PUBCORP CASES resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such

certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in
COQUILLA VS COMELEC
ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason.
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition] Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at
FACTS: bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s
citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy
out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the in this case is thus fully justified
United States.
DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC
258 SCRA 483, 1996
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was
approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission
Philippines.
on Elections from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the
May 8, 1995 elections. The ground cited by the COMELEC was Section 40(a)
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras,
of the Local Government Code of 1991. Said section provides that those
Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his
sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment within two (2)
Samar for 2 years.
years after serving sentence are disqualified from running for any elective
local position. It was established by the COMELEC that the petitioner was
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel
found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the
It was contended by the petitioner that Section 40(a) is not applicable to him
two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided
because he was granted probation by the MTC.
therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Issues:
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability.
Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy.
Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the “fence” of the
fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious
ISSUE:
deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on
theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Anent the
year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his
second issue, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to
COC.
suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing
which already declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely
RULING:
under the disqualification found in Section 40(a), subsists and remains totally
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a
unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
 Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.
MERCADO VS MANZANO
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number votes o Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen
while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzano’s o Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold
proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for elective office
disqualification on the grouFACTS:

Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in

the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number votes HELD:
while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzano’s
proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.
Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner
with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco, different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a
US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered
cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV)
is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens
citizens are disqualified from running for any position. of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its

resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino
citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien
with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an
American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine
citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did
not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC
found that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which
effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children
are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country
the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
 national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine
but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional the sovereignty over foreign territory.” But this provision was
provisions on citizenship. declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless,
our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is the result of an individual’s volition. To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship” of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution
of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict before as a dual citizen.
process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
laws of different states. country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his
Allegiance to the Other Country undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
citizenship. That is of no moment. Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any
one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.nd that he is an American
The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of citizen.
registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his
American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner
and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino
 citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco,
CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under
US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an
American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and
cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he
is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual
citizens are disqualified from running for any position.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its
resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino
citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien
with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an
American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine
citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did
not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC
found that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which
effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.
Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
o Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen
o Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective
office
HELD:
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto
and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered
a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV)
of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens
of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state;
but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is the result of an individual’s volition.
LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship”
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states.
By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear
Allegiance to the Other Country
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may
be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws,
such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment.
PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of
registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his
American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration
and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine
the sovereignty over foreign territory.” But this provision was
declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless,
our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for
his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship
and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution
of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that
he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as
far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated
his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any
one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC
259 SCRA 296, 1996
Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the
Province of Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said
position was Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private
respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based
principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” Private
respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft
and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the
petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a
“fugitive from justice” which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility
under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez.
Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of
Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five
(5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him
before the Los Angeles Court.
Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.”
Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a “fugitive from justice” includes
not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who,
being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the
intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a
particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade
prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of
an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction.
GAMBOA VS AGUIRRE [310 SCRA 867]
A vice-governor who is concurrently an acting governor is actually a quasi-
governor. For the purpose of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers,
he is deemed a non member of the SP for the time being. A Vice-Governor who
is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means,
that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is
deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the
nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to
discharge them. 19 Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the
clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions
in both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a
temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding
temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts
as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an
"inability" on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside
during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in
Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code — concerning the election of a
temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor's (Vice
Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in
such capacity. Under Section 49(b), "(i)n the event of the inability of the regular
presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding
officer.
RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting Governor of
Cagayan, respondents.
NOCON, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the
decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,1990
in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89 dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan on
the ground that the power of the Secretary of Local Government to dismiss
local government official under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3 and Sections
60 to 67, Chapter 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, was repealed by the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution.
The pertinent facts are as follows: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor
of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to said position during the
local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a term of four (4) years
therefrom. He took his oath sometimes around March 1988.
Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent Secretary
of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4,
1989, to petitioner requiring him to show cause why should not be suspended
or remove from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48)
hours from receipt thereof.
On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and
culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel
Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the municipalities of
Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the
latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified
answer to the complaint.
On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a letter
from petitioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent Secretary's
December 4, 1989 letter requiring him to explain why should not be
suspended or removed from office for disloyalty. In his letter, petitioner denied
being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution,
though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel
soldiers. 1
Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to
the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. 2 On the basis thereof,
respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from
notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against
him.
During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner,
complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the
charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the
complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that respondent
Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied.
Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding
petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed as
Governor of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin Vargas, who
was then the Vice-Governor of Cagayan.
Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the petition, namely:
(1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was
repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no
longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not
appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan; and (3) the
alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence,
because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992
elections. Three separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed
against him, all based on the ground that he had been removed from office
by virtue of the March 19, 1990 resolution of respondent Secretary. The
commission on Elections granted the petitions by way of a resolution dated
May 9, 1992. On the same day, acting upon a "Motion to Clarify" filed by
petitioner, the Commission ruled that inasmuch as the resolutions of the
Commission becomes final and executory only after five (5) days from
promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a candidate for governor
pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases with his Court.
Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
this Court, G.R. Nos. 105128-30, entitled Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo v.
Commission on Elections, et al., seeking to nullify the resolution of the
Commission ordering his disqualification. The Court, in a resolution dated
May 14, 1992, issued a temporary restraining order against the Commission
to cease and desist from enforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution pending the
outcome of the disqualification case, thereby allowing the canvassing of the
votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. However, the Commission was
ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided the case.
On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case
granting petition and annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the Commission
on the ground that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained
finality and is still pending review with this Court. As petitioner won by a
landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his
eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find the petition
meritorious.
Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered
the administration case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears
that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of
votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. As held by
this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec et al., supra,:
. . . [T]he certified true xerox copy of the "CERTITICATE OF
VOTES OF CANDIDATES", attached to the "VERY URGENT
MOTION FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE RESOLUTION
DATED MAY 14, 1992["] filed by petitioner shows that he
received 170,382 votes while the other candidates for the
same position received the following total number of votes:
(1) Patricio T. Antonio — 54,412, (2) Paquito F. Castillo —
2,198; and (3) Florencio L. Vargas — 48,129.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the fact narrated, the expiration
of petitioner's term of office during which the
acts charged were allegedly committed, and
his subsequent reelection, the petitioner must
be dismissed for the reason that the issue has
become academic. In Pascual v. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija, L-11959, October 31,
1959, this Court has ruled:
 The weight of authority,
however, seems to incline to
the ruled denying the right to
remove from office because
of misconduct during a prior
term to which we fully
subscribe.
Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is
especially true were the Constitution provides that the penalty
in proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from holding office
for a term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (6
C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice v. State, 161 S.W. 2nd 4011;
Montgomery v. Newell, 40 S.W. 23rd 418; People ex rel
Bashaw v. Thompson, 130 P. 2nd 237; Board of Com'rs
Kingfisher County v. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State v. Blake, 280
P. 388; In re Fedula, 147 A 67; State v. Wald, 43 S.W. 217)
The underlying theory is that each term is
separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation
of the officer's misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
(43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. v. Kasty,
184 Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50 L.R.A. [NS]
553). As held in Comant v. Bregan [ 1887] 6
N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559,
50 [NE] 553.
The Court should ever remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be
to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When
a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of
such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the
people. (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al., 17 SCRA 58, 59-60
[1966]) (See also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [1974])3
Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election
to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminalcases pending against petitioner for
acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant consideration.
Petitioner contends that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or
remove local government officials as alter ego of the President, and as
embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and
which is now vested in the courts.
We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local
government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory
grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by
Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President
the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and
the power of general supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine
that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the
President unless expressly rejected by him. 4 The statutory grant found in B.P.
Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been enacted by the then Batasan
Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2 of which
specifically provided as follows —
Sec. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local
government code which may not thereafter be amended
except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more
responsive and accountable local government structure with
an effective system of recall, allocating among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and
removal, term, salaries, power, functions, and duties of local
government officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. However, any
change in the existing form of local government shall not take
effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite called for the purpose. 5
A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provided for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and
 resources, and provide for Case No. P-10437-89, dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is
thequalifications, election, appointment, and removal, term hereby REVERSED.
and salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and SO ORDERED
operation of the local units. 6

Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local

government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local
government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987
Constitution, then it can not be said that BP Blg. 337 was repealed by the
effective of the present Constitution.

Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., 7 this court had the
occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of
the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code
of 1991 is approved.

The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government

to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of
B.P. Blg. 337. 8

As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of respondent Secretary

to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan, We need but
point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg 337 to show the fallacy of the same, to writ
—

In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor . . .

refuses to assume office, fails to quality, dies or is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, the vice-
governor . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired term
of the former. 9

Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended

or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch
as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is
defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of removing
petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of
disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence. 10

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public

respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm.