court order, respondent cannot file a Motion for Bill of Particulars.
Respondent was granted leave to file an Answer to the expanded complaint,
not a Motion for Bill of Particulars. Respondent impliedly admitted that the
Complaint sufficiently averred factual matters with definiteness to enable him
to properly prepare a responsive pleading because he was able to prepare a
draft Answer, as stated in his second and third MOTEXes. The factual matters in
the expanded complaint are sufficient and clear as Mrs. Marcos and Cruz had
already filed their respective Answers.
If the assailed Resolutions are enforced, the People will suffer irreparable
damage because petitioner will be forced to prematurely divulge evidentiary
matters, which is not a function of a bill of particulars.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT(S):
This Court had compelled petitioner in several ill-gotten wealth cases involving
the same issues and parties to comply with the motions for Bill of Particulars
filed by other defendants on the ground that most, if not all, of the allegation in
the similarly worded complaints for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth were
too vague and general to enable the defendants to intelligently parry them.
Page 5 of 8
It is misleading for the Government to argue that the default order against his
father stands because the May 28, 1999 Resolution effectively lifted it;
otherwise, he would not have been called by the Court to appear before it and
allowed to file a responsive pleading.
The Motion for Bill of Particulars is not dilatory as it is the petitioner’s
continued refusal to submit of Bill of Particulars which causes the delay. The
respondent’s draft Answer turned out “not as intelligent” because of the
vagueness of the allegations.
ISSUE(S):
WON the filing and granting of a Motion for Bill of Particulars for the estate of
a defaulting and deceased defendant is proper / YES.
HELD:
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS DOES NOT CONTRAVENE THE ROC
Under the Rule 9 Sec. 3, a defending party may be declared in default, upon
motion and notice, for failure to file an Answer within the allowable period. As
a result, the defaulting cannot take part in the trial albeit he is entitled to notice
of subsequent proceedings. The remedies against a default order are: (1)
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default at any time after discovery thereof and
before judgment on the ground that defendant’s failure to file an Answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect and that the defendant
has a meritorious defense; (2) a Motion for New Trial within 15 days from
receipt of judgment by default, if judgment had already been rendered before
the defendant discovered the default, but before the judgment became final
and executory; (3) an Appeal within 15 days from receipt of judgment by
default; (4) a Petition for Relief from Judgment within 60 days from notice of
judgment and within 6 months from entry thereof; and (5) a Petition for
Certiorari in exceptional circumstances. In this case, former Pres. Marcos was
declared in default for failure to file an Answer. He died in Hawaii while this
case was pending. His representatives failed to file a Motion to Lift the Order of
Default. Nevertheless, respondent, as executor of his father’s estate, filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Responsive Pleading, 3 MOTEXes to file an Answer,
and a Motion for Bill of Particulars all of which were granted.
Given the existence of the default order then, what is the legal effect of
granting the aforesaid Motions? The effect is that the default order is deemed
lifted. While it is true that there was no positive act on the part of the court to
lift the default order because there was no motion to that effect, the anti-graft
court’s act of granting respondent the opportunity to file a responsive pleading
meant the lifting of the default order on terms the court deemed proper in the
interest of justice. It was the operative act of lifting the default order and
thereby reinstating the position of the original defendant whom respondent is
representing, founded on the court’s discretionary power to set aside orders of
default.
A Motion to Lift a Default Order requires no hearing; it only needs to be under
oath and accompanied by an affidavit of merits showing a meritorious defense.
The act of the court in entertaining the motions to file a responsive pleading
during the pre-trial stage effectively meant that the respondent has acquired a
locus standi in this case. That he filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars instead of
an Answer is not an issue because he, as a party-defendant representing the
estate, is allowed to do so under the ROC to be able to file an intelligent
Answer. Indeed the failure to file a Motion to Lift a Default Order is not
procedurally fatal.
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS IS NOT DILATORY AND BEREFT OF
BASIS
Default orders are frowned upon, and the SC has been advising the lower
courts to be liberal in setting aside default orders to give both parties every
chance to present their case fairly without resort to technicality. As understood
under Rule 12 Sec. 1, a Motion for a Bill of Particulars must be filed within the
reglementary period for the filing of a responsive pleading to the pleading
sought to be clarified. This contemplates pleadings which are required by the
Rules to be answered under pain of procedural sanctions, such as default or
implied admission of facts not responded to. The fact that former Pres. Marcos
was in exile when he was declared in default, and that the later died still in
exile, makes the belated filing of his Answer in this case understandably
excusable.
In his Motion for Bill of Particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the
specific nature, manner, and extent of participation of his father in the
acquisition of assets under Cruz.
The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine (Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 1991) prescribes a
Motion for a Bill of Particulars, not a Motion to Dismiss, as the remedy for
perceived ambiguity or vagueness of a complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth. While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear,
they were vague as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were in alleged
unlawful concert with the former. There was no factual allegation in the
original and expanded Complaints on the collaboration of former Pres. Marcos
and Cruz. That the late president’s co-defendants were able to file their
respective Answers does not necessarily mean that his estate’s executor will be
able to file an equally intelligent Answer.
Page 6 of 8
Estandarte v. People of the Philippines GR No. 156851-55
Feb. 18, 2008 Austria-Martinez, J.
Digest by: Lopez
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Bill of Particulars (Rule 12)
SUMMARY: Two complaints were filed against Estandarte for irregularities with
the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman forwarded the complaints to
City Prosec for PI who served her a subpoena and required her to submit a
counter-affidavit. Estandarte filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars instead of a
counter-aff. The City Prosec issued an order with an attached Bill of Particulars,
charging her with violations of PD 1445. Estandarte then filed her counter-aff
limiting herself to the charges in the BoP. The Omb filed 5 Informations against
her charging her with violations of RA 3019. Estandarte filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation which was denied. She filed an MR, stating that her due
process rights were violated and that the Omb was not allowed to go beyond
the charges in the Bill of Particulars. MR was denied so she filed a Pet for Rev
on Cert (R45) directly with the SC. SC held that Omb was not bound by the
erroneous grant of BoP because it is a prohibited motion under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Omb. However, while BoP is not allowed and
should not be the basis for determining what specific criminal charges should
be filed against Estandarte, she must still be accorded her basic rights to due
process in the conduct of PI.
DOCTRINE: BoP is a prohibited motion before the Office of the Ombudsman
and an erroneous grant thereof does not bind the Ombudsman to the charges
stated therein. (implied because this was never stated explicitly)
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 to reverse and set aside RTC order denying Petitioner’s Motion for
Reinvestigation and MR
FACTS:
• Petitioner Heide Estandarte – principal of Ramon Torres National High
School (RTNHS)
• 1998 – group of concerned RTNHS teachers composed of the Faculty
and Personnel Club Officers and department heads (private
complainants), sent an undated letter to the Schools Division of Bago
City with an attached of 15 irregularities.
• Two complaints were filed by private complainants with the Office of
the Ombudsman-Visayas (Omb-Vis)
 • Omb-Vis forwarded complaint to Office of the City Prosecutor for
preliminary investigation. City Prosecutor then served Estandarte with
a subpoena and required her to submit a counter-affidavit.
• Instead of a counter-aff, Estandarte filed with the City Prosec a Motion
for Bill of Particulars and Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-
Aff.
o In the Motion for Bill of Particulars, Estandarte alleged that
there were no specific criminal charges that were stated in the
subpoenas. Thus, she cannot intelligently prepare her counter-
affidavit
• City Prosec issued an Order, attaching a Bill of Particulars stating:
o “Complainants are charging respondent for violation of Sec.
68 and 691 of PD 1445”; and
o “Private complainants adopt the investigation report of the
provincial [sic] Auditor on [sic] complaint No. 23 and 25
which states: The principal Ms. Estandarte accepted cash and
in kind donations without being properly channeled and
accounted first by the property custodian and the cash
without first deposited in the Trust Fund.”
• Estandarte filed her counter-aff limiting herself to the charges stated in
the Bill of Particulars.
• Omb-Vis found sufficient grounds to hold Estandarte liable for 5
counts of violations of Sec 3 (e) of RA 30192 and filed 5 Informations
charging her:
o For receiving cash donations from private individuals and
establishments in the total amount P163,400.00;
o For collecting contributions or allowing the collection of
contributions in the amount of P10.00 from the enrollees of
the school without authority of law;
o For purchasing guns using the students Trust Fund depriving
the Security Guard of the school of the use of said guns.
o For double charging of the expenses of P1,500.00 incurred
for the video coverage of the coronation night
1 Section 68. Issuance of Official receipt and Section 69. Deposit of moneys in the treasury
2Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
Page 7 of 8
o For double charging of the expenses amounting to
P45,000.00 incurred in the repairs of the Home Economics
Building
• Estandarte filed a Motion for Reinvestigation on the ground that she
cannot allegedly be charged with violation of Sec. 68 and 69 since she
was not a collecting officer and she cannot be charged under Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, as the acts which she was charged with, did not
constitute manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence
RTC:
• Denied the Motion for Reinvestigation because Estandarte’s claim that
her acts do not constitute manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
grossly inexcusable negligence and is evidentiary in nature, and can
only be appreciated after a full-blown trial.
• Estandarte filed MR, stating that:
o When the 5 Informations for the violation of Sec 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 were filed by the Omb-Vis, her right to due process
was violated; and that the Omb-Vis went beyond the Bill of
Particulars.
• RTC Denied MR
• From the RTC, Estandarte went straight to SC via petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 on the basis of Sec. 2(c), Rule 41 of the RoC,
which provides that in all cases where only questions of law are
raised, the appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC shall be to
SC by a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
• Omb-Vis should have limited the charges filed against her to the
crimes mentioned in the Bill of Particulars, and that the filing of the
Informations charging her with crimes different from those specified in
the Bill of Particulars violates her right to due process
• City Prosec was deputized by Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation. Omb is bound by the act of granting the Bill of
Particulars because Prosec’s actions is effectively Omb’s actions.
• No criminal charges were stated in the subpoenas served on her so she
was not properly informed of the nature of the crime which she was
supposed to answer in her counter-affidavit
• In the Motion for Bill of Particulars, she declared that she was served
with subpoena together with the documents attached therein
OSG’s ARGUMENT:
• Bill of particulars is not allowed by AO 7 (Rules of Procedure in the
Office of the Ombudsman) so the Omb cannot be bound by the Bill of
Particulars submitted by private complainants.
ISSUE(S): —
W/N the Ombudsman is bound by the Bill of Particulars? NO.
W/N Estandarte was deprived of due process? YES.
W/N RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion when in denying the Motion for
Reinvestigation? NO.
HELD:
RE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
• Orders are obviously interlocutory orders, the proper recourse of
petitioner should have been by way of a petition for certiorari as
prescribed in Sec 1, Rule 41 of RoC, which specifically allows the
aggrieved party to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
• In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, (proceeding from the time-
honored principle that rules of procedure should promote, not defeat
substantial justice) Court shall treat the petition as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
RE: BILL OF PARTICULARS
• The Omb cannot be bound by the act of the Prosecutor who acted
contrary to the express mandate of AO 7, Sec. 4 (d)3
• Estandarte has no basis for insisting that Omb must be bound by the
erroneous act of the City Prosecutor in granting petitioners Motion for
Bill of Particulars.
• Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to reverse or nullify the
acts of the prosecutor pursuant to its power of control and supervision
over deputized prosecutors.
• While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and should not be the
basis for determining what specific criminal charges should be filed
against Estandarte, she must still be accorded her basic rights to due
process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
3xxx d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither
may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. xxx
Page 8 of 8
RE: DUE PROCESS
• In a preliminary investigation (Sec 3, Rule 112 RoC) basic due process
rights, such as the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit
counter-affidavits are guaranteed
• Court does not find the subpoenas and the alleged documents served
on her.
o Without the subpoenas and the documents attached to the
subpoenas, it could not be intelligently determined whether
she was fully apprised of the acts imputed to her and whether
she was given the opportunity to submit an appropriate
counter-affidavit to the charges and whether the charges
against her were based on the same acts complained of and
stated in the subpoena and the attached documents.
• It is an elementary rule that the complaint should specifically allege
the criminal acts complained of to enable the accused to prepare his
answer or counter-affidavit accurately and intelligently.
• In resolving the question whether petitioner was denied due process,
Court cannot rely on the disputable presumption that official duties
have been regularly performed.
o RTC should have required the petitioner to submit the
subpoenas and the attached documents served on her to
examine the same and resolve whether the petitioner’s right
to be informed was violated.
• A preliminary investigation is a judicial proceeding wherein the
prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts
as a quasi-judicial officer
• A PI is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial
court but it is not a casual affair. It is in effect a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of the case.
• In order to satisfy the due process clause, it is not enough that the
preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that
a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. PI is part of the
guarantee of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country.
PETITION PARTIALLY GRANTED. RTC ORDERS SET ASIDE. CASE
REMANDED.