FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175039. April 18, 2012.]

ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG CIVIC & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION,

INC. , petitioner, vs . MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES & HOLDINGS, INC.,
WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL, in his capacity as Director, NCR, and
HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES , respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO , J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure of the Decision 1 dated May 16, 2006 as well as the Resolution 2 dated October
5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63439, entitled "ADDITION HILLS
MANDALUYONG CIVIC & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, INC. vs. MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES &
HOLDINGS, INC., WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL in his capacity as Director, NCR, and HOUSING
AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES." In effect, the appellate court's issuances reversed and set aside the Decision
3 dated September 10, 1998 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 158 in Civil Case No. 65171. HTaIAC

The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed May 16, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
[Private respondent] MEGAWORLD was the registered owner of a parcel of
land located along Lee Street, Barangay Addition Hills, Mandaluyong City with an
area of 6,148 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title
(TCT) No. 12768, issued by the Register of Deeds for Mandaluyong City.

Sometime in 1994, [private respondent] MEGAWORLD conceptualized the

construction of a residential condominium complex on the said parcel of land
called the Wack-Wack Heights Condominium consisting of a cluster of six (6)
four-storey buildings and one (1) seventeen (17) storey tower.

[Private respondent] MEGAWORLD thereafter secured the necessary

clearances, licenses and permits for the condominium project, including: (1) a
CLV, issued on October 25, 1994, and a Development Permit, issued on November
11, 1994, both by the [public respondent] HLURB; (2) an ECC, issued on March 15,
1995, by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (3) a
Building Permit, issued on February 3, 1995, by the O ce of the Building O cial
of Mandaluyong City; and (4) a Barangay Clearance dated September 29, 1994,
from the office of the Barangay Chairman of Addition Hills.

Thereafter, construction of the condominium project began, but on June

30, 1995, the plaintiff-appellee AHMCSO led a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, docketed as Civil Case No. 65171, for yo
(sic) annul the Building Permit, CLV, ECC and Development Permit granted to
MEGAWORLD; to prohibit the issuance to MEGAWORLD of Certi cate of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Registration and License to Sell Condominium Units; and to permanently enjoin
local and national building o cials from issuing licenses and permits to
MEGAWORLD.

On July 20, 1995, [private respondent] MEGAWORLD led a Motion to

Dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and that jurisdiction over the case
was with the [public respondent] HLURB and not with the regular courts.
On July 24, 1994, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss led by [private
respondent] MEGAWORLD.

On August 3, 1995, [private respondent] MEGAWORLD filed its Answer.

On November 15, 1995, pre-trial was commenced.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 4 HDCAaS

The trial court rendered a Decision dated September 10, 1998 in favor of petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Certi cate of Locational
Viability, the Development Permit and the Certi cate of Registration and License
to Sell Condominium Units, all issued by defendant Wilfredo I. Imperial, National
Capital Region Director of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB-
NCR) are all declared void and of no effect. The same goes for the Building
Permit issued by defendant Francisco Mapalo of Mandaluyong City. In turn,
defendant Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. is directed to rectify its Wack
Wack Heights Project for it to conform to the requirements of an R-2 zone of
Mandaluyong City and of the Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance 81-01.

Costs against these defendants. 5

Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which issued the assailed May
16, 2006 Decision which reversed and set aside the aforementioned trial court ruling, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 10, 1998 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, rendered in Civil Case No. 65171 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING the
complaint. 6

As can be expected, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, the Court of

Appeals denied the motion in its assailed October 5, 2006 Resolution.
Hence, the petitioner led the instant petition and submitted the following issues for
consideration:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE
SEEKING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION FROM THE COURTS.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE
CASE FILED BEFORE AND DECIDED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
BRANCH 158, DOES NOT FALL UNDER ANY ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE
RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS (The Court) ERRED WHEN IT

FOUND THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION FROM THE COURTS.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS (The Court) ERRED WHEN IT

CONCLUDED THAT THE HLURB HAD JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS TO ANNUL
CERTIFICATES OF LOCATIONAL VIABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT PERMITS. 7 TcDIaA

On the other hand, private respondent put forth the following issues in its
Memorandum: 8
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR

BEING IMPROPERLY VERIFIED.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY ANNULLED AND SET

ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT FOR
PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CONTRARY TO LAW

AND THE FACTS.

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE CLV WAS IMPROPERLY AND IRREGULARLY ISSUED.

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT HLURB HAS NO POWER TO GRANT AN EXCEPTION OR
VARIANCE TO REQUIREMENTS OF METRO MANILA COMMISSION
ORDINANCE NO. 81-01.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE PROJECT DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
SECTION 3(B), ARTICLE VII OF METRO MANILA COMMISSION
ORDINANCE NO. 81-01 TO QUALIFY FOR AN EXCEPTION OR
DEVIATION.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE DEVELOPMENT PERMIT WAS IMPROPERLY AND
IRREGULARLY ISSUED.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE PROJECT DEPRIVES THE ADJACENT PROPERTIES OF AIR. 9

We find the petition to be without merit.

At the outset, the parties in their various pleadings discuss issues, although
ostensibly legal, actually require the Court to make findings of fact. It is long settled, by law
and jurisprudence, that the Court is not a trier of facts. 10 Therefore, the only relevant issue
to be resolved in this case is whether or not the remedy sought by the petitioner in the trial
court is in violation of the legal principle of the exhaustion of administrative remedies. TEIHDa

We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must
allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. 11
In the case of Republic v. Lacap , 12 we expounded on the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the related doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this wise:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should rst avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without rst
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after
due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
13

It is true that the foregoing doctrine admits of exceptions, such that in Lacap , we
also held:
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy
and practical considerations, are not in exible rules. There are many accepted
exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or o cial
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided
by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its
application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted
acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
warranto proceedings. . . . 14
Upon careful consideration of the parties' contentions, we nd that none of the
aforementioned exceptions exist in the case at bar. HICSaD

What is apparent, however, is that petitioner unjusti ably failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) before seeking recourse with the trial court. Under the rules of the HLURB which
were then in effect, particularly Sections 4 and 6 of HLURB Resolution No. R-391, Series of
1987 (Adopting the 1987 Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board), 15 a complaint to annul any permit issued by the HLURB may be led before the
Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA). Therefore, petitioner's action to annul the Certi cate
of Locational Viability (CLV) and the Development Permit issued by the HLURB on October
25, 1994 and November 11, 1994, respectively, in favor of private respondent for its Wack-
Wack Heights Condominium Project should have been properly led before the HLURB
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 instead of the trial court.
We quote with approval the Court of Appeals' discussion of this matter:
In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellee AHMCSO failed to exhaust the
available administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention v i a a
petition for annulment. The power to act as appellate body over decisions and
actions of local and regional planning and zoning bodies and deputized o cial
of the board was retained by the HLURB and remained unaffected by the
devolution under the Local Government Code.
Under Section 5 of Executive Order No. 648, series of 1981, the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) later renamed as Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), pursuant to Section 1(c) of Executive Order No.
90, series of 1986, has the power to:
f) Act as the appellate body on decisions and actions of local
and regional planning and zoning bodies of the deputized o cials of the
Commission, on matters arising from the performance of these functions.
In fact, Section 4 of E.O. No. 71 a rms the power of the HLURB to review
actions of local government units on the issuance of permits —
Sec. 4. — If in the course of evaluation of application for registration
and licensing of projects within its jurisdiction, HLURB nds that a local
government unit has overlooked or mistakenly applied a certain law, rule or
standard in issuing a development permit, it shall suspend action with a
corresponding advice to the local government concerned, so as to afford it
an opportunity to take appropriate action thereon. Such return and advice
must likewise be effected within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt by
HLURB of the application.

Moreover, Sections 18 and 19 of HSRC Administrative Order No. 20

provides: SIcCEA

Section 18. Opposition to Application. — Opposition to

application shall be considered as a complaint, the resolution of which
shall be a prerequisite to any action on the application. Complaints and
other legal processes shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission, and shall have the effect of suspending the application.

Section 19. Complaints/Opposition Filed After the Issuance of

Locational Clearance. — Temporary issuance of locational permit or land
transaction approval shall be acted upon by the O ce that issued the
same. Such complaint shall not automatically suspend the locational
clearance, temporary use permit, development permit or land transaction
approval unless an order issued by the commission to that effect.
The appropriate provisions of the Rules of Procedure governing
hearings before the Commission shall be applied in the resolution of said
complaint as well as any motion for reconsideration that may be led
thereto, provided that if the complaint is directed against the certi cate of
zoning compliance issued by the deputized zoning administrator, the same
shall be acted upon the Commissioner in Charge for adjudication.
Under the rules of the HLURB then prevailing at the time this case was
filed, a complaint to annul any permit issued by the HLURB may be led
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 before the Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA). The decision of the
HLA may be brought to the Board of Commissioners by Petition for
Certiorari and the decision of the Board of Commissioners [is]
appealable to the O ce of the President . 16 (Citations omitted; emphases
supplied.)

It does not escape the attention of the Court that in its Reply, petitioner admitted
that it had a pending complaint with the HLURB involving private respondent's the
Development Permit, the Certi cate of Registration and License to Sell Condominium
Units, aside from complaints with the Building O cial of the Municipality (now City) of
Mandaluyong and the MMDA, when it instituted its action with the trial court. As discussed
earlier, a litigant cannot go around the authority of the concerned administrative agency
and directly seek redress from the courts. Thus, when the law provides for a remedy
against a certain action of an administrative board, body, or o cer, relief to the courts can
be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. It is settled that the non-
observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of
cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal
of the complaint. 17
In view of the foregoing discussion, we nd it unnecessary to resolve the other
issues raised by the parties.
To conclude, it is our view that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
setting aside the trial court decision and dismissing said complaint.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED . The assailed
Decision dated May 16, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 5, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63439 are AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED . ScaAET

Velasco, Jr., * Bersamin, Del Castillo and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*Per Raffle dated March 28, 2012.
1.Rollo, pp. 10-20; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justices
Godardo A. Jacinto and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
2.Id. at 69-70.
3.CA rollo, 250-274.
4.Rollo, pp. 12-13.

5.CA rollo, p. 274.

6.Rollo, pp. 19-20.
7.Id. at 384-385.
8.Id. at 315-365.
9.Id. at 323-324.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 10.General Milling Corporation v. Ramos, G.R. No. 193723, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 256, 267.

11.New Sun Valley Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Sangguniang Barangay, Barangay Sun
Valley, Parañaque City, G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 438, 463, citing
Universal Robina Corporation (Corn Division) v. Laguna Lake Development Authority,
G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 506, 511.
12.G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255.
13.Id. at 265.
14.Id. at 265-266.

15.Section 4. Applicant and Oppositor. — Any person natural or juridical, applying to the Board
for issuance of any license, permit, development and/or locational clearance or the
authority to exercise any right or privilege under any law administered or enforced by the
Board, shall be called the applicant.
Any person claiming interest in any application filed with the Board, or in the subject
matter thereof, which is adverse to the applicant, shall be called the oppositor.
Section 6. When Action Deemed Commenced. — An action is deemed commenced upon
the filing of a verified complaint or opposition, in three copies, together with all the
supporting documents, and upon payment of the filing fees.

16.Rollo, pp. 16-17.

17.National Electrification Administration v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010, 614
SCRA 659, 665-666, citing Teotico v. Baer, G.R. No. 147464, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 279,
284.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com