EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. vs.
SURIO The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus, holding that the matter of
DOCTRINE: The NLRC has no jurisdiction to review cases decided by the POEA
Administrator involving disciplinary actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, the Labor Arbiter shall have jurisdiction over money claims
involving employer-employee relationship. Here, the petitioners should have appealed
the adverse decision of the POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC.
The right to appeal from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws,
which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it
is proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by
which the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved. This is why we
consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in character, and is available
only if granted by law or statute. (ito lang yung feeling kong related sa Rule 40, yung
general principle about appeals. Pinilit ko lang hanapan ng connection. 😊)
FACTS: Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by
petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and operated by petitioner
Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. While respondents were still on board the vessel, they
experienced delays in the payment of their wages and in the remittance of allotments,
and were not paid for extra work and extra overtime work. They complained about the
vessel’s inadequate equipment, and about the failure of the petitioners to heed their
repeated requests for the improvement of their working conditions. On December 19,
1993, when MT Seadance docked at the port of Brofjorden, Sweden to discharge oil,
representatives of the International Transport Federation (ITF) boarded the vessel and
found the wages of the respondents to be below the prevailing rates. The ensuing
negotiations between the ITF and the vessel owner on the increase in respondents
wages resulted in the payment by the vessel owner of wage differentials and the
immediate repatriation of respondents to the Philippines.
Subsequently, on December 23, 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-
repatriated respondents a complaint for disciplinary action based on breach of
discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases in the Workers Assistance
and Adjudication Office of the POEA. During the pendency of the administrative
complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of employer-
employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters. The
jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA
Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).
The POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Relying on the 1991 POEA
Rules, petitioners filed a partial appeal on August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still maintaining
that respondents should be administratively sanctioned for their conduct while they
were on board MT Seadance.
The NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Commission has
no jurisdiction to review cases decided by the POEA Administrator involving disciplinary
actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the Labor
Arbiter shall have jurisdiction over money claims involving employer-employee
relationship (sec. 10, R.A. 8042). Said law does not provide that appeals from decisions
arising from complaint for disciplinary action rest in the Commission.
inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in the POEA Blacklist/Watchlist is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the public respondent.
Nor has the latter appellate jurisdiction to review the findings of the POEA involving
such cases.
ISSUE: WON the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided by the
POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinary actions against private respondents.
RULING: NO, NLRC has no jurisdiction.
Petitioners adamant insistence that the NLRC should have appellate authority over the
POEA s decision in the disciplinary action because their complaint against respondents
was filed in 1993 was unwarranted. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section
10, transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims
involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did
not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character involving
such workers. The obvious intent of Republic Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA
focus its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and involving such
workers.
Petitioners position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to
the review of the POEA’s decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has
no support in jurisprudence. Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in application
unless the contrary is expressly provided, or unless the law is procedural or curative in
nature, there is no serious question about the retroactive applicability of Republic Act
No. 8042 to the appeal of the POEA s decision on petitioner’s disciplinary action against
respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its providing
or omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los Santos v.
Vda. De Mangubat, when it:
Refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues. They may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioner’s complaint by virtue of the case being then
still pending or undetermined at the time of the law’s passage, there being no vested
rights in rules of procedure. They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to
ascertain which law or rule should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint
was originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and its
implementing rules and regulations were already in effect when petitioners took their
appeal. A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment
rendered final and unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to
prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the
right to appeal has already vested and cannot be impaired. Conversely and by analogy,
an appeal that is perfected when a new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes
into effect should comply with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided
by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal
from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws, which, upon authorizing the
taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is proper to present the appeal, the
procedure to be observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to be proceeded with
and resolved. This is why we consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in
character, and is available only if granted by law or statute.
When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect
of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary
of Labor in accordance with his power of supervision and control under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.
NEYPES vs. CA; GR 141524, September 14 2005
DOCTRINE: A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. This fresh period rule shall also apply
to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of
the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice
of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days.
FACTS: Petitioners Domingo Neypes, etc. filed an action for annulment of judgment
and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development,
Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo,
namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen (respondents).
In an order dated February 12, 1998, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the
ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of
the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March
18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the RTC issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22,
1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the CA,petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22,
1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only
five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.
The CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998
order dismissing their complaint. According to the CA, the order was the final order
appealable under the Rules. It held further: Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was
correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and
in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal
requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.
Petitioner filed MR but it was denied by the CA.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the lower courts erred in ruling that the words “final order” in Sec.3, Rule 41
of the ROC refers to the (first order denying their petition) dated Feb. 12, 1998 instead
of the (last order denying their MR) dated July 1, 1998 a copy of which was received
by petitioners through counsel on July 22, 1998.
(2) WON the petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.
Ruling:
(1) YES, the lower courts erred. The order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal
is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the
rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.
(2) YES, the notice of appeal was file on time.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing
appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court
allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to
file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

The petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which the Court already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.