ADMIN AND ELECTION CASES COMPILED Page |1

DUE PROCES CASES

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ADMIN AND ELECTION

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1.
VILLA vs. LAZARO
DOCTRINE:
Administrative proceedings are not
exempt from the operation of certain basic
and fundamental procedural principles, such
as the due process requirements in
investigations and trials. An earlier
judgment on the merits by a competent
court cannot be negated by a result of
administrative proceedings.
FACTS:
Petitioner was granted a building
permit issued by the City Engineer to
construct a funeral parlour. The court
rendered a judgment in favour of the
petitioner. Following the adverse decision of
the court, respondent, instead of appealing
the judgment lodged a complaint with the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) on substantially the same ground
litigated in the action relative parlour’s
distance from hospitals. Petitioner received
a telegram from the HSRC through its
Commissioner requesting transmittal of
proof of location clearance granted by the
office. The petitioner sent a telegram
containing the required locational clearance.
Subsequently, the petitioner received a
Show Cause order requiring her to show
cause why a fine should not be imposed on
her or a cease-and-desist order issued
against her for her failure to show proof of
locational clearance. In spite of her
communication that she had already mailed
all the necessary documents, he was still
fined at the amount of P 10,000.00 and was
required to cease operations. The petitioner
filed for a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied. Her appeals to the Commission,
and subsequently to the Office of the
President, were likewise denied. It must be
stressed that neither the respondent nor the
Commission ever made known the
complaint ledged by the respondent to the
petitioner until much later, after the
Commissioner has rendered several adverse
rulings against her.
ISSUE:
Was the petitioner denied of due
process against which the defense of failure
of AV to take timely appeal will not avail?
HELD:
All of the foregoing translate to a
denial of due process against which the
defense of failure to take timely appeal will
not avail. Administrative proceedings are
not exempt from the operation of certain
basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the due process
requirements in investigations and trials.
And this administrative process is
recognized to include: (a) the right to
notice, be it actual or constructive, of the
institution of the proceedings that may
affect a person’s legal right; (b) reasonable
opportunity to appear and defend his rights,
introduce witnesses and relevant evidence
in his favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as
to give him reasonable assurance of
honesty and impartiality, and one of
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competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or
decision by that tribunal supported by
substantial evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the records
or disclosed to the parties affected. And it
being clear that some, at least, of those
essential elements did not obtain or were
not present in the proceedings complained
of, any judgment rendered, or order issued,
therein was null and void, could never
become final and could be attacked in any
appropriate proceeding. Also, an earlier
judgment on the merits by a competent
court cannot be negated by a result of
administrative proceedings. What the record
shows is that the petitioner responded
promptly to orders and communications
sent to her. At any rate, this court will not
permit the result of an administrative
proceeding riddled with serious defects
already pointed out to negate an earlier
judgment on the merits on the same matter
regularly rendered by competent court.
2.
G.R. No. L-49711 November 7,
1979
ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING
VS. CA GR NO. 49711 11/07/1979
Due Process – Administrative Due Process
FACTS:
ZCM filed an administrative case
before the Director of Mines Gozon to have
them be declared the rightful and prior
locators and possessors of 69 mining claims
in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting
their claim against the group of Martinez
and Pabiloňa. Gozon decided in favor of
Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case
before the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon
was assigned as the Sec of Agri. And
Natural Resources. He did not inhibit
himself from deciding on the appeal but he
instead affirmed his earlier decision when
he was still the director of mines.
ZCM then appealed before the CFI
of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision
of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of
a judge to review his own decision or ruling
(Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not
apply to administrative bodies; that there is
no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources from deciding an appeal from a
case which he had decided as Director of
Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification; that the ZCM did not
seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from
deciding their appeal, and that there was no
evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and
with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to
ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA.
The CA reversed Gozon’s finding
and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier
attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon.
Martinez et al appealed averring that the
factual basis found by Gozon as Director of
Mines be given due weight. The CA
reconsidered after realizing that Gozon
cannot affirm his own decision and the CA
remanded the case to the Minister of
Natural Resources. Now both parties
appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM
wants the CA’s earlier decision to be
reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded
that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA
denied both petition.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Gozon can validly
affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing
due process.
RULING:
The SC annulled the decision of
Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice.
Gozon had acted with grave abuse of
discretion. In order that the review of the
decision of a subordinate officer might not
turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer
must perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review; otherwise,
there could be no different view or there
would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a
biased view; inevitably, it would be the
same view since being human, he would not
admit that he was mistaken in his first view
of the case. The SC affirmed the
2nd decision of the CA.
3.
MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), respondents.
FACTS:
Miguel Singson was an employee of
the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In 1991, a
Japanese national alleged that Singson
extorted money from her ($200.00) by
accusing her of having excess baggage; and
that to settle the issue, she needs to pay
said amount to him. Singson was later
investigated and the investigating
committee found him guilty. PAL then
dismissed Singson from employment.
Singson then filed a case before NLRC
against PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor
Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of
Singson as he found PAL’s side insufficient
to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and his case was raffled to the 2nd
Division thereof.
The 2nd Division, however, was
composed of Commissioners Victoriano
Calaycay, Rogelio Rayala, and former Labor
Arbiter Raul Aquino – same arbiter which
decided Singson’s case. The commissioners
deliberated on the case and thereafter
reversed the decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration.
This time, only Commissioners Calaycay and
Rayala deliberated on the motion. The
motion was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Singson was denied
of due process.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that
Singson was denied due process. The SC
held that Singson was denied due process
when Aquino participated, as presiding
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commissioner of the 2nd Division of the
NLRC, in reviewing PAL’s appeal. He was
reviewing his own decision as a former
labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the
New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each
Division shall consist of one member from
the public sector who shall act as the
Presiding Commissioner and one member
each from the workers and employers
sectors, respectively. The composition of
the Division guarantees equal
representation and impartiality among its
members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a
review of three (3) commissioners who are
impartial right from the start of the process
of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be
considered impartial since he was the
arbiter who decided the case under review.
He should have inhibited himself from any
participation in this case. The infirmity of
the resolution was not cured by the fact
that the motion for reconsideration of
Singson was denied by two commissioners
and without the participation of Aquino. The
right of petitioner to an impartial review of
his appeal starts from the time he filed his
appeal. He is not only entitled to an
impartial tribunal in the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his
right is to an impartial review of three
commissioners. The denial of Singson’s right
to an impartial review of his appeal is not
an innocuous error. It negated his right to
due process.
4.
CSC vs. Lucas
Nature: Petition for review on
certiorari
FACTS:
Raquel Linatok filed w/ office of
Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint vs.
Lucas (photographer of DA) for misconduct,
allegedly because Mr. Lucas touched her
thighs down her ankle and when she kicked
him for repeating the same actions, the two
had a verbal exchanged and Mr. Lucas
shoved her to the door twice, causing her to
stumble.
When Lucas was summoned by
BOPI to answer the complaint, Lucas said
that there was no malice when he
accidentally touched Linatok’s leg when he
reached for his shoes.
*BOPI: GUILTY for SIMPLE
MISCONDUCT and recommended to be
suspended for 1m,1d. Approved by Sec of
DA. Lucas appealed to CSC.
*CSC: GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT, dismissed from service. MR
denied. appeal with CA.
*CA: set aside CSC resolution,
reinstate BOPI resolution (simple
misconduct)
based on MC 49-89, classification of
administrative offenses:
a. grave misconduct: grave offenses,
punishable by dismissal
b. simple misconduct: less grave offenses,
punishable by suspension (1st offense),
dismissal (2nd offense)
+ no Due Notice: only found out about the
modification of the charge against him
when he received notice of the resolution
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dismissing him from office (wait, the charge
was modified?)
ISSUES:
(a) whether respondent Lucas was denied
due process when the CSC found him guilty
of grave misconduct on a charge of simple
misconduct
(b) whether the act complained
constitutes grave misconduct.
RULING:
(a) YES
-as Lucas was merely charged with simple
misconduct but was convicted of grave
misconduct, he was deprived of his right to
due process.
*Due Process: informed of the charges
against him + convicted of ONLY the crime
w/ w/c he was charged
(b) No proof
“Of course, we do not in any way condone
respondent’s act. Even in jest, he had no
right to touch complainant’s leg. However,
under the circumstances, such act is not
constitutive of grave misconduct, in the
absence of proof that respondent was
maliciously motivated. We note that
respondent has been in the service for
twenty (20) years and this is his first
offense.”
Disposition: DENY PETITION BY CSC
5.
G.R. No. 109113 January 25,
1995
CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND
SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS),
petitioners, vs.
of
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO
M. VASQUEZ AND MEMBERS OF THE
PHILIPPINE LARGE DIAMETER
PRESSURE PIPE MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION (PLDPPMA),
respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Philippine Large
Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturer’s
Association (PLDPPMA) filed a complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman on the
public bidding conducted by MWSS for
projects APM-01 and APM-02 of its Angat
Water Supply Optimization Project
(AWSOP), which aims to provide 1.3 million
liters of water daily to about 3.8 million
residents in the metropolitan area.
The letter of complaint accused the MWSS
of an apparent plan even before the bidding
to favour suppliers of fiberglass pipes and
urged the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation to hold in abeyance the award
of contracts.
The Fact finding and Intelligence
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
issued an injunction directed to the Board of
Trustees of the MWSS (1) to set aside the
recommendation of its Pre-qualification,
Bids, and Awards Committee for
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Construction Services and Technical
Equipment (PBAC-CSTE) that contract no.
APM-01 be given to a contractor offering
fiberglass pipes and (2) to instead award
the contract to a complying and responsive
bidder.
Petitioner MWSS assailed the order
of the Ombudsman for lack of jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman over PLDPPMA’s complaint
and for issuing the challenged order
contrary to PD 1818 prohibiting the
issuance of restraining orders/injunctions in
cases involving government infrastructure
projects.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction over PLDPPMA’s complaint and
has the power to issue orders directing the
Board of Trustees of the MWSS to set aside
the recommendation of PBAC-CSTE and to
instead award the contract to a complying
and responsive bidder.
RULING:
No. While recognizing the
investigatory and public assistance duties of
the Ombudsman, the assailed orders were
an undue interference in the adjudicatory
responsibility of the MWSS Board of
Trustees rather than a mere directive
requiring the proper observance of and
compliance with the law. The Fact finding
and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman reveals a predisposition
against the use of fiberglass pipes, a
technical, rather than a legal matter.
As a GOCC, MWSS is charged with
the construction, maintenance, and
operation of waterwork system to insure
uninterrupted and adequate supply and
distribution of potable water. Therefore, it is
the agency that should be in the best
position to evaluate the feasibility of the
projections of the bidders and to decide
which bid is compatible with its
development plans. The exercise of this
discretion to reject a bid and to award
contracts, which is a purely technical
matter, is vested in the MWSS
entrusted with such function that even
courts or the Ombudsman cannot
unduly interfere from.
6.
GILDA G. CRUZ and ZENAIDA C.
PAITIM, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners Zenaida Paitim, Municipal
Treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan and Gilda
Cruz were charged with dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service after a fact-
finding investigation disclosed that Paitim
impersonated Gilda Cruz in the non-
professional career civil service
examinations conducted on July 30, 1989 in
Quezon City.
Petitioners denied the charges
against them, declared that they were
electing a formal investigation on the matter
and subsequently moved to dismiss on the
ground of denial of due process because the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) was the
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complainant, the prosecutor and the judge,
all at the same time. The motion was
denied.
The CSC, in a resolution dated July
1, 1998, found petitioners guilty as charged
and ordered their dismissal from the
government service. Petitioners elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review which was, however,
dismissed. Their subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether not petitioners were
denied due process.
RULING:
The Civil Service Commission is
vested with the appellate jurisdiction in all
administrative cases where the penalty
imposed is removal or dismissal from office
and where the complaint was filed by a
private citizen. This appellate jurisdiction
does not contemplate a case where the acts
complained of was committed against the
Commission itself as when the employee
committed irregularity or anomaly in the
conduct of its examinations.
Factual findings of administrative
bodies like the Civil Service Commission, if
supported by substantial evidence, are
binding on this Court. There is no denial of
administrative due process where after
being formally charged, respondents
submitted their answer and given
opportunity to defend themselves.
NOTA BENE:
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION; APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OVER ALL ADMINISTRATIVE CASES;
REFERS TO CASES FILED AGAINST
EMPLOYEES IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS; DOES NOT
REFER TO IRREGULARITIES OR
ANOMALIES CONNECTED TO
EXAMINATIONS UNDER THE DIRECT
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE
COMMISSION; CASE AT BAR. —
Petitioners maintain that the CSC did
not have original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in
accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7,
Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative
Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with
appellate jurisdiction only in all
administrative cases where the penalty
imposed is removal or dismissal from the
office and where the complaint was filed by
a private citizen against the government
employee. Petitioners' invocation of the law
is misplaced. The provision is applicable to
instances where administrative cases are
filed against erring employees in connection
with their duties and functions of the office.
This is, however, not the scenario
contemplated in the case at bar. It must be
noted that the acts complained of arose
from a cheating caused by the petitioners in
the Civil Service (Subprofessional)
examination. The examinations were under
the direct control and supervision of the
Civil Service Commission. The culprits are
government employees over whom the Civil
Service Commission undeniably has
jurisdiction. Thus, after the petitioners were
duly investigated and ascertained whether
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they were indeed guilty of dishonesty, the
penalty meted was dismissal from the
office. Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly
provides that the CSC can rightfully take
cognizance over any irregularities or
anomalies connected to the examinations.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, BINDING ON
SUPREME COURT. —
The fact that the complaint was filed
by the CSC itself does not mean that it
could not be an impartial judge. As an
administrative body, its decision was based
on substantial findings. Factual findings of
administrative bodies, being considered
experts in their field, are binding on the
Supreme Court
. 3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW;
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS; NOT
DENIED WHERE PETITIONERS WERE
GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. —
It cannot be denied that the
petitioners were formally charged after a
finding that a prima facie case for
dishonesty lies against them. They were
properly informed of the charges. They
submitted an Answer and were given the
opportunity to defend themselves.
Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that
there was a denial of due process much less
the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
CSC to take cognizance of the case. We do
not find reversible error with the decision of
the Court of Appeals in upholding the CSC
Resolution.
7.
THERON V. LACSON, Petitioner vs. THE
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION, PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY, and TEODORICO C.
TAGUINOD, in his capacity as General
Manager and Chief Executive Officer of
the Public Estates Authority,
Respondents, G.R. Nos. 165399 and
165475, May 30, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners Theron V. Lacson
(Lacson), Jaime R. Millan (Millan) and
Bernardo T. Viray (Viray) were non-
presidential appointees and career service
officials of respondent Philippine Estates
Authority (PEA). Sulficio O. Tagud (Tagud)
filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of
the Ombudsman accusing petitioners for
overpricing, by P600 million the contract for
the construction of the President Diosdado
Macapagal Boulevard.
The Ombudsman proceeded with the
investigation of both the criminal and the
administrative aspects of the case. The
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
requested the Ombudsman for authority to
conduct administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioners. The
administrative case charged them with
Dishonesty, Serious Misconduct and
Acts Inimical to the Interest of the
Public Service in violation of Section 52A
(1), (3) and (20) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases.
The basic complaint has not been
further docketed as an administrative case.
Thus, the same did not preclude the
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subsequent filing with the PAGC of an
administrative complaint against the
concerned PEA officials. A formal
complaint was filed by the Investigation
Office of PAGC charging several employees
of PEA, including petitioners.
During the preliminary conference,
petitioners raised the lack of jurisdiction
of PAGC over the complaint against
them considering that they were not
presidential appointees and there was
no allegation that they had conspired with
the presidential appointees who were
charged with them.
PAGC issued a resolution
recommending the dismissal of petitioners
with the imposition of the corresponding
accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits and disqualification from
employment in the government. The
President approved the recommendation.
Millan and Viray, together with Manuel R.
Beriña, Jr. (Beriña) filed a motion for
reconsideration. This motion was not acted
upon. Aggrieved, they filed their Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
with the CA. The CA dismissed the
consolidated petitions.
Issue #1: Whether or not it is the
Ombudsman who should conduct the
investigation on the charge of overpricing of
the Project against petitioners.
Held: The Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction with similarly authorized
agencies. Petitioners argue that because
they are not presidential appointees, it is
only the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction
over them. In this regard, the petitioners
are not correct. The Court has
repeatedly ruled that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officials is not
exclusive, but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the
government in relation to the offense
charged. Therefore, with respect to
petitioners, the Ombudsman may share its
authority to conduct an investigation
concerning administrative charges against
them with other agencies.
At any rate, this issue is already
moot and academic as the Ombudsman has
terminated its investigation of petitioners. It
appears therefrom that the Ombudsman
dismissed the administrative case
against the petitioners because the
charges had already been passed upon
by PAGC.
Issue #2: Whether or not the Court can
still review the dismissal ordered by PEA.
Held: NO. Having been dismissed by PEA,
petitioners should have appealed to
the Civil Service Commission. Granting
that PEA committed an error, whether
substantial or procedural, petitioners should
have appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), pursuant to Section 47,
Chapter 6, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292
(The Administrative Code of 1987), to wit:
(1) The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days'
salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
xxx
It is only after appealing the case to
the CSC that it can be elevated to the
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 11
CA via a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately,
petitioners chose the wrong remedy.
Instead of appealing their dismissal by the
PEA to the CSC, they chose to question it
before the CA. As the petitioners did not
appeal the decision of the PEA to
dismiss them to the CSC, it has
become final and executory and the
Court can no longer review it.
Other Issue: Whether or not there was a
violation of petitioners’ right to due process
and security of tenure.
Held: NO. There was no violation of
petitioners’ right to due process and
security of tenure. Petitioners cannot claim
that their dismissal was unattended by the
requisite due process because they were
given the opportunity to be heard in
the course of PAGC’s investigation.
The tenurial protection accorded to a civil
servant is a guaranty of both procedural
and substantive due process. Procedural
due process requires that the dismissal,
when warranted, be effected only after
notice and hearing. On the other hand,
substantive due process requires, among
others, that the dismissal be for legal cause,
which must relate to and effect the
administration of the office of which the
concerned employee is a member of and
must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the
rights and interests of the public.
Nevertheless, the right to security of tenure
is not tantamount to immunity from
dismissal.
8.
Republic v. Extelcom G.R. 147096,
January 15, 2002
FACTS:
Bayantel filed an application with the
NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience
or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and
maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone
System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter
the NTC issued directing all interested
applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS
to file their respective applications before
the Commission and prior to the issuance of
any notice of hearing by the NTC with
respect to Bayantel’s original application,
Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
admit an amended application.
The notice of hearing issued by the
NTC with respect to this amended
application was published in the Manila
Chronicle. Copies of the application as well
as the notice of hearing were mailed to all
affected parties. Subsequently, hearings
were conducted on the amended
application. But before Bayantel could
complete the presentation of its evidence,
the NTC grant of two (2) separate
Provisional which resulted in the closing out
of all available frequencies for the service
being applied for by herein applicant, and in
order that this case may not remain
pending for an indefinite period of time,
ordered ARCHIVED without prejudice to its
reinstatement if and when the requisite
frequency becomes available.
NTC issued Memorandum re-
allocating five (5) megahertz (MHz) of the
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 12
radio frequency spectrum for the expansion
of CMTS networks. Bayantel filed an Ex-
Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the
availability of new frequency bands for
CMTS operators, the NTC granted
BayanTel’s motion to revive the latter’s
application and set the case for hearings.
Extelcom filed an Opposition praying for the
dismissal of Bayantel’s application which
was denied for lack of merit. Extelcom filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition,which was
granted.
Petitioner filed MR but subsequently
denied by the CA. Hence, the NTC filed the
instant
petition. adrianantazo.wordpress.com
ISSUE:
Whether the 1993 Revised Rules of
the NTC is operative and should be applied
to the Respondent even with the absence of
Publication
Requirement? adrianantazo.wordpress.com
RULING:
No, publication must be in full or it
is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the
laws. The Administrative Order under
consideration is one of those issuances
which should be published for its effectivity,
since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation, publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non
before statutes, rules or regulations can
take effect.
The Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the NTC fall squarely within the scope of
these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the
case Tañada v. Tuvera. which is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
exceptions are interpretative regulations,
those merely internal in nature, or those so-
called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the
rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules
should be published in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation
before it can take effect. Even the 1993
Revised Rules itself mandates that said
Rules shall take effect only after their
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. In the absence of such
publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules
that governs.
9.
FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN v. HON. ANGEL C.
ALCALA, ET AL.
GR No. 150178 444 SCRA 428
26 NOVEMBER 2004
FACTS:
On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint
was filed with CHED against Florian Gaoiran
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 13
(petitioner), Head Teacher III in the High School
Department of the Angadanan Agro-Industrial
College (AAIC), a state-supervised school in
Angadanan, Isabela. Edmond M. Castillejo,
Administrative Officer II of the same school,
charged petitioner of mauling him while he was
performing his duties. Appended to the letter-
complaint were the verified criminal complaint
filed by Castillejo against petitioner and the
sworn statements of his witnesses. The criminal
complaint for assault to a person in authority
was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Angadanan-San Guillermo.
The letter-complaint was referred to the
Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Atty. Felina S.
Dasig, then OIC of the Office of the Director III,
Legal Affairs Service, conducted a fact-finding
investigation on the mauling incident. After the
fact-finding investigation was terminated, and
upon finding of a prima facie case against the
petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
Atty. Dasig issued the Formal Charge and Order
of Preventive Suspension dated July 27, 1998.
The petitioner did not submit his written
counter-affidavit or answer to the charges
against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC of
Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to restrain enforcement
of the preventive suspension order. Having
served the suspension, the case was dismissed
for being moot and academic. Petitioner then
sought reconsideration of the formal charge and
preventive suspension order, contending that
the letter-complaint was not under oath and that
he was not informed nor apprised of the
complaint against him.
Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later
appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of
CHED, issued a Resolution dated February 20,
1999, dismissing the administrative complaint
against the petitioner on the ground that the
letter-complaint was not under oath. However,
Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of CHED,
unaware of the existence of Mayo’s resolution,
issued another Resolution dated June 3, 1999,
finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Petitioner was dismissed form service.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC of
Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He alleged
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Alcala in
issuing the Resolution despite that a previous
Resolution already dismissed the administrative
complaint against him. The RTC sided with the
petitioner and declared the Resolution of Alcala
null and void.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set
aside the decision of RTC. It declared as valid
Alcala’s Resolution. Hence, this petition for
review.
The petitioner continuously argued that
the letter-complaint is inexistent because it was
not made under oath and does not contain a
certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner
cites Section 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 and Section
4(d) of Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
94-0521 (Uniform Rules of Procedure in the
Conduct of Administrative Legislation). Hence,
the formal charge and order of preventive
suspension stemming from it is likewise null and
void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the letter-complaint
should be deemed inexistent as it was not made
under oath.
RULING:
The Court is not persuaded. The
pertinent provisions governing the initiation of
administrative complaints against civil service
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 14
officials or employees are provided in Book V of
EO No. 292, Sections 46 (c) and 48 (1) and (2),
Chapter 6, Subtitle A. It must be pointed out
that, while the letter-complaint was not verified,
appended thereto were the verified criminal
complaint that Castillejo filed against the
petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of
his witnesses. These documents could very well
be considered as constituting the complaint
against the petitioner. In fact, this Court,
through the Court Administrator, investigates
and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but
also even anonymous complaints filed against
court employees or officials for violations of the
Code of Ethical Conduct. It is not totally
uncommon that a government is given wide
latitude in the scope and exercise of its
investigative powers. Administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied.
In any case, the letter-complaint of
Castillejo is not a “complaint” within the
meaning of the provisions cited. The letter-
complaint did not by itself commence the
administrative proceedings against the
petitioner. It merely triggered a fact-finding
investigation by CHED. The Court cannot uphold
the petitioner’s contention as it would result to
an absurd and restrictive interpretation of EO
No. 292. It was the formal charge and order of
preventive suspension filed by Atty. Dasig that
constituted the complaint. Atty. Dasig signed the
formal charge in her capacity as the OIC. As the
complaint was initiated by the appropriate
disciplining authority under EO No. 292, the
same need not be subscribed and sworn to.
Neither is it required that the same contain a
verification of non-forum shopping. Jurisdiction
was properly acquired over the case.
Petition is denied.
10.
G.R. NO. 155784, OCTOBER 13, 2005
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL
CAPITAL REGION, PETITIONER,
VS.RANULFO P. ALBAO, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
On September 1, 1998, the Office of the Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines
issued an original and permanent appointment
for the position of Executive Assistant IV to
respondent Ranulfo P. Albao. Respondent was
then a contractual employee at said Office. In a
letter dated September 28, 1998 addressed to
the Director of the Civil Service Commission
Field Office, Manila, the Office of the Vice
President requested the retrieval of the said
appointment paper. Instead of heeding the
request, petitioner CSC-NCR disapproved the
appointment.
On October 5, 1998, petitioner issued an
order that a prima facie case against respondent
for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official
Documents by declaring in his Personal
Datasheet (PDS) to support his appointment
that he passed the Assistant Electrical Engineer
Examination with a rating of 71.64% and
attaching thereto a Report of Rating purportedly
issued by the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC). Upon validation with the
PRC, petitioner found that his name does not
appear in their list and the examinee number as
appearing in the report belongs to one
Bienvenido Aniño, Jr.
In his answer on February 18, 1999,
respondent contended that the CSC has no
jurisdiction over the matter since his
appointment was disapproved, and he has
already resigned from government service since
the closing hours of October 30, 1998. As he is
no longer with the civil service, the Commission
has no disciplinary jurisdiction over him as a
private person.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 15
The Court of Appeals decided in favor of the
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the CSC has jurisdiction to
institute administrative proceedings over
respondent and whether the power of the CSC
to hear and decide administrative cases includes
the power to initiate and prosecute said cases.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the following are the
relevant provisions of the law which will give
light to the resolution of the issue:
1. Title A, Book V of Executive Order No.
292
i. Section 12, paragraph
11 on the Powers and Functions of the
commission states that it has the power to “hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions
and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. . . . “
ii. Section 47, on the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC provides that
“The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. . .”
(par. 1). Paragraph 2 of the same section states
that “the Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction.
iii. Section 48 provides the
procedure in administrative cases against non-
presidential appointees which may be
commenced by the Secretary or head of office of
equivalent rank, or head of local government, or
chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon
sworn, written complaint of any other person.
2. Article IX-B, Section 3 of the Constitution
also provides that The Civil Service Commission,
as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen
the merit and rewards system, integrate all
human resources development programs for all
levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public
accountability.
From the foregoing provisions of the
law, it is the Vice-President who is vested with
jurisdiction to commence disciplinary action
against respondent. However, the court ruled
that petitioner can act directly and motu proprio,
on the alleged acts of dishonesty and
falsification of official document committed by
respondent in connection with his appointment
to a permanent position in the Office of the Vice
President.
The present case partakes of an act by
petitioner to protect the integrity of the civil
service system, and does not fall under the
provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47.
It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11,
on administrative cases instituted by it directly.
This is an integral part of its duty, authority and
power to administer the civil service system and
protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its
list of eligibles those who falsified their
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 16
qualifications. This is to be distinguished from
ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a
bona fide member of the system, for acts or
omissions that constitute violations of the law or
the rules of the service.
The petition was GRANTED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals,
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
11.
Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190,
June 30, 2005
FACTS:
The report of Resident Auditor
Alexander A. Tan implicated petitioner as
persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of
P2.2 million of PNB funds. The Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ordered
petitioner to file their respective counter-
affidavits. Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G.
Canton recommended the filing of the proper
information against petitioner and was
thereafter referred for review to the Office of
the Special Prosecutor who affirmed the
resolution of Graft Investigation Officer, Deputy
Special Prosecutor recommended the approval
of the memorandum of Special Prosecution
Officer.
Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special
Prosecutor, concurred in the approval.
Ombudsman concurred thereto. Subsequently,
on 24 November 1994, an Information for
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,
as amended, was filed before the
Sandiganbayanpetitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of
Time to File Motion
for Reinvestigation.The Sandiganbayan granted
the motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner filed his
motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office
of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the
reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was
assigned to Special Prosecution Officer.
Convinced that no probable cause existed to
indict petitioner Special Prosecutor Micael
recommended the dismissal of the case. The
recommendation was approved by Deputy
Special Prosecutor Kallos and concurred in by
Special Prosecutor Tamayo. Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor,
disapproved the recommendation for the
dismissal of the case with the marginal note
“assign the case to another prosecutor to
prosecute the case aggressively.”
Special Prosecutor Micael filed a
Manifestation, to which was attached a copy of
his memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan
of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of
his recommendation to dismiss the case. On 10
February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the disapproval by
Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of
Micael. Apparently, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was not resolved on the merits
because on 27 June 2000, Special Prosecution
Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set
the Case for Arraignment alleging therein that
the prosecution did not give due course to the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that it
was the second motion which is prohibited
under the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
He added that the results of the
reinvestigation were already submitted to the
respondent court before receiving the motion for
reconsideration.Petitioner manifested before the
Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 17

Prosecutor’s failure to resolve his motion for recommendation for the filing of the information
reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution13 dated before the Sandiganbayan.
24 March 2003, the respondent court directed
the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the
Having participated in the initial
said motion.In a memorandum14 dated 09 June
preliminary investigation of the instant case and
2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer
having recommended the filing of appropriate
recommended the denial of the motion for
information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto
reconsideration filed by petitioner.
to recuse himself from participating in the
review of the same during the reinvestigation.
Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. He should have delegated the review to his
Kallos changed his previous position and Deputies.
recommended that the memorandum for the
dismissal of the motion for reconsideration be
approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M.
Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial.
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded 12.
Ombudsman Desierto when he retired, approved
Joselito Ferrer’s memorandum recommending
OMBUDSMAN vs. HEIDI M.
the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
ESTANDARTEG.R. No. 168670 April 13,
2007
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
On August 17, 1998, People’s
restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
Graftwatch referred to the Office of the
from taking further action in Criminal Case. The
Ombudsman (Visayas), for immediate
First Division of this Court issued the temporary
investigation, a complaint of the Faculty
restraining order prayed for.The instant petition
Club and Department Heads of the Ramon
was transferred to the Second Division of this
Torres National HighSchool against Heidi
Court.
Estandarte, the school principal.

ISSUE:
Where Ombudsman Desierto committed
grave abuse of discretion?
RULING:
Yes, attributes partiality on the part of
Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in
the reinvestigation of the instant case despite
the fact that he earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation of the same when he
was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the
The complaint consisted of 33
allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal
handling of school funds, irregular financial
transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority.
The Ombudsman decided to refer the
administrative aspect of the case to the DECS-
Region VI for administrative adjudication . The
complete records of the case were forwarded to
the DECS-Region VI in a letter dated November
29, 1999.
In a letter dated April 29, 2002,
the Faculty Club requested the Ombudsman
to take over the case for speedier disposition.
Ms. Lucia Jane Grecia, a member of the Faculty
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 18
Club, requested the Ombudsman to take over
the case. Consequently, on July 5, 2002, the
Ombudsman informed the DECS-Region VI that
it would not object if the case is returned to it.
On August 16, 2002, DECS-Region VI
turned over the records of the case to the
Ombudsman for adjudication, stating that "[i]t is
the impression of this Office that the
complainants intend that their case be heard by
the Office of the Ombudsman and that Office
had also manifested its willingness to reassume
jurisdiction of the same.
"On November 6, 2002, the
Ombudsman set the case for preliminary
conference. In the meantime, Estandarte filed
an Urgent Motion to Remand the case to the
DECS-Region VI on the ground that
jurisdiction is now exclusively vested on the
latter. On December 17, 2002, the Ombudsman
denied the motion ratiocinating that It was not
barred from assuming jurisdiction over the
complaint after the DECS-Region VI had
relinquished its jurisdiction over the same.
Estandarte filed a motion for reconsideration of
said Order, which was later denied by the
Ombudsman.
Issue:
WON DECS has exclusive jurisdiction over the
case.
RULING:
Undoubtedly, the DECS-Region VI first
assumed jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint against the respondent. It should be
recalled that when People’sGraftwatch
forwarded the complaint to the Ombudsman,
the latter treated it as a request for assistance
and referred it to the DECS-Region VI
and COA for appropriate action. After it had
resolved to upgrade the matter to an
administrative case, the Ombudsman
decided not to take cognizance of the same and
refer it, instead, to the DECS-Region VI.
We do not agree with petitioner’s
contention that it could assume jurisdiction over
the administrative case after the DECS-Region
VI had voluntarily relinquished its
jurisdiction over the same in favor of the
petitioner. Jurisdiction is a matter of law.
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated. When the complainants filed
their formal complaint with the DECS-
Region VI, jurisdiction was vested on the latter.
It cannot now be transferred to petitioner
upon the instance of the complainants,
even with the acquiescence of the DECS and
petitioner. Nonetheless, even if we hold that the
Ombudsman had concurrent jurisdiction
over the administrative case, we would still
sustain the DECS’ authority to decide the
administrative case. We are not unmindful of the
Court’s ruling in Emin v. DeLeon reiterated in
Alcala v. Villar that a party may be estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the DECS.
However, the rulings of the Court in
Alcala and de Leonare not applicable in this
case. From the very start, respondent
consistently protested the referral of the case
back to the Ombudsman, and demanded that
the same be remanded to the DECS.
She refused to participate in the proceedings
before the Ombudsman precisely because she
believed that jurisdiction was already vested on
the DECS-Region VI.
Hence, she filed instead a motion to
remand the case to the DECS-Region VI and
motions to postpone or suspend the
proceedings. On the other hand, what was
striking in the Emin and Alcala cases was that
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 19

the respondent there inactively participated in process because she was not furnished copies of
the proceedings before the other tribunal the affidavits of Bernardo’s witnesses.

The Ombudsman responded to the

motion by order that Bernardo furnish Ruivivar
with copies and directed the latter to file, within
13. 10 days from receipt of the Order, such pleading
which she may deem fit under the
circumstances. Ruivivar, nonetheless, did not
RACHEL BEATRIZ RUIVIVAR, petitioner,
choose to controvert the affidavits and insisted
vs.
on her previous stand that she was deprived of
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DR.
due process. Thus, the Ombudsman issued a
CONNIE BERNARDO, respondents.
ruling maintaining its findings.
G.R. No. 165012, September 16, 2008. J.
Brion:
On petition for certiorari, the petition
was dismissed on the ground that Ruivivar used
FACTS:
the wrong legal remedy and failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before the Ombudsman.
Dr. Connie Bernardo is the President of
The CA posits that the remedy should have been
the Association of Drug Testing Centers
an appeal to the CA by way of petition for
(Association) that conducts drug testing and
review, citing the case of Fabian v. Desierto.
medical examination of applicants for driver’s
license. In this capacity, Bernardo went to the
ISSUEs:
Land Transportation Office (LTO) to meet with
representatives from the Department of
(1)Whether or not Ruivivar chose the wrong
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and
remedy and (2) Whether or not Ruivivar was
some other errands. Before proceedings to the
deprived of due process
office of the LTO Commissioner, Bernardo
passed by the office of Rachel Beatriz Ruivivar to
RULING:
conduct a follow up on the status of her
company’s application for accreditation.
The Mode of Review Issue

While there, Ruivivar shouted at her in a

Petitioner contends that he ruling in
very arrogant and insulting manner, hurled
Fabian is not applicable to the Ombudsman
invectives upon her person and prevented her
rulings under the express provisions of Section
from entering the office of the LTO
27 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 and Section
Commissioner. This prompted Bernardo to file
7, Rule III of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7
an Affidavit-Complaint charging Ruivivar before
since the penalty of reprimand imposed is final
the Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct
and unappealable. The appropriate remedy,
unbecoming of a public official, abuse of
under the circumstances, is not the appellate
authority and violations of the RPC and of the
remedy provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Court but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding
of these Rules.
Ruivivar administratively liable for discourtesy in
the course of her official functions and imposed
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose
on her the penalty of reprimand. Ruivivar filed a
from the doubt created in the application of
MR arguing that she was deprived of due
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 20
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsmans
Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)
on the availability of appeal before the Supreme
Court to assail a decision or order of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian,
we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and
Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other
rules implementing the Act) insofar as it
provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases.
We held that Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its
advice and concurrence in violation of Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court which provides that a petition for
review on certiorari shall apply only to a review
of judgments or final orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other
courts authorized by law. We pointedly said:
As a consequence of our ratiocination
that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should
be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line
with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken
to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43.
We restated this doctrine in several
cases and further elaborated on the recourses
from Ombudsman actions in other cases we
have decided since then. In Lapid v. CA, we
explained that an appeal under Rule 43 to the
CA only applies to administrative cases where
the right to appeal is granted under Section 27
of R.A. No. 6770. In Lopez v. CA and Herrera v.
Bohol, we recognized that no appeal is allowed
in administrative cases where the penalty of
public censure, reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
one month salary, is imposed.
We pointed out that decisions of
administrative agencies that are declared by law
to be final and unappealable are still subject to
judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness
or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion; the
complainants legal recourse is to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, applied as rules suppletory to the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The use of this recourse should take
into account the last paragraph of Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court i.e., the petition
shall be filed in and be cognizable only by the
CA if it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or by the Rules.
In the present case, the Ombudsmans
decision and order imposing the penalty of
reprimand on the petitioner are final and
unappealable. Thus, the petitioner availed of the
correct remedy when she filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA to question the
Ombudsmans decision to reprimand her.
The Due Process Issue
The CA Decision dismissed the petition
for certiorari on the ground that the petitioner
failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies
available to her before the Ombudsman.
This ruling is legally correct as
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
requisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Other than this legal significance, however, the
ruling necessarily carries the direct and
immediate implication that the petitioner has
been granted the opportunity to be heard and
has refused to avail of this opportunity; hence,
she cannot claim denial of due process. In the
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 21
words of the CA ruling itself: Petitioner was
given the opportunity by public respondent to
rebut the affidavits submitted by private
respondent. . . and had a speedy and adequate
administrative remedy but she failed to avail
thereof for reasons only known to her.
The records show that the petitioner
duly filed a motion for reconsideration on due
process grounds (i.e., for the private
respondents failure to furnish her copies of the
affidavits of witnesses) and on questions relating
to the appreciation of the evidence on record.
The Ombudsman acted on this motion by issuing
its Order of January 17, 2003 belatedly
furnishing her with copies of the private
respondents witnesses, together with the
directive to file, within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Order, such pleading which she
may deem fit under the circumstances. Given
this opportunity to act on the belatedly-
furnished affidavits, the petitioner simply chose
to file a Manifestation where she took the
position that The order of the Ombudsman
dated 17 January 2003 supplying her with the
affidavits of the complainant does not cure the
04 November 2002 order, and on this basis
prayed that the Ombudsman’s decision be
reconsidered and the complaint dismissed
forlack of merit.
14.
Hadji-Sirad vs. CSC
G.R. no. 182267 Aug. 28, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner, who was an employee of COA
in the ARMM, was charged with
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of Service, for the anomaly found in her
examination files for the Career Service
Personal Examination held on Oct.1993,
where she passed with a 88.31% score.
The examination files (1993) were
compared with her personal data sheet
(1994). I t was found:
o That the image included in the
personal data sheet of petitioner
bears no resemblance with the
examinee petitioner. The
signatures were also vastly
different.
o Based on these facts, it was
then alleged that petitioner
allowed a different person to
take the exam for her.
A full investigation followed. The
hearings were repeatedly postponed as
per Petitioner’s request, but eventually
the hearing materialized and both sides
(the prosecutor and petitioner) were
able to present their evidence.
o CSCRO: Found petitioner guilty
of the charges and was meted
with dismissal from service.
o CSC: affirmed the findings and
the resolution of CSCRO.
Petitioner coursed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the RoC
before the CA.
o CA: dismissed the petition for
being the wrong mode of
appeal. Petitioner should have
filed a petition for review under
Rule 43, not a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner also failed to indicate
the material date of filing of her
MR to the CSC, and to include
the said MR to the petition, in
violation of Rule 43.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was wrong in the
mode of appeal.
A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 22

certiorari is not a substitute for

a lost or lapsed remedy of
RULING:
appeal. A special civil action
- The correct appeal was through Rule 43 for certiorari under Rule 65
of the RoC, not through Rule 65. of the 1997 Revised Rules of
o Section 50, Rule III of the Civil Procedure lies only
Uniform Rules on Administrative when there is no appeal or
Cases in the CSC plainly plain, speedy and adequate
indicates that a party may remedy in the ordinary
elevate the decision of the course of law. Certiorari is not
Commission before the CA by allowed when a party to a case
way of petition for review under fails to appeal a judgment or
Rule 43 of the 1997 RoC. final order despite the
o Section 1 of Rule 43 of the RoC availability of that remedy.
also provide that final orders or
resolutions of the CSC are  The remedies of appeal
appealable to the CA through a and certiorari are
petition for review mutually exclusive
“SECTION 1. and not alternative
Scope. - This or successive.
Rule shall apply  In this case, petitioner
to appeals from utterly failed to provide
judgments or any justification for her
final orders of resort to a special civil
the Court of Tax action for certiorari,
Appeals and when the remedy of
from awards, appeal by petition for
judgments, final review was clearly
orders or available.
o In addition to being the wrong
resolutions of or
authorized by mode of appeal, petitioner failed
any quasi- to attach the requirements for
judicial agency petitions under Rule 65. It failed
in the exercise to indicate the date when the
of quasi judicial denial of the MR was received,
functions. as well as a certified true copy
Among these or duplicate original of the MR.
agencies are Accordingly, the CA correctly
the Civil dismissed the petition.
o
Service
- Even based on merits, petitioner’s stand
Commission,
is untenable.
Central Board of
Assessment o First, petitioner was granted due
Appeals, x x x.” process. In administrative
proceedings, procedural due
o As we have held in numerous
process has been recognized to
cases, a special civil action for
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 23

include the following: (1) the

right to actual or constructive
notice of the institution of
proceedings, which may affect a
respondent's legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance
of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one's favor, and
to defend one's rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted
as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by
said tribunal which is supported
by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained
in the records or made known
to the parties affected.
 Petitioner prayed for
and was granted the
postponement of the
hearings several times,
and she was also able
to appeal her case
numerous times.
o Second, there is substantial
evidence to support the findings
and conclusion of CSCRO and
CSC. Perusal of the pictures and
signatures of the documents
(the examination documents as
well as others) clearly show that
the one who took the exam on
October 1993 is not petitioner.

Petition Denied; Resolution Affirmed.

A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 24

SECOND BATCH OF CASES

DIGEST POOL
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 25
1.
VIRGINIA MALINAO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUISITO REYES, in his capacity
as Governor of the Province of
Marinduque, SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF
MARINDUQUE and
WILFREDO RED, in his capacity as
Mayor of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque, respondents.
FACTS :
Petitioner Virginia Malinao is Human
Resource Manager III of Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque. Respondent Mayor filed a case
against her in the Office of the Ombudsman
for gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and
incompetence. On February 24,
1994 petitioner filed an administrative case
against respondent Mayor in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque,
charging him with abuse of authority and
denial of due process. The case was taken
up in executive session of the Sanggunian.
By the vote of 5 to 3 of its members, found
respondent Mayor guilty of the charge and
imposed on him the penalty of one-month
suspension. What petitioner claims to be
the Sept 5, 1994 Decision of the
Sanguniang Panlalawigan bore the
signature of only one member (Rodrigo V.
Sotto) who signed the decision as presiding
chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee,
Sanguninang Panlalawigan. Petitioner claims
that at its session on Aug 12, 1994, the
Sanguninan by the vote of 5 members
against 3 found respondent Mayor guilty of
having removed the petitioner without due
process and that this fact is shown in the
minutes of the session in the Sanggunian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his contentions are
correct?
RULING:
NO. Contrary to petitioners claim,
what the minutes only show is that on Aug.
12, 1994 the Sangunian took a vote on the
administrative case of respondent Mayor
and not that it then rendered a decision as
required by 66(a) of the Local Government
Code (RA No. 7160) which provides as
follows:
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 26
66. Form and Notice of Decision. - (a) The
investigation of the case shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from the start
thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the
end of the investigation, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned shall
render a decision in writing stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the reasons for
such decision. Copies of said decision shall
immediately be furnished the respondent
and all interested parties.
In order to render a decision in
administrative cases involving elective local
officials, the decision of the Sangunian must
thus be in writing stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the reasons for such
decision. What the Sangunian, did on Aug
12, 1994 was not to render a decision.
Neither may the so called Decisions
prepared by the Sangunian Member Rodrigo
V. Sotto on Sept 5, 1994 be regarded as the
decision of the Sangunian for lack of
Signatures of the requisite majority./ like
the procedure in the SC, the voting
following the deliberation of the members of
the Sangunian did not necessarily constitute
their decision unless this was embodied in
an opinion prepared by one of them and
concurred in by others, in the same way
that the voting following the deliberation on
a case in the SC becomes its decision only
after the opinion prepared by a Justice is
concurred in by others composing the
majority. Until they have signed the opinion
and the decision is promulgated, the
justices are free to change their votes.
2.
HON. ARMAND FABELLA vs THE COURT
OF APPEALSCitation : G.R. No. 110379
November 28,
1997Ponente : PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS
Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work
order to all public schoolteachers who had
participated in walk-outs and strikes on
various dates during the period of
September to October 1990. The mass
action had been staged to demand payment
of 13th month pay, allowances and passage
of debt cap bill in Congress. On October
1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative
cases against respondents, who are
teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The
charge sheets required respondents to
explain in writing why they should not be
punished for having taken part in the mass
action in violation of civil service laws.
Administrative hearings started on
December 1990. Respondents, through
counsel assailed the legality of
the proceedings on the following due
process grounds: first, they were not given
copies of the guidelines adopted by the
committee for the investigation and denied
access to evidence; second, the
investigation placed the burden of proof on
respondents to prove their innocence; third,
that the investigating body was illegally
constituted, their composition and
appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending
the action assailing the validity of the
administrative proceedings, the
investigating committee rendered a decision
finding the respondents guilty and ordered
their immediate dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents
were denied due process?
RULING:
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 27
YES. In administrative proceedings, due
process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution
ofproceedings which may affect a embodied in the basic requirement of notice
respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with
the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and
to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested
with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported
by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected. The legislature enacted
a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, which
specifically
covers administrative proceedings involving
public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law
expressly provides that the committee to
hear public
schoolteachers’administrative cases should
be composed of the school superintendent
of the division as chairman, a representative
of the local or any existing provincial or
national teachers’ organization and a
supervisor of the division. In the present
case, the various committees formed by
DECS to hear the administrativecharges
against private respondents did not include
“a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national
teacher’s organization” as required by
Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these
committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus,
all proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any
basis for the suspension or dismissal of
private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers’ organization in
these committees was indispensable to
ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right to be
heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the
essence of procedural due process is
and a real opportunity to be heard. Other
minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of
RA 4670 was complied with because the
respondents are members of Quezon City
Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere
membership of said teachers in their
respective teachers’ organizations does not
ipso facto make them authorized
representatives of such organizations as
contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Under this section, the teachers’
organization possesses the right to indicate
its choice of representative to be included
by the DECS in the investigating committee.
Such right to designate cannot be usurped
by the secretary of education or the director
of public schools or their underlings. In the
instant case, there is no dispute that none
of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was
ever designated or authorized by a teachers’
organization as its representative in said
committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed
by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent
general law cannot repeal a previous
specific law, unless there is an express
stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to
harmonize them.
3.
Padua v. Ranada [G.R. No. 141949.
October 14, 2002]
FACTS:
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued
Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing
provisional toll rate adjustments on Metro
Manila Skyway. It was thereafter published
in newspapers of general circulation for
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 28
three (3) consecutive weeks. However,
there was no hearing conducted for the
matter. Deliberations were not even
attended by Board Members except TRB
Executive Director Jaime Dumlao, Jr.
Petitioners assail the validity of the
resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 2001-89 is
invalid on the ground that:
(a) it was in violation of due process;
(b) the provisional toll rate adjustments are
exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and
unconscionable; and,
(c) TRB Executive Director Jaime Dumlao,
Jr. alone authorized the provisional
increase.
RULING:
“(a) No. TRB clearly complied with the
publication requirements. Also, the TRB may
grant and issue ex-parte to any
petitioner, without need of notice,
publication or hearing, provisional authority
to collect, pending hearing and decision on
the merits of the petition, the increase in
rates prayed for or such lesser amount as
the TRB may in its discretion provisionally
grant.
“(b) No. This is obviously a question of fact
requiring knowledge of the formula used
and the factors considered in determining
the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is
within the province of the TRB. The SC
takes cognizance of the wealth of
jurisprudence on the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. In this era of
clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical
matters or intricate questions of facts,
subject to judicial review in case of grave
abuse of discretion, is
indispensable. Between the power lodged
in an administrative body and a court, the
unmistakable trend is to refer it to the
former.”
“(c) No. It is not true that it was TRB
Executive Director Dumlao, Jr. alone who
issued Resolution No. 2001-89. The
Resolution itself contains the signature of
the four TRB Directors. Petitioner Padua
would argue that while these Directors
signed the Resolution, none of them
personally attended the hearing. This
argument is misplaced. Under our
jurisprudence, an administrative agency
may employ other persons, such as a
hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to
receive evidence, conduct hearing and
make reports, on the basis of which the
agency shall render its decision. Such a
procedure is a practical necessity.
Corollarily, in a catena of cases, the
Supreme Court laid down the cardinal
requirements of due process in
administrative proceedings, one of which is
that “the tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate.” Thus, it
is logical to say that this mandate was
rendered precisely to ensure that in cases
where the hearing or reception of evidence
is assigned to a subordinate, the body or
agency shall not merely rely on his
recommendation but instead shall
personally weigh and assess the evidence
which the said subordinate has gathered.”
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 29
4.
[ G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002 ]
MARTIN S. EMIN, PETITIONER, VS.
CHAIRMAN CORAZON ALMA G. DE
LEON, COMMISSIONERS THELMA P.
GAMINDE AND RAMON P. ERENETA,
JR., OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Appointment papers for a change of
status from provisional to permanent under
Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were
submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-
Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato
with attached photocopies of certificates of
eligibility of the teachers. Although the
certificates seemed authentic, the
signatures were forgeries. Upon verification,
it was found out that said applications were
disapproved and the certificates although
authentic but were never issued to anyone.
Two separate investigations were conducted
(1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates were
issued/released from the Office, and (2) on
how the teachers got said certificates. The
teachers concerned were asked to report to
the Office and bring the original copies of
their certificates of eligibility. The teachers
gave their own sworn statements pointing
the petitioner as the person who gave them
the R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility they
had attached to their appointments for a
fee. Upon finding a prima facie case,
petitioner was formally charged with
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
The petitioner denied the accusations and
filed for motion to dismiss but was
subsequently denied. Six teachers cited in
the charge sheet were presented as
witnesses for prosecution including two
other holders of fake certificates of
eligibility. On June 29, 1994, Director
Buenaflor submitted a report[5] to the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
where CSC found sufficient evidence to
warrant the conviction of petitioner. The
CSC resolution decreed petitioner guilty of
Grave Miscounduct with penalty of dismissal
from service and its accessory penalties.
Petitioner filed again for Motion of
Reconsideration but the same was denied.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, but it was subsequently dismissed.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the CSC has original
jurisdiction over the present case; and
(2) whether or not petitioner was accorded
due process.
RULING:
Petitioner is the Non-Formal
Education Supervisor of the DECS, in
Kidapawan, Cotabato, in-charge of the out-
of-school programs, and this position is
covered by the definition of teacher as
provided by R.A. 4670. The petitioner’s
contention that since he is under R.A. 4670,
the Investigating Committee should have
investigated his case in conformity with the
DECS Rules of Procedure, is correct.
However, at this late hour, the proceedings
conducted by the public respondent CSC
can no longer be nullified on procedural
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 30
grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by
laches, petitioner is now barred from
impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his
case. The Civil Service Commission has
afforded the petitioner ample time to
defend and opportunity to be heard in view
of the case filed against him and during this
time no objections were raised. Petitioner
voluntarily and willfully participated in the
proceedings. As held previously,
participation by parties in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection
thereto bars them from raising any
jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse
decision is rendered against them.[22] In
the case at bar, petitioner raised the issue
of lack of jurisdiction for the first time in his
amended petition for review[23] before the
CA.
Petitioner’s contention that he was denied
due process for he was not allowed for
cross examination was equally
unmeritorious. It is well to remember that in
administrative proceedings, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied and administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense. Neither is there
merit in petitioner’s assertion that he was
denied the right to due process when the
CSC Regional Office, according to him,
acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge and
executioner. This kind of procedure is not
unusual in an administrative proceeding. It
is has to be noted however, that ultimately
the Civil Service Chairman was the one who
promulgated the decision.
Lastly, the petitioner contention of
admitting the affidavit of Teodorico Cruz as
newly discovered evidence cannot be
accepted by court. Newly discovered
evidence can only be accepted if the
petitioner exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate such evidence before or
during trial but had nonetheless failed to
secure it. It appears that the affidavit was
merely an afterthought, a last ditch effort to
clear petitioner’s name.
Hence instant petition is hereby denied and
decision of CA is affirmed.
5.
MELECIO ALCALA, PERLA ALCALA,
ROQUE BORINAGA, DIOSDADA
BORINAGA, HELEN LENDIO, andMARY
BABETH MAGNO,
petitioners,
vs
JOVENCIO VILLAR,
respondent
FACTS:
Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the
School Principal of Lanao National High
School, Pilar, Cebu City. InFebruary 1998,
Rolando Torceno and petitioners, Melecio
Alcala, Perla Alcala, Roque Borinaga, Helen
Lendio, Emma Labaniego and Mary Babeth
Mano, all teachers of Lanao National High
School, as well as Asterio Villarante and
petitioner Diosdada Borinaga, teachers of
Dapdap National High School, Pilar, Dapdap,
Cebu City (herein collectively referred to as
complainants), filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative complaint
against respondent for dishonesty.
Complainants alleged that on August 18-22,
1997, they attended a mass
training/seminar at the Consolacion National
High School, Consolacion, Cebu.
Respondent asked them to submit their
respective Certificates of Appearance for
the preparation of the vouchers for the
refund of their expenses during the said
training/seminar. Thereafter, they received
from respondent the amounts as refund.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 31
Upon verification with the Department of
Education Culture and Sports (DECS)
Division Office, complainants discovered
that each of them were issued checks in the
amount of P312.00 as reimbursement, and
that respondent received the same by
forging their signature. Complainants
further alleged that sometime in November
1997, Melecio Alcala, Diosdada Borinaga,
Helen Lendio, and Rolando Torceno
received from respondent P1,500.00 each
representing Loyalty Benefits. They learned,
however, from the DECS Division Office that
they were entitled to receiveP2,000.00
each. Respondent, on the other hand,
claimed that he was in fact authorized by
the complainants to claim and en cash their
checks at the E and E Lending Investors
where most of them have existing loans. He
contended that their school is located in the
rural area where no banks are operating,
such that it has been the practice of
teachers to authorize the principal to claim,
receive and en cash the checks in their
behalf. He explained that complainants did
not receive the entire amount of P312.00
because they authorized the E and E
Lending Investors to deduct certain
amounts from their checks as payment for
their respective loans. As for the Loyalty
Benefits, respondent alleged that
complainants received the entire amount
due them and that he deducted nothing
there from. He asserted that the real reason
behind he filing of the complaint was to
force him to resign so that one of the
complainants could apply for his post. On
June 22, 1999, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution finding
respondent guilty of dishonesty and
dismissing him from service. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by respondent;
however, the same was denied on October
13,1999.On appeal, the Court of Appeals
nullified and set aside the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman on the ground
that the latter was without jurisdiction over
administrative complaints against public
school teachers. It ruled that the governing
law is Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise
known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, and not Republic Act No. 6770,
the Ombudsman Act of 1989.Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were accorded
opportunity to be heard.
RULING:
Yes. Here what is crucial, in our view, is
that the Civil Service Commission had
afforded petitioner sufficient opportunity to
be heard and defend himself against
charges of participation in faking civil
service eligibilities of certain teachers for a
fee. Not only did he answer the charges
before the CSC Regional Office but he
participated in the hearings of the charges
against him to the extent that we are left
with no doubt that his participation in its
proceedings was willful and voluntary. As
held previously, participation by parties in
the administrative proceedings without
raising any objection thereto bars them
from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after
an adverse decision is rendered against
them. In the case at bar, petitioner raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first
time in his amended petition for review
before the CA. He did not raise this matter
in his Motion to Dismiss filed before the CSC
Regional Office. Notably, in his Counter-
Affidavit, he himself invoked the
jurisdiction of the Commission by stating
that he was open to further investigation by
the CSC to bring light to the matter and by
further praying for any remedy or judgment
which under the premises are just and
equitable. It is an undesirable practice of a
party participating in the proceedings,
submitting his case for decision, and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable,
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 32
but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse. In the case at bar, respondent was
amply afforded due process in an
administrative proceeding, the essence of
which is an opportunity to explain ones side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Not only
did respondent file a counter-affidavit and
a motion for reconsideration, he also
participated in the hearings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman and was
given the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. Verily, participation
in the administrative proceedings without
raising any objection thereto amounts to a
waiver of jurisdictional infirmities.
6.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
vs.
PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE
L. PEREZ, and IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 157684
April 27, 2005
FACTS:
Respondents are former employees
of the DOH-NCR, holding various positions.
In 1996 some concerned DOH-NCR
employees filed a complaint before the DOH
Resident Ombudsman against Majarais,
Cabrera, and the respondents, arising out of
an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-
NCR of certain medicines worth ₱330k.
Resident Ombudsman submitted an
investigation report to the Secretary of
Health recommending the filing of a formal
administrative charge of Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct against [respondents]
and their co-respondents. PCAGC took over
the investigation from the DOH and issued a
penalty of dismissal from the government
service be imposed thereon.
Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the
Secretary of Health. Respondents appealed
to the CSC where the same was denied by
the CSC, except for Cabrera who was
exonerated of the administrative charges
against him.
Upon appeal to the CA, the CA nonetheless
used the same legal bases for annulling the
CSC’s Resolution against respondents. It
held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over
administrative complaints pertained only to
presidential appointees. Thus, the
Commission had no power to investigate
the charges against respondents. Moreover,
in simply and completely relying on the
PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of health
failed to comply with administrative due
process. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PCAGC has
jurisdiction to investigate anomalous
transactions involving the respondents. YES.
RULING:
EO No. 151 granted the PCAGC the
jurisdiction to investigate administrative
complaints against presidential appointees
allegedly involved in graft and corruption.
From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is
evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC
to investigate charges against presidential,
not non-presidential, appointees. In its
Preamble, specifically in its "Whereas"
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 33
clauses, the EO "specifically tasked [the
PCAGC] to x x x investigate presidential
appointees charged with graft and
corruption x x x." More pointedly, Section 3
states that the "Commission shall have
jurisdiction over all administrative
complaints involving graft and corruption
filed in any form or manner against
presidential appointees x x x."
"Section 3. Jurisdiction. – The Commission
shall have jurisdiction over all administrative
complaints involving graft and corruption
filed in any form or manner
against presidential appointees,
including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations." (emphasis
supplied)
"Section 4. Powers, Functions and Duties. –
The Commission shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
"(a) Investigation – The Commission shall
have the power to investigate administrative
complaints against presidential
appointees in the executive department of
the government, including those in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, charged with graft and
corruption. x x x x”
On the basis of the foregoing verba
legis approach, respondents claim that the
PCAGC did not have jurisdiction over them,
because they were not presidential
appointees.The Court notes, however, that
respondents were not investigated pursuant
to EO 151. The investigation was authorized
under Administrative Order No. 298 dated
October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad
Hoc Committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against Director
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G.
Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q.
Agustin and Enrique L. Perez. The Chief
Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298
as mandate, the legality of the investigation
is sustained.
As to the validity of the Secretary’s
decision, it is patently void for want of due
process. The Administrative Code of 1987
vests department secretaries with the
authority to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and
employees under the former’s jurisdiction.
Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary
authority over respondents. As a matter of
administrative procedure, a department
secretary may utilize other officials to
investigate and report the facts from which
a decision may be based. In the present
case, the secretary effectively delegated the
power to investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad
Hoc Investigating Committee created under
AO 298 had the power to impose any
administrative sanctions directly. Their
authority was limited to conducting
investigations and preparing their findings
and recommendations. The power to
impose sanctions belonged to the
disciplining authority, who had to observe
due process prior to imposing penalties.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 34
In this case, the CA correctly ruled that
administrative due process had not been
observed in the present factual milieu. The
secretary simply and blindly relied on the
dispositive portion of the Commission’s
Resolution. The actual exercise of the
disciplining authority’s prerogative requires
a prior independent consideration of the law
and the facts. Failure to comply with this
requirement results in an invalid decision.
The disciplining authority should not merely
and solely rely on an investigator’s
recommendation, but must personally weigh
and assess the evidence gathered.
7.
MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR.
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
EVANGELINE URSAL, HON. JOSE E.
LINA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), and HON.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., in his
capacity as City Mayor of Quezon City,
G.R. No. 153155
September 30, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Laxina, Sr. (Barangay
Chairman) In 1998, Ursal (Barangay Clerk)
filed with the NBI a complaint for attempted
rape against petitioner. Petitioner was
subsequently charged with sexual
harassment before the RTC. Ursal brought
before the DILG a complaint-affidavit
charging petitioner with grave misconduct
for the alleged attempted rape. However,
the DILG referred the complaint to the
Quezon City Council for appropriate action.
In 2000, Ursal filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a similar complaint-affidavit
charging petitioner with grave misconduct.
Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit and
attached thereto the affidavits of two
witnesses. The Administrative Adjudication
Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman exonerated petitioner from the
charge, dismissing the complaint for lack of
substantial evidence. However, upon
review, and with the approval of the
Ombudsman, petitioner was found guilty of
grave misconduct and meted the penalty of
dismissal, with forfeiture of material
benefits.
Petitioner sought the review of the
Ombudsman’s Memorandum Order before
the CA, arguing that: (i) the Office of the
Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction over
the administrative complaint; (ii) Ursal’s
filing of the same administrative case before
the Office of the Ombudsman and the City
Council through the DILG warranted the
dismissal of both cases; and (iii) petitioner
was denied due process in the proceedings
before the Ombudsman.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner claims that the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction over the case since the City
Council had earlier acquired jurisdiction over
the matter.
ISSUES:
1) WON the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over the case.
2) WON the petitioner wasdeprived
of his right to administrative due process.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 35
RULING:
1) No. The Court is not convinced.
The mandate of the Ombudsman to
investigate complaints against erring public
officials, derived from both the Constitution
and the law gives it jurisdiction over the
complaint against petitioner. The
Constitution has named the Ombudsman
and his Deputies as the protectors of the
people who shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the
government. To fulfill this mandate, R.A.
No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
was enacted, giving the Ombudsman or his
Deputies jurisdiction over complaints on all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance against officers or employees of
the government, or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality therefor, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations, and the disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials,
except those who may be removed only by
impeachment or over members of Congress
and the Judiciar. On the other hand, under
R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government
Code, the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan has disciplinary
authority over any elective barangay official.
Without a doubt, the Office of the
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Quezon City Council over
administrative cases against elective officials
such as petitioner.
2) Another submission made by petitioner is
that he was deprived of his right to
administrative due process when he was
dismissed from service without substantial
evidence and without consideration of the
evidence he proffered.
The Court is not impressed.
Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to
be heard. He was required to answer the
formal charge and given a chance to
present evidence in his behalf. He was not
denied due process. More importantly, the
decision of the Ombudsman is well
supported by substantial evidence.
A finding of guilt in an administrative case
would have to be sustained for as long as it
is supported by substantial evidence that
respondent has committed the acts stated
in the complaint or formal charge.
Substantial evidence has been defined as
such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. This is different from the degree
of proof required in criminal proceedings,
which calls for a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner’s reliance on
the rules on prosecution for the crime of
rape is therefore misplaced. What is at issue
in the case before the Ombudsman is
whether his acts constitute grave
misconduct, and not whether he is guilty of
the crime of attempted rape. Also,there is
no basis for believing petitioner’s claim that
the Ombudsman had refused to consider his
evidence.
8.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 36

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN relation to the collection of unauthorized

vs. fees, non-remittance of authorized fees and
FLORITA A. MASING and JOCELYN A. failure to account for public funds. Tayactac
TAYACTAC is guilty of simple neglect of duty, and is
hereby suspended for a period of six (6)
G.R. No. 165416
months.
January 22, 2008
Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the
FACTS: respondents and ordered their immediate
reinstatement.
Respondent Masing was the former
Principal of the Davao City Integrated ISSUE:
Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao
City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was Whether or not the Ombudsman may
an office clerk in the same school. In 1997, directly discipline public school teachers and
respondents were administratively charged employees.
before the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao for allegedly collecting
unauthorized fees, failing to remit
authorized fees, and to account for public RULING:
funds.The complainants were parents of
children studying at the DCISS, namely,
Cansino, Mojica, Mojica, and Mamparo.
YES. Under Section 13(3) of Article
In 1998, respondents filed a motion to XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:
dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman
Section 13. The Office of the
has no jurisdiction over them. Respondents
Ombudsman shall have the
alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over
following powers, functions,
them which shall exercise the same through
and duties:
a committee to be constituted under Section
9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise
(3) Direct the officer
known as the "The Magna Carta for Public
concerned to take
School Teachers." The motion was denied,
appropriate action against a
as well as respondents’ motion for
public official or employee at
reconsideration.
fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension,
In 2000, the Ombudsman for Mindanao
demotion, fine, censure, or
rendered a joint decision finding respondent
prosecution, and ensure
Masing is guilty of gross misconduct,
compliance therewith.
neglect of duty, and violation of RA 6713
and Tayactac guilty of gross misconduct,
We reiterated this ruling in Office of the
neglect of duty, and violation of RA 6713 in
Ombudsman v. Laja, where we
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 37
emphasized that "the Ombudsman’s order
to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure,
or prosecute an officer or employee is not
merely advisory or recommendatory but
is actually mandatory." Implementation
of the order imposing the penalty is,
however, to be coursed through the proper
officer. Recently, in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we
also held—
While Section 15(3) of RA 6770
states that the Ombudsman has the
power to "recommend x x x
removal, suspension, demotion x x
x" of government officials and
employees, the same Section 15(3)
also states that the Ombudsman in
the alternative may "enforce its
disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of RA
6770.
9.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
vs.
VICTORIO N. MEDRANO
G.R. No.177580
October 17, 2008
FACTS:
Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher
filed before the petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman a sworn letter-complaint
against her superior herein-respondent
Victorio N. Medrano for violation of Republic
Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act
of 1995) (criminal case), and grave
misconduct (administrative case). While the
administrative case was pending
investigation, Dumalaog filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension, and
was granted by the Ombudsman ordering
the preventive suspension of Medrano for
six months without pay. Medrano moved for
lifting the suspension but was denied. When
Medrano filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, Ombudsman lifted the
preventive suspension order.
The Ombudsman rendered its decision with
the administrative case and found Medrano
guilty of grave misconduct. Medrano moved
for reconsideration of the decision and
assailed not only the factual findings
and conclusions of the Ombudsman, but for
the first time, challenged its jurisdiction over
the case. With regard to the criminal case,
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
Medrano and a criminal case was filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Biñan, Laguna against him. By joint
order, the Ombudsman affirmed its
Resolution in the criminal case but modified
its decision in the administrative case.
Medrano filed a Petition for Review with
the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing
Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction over the
administrative case. The CA annulled
Ombudsman‘s decision in the administrative
case and dismissed the complaint on the
sole ground that Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over it. The Ombudsman filed a
motion for reconsideration of the CA‘s
decision but was denied.
ISSUE:
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 38
Whether or not Office of the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint against Medrano
even if an affidavit of desistance has
already been filed by Dumalaog.
RULING:
The flaw in Medrano‘s argument that
the execution of Dumalaog‘s Affidavit of
Desistance and the dismissal of the criminal
case must result in the dismissal of the
administrative case is that it ignores the
whale of a difference between those two
remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and
Rodel A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and
Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the
Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman), the Court
stressed the distinct and independent
character of the remedies available to an
offended party against any impropriety or
wrongdoing committed by a public officer. It
provides the three remedies available: 1.)
civil, 2.) criminal, and 3.) administrative.
These remedies may be invoked separately,
alternately, simultaneously or successively.
Sometimes, the same offense may be the
subject of all three kinds of remedies.
At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or
recantation) is, as a rule, viewed with
suspicion and reservation because it can
easily be secured from a poor and ignorant
witness, usually through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. And there is always
the probability that it would later be
repudiated, and criminal prosecution would
thus be interminable. Hence, such
desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground
for the dismissal of an action once it has
been instituted in court.
With regard to whether Ombudsman has
jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint, Section 5, Article XI of the
Constitution “created the independent Office
of the Ombudsman.” Hailed as the
“protectors of the people,” the Ombudsman
and his Deputies are bestowed with
overreaching authority, powers, functions,
and duties to act on complaints against
public officials and employees, as provided
in Sections 12 and 13.
When an administrative charge is initiated
against a public school teacher, however,
Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers specifically provides that
the same shall be heard initially by an
investigating committee composed of the
school superintendent of the division, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial
or national teachers‘organization, and a
supervisor of the division. Thus, Section 23
of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directsthat
the petitioner “may refer certain complaints
to the proper disciplinary authority for the
institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or
employees.”
In light of this, the Court holds that the
administrative disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman over a public school teacher is
not an exclusive power but
is concurrent with the proper committee of
the DepEd.
While Ombudsman should have desisted
from hearing the administrative complaint
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 39
against Medrano and referred it to the
proper DepEd committee, given that it had
already concluded the proceedings and had
rendered a decision thereon, Medrano is
now barred from assailing Ombudsman‘s
acts under the principle of estoppel. He had
actively participated in the administrative
proceedings before the Ombudsman. In his
Counter-Affidavit, he asked Ombudsman
for affirmative relief by seeking the
dismissal of the administrative complaint
allegedly for being baseless. Verily, Medrano
cannot be permitted to challenge
Ombudsman‘s acts belatedly.
10.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO DELIJERO, JR., Respondent
G.R. No. 172635 October 20,
2010
FACTS:
Respondent Pedro Delijero, Jr., was a public
school teacher at the Burauen
Comprehensive National High School,
Burauen, Leyte and was administratively
charged for Grave Misconduct.
The complainant, Cleofas P. dela Cruz, was
the mother of the alleged victim Myra dela
Cruz (Myra). At the time of the incident,
Myra was only 12 years old and a first year
high school student at the Burauen
Comprehensive National High School.
Respondent, on the other hand, was Myra's
52-year-old Mathematics teacher.
Sometime in May 2003, complainant learned
from her cousin that respondent was
courting her daughter Myra. Complainant
then immediately confronted Myra, who
admitted having received from respondent
several handwritten love letters, a
Valentine's card and Two Hundred Pesos as
allowance.
Off-tangentially, this case involved a public
school teacher charged with serious
misconduct for allegedly kissing his 12-year
old student.
The CA ruled that petitioner had no
jurisdiction to investigate the complaint filed
before it as Republic Act No. 4670 (RA
4670), the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, specifically covers and governs
administrative proceedings involving public
school teachers.
ISSUE:
WON Office of Ombudsman has the
authority to determine the administrative
liability of an erring public school teacher.
RULING:
The Office of Ombudsman has the authority
to determine the administrative liability of
an erring public official or employee, and to
direct and compel the head of the
concerned officer or agency to implement
the penalty imposed.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano,
this Court ruled that the administrative
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman
over a public school teacher is not an
exclusive power but is concurrent with the
proper committee of the DECS, to wit:
"In resolving the second issue
whether petitioner has jurisdiction over the
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 40

administrative complaint against respondent vs.

it is necessary to examine the source,
DELFIN C. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF
nature and extent of the power and
LANDS and SECRETARY OF
authority of the Ombudsman vis--vis the
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
provisions of the Magna Carta for Public
RESOURCES, respondents-appellees.
School Teachers."
G.R. No. L-16537 June
Based on the foregoing, while petitioner has
29, 1962
concurrent administrative disciplinary
authority with the DECS over public school
teachers, Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act
FACTS:
of 1989 provides that the Ombudsman may
refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary Request for reconsideration having been
authority. Under the circumstances denied by the Director of Lands on 25
obtaining herein, it would have been more January 1957, Francisco C. Calo, petitioner-
prudent for petitioner to have referred the appellant brought to the Secretary of
complaint to the DECS given that it would Agriculture and Natural Resources the case.
have been in a better position to serve the
Francisco C. Calo asked the Secretary of
interest of justice considering the nature of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to
the controversy. Respondent is a public
reconsider it but the latter denied a
school teacher and is covered by RA 4670,
reconsideration thereof. Hence, on 1 August
therefore, the proceedings before the DECS
1958 Francisco C. Calo appealed to the
would have been the more appropriate
President of the Philippines but on 8 August
venue to resolve the dispute.
1958 he withdrew it before the President of
It is obvious that R.A. 6770, taken together the Philippines could act thereon
with the constitutional provisions creating
CA dismissed the case based on lack of
an independent OMB, reveals the manifest
jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the
intent of the lawmakers to bestow upon the
administrative remedies available to the
anti-graft body full administrative
petitioner in the ordinary course of law.
disciplinary power over all elective and
appointive public officials and employees ISSUE:
and conspiring private persons. The only
exceptions are impeachable officials, WON The case be dismissed based on the
Members of Congress and the Judiciary. withdrawal of appeal to the President.

RULING:

Failure to state a cause of action, for lack of

jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the
11. administrative remedies available to the
petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the
FRANCISCO C. CALO, Petitioner-
Court resolves to dismiss as it hereby
Appellant,
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 41

dismisses the herein petition with costs

against petitioner.
12.
The petitioner appealed, but as only a
question of law is raised, the Court of HILDA RALLA ALMINE , petitioner
Appeals certified the appeal to this Court.
vs.
At any rate, the appellant's contention that,
as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
Resources is the alter ego of the President
and his acts or decisions are also those of
GR No. 80719 Sep 26, 1989
the latter, he need not appeal from the
decision or opinion of the former to the
FACTS:
latter, and that, such being the case, after
he had appealed to the Secretary of On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a
Agriculture and Natural Resources from the sworn application for retention of her
decision or opinion of the Director of Lands riceland or for exemption thereof from the
he had exhausted all the administrative Operation Land Transfer Program with the
remedies, is untenable. then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR),
Regional Office in Tabaco, Albay. After due
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the
hearing, Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the
President of the Philippines is tantamount to
said office filed an investigation report
not appealing at all thereto. Such
dated June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of
withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to
the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of
the President is the last step he should take
private respondent who appears to be
in an administrative case.
petitioner's tenant over her riceland.
Furthermore, a special civil action for
Upon failure of the Ministry to take the
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of
necessary action, petitioner reiterated her
the Rules of Court lies only when "there is
application sometime in 1979-1985 alleging
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
that her tenant deliberately failed and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
refused to deliver her landowner's share
law." In the case at bar, appeal from an
from 1975 up to the time of the filing of the
opinion or order by the Secretary of
said application and that the latter had
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the
distributed his landholding to his children.
President of the Philippines is the plain,
A reinvestigation was conducted this time
speedy and adequate remedy available to
by Atty. Seth Evasco who on October 31,
the petitioner.
1985 filed his report recommending the
The judgment appealed from already had cancellation of private respondent's CLT.
become final and cannot be reviewed. The Said report was elevated to the MAR.
appeal is dismissed.
On April 17, 1986, petitioner appealed to
the then Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC).
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 42
However, it was denied in an order dated
May 28, 1986. A motion for reconsideration
thereof was likewise denied. After the
parties filed their respective pleadings, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision dated
June 29, 1987 dismissing the appeal on the
ground of lack of jurisdictio.
ISSUE:
Whether a landowner should or should not
be allowed to retain his landholdings, if
administratively decided by the Minister of
Agrarian Reform, are appealable and could
be reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian
Relations
RULING:
A perusal of the provision above cited
reveals that retaining landholdings are
exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now
Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose
decision may be appealed to the Office of
the President and not to the Court of
Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus
excluded from those cognizable by the then
CAR, now the Regional Trial Courts. There
is no appeal from a decision of the
President. However, the said decision may
be reviewed by the courts through a special
civil action for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, as the case may be under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner's posture is that it is an error for
the respondent appellate court to dismiss
the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since under Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, said appellate court is
vested with the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all decisions, resolutions, or
orders of quasi-judicial agencies except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.
Petitioner argues that since the appeal
involves both calibration of the evidence
and the determination of the laws applicable
thereto, then an appeal to the Court of
Appeals is the appropriate remedy and
hence her appeal should not have been
dismissed. Petitioner argues further that on
the assumption that the Court of Appeals
has no jurisdiction on the matter, still the
appeal should not have been dismissed but
should have been certified to the proper
court citing Section 3 of Rule 50 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The Court of Agrarian Relations has original
and exclusive jurisdiction as follows:
"Jurisdiction over Subject Matter. - The
Courts of Agrarian Relations shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
a) Cases involving the rights and
obligations of persons in the cultivation and
use of agricultural land except those
cognizable by the National Labor Relations
Commission; Provided, That no case
involving the determination of rentals over
any kind of tenanted agricultural land shall
be taken cognizance of by the Courts of
Agrarian Relations unless there has been a
prior fixing of provisional rental by the
Department of Agrarian Reform, except that
the tenant-farmer may directly bring the
case for immediate determination by the
Courts of Agrarian Relations;
b) Questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by laws, Presidential
Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and
Regulations issued and promulgated in
relation to the agrarian reform program;
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 43
Provided, however, That matters involving
the administrative implementation of the
transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer
under Presidential Decree No. 27 and
amendatory and related decrees, orders,
instructions, rules and regulations, shall be
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
Thus, the respondent appellate court erred
in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the
petition for review by way of certiorari
brought before it of a decision of the
Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made
in grave abuse of his discretion and in
holding that this is a matter within the
competence of the Court of Agrarian
Reform. The Court of Appeals has
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and
the Regional Trial Court over petitions
seeking the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
13.
RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner,
vs.
PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990
FACTS:
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P.
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office
of General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority from which he claims to
have been removed without just cause in
violation of his security of tenure.
In April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought
approval from President Aquino of the
composition of the Board of Directors of the
PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-
Chairman in his capacity as General
Manager. This approval was given by the
President on the same date.
Binamira claims that since assuming office,
he had discharged the duties of PTA
General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its
Board of Directors and had been
acknowledged as such by various
government offices, including the Office of
the President.
Garrucho having taken over as General
Manager of the PTA in accordance with a
new memorandum, the petitioner filed this
action against him to question his title.
Subsequently, while his original petition was
pending.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner may be reinstated.
RULING:
The reason is that the decree clearly
provides that the appointment of the
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority shall be made by the President of
the Philippines, not by any other officer.
Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature
cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it
was not possible for Minister Gonzales to
assume the exercise of that discretion as an
alter ego of the President. The appointment
(or designation) of the petitioner was not a
merely mechanical or ministerial act that
could be validly performed by a subordinate
even if he happened as in this case to be a
member of the Cabinet.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 44
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted
cannot delegate it to another, the
presumption being that he was chosen
because he was deemed fit and competent
to exercise that judgment and discretion,
and unless the power to substitute another
in his place has been given to him, he
cannot delegate his duties to another.
In those cases in which the proper
execution of the office requires, on the part
of the officer, the exercise of judgment or
discretion, the presumption is that he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and
competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and, unless power to substitute
another in his place has been given to him,
he cannot delegate his duties to another.
The argument that the designation made by
Minister Gonzales was approved by
President Aquino through her approval of
the composition of the Board of Directors of
the PTA is not persuasive
With these rulings, the petitioner's claim of
security of tenure must perforce fall to the
ground. His designation being an unlawful
encroachment on a presidential prerogative,
he did not acquire valid title thereunder to
the position in question. Even if it be
assumed that it could be and was
authorized, the designation signified merely
a temporary or acting appointment that
could be legally withdrawn at pleasure. In
either case, the petitioner's claim of security
of tenure must be rejected.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner,
who apparently believed in good faith that
he was being extended a permanent
appointment by the Minister of Tourism.
After all, Minister Gonzales had the
ostensible authority to do so at the time the
designation was made. This belief seemed
strengthened when President Aquino later
approved the composition of the PTA Board
of Directors where the petitioner was
designated Vice-Chairman because of his
position as General Manager of the PTA.
However, such circumstances fall short of
the categorical appointment required to be
made by the President herself, and not the
Minister of Tourism.
14.
JOHNNY DEMAISIP, Petitioner,Vs
COURT OF APPEALS;G.R. No. 89393;
25 Jan 1991; 193 SCRA 373
FACTS:
There was a confidential information
that Johnny Demaisip. Petitioner, had in his
possession marijuana and brownies cake
(spiced with marijuana ingredient), a
surveillance was conducted at the vicinity of
the residence of the accused at No. 3,
Mango Street, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro
City, by the agents of the 10th NARCOTICS
REGIONAL UNIT, Narcotics command,
AFP. . They were M/Sgt. Dominador Pascua,
PC; P/Sgt. Avelino Tampus, INF; Sgt.
Reynaldo Miguel, PC, and prosecution
witness P/Sgt. Rico Carino, INF. The
confidential information, when verified by a
"Task Buy" was found to be positive. A
search warrant, upon application was issued
by Judge Antonio Orcullo of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City.
The search warrant, however, has neither
been shown nor submitted as part of the
evidence for the prosecution.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 45
During Trial, Sgt. Carino mentioned it in his
testimony. The accused admitted that there
was a search warrant. The police team
proceeded to the suspect's place to [verify]
if the prohibited stuff was still in the
residence of the accused. A test buy was
made on October 11, 1983 through another
confidential informer who was directed to
buy ten-pesos worth of dried marijuana
leaves from Joey — the brother of the
accused. The agents, according to Sgt.
Carino, were able to buy from Joey
Demaisip ten pesos worth of Marijuana
leaves. During interrogation, petitioner
disclosed that the marijuana which he has
sold came from their residence along Mango
Street.
The petitioner was convicted of illegal
possession of marijuana. The Court of
Appeals admitted in evidence the marijuana
seized from him and affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not petitioner may
object to the admissibility of the evidence
against him during this appeal.
RULING:
NO. Objections to the legality of the
search warrant and to the admissibility of
the evidence obtained thereby were
deemed waived when no objection to the
legality of the search warrant was raised
during the trial of the case nor to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained
through said warrant.
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
15.
G.R. No. 85156 February 5,
1991
HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING in her
official capacity as Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
HON. TEOFILO GOMEZ and CRISANTO
B. DELAMIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LUIS GUMBAN,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 23 –– General Santos City,
South Cotabato, and ESTHER B. YAP,
respondents.
FACTS:
On or before 1979, private
respondent Esther B. Yap was appointed
District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public
Schools and assigned to the District of Glan,
South Cotabato. On 1987,then Secretary
Lourdes Quisumbing issued a Memorandum
Order, directing Regional Director Teofilo E.
Gomez to reassign or transfer Esther B. Yap
to another district. The latter in turn issued
a Memorandum Order to the principals and
headteachers of different public schools at
Glan informing them of his assumption of
office. However, private respondent Esther
B. Yap defied the orders of her superiors
and she continued to perform the functions
of public school district supervisor of Glan.
On February 20, 1987, Yap filed a petition
for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction/restraining order with the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City
against the Hon. Lourdes R. Quisumbing, et
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 46
al. who filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss,
which was denied by respondent Judge
Manuel Luis Gumban in his order. On
August 25, 1987, said Judge issued another
order granting the Writ of Preliminary
injunction and denied Quisumbing et al.'s
motion for reconsideration. Quisumbing, et
al. assailed the aforesaid orders on the
ground that Esther B. Yap failed to
exhaust all available administrative
remedies. On the other hand, Yap argued
that the doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable to
the case at bar as the Memorandum Order
issued by the petitioners, Lourdes
Quisumbing and Teofilo Gomez dated
February 11, 1987 and February 12, 1987,
respectively, would readily show that the
basis for the issuance of the orders are the
unverified demands of alleged concerned
citizens without the benefit of investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable in the case at bar.
RULING:
Negative. After a careful scrutiny of
the records, it is to be underscored that the
appointment of private respondent Yap is
simply that of a District Supervisor of the
Bureau of Public Schools which does not
indicate a specific station. As such, she
could be assigned to any station and she is
not entitled to stay permanently at any
specific station. Finally, the lower court did
not err in taking cognizance of the case.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not a hard and fact rule. It has
been repeatedly held that the requiring
previous exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one:
where the controverted act is patently
illegal or was performed without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction; where the
respondent is a department secretary,
whose acts as an alter ego of the President,
bear the implied or assumed approval of the
latter; where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention; or where the respondent has
acted in utter disregard of due process. The
rule does not apply where insistence on its
observance would result in nullification of
the claim being asserted; and when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.
In the instant case We deem it more
felicitous and expedient to resolve the same
on the merits to avoid multiplicity of suits
since after all the circumstances warrant a
final disposition of this petition, namely the
granting thereof because private
respondent had previously been appointed
as district supervisor, without indicating any
specific place as her permanent station. Her
status was therefore akin to that of a
district supervisor at large. Her transfer was
neither whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious.
16
G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998
HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in
his capacity as the Governor of the
Province of Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 47

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D.
TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
represented by SECRETARY ROBERT Z.
BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY
MANUEL R. SANCHEZ, MR. OSCAR C.
TINIO, in his capacity as Provincial
Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija, and MR.
LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR.
CRISPULO S. ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA
C. SANTOS, MR. VICENTE C. PALILIO,
and MR. NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in
their capacity as Provincial Board
Members of Nueva Ecija, respondents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
 (a) Preventive suspension is
proper;
 (b) Procedural due process is
violated;
 (c) The resolution of DILG
Secretary is invalid on the ground of
undue delegation; that it is the
President who is the Disciplining
Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;
RULING:

FACTS: “(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be

imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any
Petitioner Governor Joson was filed time (a) after the issues are joined; (b)
a complaint before the Office of the when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
President for barging violently into the given the gravity of the offense, there is
session hall of the Sangguniang great probability that the respondent, who
Panlalawigan in the company of armed continues to hold office, could influence the
men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
For failure to file an answer after three (3) integrity of the records and other evidence.
extensions, petitioner was declared in The act of respondent in allegedly barging
default and ordered the petitioner 60-day violently into the session hall of the
preventive suspension. Petitioner later Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company
“Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. of armed men constitutes grave
DILG denied the motion declaring that the misconduct. The allegations of
submission of position papers substantially complainants are bolstered by the joint-
complies with the requirements of affidavit of two (2) employees of the
procedural due process in administrative Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent
proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, who is the chief executive of the province is
by authority of the President, adopted the in a position to influence the
findings and recommendation of the DILG witnesses. Further, the history of violent
Secretary. The former imposed on confrontational politics in the province
petitioner the penalty of suspension from dictates that extreme precautionary
office for six (6) months without pay. measures be taken.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 48
“(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right
to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O.
No. 23 provides that at the preliminary
conference, the Investigating Authority
shall summon the parties to consider
whether they desire a formal
investigation. This provision does not give
the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation
would be conducted. The records show
that petitioner filed a motion for formal
investigation. There is nothing in the Local
Government Code and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23
that provide that administrative cases
against elective local officials can be
decided on the basis of position
papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the
Investigating Authority may require the
parties to submit their respective
memoranda but this is only after formal
investigation and hearing.
“(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The
President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power
to investigate, not the power to discipline.
The power to discipline evidently includes
the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the
power derived from the Constitution itself to
investigate complaints against local
government officials. A. O. No. 23,
however, delegates the power to investigate
to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. This is not undue
delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s
claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political
agency “…which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.”
This doctrine is corollary to the control
power of the President provided in the
Constitution. Control is said to be the very
heart of the power of the presidency. As
head of the Executive Department, the
President, however, may delegate some of
his powers to the Cabinet members except
when he is required by the Constitution to
act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts
personally. The members of Cabinet may
act for and in behalf of the President in
certain matters because the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control
(and supervisory) powers personally all the
time. Each head of a department is, and
must be, the President’s alter ego in the
matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise
authority.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 49
17.
G.R. No. 80796 October 11,
2001
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE,
Represented by Hon. Roy A. Padilla,
Jr., as Provincial Governor, petitioner,
vs.
PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Represented
by Hon. Eduardo T. Rodriguez, as
Provincial Governor, respondent.
RE: URGENT PETITION TO CITE
GOVERNOR EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ
OF QUEZON PROVINCE, AND MAYOR
JULIO U. LIM OF CALAUAG, QUEZON,
IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
SUMMARY: A 1989 SC decision settled the
land boundary dispute between Camarines
Norte and Quezon. As aconsequence, 9
barangays previously located in Calauag,
Quezon became part of Sta. Elena,
Camarines Norte. The decision ordered the
Government to undertake a survey in
accordance with a 1922 decision of the
Executive Board –which was upheld by the
SC as basis for the delineation of the
boundary. Upon request of Camarines Norte
Governor Padilla, DENR sent a survey team,
which laid down a boundary marker. In Oct.
1991, Calauag Mayor Lim and Quezon
Governor Rodriguez ordered the bulldozing
and removal of the boundary marker.
Padilla responded by filing a contempt
charge against the Quezon officials. Pending
resolution of that case, COMELEC and other
agencies of the Executive branch issued
directives recognizing the jurisdiction of
Camarines Norte over the 9 disputed
barangays. Specifically, NSO transferred
jurisdiction to the civil registrar of Sta.
Elena; DBM transferred the IRAs of the 9
barangays to Sta. Elena; realty tax records
were also ordered transferred; and the
COMELEC authorized the Sta. Elena election
officer to change the addresses of the
registered voters in the 9 barangays.
Quezon Government thus filed a petition for
certiorari assailing the COMELEC resolutions
authorizing the transfer of the voter
registration records in the 9 barangays. This
petition was consolidated with the contempt
charge. CA Justice ordered to hear
thecontempt case found sufficient basis to
cite Rodriguez and Lim in contempt for
willful disregard of the 1989 SC
decision, by contumaciously asserting their
own interpretation of the boundary line and
by having the DENR-installed marker
removed. SC concurred with the CA.
Rodriguez was guilty of willful disregard of a
final and executory SC decision. He even
said in his demurrer to the contempt charge
that they would not have ordered the
removal of the marker had the SC decided
the case in the way Quezon wanted it
decided. Pasaway kang talaga. SC has
rejected their argument with finality and
they must act accordingly. Quezon cannot
invoke the plebiscite requirements under
LGC 10 and the Constitution because the
boundary delineation was merely an
implementation of Sec. 42, Art. II of the
RAC, as interpreted by the 1922 EB
decision, which was upheld by the SC in
1989. Neither can the law creating Sta.
Elena be invoked, because the definition of
Sta. Elena’s territory in that law was subject
to the delineation of the Quezon-CamNor
boundary, which was to be determined by
the DENR by undertaking the SC-mandated
survey. Governor Rodriguez and Mayor Lim
were held guilty of indirect contempt.
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the transfer of the
voter registration records of the 9
barangays because it was merely complying
with the SC decision. Instead of being
punished, they should be commended for
doing so. [Anecdote: According to Danicon,
counsel for Camarines Norte went to the
Law Center, chanced upon DLC, Sereno,
Labitag, Sison, and Feliciano. They handled
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 50
the case for CamNor and won. Kaya ginawa
raw silang adopted sons and daughters of
Camarines Norte. ^^]
DOCTRINE]:
The 1922 decision of the Chief of the
Executive Bureau did not alter or redefine
oramend an existing provincial boundary,
the boundary line between Ambos
Camarines and Tayabas (now
QuezonProvince). All that the Chief of the
Executive Bureau did was to implement,
upon the authority of the Secretary
ofInterior, Section 42 of Act No. 2711.
Necessarily, the argument on the
noncompliance with the plebiscite
requirementunder Section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution, as well as Section 10
of Republic Act No. 7160, is misplaced.
What was involved in this case is not a
setting or resetting of an existing provincial
boundary but the implementationof a
decision clarifying a law which set a
provincial boundary in an ambiguous or
partial manner: “Section 42 (ArticleII,
Revised Administrative Code of 1917) does
set out a definition or description of the
boundary line between AmbosCamarines
and Quezon Province. [However, it] does
not describe or define the entirety of that
line in such a manneras to permit the whole
boundary line to be located on the ground
by a surveyor. Close examination of Section
42 willshow that it is not the whole
boundary line that is disputed but only a
segment thereof.”
Where there is clear and contumacious
defiance of, or refusal to obey an SC
decision, it will not hesitate to exercisethe
inherent power [of contempt] if only to
maintain respect for the SC, for without
which the administration of justicemay falter
or fail.
FACTS:
Nov. 8, 1989 – SC rendered a
decision in GR No. 80796 (1989 decision)
resolving the long-standing [sincethe
Spanish period] boundary dispute between
Camarines Norte (CAMNOR) and Quezon in
favor of theformer.
The decision stated in part: “Let a copy of
this decision be furnished to the Secretary
of the Local
Governments and the Office of the
President with the request that surveyors
from the Bureau ofLands or other
appropriate government agency be
forthwith designated to survey and locate,
bylatitude and longitude and by metes and
bounds, and to monument the Basiad Bay-
Mt. Cadig linedescribed in the 16 June 1922
decision of the Chief of the Executive
Bureau.[1922 DECISION]”
Mar. 19, 1990 - The 1989 decision became
final and executory.
Pursuant to the directive of the SC, CamNor
governor Roy PADILLA asked the DENR
Secretary toundertake the survey of the
Quezon-Camnor boundary line based on the
description in the 1922 decision.
DENR Secretary Fulgencio FACTORAN, Jr.,
thus issued Special Order 1179 constituting
atechnical working group for the purpose.
Jan. 31, 1991 – The DENR team informed
Quezon Governor Eduardo RODRIGUEZ
about the upcomingsurvey.
Quezon Provincial Secretary Jorge VARGAS
objected to the use of the 1922 decision as
the basis of thesurvey, asserting that it
should be done on the basis of the
conditions set forth in Art. II, §42 of the
RevisedAdministrative Code of 1917 (Act
2711).
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 51
The DENR team proceeded with the survey
anyway, using the 1922 decision as basis.
May 28, 1991 – The DENR team went to
Brgy. Tabugon, Calauag, Quezon and
installed a monumentmarker along the
boundary line determined in the survey.
The marker indicated that the area of 8,032
hectares actually falls within the jurisdiction
of CamNor.
The area comprises 9 barangays:
Kagtalaba, Plaridel, Kabuluan, Don Tomas,
Guitol, Tabugon,
Maualawin, Patag Ibaba, and Patag Iraya.
Oct. 14, 1991 – Rodriguez and Calauag
Mayor Julio LIM had the boundary marker
bulldozed and removed.
The event was covered by the Manila
Bulletin.
In response, Padilla filed a petition for
contempt in the SC against Rodriguez and
Lim for disobedience
to a SC decision, which is punishable as
indirect contempt under ROC 71§3.
COMMENT OF RODRIGUEZ & LIM on
contempt petition: The placing of the
marker is illegal asit was installed within
Calauag territory and because the DENR
team lacked prior authority from theOffice
of the President, as required by the 1989
decision. Their action was a reasonable use
offorce under NCC 429 to protect Quezon
territory from a threatened physical
invasion.
SC resolved to direct CA Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy to conduct hearings, receive
evidence, and submit areport and
recommendation on the contempt
proceedings.
After CamNor rested its case, Rodriguez
filed a demurrer, contending that the 1989
decision cannotbe implemented in the light
of RAC 42 and RA 5480 (which created the
Municipality of Sta. Elena inCamNor). The
demurrer was denied.
Upon retirement of Justice Sempio-Diy, the
case was assigned to CA Justice Teodoro
Regino.
Pending the contempt proceedings in the
CA, the DBM transferred the Internal
Revenue Allotment of the 9barangays from
Calauag to Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte
starting in Fiscal Year 1994.
During the May 6, 1996 SK elections,
COMELEC sent the election paraphernalia of
the 9 barangays to Sta.Elena. COMELEC
also issued a resolution directing the
Calauag Election Officer to refrain from
exercisingsupervision over political exercises
in the 9 barangays.
The Civil Registrar General likewise issued a
Memorandum informing the Calauag Civil
Registrar thatregistration of vital events
occurring in the 9 barangays should now be
registered with the Sta. Elena CivilRegistrar.
March 18, 1997 – the Department of
Finance directed the Quezon Provincial
Treasurer and the ProvincialAssessor to
transfer the realty tax records of the 9
barangays to CamNor.
Jul. 10, 1997 – COMELEC issued a
resolution authorizing the Sta. Elena
Election Officer to change theaddress in the
voting registration records of the 9
barangays from Calauag, Quezon to Sta.
Elena,Camarines Norte; and to notify the
registered voters concerned of such change
in address.
Sep. 12, 1997 – The Sangguniang Bayan of
Calauag passed a resolution opposing the
Jul. 10 COMELECresolution.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 52
Nov. 27, 1997 – COMELEC resolved to note
the Calauag SB resolution and deny it with
finality.
Quezon filed a petition for certiorari with the
SC, which was consolidated with the
contempt petition.
May 3, 2000 - Justice Regino submitted his
report and recommendation in the contempt
case.
Rodriguez and Lim are guilty of contempt of
court and should be sentenced to maximum
penalty of6 months imprisonment and
P1000 fine; and be ordered to shoulder the
cost of installing a newboundary marker to
replace the one they had removed.
ISSUES:
1) W/N Rodriguez and Lim are guilty of
contempt of court (YES)
2) W/N COMELEC committed GAD in issuing
the resolutions assailed by Quezon (NO)
RULING:
1) BULLDOZING & REMOVAL OF
MARKER WAS DISOBEDIENCE OF 1989
SC DECISION; RODRIGUEZ & LIM
(RL) GUILTY OF CONTEMPT
RL’s act of removing the monument marker
amounts to contumacious conduct defined
under ROC71§3(b), which declares
contemptuous any "disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process,order, or
judgment or command of a court."
The installation of the boundary marker was
in compliance with the 1989 SC decision,
which made
the 1922 decision the basis of the boundary
line.
RL have a long record of resisting CamNor’s
claim to the disputed area.
RL’s contumacious refusal was made with
full understanding that their acts would fall
undercontempt, as evinced by the following
statement made in their demurrer: “The
whole case wouldhave been different if
factually the territory defined in the (1922)
Decision of the Executive Bureauconformed
with the prescription of Section 42 (of
Article II, Revised Administrative Code of
1917)”
SC agrees with Justice Regino’s findings.
In effect, Rodriguez was saying in the
demurrer that they would not have removed
the boundary marker hadthe SC decided the
case on the basis on RAC Art. II, Sec. 42.
This is an act of defiance of the 1989
decision, where it was ruled with finality
that RAC Art. II, Sec. 42 didnot define the
entirety of the CamNor-Quezon boundary
line in such a manner as to permit the
wholeboundary line to be located on the
ground by a surveyor.
Pertinent part of the 1989 SC decision: "It is
pointed out by [CamNor], firstly, that the
particular point onBasiad Bay that is the
terminus of the boundary line is not
specifically identified in Section 42,
consideringthat the eastern shore of Basiad
Bay is 25 kilometers in length, more or less,
such that that terminal pointcould in theory
be located anywhere along the 25-kilometer
shore line. Secondly, the specific direction
ordirections and the varying lengths (the
'metes and bounds') of the various
segments of the boundary line tobe
projected from the terminus point on Basiad
Bay onto Mt. Cadig's peak, are similarly not
specified in
Section 42. Thus, again, a surveyor on the
ground would be unable to locate and
monument the boundaryline from Basiad
Bay to Mt. Cadig if all he had was the
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 53
language found in Section 42 of the
RevisedAdministrative Code.
"We agree with [CamNor]'s argument. We
consider that to that limited extent, the
Ambos Camarines
Quezon boundary line was `undefined' and
that there was thus necessity for the 16
June 22 decision of theChief of the
Executive Bureau to provide more specific
guidance that would permit the actual
identificationor location of the Basiad Bay-
Mt. Cadig portion of the boundary line
between Ambos Camarines andQuezon
Province:
'[from the peak of Mt. Cadig] thence a
straight line is drawn to the point of
intersection of the interprovincialroad
between Camarines Norte and Tayabas
(now Quezon) with the Tabugon River,
thence following thecourse of the river to
each mouth at the Basiad Bay.'"
The 1989 SC decision clearly upheld the
validity and binding effect of the 1922
decision of the ExecutiveBureau. Despite
this, RL stubbornly insist on their own
interpretation of what should be the correct
boundaryline.
This willful disregard of the SC decision was
demonstrated by RL’s causing the removal
of the boundarymarker installed by the
DENR.
Counsels for Quezon have already been
reprimanded by the SC for insisting on the
applicability of RAC Art.II, Sec. 42, as a
tactic to delay the implementation of the
1989 SC decision.
SC said: “This Court does not, as it cannot,
always expect counsel of losing litigants
graciously to accept thecorrectness of the
decisions of this Court. But when such
decisions reach finality, it is the duty of
suchcounsel as officers of the Court and
members of the Bar to obey those
decisions, whatever their personalopinion
may be in respect of the merits of the
decisions. It is, of course, open to the
respondents herein toseek to change those
decisions they disagree with by going to the
Congress of the Philippines to try tosecure
the enactment of a statute changing the
boundary line already declared legally
binding by this Court.
Until such a statute is enacted, however,
respondents owe a special duty faithfully
and honestly to complywith final decisions
of this Court. The Court cannot countenance
any further disregard of this duty. It is
ofessence of an ordered and civilized
community that the function of final
resolution of disputes be located ina
particular institution. In our system, that
institution is this Court.”
Quezon cannot invoke RA 5480 [creating
the Municipaliy of Sta. Elena]
Sec.1 of that law, defined the territory of
Sta. Elena as including “Barrios Salvacion,
Bulala, Rizal, SanLorenzo, Pulong Guitguit,
Santa Elena, San Vicente, Basiad and San
Pedro up to the boundary of theProvince of
Quezon and the Province of Camarines
Norte as defined in Chapter three, Article II,
Sectionforty-two of the Administrative
Code”
Quezon: Including the 9 barangays within
the disputed area in the territory of Sta.
Elena would violate notonly Sec. 1 of RA
5480, but also Art. X, Sec. 10 of the
Constitution and LGC 10 which require the
conductingof a plebiscite in cases of
substantial alteration of territorial
boundaries.
SC: This has been resolved with finality in
the 1989 decision: RA 5480 does not
purport to have amendedSection 42 of the
Revised Administrative Code nor Section 2
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 54
of Act No. 2809, both as implemented in
thedecision dated 16 June 1922 of the
Executive Bureau of the Department of
Interior.
Sec. 1 of RA 5480 extends the jurisdiction
of Sta. Elena up to the Quezon-CamNor
boundary,which was defined in the 1922 EB
decision; which was in turn ordered
enforced by the SC in its1989 decision. The
enumeration of barangays in Sec. 1 is not a
delimitation of territorial jurisdiction.
The 1922 decision did not “alter, re-define,
or amend” an existing provincial boundary.
All it did wasimplement RAC 42. The
reliance on the plebiscite provisions of the
Local Govenment Code andArt. X,
Constitution are therefore misplaced.
Authority of the DENR technical team comes
from the President through his alter ego,
the SENR
Special Order No. 1179 issued by the DENR
Secretary was the basis for the DENR
team’s authority toconduct the survey and
place boundary markers. The DENR
Secretary is the President’s alter ego; thus
theSENR’s acts are presumed to be acts of
the President, unless expressly repudiated
by the latter. Theargument that the survey
was conducted without Presidential
authority is therefore baseless.RL liable for
indirect contempt
RL thus openly disobeyed the 1989 Decision
when they caused the removal of the
monument markerinstalled by the DENR.
The significance of the monument marker
cannot simply be disregarded. As
aptlyexplained by Engr. Mamerto Infante, it
has a technical purpose of preserving the
survey conducted by histeam. In fact the
1989 Decision mandates "...to monument
the Basiad Bay-Mt. Cadig line described in
the 16June 1922 decision of the Chief of the
Executive Bureau."
That RL understood the 1989 Decision is
fully borne by the records in these cases
and well attested by theirvaliant effort in re-
litigating issues already settled by this
Court. That same effort, however,
highlighted bytheir contumacious
destruction of the monument, worked
adversely to their cause. It renders them
liable forindirect contempt.
2) NO GAD COMMITTED IN ISSUING
ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS; COMELEC &
OTHER AGENCIES
COMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTING
1989 DECISION
 Quezon: The assailed COMELEC
resolutions recognizing CamNor’s
jurisdiction over the 9 disputedbarangays
were issued with grave abuse of discretion,
being violative of RA 5480, Art. X, Sec. 10
of theConstitution and LGC 10.
COMELEC: The assailed Resolutions were
issued in deference to the 1989 decision,
and only after the landboundary dispute
between the two provinces had been
settled. The resolutions were mere
compliance withthe SC resolution dated
Aug. 4, 1994 in the same case.
SC fully agrees COMELEC.
For showing high regard to the SC's
Decision and Orders, we commend not only
the COMELEC but also theDepartment of
Budget and Management, the Department
of Finance, the Department of Environment
andNatural Resources, the Department of
Interior and Local Government and the
National Statistics Office.
These government offices and agencies
have collectively recognized the subject 9
barangays as part ofCamarines Norte's
jurisdiction (bigyan ng jacket).
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 55
It is only Quezon Province and its officials
who ignore the finality of the Decision and
Resolutions of the SC.Their present petition
attempts to re-litigate the same issues
judiciously passed upon by the SC with
finality.It is but imperative for the SC to
write finis to these cases. Indeed, every
litigation must come to an end;otherwise, it
would become even more intolerable than
the wrong and injustice it is designed to
correct.
DISPOSTION: Petition for contempt
granted. Rodriguez and Lim fined P1,000.
Petition for certiorari denied.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Tondo Medical vs CA #167324
17July2007
FACTS:
HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA,
a reform agenda developed by the
HSRA Technical Working Group after a
series of workshops and analyses with
inputs from several consultants, program
managers and technical staff possessing
the adequate expertise and experience in
the health sector. It provided for five
general areas of reform: (1) to provide
fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
(2) secure funding for priority public
health programs; (3) promote the
development of local health systems and
ensure its effective performance; (4)
strengthen the capacities of health
regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the
coverage of the National Health
Insurance Program (NHIP). However, some
provisions of the Health Sector Reform
Agenda are challenged on the ground that
they violate 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of
Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article
XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV,
all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly
or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State
to protect and promote the people’s right to
health and well-being. However, these
provisions are not self-executory.
Petitioners challenged:
First reform agenda involving the
fiscal autonomy of government
hospitals, particularly the collection
of socialized user fees and the
corporate restructuring of
government hospitals.
Petitioners also assailed the
issuance of a draft administrative
order issued by
the DOH, dated 5 January 2001,
entitled "Guidelines and Procedure
in the
Implementation of the Corporate
Restructuring of Selected DOH
Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal
Autonomy, and Managerial
Flexibility to Start by January
2001;"and Administrative Order
No. 172 of the DOH, entitled
"Policies and Guidelines on the
Private Practice of Medical and
Paramedical Professionals in
Government Health
Facilities," dated 9 January 2001,
for imposing an added burden to
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 56

indigent Filipinos, who cannot Congress in the exercise of its

afford to pay for medicine and legislative function. They argued
medical services. that Executive Order No. 102 is
They also alleged that the void, having been issued in
implementation of the excess of the President’s authority.
aforementioned reforms had Implementation of the
resulted in making free medicine Rationalization and Streamlining
and free medical services Plan (RSP) was not in
inaccessible to economically accordance with law. The RSP
disadvantaged Filipinos. was allegedly implemented even
before the
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102 Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) approved it.
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph They also
Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order maintained that the Office of the
No. 102, entitled "Redirecting the President should have issued an
Functions and Operations of the Depa administrative
rtment of Health," which provided for the order to carry out the streamlining,
changes in the roles, functions, and but that it failed to do so.
organizational processes of the DOH. The validity of Executive Order
Under the assailed executive order, the No. 102 will be the reason of
DOH refocused its mandate from being losing their jobs,
the sole provider of health services to being and that some of them were
a provider of specific health services and suffering from the inconvenience of
technical assistance, as a result of the having to travel a longer distance to
devolution of basic services to local get to their new place of work, while
government units. other DOH employees had to
relocate to far-flung areas.
There are certain provisions for the
streamlining of the DOH and the The Court of Appeals denied the petition
deployment of DOH personnel to regional due to a number of procedural defects,
offices and hospitals. which
proved fatal: 1) Petitioners failed to show
Executive Order No. 102 was enacted capacity or authority to sign the certification
pursuant to Section 17 of the Local of
Government non-forum shopping and the verification; 2)
Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which Petitioners failed to show any particularized
provided for the devolution to the local interest for bringing the suit, nor any
government units of basic services and direct or personal injury sustained or
facilities, as well as specific health- were in the immediate danger of
related sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought
functions and responsibilities. before the Supreme Court on 15 August
1999, was filed out of time, or beyond
Petitioners contended that: 60 days from the time the reorganization
methods were implemented in 2000;
Executive Order No. 102, which and 4) certiorari, Prohibition and
effects the reorganization of the Mandamus will not lie where the President,
DOH, should be enacted by in issuing the assailed Executive Order, was
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 57
not acting as a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Court of Appeals also ruled that the
HSRA cannot be declared void for
violating
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article
II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and
14
of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of
Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution,
which
directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of
the State to protect and promote the
people’s
right to health and well-being. It
reasoned that the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution are not
self-executing; they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights and can
only provide guidelines for legislation.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
rendered on 26 November 2004, but
the same was denied in a Resolution
dated 7 March 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO102 is constitutional?
RULING:
YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should
be declared void, since It runs counter to
the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino
people as embodied in the Constitution.
They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal
autonomy, incomegeneration, and revenue
enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11,
13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of
Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article
XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of
the 1987 Constitution. Such policies
allegedly resulted in making inaccessible
free medicine and free medical services.
This contention is unfounded. As a general
rule, the provisions of the Constitution are
considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their
enforcement. If they are not treated as self-
executing, the mandate of the fundamental
law can be easily nullified by the inaction of
Congress. However, some provisions have
already been categorically declared by this
Court as non-self-executing. In Basco v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, this Court declared that
Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section
13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-
executing provisions. In Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to
Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of
Article XIV of the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights. These provisions, which
merely lay down a general principle, are
distinguished from other constitutional
provisions as non-self-executing and,
therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts; they do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
Some of the constitutional provisions
invoked in the present case were taken
from Article II of the Constitution--
specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15
and 18—the provisions of which the Court
categorically ruled to be non-self-executing
in the afore-cited case of Tañada v. Angara.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any
explanation of how the HSRA supposedly
violated the equal protection and due
process clauses that are embodied in
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution.
There were no allegations of discrimination
or of the lack of due process in connection
with the HSRA. Since they failed to
substantiate how these constitutional
guarantees were breached, petitioners are
unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of
this provision to the petition, and
consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the
remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article
XV, the State accords recognition to the
protection of working women and the
provision for safe and healthful working
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 58
conditions; to the adoption of an integrated
and comprehensive approach to health; to
the Filipino family; and to the right of
children to assistance and special
protection, including proper care and
nutrition. Like the provisions that were
declared as non-self-executory in the cases
of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, they are mere
statements of principles and policies. As
such, they are mere directives addressed to
the executive and the legislative
departments. If unheeded, the remedy will
not lie with the courts; but rather, the
electorate’s displeasure maybe manifested
in their votes.
DISPOSITIVE:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
instant Petition is DENIED. This Court
AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26
November 2004, declaring both the HSRA
and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No
costs.
23.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-II
BUILDERS, INC., R-II HOLDINGS,
INC., HARBOUR CENTRE PORT
TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS
ROMERO II, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164527 August 15,
2007
FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition
raising constitutional issues on the JVA
entered by National Housing Authority and
R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory
Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO)
161 approving and directing implementation
of the Comprehensive and Integrated
Metropolitan Manila Waste Management
Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a
wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made
residence of many Filipinos living in a
subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared
feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into
low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation
Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957
(Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed
on July 1990 declaring the importance of
private sectors as contractors in
government projects. Thereafter, Aquino
proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to
SMDRP, among others. The same MO also
established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the
execution and evaluation of the plan,
respectively, to be assisted by the Public
Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s
venture partner for SMDRP were published
in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II
Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding
process. Then-President Ramos authorized
NHA to enter into a Joint Venture
Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the
clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual
development into a low cost housing
complex and industrial/commercial site.
RBI is expected to fully finance the
development of Smokey Mountain and
reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the
Manila Bay Area. The latter together with
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 59
the commercial area to be built on Smokey
Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling
components. If the project is revoked or
terminated by the Government through no
fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the
Government shall compensate RBI for its
actual expenses incurred in the Project plus
a reasonable rate of return not exceeding
that stated in the feasibility study and in the
contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to
be agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of
Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the
project involves clearing, levelling-off the
dumpsite, and construction of temporary
housing units for the current residents on
the cleared and levelled site. Phase II
involves the construction of a fenced
incineration area for the on-site disposal of
the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the
DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was
amended and restated (now ARJVA) to
accommodate the design changes and
additional work to be done to successfully
implement the project. The original 3,500
units of temporary housing were decreased
to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling
component was increased from 40 hectares
to 79 hectares, which was supported by the
issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by
President Ramos. The revision also
provided for the 119-hectare land as an
enabling component for Phase II of the
project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed
by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal,
making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey
Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998,
the project was suspended, to be later
reconstituted by President Estrada in MO
No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI
executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby both parties agreed to terminate
the JVA and subsequent agreements.
During this time, NHA reported that 34
temporary housing structures and 21
permanent housing structures had been
turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI
have been granted the power and
authority to reclaim lands of the
public domain as this power is
vested exclusively in PEA as claimed
by petitioner
2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI
were given the power and authority
by DENR to reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands
3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire
reclaimed foreshore and submerged
lands considered as alienable and
outside the commerce of man
4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire
reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no
longer needed for public use
5. Whether there is a law authorizing
sale of reclaimed lands
6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed
lands to RBI was done by public
bidding
7. Whether RBI, being a private
corporation, is barred by the
Constitution to acquire lands of
public domain
8. Whether respondents can be
compelled to disclose all information
related to the SMDRP
9. Whether the operative fact doctrine
applies to the instant position
HELD:
1. Executive Order 525 reads that the
PEA shall be primarily responsible for
A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 60
integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects
for and on behalf of the National
Government. This does not mean
that it shall be responsible for all.
The requisites for a valid and legal
reclamation project are approval by
the President (which were provided
for by MOs), favourable
recommendation of PEA (which were
seen as a part of its
recommendations to the EXECOM),
and undertaken either by PEA or
entity under contract of PEA or by
the National Government Agency
(NHA is a government agency whose
authority to reclaim lands under
consultation with PEA is derived
under PD 727 and RA 7279).
2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR
permission, the DENR is deemed to
have granted the authority to
reclaim in the Smokey Mountain
Project for the DENR is one of the
members of the EXECOM which
provides reviews for the project.
ECCs and Special Patent Orders
were given by the DENR which are
exercises of its power of supervision
over the project. Furthermore, it
was the President via the
abovementioned MOs that originally
authorized the reclamation. It must
be noted that the reclamation of
lands of public domain is reposed
first in the Philippine President.
3. The reclaimed lands were classified
alienable and disposable via MO 415
issued by President Aquino and
Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by
President Ramos.
4. Despite not having an explicit
declaration, the lands have been
deemed to be no longer needed for
public use as stated in Proclamation
No. 39 that these are to be
“disposed to qualified beneficiaries.”
Furthermore, these lands have
already been necessarily reclassified
as alienable and disposable lands
under the BOT law.
5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly
states that the NHA can acquire
property rights and interests and
encumber or otherwise dispose of
them as it may deem appropriate.
6. There is no doubt that respondent
NHA conducted a public bidding of
the right to become its joint venture
partner in the Smokey Mountain
Project. It was noted that notices
were published in national
newspapers. The bidding proper
was done by the Bids and Awards
Committee on May 18, 1992.
7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718
explicitly states that a contractor can
be paid “a portion as percentage of
the reclaimed land” subject to the
constitutional requirement that only
Filipino citizens or corporation with
at least 60% Filipino equity can
acquire the same. In addition, when
the lands were transferred to the
NHA, these were considered
Patrimonial lands of the state, by
which it has the power to sell the
same to any qualified person.
8. This relief must be granted. It is the
right of the Filipino people to
information on matters of public
concerned as stated in Article II,
Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the
1987 Constitution.
9. When the petitioner filed the case,
the JVA had already been
terminated by virtue of MOA
between RBI and NHA. The
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 61
properties and rights in question
after the passage of around 10 years
from the start of the project’s
implementation cannot be disturbed
or questioned. The petitioner, being
the Solicitor General at the time
SMDRP was formulated, had ample
opportunity to question the said
project, but did not do so. The
moment to challenge has passed.
24.
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
OF 2010
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
x––––––––––––––––––––
– – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP.
RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC)
dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under
the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its
finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant
the filing of an information in our courts of
law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers
as it arrogates the power of the Congress to
create a public office and appropriate funds
for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10,
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new public office which
was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the
Constitution and statutes when it vested the
“Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the
DOJ created under the Administrative Code
of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause as it selectively targets for
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 62
investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as
if corruption is their peculiar species even as
it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may
be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the
legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers
of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and
settled jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of
Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate
or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate
the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing
to file the petitions and question E. O. No.
1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of
the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing
to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation
of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. To the
extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of
that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it
that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office
remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown
that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 63
attributable to the implementation of E. O.
No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.” In
private suits, standing is governed by the
“real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides
that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in
interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises
in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has
to show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result.” The Court, however, finds reason
in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition
covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view
of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in
ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are
not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain
facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing
ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only
an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
There is no need to specify the amount to
be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission. The amount that
would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or
the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If
at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the
two offices. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 64
equal protection clause enshrined in Section
1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state’s duly
constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as
determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same
class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid
if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out
the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent
and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member
of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights determined and
all public authority administered. Laws that
do not conform to the Constitution should
be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
25.
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS
ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA)
Petitioners,
- versus -
THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
(NPC), NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF
DIRECTORS (NPB), Respondents.
FACTS:
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 65
On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136,
otherwise known as the “Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law),
was approved and signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It took
effect on 26 June 2001.
Under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,
[2] a new National Power Board (NPB) of
Directors was formed. An energy
restructuring committee (Restructuring
Committee) was also created to manage the
privatization and the restructuring of the
National Power Corporation (NPC), the
National Transmission Corporation
(TRANSCO), and the Power Sector Assets
and Liabilities Corporation (PSALC).
On November 18 , 2002, pursuant to
Section 63[3] of the EPIRA Law and Rule
33[4] of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB
Resolution No. 2002-124, which provided
for “Guidelines on the Separation Program
of the NPC and the Selection and Placement
of Personnel.” Under this Resolution, the
services of all NPC personnel shall be legally
terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall
be entitled to separation benefits provided
therein. On the same day, the NPB
approved NPB Resolution 2002-125,
constituting a Transition Team to manage
and implement the NPC’s Separation
Program.
Contending that the assailed NPB
Resolutions were void, petitioners filed, in
their individual and representative
capacities, the present Petition for
Injunction to restrain respondents from
implementing NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-
124 and 2002- 125.
Issue:
The issue was whether or not NPB
Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125
were properly enacted.
The Court’s Ruling:
The Court’s Decision, written by
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[5] held that
the Resolutions were invalid, because they
lacked the necessary number of votes for
their adoption.
Under Section 48, the power to
exercise judgment and discretion in running
the affairs of the NPC was vested by the
legislature upon the persons composing the
National Power Board of Directors. When
applied to public functionaries, discretion
refers to a power or right conferred upon
them by law, consisting of acting officially in
certain circumstances, according to the
dictates of their own judgment and
conscience, and uncontrolled by the
judgment or conscience of others.
Presumably, in naming the
respective department heads as members
of the board of directors, the legislature
chose these secretaries of the various
executive departments on the basis of their
personal qualifications and acumen that had
made them eligible to occupy their present
positions as department heads. Thus, the
department secretaries cannot delegate
their duties as members of the NPB, much
less their power to vote and approve board
resolutions. Their personal judgments are
what they must exercise in the fulfillment of
their responsibilities.
There was no question that the
enactment of the assailed Resolutions
involved the exercise of discretion, not
merely a ministerial act that could be validly
performed by a delegate. Respondents’
reliance on American Tobacco Company v.
Director of Patents[6] was misplaced. The
Court explicitly stated in that case that, in
exercising their own judgment and
discretion, administrative officers were not
prevented from using the help of
subordinates as a matter of practical
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 66
administrative procedure. Officers could
seek such aid, as long as the legally
authorized official was the one who would
make the final decision through the use of
personal judgment.
In the present case, it is not difficult
to comprehend that in approving NPB
Resolutions 2002-124 and 2002-125, it is
the representatives of the secretaries of the
different executive departments and not the
secretaries themselves who exercised
judgment in passing the assailed Resolution.
This action violates the duty imposed upon
the specifically enumerated department
heads to employ their own sound discretion
in exercising the corporate powers of the
NPC.
26.)
Beautifont vs CA #L-50141 29 Jan
1988
FACTS:
 P Aura Laboratories Inc and
Beautifont Inc are domestic corps
engaged in manufacture of cosmetic
products and marketing/distribution
of such.
 Both applied w/ Board of
Investments for authority to accept
permissible investments of 2 thereof had actually been published
American-owned firms, Avon
Products and Manila Manufacturing
Co., filed in accordance w/ RA 5455,
Permissible Investments Law
(requires approval by BOI of a
foreign natl in a local corp. w/c
would exceed 30% outstanding
capital)
 BOI prepared the notice of
applications w/c was published in
Official Gazette and newspapers of
GenCirc. (15d to oppose)
 Rustan Marketing Corp and Holiday
Cosmetics opposed it: (1) would
conflict with the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act; (2) would pose a
clear and present danger of a
monopoly in the cosmetics industry;
(3) would be made in an enterprise
already adequately exploited by
Philippine nationals (4) were
inconsistent with the Government's
Investment Priorities Plans as well as
declared national policies; and (5)
would not contribute to a sound and
balanced development of the
national economy.
 Notice of hearing published, inviting
all interested parties
 At the hearing, Rustan and Holiday
(R) alleged fatal jurisdictional defect
in proceedings: violation by the BOI
of Section 7 of RA 5455 in that
instead of requiring and causing
publication of
the applications themselves — which
is what in their view the cited
provision directs — only notice
and posted.
o officer of the Philippine
Chamber of Commerce and
Industry also appeared to
oppose the applications
 Applications were eventually
approved, Certificate of Authority
issued  P accepted the foreign
A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 67
equity investments and transfer of
stock made.
 R filed w/ CFI Manila, petition for
certiorari + preliminary injunction
later amended to annul BOI
resolution + prohibit them from
approving the applications
 CFI denied the motion, filed MR but
before MR resolution, R went to CA
filing the same petition for cert + PI.
 CA Issued the TRO so P went to SC,
filed certiorari and PI vs CA and R
 R: administrative cognizance had
been taken by the "Office of the
President/Prime Minister" of the P’s
applications for authority to accept
permissible investments, and praying
that because of this development,
the proceedings be suspended. 
proceedings were actually
suspended twice
 Pending SC ruling, Avon sought
approval to find a Filipino buyer to
sell 30% of its equity to so the BOI
decision can be affirmed. This was
approved by Minister Tuvera and
opposed to by R as a “gratuitous
conclusion” + President still waiting
on NEDA recommendation on the
public hearings + reducing Avon’s
holdings did not resolve the
economic issues they raised.
ISSUE:
1. WON BOI committed Gross
abuse of discretion in overruling
R’s objections?  NO.
RULING:
 The legal presumption is that official
duty has been duly performed
o a presumption respecting the
correctness of the acts and
determinations of
administrative agencies like
the BOI, that the policy has
been adopted for courts not
to interfere therewith unless
there be a clear showing of
arbitrary action or palpable
and serious error.
 Courts of justice will not generally
interfere with purely administrative
matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government
agencies unless there is a clear
showing that the latter acted
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion or when they have acted
in a capricious and whimsical
manner such that their action may
amount to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction
 Though prima facie, when all the
facts were not yet laid out, the
injunction may have had basis, now
there’s no basis for the injunction.
 Sec. 7: creates impression that
actual application needs to be
published, other parts of the section
make clear that it is the notice of the
application that is meant to be so
published and posted.
o Sub-head or title clearly
refers to Notice.
o Last sentence also mentions
Notices
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 68
o Description of what’s
needed: “the name of the
applicant, the business in
which it is engaged or
proposes to engage or
invest, and such other data
and information as may be
required by the Board of
Investments" 
abstract/summary is what is
needed (no need to itemize
like this if it were the actual
application needed.
 While the notice DID leave out the
business the corps are engaged in,
is not serious enough an omission to
negate the notice completely
27.)
Qualitrans Limousine vs. Royal Class
Limousine #79886 22 Nov 1989
FACTS:
1. Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc., was
the grantee of a certificate of public
convenience issued by the defunct Board of
Transportation to operate a "garage
(tourist) air-conditioned service" from
Manila t any point in Luzon
2. A decision by the BOT amended the
certificate for garage service into one for
limousine tourist service for the
transportation of all outgoing passengers of
the Manila International Airport
3. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by
private respondent with Transcare, Inc., a
duly licensed limousine service operator and
likewise, a holder of a certificate of public
convenience.
4. By virtue of said sale, the franchise
granted to Transcare, Inc. for the use of 40
units of tourist cars was sold to private
respondent.
5. On December 27, 1985, upon application
filed for the approval of aforementioned
sale, an Order was issued by the Land
Transportation Commission granting a
provisional permit in favor of private
respondent (Annexes C and 3, CA-G.R. SP
No. 10049); Annexes B and 3 CA-G.R. No.
10370-SP). The prefatory portion thereof
states: The application filed in this case is
for the approval of sale made by
TRANSCARE, INC., in favor of ROYAL CLASS
LIMOUSINE SERVICE of the Certificate of
Public Convenience issued in Case Nos. 81-
4405 and 82-415 authorizing the operation
of a TOURIST CAR (AIR-CONDITIONED)
SERVICE within the New Manila
International Airport and from said place to
any point in the Island of Luzon accessible
to motor vehicle traffic and vice-versa,
involving the right to operate forty (40)
units authorized therein. ... (Emphasis
supplied).
6. Petitioner argues that the application filed
by private respondent was for the route
from the "New Manila International Airport
to hotels and from said hotels to any point
in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic and
vice-versa", and not from the "New Manila
International Airport ... to any point in the
Island of Luzon.”
7. Petitioner claims that respondent has
been soliciting passengers from the New
Manila International Airport to transport
them to any point in Luzon to the prejudice
of petitioner's business
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 69
8. Petitioner argued that the Land
Transportation Commission denied them
due process of law because it advanced the
time of hearing without the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner is correct?
RULING:
The fact that Qualitrans had, meanwhile,
commenced suit in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) does not oust the Commission of its
jurisdiction. The Commission had a primacy
of authority to take cognizance of Royal
Class 'inquiry. It is to be noted, indeed, that
the very trial court, by its order of
September 8, 1986, denied the issuance of
preliminary injunctive relief sought by
Qualitrans, in deference, precisely, to the
Board's primal and preferential jurisdiction.
2. Of course, the Commission's action must
have been preceded by due notice and
hearing, and precisely, it is Qualitrans'
complaint that it had been deprived of due
process for failure of the transportation
body to give it notice and hearing (in
particular, of Royal Class' motion to lift
cease and desist order). The records show,
however, that the decision of the Board is
founded on substantial evidence.Moreover,
in administrative cases, notice" is not
indispensable, but the deprivation of
opportunity to be heard. That is not the
case here. The reality is that on October 1,
1986, Qualitrans opposed Royal Class'
application for "declaratory relief." It
cannot therefore be heard to say that the
Commission had acted without giving the
petitioner an avenue to air its side of the
story.
28.)
RP vs Migrino #89483 30 August
1990
FACTS:
Acting on information received by the New
AFP Anti-Graft Board, which indicated the
acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful
income, private respondent Ret. Lt. Tecson
was required by the Board to submit his
explanation/comment together with his
supporting evidence. Private respondent
was unable to produce his supporting
evidence because they were allegedly in the
custody of his bookkeeper who had gone
abroad. The Board proceeded with its
investigation and submitted its resolution,
recommending that private respondent be
prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep.
Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act
No. 1379, as amended. The case was set
for preliminary investigation by the
PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss
the case on the following grounds: (1) that
the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his
person; (2) that the action against him
under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already
prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as
it suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No.
1379 on prescription of actions, was
inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having
retired from the AFP, he was now beyond
the reach of Rep. Act No.3019. The Board
opposed the motion to dismiss. The PCGG
denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration but was denied by
the PCGG. Private respondent was directed
to submit his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidence. Private respondent
filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary
injunction with the RTC. Petitioner filed a
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 70
motion to dismiss and opposed the
application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on the principal
ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v.
Pena. Private respondent opposed the
motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the
opposition. The court judge denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The
respondent judge granted the application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining petitioners from
investigating or prosecuting private
respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and
1379 upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos.
Petitioner strongly argues that the private
respondent’s case falls within the
jurisdiction of the PCGG. Hence, this
petition.
Issues:
WON PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of
private respondent
Ruling:
No. It will not do to cite the order of the
PCGG Chairman, creating the Board and
authorizing it to investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, both retired and in active
service, to support the contention that
PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of
private respondent
Applying the rule in statutory construction
known as ejusdem generis, the term
“subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2
would refer to one who enjoys a close
association or relation with former Pres.
Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the
immediate family member, relative, and
close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close
relative, business associate, dummy, agent,
or nominee in E.O. No. 2. Clearly, this
alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is
not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.
29.)
Guilles vs CA G.R. No. 77098
November 27, 1990
FACTS:
On September 2, 1980, the Director of
Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision
declaring and recognizing the preferential
right of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to
explore, develop, exploit and lease the area
covered by her "MAMAKAR" mining claims
situated at Sitio Palasaan, Barrio Suyoc,
Municipality of Mankayan, Benguet. This
decision was appealed by private
respondents to the then Ministry of Natural
Resources. On October 6, 1982, respondent
Minister of Natural Resources dismissed the
appeal. From this dismissal, private
respondent’s heirs of John and Maria Guilles
interposed an appeal on November 4, 1982
to the Office of the President, docketed
therein as MNR Case No. 5096, but failed to
prosecute the same. Private respondents
later filed their respective motions for
reconsideration which, however, proved to
be belated as the decision of respondent
Minister had already become final and
executory. The finality of the decision
notwithstanding, respondent Minister of
Natural Resources rendered another
decision in the same MNR Case No. 5096 on
June 25, 1984, reversing and setting aside
the decision of October 6, 1982 and
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 71
declaring petitioner’s "MAMAKAR" claims as
null and void ab initio.
On July 25, 1984, petitioner sought the
reconsideration of the decision and prayed
for a status quo order. The Assistant
Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of
the Minister of Natural Resources issued the
status quo order on August 20, 1984 and
directed the respondents to answer the
motion within five (5) days from receipt of
the order. However, none of the
respondents complied therewith.
On July 25, 1984, petitioner sought the
reconsideration of the decision and prayed
for a status quo order. The Assistant
Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of
the Minister of Natural Resources issued the
status quo order on August 20, 1984 and
directed the respondents to answer the
motion within five (5) days from receipt of
the order. However, none of the
respondents complied therewith.
February 19, 1985, with the motion for
reconsideration still unresolved, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for preliminary injunction,
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
69937, for the nullification of the decision of
respondent Minister of Natural Resources
dated June 25, 1984 and to restrain public
respondent from further proceeding in said
case. Petitioner contended that respondent
Minister acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in rendering said decision.
On February 27, 1985, this Court resolved
to refer the case to the Court of Appeals
(then Intermediate Appellate Court) for
determination. On March 7, 1985,
respondent court initially dismissed the
petition for being premature inasmuch as
petitioner had an unresolved motion for
reconsideration pending in the Office of the
Minister of Natural Resources.
On March 27, 1985, petitioner prayed for
the reconsideration of the dismissal and
informed respondent court that her motion
for reconsideration had been denied by the
Minister of Natural Resources on January
31, 1985, notice of which she received only
on February 25, 1985. Petitioner also filed
with this Court on March 1, 1985 an
addendum to the petition giving the same
information, not knowing that said petition
had been referred to respondent court.
On April 10, 1985, respondent court
reconsidered its decision dismissing the
petition. Nevertheless, it thereafter ruled
against petitioner, holding that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies
and for which the petition must be
On
dismissed. It cited Section 50, Presidential
Decree No. 463, as authority for its ruling,
as follows:
"Sec. 50. Appeals. — Any party not satisfied
with the decision or order of the Director
may within five (5) days from receipt
thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions
of the Secretary are likewise appealable
within five (5) days from receipt thereof by
the affected party to the President of the
Philippines whose decision shall be final and
executory."
x x x
ISSUE:
WON the respondent Court erred in
dismissing the petitioner’s original
action for certiorari on the ground of
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 72
non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies
RULING:
YES. It is true that in our jurisdiction,
unless otherwise provided by law or
required by public interest, before bringing
an action in or resorting to the courts of
justice, all remedies of administrative
character affecting or determinative of the
controversy at that level should first be
exhausted by the aggrieved party. It is
likewise true, however, that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
a hard and fast rule. Foremost among the
exceptions is when the assailed act, order
or decision is patently illegal or was
performed or issued without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the SC’s opinion that the
decision in question, dated June 25, 1984,
is of such a defective nature. The decision it
superseded, dated October 6, 1982, was
already final and executory, the belated
motions for reconsideration by all the
private respondents in G.R. No. 74223 being
patently time-barred. Of course, the
aforesaid heirs of John and Maria Guilles did
file a timely appeal but they likewise failed
to prosecute the same. It is obvious and
indisputable, therefore, that respondent
Minister Peña gravely abused his discretion
in reversing his original decision which
precisely prompted June Prill Brett to
forthwith invoke the jurisdiction of the
courts.
The circumstance that the June 25, 1984
decision was rendered without jurisdiction is
itself confirmed by respondent court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 09349 which is the subject of
our review in G.R. No. 77098, to wit:
"The decision dated October 6, 1982 of the
Minister of Natural Resources in MNR Case
No. 5096 which the Heirs of Guilles received
on October 25, 1982, became final on
October 30, 1982 since it was not appealed
to the Office of the President pursuant to
Section 50 of P.D. No. 463, which provides:
‘Sec. 50. Any party not satisfied with the
decision or order of the Director may, within
five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to
the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary
are likewise appealable within five (5) days
from receipt thereof by the affected party to
the President of the Philippines whose
decision shall be final and executory. (P.D.
463)’
"Instead of pursuing their appeal in the
Office of the President, the petitioners filed
a belated motion for reconsideration in the
Ministry after Minister Peña had lost
jurisdiction to review, revise, or reverse his
decision because it had already become
final. Consequently, his amended decision
of June 25, 1984 was void for lack of
jurisdiction."
Indeed, as therein petitioner June Prill Brett
pointed out, the necessity of giving finality
to judgments that are not void is self-
evident. The interests of society impose it.
The opposing view might make litigation
more unendurable than the wrongs it is
intended to redress. It would create doubt,
real or imaginary, and controversy would
constantly arise as to what the judgment or
order was. Public policy and sound practice
demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become
final and executory at some definite time
fixed by law; and this rule holds true over
decisions rendered by administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial powers.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 73
Going back to the subject of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies, June Prill Brett’s
failure to appeal to the Office of the
President from the decision of Minister Peña
cannot also be considered a violation of the
rule as the latter is the alter ego of the
President and, under the doctrine of
qualified political agency, his action is
deemed to be that of the President.
All told, we hold that respondent court erred
in dismissing June Prill Brett’s action
for certiorari for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
30.
Brett vs IAC
1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW;
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; RULE AND
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — It is true that
in our jurisdiction, unless otherwise
provided by law or required by public
interest, before bringing an action in or
resorting to the courts of justice, all
remedies of administrative character
affecting or determinative of the
controversy at that level should first be
exhausted by the aggrieved party. (Miguel,
Et. Al. v. Vda. de Reyes, Et Al., 93Phil. 542
[1953]; Pestañas, Et. Al. v. Dyogi, Et. Al.,81
SCRA 574 [1978]). It is likewise true,
however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a hard and
fast rule. (Fernandez, Et Al., v. Cuneta, etc.,
Et Al., 108 Phil. 427 [1960]; National
Development Company, Et Al., v. Collector
of Customs of Manila, 118 Phil. 1265
[1963]). Foremost among the exceptions is
when the assailed act, order or decision is
patently illegal or was performed or issued
without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction. (Visca v. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Et Al.,
173 SCRA 222 [1989]). In the case at bar, it
is our considered opinion that the decision
in question, dated June 25, 1984, is of such
a defective nature. The decision it
superseded, dated October 6, 1982, was
already final and executory, the belated
motions for reconsideration by all the
private respondents in G.R. No. 74223 being
patently time-barred. Of course, the
aforesaid heirs of John and Maria Guilles did
file a timely appeal but they likewise failed
to prosecute the same. It is obvious and
indisputable, therefore, that respondent
Minister Peña gravely abused his discretion
in reversing his original decision which
precisely prompted June Prill Brett to
forthwith invoke the jurisdiction of the
courts.
FACTS:
On September 2, 1980, the Director of
Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision
declaring and recognizing the preferential
right of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to
explore, develop, exploit and lease the area
covered by her "MAMAKAR" mining claims
situated at Sitio Palasaan, Barrio Suyoc,
Municipality of Mankayan, Benguet. This
decision was appealed by private
respondents to the then Ministry of Natural
Resources.
The finality of the decision notwithstanding,
respondent Minister of Natural Resources
rendered another decision in the same MNR
Case No. 5096 on June 25, 1984, reversing
and setting aside the decision of October 6,
1982 and declaring petitioner’s "MAMAKAR"
claims as null and void ab initio.which lead
petitioner to seek reconsideration. A change
in the minister of the natural resources lead
to an appeal by Petitioner until it ultimately
leads to this petition for review on certiorari
Issues:
(1)WON respondent court erred in dismissing
petitioner’s original action for certiorari on the
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 74
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies,
(2)WON respondent court erred in invoking
Presidential No. 605 to deny petitioner’s prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction
HELD:
NO,
It is true that in the court’s jurisdiction, unless
otherwise provided
by law or required by public interest, before
bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of
justice, all remedies of administrative character
affecting or determinative of the controversy at that
level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved
party.
In the case at bar it is our considered opinion that
the decision in question, is of such a defective
nature. The decision it superseded was
already final and executory, the belated
motions for reconsideration by the private
respondents being patently time-barred. Although
the respondents did file a timely appeal, they failed
to likewise prosecute the same. It is obvious that
the respondent minister gravely abused his
discretion in reversing his original decision which
prompted petitioner to forthwith invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts. Wherefore, judgment
is hereby rendered affirming the assailed decision.
Also the assailed decision of respondent minister is
also reinstated without prejudice to the appeal in
the Office of the President taking its due course and
the consequent adjudication thereto
31.
Industrial Enterprises Inc vs CA
Facts:
Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was
granted a coal operating contract by the
Bureau of Energy Development (BED), for
the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern
Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of Energy for
another to contract for the additional three
coal blocks.
IEI was advised that there is another coal
operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a
Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI
will assign all its rights and interests to
MMIC.
IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum
plus damages against the MMIC and the
Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before
the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC
started operating in the coal blocks prior to
finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed
for that the rights for the operation be
granted back.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as
co-defendant because they have mortgages
in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed
Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is
President of both IEI and MMIC.
RTC ordered the rescission of the
memorandum and for the reinstatement of
the contract in favor of IEI.
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating
that RTC has no jurisdiction over the
matter.
Issue:
W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?
Held:
No. While the action filed by IEI sought the
rescission of what appears to be an ordinary
civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the
fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement
sought to be rescinded is derived from a
coal-operating contract and is inextricably
tied up with the right to develop coal-
bearing lands and the determination of
whether or not the reversion of the coal
operating contract over the subject coal
blocks to IEI would be in line with the
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 75
integrated national program for coal-
development and with the objective of
rationalizing the country's over-all coal-
supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of
action was not merely the rescission of a
contract but the reversion or return to it of
the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was
that in its Decision ordering the rescission of
the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter
alia, declared the continued efficacy of the
coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and
directed the BED to give due course to IEI's
application for three (3) IEI more coal
blocks. These are matters properly falling
within the domain of the BED.
In recent years, it has been the
jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in many cases involving
matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies. It
may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of a particular case, which
means that the matter involved is also
judicial in character. However, if the case is
such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge
of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of
facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts even though the matter is within the
proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies
"where a claim is originally cognizable in
the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative
body, in such case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its view"
Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
finds application in this case since the
question of what coal areas should be
exploited and developed and which entity
should be granted coal operating contracts
over said areas involves a technical
determination by the BED as the
administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter.
The Trial Court does not have the
competence to decide matters concerning
activities relative to the exploration,
exploitation, development and extraction of
mineral resources like coal. These issues
preclude an initial judicial determination. It
behooves the courts to stand aside even
when apparently they have statutory power
to proceed in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
32.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs CA & B.A
Gonzales
FACTS:
The petitioners Director of Lands
and the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources entered into a contract
on June 30,1973 with the private
respondent B.A. Gonzalez Surveying
Company for which the latter was bound to
execute a public land subdivision mapping
(Plsm) of the alienable and disposable lands
in the Municipality of Valderama, Antique,
Blk. I-IIII, L.C. No. 819, for and in
consideration of the amount of
P183,818.00.
However, despite written demands from the
Bureau of Lands to the private respondent
to commence the Numancia, Aklan Pcadm
project, the latter failed to do so;
consequently, in an order dated February 7,
1977, the former cancelled the contract with
regard to the said project and declared the
performance bond No. BCICI-3323 as
forfeited
BA GONZALES failed filed a motion and the
Director of Lands reinstated the said
contract on June 20, 1977 without however
granting the company’s request for a price
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 76
adjustment which denial the private
respondent seasonably appealed to the
Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources' This appeal is pending
On April 14, 1983, the Director of Lands
likewise scrapped the Valderama Plsm
contract because of the non-completion of
the project despite the grant of repeated
extensions totalling 1,200 days. Private
respondent also appealed and both appeals
were pending.
Meanwhile, without both appeals being
resolved, the Director of Lands conducted a
public bidding for the cadastral survey of
several municipalities including the
Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and the
Municipality of Valderama, Antique. In the
said bidding, Armando Villamayor and
Cristina Matuod were declared as the
successful bidders for the Numancia and
Valderama projects, respectively.
Thereupon, the private respondent filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus with
a prayer for a temporary restraining order
with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 10421, alleging that the Director of
Lands acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in awarding the said cadastral
survey projects to other persons while the
appeals of the private respondent remain
pending.and the respondent court of
appeals granted the said petition!
petitioners file motion for reconsideration,
Hence this petition
ISSUE: WON the CA violates the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction when it issued writ of
injunction against the Director of Lands in
granting award of cadastral survey project
to new contractors involving lands subject
to prior mapping projects with another
contractor ( the private respondent) whose
contracts are involved in a pending appeal
to the Secretary of environment and Natural
Resources.
HELD:Yes, the respondent court committed
a reversible error in stopping the
implementation of the results of the bidding
for the cadastral survey projects conducted
by the Director of Lands. The said injunction
issued by the respondent court constitutes a
violation of the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction and defeats the
very purpose thereof, which is, "not only to
give the administrative agency the
opportunity to decide the controversy by
itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the
courts
33.
Paat
vs
Court of Appeals, et. Al.
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167
FACTS
The truck of private respondent
Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR
personnel while on its way to Bulacan
because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest product
found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the
confiscation of the truck and required the
owner to explain. Private respondents failed
to submit required explanation. The DENR
Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of
the truck. Private respondents brought the
case to the DENR Secretary. Pending
appeal, private respondents filed a replevin
case before the RTC against petitioner
Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the
same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case
contending, inter alia, that private
respondents had no cause of action for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The trial court denied their motion. Hence,
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 77
this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin
because the truck was under administrative
seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case
falls within the exception of the doctrine.
HELD: No
The Court held in the negative. The
Court has consistently held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of
administrative processed afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such
remedy should be exhausted first before
court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court’ intervention
is fatal to one’s cause of action.
The doctrine is a relative one and
its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is violation of
due process, (2) when the issue involved is
purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppels on the part of
the administrative agency concerned, (5)
when there is irreparable injury, (6) when
the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of
the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.
A suit for replevin cannot be
sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them
for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as
amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for
lack of cause of action in view of the private
respondents’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been
the proper course of action by the lower
court instead of assuming jurisdiction over
the case and consequently issuing the writ
ordering the return of the truck.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
DR. OFELIA P. TRISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
LEYTE STATE COLLEGE BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 78623, December 17, 1990
FACTS:
For two years, Petitioner discharged
her duties and functions as vice-president of
the college. However, from the time when
Magdalena S. Remo retired as President of
the college, there was a total revamp in the
composition of the Board of Trustees. Dr.
Purificacion M. Flores was designated
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 78
officer-in-charge and later appointed as the
new College President. Anticipating moves
to replace her as a vice-president, petitioner
submitted to the Board of Trustees a
position paper, asserting that the Board
could not appoint a vice-president because
the position was not vacant, the vice-
president’s term was not co-terminous with
that of the recommending president who
had retired, and the incumbent was not
replaceable at the pleasure of the Board. In
fact, she stated therein that she is qualified
for the college presidency.
Petitioner’s apprehensions were
proved right by the later development. She
received a letter from the President Flores
assigning her to another position. Alleging
that the appointment of Dr. Crescencia V.
Chan-Gonzaga to the position of vice-
president in effect eased her out of said
position. She contented that her
constitutional and legal rights to security of
tenure had been violated. She alleged
therein that since her ouster as vice-
president, she had been demoted to the
position of Director of Research and that
the 20% salary increase granted to all
academic personnel of government schools
was not given to her because under the
plantilla approved by the Office of Budget
and Management, her salary was reduced
by one step since she was no longer the
college vice-president. She argued that she
was terminated and stripped of her rank
and status without legal cause and due
process.
Private respondent Dr. Gonzaga and
public respondent Dr. Flores contend that
petitioner was merely “designated” and not
“appointed” to the college vice-presidency.
They aver that petitioner’s “designation” to
said position was “purely an internal
arrangement which does not require
approval or confirmation by the Civil Service
Commission.” They maintain that
petitioner’s term of office being co-
terminous with the retired college president,
petitioner may not complain that she was
illegally dismissed from the vice-presidency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was
merely designated or permanently
appointed.
RULING:
While in a line cases, the term
“APPOINT” applied to the nomination or
designation of an individual. Common
usage, however oftentimes puts distinction
in such that “APPOINTMENT” connotes
permanency, while “DESIGNATION” implies
temporariness. A public officer to another
position may mean to vest him with
additional duties while he perform the
functions of his permanent office; or in
some cases, a public officer may be
“designated” to a position in an acting
capacity. However in this case, the court
rules that the laws contemplate of a duly
appointed vice president. As such, petitioner
could be removed only for justifiable reason
and such after she was accorded due
process.
Executive Order No. 17 was issued
by the President on May 28, 1986 “to
obviate unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving
officials and employees, particularly in the
career civil service.”
Section 1 thereof provides that
separation or replacement of officers and
employees shall be made “only for
justifiable reasons.” For its purposes, a state
college is considered a ministry. “SEC 3. The
following shall be the grounds for
separation/replacement of personnel:
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 79
1. Existence of a case for summary
dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of
the Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of a probable cause for
violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act as determined
by the Ministry Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence of inefficiency
in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of public office for partisan
political purposes; and
5. Any other analogous ground
showing that the incumbent is unfit
to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in interest
of the service.”
Petitioner learned of her removal as
vice-president when it was already a fait
accompli. Hence, all she could do under the
circumstances was to petition for the
reconsideration of the Board resolution
designating Gonzaga as her replacement
and at the same time asserting her
constitutional right to security of tenure.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED and
the IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of
petitioner with back wages to the position
of vice-president of Leyte State College is
hereby ordered.
39.
JOVENTINO MADRIGAL, Petitioner-
Appellant,
vs.
PROV. GOV. ARISTEO M. LECAROZ,
VICE-GOVERNOR CELSO ZOLETA, JR.,
PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERS
DOMINGO RIEGO AND MARCIAL
PRINCIPE; PROV. ENGR. ENRIQUE M.
ISIDRO, ABRAHAM T. TADURAN AND
THE PROVINCE OF MARINDUQUE,
Respondent-Appellees.
G.R. No. L-46218, October 23, 1990
FACTS:
On November 25, 1971, public
respondents abolished petitioner-appellant
Joventino Madrigal's position as a
permanent construction captain in the office
of the Provincial Engineer from the annual
Roads Bridges Fund Budget for fiscal year
1971-1972 by virtue of Resolution No. 204.
The abolition was allegedly due to the poor
financial condition of the province and it
appearing that his position was not
essential. Madrigal appealed to the Civil
Service Commission. He transmitted a
follow-up letter to the Commission
regarding his appeal. On January 7, 1974,
the Commission in its 1st Indorsement
declared the removal of Madrigal from the
service illegal. On August 4, 1975, Madrigal
sent a letter to the Provincial Board
requesting implementation of the resolution
of the Commission and consequently,
reinstatement to his former position.
However, the Provincial Board denied
Madrigal's request for reinstatement
because his former position no longer
exists.
Madrigal then filed a petition before
the Court of First Instance of Marinduque
against public respondents for mandamus
and damages seeking restoration of his
abolished position in the Roads and Bridges
Fund Budget of the Province, reinstatement
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 80
to such position; and payment of his back
salaries plus damages. The trial court issued
an order dismissing the petition on the
ground that Madrigal's cause of action was
barred by laches. Hence, this petition.
Madrigal alleges that the one (1)
year period prescribed in an action for quo
warranto is not applicable in an action for
mandamus because Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court does not provide for such prescriptive
period. The declaration by the trial court
that the pendency of administrative
remedies does not operate to suspend the
period of one (1) year within which to file
the petition for mandamus, should be
confined to actions for quo warranto only.
On the contrary, he contends that
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
condition sine qua non before one can
petition for mandamus. On the part of
public respondents, they aver that it has
become an established part of our
jurisprudence, being a public policy
repeatedly cited by the courts in myriad of
mandamus cases, that actions for
reinstatement should be brought within one
year from the date of dismissal, otherwise,
they will be barred by laches. The pendency
of an administrative remedy before the
Commission does not stop the running of
the one (1) year period within which a
mandamus case for reinstatement should be
filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may
still be entitled to reinstatement.
RULING:
NO, he is already barred by laches.
The unbending jurisprudence in this
jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for
quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles
to public office must be filed within one (1)
year from the date the petitioner is ousted
from his position.
The Court noted that in actions of
quo warranto involving right to an office,
the action must be instituted within the
period of one year. This has been the law in
the island since 1901, the period having
been originally fixed in Section 216 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190).The
Court finds this provision to be an
expression of policy on the part of the State
that persons claiming a right to an office of
which they are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said
office and that if they do not do so within a
period of one year, they shall be considered
as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of
public policy and convenience that demand
the adoption of a similar period for persons
claiming rights to positions in the civil
service. There must be stability in the
service so that public business may (sic) be
unduly retarded; delays in the statement of
the right to positions in the service must be
discouraged.
The fatal drawback of
Madrigal's cause is that he came to
court out of time. As aforestated, it
was only after four (4) years and
twenty (20) days from the abolition
of his position that he file the
petition for mandamus and
damages. This single circumstance
has closed the door for any judicial
remedy in his favor.
And this one (1) year period is not
interrupted by the prosecution of any
administrative remedy (Torres v. Quintos,
88 Phil. 436). Actually, the recourse by
Madrigal to the Commission was
unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a
case where pure questions of law are
raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 81
administrative remedies cannot apply
because issues of law cannot be resolved
with finality by the administrative officer.
Appeal to the administrative officer of
orders involving questions of law would be
an exercise in futility since administrative
officers cannot decide such issues with
finality (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co.,
Inc. v. Drilon, et al., G.R. No. 82849, August
2, 1989, citing Pascual v. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466; Mondano v.
Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143). In the present case,
only a legal question is to be resolved, that
is, whether or not the abolition of Madrigal's
position was in accordance with law.
40.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 10TH
JUDICIAL BRANCH XXV, CAGAYAN DE
ORO CITY, PROVINCE OF MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, MUNICIPALITY OF
JASAAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL AND
BARANGAY APLAYA, JASAAN,
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 72477, October 16, 1990
FACTS:
The Province of Misamis Oriental
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV
against NAPOCOR for the collection of real
property tax covering the period 1978 to
1984. Petitioner contends that the court has
no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is
not the proper forum for the adjudication of
the case pursuant to P.D. 242 which
provides that disputes between agencies of
the government including GOCC’s shall be
administratively settled or adjudicated by
the Secretary of Justice. On the other hand
respondent invokes P.D. 464 which governs
the appraisal and assessment of real
property for purposes of taxation by
provinces, cities and municipalities thereby
justifying its position in favor of the
concerned municipal corporations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court
has jurisdiction over the civil action.
RULING:
Yes. P.D. 242 must yield to P.D. 464
on the matter of which tribunal or agency
has jurisdiction over the enforcement and
collection of real property taxes. granted
that the latter is a special law dealing
specifically with real property taxes
whereas, P.D. 242 is a general law that
deals with a broad coverage concerning
administrative settlement of disputes, claims
and controversies between or among
government agencies and instrumentalities.
Special laws ought to be upheld and
construed as exceptions to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances
calling for a contrary conclusion.
41.
JOAQUIN M. TEOTICO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEMOCRITO AGDA O., SR., and
HON. JUDGE IGNACIO M. CAPULONG,
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 82
Regional Trial Court, Branch No. 134,
Makati, Metro Manila, Respondents.
G.R. No. 87437, May 29, 1991
FACTS:
On 2 January 1984, Honorable Cesar
Lanuza, then Administrator of the Fiber
Development Authority (FIDA for short), an
agency attached to the Department of
Agriculture, appointed Agda as CHIEF FIBER
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER. This appointment
does not indicate any specific station or
place of assignment.
Under Special Order No. 29, series
of 1984, dated 2 January 1984, which was
to take effect immediately and to "remain in
force until revoked," Administrator
Lanuza designated Agda as "Acting Regional
Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II." In
Special Order No. 219 dated 13 November
1987, series of 1987, Administrator Lanuza
"temporarily re-assigned" Agda, "in the
interest of the service," at the main office of
the Administrator to perform special
functions which may be assigned to him,
and one Mr. Epitacio Lanuza, Jr., Assistant
Fiber Regional Administrator, was
designated Officer in Charge of FIDA Region
I.
On 9 December 1987, Agda prepared for
filing with the Civil Service Commission, the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture,
and the Commission on Audit an Urgent
Petition To Stop Implementation and Nullify
Special Order No. 219, s. '87, alleging
therein that the Special Order is (a) devoid
of legal basis as it does not preserve and
maintain a status quo before the
controversy, (b) against the interest of
public service considering that Epitacio
Lanuza has been cited for two cases both
involving dishonesty, abuse of privileges
and character unbecoming a government
official, (c) improper, inappropriate and
devoid of moral justification, and (d) a
violation of Civil Service rules and regulation
considering that it violates the rule on
nepotism since Epitacio Lanuza and
Administrator Lanuza are cousins.
On 4 April 1988 Teotico placed Agda
under preventive suspension pursuant to his
Special Order No. 74. It likewise appears
that on 13 April 1988 Agda sent a letter to
the Commission on Elections inquiring if
Special Order No. 219, series of 1987, of
Administrator Lanuza was referred and
submitted to it for approval three days
before its implementation. In a letter dated
14 April 1988, Atty. Horacio SJ Apostol,
Manager of the Law Department of the
Commission, informed private respondent
that "as of this date, records of the
Department do not show that aforesaid
Special Order was submitted or referred to
this Commission for approval."
On 18 April 1988 Agda filed with the
court below in Civil Case No. 88-577 his
Amended Petition 25 for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Injunction with preliminary
injunction and restraining order against
Teotico and the three (3) members of the
FIDA-AC alleging, in substance, that Special
Order No. 219 of 13 November 1987 issued
by then Fida Administrator Lanuza is null
and void for having been issued in violation
of Section 48 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree) which prohibits the detail or re-
assignment of civil service personnel within
three months before an election and Section
261(h) of Batas Pambansa Blg 881 (The
Omnibus Election Code).
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge
clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion
in taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 88-
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 83
577, in deliberately failing to act on the
motion to dismiss, in issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction, and in ordering the
“reinstatement” of Agda, “as Fiber Regional
Administrator, FIDA Region I, with full back
wages and allowances mandated by law.”
RULING:
Agda was not appointed as Fiber
Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, but
as CHIEF FIBER DEVELOPMENT OFFICER;
he was not appointed to any specific
station. He was merely designated as Acting
Regional Administrator For FIDA Regions I
and II. Not having been appointed to any
specific station, he could be transferred or
assigned to any other place by the head of
office where in the opinion of the latter his
services may be utilized more effectively.
In the latest case of Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, et al. vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., 183
SCRA 555, 562, We held:
The appointment of Navarro
as principal does not refer to any
particular station or school. As such,
she could be assigned to any station
and she is not entitled to stay
permanently at any specific school.
(Bongbong vs. Parado, 57 SCRA
623). When she was assigned to the
Carlos Albert High School, it would
not have been with the intention to
let her stay in said school
permanently. Otherwise, her
appointment would have so stated.
Consequently, she may be assigned
to any station or school in Quezon
City as the exigencies of public
service require even without her
consent.
Moreover, it should be borne in mind
that Special Order No. 29 of 2 January 1984
merely designated Agda as Acting Regional
Administrator for Regions I and II. Such
being the case, the rule enunciated
in Cuadra vs.Cordova etc., 103 Phil. 391, on
temporary appointments or appointments in
an acting capacity that they are terminable
at the pleasure of the appointing authority,
is applicable to Agda. He can neither claim a
vested right to the station to which he was
assigned nor to security of tenure thereat.
The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No.
807, allows transfer, detail and re-
assignment. If the employee concerned
believes that there is no justification
therefore, he "may appeal his case to" the
Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise
ordered by the Commission, the decision to
detail an employee shall be executory. Agda
invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the
Commission when he filed his Urgent
Petition To Stay Implementation and Nullify
the Special Order in question with the Civil
Service Commission. It does not, however,
appear to Us that he exerted genuine and
sincere efforts to obtain an expeditious
resolution thereof What appears to be clear
is that he used its pendency as an excuse
for his refusal to comply with the
memorandum of Teotico of 7 January 1988
and the routing slip request of 11 March
1988 for the key to the safety vault.
Furthermore, even in the cases of
transfer or detail within the prohibited
period prior to an election, an aggrieved
party is provided an appropriate
administrative remedy. Section 6 of Rule VI
of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel
Actions and Policies provides:
Sec. 6. Except when the
exigencies of the service require, an
official or employee of the
government may not be ordered
detailed or reassigned during the
three-month period before any local
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 84
or national election, and if he
believes that the order for his detail
or reassignment is due to
harassment, coercion, intimidation,
or other personal reasons, he may
appeal the order to the Commission.
Until this is proven, however, the
order is presumed to be in the
interest of the service and
notwithstanding the appeal, the
decision to detail or reassign him
shall be executory, but the
Commission may order deferment of
suspension of the detail or
reassignment ex parte."
Agda made no attempt to avail of
this remedy. In his Urgent Petition to Stay
Implementation and Nullify Special Order
No. 219, nothing is mentioned about a
violation of the ban on transfer or detail.
The reason seems too obvious. Until he filed
the Amended Petition before the court
below he did not consider his re-assignment
per Special Order No. 219 as a violation of
the ban on transfer or detail during the
three-month period before the election.
Even if the 16 December
reinstatement order should be construed to
be directed against the preventive
suspension order issued by Teotico on 4
April 1988, respondent Judge clearly
capriciously breached the limits of his
discretion for nowhere in his amended
petition has Agda attacked its validity or
legality on any other ground than its being
issued to implement Special Order No.
219, which he claims was issued in violation
of the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code and the Civil Service Decree
prohibiting transfer or reassignment of civil
service officials and employees within three
months before the local election of January
18, 1988. He assailed the suspension order
not on the ground that Teotico does not
have the authority to file the formal charge
and to preventively suspend him, but solely
on the basis of his self-serving claim that
both were issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
because they were meant to implement
Special Order No. 219.
Lastly, we hold that both the
preliminary injunction and the reinstatement
order issued by respondent Judge
practically granted the main relief prayed
for by Agda even before the hearing on the
case on the merits. In Obias, et
al., vs. Hon. Borja, et al., 136 SCRA 687,
We ruled that respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction which in effect
practically granted the principal relief
sought in the Mandamus case. The reason
for this is that such issuance "would, in
effect, be a prejudgment of the main case
and a reversal of the rule on the burden of
proof since it would assume the proposition
which the petitioner is inceptively bound to
prove.
42
G.R. No. 112708-09. March 29, 1996]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, SIPALAY
TRADING CORPORATION and ALLIED
BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 85

Trial of SIPALAYs and ALLIEDs petitions

(S.B. 0095 and S.B. 0100) with Civil Case
Facts: Petitioner PCGG issued
0005 - a complaint for Reversion,
separate orders against private respondents
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and
Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied
Damages dated July 17, 1987 likewise filed
Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to
before the SANDIGANBAYAN by the PCGG
as SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their
against Lucio Tan, Ferdinand and Imelda
sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions
Marcos, and other defendants.The
were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before
SANDIGANBAYAN formally denied this
this Court assailing the sequestration
motion.
orders. Where SIPALAYs petition was
docketed as S.B. 0095, and that of ALLIED Issue: W/N the SANDIGANBAYANs
as S.B. 0100, concerning SIPALAY (S.B. denial of the PCGGs motion to dismiss
0095), its 360, 875, 513 shares of stock in proper?
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation
Held: Yes. One of the forceful reason
which owns the Century Park Sheraton
warranting the denial of the PCGG's motion
Hotel are, according to the PCGG, part of
to dismiss is that this case falls under two
Lucio C. Tans ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG
recognized exceptions to the general rule of
on July 24, 1986 thus sequestered these
prior exhaustion of administrative remedies,
SIPALAY shares under a Sequestration
and the SANDIGANBAYAN's brief but lucid
Order and Supervisory Committee.
disquisition on one exception merits this
ALLIED went to court for the same
Court's approval.
reason that the PCGG was bent on
implementing the order. ALLIED contended Two. The rule on non-exhaustion of
that this order is not one for sequestration administrative (sic) remedies does not apply
but is particularly a general search warrant to petitioners' case. This rule, which is
which fails to meet the constitutional based on sound public policy and practical
requisites for its valid issuance. PCGG considerations, is not inflexible. It is subject
instead of filing a formal offer of evidence, to many exceptions, to wit: (i) where there
they rather filed a Motion to Dismiss the is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions. At some the doctrine; (ii) where the challenged
earlier time (May 21, 1992), the PCGG filed administrative act is patently illegal
a Motion For The Consolidation Or Joint amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (iii) where
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 86

there is unreasonable delay or official him to submit a written explanation within

inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the 48 hours as to why he failed to report for
complainant; and (iv) where the question his trip scheduled on 28 December 1991.
involved is purely legal and will ultimately However, Santos claimed that on 2 January
have to be decided by the courts of justice. 1992, he applied for a leave of absence with
the petitioners Operations Manager Danilo
The other exception is the first in the
Alvarado; but Alvarado tore the leave
enumeration, i.e., "where there is estoppel
application, verbally terminated his services,
on the part of the party invoking the
and even forced him off the
doctrine", consisting in the PCGG's being
premises. Santos then opted to mail his
guilty of estoppel by laches which has just
application for leave, also on 2 January
been discussed in great length. Therefore,
1992.
the denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss
Subsequently, Santos received a letter
was proper.
of termination premised on the grounds
that: (1) he committed insubordination to a
43
lawful order of his superior by failing to
G.R. No. 116025. February 22, 1996]
submit the required written explanation;
SUNSHINE TRANSPORTATION,
and (2) such failure amounted to an
INCORPORATED, petitioner,
admission of his guilt. Nonetheless, he kept
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
reporting for work, but was not allowed
COMMISSION and REALUCIO R.
entry into the companys premises,
SANTOS, respondents.
prompting him to believe that he had been
either suspended or dismissed.
Facts:On 24 August 1989, petitioner
On 21 December 1992, Santos filed
Sunshine Transportation, Inc. hired private
with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for (a)
respondent Realucio R. Santos
illegal suspension, (b) illegal dismissal, (c)
(hereinafter Santos) as a bus driver on a
illegal deduction of Bicol trip allowance, (d)
probationary basis. After six months, the
non-payment of salaries, overtime pay,
former then extended the latter a regular
premiums for holidays, rest day and night
appointment as Bus Driver Class C. On 7
shift, allowances, and separation pay.He
January 1992, Santos received a
also prayed for reinstatement with back
memorandum4 from the petitioner directing
wages and moral damages.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 87
Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio dismissed
the complaint upon a finding that Santos
was dismissed for cause with due process
and that he was not entitled to his money
claims. Santos appealed to the NLRC and
the NLRC
upheld the Labor Arbiters finding. Unsatisfie
d with the NLRC decision,
the petitioner filed the instant special civil
action for
certiorari against NLRC.
ISSUE: W/N the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
decision.
Held: No. Section 14, Rule VII of
the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
which allows an aggrieved party to file a
motion for reconsideration of any order,
resolution, or decision of the NLRC,
constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy which the said party may avail of.
Accordingly, and in the light of the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a
motion for reconsideration must first be
filed before the special action for certiorari
may be availed of. In the case at bench,
the records do not show and neither does
the petitioner make a claim that it filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the
challenged decision before it came to us
through this action. It has not, as well,
suggested any plausible reason for direct
recourse to this Court against the decision
in question.
44
G.R. No. 121587. March 9, 1999]
SOLEDAD DY, doing business under
the name and style RONWOOD
LUMBER, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ODEL BERNARDO
LAUSA, respondent.
Facts: On May 31, 1993, the Mayor
of Butuan City issued Executive Order No.
93-01 creating Task Force Kalikasan to
combat "illegal logging, log smuggling or
possession of and/or transport of illegally
cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and
other forest products" in that... city.
On July 1, 1993, the members of the task
force received confidential information that
two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would
be brought to Butuan City from the
Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area.
Forester Resurreccion Maxilom of the DENR
issued a temporary seizure order and a
seizure receipt for the two vehicles and their
cargo consisting of several pieces of lumber
of different sizes and dimensions, but
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 88
Lucero, the caretaker of the compound
where they were seized,... refused to accept
them. The seized lumber and vehicles were
then taken to the City motorpool and placed
in the custody of respondent Lausa.
For lack of claimants, DENR Regional
Technical Director Raoul Geollegue
recommended to the Secretary on July 29,
1993 the forfeiture of the lumber and the
two vehicles.
On October 20, 1993, more than two
months after the lumber had been forfeited,
petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the
lumber, filed a suit for replevin in the
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch
5) for its recovery.
Before the court could act on his motion, he
moved to dismiss and/or quash the writ of
replevin on the ground that the lumber in
question, having been seized and forfeited
by the DENR... pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as
amended (Revised Forestry Code), was
under its custody and, therefore, resort
should first be made to the DENR.
Issues: W/N RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
VERIFICATION MADE BY LORENCIO DY
AND NOT BY PETITIONER SOLEDAD Y. DY
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE
ISSUANCE OF THE REPLEVIN WRIT.
Held:The rule is that a party must exhaust
all administrative remedies before he can
resort to the courts.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such
remedy should be exhausted first before a
court's judicial power can be sought.
As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies, the Court
of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed
orders of the trial court granting petitioner's
application for a replevin writ and denying
private respondent's motion to dismiss.
Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D. No.
705, as amended, the lumber properly came
under the custody of the DENR and all
actions seeking to recover possession
thereof should be directed to that agency.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated January 19, 1995, and its
Resolution, dated July 26, 1995, in CA-G.R.
SP 33099 are AFFIRMED with the
modification that the complaint for recovery
of personal property is DISMISSED.
Principles:
Section 8 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
provides:
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 89

SEC. 8. Review. ¾ All actions and decisions
of the Director are subject to review, motu
propio or upon appeal of any person
aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head
whose decision shall be final and executory
after the lapse of thirty (30) days from...
receipt by the aggrieved party of said
decision, unless appealed to the President in
accordance with Executive Order No. 19,
series of 1966. The Decision
Department Head may not be reviewed by
the courts except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition.
45
G.R. No. 127139. February 19, 1999
JAIME C. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. CITY
OF MANILA and HON. BENJAMIN A.G.
VEGA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila,
Branch 39, respondents
and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila,
including the City of Manila, to conduct the
general revision of real property and after
obtaining the necessary funds from the City
Council, the City Assessor began the
process of general revision based on the
updated fair market values of the real
properties.
of the The City Assessor’s Office submitted the
proposed schedule of fair market values to
the City Council for its appropriate
action. The council then enacted Manila
Ordinance No. 7894 which was approved.
With the implementation of the ordinance,
the tax on the land owned by the petitioner
was increase hence he filed a special
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of
the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 for
being “unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory.”

Facts: Section 219 of Republic Act Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect

7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government thereafter, reducing by fifty percent (50%)

Code of 1991 requires the conduct of the the assessment levels (depending on the

general revision of real property. use of property, e.g., residential,

The revision of real property assessments commercial) for the computation of tax

prescribed therein was not yet enforced in due. The new ordinance amended the

the City of Manila. Upon receipt of assessment levels provided by Section

Memorandum Circular No. 04-95 from the 74, paragraph (A) of Manila Ordinance No.

Bureau of Local Government Finance 7794..

relating to the failure of most of the cities

 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 90

Despite the amendment brought about by matters coming primarily within the
Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the controversy competence of other department. x x x
proceeded.
There are however a number of
The trial court dismissed the case for failure instances when the doctrine may be
of the petitioner to exhaust administrative dispensed with and judicial action validly
remedies. resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptional cases are: (1) when the
ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of question raised is purely legal, (2) when the
exhaustion of administrative remedies may administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when
be dispensed with in the instant case the act complained of is patently illegal; (4)
HELD: NO. As a general rule, when there is urgent need for judicial
where the law provides for the remedies intervention; (5) when the claim involved is
against the action of an administrative small; (6) when irreparable damage will be
board, body, or officer, relief to courts can suffered; (7) when there is no other plain,
be sought only after exhausting all remedies speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when
provided. The reason rests upon the strong public interest is involved; (9) when
presumption that the administrative body, if the subject of controversy is private land;
given the chance to correct its mistake or and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding
error, may amend its decision on a given (citation omitted).
matter and decide it properly. Therefore,
where a remedy is available within the In the court’s opinion, however, the instant
administrative machinery, this should be petition does not fall within any of the
resorted to before resort can be made to exceptions above-mentioned.
the courts, not only to give the
administrative agency the opportunity to
decide the matter by itself correctly, but 46)
Salinas vs NLRC #114671
also to prevent unnecessary and premature 24November 1999
resort to courts.
FACTS:Petitioners were employed with
“One of the reasons for the doctrine of Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (AG & P).
exhaustion is the separation of powers Salinas was a carpenter from 1983 - 1988,
Alejandro a bulk cement operator and
which enjoins upon the judiciary a crane driver from1982-1989 as bulk
becoming policy of non-interference with cement operator, Cortez a carpenter and
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 91
forklift operator from 1979-1988, and
Samulde a lubeman and stationary operator
from 1982-1989.
They, the petitioners filed separate complai
nts for illegal dismissal and consolidated by
labor arbiter.They claimed that th
ey had been covered by a number
o f c o n t r a c t s renewed continuously,
with periods ranging from 5 to 9
years, and they performed the same
kind of work throughout their
employment, and such was usually
necessary and desirable in the trade
and business of the respondent
corporation and their work did not end
on a project to project basis although
the contract was made to appear by
the employer through the signing of
separate employment contract.
The labor arbiter dismissed petitions
on the ground that the petitioners are
project employees whose work
contract with AG & P indicates that
they were employed in such category;
that they have been assigned to
different work projects not just to one
and that their work relation with AG &
P, relative to termination is ground by
Policy Instruction No. 200 (rule
governing project employees). On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor’s
findings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are
merely project employees
HELD:
No. the petitioners are regular employees.
The mandate in Art. 281 of the Labor Code,
which prescribes that the ‘provisions of
written agreements to the contract
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreements of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform
activities which necessary and desirable on
the usual business or trade of the employer
and that ‘any employee who has rendered
atleast 1 year of service, whether
continuous or broken shall be considered
regular employee with respect to the
activity which he is employed and
employment shall continue while exists’,
should apply in the case of petitioners.
It is basic rule that in carrying out and
interpreting the provisions of the Labor
Code and implementing regulation, the
workingman’s welfare should primordial and
paramount consideration. The
interpretation herein made gives
meaning and substance to the liberal
and compassionate spirit of the law
enunciated in Art. 4 of the Labor Code-
all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provision of Labor
Code including its implementing rules
and regulation shall be resolved in
favor of the labor.
Petitioners had been providing the
respondent corporation with continuous and
uninterrupted service, except for a day or so
gap in their successive employment
contract. Their contract has been renewed
several times, with the total length of their
services ranging from 5 to 9.
47)
Jalandoni vs Drilon G.R. No. 115239-
40. March 2, 2000
Facts: Private respondent Ledesma filed
an administrative complaint for violation
of the RPC and the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act against the
petitioner with the PCGG. Exactly a year
thereafter, petitioner Jalandoni filed a
complaint for the crime of libel against
officials/directors of OPMC. Herein is a
petition for certiorari seeking to nullify
and set aside the orders of the Honorable
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 92
Secretary of Justice withdrawing the
information in I.S. Nos. 93-6228 and 93-
6422 and denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by herein petitioner
Jalandoni.
Issue: Can malice be presumed from
defamatory words? Who has the burden of
proving malice?
Held: No. Under Article 361 of the
Revised Penal Code, in libel cases against
public officials, for liability to arise, the
alleged defamatory statement must relate
to official conduct, even if the defamatory
statement is false, unless the public
official concerned proves that the
statement was made with actual malice,
that is, with knowledge that it was false or
not. The subject of the defamatory
statement has the burden of proving
malice on the part of the author of such
statement. The same was not written
to cast aspersion on the good name
of the petitioner. The paid
advertisement merely served as a vehicle
to inform the stockholders of the going-ons
in the business world and only exposed the
irregularities surrounding the PCGG and
RCBC deal and the parties involved.
48)
Demaisip vs Bacal #139382
06December 2000
Facts: Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career
Executive Service Examinations in 1989. On
July 28,1994, she was conferred CES
eligibility and appointed Regional Director of
the Public Attorney’s Office. On January 5,
1995, she was appointed by then President
Ramos to the rank of CESO III. On
November 5, 1997, she was
designated by the Secretary of Justice
as Acting Chief Public Attorney. On
February 5, 1998, her appointment was
confirmed by President Ramos so that, on
February 20, 1998, she took her oath and
assumed office. On July 1, 1998, Carina
J. Demaisip was appointed “chief
public defender” by President
Estrada. Apparently because the position
was held by Bacal, another appointment
paper was issued by the President on July
6, 1998 designating Demaisip as “chief
public
defender(formerlyc h i e f p u b l i c a t t o r n e
y), PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE vice AT
T Y . JOSEFINA G. BACAL, effective
July 1, 1998. On the other hand, Bacal
was appointed “Regional Director, Public
Defender’s Office” by the President.O n
July 7, 1998, Demaisip took her
oath of office. President
Estrada then issued
am e m o r a n d u m , d a t e d J u l y 1 0 ,
1998, to the personnel of the
“Public Defender’s Office”
announcing the appointment of Demaisip as
“CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER.” Secretary of
Justice was notified of the appointments of
Demaisip and Bacal on July 15, 1998.On
July 17, 1998, Bacal filed a petition for quo
warranto questioning her replacement as
Chief Public Attorney. The petition,
which was filed directly with this
Court, was dismissed without prejudice
to its refiling in the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, Bacal brought her
case in the CA which ruled in her favor
finding her to be lawfully entitled to
the Office of Chief Public Attorney.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Bacal is entitled to
the contested position
Held: No. What should be emphasized
in this case is that respondent Josefina G.
Bacal is a
CESOI I I a n d t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n o
f Regional Director of the PAO
, to which she was transferred
, corresponds to her CES Rank Level
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 93
III and Salary Grade 28. This was her
position before her “appointment” on
February 5, 1998 to the position of
Chief Public Attorney of the PAO,
which requires a CES Rank Level I for
appointment thereto. Respondent Bacal
therefore has no ground to complain. She
may have been considered for promotion to
Rank I to make her appointment a s C h i e f
Public Attorney
permanent. The fact, however, is
that this did not materialize as
petitioner Carina
J. Demaisip was appointed in her
place. If respondent was paid a s
a l a r y equivalent to Salary Grade 30 while
she was holding that office, it was only
because, under the law, if a CESO is
assigned to a position with a higher
salary grade than that corresponding
to his/her rank, he/she will be allowed
the salary of the CES position. As
Bacal does not have the rank
appropriate for the position
of Chief Public Attorney,
her appointment to that position
cannot be considered permanent, and
she can claim no security of tenure in
respect of that position. Appointments,
assignments, reassignments, and transfers
in the Career Executive Service are based
on rank. Thus, security of tenure in the
career executive service is thus acquired
with respect to rank and not to
position. The guarantee of security of
tenure to members of the CES does not
extend to the particular positions to which
they may be appointed a concept which is
applicable only to first and second-level
employees in the civil service but to the
rank to which they are appointed by the
President. Accordingly, respondent did not
acquire security of tenure by the mere fact
that she was appointed to the higher
position of Chief Public Attorney since she
was not subsequently appointed to the rank
of CESO I based on her performance in that
position as required by the rules of the CES
Board. Within the Career Executive Service,
personnel can be shifted from one office or
position to another without violation of their
right to security of tenure because their
status and salaries are based on their
ranks and not on their jobs. Mobility
and flexibility in the assignment
of personnel, the better to cope with
the exigencies of public service, is
thus the
distinguishingf e a t u r e o f t h e C a r e e r
Executive Service. Petitioners are,
t h e r e f o r e , r i g h t i n a r g u i n g t h a t res
pondent, “as a CESO, can be
reassigned from one CES position to
another and from one
department, bureau or office to
another. Further, respondent, as a CESO,
can even be assigned or made to occupy
a CES position with a lower salary
grade. In the instant case,
respondent, who holds a CES Rank
III, was correctly and properly appointed by
the appointing authority to the position of
Regional Director, a position which has a
corresponding CES Rank Level III.” Indeed,
even in the other branches of the civil
service, the rule is that, unless an employee
is appointed to a particular office or
station, he can claim no security of
tenure in respect of any office. This rule
has been applied to such appointments as
Director III or Director IV or Attorney IV or
V in the Civil Service Commission since the
appointments are not to specified offices
but to particular ranks; Election Registrars;
Election Officers, also in the Commission on
Elections; and Revenue District Officers in
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Moreover,
as Bacal herself does not have the requisite
qualification for the position of Chief Public
Attorney, she cannot raise the lack of
qualification of petitioner. As held in
Carillo v. Court of Appeals,“in a quo
warranto proceeding the person suing must
show that he has a clear right to the office
allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 94
that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility
of the supposed usurper is immaterial
49)
Castro vs Gloria G.R. No. 132174.
August 20, 2001
FACTS:
Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the DECS a
complaint fordisgraceful and immoral
conduct
against petitioner Gualberto Castro,
a teacher in Guibuangan Central School,
Barili,Cebu. It was alleged that he has an
illicit affair with Gutang's wife, petitioner's
co-teacher at the same school. After
hearing the DECS Regional Office through
Assistant Superintendent Concillo rendered
a decision declaring petitioner guilty of the
offense charged. He was meted the penalty
of dismissal from the service. The DECS
Central Office affirmed Concillo's decision in
an Indorsement. Thereafter, petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration. Instead of
resolving the motion, the DECS Central
Office directed the School Division of Cebu
to comment on the motion where the latter
recommended that the motion be resolved
favorably. However, there commendation
was opposed by the DECS Region VII.
Thereafter, in his letters petitioner asked
the incumbent DECS Secretary to resolve
his motion for reconsideration. But his
letters remained unheeded, thus petitioner
filed with the DECS Central Office a " Motion
for Review Setting Aside/Modifying the
Decision of Regional Director of DECS
Region VII ." where DECS Secretary Ricardo
Gloria (respondent) referred the motion to
the Regional Director of Region VII for
comment. Later, Regional Director Eladio C.
Dioko issued a2nd Indorsement sustaining
the decision of Assistant Superintendent
Concillo. In his 3rdIndorsement, respondent
Secretary denied petitioner' s motion for
review. Thrice thwarted, petitioner filed a
petition for mandamus with the RTC where
the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
It ruled that petitioner should have
appealed to the CSC before coming to
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
RULING:
No, this falls to the exception of the
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies.The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies calls for resort first
to the appropriate administrative authorities
in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same
may be elevated to the courts of justice for
review. It is settled that non-observance of
the doctrine results in lack of a cause of
action, which is one of the grounds allowed
by the Rulesof Court for the dismissal of the
complaint. The doctrine is not absolute.
There are instances when it may be
dispensed with and judicial action may be
validly resorted to immediately. Among
these exceptions are:
1) When the question raised is purely legal ;
2) when the administrative body is
inestoppel;
3) when the act complained of is patently
illegal;
4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention;
5) when the claim involved is small;
6) when irreparable damage will be
suffered;
7) when there is noother plain, speedy and
adequate remedy;
8) when strong public interest is involved;
And
9) inquo warrantoproceedings.
Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature
if there are administrative remedies
available to petitioner.But where the case
involves only legal questions, the litigant
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 95
need not exhaust all administrative
remedies before such judicial relief can be
sought.
In Cortes v. Bartolome,a case involving a
petition for mandamus, we ruled that "while
it may be that non-judicial remedies could
have been available to respondent in that
he could have appealed to the then
Secretary of Local Government and
Community Development and thereafter to
the Civil Service Commission, the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies
need not be adhered to when the question
is purely legal." This is because issues of
law cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer. Appeal to the
administrative officer would only be an
exercise in futility.
50
51
52
53
54
G.R. NO. 154243 March 6, 2007
DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL
ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP),
DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND
RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM),
INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT.
RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER
REJANO, Petitioners,
vs.
P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO,
Respondent.
FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed before
the Office of the Inspector General of the
PNP for abuse of authority/harassment
against the respondent. The latter allegedly
obstructed police officers from arresting his
brother Lamberto Asayo, one of the
suspects in the shooting of petitioner’s son.
The complaint was referred to the Inspector
General for pre-charge investigation. When
summoned, respondent did not appear but
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it
was the People's Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB) which had jurisdiction over the case.
Meanwhile, the Inspector General submitted
a report to the PNP Chief recommending the
commencement of summary dismissal
proceedings against respondent. Upon
approval of said recommendation, the
administrative complaint was referred to the
PNP Legal Service for summary hearing.
The PNP Chief, then Deputy Director
General Roberto Lastimoso, rendered a
decision dismissing respondent from police
service.
ISSUES:
· WON the respondent failed to
exhaust all the available administrative
remedies prior to the filing of his petition.
· WON the chief of the philippine
national police has the authority or
jurisdiction under republic act no. 6975 to
hear and try the citizen's complaint against
respondent.
HELD:
· With regard to the first issue, the
respondent rightfully invoked the
jurisdiction of the courts without first going
through all the administrative remedies
because the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies admits of
exceptions, such as when the issue involved
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 96
is a purely legal question. The only issue
presented by respondent in his petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the RTC
was whether or not the PNP Chief had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
complaint filed by a private citizen against
him. Said issue being a purely legal one, the
principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies did not apply to the case.
· Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the
Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, which took effect
on 1 January 1991, x x x delineates the
procedural framework in pursuing
administrative complaints against erring
members of the police organization. Section
41 of the law enumerates the authorities to
which a complaint against an erring
member of the PNP may be filed. It is
readily apparent that a complaint against a
PNP member which would warrant dismissal
from service is within the jurisdiction of the
PLEB. However, Section 41 should be read
in conjunction with Section 42 of the same
statute. Evidently, the PNP Chief and
regional directors are vested with the power
to summarily dismiss erring PNP members if
any of the causes for summary dismissal
enumerated in Section 42 is attendant.
Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is
not only the prerogative of PLEB but
concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and
regional directors.
Once a complaint is filed with any of the
disciplining authorities under R.A. No. 6975,
the latter shall acquire exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case although other
disciplining authority has concurrent
jurisdiction over the case. Paragraph (c) of
Section 41 explicitly declares this point.
The Court further declared that R.A. No.
6975 defines the summary dismissal powers
of the PNP Chief and regional directors,
among others in cases, "where the
respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a police officer."
Webster defines "unbecoming" conduct as
"improper" performance. Such term "applies
to a broader range of transgressions of
rules not only of social behavior but of
ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method." Obviously, the charges
of neglect of duty, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official
duties fall within the scope of conduct
unbecoming a police officer. Clearly, the
charges against respondent in this case are
also covered by paragraph (c), Section 42 of
R.A. No. 6975, vesting the PNP Chief with
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
complaint against respondent.
Verily, the assistance of counsel was not
required for respondent to validly waive his
right to cross-examine the witnesses in the
administrative case against him.
In sum, the charges against respondent fall
well within the scope of paragraph (c),
Section 42 of R.A. No. 6975, thus, the PNP
Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the complaint against respondent; and the
summary hearing officer accorded
respondent due process and never deprived
respondent any of his rights.
55
ALEJA SIBAYAN VDA. DE PINEDA v.
TEODORO PENA, GR No. 57665,
July 2, 1990
Facts:
The "Ped" mining claim was located by
Pedro Sibayan in January, 1932. After
Sibayan's death, his heirs Miguela and Aleja
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 97
Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement... wherein they waived their
rights and interest over the "Ped" claim,
among others, in favor of co-heir Feliza
Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims
to Sofia Reyes.
The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by
Elvira Carmelo in February, 1932, and was
subsequently transferred to Joseph
Palengaoan.
In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several
others formed the KM. 21 Mining
Association, later converted into the KM. 21
Exploration Corporation, to which the
members conveyed their respective mining
claims, including the "Ped" and
"Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims
were assigned to the Baguio Gold Mining
Company for operation.
During this time, an amended declaration of
location for the "Ullmann" claim was
registered.
On November 23, 1972, petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. Q-17136 against
Feliza Sibayan, Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining
Exploration Corporation, et. al., with the
Court of First
Instance, Quezon City, Branch IX.
Petitioners claimed that the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement from which private
respondents derived their... ownership and
possession over the "Ped" claim was
maliciously falsified [Annex "I" to the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 78-79] and prayed for
annulment of all subsequent transfers
involving the mining claims.
During the pre-trial of Civil Case No. Q-
17136, the parties entered into an amicable
settlement, agreeing that: (1) private
respondents will return to petitioners the
disputed mining claims, including the "Ped"
claim; (2)... petitioners will reimburse
private respondents all expenses, like
assessment taxes, incurred in the
preservation of the claims; and (3) private
respondents shall execute the necessary
documents to reconvey the mining claims to
petitioners [Annex "I" to the Petition
Thus, the Court of First Instance rendered a
decision on November 11, 1974 ordering
the parties to comply with the above
settlement
On July 20, 1974, petitioners filed with the
Bureau of Mines a letter-complaint (Mines
Administrative Case No. V-784) against
private respondents for alleged overlapping
and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim
over the "Ped" claim.
On January 10, 1977, the Director of Mines
rendered a decision declaring that there
was no conflict between the "Ped" and
"Ullmann" claims
Issues:
On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners
contend that public respondents may not
validly and legally take cognizance of an
issue not raised in the complaint, i.e., the
issue of the validity of the "Ped" mining
claim.
Having resolved the question of jurisdiction,
the Court shall next determine if public
respondents acted within their jurisdiction,
or if they committed grave abuse of
discretion which would warrant the issuance
of the writs prayed for.
Private respondents argue that the
documents were not filed at the proper time
since they were not formally offered in
evidence when the case was still before the
respondent Director, and were
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 98

Ruling: involved in the protest case, even if not

raised in issue.
This assertion is mistaken. Petitioners had
filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. The petition is impressed with merit.
Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau of
The certification issued by the Mines
Mines with jurisdiction over protests
Regional Officer of Baguio City cannot
involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres.
prevail over the documents clearly
Decree No. 463.]
evidencing the petitioners' filing the
Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers application. Not only was the application
upon the Secretary of Natural Resources, filed within the prescriptive period, it was
upon recommendation of the Director of also... duly filed with the Bureau of Mines
Mines, the authority to issue rules, Office in Manila, the venue specified under
regulations and orders necessary to carry Section 176 of the implementing rules.
out the provisions and purposes of the
The contention is clearly untenable.
Decree. In... accordance with the statutory
Petitioners precisely were unaware that the
grant of rule-making power, the
validity of the "Ped" claim would be passed
Department Secretary on May 17, 1975
upon in the protest case since such was not
issued the Consolidated Mines
raised as an issue. Hence it was only after
Administrative Order Implementing Pres.
the decision... in the protest case was
Decree No. 463, which was published in the
rendered that petitioners found the need to
Official Gazette on June 16, 1975.
present evidence on appeal relating to the
One such implementing rule is Section 128, validity of the "Ped" claim.
which respondent Minister of Natural
Clearly, respondent Minister gravely abused
Resources relied upon in his decision to
his discretion when he disregarded the
dispose of the jurisdictional issue raised by
rebuttal evidence submitted by petitioners
petitioners.
which otherwise would have had the effect
Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural of reversing respondent Director's finding.
rule to implement the general provisions of
As to petitioners' supposed failure to
the enabling... law. It does not amend or
perform annual work obligations on the
extend the provisions of the statute [People
"Ped" claim since 1952, the conclusion is
v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18,
only partly correct. Annual work
1977, 79 SCRA 450, citing University of
obligations, consisting of payment of
Santo Tomas... v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93
assessment and taxes, had in fact been paid
Phil. 376 (1953).]
up to the... year 1975, although not by
In this case, petitioners were afforded the... petitioners.
opportunity to be heard on the validity of
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds
the "Ped" mining claim when they submitted
that public respondents had the authority to
rebuttal evidence on appeal.
ascertain the validity of the "Ped" claim.
Section 128, being a valid implementing Nevertheless, in affirming that portion of
rule, has the force and effect of law. Thus, the decision of the Director of Mines
public respondents were duly empowered to declaring petitioners to have
inquire into the validity of the mining claims
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 99
"abandoned and lost their rights" over the
"Ped" claim, respondent Minister committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
Principles:
It is established in jurisprudence that
Congress may validly delegate to
administrative agencies the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate
its policies [People v. Exconde, 101 Phil
1125 (1957); Director of Forestry v. Munoz
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
1183.] In order to be valid, the
administrative regulation must be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law,
conform to the standards that the law...
prescribes [People v. Exconde, supra, citing
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 727 (1940);
Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service
Commission, 70 Phil 221 (1940),] and must
relate solely to carrying into effect the
general provisions... of the law [U.S. v.
Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil 119 (1914).]... it is
axiomatic in administrative law that what
the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence
thereof and lack of opportunity to... be
heard [Catura v. Court of Industrial
Relations, G.R. No. L-27392, January 30,
1971, 37 SCRA 303, citing De Borja v. Tan,
93 Phil. 167 (1953).]
As a rule, the courts will not interfere with
purely administrative matters involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, and
findings of fact, of the administrative
agency. The exception is when there is a
clear showing that the agency... acted
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
or when it acted in a capricious manner
such that its action may amount to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction [Pajo v. Ago,
108 Phil. 905 (1960); Ganitano v. Secretary
of Agriculture, G.R. No. L-21167,... March
31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Beautifont, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50141, January
29, 1988, 157 SCRA 481.]
56
Univerity of Sto. Tomas vs NLRC, 182
SCRA 371
G.R NO 89920 18 OCTOBER 1990
FACTS:
 University of Sto. Tomas (UST) terminated
the employment of 16 union officers and
directors of UST Faculty Union for grave
misconduct, serious disrespect to a
superior and conduct unbecoming a
faculty member on the ground that "in
publishing or causing to be published in
Strike Bulletin No. 5 the libelous and
defamatory attacks against the Father
Rector.
 Some faculty members staged mass
leaves of absence disrupting classes in all
levels at the University.
 The faculty union filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice
with the DOLE.
 The labor arbiter, on a prima facie
showing that the termination was causing
a serious labor dispute, certified the
matter to the Secretary of DOLE for a
possible suspension of the effects of
termination.
 Secretary Franklin Drilon issued an order
to accept the 16 terminated employess
back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to their
dismissal in the interest of industrial
peace.
 Secretary Drilon issued another order
which certifies the labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 100
 NLRC issued a resolution directing UST to
comply and faithfully abide with the
Orders of the Secretary Drilon by
immediately reinstating or readmitting the
16 faculty members under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to the
present dispute or merely reinstate them
in the payroll.
 UST states that it has already actually
reinstated 6 of the dismissed faculty
members; As to 2 professors whose
teaching assignments were partially taken
over by new faculty members, they were
given back their remaining teaching loads
(not taken by new faculty members) but
were given substantially equivalent
academic assignments corresponding to
their teachings loads already taken over
by new faculty members; The remaining 7
faculty members were given substantially
equivalent academic assignments in lieu
of actual teaching loads because all of
their teaching loads originally assigned to
them at the start of the first semester
were already taken over by new faculty
members; 1 dismissed faculty had been
"absent without official leave" or AWOL.
 SC issued a TRO enjoining NLRC from
enforcing or executing the NLRC
resolution.
 UST argues that actual reinstatement of
the dismissed faculty members whose
teaching assignments were previously
taken over by new faculty members is not
feasible nor practicable since this would
compel UST to violate and terminate its
contracts with the faculty members who
were assigned to and had actually taken
over the courses.
 UST claims that to change the faculty
member when the semester is about to
end would seriously impair and prejudice
the welfare and interest of the students
because dislocation, confusion and loss in
momentum, if not demoralization will
surely ensue.
 UST contended that it has the sole and
exclusive right and prerogative to
determine the nature and kind of work of
its employees and to control and manage
its own operations.
ISSUE: May UST comply with the NLRC
readmission order by granting substantially
equivalent academic assignments, in lieu of
actual reinstatement, to dismissed faculty
members?
RULING:
 No.Pursuant to Article 263 (g), 1 st
paragraph, of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 27 of RA 6715, the
NLRC was charged with the task of
implementing a valid return-to-work order
of the Secretary of Labor. As the
implementing body, its authority did not
include the power to amend the
Secretary's order.
 Since the Secretary's order specifically
provided that the dismissed faculty
members shall be readmitted under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to the present dispute, the NLRC should
have directed the actual reinstatement of
the concerned faculty members. It
therefore erred in granting the alternative
remedy of payroll reinstatement.
 The grant of substantially equivalent
academic assignments cannot be
sustained. The giving of substantially
equivalent academic assignments, without
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 101
actual teaching loads, cannot be
considered a reinstatement under the
same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike.
 The phrase "under the same terms and
conditions" contemplates actual
reinstatement or the return of actual
teaching loads to the dismissed faculty
members.
 Article 263(g) was devised to maintain the
status quo between the workers and
management in a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national
interest, pending adjudication of the
controversy. The grant of substantially
equivalent academic assignments would
evidently alter the existing status quo
since the temporarily reinstated teachers
will not be given their usual teaching
loads.
 The order of NLRC did not amount to
grave abuse of discretion. Such error is
merely an error of judgment which is not
correctible by a special civil action for
certiorari. The NLRC was only trying its
best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc
solution to a festering and serious
problem.
 The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and
promotion of employees are traditionally
identified as management prerogatives.
However, these are not absolute
prerogatives. They are subject to
limitations found in law, a collective
bargaining agreement, or general
principles of fair play and justice.
 Article 263(g) is one such limitation
provided by law. To the extent that Art.
263(g) calls for the admission of all
workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike,
UST is restricted from exercising its
generally unbounded right to transfer or
reassign its employees.
 The first semester is about to end and to
change the faculty members around the
time of final examinations would adversely
affect and prejudice the students whose
welfare and interest we consider to be of
primordial importance and for whom both
the University and the faculty union must
subordinate their claims and desires. The
actual reinstatement of the non-reinstated
faculty members may take effect at the
start of the second semester.
 The contracts of new professors cannot
prevail over the right to reinstatement of
the dismissed personnel.
Petition is denied.
57.
MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD
PRODUCTS, INC., Vs.COURT Of
APPEALS
G.R. No. 98310, October 24, 1996
FACTS OF THE CASE
Milagros Matuguina, a sole proprietor, has a
timber business named Matuguina Logging
Enterprises in Davao under the Provisional
Timber License No. 30 for a certain area.
During the same time, Milagros became the
majority stockholder of MIWP (Matuguina
Integrated Wood Products) by buying 70%
of stock ownership. Milagros requested to
the director of Forest Development to
transfer the management of the timber
license no. 30, granted for MLE, to MIWP.
Pending the approval of the transfer of the
license, DAVENCOR (private respondent)
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 102
submitted a complaint regarding the
encroachment of MLE in the concession
area of DAVENCOR. , The Minister of
Natural Resources, Hon. Ernesto M. Maceda
rendered his decision against MLE for illegal
logging operations on the portion of the
land under the concession of DAVENCOR.
DAVENCOR then requested the issuance of
writ of execution for MLE and/or MIWP.
MIWP, as a defense, filed for prohibition,
damages and injunction, with prayer for
restraining order on the grounds that they
are a separate entity from MLE and,
therefore, not a party to the complaint by
DAVENCOR. Trial Court granted the TRO.
RTC ruled in favor of MIWP which was
reversed by the Court of Appeals; hence,
this petition on certiorari.
ISSUE
WON the corporate veil of MIWP shall be
pierced to be held liable for the acts of MLE
RULING
NO, MIWP cannot be held liable. A
corporation has a separate personality. . It
may not generally be held liable for that of
the persons composing it unless when the
juridical personality of the corporation is
used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the
corporation shall be considered as a mere
association of persons. But for the separate
juridical personality of a corporation to be
disregarded, the wrongdoing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It
cannot be presumed.
It is likewise improper to state that the
MIWPI is the privy or the successor-in-
interest of MLE, as the liability for the
encroachment over DAVENCOR's timber
concession is concerned, by reason of the
transfer of interest in PTL No. 30 from MLE
to MIWPI. The transfer has never become
effective. More importantly, even if it is
deemed that there was a valid change of
name and transfer of interest in the PTL No.
30, this only signifies a transfer of authority,
from MLE to MIWPI, to conduct logging
operations in the area covered by PTL No.
30. It does not show indubitable proof that
MIWPI was a mere conduit or successor of
Milagros Matuguina/MLE, as far the latter's
liability for the encroachment upon
DAVENCOR's concession is concerned.
The issue of whether or not petitioner is an
alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one
of fact, and which should have been
threshed out in the administrative
proceedings, and not in the prohibition
proceedings in the trial court, where it is
precisely the failure of the respondent
Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as
mandated by law in the execution of its
order which is under scrutiny.
NOTE
The liberal atmosphere which pervades the
procedure in administrative proceedings
does not empower the presiding officer to
make conclusions of fact before hearing all
the parties concerned.[32] In Police
Commission vs. Hon Judge Lood, we held
that the formalities usually attendant in
court hearings need not be present in an
administrative investigation, provided that
the parties are heard and given the
opportunity to adduce their evidence. The
right to notice and hearing is essential to
due process and its non-observance will, as
a rule, invalidate the administrative
proceedings.
58
59
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 103
60
61
62
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT,
petitioner,
vs
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, respondent.
G.R. NO. 103144
APRIL 4, 2001
FACTS: Private respondents, who were
recruited by Philsa for employment in Saudi
Arabia, were required to pay placement
fees. After the execution of their respective
work contracts, private respondents left for
Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, private
respondents were allegedly made to sign a
second contract which changed some of the
provisions of their original contract resulting
in the reduction of some of their benefits
and privileges. Their foreign employer
forced them to sign a third contract which
increased their work hours from 48 hours to
60 hours a week without any corresponding
increase in their basic monthly salary. When
they refused to sign this third contract, the
services of private respondents were
terminated and they were repatriated to the
Philippines. Upon their arrival in the
Philippines, private respondents demanded
from Philsa the return of their placement
fees and for the payment of their salaries
for the unexpired portion of their contract.
When Philsa refused, they filed a case
before the POEA against Philsa on the
grounds of illegal dismissal, payment of
salary differentials, illegal
deduction/withholding of salaries, illegal
exactions/refund of placement fees, and
contract substitution. Philsa insists,
however, that it cannot be held liable for
the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11 and
2. Series of 1983, which enumerated the
allowable fees which may be collected from
applicants, is void for lack publication.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philsa’s contention
is correct.
RULING: The assailed issuances upon
which private respondents based their
cause of action were not published or filed
with the National Administrative Register as
required by the Administrative Code of
1987. Hence, Philsa is not liable.
63
BAUTISTA
Vs
AGUSTIN
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged therein that she was
the major stockholder and president of
PROMAT Construction and Development
Corporation (PROMAT) engaged in
construction business. In 1986, PROMAT
participated in the various biddings for the
construction of government projects within
the First Metro Manila Engineering District
(FMED) of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH). Respondent is the
incumbent District Engineer of the FMED.
Petitioner further averred that
respondent became a persistent suitor and
refused to deal with PROMATs liaison
officer, insisting that she personally attend
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 104

to her companys projects with FMED, of his brother Honorato Agustin who was
otherwise, her papers would get stuck in his with him at the restaurant and those of
office. Respondent relentlessly pursued her Rolando Martinez and Arthur Diaz, Agents of
and one time invited her to a snack at the the Criminal Investigation Command, who
Philippine Plaza Hotel. After finishing her were supposedly present in the restaurant
drink, she felt dizzy. Taking advantage of at that time.
her semi-conscious state, he brought her to
After carefully reviewing all the
a motel and raped her. That was the
evidence obtaining in this case, we find the
beginning of a hateful relationship. Her
positive declarations of petitioner and her
attempts to extricate herself proved futile
witnesses in their sworn statements more
since he constantly warned her that
credible than those of respondent. In
PROMAT would no longer do business with
administrative proceedings, only
FMED unless the relationship
substantial evidence is required to
continues. Whenever she tried to avoid him,
hold respondent liable for the charges
he would go to her house in the middle of
against him.
the night and create a scene by blowing the
horn of his car, pounding at the gate,
shouting on top of his voice and pelting her
windows with stones. As a result of these 64
disturbances, she suffered nervous
breakdown and was eventually operated for TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
breast cancer on October 1994.
vs
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigation
Officer Eduardo Benitez issued a NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondent.
Resolution[2] finding respondent guilty of
grave misconduct and irregular or immoral
acts and ordering his dismissal from the G.R. No. 143092
service with forfeiture of all benefits under
the law. FEBRUARY 14, 2003

ISSUE: FACTS: Before us is a petition for review on

certiorari assailing the Amended Decision of
WON Respondent is guilty of grave the Court of Appeals dated May 8, 2000 in
misconduct. CA G.R. SP No. 49182, Teresita G. Fabian
vs. Hon. Aniano Desierto, et al.

The instant controversy arose from the

RULING: verified letter-complaint[1] dated July
24, 1995 filed by Teresita Fabian, petitioner,
YES. As mentioned earlier, respondent, with the Office of the Ombudsman,
in his counter-affidavit, merely denied charging Nestor Agustin, herein respondent,
petitioners charges, except the one with grave misconduct, disgraceful and
concerning the Lasap Restaurant immoral acts, and oppression.
incident. To substantiate his version of the
same incident, he submitted the affidavits
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 105
Petitioner alleged therein that she was the
major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction and Development Corporation
(PROMAT) engaged in construction
business. In 1986, PROMAT participated in
the various biddings for the construction of
government projects within the First Metro
Manila Engineering District (FMED) of the
Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH). Respondent is the incumbent
District Engineer of the FMED.
Petitioner further averred that respondent
became a persistent suitor and refused to
deal with PROMATs liaison officer, insisting
that she personally attend to her company’s
projects with FMED, otherwise, her papers
would get stuck in his office. Respondent
relentlessly pursued her and one time
invited her to a snack at the Philippine Plaza
Hotel. After finishing her drink, she felt
dizzy. Taking advantage of her semi-
conscious state, he brought her to a motel
and raped her. That was the beginning of a
hateful relationship. Her attempts to
extricate herself proved futile since he
constantly warned her that PROMAT would
no longer do business with FMED unless the
relationship continues.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigation
Officer Eduardo Benitez issued a Resolution
finding respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and irregular or immoral acts
and ordering his dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits under the law.
On February 27, 1996, then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto approved with modification
the said Resolution (reviewed by Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera) in the
sense that respondent was found guilty only
of misconduct and that the penalty was
reduced from dismissal from office to
suspension without pay for one (1) year.
Both parties filed their respective motions
for reconsideration. In his Order dated June
19, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer Benitez
denied respondents motion and reiterated
his assailed Order. Graft Investigation
Officer Rafaelito H. Imperial and Legal
Officer Andrew F. Ammuyutan likewise
recommended that respondent be found
guilty of grave misconduct and imposed
upon him the penalty of dismissal from the
service.
Before the parties motions for
reconsideration were resolved, Atty. Amador
Casino, a classmate and close associate of
Ombudsman Desierto, entered his
appearance as counsel for the respondent.
Forthwith, Ombudsman Desierto inhibited
himself and designated then Deputy
Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero to resolve the
motions.
On June 18, 1997, Deputy Ombudsman
Guerrero issued a Joint Order, dismissing
the administrative complaint.
Simply stated, the Court of Appeals, in its
assailed Amended Decision, held that since
petitioner failed to prove her charges by
substantial evidence, her complaint must be
dismissed. Pursuant to Section 27 of
RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)
and Section 7 of Administrative Order No.
07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), the Joint Order of Deputy
Ombudsman Guerrero dismissing the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence is,
therefore, final and unappealable.
From the above Amended Decision,
petitioner now appeals to this Court,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the Guerrero Joint Order. She
contends that she was able to prove her
charges by substantial evidence. For his
part, respondent maintains that the petition
raises only questions of fact which are not
proper for review by this Court.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 106
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the
Court of Appeals is final and unappealable.
RULING: While we agree with respondent
that only questions of law may be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari, however,
there are recognized exceptions to this rule,
among which, is when there is a conflict
between the factual findings of the trial
court and that of the appellate court. In
such case, this Court is bound to analyze
and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings
below.
Here, it is undisputed that the discord in the
factual findings existed not only at the
Ombudsman level, but even at the
Appellate Court. First, it must be recalled
that: (1) In his Resolution of January
31, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer
Eduardo Benitez found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct as well as irregular or
immoral acts and recommended his
dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of
all benefits under the law; (2) Graft
Investigator and Legal Officer Andrew
Ammuyutan made similar finding and
recommendation; (3) Then Ombudsman
Desierto, approved the said finding and
recommendation with modification in the
sense that the offense is only misconduct
and that the penalty is suspension from
office for one (1) year without pay; (4)
Eventually, Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. Second, the Court of Appeals, in
its original Decision, reinstated Ombudsman
Desiertos Order dated February
26, 1996 finding respondent guilty of
misconduct and imposing upon him the
penalty of suspension from the service for
one (1) year without pay. Later, the Court
of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision,
this time, affirming the Guerrero Joint Order
dismissing the administrative complaint for
insufficiency of evidence.
Such conflict in the factual findings compels
this Court to deviate from the general rule
and review the evidence obtaining in this
case.
In administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence is required to hold
respondent liable for the charges against
him. Here, we are convinced that petitioners
charges are supported by substantial
evidence jurisprudentially defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.We quote with approval the
following findings and observations of Graft
Investigation Officer Benitez, sustained by
the Court of Appeals in its original Decision,
thus:
The complainants evidence and respondents
admissions stand for the requisite
substantial evidence which in an
unprejudiced mind reasonably supports a
conclusion that indeed the administrative
offenses, subject of the complaint had been
committed. The uncontroverted facts show
that respondent courted complainant and
established intimate relationship with her.
On account of that affair, or at least in the
course thereof, her firm was awarded a
number of contracts by the office of which
respondent was the head. From these
contracts even the respondent averted that
she derived windfall profits. Times were,
through complainants persuasion,
respondent interceded for complainants firm
whenever it was involved in contract
violations. This alone constitutes grave
misconduct in office.
We thus find respondent guilty of grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral acts
and oppression. Indeed, by his conduct,
respondent violated the policy of the State
to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 107

people, serve them with utmost (docketed as OMB-0-93-3107), and [2]

responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. Public servants must
bear in mind this constitutional mandate at
all times to guide them in their actions
during their entire tenure in the government
service.
65
MOISES S. SAMSON, petitioner,
vs
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
EVALUATION AND PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION BUREAU, NORMA
SANCHEZ and LEONITO L. CATARROJA,
respondents.
order dated August 26, 1994[2] which
denied petitioners motion for partial
reconsideration of said joint resolution.
Private respondents counter-alleged that
petitioner had neither the personality to sue
nor personal knowledge of the veracity of
the complaint, which was mere hearsay, not
having been supported by any affidavit from
the purportedly affected, if not fictitious,
health certificate applicants or sanitary
inspectors. Also, petitioner did not present
any of his witnesses before the investigating
committee created by then Quezon City
Mayor Ismael Mathay. Thus, private
respondents filed counter-charges against
petitioner for libel, falsification and perjury.

On May 27, 1994, public respondent,

G.R. No. 117741
through Graft Investigation Officer
Lamberto G. Sagum, issued a joint
resolution dismissing the cases filed by both
SEPTEMBER 29, 2004 parties.

FACTS: This petition for certiorari and Mr. Raul R. Arnau and Assistant
mandamus seeks the reversal of public Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr.
respondent Office of the Ombudsman reviewed and later on endorsed the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation aforesaid joint resolution to Overall Deputy
Bureaus: [1] joint resolution dated May 27, Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, who
1994 (joint resolution)[1] which dismissed approved it on June 22, 1994.
petitioner Moises S. Samsons complaint
(docketed as OMB-0-93-0920) against
private respondents Dr. Leonito L. Catarroja
The public respondent, in its August 26,
and Norma Sanchez for allegedly printing
1994 order, approved by Overall Deputy
and issuing health certificates sans serial
Ombudsman Villa on September 9, 1994,
numbers and official receipts to applicants
denied petitioners motion for partial
without prior medical examination, in
reconsideration of the joint resolution with
violation of RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft and
respect to the dismissal of OMB-0-93-0920.
Corrupt Practices Act), as well as private
respondents counter-charges against
petitioner for libel, falsification and perjury
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 108
Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent
for dismissing OMB-0-93-0920, a a trier of facts, more so in the consideration
supposedly prima facie graft case against
private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the case against
private respondents.
RULING: For private respondents to be
held criminally liable under paragraph (b) of
Section 3 of RA 3019, they must have
requested or received, directly or indirectly,
any gift or benefit for themselves or for
another public officer who has to intervene
in any contract or transaction with the
government. Under paragraph (e), they
must have given unwarranted benefits with
evident bad faith, gross inexcusable
negligence or manifest partiality. Under
paragraph (h), they must have had a
financial interest, directly or indirectly, in
any transaction in which they took part in
their official function or in any transaction in
which they were prohibited by the
Constitution or any law from having any
interest therein.
The Constitution and RA 6770 (the
Ombudsman Act of 1989) endowed the
Office of the Ombudsman with a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial
powers, virtually free from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention, in order to
insulate it from outside pressure and
improper influence.
Furthermore, the calibration of evidence to
asses whether a prima facie graft case
exists against private respondents is a
question of fact. The Supreme Court is not
of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where
neither questions of fact nor law are
entertained, but only questions of lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.
Finally, mandamus will not lie in the
absence of any of the following grounds:
[a] that the court, officer, board, or person
against whom the action is taken, unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust, or station, or [b]
that such court, officer, board or person has
unlawfully excluded the petitioner from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which he is entitled. Mandamus will lie to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty but not to compel the performance of
a discretionary duty requiring the exercise
of judgment, as in this case.
66
MARITA C. BERNALDO vs OMB
FACTS:
Petitioner Bernaldo was the DPWH Region I
II Project Engineer of one of the projects,pa
rticularly
The Almacen River II Project. When the con
tractor finished the project, aStatementof W
ork Accomplished andCertificate of Final Ins
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 109
pection and Certificate of Final Acceptancec
ertified that theAlmacen River II Project was
100% completed by the contractorandtheD
PWHRegion III Engineers. The contractor w
as eventually paid 93.58% of the contract p
ricecost.However, the Survey and Investigat
ion Team of the Bureau of Design of the DP
WH,in itsFieldSurvey and Investigation Repo
rt
indicated that the amount of workaccomplis
hed by thecontractor on the Project was onl
y about 21% completed. Moreover, in aLett
er-Report to theOMB, the equipments utilize
d on the Project were evaluated and it was
stated therein that thesame could not possi
bly accomplish the reported full completion
of the said project.Based on the foregoing r
eports, the DPWH Region III Engineers con
nected with the Projectswere all administrati
vely charged for Falsification, Dishonesty, a
nd Conduct Prejudicial to the BestInterest of
the Service before the Administrative Adjudi
cation Bureau (AAB) of the OMB.Later, the r
espondent DPWH Region III Engineers, incl
uding petitioner Bernaldo, were orderedby t
he OMB for their suspension for a period of
nine (9) months without pay and other bene
fits.The case was elevated for review in the
CA which granted the petition and the assail
ed orders ofthe OMB were annulled and set
aside. However, the CA held that the factual
findings of the OMBwere supported by subst
antial evidence to hold petitionerBernaldo a
dministratively liable. Hence,the instant peti
tionforcertiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adjudication of the
petitioner’s administrative charge is beyond
the scope of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
We find merit in the petition. Anent the preli
minary matter regarding the mode of appea
l tothisCourt, the wellsettledprinciple under
Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt is that only qu
estions of law shall be raised inappeal bycer
tiorari before this Court. But, it recognizes o
f certain exceptions, namely: (1)
whenthe findings are grounded entirely ons
peculations, surmises, or conjectures;(2) wh
en theinference made is manifestly mistake
n, absurd, or impossible;(3) when there is a
grave abuse ofdiscretion;(4) when the judg
ment is based on misappreciation of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings, the same ar
e contrary to the admissions ofboth appella
nt and appellee;(7) when the findings are c
ontrary to those of the trial court;(8)when t
he findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are base
d;(9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 110

briefs arenot disputed by the respondent;an Whether or not the legality of disciplining an
d (10) when the findings of fact are premise elective municipal official for a wrongful act
d on thesupposed absence of evidence and committed by him during his immediately
contradicted by the evidence on record. preceding term of office is moot and
academic.
67.
RULING:
PASCUAL VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
NUEVA ECIJA In the absence of any precedent in this

FACTS: jurisdiction, we have resorted to

American authorities.
Pascual had been elected mayor of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija... in November 1951 and The weight of authority, however, seems to

reelected in 1955. On October 6, 1956, the incline to the rule denying the right

Acting Provincial Governor of that province to remove one from office because of

filed with the Provincial Board three misconduct during a prior term, to which we

administrative charges against the said fully subscribe.

appellant. Charges were "Offenses omitted, or acts one, during

"Maladministrative, Abuse of Authority, previous term are generally held not to
and Usurpation of Judicial Functions". furnish cause for removal and this is
Petitioner filed with the respondent- especially true where the constitution
appellee, the Provincial Board, a motion to provides that the penalty in proceedings for
dismiss the third charge above referred to, removal shall not extend beyond the
on the main ground that the wrongful acts removal from office, and disqualification
therein alleged had... been committed from holding office for the term for which
during his previous term of office and could the officer was elected, or appointed." (67
not constitute a ground for disciplining him C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State
during his second term. Upon opposition
The underlying theory is that each term is
filed by a special counsel for the
separate from other terms, and that the
respondent-appellee, the motion to dismiss
reelection to office operates as a
was, denied by resolution of the
condonation of the officer's previous
Board. misconduct to the extent of cutting off the

ISSUE: right to remove him therefor

 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 111

"The Court should never remove a public admitted that he was sympathetic to the
officer for acts done prior to his present cause of the rebel soldiers.
term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to The Secretary suspended petitioner from
elect their officers. When the people have office for 60 days from notice, pending the
elected a man to office, it must be assumed outcome of the formal investigation. Later,
that they did this with knowledge of his life the Secretary rendered a decision finding
and character, and that they disregarded or petition guilty as charged and ordering his
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas
been guilty of any. It is not for the court, was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo
by reason of such faults or misconduct to appealed.
practically overrule the will of the people."
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary mandatory
68.
injunction and/or restraining order with the
AGUINALDO VS. SANTOS
SC, assailing the decision of respondent
FACTS:
Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner
argued that: (1) that the power of
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of
respondent Secretary to suspend or remove
the province of Cagayan. After the
local government official under Section 60,
December 1989 coup d’état was crushed,
Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by
DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram &
the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since
letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him
respondent Secretary no longer has power
to show cause why he should not be
to suspend or remove petitioner, the former
suspended or removed from office for
could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas
disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn
as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of
complaint was also filed by Mayors of
disloyalty committed by petitioner should be
several municipalities in Cagayan against
proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
Aguinaldo for acts committed during the
and not be a mere preponderance of
coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the
evidence, because it is an act punishable as
planning of the coup or actively
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
participating in its execution, though he
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 112

While the case was pending before the SC, position of Governor of Cagayan has
Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy rendered the administrative case pending
for the position of Governor of Cagayan. moot and academic. It appears that after
Three petitions for disqualification were filed the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered
against him on the ground that he had been most number of votes among the
removed from office. candidates for governor of Cagayan
province. The rule is that a public official
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, cannot be removed for administrative
this was reversed on the ground that the misconduct committed during a prior term,
decision of the Secretary has not yet since his re-election to office operates as a
attained finality and is still pending review condonation of the officer's previous
with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
landslide margin in the elections, the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing
resolution paved the way for his eventual rule, however, finds no application
proclamation as Governor of Cagayan. to criminal cases pending against petitioner
for acts he may have committed during the
ISSUES: failed coup.
1. WON petitioner's re-election to the
position of Governor of Cagayan has 2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to
rendered the administration case moot and remove local government officials is
academic anchored on both the Constitution and a
statutory grant from the legislative branch.
2. WON the Secretary has the power to The constitutional basis is provided by
suspend or remove local government Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987
officials as alter ego of the President Constitution which vest in the President
the power of control over all executive
3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is departments, bureaus and offices and the
required before petitioner could be removed power of general supervision over local
from office. governments. It is a constitutional doctrine
that the acts of the department head are
HELD: presumptively the acts of the President
1. Yes. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the unless expressly rejected by him.
 A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 113

Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 2001, which period was to commence on
was repealed by the effectivity of the September 1998 when the first delivery
present Constitution as both the 1973 and should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.
1987 Constitution grants to the legislature Sometime in March 1999, news reports
the power and authority to enact a local came out regarding the alleged anomalous
government code, which provides for the purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through
manner of removal of local government the contract signed by petitioner. This
officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. prompted the Office of the Ombudsman
Davide, Jr., et al., this court had the (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the
occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 matter.[1] Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T.
remained in force despite the effectivity of Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the
the present Constitution, until such time as Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to
the proposed Local Government Code of conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-
1991 is approved. The power of the DILG 99-0132. After his investigation, he
secretary to remove local elective recommended that the said inquiry be
government officials is found in Secs. 60 upgraded to criminal and administrative
and 61 of BP 337. cases against petitioner and the other city
officials involved. Respondent Arturo C.
3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,
criminally, but administratively where the approved this recommendation.
quantum of proof required is
only substantial evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. ISSUES:
Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992) 1. WON Garcia may be held
administratively liable.
2. 2. WON the Ombudsman was
69.
stripped of its powers by virtue of
GARCIA VS MOJICA
the LGC.

FACTS:
RULING:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity
as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with
1. NO. In a number of cases, we have
F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the
repeatedly held that a reelected local
city. The contract covers the period 1998-
A D M I N A N D E L E C T I O N C A S E S C O M P I L E D P a g e | 114
official may not be
administratively accountable
misconduct committed during his
prior term of office.The rationale for
this holding is that when
electorate put him back into office, it
is presumed that it did so with full
knowledge of his life and character,
including his past misconduct. If,
armed with such knowledge, it still
reelects him, then such reelection is
considered a condonation of his past
misdeeds. However, in the present
case, respondents point out that the
contract entered into by petitioner
with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four
days before the date
elections. It was not made an issue
during the election, and so the
electorate could not be said to have
voted for petitioner with knowledge
of this particular aspect of his life
and character. For his
petitioner contends that the only
conclusive determining factor
regards the peoples thinking on the
matter is an election. On this point,
we agree with petitioner. That the
people voted for an official with
knowledge of his character
presumed, precisely to eliminate the
need to determine, in factual terms,
held the extent of this knowledge. Such
for an undertaking will obviously be
impossible. Our rulings on the
matter do not distinguish the precise
the timing or period when the
misconduct was committed,
reckoned from the date of the
officials reelection, except that it
must be prior to said date. The
above ruling in Salalima applies to
this case. Petitioner cannot anymore
be held administratively liable for an
act done during his previous term,
that is, his signing of the contract
with F.E. Zuellig. The agreement
between petitioner (representing
of the Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was
perfected on the date the contract
was signed, during petitioners prior
term. At that moment, petitioner
already acceded to the terms of the
contract, including stipulations now
part, alleged to be prejudicial to the city
government. Thus, any culpability
as petitioner may have in signing the
contract already became extant on
the day the contract was signed. It
hardly matters that the deliveries
under the contract are supposed to
is have been made months later. While
petitioner can no longer be held
administratively liable for signing the
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contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, Preventive Suspension. The

this should not prejudice the filing of
any case other than administrative
against petitioner. Our ruling in this
case, may not be taken to mean the
total exoneration of petitioner for
whatever wrongdoing, if any, might
have been committed in signing the
subject contract. The ruling now is
limited to the question of whether or
not he may be held administratively
liable therefor, and it is
considered view that he may not.
2. No. Indeed, there is nothing in the
Local Government Code to indicate
that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act.
The two statutes on the specific
matter in question are not
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable,
as to compel us to only uphold one
and strike down the other. The
decision of the Ombudsman (6-
month suspension) will prevail over
the LGC (60day suspension) if the
evidence of guilt is strong. xxxThe
power to preventively suspend
is available not only to the
Ombudsman but also to the
Deputy Ombudsman. SEC. 24.
Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his
authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment
the evidence of guilt is
strongxxx
70.
Civil Service Commission vs Dacoycoy
our
To constitute a violation of the law, it
suffices that an appointment is extended or
issued in favor of a relative within the third
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
the chief of the bureau or office, or the
person exercising immediate supervision
over the appointee.
Facts:
In 1995, George P. Suan, Citizens Crime
Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter,
so
Northern Samar, filed with the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), Quezon City, a
complaint for habitual drunkenness,
misconduct and nepotism against
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy. After a
formal investigation, the CSC promulgated
its resolution on January 28, 1997 finding
no substantial evidence to support the
charge of habitual drunkenness and
misconduct. However, the CSC found
Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts
as a result of the appointment of his two
sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and
utility worker, respectively, and their
assignment under his immediate supervision
and control as the Vocational School
Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and
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Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of The following are exempted from
dismissal from the service. the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a)
persons employed in a confidential
capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the (d) members of the Armed Forces of the
CSC’s resolution was reversed ruling that Philippines: Provided, however, That in each
the respondent did not appoint his two particular instance full report of
sons; hence, respondent was not guilty of such appointment shall be made to the
nepotism. The Court further held that it is Commission.”
“the person who recommends or appoints
who should be sanctioned, as it is he who
performs the prohibited act. Under the definition of nepotism, one is
guilty of nepotism if an appointment is
issued in favor of a relative within the third
civil degree of consanguinity or affinityof
Issues: any of the following:

a) appointing authority;
1. Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of b) recommending authority;
nepotism. c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision
over the appointee.
2. Who may take an appeal from an
adverse decision of the appellate court in an
administrative civil service disciplinary case Clearly, there are four situations
covered. In the last two mentioned
situations, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority
Held: is. To constitute a violation of the law, it
suffices that an appointment is extended or
issued in favor of a relative within the third
Yes. The law defines nepotism civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
as all appointments to the national, the chief of the bureau or office, or the
provincial, city and municipal governments person exercising immediate supervision
or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, over the appointee.
including government owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of
the appointing or recommending authority, It is true that Dacoycoy did not appoint or
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of recommend his two sons to the positions of
the persons exercising immediate driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was
The word “relative” and members of the Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the
family referred to are those related within Vocational Department of the BCAT, who
the third degree either of consanguinity or recommended to DECS Region VIII
of affinity. the appointment of Rito Dacoycoy as driver
and appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual
utility worker. However, it was the
respondent who recommended Mr. Daclag’s
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authority to appoint first level positions. It
was also the respondent who certified that
“funds are available for
theproposed appointment of Rito and even
rated his performance as “very
satisfactory”. Further, Ped, listed him in his
job description as his “next higher
supervisor.” Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag
was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, who was the school
administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended
theappointment of respondent's two sons
and placed them under respondent's
immediate supervision serving as driver and
utility worker of the school. Both positions
are career positions. Clearly he is guilty of
nepotism.
Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding
the civil service and the efficiency of its
personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that
“The basic purpose or objective of the
prohibition against nepotism also strongly
indicates that the prohibition was intended
to be a comprehensive one.” “The Court
was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope
of the prohibition which is textually very
broad and comprehensive.” If not within the
exceptions, it is a form of corruption that
must be nipped in the bud or bated
whenever or wherever it raises its ugly
head. As we said in an earlier case “what
we need now is not only to punish the
wrongdoers or reward the ‘outstanding’ civil
servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps
and potholes of corruption as well as to
insist on strict compliance with existing legal
procedures in order to abate any occasion
for graft or circumvention of the law.
2. There is no question that respondent
Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of
Appeals from the decision of the Civil
Service Commission adverse to him. He was
the respondent official meted out the
penalty of dismissal from the service. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court
required the petitioner therein, here
respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil
Service Commission as public respondent as
the government agency tasked with the
duty to enforce the constitutional and
statutory provisions on the civil
service. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Civil Service
Commission and held respondent not guilty
of nepotism. Who now may appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court? Certainly not the
respondent, who was declared not guilty of
the charge. Nor the complainant George P.
Suan, who was merely a witness for the
government. Consequently, the Civil
Service Commission has become the party
adversely affected by such ruling, which
seriously prejudices thecivil
service system. Hence, as an aggrieved
party, it may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
71.
OMB vs Torres
FACTS:
Maricar was appointed as Legislative
Staff Assistant on February 16, 1995, while
Marian was appointed as Messenger on May
24, 1996. At the time of their public
employment, they were both enrolled as
full-time regular college students – Maricar,
as a full-time student at the University of
Santo Tomas (UST) and Marian as a
dentistry-proper student at the College of
Dentistry of Centro Escolar University.
During the period subject of this case, they
were able to collect their respective salaries
by submitting Daily Time Records (DTR)
indicating that they reported for work every
working day, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
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After due proceedings held in the
Office of the Ombudsman, Graft
Investigation Officer (GIO) Moreno F.
Generoso, in the Decision4 dated November
9, 2001, found Maricar and Marian
administratively guilty of Dishonesty and
Falsification of Official Document and
recommended the imposition of the penalty
of dismissal from the service.
Aggrieved, Maricar and Marian went
to the CA via a petition6 for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In a Decision dated January 6, 2004,
the CA granted the petition. While affirming
the findings of fact of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the CA set aside the finding of
administrative guilt against Maricar and
Marian
ISSUE:
WON CA gravely erred in reversing the
decision of the lower court
RULING:
YES. Falsification of a DTR (an official
document) amounts to dishonesty. Thus,
respondents should be held administratively
liable. While dismissal was originally
recommended for imposition on
respondents, the penalty was eventually
tempered to suspension of one (1) year
without pay.
We agree with the imposition of the lower
penalty considering that respondents’ public
employment with the then Sangguniang
Bayan of Malabon, even while they were
regular college students, was of a
confidential character, and the arrangement
was with the full knowledge and consent of
their father who appointed them to their
positions.
While this Court recognizes the relative
laxity given to confidential employees in
terms of adjusted or flexible working hours,
substantial non-attendance at work as
blatant and glaring as in the case of
respondents cannot be countenanced.
Collecting full salaries for work practically
not rendered is simply, downright
reprehensible. Inevitably, this leads to the
erosion of the public’s faith in and respect
for the government.
72.
OMB vs Samaniego
FACTS:
Respondent has allegedly incurred
shortages in his accountabilities. He was
meted the penalty of one year suspension
from office by the Ombudsman. However
CA granted the respondent’s prayer for the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
Ombudsman, filed a motion for
intervention and a motion to recall the writ
of preliminary injunction but were both
denied. The Ombudsman, claims that CA
erred in denying its right to intervene.
ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman has the authority
to intervene.
RULING:
Yes. To aid the Ombudsman in carrying out
its tasks, it was vested with disciplinary
authority over governmentofficials.
TheOffice of the Ombudsman is vested with
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full administrative disciplinary authority
including the power to determine
appropriate penalty imposable on erring
public impose the said penalty.
73.
Morales v CA and Binay
Facts:
 A complaint was filed against Binay
and other public officers of the City
Government of Makati charging
them with administrative cases for
Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service,
and criminal cases for violation of RA
3019, Malversation of Public Funds,
and Falsification of Public
Documents. Binay, Jr. was alleged to
be involved in anomalous activities
attending the procurement and
construction phases of the Makati
Parking Building project, committed
during his previous and present
terms as City Mayor of Makati.
 The Ombudsman issued a The Ombudman’s contentions:
preventive suspension order, placing
Binay Jr., et al., under preventive
suspension for not more than six (6)
months without pay, during the
pendency of the OMB Cases.
 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the preventive
suspension order.
 The CA granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer
for a TRO, notwithstanding Peña,
Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor. Citing Governor Garcia, Jr.
v.CA, it found that it was more
prudent on its part to issue a TRO in
view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues
raised, considering that if it were
established that the acts subject of
the administrative cases against
Binay, Jr. were all committed during
his prior term, then, applying the
condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-
election meant that he can no longer
be administratively charged.
Binay’s contention:
 Phases I and II were undertaken
before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010; and
 (b) Phases III to V transpired during
his first term and that his re-election
as City Mayor of Makati for a second
term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if
any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him
moot and academic.
 In view of the condonation doctrine,
as well as the lack of evidence to
sustain the charges against him, his
suspension from office would
undeservedly deprive the electorate
of the services of the person they
have conscientiously chosen and
voted into office.
 The condonation doctrine is
irrelevant to the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is
strong for purposes of issuing
preventive suspension orders.
 Reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense,
which should have been raised by
before it during the administrative
proceedings.
 There is no condonation because
Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of
the OMB Complaint after his re-
election in 2013.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and
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the WPI enjoining the implementation of
the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine.
Ruling: No. However, the condonation
doctrine is abandoned, but the
abandonment is prospective in effect.
A. The WPI against the Ombudsman's
preventive suspension order was correctly
issued.
1. The CA's resolutions directing the
issuance of the assailed injunctive
writs were all hinged on cases
enunciating the condonation
doctrine. By merely following settled
precedents on the condonation
doctrine, which at that time,
unwittingly remained "good law," it
cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of
discretion based on its legal
attribution above.
B. The Condonation Doctrine
1. Condonation is defined as "a victim's
express or implied forgiveness of an
offense, especially by treating the
offender as if there had been no
offense."
2. Under the Condonation Doctrine,
a. First, the penalty of removal
may not be extended beyond
the term in which the public
officer was elected for each
term is separate and distinct.
b. Second, an elective official's
re-election serves as a the context of the 1935
condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting
the right to remove him
therefor.
c. Third, courts may not deprive
the electorate, who are
assumed to have known the
life and character of
candidates, of their right to
elect officers.
3. It is not based on statutory law but
a jurisprudential creation.
a. It originated from the 1959
case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija. In which case, as there
was no legal precedent on the
issue at that time, the Court,
resorted to American
authorities and found that the
weight of authorities seems to
incline toward the rule
denying the right to remove
one from office because of
misconduct during a prior
term.
4. The condonation doctrine does not
apply to a criminal case. Also, it
would not apply to appointive
officials since, as to them, there is
no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
C. The doctrine of condonation is
actually bereft of legal bases.
1. There is really no established weight
of authority in the US favoring the
doctrine of condonation.
2. The plain difference in setting,
including the sheer impact of the
condonation doctrine on public
accountability, calls for Pascual's
judicious re-examination.
a. Pascual was decided within
Constitution which was silent
with respect to public
accountability, or of the
nature of public office being a
public trust.
3. The concept of public office,
under the 1987 Constitution, AS
A PUBLIC TRUST and the
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corollary requirement of the public. At a conceptual

ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE level, condonation
PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is presupposes that the
PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with condoner has actual
the idea that an elective local knowledge of what is to be
official's administrative liability condoned. Thus, there could
for a misconduct committed be no condonation of an act
during a prior term can be that is unknown.
wiped off by the fact that he
was elected to a second term of 8. Liability arising from administrative
office, or even another elective offenses may only be condoned by
post. the President in light of Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
4. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative D. The Court's abandonment of the
offense. condonation doctrine should be
5. There is no constitutional or prospective in application. It should be,
statutory basis to support the as a general rule, recognized as "good law"
notion. In fact the Local Government prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
Code and the RRACCS precludes people's reliance thereupon should be
condonation since in the first place, respected.
an elective local official who is
meted with the penalty of removal
could not be re-elected to an
elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for
such post.

6. If condonation of an elective
official's administrative liability
would perhaps, be allowed in
this jurisdiction, then the same
should have been provided by
law under our governing legal
mechanisms.

7. The proposition that the electorate,

when re-electing a local official, are
assumed to have done so with
knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any, is infirm. No
such presumption exists in any
statute or procedural rule.
a. Most corrupt acts by public
officers are shrouded in
secrecy, and concealed from
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