Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No.

46496, February 27, 1940

G.R. NO. L-46496 FEBRUARY 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies

Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army.
Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However,
the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers
Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was
merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered
as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of
such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the Court of Industrial Relations, although not
strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in
support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.
Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. (ALFI) et.al. vs. Hon. Garin
(G.R. Nos. 217872 and 221866, 26 April 2017)

Petitioners opposed the unilateral act of the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) on re-
certifying the contraceptive drugs named Implanon and Implanon NXT; the basis of their
opposition hinges on the fact that these drugs are abortifacients. Thus, according to them,
they should have been given notice of the certification proceedings, and a chance to present
evidence that indeed such drugs are abortifacients.

Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners are not entitled to notice and hearing
because the said proceedings are done in the exercise of its regulatory power, not quasi-
judicial power; also, they alleged that the Honorable Supreme Court is incompetent to rule
on the instant controversy due to the same reason.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not said controversy is outside the scope of Judicial Review; No

(b) Whether or not petitioners were deprived of substantial and procedural due process of
law;

Held/Doctrines:

It is quite fascinating that the Supreme Court again reminded us the two fundamental powers
of an administrative body, in the words of the Honorable Court:

“The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the power of
subordinate legislation, has been defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body
to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions
of law and implement legislative policy. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. The
exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power through the promulgation
of regulations of general application does not, as a rule, require notice and hearing. The only
exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall
be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.
Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative
agency to determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself. As it involves the exercise of
discretion in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-
judicial power requires the concurrence of two elements: one, jurisdiction which must be
acquired by the administrative body and two, the observance of the requirements of due
process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.”
To answer (a) above, the Supreme Court has this to say, viz:
“On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the
exercise of its “regulatory powers” and, therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court holds
that it has the power to review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave
abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its
duty to ensure that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed when
there is a violation of the constitutional mandate that “no person is deprived of life, liberty,
and property without due process of law.” The Court’s power cannot be curtailed by the
FDA’s invocation of its regulatory power.”
With regard to (b), the Supreme Court ruled that petitioners were deprived of their Right to
Due Process. Perusal of the law and rules of procedure of the instant agency reveals the need
of an issuance of notice to all concerned MAHs and a posting of the contraceptive
products for public comments.These, respondents failed to do.
This was thoroughly explained by the Court, to wit:
“Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular
act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance
with both the substantive and procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due process
refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his
property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures
or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play
and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it. xxx

xxx To conclude that product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of

the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices by the FDA in the exercise of its regulatory
power need not comply with the requirements of due process would render the issuance of
notices to concerned MAHs and the posting of a list of contraceptives for public comment a
meaningless exercise. Concerned MAHs and the public in general will be deprived of any
significant participation if what they will submit will not be considered.

Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the IRR of the RH Law (RH-IRR), relied upon by the respondents in
support of their claims, expressly allows the consideration of conflicting evidence, such as
that supplied by the petitioners in support of their opposition to the approval of certain
contraceptive drugs and devices. In fact, the said provision mandated that the FDA utilize the
“best evidence available” to ensure that no abortifacient is approved as family planning drug
or device. It bears mentioning that the same provision even allows an independent evidence
review group (ERG) to ensure that evidence for or against the certification of a contraceptive
drug or device is duly considered.”

MUNICIPALITY OF LA LIBERTAD, NEGROS ORIENTAL, represented by the

Municipal Mayor LAWRENCE D. LIMKAICHONG, JR., petitioner, vs. JUDITH
C. PENAFLOR,
HELD: Generally the power to appoint includes the power to remove except in instances where it does not
include the power to remove, e.g.: 1.) The Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman who are appointed by the President may be removed
from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 2.) The Judges of lower court are subject
to discipline by the Supreme Court en banc which can order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Since it is not claimed that Penaflor was a head of department or office in the office of petitioner, then
following Sec. 444(5) of the Local Government Code, under which a mayor is empowered to ―appoint all
officials whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal funds and whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to
appoint,‖ former Mayor Camero did not have to secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan to
terminate Penaflor‘s services.

Cabral vs adolfo

Facts:
In her petition, Cabral argued that: (1) the EPs covered nonagricultural lands which were outside the coverage of
the OLT program; (2) the EPs were issued without due notice and hearing; and (3) no Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) were previously issued over Lot 4.

Respondents Adolfo and Lazaro moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of
personality to sue, and prescription;10 however, it was denied. The respondents then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the CA but it was dismissed for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.11 On June 18, 2004, the PARAD rendered its Decision12 cancelling the EPs of the respondents and
ordering the RD of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to revive Cabral’s OCT No. 0-1670, to wit: Cabral vs. Adolfo, 801 SCRA
695, G.R. No. 198160 August 31, 2016

Remedial Law; Administrative Agencies; The Court generally accords respect, if not finality, to the factual findings
of quasi-judicial bodies as these administrative bodies are deemed experts on matters within its specific and
specialized jurisdiction.—The Court generally accords respect, if not finality, to the factual findings of quasi-
judicial bodies, such as the DARAB and the PARAD, as these administrative bodies are deemed experts on
matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction. However, since the findings of the PARAD and the DARAB
conflict with those of the CA, the Court is constrained to disregard the general rule and to reexamine the records
of the case to address the issue on hand. Cabral vs. Adolfo, 801 SCRA 695, G.R. No. 198160 August 31, 2016

Alfonso vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 811 SCRA 27, November 29, 2016
), Congress gave the DAR primary jurisdiction to conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine and
decide the compensation for the land, in case of disagreement between the DAR/LBP and the landowners:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. – For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following
procedures shall be followed:

xxx

(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine
the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to
the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the
above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days
after it is submitted for decision.

xxx

(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Fourth, to implement Section 16(f), Congress provided for the judicial review of the DAR preliminary determination
of just compensation. Under Sections 56 and 57, it vested upon designated Special Agrarian Courts the special
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners:

Sec. 56. Special Agrarian Court. – The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special Agrarian Court. The Supreme Court may designate more
branches to constitute such additional Special Agrarian Courts as may be necessary to cope with the number of
agrarian cases in each province. In the designation, the Supreme Court shall give preference to the Regional Trial
Courts which have been assigned to handle agrarian cases or whose presiding judges were former judges of the
defunct Court of Agrarian Relations. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned to said courts shall exercise said
special jurisdiction in addition to the regular jurisdiction of their respective courts. The Special Agrarian Courts shall
have the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the Regional Trial Courts.

Sec. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified
by this Act. The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty
(30) days from submission of the case for decision.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the
nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot
ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless
an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.94

1. In actions for the judicial determination of just compensation of property taken pursuant to RA 6657 that
were filed when RA 9700 took effect on August 7, 2009 and onwards, the Special Agrarian Courts have the
duty to apply the prevailing DAR formula at the time of filing. Disregarding the formula or deviating
therefrom shall only be allowed upon justifiable grounds and if supported by evidence on record. If the SAC
does not apply the DAR formula, it may adopt any other valuation method, a variation of the DAR formula,
or a combination of the DAR formula with any other valuation method, provided that all of the factors under
Sec. 17 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700, shall be taken into consideration. Determination of just
compensation "shall be subject to the final decision" of the SACs.
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its
“insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1).
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to
the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
ALBANIA v. COMELEC
SOFRONIO B. ALBANIA, Petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGARDO A. TALLADO,
Respondent
G.R. No. 226792
June 6, 2017

FACTS:

In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, respondent Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O. Typoco were both
candidates for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Typoco
was proclaimed as the winner. Respondent questioned Typoco's proclamation by filing with the COMELEC, a
petition for correction of a manifest error. The Petition was decided in respondent's favor on March 5, 2010 and
the latter assumed the position of Governor of Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the end of
the 2007-2010 term.

Respondent ran again in the 2010 and 2013 National and Local Elections where he won and served as Governor
of Camarines Norte, respectively. On October 16, 2015, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy as Governor
of Camarines Norte in the May 9, 2016 National and Local elections. On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a
registered voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, filed a petition for respondent's disqualification from
running as Governor based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 on two grounds: (1) he violated the
three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC); and (2) respondent's suspension froni office for one year without pay, together with its accessory penalties,
after he was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority in the Ombudsman's Order9 dated October
2, 2015.

Respondent argued that since the petition was primarily based on his alleged violation of the three-term limit rule,
the same should have been filed as a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Rule
23 of COMELEC Resolution 9523, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the ground cited
affected a candidate's eligibility; that based on Section 23, the petition should had been filed on November 10,
2015, but the petition was filed only on November 13, 2015, hence, the same had already prescribed and must be
dismissed. His suspension from office is also not a ground for a petition for disqualification. On the substantive
issues, he denied violating the three-term limit rule as he did not fully serve three consecutive terms since he only
served as Governor for the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010.

On April 22, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. It ruled that a
violation of the three-term limit rule and suspension from office as a result of an administrative case are not
grounds for disqualification of a candidate under the law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which dismissed the same in a
Resolution dated August 24, 2016. The COMELEC En Banc echoed the Division's findings that the grounds relied
upon by petitioner are not proper for a petition for disqualification but one for denial of due course to or
cancellation of respondent's COC, which was filed out of time. It then continued to rule on the merits finding that
respondent did not serve the full 2007-2010 term as Governor of Camarines Norte, thus, cannot be considered as
one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Edgardo A. Tallado violated the three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

RULING:

No, the respondent Edgardo A. Tallado did not violate the three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 .The Court noted the grounds for disqualification of a
candidate are found under Sections 12 and 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as well as Section 40 of the Local Government Code, which
respectively provide: SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon
or granted amnesty. x x x x SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;

x x x x SECTION 40. Disqualifications - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

A reading of the grounds enumerated under the above-quoted provisions for a candidate's disqualification does
not include the two grounds relied upon by petitioner. Hence, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated
August 24, 2016 of the Commission on Elections En Banc is AFFIRMED.
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The Constitution has vested in the COMELEC broad powers, involving not only the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but also the resolution and
determination of election controversies. It also granted the COMELEC the power and authority to
15

promulgate its rules of procedure, with the primary objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of
election cases. Concomitant to such powers is the authority of the COMELEC to determine the true nature
16

of the cases filed before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading filed, obviously aware that in
determining the nature of the complaint or petition, its averments, rather than its title/caption, are the proper·
gauges.
Lazatin vs. Desierto-

Ombudsman; It has long been settled that the provisions of Republic Act No. 6770 granting the Office of the
Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) under said office have
no constitutional infirmity.—Petitioners’ attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long
been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers
and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of
R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the
Ombudsman (248 SCRA 566 [1995]).

Same; The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman; Under the Constitution,
Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) under the Office of the Ombudsman.—The foregoing ruling of the Court
has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero (268 SCRA 473 [2005]). More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman
v. Valera (471 SCRA 715 [1997]), the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared
that the OSP is “merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision
and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman” and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to
preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court’s ruling in Acop
that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution
was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan (503 SCRA 252 [2006]), where it was
held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power
had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not
proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the
Office of the Ombudsman.

Judgments; Stare Decisis; Doctrine of Stare Decisis; The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.—The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to
adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines which provides, thus: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Same; Same; As explained in Fermin vs. People (550 SCRA 132 [2008]), the doctrine of stare decisis is based on
the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.—It was further explained in Fermin v. People (550 SCRA 132 [2008]) as follows: The
doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.

Same; Same; Only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits
derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the
same.—The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
“[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue
of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public’s confidence
in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.” Verily, only upon showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of
stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment.—The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman’s disapproval of the OSP
Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases is based on misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises
and conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough evidence
to support a finding of probable cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It must be
stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Lazatin
vs. Desierto, 588 SCRA 285, G.R. No. 147097 June 5, 2009

Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)

Administrative Law; Preventive Suspension; A preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive
measure.—By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo
v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277 (2005), the Court explained the distinction, stating that its
purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his
office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him: Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure
and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily
cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive
measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent
the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such
investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

Same; Same; The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of
preventive suspension pending an investigation.—The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to
justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely: (1) The evidence of
guilt is strong; and (2) Either of the following circumstances coexist with the first requirement: (a) The charge
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) The charge would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) The respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

Same; Condonation; Words and Phrases; Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as “[a] victim’s
express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no
offense.”—Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as “[a] victim’s express or implied forgiveness of
an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense.” The condonation doctrine —
which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon — is
not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935
Constitution. Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431, G.R. Nos. 217126-27 November
10, 2015

Doctrine of Condonation
explained
Pursuant to the 1992 case of Aguinaldo v Santos, a public official cannot
be removed for misconduct committed during a prior or previous term;
his reelection operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct, reiterated in Malinao v Reyes, 1996 (see Provincial Board of
Zamboanga del Norte v Guzman, 1967). This Aguinaldo ruling was based
on the fact that the term of office during which the misconduct was
committed expired before the petition questioning the validity of the
administrative decision removing the respondent could be decided (see
Reyes v Comelec).

Reyes v Comelec explains the rationale: If a public official is not removed

before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is
thereafter reelected for another term. Removal cannot extend beyond
the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.
The doctrine of condonation is a limited empowerment of the electorate
over the accountabilities of their elective local officials. It is limited
because it does not cover criminal accountabilities. It is a legal fiction
grounded upon a presumed knowledge of all the activities and behavior
of the elective local official. It is presumed that when the electorate
exercised their right to choose, they were all aware of “all” the
misconducts of the public official.

Reelection is the manifestation of the people’s will. The rationale for this
condonation doctrine was provided by American authorities, specifically
the 1887 case of Conant v Brogan, which has found unwavering adoption
in Philippine jurisprudence.

Aguinaldo explained, citing Pascual v Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva

Ecija: “The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the
will of the people.”

The Doctrine of Condonation does not apply to criminal acts committed

by the reelected official during his prior or previous term (Ingco v
Sanchez, 1967; People v Jalosjos, 2000). Accordingly, the pendency of a
criminal case under Republic Act 3019 may be the legal basis for the
suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of an elective
official’s reelection (Libanan v Sandiganbayan, 1994). The ruling that a
public officer cannot be removed for acts done prior to his present term
of office applies only to administrative liabilities committed during the
previous term of an elective official. The rationale for the foregoing
distinction is that the administrative liability of a public officer is
separate and distinct from his penal liability.
Tabino vs. Tabino

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of Our judicial system. The thrust of
the ruleis that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is
obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed.

Another important reason for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins the
Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively)
withinthe competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a
better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by
subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. Strict
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which
otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.

Thus, the party with an administrative remedy must not only commence with the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention
to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court
justifying the dismissal of the complaint.

Indeed, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, but none of these apply
in this case. Consequently, Lazaro and Rafael should have first appealed to the Office ofthe President,
1âwphi1

which has the power to review the orders or acts of the DENR Secretary, being his subordinate, before
coming to Us through a petition for review.
KATHERINE ROSE SALVA, Petitioner, v. ILDEFONSO P. MAGPILE

30
The local tax cases referred to in Section 7(a) (3) above-quoted include those involving real property taxes. Real
property taxation is governed by Book II of the Local Government Code on "Local Taxation and Fiscal Matters" and
real property taxes are collected by the Local Treasurer, not by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in charge of
31
collecting national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges. In National Power Corp. v. Municipal Government of
32
Navotas, et al., the Court held:

Indeed, the CTA, sitting as Division, has jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, rulings and resolutions of the
RTC over local tax cases, which includes real property taxes. This is evident from a perusal of the Local Government
Code (LGC) which includes the matter of Real Property Taxation under one of its main chapters. Indubitably, the
power to impose real property tax is in line with the power vested in the local governments to create their own
revenue sources, within the limitations set forth by law. As such, the collection of real property taxes is conferred
with the local treasurer rather than the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

We, therefore, disagree with the conclusion of the CTA En Banc that real property taxes have always been treated by
our laws separately from local taxes. The fact that a separate chapter is devoted to the treatment of real property
taxes, and a distinct appeal procedure is provided therefor does not justify an inference that Section 7(a)(3) of R.A.
9282 pertains only to local taxes other than real property taxes. Rather, the term "local taxes" in the aforementioned
provision should be considered in its general and comprehensive sense, which embraces real property tax
assessments, in line with the precept Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia - what is generally spoken shall be
generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail
unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. In the words of the Court in Marcos v. Chief
of Staff:

As an exception to the rule that administrative proceedings are presumed to be regular, there can be no
presumption of the regularity of any administrative action which results in depriving a taxpayer of his property
35 36
through a tax sale. The fairly recent case of Corporate Strategies Development Corp., et al. v. Agojo discussed
this at length, thus:

In Spouses Sarmiento v. CA, this Court reiterated the rule that there could be no presumption of the regularity of
any administrative action which resulted in depriving a taxpayer of his property through a tax sale. This is an
exception to the rule that administrative proceedings are presumed to be regular. This has been the rule since the
1908 case of Valencia v. Jimenez and Fuster where this Court held:

The American law does not create a presumption of the regularity of any administrative action which results in
depriving a citizen or taxpayer of his property, but, on the contrary, the due process of law to be followed in tax
proceedings must be established by proof and the general rule is that the purchaser of a tax title is bound to take
upon himself the burden of showing the regularity of all proceedings leading up to the sale. The difficulty of
supplying such proof has frequently lead to efforts on the part of legislatures to avoid it by providing by statute that
a tax deed shall be deemed either conclusive or presumptive proof of such regularity.

Those statutes attributing to it a conclusive effect have been held invalid as operating to deprive the owner of his
property without due process of law. But those creating a presumption only have been sustained as affecting a rule
of evidence, changing nothing but the burden of proof. (Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S., 51.)

The tax law applicable to Manila does not attempt to give any special probative effect to the deed of the
assessor and collector, and therefore leaves the purchaser to establish the regularity of all vital steps in
the assessment and sale.(Emphasis supplied)

In 1915, the Court reiterated this doctrine in Camo v. Boyco. It was written therein that no presumption of the
regularity existed in any administrative action which resulted in depriving a citizen or taxpayer of his property. It
further stated that on the contrary, the due process of law to be followed in tax proceedings must be established by
proof and the general rule was that the purchaser of a tax title was bound to take upon himself the burden
of showing the regularity of all proceedings leading up to the sale.

And in the 2003 case of Requiron v. Sinaban, this Court likewise pronounced that it was incumbent upon the buyer
at an auction sale to prove the regularity of all proceedings leading to the sale for the buyer could not rely on the
presumption of regularity accorded to ordinary administrative proceedings.

The above jurisprudential tenor clearly demonstrates that the burden to prove compliance with the validity of the
proceedings leading up to the tax delinquency sale is incumbent upon the buyer or the winning bidder, which, in this
case, is the respondent. This is premised on the rule that a sale of land for tax delinquency is in derogation of
property and due process rights of the registered owner. In order to be valid, the steps required by law must be
strictly followed. The burden to show that such steps were taken lies on the person claiming its validity, for the Court
cannot allow mere presumption of regularity to take precedence over the right of a property owner to due process
accorded no less than by the Constitution.37

Corporate Strategies Development Corp vs. Norman Agojo

Tax Delinquency Sale; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The burden to prove compliance with the validity of the
proceedings leading up to the tax delinquency sale is incumbent upon the buyer or the winning bidder, which, in
this case, is the respondent.—The burden to prove compliance with the validity of the proceedings leading up to
the tax delinquency sale is incumbent upon the buyer or the winning bidder, which, in this case, is the
respondent. This is premised on the rule that a sale of land for tax delinquency is in derogation of property and
due process rights of the registered owner. In order to be valid, the steps required by law must be strictly
followed. The burden to show that such steps were taken lies on the person claiming its validity, for the Court
cannot allow mere presumption of regularity to take precedence over the right of a property owner to due
process accorded no less than by the Constitution.

Same; Under Section 254 of the Local Government Code (LGC), it is required that the notice of delinquency must
be posted at the main hall and in a publicly accessible and conspicuous place in each barangay of the local
government unit (LGU) concerned. It shall also be published once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province, city, or municipality.—Under Section 254 of the LGC, it is
required that the notice of delinquency must be posted at the main hall and in a publicly accessible and
conspicuous place in each barangay of the local government unit concerned. It shall also be published once a
week for two (2) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city, or municipality.

Same; Section 258 of the Local Government Code (LGC) requires that should the treasurer issue a warrant of
levy, the same shall be mailed to or served upon the delinquent owner of the real property or person having
legal interest therein, or in case he is out of the country or cannot be located, the administrator or occupant of
the property.—Section 258 of the LGC further requires that should the treasurer issue a warrant of levy, the
same shall be mailed to or served upon the delinquent owner of the real property or person having legal interest
therein, or in case he is out of the country or cannot be located, the administrator or occupant of the property.
At the same time, the written notice of the levy with the attached warrant shall be mailed to or served upon the
assessor and the Registrar of Deeds of the province, city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area
where the property is located, who shall annotate the levy on the tax declaration and certificate of title of the
property, respectively.

Same; Section 260 of the Local Government Code (LGC) mandates that within thirty (30) days after service of the
warrant of levy, the local treasurer shall proceed to publicly advertise for sale or auction the property or a usable
portion thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the tax delinquency and expenses of sale.—Section 260 of the LGC
also mandates that within thirty (30) days after service of the warrant of levy, the local treasurer shall proceed to
publicly advertise for sale or auction the property or a usable portion thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the
tax delinquency and expenses of sale. Such advertisement shall be effected by posting a notice at the main
entrance of the provincial, city or municipal building, and in a publicly accessible and conspicuous place in the
barangay where the real property is located, and by publication once a week for two (2) week in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, city or municipality where the property is located.

Same; Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the
taxpayers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called
upon to enforce the laws; Thus, the holding of a tax sale despite the absence of the requisite notice, as in this
case, is tantamount to a violation of the delinquent taxpayer’s substantial right to due process.—Respondent
must be reminded that the requirements for a tax delinquency sale under the LGC are mandatory. Strict
adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the taxpayers, but also
to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce the
laws. Particularly, the notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in general is an essential and
indispensable requirement of law, the nonfulfilment of which vitiates the sale. Thus, the holding of a tax sale
despite the absence of the requisite notice, as in this case, is tantamount to a violation of the delinquent
taxpayer’s substantial right to due process. Corporate Strategies Development Corp. vs. Agojo, 741 SCRA 354,
G.R. No. 208740 November 19, 2014

HE CHAIRMAN and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT, and THE PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Petitioners
vs.
EJERCITO LIM DOING BUSINESS AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES, AS REPRESENTED BY HIS
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CAPT. ERNESTO LIM, Respondent

Administrative agencies possess two kinds of powers, the quasi-legislative or rule-making power, and the
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. The first is the power to make rules and regulations that
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers. The issuance of the assailed A.O. No. 00-05, Resolution. No. 03-
15

211 and the other issuances by the PCSD was in the exercise of the agency's quasilegislative powers. The
second is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same
law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
that is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted
to it.
16

The challenge being brought by the petitioners rests mainly on the theory that the CA should not have
interpreted the functions of the PCSD, particularly those provided for in Sections 4, 6, 16, and 19 of R.A. No.
7611, as limitations on the power of the PCSD to promulgate A.O. No. 00-05. Clearly, what was assailed
before the CA was the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the PCSD as an
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function. The question thus presented was a
matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, and exclusively and originally pertained to the proper Regional
Trial Court pursuant to Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Indeed, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court expressly states that any person "whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation" may bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court "to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder." The judicial course to raise the issue against such validity should have adhered to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts except only if the respondent had sufficient justification to do otherwise. Yet,
he utterly failed to show justification to merit the exception of bypassing the Regional Trial Court. Moreover,
by virtue of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Court's power to evaluate the validity of an
17

implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature.

In this regard, the Court has categorically observed in Smart Communications, Inc. v. National
Telecommunications Commission that if what is being assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
18

regulation issued by an administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative functions, then the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the Constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. 19

To accord with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, therefore, the petition for prohibition should have been
originally brought in the proper Regional Trial Court as a petition for declaratory relief.

We also need to remind that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an administrative
order issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are
without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Its lies against the exercise of judicial or ministerial functions, not against the exercise of legislative or
20

quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of the writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the
limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. In other words,
21
prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior
court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior
court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in
the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. 22

Nevertheless, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on this case on the merits if only to facilitate its
speedy resolution. In proper cases, indeed, the rigidity of procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in
the interest of substantial justice. The power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever
the purposes of justice so require cannot be questioned. 23

GIL G. CAWAD vs abad

prohibition is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Based on the foregoing, this Court has consistently reiterated that petitions for certiorari and
12

prohibition may be invoked only against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers, or persons exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, and not against their exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative
functions.

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a
law that gives rise to some specific rights under which adverse claims are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with authority to determine the law
and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. In this case, respondents did not act in any
17

judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In issuing and
implementing the subject circulars, respondents were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending
parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The issuance and enforcement by the
Secretaries of the DBM, CSC and DOH of the questioned joint circulars were done in the exercise of their
quasi-legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by
them in their exercise of delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies
through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the government. 18

Based on the foregoing, it must be recalled that administrative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH Joint
Circular herein, enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law they are entrusted to
enforce are entitled to great respect. They partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if
31

they have been written in the statute itself. As such, administrative regulations have the force and effect of
law and enjoy the presumption of legality. Unless and until they are overcome by sufficient evidence showing
that they exceeded the bounds of the law, their validity and legality must be upheld.
32

Thus, notwithstanding the contention that the Joint Resolution No. 4 promulgated by Congress cannot be a
proper source of delegated power, the subject Circular was nevertheless issued well within the scope of
authority granted to the respondents. The issue in this case is not whether the Joint Resolution No. 4 can
become law and, consequently, authorize the issuance of the regulation in question, but whether the circular
can be struck down as invalid for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Regardless, therefore, of the
validity or invalidity of Joint Resolution No. 4, the DBMDOH Joint Circular assailed herein cannot be said to
have been arbitrarily or capriciously issued for being consistent with prior issuances duly promulgated
pursuant to valid and binding law

\
Ferrer Vs. Bautista

Facts:
 The City of Quezon passed two ordinances namely.
 The first one was the Socialized Housing Tax of QC allowing the imposition of special
assessment (1/2 of the assessed valued of land in excess of P100k)
 The second one was Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Collection Fees
imposing fees depending on the amount of the land or floor area).
 Jose Ferrer, as a property in Quezon City questioned the validity of the city ordinances.
 According to Ferrer:
 The city has no power to impose the tax.
 The SHT violates the rule on equality because it burdens real property owners
with expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal settlers.
 The SHT is confiscatory or oppressive.
 Also, he assails the validity of the garbage fees imposition because:
 It violates the rule on double taxation.
 It violates the rule on equality because the fees are collected from only domestic
households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and other
commercial dining places that spew garbage much more than residential property
owners.

Issue: WON the ordinances were valid.

Held:

1st ordinance: Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is valid.

Cities have the power to tax

It must be noted that local government units such as cities has the power to tax. The collection
for the socialized housing tax is valid. It must be noted that the collections were made to
accrue to the socialized housing programs and projects of the city.

The imposition was for a public purpose (exercise of power of taxation + police power)
In this case, there was both an exercise of the power to tax (primary) and police power
(incidental). Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged
and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well.
The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying the same in
view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor,
making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.

There is no violation of the rule on equality

Note: There is a substantial distinction between: real property owner and an informal settler. In
fact, the Supreme Court said that the disparity is so obvious. It is inherent in the power to tax
that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities which result from a singling out
of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

All these requisites are complied with: An ordinance based on reasonable classification does
not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a
valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The ordinance is not oppressive or confiscatory

The ordinance is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent with the
UDHA (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). While the law authorizes LGUs to
collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the questioned
ordinance only covers properties with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00. As well, the
ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment
paid by the property owner beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.

2nd ordinance: The imposition of garbage fee is invalid.

Note: There was no violation of double taxation but there was a violation of the rule on equity.

There is no violation of double taxation: the garbage fees are not taxes
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that:
"if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is
also obtained does not make the imposition a tax."

Contention of Ferrer: that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double taxation
because garbage collection is a basic and essential public service that should be paid out from
property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community tax certificate, other taxes,
and the IRA of the Quezon City Government. All these are valid taxes. The garbage fees are
license fees

Footnote: In order to constitute double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited sense the
same property must be taxed twice when it should be taxed but once; both taxes must be
imposed on the same property or subject-matter, for the same purpose, by the same State,
Government, or taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district, during the same
taxing period, and they must be the same kind or character of tax.

There is a violation of the rule on equality: no substantial distinction

There is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant
of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand.
Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary
to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.

The garbage fees or rates are unjust and inequitable

A resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice
the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot
with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same
amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium
or from a socialized housing project.

The classifications are not germane to the purpose of the ordinance

The declared purpose is: "promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their
common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in generating waste."

Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have
considered factors that could truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the
appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household age and size,
accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to pay,
and actual occupancy of the property.

SC:
→ Validity of Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is upheld.
→ Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic
households in Quezon City, is unconstitutional and illegal.

Citation:
 JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, vs.CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY
COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, and CITY
ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU AND NOEL AGUSTIN vs. LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO

Pertinent to Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is only as to the rank and salary that the Ombudsman and
the deputies shall be the same with the chairman and members, respectively, of the constitutional commissions.

Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution with Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, in any vacancy for the
positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as a result of the expiration of the term or death, resignation,
removal, or permanent disability of the predecessor, the successor shall always be appointed for a full term of seven
years.

Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the seven-year term of office of the first
appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is not reckoned from 2 February 1987, but shall be reckoned from their
date of appointment. Accordingly, the present Ombudsman and deputies shall serve a full term of seven years from
their date of appointment unless their term is cut short by death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability.
ANGEL ABAD v HERMINIO DELA CRUZ

Pertinent to Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is only as to the rank and salary that the Ombudsman and
the deputies shall be the same with the chairman and members, respectively, of the constitutional commissions.

Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution with Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, in any vacancy for the
positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as a result of the expiration of the term or death, resignation,
removal, or permanent disability of the predecessor, the successor shall always be appointed for a full term of seven
years.

Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the seven-year term of office of the first
appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is not reckoned from 2 February 1987, but shall be reckoned from their
date of appointment. Accordingly, the present Ombudsman and deputies shall serve a full term of seven years from
their date of appointment unless their term is cut short by death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability.
ANGEL ABAD v HERMINIO DELA CRUZ
48
The Civil Service Commission is the "central personnel agency of the Government[.]" Its mandate is to ensure that
49
appointments in the civil service are generally made on the basis of merit and fitness. The Commission is tasked to
50
strengthen the merit and rewards system in the civil service by administering and enforcing the "constitutional and
51
statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service[.]"

Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis of merit. Both the
Constitution and law ensure that those appointed are t for the position. hile those who
are ne9t in ran5 to a vacant position may be given some preference, no one has a vested
right to a government position. eniority and salary grades should be given their due
weight but should not trump the public interest. TheCivil ervice Commission0/ational
Capital Region and the Civil ervice Commission agree that respondent possesses the
minimum =ualications under the law for the

position of City #overnment Department !ead $$$. %oreover, the appointment of Dela
Cru" was conrmed by the angguniang Panlungsod ng %untinlupa in Resolution /o.
-012. The ne9t0in0ran5 rule is a
rule of preference
on who to consider for promotion.

The rule does not give employees ne9t in ran5 a vested right to the position ne9t higher
to theirs should that position become vacant.

Appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing authority.

o long as the appointee possesses the =ualications re=uired by law, the appointment is
valid. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving that he was a =ualied
ne9t0in0ran5. Re 10salary0grade rule, case falls under one of the e9ceptions (deep
selection process)
SPO1 RAMON LIHAYLIHAY1 AND C/INSP. VIRGILIO V. VINLUAN, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

At the outset, it bears pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this case, only questions of
law and not questions of fact may be raised. Issues brought to the Court on whether the prosecution was
able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of innocence was
sufficiently debunked, whether or not conspiracy was satisfactorily established, or whether or not good faith
was properly appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of fact. 20 Hence, absent any of the recognized
exceptions to the above-mentioned rule,21the Sandiganbayan’s findings on the foregoing matters should be
deemed as conclusive.

Petitioners were charged with the crime of violation of Section 3(e) 22 of RA 3019 which has the following
essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 23 As observed by the
Sandiganbayan, all these elements are extant in this case:

2. Pablico vs. Villapando, Gr No. 147870, July 31. 2002

3. Dimayuga vs. Benedicto, Gr No. 144153, jan. 16, 2002
4. Baculi vs. Office of the President. GR No. 188681, mar. 8, 2017
7. Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, Gr no. 81563, Dec. 19, 1989
8. GR. L-19313, January 19, 1962, Dominador Aytona vs. Andre Castillo
9. GR No. 203372, June 16, 2015
Garafel vs. Office of the President
10. Funa vs. Acting Secretary Agra, GR No. 191644, Feb. 19, 2013
11. Philippine Ports Authority vs. Piers's Arrastre, & Stevedoring Services Inc. GR No.
147861, Nov. 18, 2006
12. Miranda vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 154098, July 27, 2005
13. Police Director Gen Alan La mAdrid Purisima vs. Hon. Morales, GR No. 219501, July
26, 20-17